Much-loved Colombian movie set to get Hollywood makeover

A Hollywood version of award-winning Colombian film Un Poeta, rumored to star actor Bill Murray, has angered Latin American fans of the movie worried the remake could be lost in translation.

The 2025 Cannes favorite – it won a jury prize in the coveted un certain regard category – features a down-at-heel poet and was filmed in Medellín with a mix of professional and first-time actors.

News of a U.S. copy has sparked strong reactions from Colombian audiences convinced the darkly satirical Spanish-language version is strong enough to pull in audiences worldwide on its own merits.

“This film is a brilliant Latin-American movie made less than one year ago,” said Mexican critic Jesús Iglesias on his Peli de La Semana (‘Film of the Week’) website.

Filmmakers should allow more time for the original to circulate before creating another version, including with subtitles for foreign viewers, he added.

Historically film companies had waited two or three decades before remaking a movie. The fast-track English-language copy of Un Poeta showed “a lack of respect for Latin American artists,” argued Iglesias.

While there was no official confirmation this week that Ghostbusters star Bill Murray would take the leading role, The Hollywood Reporter announced that the English-language version would be scripted by Nathan Silver and produced by Ben Saïd, a French Tunisian well known for his avant-garde movies.

Nathan Silver will follow 'Between the Temples' with a remake of Simón Mesa Soto’s 'A Poet,' set to begin production this fall: https://t.co/TApNuY9mRv pic.twitter.com/z1UTsYyCB8

— The Film Stage (@TheFilmStage) May 11, 2026

Tale of redemption

The Colombian original of Un Poeta, directed by Simón Mesa Soto, wowed critics in May 2025 and later scored a whopping 92 per cent on Rotten Tomato’s audience poll.

The two-hour movie follows the tribulations of middle-aged Oscar, a failed poet wandering the streets of Medellín in a drunken stupor and ruing the lack of literature in his home society. His life turns around after meeting a young student he mentors in a poetry competition.

This tale of redemption, starring first-time actor Ubeimar Rios as the failed poet, was “a hilarious fable about trying to lead a creative life and failing miserably at making ends meet,” according to a review in Variety magazine.

Much of the movie’s charm was its setting in Medellín and nod to the characteristics of paisa culture, Colombian critic and film industry expert Jazid Contreras told The Bogotá Post.

“Some cultural aspects will be hard to translate,” he said. “The risk is Hollywood produces an oversimplified watered-down version which often happens when movies are adapted to other cultures.”

But the U.S. film industry’s haste to remake the movie could also be seen positively, said Contreras.   

“In some ways it’s a vote of confidence that here in Colombia we can make films with stories that are universal and which can move audiences in any part of the world.”

World’s top telenovela

Historically, few Colombian TV and movie productions had been adapted for foreign consumption, said Contreras. The standout exception being the 1999 series Yo Soy Betty, La Fea which in 2006 transferred to the U.S. as Ugly Betty.

Ugly Betty was a prime example of a successful switch to an English-language version, said Contreras.

The original Colombian series was recast in New York as a show that touched on themes of exclusion, classism, racism and migration, with Betty coming from a poor Mexican family.

Ugly Betty also boosted the career of America Ferrera who became the first Latina actress to win a lead actress Emmy Award, along with a Golden Globe.

But the social themes tapped by the original show travelled a lot further than New York: the Colombian production would go on to hold the world record from most remakes according to the Guiness Book of Records.

Adaptions have now been produced in 28 countries, including Algeria, Greece, Vietnam, China and Mexico.

Moonlighting

Part of Betty’s success as a universal figure was that local versions fitted her story to the cultural context, said Contreras.

That was also the hope of creator of Un Poeta, Simón Mesa Soto, for his tragicomic hero’s move to Hollywood.

Pushing back at criticism of the English-language remake, the Colombian filmmaker told The Hollywood Reporter that producer Ben Saïd had been captivated by the original character of Oscar, but could take the U.S. version in new directions.

“He felt a strong connection to the main character, so much so that he wanted to use him as inspiration for his next film. Not to make an identical adaptation of the original, but to incorporate elements that would align with his own artistic vision,” said Mesa Soto.

A remake would not diminish the quality of the original film, he said.

And in a reflection perhaps on his movie’s main character, Mesa Soto noted that artists frequently faced financial struggles in Colombia: the director had himself moonlighted as a university teacher while making the movie, his only way to get by.

The Hollywood deal would be a welcome financial boost, he said.

“Of course, there are people who can afford to reject an offer like this and make films with their own money because they have it. But that’s not my case,” he concluded.

The post Colombian movie fans angry at US remake of Un Poeta appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

New rules on electric motorbikes could shift the battle of the bike lanes in Bogotá, where transit authorities are already struggling to contain the tide of battery-powered vehicles.

