The departure of former Vice President Germán Vargas Lleras’s coffin from Bogotá’s Palacio de San Carlos on Monday morning blended state mourning with unmistakable political symbolism, as Colombia’s political elite gathered to bid farewell to one of the country’s most influential figures.

His daughter, Clemencia Vargas Umaña, attended the ceremony accompanied by her father’s two French bulldogs – Toño and Henry –  adding a deeply personal note to the solemn proceedings before the main funeral mass at 11:00 a.m. inside Bogotá’s Primatial Cathedral of Bogotá. The service marked the conclusion of three days in which the Foreign Ministry headquarters became the center of national political attention.

Vice President Francia Márquez represented the national government in the absence of President Gustavo Petro and delivered one of the most emotional moments of the day when she embraced Clemencia Vargas before the ceremony. Earlier, Márquez had publicly offered condolences to the family, praising Vargas Lleras’ democratic legacy and saying his “democratic work will be remembered.”

The wake drew figures from across Colombia’s political spectrum, reflecting Vargas Lleras’ decades-long influence. Former presidents Juan Manuel Santos, with whom Vargas Lleras served as vice president, Ernesto Samper, and Iván Duque were present, along with senator Paloma Valencia and former president Álvaro Uribe Vélez, whose attendance underscored the respect afforded to Vargas Lleras despite years of sharp public disputes between the two men.

Vargas Lleras died Friday in Bogotá after a prolonged battle with cancer. He was 64. His death ends a political career spanning more than three decades as senator, minister, vice president, and two-time presidential candidate.

Born in Bogotá on February 19, 1962, Vargas Lleras came from one of Colombia’s most prominent political dynasties. His grandfather, former President Carlos Lleras Restrepo, was a leading figure of the Liberal Party.

He built his own career as a city councilman, congressman, minister, and ultimately leader of the Cambio Radical party. His first presidential run came in 2010, where he finished third with nearly 1.5 million votes. Though unsuccessful, the campaign positioned him as a national force.

President Santos later appointed him to his cabinet, and in 2014 selected him as his running mate for reelection. The pair won in the runoff, and Vargas Lleras assumed office as vice president on August 7 that year.

He ran again for president in 2018 under the “Mejor Vargas Lleras” coalition, focusing on infrastructure, housing and administrative reform. He finished fourth in the first round and did not advance to the runoff.

Throughout his career, Vargas Lleras survived two assassination attempts and weathered political scandals, including accusations linked to parapolitics investigations, though he was never formally charged.

In later years, his health increasingly limited his public life. He was diagnosed with a benign meningioma in 2016 after a fainting episode, and in recent years battled cancer while largely stepping back from frontline politics.

Even as his public appearances became rare, his influence endured. Monday’s funeral made clear that, in death as in life, Germán Vargas Lleras remained a central figure in Colombia’s political history.

Colombian politician Germán Vargas Lleras died Friday in the capital Bogotá, according to Semana magazine. His death brings an end to a political career spanning more than 30 years, including as a senator, minister, vice president, and two-time presidential candidate. 

On Monday, Vargas Lleras was admitted to the Intensive Care Unit at the Luis Carlos Sarmiento Angulo Cancer Treatment and Research Center in Bogotá. He was later transferred to another hospital where he lost a battle with cancer he had been fighting for years. He was 64 years old. 

Political career

Born in Bogotá on February 19, 1962, Vargas Lleras grew up in a political family. His grandfather, former President Carlos Lleras Restrepo, was a pillar of the country’s Liberal Party. 

He would go on to make a name for himself on his own, serving as a city councilman, congressman, minister, and ultimately leader of the Cambio Radical political party.

Vargas Lleras first ran for president 2009. He traveled the country, participated in debates, and garnered nearly 1.5 million votes. It wasn’t enough to win, but he finished third. 

The winner of the election, Juan Manuel Santos, would later call on him to serve as a minister in his cabinet. 

In 2014, Santos chose him as his running mate for reelection. Together they won in the runoff, and Vargas Lleras took office as vice president on August 7 of that year. 

Once his term as vice president ended, Vargas Lleras did not sit idle. In 2018, he ran again for president, this time with the “Mejor Vargas Lleras” coalition backed by Cambio Radical. 

His policy proposals included  infrastructure, housing, and a more efficient public administration.

In the first round, he received over 1.4 million votes but finished fourth, knocking him out of the runoff race. His campaign stated that he would not officially endorse either of the remaining candidates, Iván Duque and Gustavo Petro. 

Over time, he kept a lower profile, though he never completely stepped away from politics.

During his career, Vargas Lleras would survive two assassination attempts and a “parapolitics” scandal in which he was accused, but never charged, with benefitting politically from his connections to warlord “Martin Llanos”.

Health issues

In his later years, his health gradually got in the way of politics; reportedly, he suffered from a benign meningioma, a tumor in the membranes surrounding the brain and spinal cord, which was detected in 2016 after a fainting spell. 

On March 11, former President Álvaro Uribe commented on his condition, saying, “My best wishes for the health of Dr. Germán Vargas Lleras, a distinguished patriot whom I respect despite our occasional disagreements.”

During his final months, the former vice president stayed out of the public eye, though he briefly reappeared on March 3  in a video concerning the March 8 parliamentary elections. 

Upon learning of his death, former President Santos wrote on X that he is “deeply saddened” and described Vargas Lleras as “an exceptional colleague.”