A law governing the burgeoning use of “VELMPUs” (Vehículos Eléctricos Livianos de Movilidad Personal Urbana), as they are officially known, is being tabled by the Ministry of Transport.

This covers the dizzying array of e-bikes, electric scooters, electric motorbikes and even motorized unicycles being deployed by commuters around the city.

The bill, which has just ended its consultation period and is expected to be signed into law in July, will impose stricter safety rules and also require registration of vehicles, though they will remain exempt from number plates, insurance or the need for licensed riders.

See also: The Battle of the Bike Lanes

Last week transport minister María Fernanda Rojas described the bill as an “historic step in personal electric mobility in Colombia”.

“We will have clear rules in terms of speed, rules such as wearing of helmets, also the infrastructure for these types of vehicles,” she said.

Legislation will also better define categories of vehicles, their power and top speed. Crucially, it also gives city transit authorities the discretion to ban specific categories of VELMPUs from cycle paths. This should end years of confusing messaging on where you can and can’t ride them.

Tiny pedals

This would be a welcome development for Bogotá where the city’s 677 kilometers (420 miles) of dedicated bike lanes – the most extensive of any city in Latin America – are reserved for pedal cycles, electric scooters and e-bikes but prohibited for electric motorbikes.

This might come as surprise to the city’s cyclists: on any given day thousands of e-motos are zipping down the ciclorutas.

In a 10-minute survey by The Bogotá Post of one of the capital’s busiest cycle routes – following the Avenida NQS – we counted 66 pedal bikes, 12 electric scooters and 38 electric motorbikes.

That means a third of the users were technically breaking the law, despite the on-site presence of Guias de Movilidad – council mobility guides – directing traffic around the bike lane.

“We’re not here to fine people, just to advise them,” a mobility guide Eduardo Díaz told The Bogotá Post. “People need first to be informed. Punishments will come later.”

One problem was that the businesses selling electric motorbikes were misinforming buyers, he said. The tiny pedals mounted on the rear were more for decoration and did not qualify them as a proper pedaled vehicle. “They’re fooling their customers that they are bike-lane legal,” he added.

That message has been amplified by posters around the city last week saying: “Don’t let them trick you! Ciclomotores can’t use the bike lanes!”

No need for speed

The new legislation regulates several older laws on electric mobility – from 2017, 2022 and most recently Law 2486 of 2025 – which have struggled to keep pace with innovations in electric vehicle design and their capabilities.

A key improvement will be how to categorize light electric vehicles, according to Bogotá mobility expert Carlos Prado. “Before we had a terrible situation, with different interpretations of the law,” Prado told The Bogotá Post.

Electric motorbikes and scooters will now be defined as: “Vehicles assisted or pushed by an electric motor, of reduced weight, for individual use in urban settings, whose power does not exceed 1000 watts.”

E-bikes, or battery-assisted pedal bikes, will be limited to a maximum power of 250 watts.

The new national legislation also caps any VELMPU using a cycle lane at 25 kilometers per hour (15mph), equivalent to a fast pedal bike rider.

But Pardo is concerned that many vehicles are able to go much faster: “In an ideal world, all those devices would have a manufacturing speed limit of 25 kph.”

The legislation also requires any device sold to have a speedometer and factory-installed speed limiter within the motor.

But Pardo points out these limiters are not tamper-proof – videos are already circulating online showing users how to override these restrictions.

International attention was drawn to the dangers of high-speed crashes on cycle lanes last week after an illegal e-scooter hit a cycle on the Queensboro Bridge in New York; the Blade model scooter is advertised as reaching 80 kilometers per hour (50 mph).

Legal status

In Colombia, another initiative will oblige the owners of all electric vehicles to register them with the Registro Unico Nacional de Transporte, (RUNT), Colombia’s transport data base.

To be street legal, all VELMPUs will require a visible identification plaque showing the brand, model, year, unique registration, and maximum velocity.

This will allow transit officers and police to quickly revise and check VELMPUs, at check points for example, but also allow owners of new vehicles to be fully aware of their legal status on dedicated bike lanes, for example.

Any final say on Bogotá’s bike lanes could still be up for debate and decided by the Secretaria de Movilidad.

Right now, with its publicity blitz, the Secretaria de Movilidad seems set on protecting its pedal-bike population and the infrastructure that has won Colombia’s capital the title of second-best city to cycle in Latin America (after Niteroi, in Brazil).

Looking the other way

But then there is the problem of how to eject e-motos from the bike lanes. Currently Bogotá only has 16 bicycle-mounted transit agents dedicated to 677 kilometers of ciclorutas.

Forcing electric motorbikes onto public roads will also cause a backlash. Just in Bogotá, in 2025, some 255 motorbike riders died in crashes with 10,000 injured. Protecting cycle paths could come at a high human cost.

And on open roads, electric motorbikes will be competing with urban traffic without number plates or insurance, with no mechanical checks, and ridden by untrained and unlicensed drivers.

Perhaps surprisingly, one of the harshest criticisms of this plan comes from the motorcycle industry itself.

“We are deeply concerned about the growth of informality and illegality in the sale of electric motorcycles. They are sold as if they were simple electric bicycles, but in practice they function as motorized vehicles,” said Iván García, director of the chamber of motorcycles at ANDI, the Colombian Business Association, writing in De Moto magazine.

“The most serious issue is that they are not registered, they lack mandatory insurance, and they don’t meet any minimum safety requirements. Today, nobody knows how many there are, where they are, or where they are being driven, and this represents a growing risk to road safety and to consumers.”

In the same article, journalist and motorbike fan, Lina Posada, criticized the state for allowing electric motorbikes “to grow out of control”.

“Those who defend the right to mobility might argue that any means of transportation is valid,” she said. “But when these vehicles end up in the hands of people without training, expertise, or knowledge of the rules, the debate ceases to be about mobility and becomes about the right to life.”

The Ministry of Transport has gone some way to meet that challenge: it proposes that in future all lightweight electric vehicles will require headlamps, stop lights, turning lights, horns, and front and rear brakes. Riders will require helmets and reflective clothing after dark.

But for Posado these regulations still fall short: “We are already seeing the consequences in regions where traffic authorities are nonexistent or prefer to look the other way”.

This reflects a dilemma facing many cities across the globe: how to ride the revolutionary wave in electrical personal transport which transforms how people move across congested cities while reducing pollution. But also staying safe.

The post Long-awaited legislation set to clarify Colombia’s e-moto laws appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

The results are starting to come in from around the country for the 2026 Colombian presidential election first round. Abelardo de la Espriella has outperformed expectations to win the first round with over ten million votes, facing Iván Cepeda in three weeks’ time 

The ballot boxes closed at 4pm for the 2026 Colombian presidential election first round and now the tallying up of votes is underway. So far, with 99% of the votes in (19:30), Abelardo de la Espriella is outperforming expectations and has won the first round. He was expected to win between 25-30% of the vote, but now stands at 43.74%, significantly exceeding those predictions.

Read more: Abelardo de la Espriella Candidate Guide

In second place by a whisker is Iván Cepeda of the ruling Pacto Democrático. He was widely expected to come first with 40-45% of the vote and that’s where he appears to be (40.91%). The good news is that he’s matched expectations and that he’s against the candidate he most wanted to face in the second round. The bad news is that he looks set to finish second, is right at the bottom end of his target vote share and Abelardo’s performance has put the tiger among the pigeons.

Read more: Iván Cepeda Candidate Guide

The big losers of the day seem set to be the centrists and Paloma Valencia. The former are below even the extremely modest predictions they had been given, while the latter is performing beyond her worst nightmares. She had been expected to get at least into double figures, but is languishing at under 7%.

Read more: Paloma Valencia Candidate Guide

This is only the preconteo, so the votes will be formalised and fully scrutinised later. However, there is rarely a big change between the two numbers. There will still be heavy scrutiny on the data, especially with the focus on impropriety and accusations of vote-rigging (see below).

Only Abelardo de la Espriella managed to cross the symbolic ten million vote barrier, with Cepeda over 300,000 off the mark. With around 11 million votes needed for victory in the second round, things look promising for the self-styled outsider candidate.

Abelardo de la Espriella had been gaining momentum steadily in the last few weeks, but this is still a turn-up for the books and an extraordinary result for him. There is some speculation that a share of his vote comes from Pacto supporters that would prefer a run-off with him against Cepeda, but this seems unfounded.

There have been reports of private transport being laid on for rural voters to get to stations, paid for by both Cepeda and de la Espriella supporters in different regions. Supporters of both those candidates have also been accused of campaigning on the day and so forth in various reports from around the nation.

The collapse in the Centro Democrático vote isn’t hard to understand: Paloma Valencia had run a poor campaign and failed to get traction in the final weeks. What is surprising is the sheer scale of it: she’s ten to 20 points behind where she had expected to be. Questions will be asked in the Centro Democrático head offices now.

Elsewhere in the election, the dominance of de la Espriella and Cepeda left little room for anyone else. Sergio Fajardo ended his political career with over a million votes and nearly 5% of the vote, not too far off Valencia in the end. Failed Bogotá mayor Claudia López only got a quarter of the way to the 932,000 votes needed to recover her deposit. Hilariously, that’s about half the votes she gained in March’s primaries.

López did manage to squeak ahead of the reprehensible Santiago Botero, arrested in Cartagena on the morning of the election on domestic abuse charges. No surprise from a candidate who had been promising bullets for delinquents. Spare a thought, though, for Gustavo Matamoros in last place with a shade over 5,000 votes.