Current President Gustavo Petro also mourned the political leader’s death: “Both in the Senate and on the campaign trail, he behaved like a gladiator. As someone who often disagreed with him, I regret that his seriousness in debate will be lost,” he said on his X account.

Featured image: Germán Vargas Lleras

Image credit: Germán Vargas Lleras via Facebook.

This article originally appeared on Latin America Reports and was republished with permission.

The post Germán Vargas Lleras, Colombia’s former vice president and two-time presidential candidate, has died appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

A landmark ruling by the Superior Tribunal of Bogotá has delivered one of the strongest judicial rebukes yet of the narrative surrounding Colombia’s 2021 National Strike, concluding that some of the most destructive episodes of violence during the protests were not spontaneous acts of social unrest but part of a coordinated criminal strategy involving illegal armed groups.

The decision, issued by the Criminal Chamber of the tribunal under magistrate Jaime Andrés Velasco Velasco Muñoz, found that several of those prosecuted for violent acts in the capital maintained operational ties with cells linked to the Second Manuel Marulanda Vélez, a dissident faction of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia –  FARC.

For years, much of the public debate framed the violence of the so-called Paro Nacional as the uncontrolled overflow of legitimate citizen protests sparked by social inequality, police abuse, unemployment and widespread anger over the government of then-President Iván Duque.

But after reviewing wiretaps, surveillance records, testimonies and digital communications, the court concluded that several of the attacks that paralyzed Bogotá followed a clear operational structure, with leadership roles, territorial coordination and instructions issued in advance.

According to the ruling, some defendants acted in coordination with illegal armed actors to organize attacks on police command posts, TransMilenio stations, commercial establishments and strategic road corridors across the capital.

“For the magistrates, these were not isolated or improvised actions,” the ruling stated. “There existed an organized structure with assigned functions, defined leadership and a chain of command.”

The 2021 protests initially erupted after Duque introduced a controversial tax reform proposal during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. The measure, widely criticized for placing additional burdens on the middle and working classes during an economic crisis, quickly ignited nationwide demonstrations.

Although the government later withdrew the reform, the protests escalated into weeks of nationwide unrest, marked by deadly confrontations between demonstrators and security forces, the burning of police stations, attacks on public transport infrastructure and prolonged road blockades that crippled supply chains across Colombia.

In Bogotá alone, dozens of TransMilenio stations were vandalized or destroyed, CAI neighborhood police posts were torched, and mobility across major avenues such as Las Américas, Carrera Séptima and Autonorte was severely disrupted.

Elsewhere, especially in southwestern Colombia, blockades led to shortages of fuel, medical oxygen and basic food supplies, with business leaders warning of millions of dollars in economic losses and humanitarian consequences for vulnerable communities.

The tribunal’s ruling argues that at least part of that violence was not the natural escalation of protest, but the result of deliberate planning.

Investigators identified several WhatsApp groups allegedly used to coordinate simultaneous actions across the city. Among the names cited in the judicial file were groups linked to strategic corridors such as “Américas,” “Carrera Séptima,” “Autonorte,” “Autosur” and “Caracas.”

According to prosecutors, these digital channels were used to organize blockades, assign responsibilities and plan attacks against public infrastructure.

The court also found that some young defendants had been tasked with recruiting new members and expanding influence within university environments, both public and private, strengthening support networks and facilitating operational logistics.

One of the most significant findings involved intercepted communications that allegedly referenced support from higher-ranking commanders connected to FARC dissidents.

For the magistrates, this reinforced the conclusion that there was external coordination behind the violence, rather than a purely spontaneous citizen uprising.

The ruling now sharply challenges the long-promoted narrative of the unrest as exclusively peaceful social protest and instead reframes part of the National Strike as coordinated urban sabotage carried out under the cover of legitimate public discontent.

It also revives scrutiny of the national strike committee and senior left-wing political leaders, including current President Gustavo Petro, who strongly supported the demonstrations and positioned himself as one of the loudest critics of Duque’s handling of both the protests and the pandemic.

Critics argue that political backing from opposition leaders helped legitimize actions that moved far beyond peaceful protest, allowing criminal actors to operate behind the shield of social mobilization while deepening institutional instability.

The protests also unfolded at one of the most fragile moments of the COVID-19 emergency, when Colombia was still facing high ICU occupancy, strict mobility restrictions and biosecurity measures intended to limit mass contagion.

Large demonstrations and road blockades directly violated those restrictions, and critics maintain that the protests contributed to additional infections and unnecessary strain on an already overwhelmed public health system.

For opponents of Petro and sectors of the business community, the ruling is less a revelation than a delayed institutional acknowledgment of what many citizens experienced firsthand: burned police stations, destroyed public transport, food shortages and entire cities brought to a standstill.

After evaluating the full body of evidence, the court sentenced three of the principal defendants to 19 years in prison for terrorism and criminal conspiracy. A fourth defendant received a 10-year prison sentence.

The tribunal also imposed fines exceeding 1 billion pesos, reflecting the severe damage caused to both public and private infrastructure.

Far from closing the chapter on the National Strike, the ruling reopens one of Colombia’s deepest political wounds: whether the country witnessed a legitimate social uprising, or whether parts of it were, from the beginning, a calculated strategy of destabilization supported by organized criminal networks.

For many Colombians, the answer may shape how the country remembers 2021—and who must ultimately be held responsible.