Turnout was higher than normal at 57.86%, with voto en blanco outranking all but four candidates and winning over 400,000 votes. As predicted, the Pacto won both coasts, the outer Amazon/llanos and Bogotá, while the right won all the central areas outside the capital. Dig deeper and the picture changes a bit: only de la Espriella won for the right, and Pacto’s vote share while winning was lower than expected in many departments (and Bogotá).

What happens next in the 2026 Colombian presidential election?

This means we are looking at a second round run-off on June 21st between Iván Cepeda and Abelardo de la Espriella, the two most polarising candidates on the tarjetón today. Whichever one triumphs, Colombia will have a lot of unhappy voters. It’s easy to assume that Paloma voters will flock to de la Espriella, but that’s far from guaranteed, given the divisive nature of the candidate.

We are likely to be in coin flip territory at this point – de la Espriella won around 600,000 more votes today, which is a selnder advantage. The million voters for Fajardo should mainly go his way, but again that’s far from guaranteed. He is no longer in pole position, but also not out of the race. Both candidates have a lot of work to do now.

With a relatively high turnout this weekend, it’s unlikely that there is a well of voters that will come out only for the second round, something that Cepeda will be hoping for. However, there are millions of non-voters who could make the difference if either candidate wins them over.

There are likely to be increased attacks on the electoral system from both the president and Pacto Histórico supporters. Petro has spent months questioning its validity and claiming that the system is opaque and unclear. Today has already seen a flurry of similar comments flooding social media with claims of impropriety in various places.

Cédulas gemeleadas en anillos de corrupción en la registraduría. La señora tiene el derecho de elegir y se lo han conculcado.

Espero de la registraduria
Investigación a profundidad pic.twitter.com/8vmZDTYnVO

— Gustavo Petro (@petrogustavo) May 31, 2026

Oversight is carried out by the CNE (Consejo Nacional Electoral). In order to do this over the vast territory and number of stations, over 800,000 citizens are selected to be vote-counters. This is similar to jury duty in other countries and is compensated with a day off as well as a compulsory day of training a couple of weeks beforehand. As the electorate is growing, there are now some 13,000 voting sites across the country, most with multiple voting tables – 122,000 in total for today’s elections.

Petro’s concerns rest on the fact that Thomas Greg and Sons handle the software used in the election system, a firm that he’s clashed with repeatedly, especially over Colombian passport printing. He says that the systems are opaque and he has not received answers from the CNE or Registraduria over various concerns he has. However, both groups, along with Colombia’s neutral election observers MOE have been clear about the processes.

Online, there are many posts claiming that a key part of the alleged fraud will be in the reports made by the jurados. This echoes previous elections, where there was a flurry of images purporting to show electoral forms (E-14) that had been altered by the vote-counters. With AI entering the scenario, expect more of this after the first round, especially if de la Espriella or Cepeda do badly.

US senator Bernie Moreno, Bogotá-born, is in Colombia to observe the voting process, along with a significant number of international observers. Their reports will come through in the coming week, but this is only part of the story. Much of the voting irregularities here are hard to prove and difficult for outsiders to properly scrutinise.

Petro will also be under a keen eye from the electoral authorities and watchdogs over his involvement in campagining. The president is supposed to keep neutral throughout the election of his successor, but Petro has at best ridden that line very closely. He’s been accused on multiple occasions of crossing it, too, as have his ministers and Cepeda himself.

Whatever happens in the coming three weeks, the Bogotá Post team will keep you up to date with unbiased local reporting, free from vested interests or paymasters. Stay tuned to find out what twists and turns are coming in the 2026 Colombian presidential election race, as well as detailed profiles on the two candidates left in the race.

The post 2026 Colombian Presidential elections round one results: de la Espriella and Cepeda are through appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

The Mayor of Bogotá, Carlos Fernando Galán, brought forward a scheduled citywide alcohol ban by 24 hours in a move that has enraged business owners and nightlife operators.

Under Decree 191, the ‘dry law’ (Ley Seca), which restricts the sale and consumption of alcohol hours before and during the voting period, came into effect in Bogotá at 6PM on Friday, 24 hours earlier than in the rest of the country.

While the move is purportedly to maintain order and security ahead of presidential elections on Sunday, many have questioned why Bogotá’s ban was extended at the last minute.

In a statement, Asobares, the country’s leading trade association that represents food and drink establishments, said that “continuing to enforce such restrictions is to impose outdated measures on a modern service economy, which currently sustains thousands of families”.

In the document, Asobares points out that nearly 100,000 workers (such as waiters, DJs, and security staff) will lose their shifts, which is a big hit because they earn up to 70% of their weekly pay during those days.

After the announcement, many establishments were forced to cancel events. For example, Theatron, one of the largest entertainment venues in Latin America, canceled a scheduled club night called ‘Theatron on Radio: Parcial Final y a Perrear’.

Asobares also highlighted that beyond nightlife venues, the measure disrupts the entire supply chain, negatively impacting the revenue of producers, distributors, transport workers, and farmers who supply the formal commercial sector.

“Security should not be achieved at the expense of the right to work and economic stability,” Camilo Ospina, Asobares President, told The Bogotá Post. “Bogotá needs to show that it is a mature capital, capable of holding a peaceful election day without needing to declare the temporary bankruptcy of its most productive sectors”.

The post Bogotá Mayor sparks backlash over extended ‘ley seca alcohol ban appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

Heard about the 2026 Colombian presidential election first round this weekend? Confused about what exactly is going on? Our guide clues you in on how it all works and why the bars and borders are shut

Tomorrow sees the first round of the 2026 Colombian presidential election. It’s been a long race which has turned particularly bitter in the final week. The candidates are largely campaigning on little more than vibes and charisma, with the centre absent.

While it’s been spiky, the country remains relatively safe on election weekends. You might well see some protests or celebrations on Sunday evening, there might be people on soapboxes in the streets in some areas, but there is unlikely to be any major disturbances in large urban conurbations. The story may well be very different in isolated rural zones, as is often the case in Colombia.

Colombia shuts down a lot over election weekend, with bars closing for ley seca and borders closing as well. There will be an increased police and military presence throughout the country, with particular focus on keeping key transport routes open.

Yesterday we looked at the candidates, how they might fare and what it would mean for the second round. Today we’re turning our attention to how things actually work in the 2026 Colombian presidential election on Sunday, including ley seca times and border closures.

How does the Colombian electoral system work?

Every Colombian over the age of majority (18) and with a correctly registered cédula ciudandanía can vote. In return, each voter gets a half day off work. Non-citizens are not eligible to vote in national elections, but holders of resident visas will be able to vote in next year’s local elections.

Oversight is carried out by the CNE (Consejo Nacional Electoral). In order to do this over the vast territory and number of stations, over 800,000 citizens are selected to be vote-counters. This is similar to jury duty in other countries and is compensated with a day off as well as a compulsory day of training a couple of weeks beforehand.

As the electorate is growing, there are now some 13,000 voting sites across the country, most with multiple voting tables. Colombians have to vote where their cédula is registered, so don’t be surprised to see some people trekking to other cities if they forgot to update their registration.

The polls are open from 8am until 4pm and counting is usually very fast with the results being clear before sundown. Land and fluvial borders will be closed for Colombian nationals tomorrow morning, although foreigners can cross. Airports will not be affected, so don’t worry if you are arriving on a flight.

Bogotá has entered ley seca earlier than usual, meaning no alcohol sales in bars, restaurants or shops from 6pm Friday night to Monday midday. That applies for everyone, so no representation or boozing for foreign residents, unless you do it at home. Ciclovía will also be cancelled for ease of access to polling stations.

What’s the background to the 2026 Colombian presidential election?

The run-up to the 2026 Colombian presidential election has seen a lot of criticism of the system, almost all of it coming from the national government. President Gustavo Petro has been front and centre on this issue, repeatedly questioning the neutrality of the elections.

Petro’s concerns rest on the fact that Thomas Greg and Sons handle the software used in the election system, a firm that he’s clashed with repeatedly, especially over Colombian passport printing. He says that the systems are opaque and he has not received answers from the CNE or Registraduria over various concerns he has. However, both groups, along with Colombia’s neutral election observers MOE have been clear about the processes.

Online, there are many posts claiming that a key part of the alleged fraud will be in the reports made by the jurados. This echoes previous elections, where there was a flurry of images purporting to show electoral forms (E-14) that had been altered. With AI entering the scenario, expect more of this after the first round, especially if de la Espriella or Cepeda do badly.

Voy a escribir porqué los escrutinio son opacos y vulnerables al fraude en las elecciones.

No porque crea que nuestro proyecto democrático vaya a perder sino porque es mi deber como jefe del estado al menos informar sobre uno de los peores riesgos de la democracia hasta ahora…

— Gustavo Petro (@petrogustavo) March 1, 2026

Of course, Petro is only claiming that electoral fraud exists against him, not in the multiple occasions in which he’s won at the voting urns. This is a well established populist tactic – calling elections into doubt before they happen. It’s likely to rally his base and provide an excuse if results are bad.

There is little credibility to most of the vote rigging claims. Colombia does indeed have some serious problems around corruption and influence buying, but this tends to be concentrated in rural zones in the periphery of the country. It’s also worth noting that these seats return candidates from across the political spectrum.

A lot of electoral impropriety is very hard to prove – the machines that promise to deliver blocks of votes are well-versed in legal limits and plausible deniability. Offering someone some free gifts in return for ‘support’, for example, is widespread and while dubious hard to prove in court.

It’s particularly noticeable that alliances between political actors in order to deliver voting blocs is both very common and very hard to stop. That’s where Nicolás Petro appeared to be operating and it is not clear quite who is exactly in bed with who at this point.

It goes without saying that political attacks on the CNE are particularly unhelpful, especially in what is still a very charged political atmosphere nationwide. The assassination of presidential pre-candidate Miguel Uribe last year was a shock to a country that has a long history of political violence.

Concerns remain over both electoral safety and fraud in much of the country, with over 200 municipios at high risk of fraud and/or violence. 39 of those are classed as very high risk and only 167 at very low risk, mainly in the Andino region.

There have been rumblings from Washington about the veracity of the 2026 Colombian presidential elections as well, with Bogotá-born Senator Bernie Moreno in the country as an observer. He can’t vote, having renounced his citizenship. The difference here is that they think Petro is going to rig the elections in his favour.

Petro himself has been rebuked by the Electoral Commission and others for participating in the 2026 Colombian presidential election. He’s repeatedly made comments that are at best close to the line of violating the constitutional neutrality of his office. 

Not only that, but a third of his cabinet have joined in, also being rebuked by the CNE. There’s over 140 public servants under investigation. Iván Cepeda himself has come under fire for a rally in Montería on Monday after campaigns constitutionally have to end. He claims it was a private event, just attended by hundreds of local people.  

Who’s in the 2026 Colombian presidential election?

Over time, the field has been whittled down to thirteen candidates on the official voting card. In reality, though, only three are at the races: Iván Cepeda, Abelardo de la Espriella and Paloma Valencia in order of current voting intention. Together, they account for around 80-90% of polling at the moment.

The left has been concentrated behind Cepeda, while Paloma Valencia has snaffled the centre-right position. Abelardo is the anti-establishment maverick. All the centrist candidates are languishing in the doldrums, with failed Bogotá mayor Claudia López and eternal candidate Sergio Fajardo the best of the bunch but both polling in low single figures.

There’s also the curious option of voto en blanco. Different from a spoiled vote, which is simply disregarded, this is an active protest. If it ranks highest in any race, then a rerun of the election must take place within a month with entirely new candidates and/or party lists.

Iván Cepeda is absolutely nailed on for the second round, almost certainly in first place. Who joins him is a slightly more open question. At the moment, Abelardo has the momentum and is riding high in the polls. However, polling isn’t infallible and Paloma could sneak into second place.

At best, many voters will be voting for their least-worst option in the second round. In recent years, Colombians have often cast negative votes rather than for a candidate they really support and this year is likely to be the same. Whoever wins, it will almost certainly be a loveless victory, despite their inevitable claims of popular support.

The post 2026 Colombian presidential election: How does it work? appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

Heard about the 2026 Colombian presidential election first round this weekend? Confused about what exactly is going on? Our guide clues you in on who’s running and what’s likely to happen

The 2026 Colombian presidential election enters its first round this weekend, with the election taking place on Sunday 31st May. If no one takes an overall majority, the run-off will take place three weeks later. It feels like a lifetime since the house elections in March and candidates have been furiously jockeying for position over the last few weeks.

At the moment, continuity candidate Iván Cepeda leads polling, with the rightists split between traditionalist Paloma Valencia and outsider Abelardo de la Espriella. The centre is currently more or less absent. Read on for more information about the candidates, the political backdrop and potential outcomes.

The polls are open from 8am until 4pm on Sunday 31st June for all Colombian nationals wherever their cédula is registered. Counting is usually very fast with the results being clear before sundown. Land and fluvial borders will be closed for Colombian nationals tomorrow morning, although foreigners can cross.

Bogotá will enter ley seca earlier than usual, meaning no alcohol sales in bars, restaurants or shops from 6pm Friday night to Monday midday. That applies for everyone, so no representation or boozing for foreign residents, unless you do it at home. Ciclovía will also be cancelled for ease of access to polling stations.

Who are the runners and riders in the 2026 Colombian presidential election?

Over time, the field has been whittled down to thirteen candidates on the official voting card. In reality, though, only three are at the races: Iván Cepeda, Abelardo de la Espriella and Paloma Valencia in order of current voting intention. Together, they account for around 80-90% of polling at the moment.

The left has been concentrated behind Cepeda, while Paloma Valencia has snaffled the centre-right position. Abelardo is the anti-establishment maverick. All the centrist candidates are languishing in the doldrums, with failed Bogotá mayor Claudia López and eternal candidate Sergio Fajardo the best of the bunch but both polling in low single figures.

Some interesting characters are in the also-run list. Santiago Botero has an incredibly aggressive position on crime: bullets for rapists and so on. Roy Barreras is running as a leftist alternative to Cepeda and Gustavo Matamoros represents the ecologist party of Colombia.

It won’t be third time lucky for Fajardo, who had probably the best thought-out manifesto on paper last time around. His brand of centrism is no longer en vogue and he’s announced his retirement from politics following this election.

Strangely, most of the country’s biggest parties are literally absent from the voting card. The Conservadores and Liberales dominated the last century but now don’t bother running candidates in the 2026 Colombian presidential election. Neither is there a Green candidate or a Cambio Radical candidate. Only Pacto and Centro Democrático are there.

There’s also the curious option of voto en blanco. Different from a spoiled vote, which is simply disregarded, this is an active protest. If it ranks highest in any race, then a rerun of the election must take place within a month with entirely new candidates and/or party lists.

Two candidates on the card have actually pulled out, Carlos Caicedo and Luis Gilberto Murillo. Any votes cast for them will be counted as spoiled, not for voto en blanco. Clara López pulled out earlier, which is why there is a blank space on the tarjetón.

What are the campaigns like?

The manifestos are terribly written, for the main part. There is a frankly shocking number of basic errors in most of them, suggesting that proofreaders weren’t asked to play a big part in production. Despite having had years to plan for this, it seems everybody chose to rush it instead.

Past the errors, there’s a generally low level of detail across all the manifestos. Vague numbers and targets are given with little to no consideration of how it will be achieved. That might lead one to suspect that there isn’t a high chance any of this will actually be stuck to, regardless of the outcome.

There has been no debate among all candidates. Even partial debates have been few and far between, with almost everyone preferring to stick to home turf where they have more control over questions and so forth. There’s been a host of negative publicity via influencer campaigns, with traditional electoral machines being somewhat sidelined.

Iván Cepeda is the continuity candidate, promising more of the same and offering very few details in his actual plan de gobierno, despite it being 433 pages long. He’s had an unusual campaign, turning up to dozens of rallies but offering few interviews. In many ways, he’s not the draw for his campaign.

Read More: Candidate guide to Iván Cepeda

Abelardo de la Espriella has run a controversial and divisive campaign portraying him as the outsider. That’s won him voters and he’s peaking at the right time. His manifesto is long on ideas and short on detail. He’s frequently made inflammatory comments, being accused of sexism, homophobia and racism and often leaning into that.

Read More: Candidate guide to Abelardo de la Espriella

Paloma Valencia has been faltering over the past few weeks in particular. She’s done well to make traditional political alliances, but that could be an albatross for her. Having Uribe’s support might lose as many votes as it gains. Despite this, she’s still in the race and has by far the most detailed manifesto of the three main challengers.

Read More: Candidate guide to Paloma Valencia

It’s notable that a lot of the messaging is quite similar across the candidates. Cepeda is for los nadies; de la Espriella is for los que nunca.  Both Valencia and Cepeda want 30,000km of new roads and are overshadowed by their political mentors. Paloma and Abelardo both want to turn the gas and oil taps back on.

They all support crop substitution for coca farmers and all claim to be anti-corruption. All of them support rural communities and home carers. With this level of agreement, a lot of the distinction that is being drawn is on personality and charisma, hence the two populists exploding in popularity.

So, who’s going to win the 2026 Colombian presidential election?

It’s anyone’s guess at this point, despite the polymarket predictions going wildly overboard in favour of Abelardo de la Espriella. That’s mainly from a certain type of punter that understands little about Colombian politics and is simply making a political statement via putting money on the rightist.

The last election was razor thin, with Gustavo Petro squeaking past Rodolfo Hernández (remember him?) with barely more than 50% of the vote, similar to 2018 when it went the other way for the current president. That’s very likely to be repeated more or less in full: the Pacto candidate dominating the first round then a very close run between the final two and one winning by a nose.

Iván Cepeda is absolutely nailed on for the second round, almost certainly in first place. Who joins him is a slightly more open question. At the moment, Abelardo has the momentum and is riding high in the polls. However, polling isn’t infallible and Paloma could sneak into second place.

More interesting is how many votes everyone gets. Cepeda will want 40% minimum, under that he’s probably in big trouble. If he can get over 45% he’s likely to win the second round. Anything in the middle and we’re into coinflip territory again. Note where the votes come, too. If Abelardo does well in Bogotá, a leftist heartland, that’s a good sign for him.

If Abelardo gets over 30%, he’s in a good position. If Paloma can get to that level, she’s going to be extremely happy. Those two candidates need to match Cepeda’s total at least in order to feel confident. If their combined vote share tops 50% then a rightist victory is likely.

The final numbers to keep an eye on are turnout and the centre vote. The latter will likely be 5-10% and could be crucial for the second round. The former should be over 50%. If it’s not, then the second round could be very unpredictable, especially if it’s two populists. 

Looking ahead, it’s entirely possible that someone could win with under 50% of the vote in the second round. This has become an election that is already both polarised and unstable. It is likely to become very vicious in the next phase, too.

At best, many voters will be voting for their least-worst option in the second round. In recent years, Colombians have often cast negative votes rather than for a candidate they really support and this year is likely to be the same. Whoever wins, it will almost certainly be a loveless victory, despite their inevitable claims of popular support.

The post 2026 Colombian presidential elections: The first hurdle appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

Just days away from Colombia’s first-round presidential election, incumbent President Gustavo Petro continues to sound the alarm about voter fraud. 

On Tuesday, he repeated claims that the National Registrar’s Office is allowing the vote to be manipulated against his party’s candidate, Senator Iván Cepeda.

Petro renewed calls for citizens to supervise the vote count, describing it as the only way to avoid fraud: “Only the physical vigilance of millions of people can overcome the algorithm manipulations that the Registrar’s Office refused to prevent.”

But are the president’s claims of vulnerabilities in the voting system valid?

A decade-long dispute

Petro’s claims stem from a long-running grudge with Thomas Greg & Sons, a multinational security and printing company tasked with issuing Colombian passports and overseeing electoral logistics.

According to Petro, the firm cannot be trusted with the sensitive task of printing, delivering, and processing vote counting forms.

While the president’s claims have widely been dismissed by electoral institutions as reckless, there is some foundation for them.

Following the 2014 legislative elections, the evangelical political party, MIRA, filed a legal petition against the Registrar’s Office, claiming a discrepancy between the ballot pre-count (filled out by citizen juries in a form known as E-14) and the digitized tally of the vote (filled out by officials in the E-24 form).

MIRA claimed to have evidence of manipulation of the software used for “voting, information, transmission, or tabulation of election results,” which was managed by a subsidiary of Thomas Greg & Sons. 

After a lengthy four-year legal case, the Council of State (Consejo de Estado), the highest court overseeing the government, issued a ruling in favor of MIRA. It found evidence of destruction of electoral material and inconsistencies between the E-14 and E-24 forms. 

Crucially, the Council of State said that it could not confirm that voting software had been sabotaged because it did not have access to the source code of the software during the elections.

Without the original code, it was impossible to know if the system had been tampered with.

The body issued a clear recommendation to prevent repetitions of the dispute in future elections: “Direct the Electoral Organization to acquire the necessary vote-counting software for use within the state—that is, software owned by the organization itself—which allows for full traceability of the vote-counting process from the polling stations through to the official declaration of the election results.”

In other words, it recommended that electoral authorities roll out their own software, rather than relying on third party providers.

But 12 years later, Thomas Greg & Sons remains in charge of the electoral software; according to the Registrar’s Office, purchasing proprietary software and operating the corresponding data centers is not feasible.

While Petro continues to lobby for a fully state-owned system, he has concentrated his efforts on mitigating the risks of a repeat of the 2014 source code issue.

The president has repeatedly demanded that the Registrar’s Office share the source code with the government and the public, which he says would allow them to prevent a repeat of the situation in 2014.

But the Registrar’s Office maintains that there is no need, suggesting that publicizing the code would leave the software more vulnerable to attacks and defending internal audit processes.

Petro rebutted, calling the claim “an immense lie”.

Other types of fraud

As well as warning about software manipulation, the president has also raised the alarm about differences between the pre-count and the official, scrutinized count. Ahead of the March elections, he warned that the pre-count may not accurately reflect the results.

Petro’s concerns stem from the 2022 legislative elections in which over half a million votes for his Historic Pact coalition were excluded in the pre-count and later revealed in the scrutiny. 

Rather than software, the culprit for the discrepancy, which in total represented a 5.49% difference, was human error; the Electoral Observation Mission (MOE) had warned the ballot sheets were designed in a way that could lead to Historic Pact votes being neglected. 

But the 2022 vote appears to be an outlier, with the MOE reporting just a 0.28% discrepancy between the pre-count and the scrutinized votes in March’s legislative elections.

Petro’s mistrust in the pre-count may be valid in the case of a tight race with razor-thin margins but not so much if there is a clear winner. And, in any case, the scrutiny process should clear up any doubts. 

“In Colombian elections, it is judges who determine electoral disputes and not a logistical operator such as Thomas Greg & Sons,” explained Sergio Guzmán, director at Colombia Risk Analysis, a political risk think tank.

Bigger fish to fry

While Petro aims his crusade against Thomas Greg & Sons, a firm which he has clashed with on a range of issues, there are other, more prescient threats to electoral integrity.

“I think that concerns about voters being coerced to vote are legitimate… but I think concerns that somebody will steal the election are overblown,” said Guzmán.

International observers including the United Nations have warned that violence may undermine the elections, particularly in areas under armed group control. 

Vote buying is also a well-documented phenomenon in many regions of the country.

While Petro has some basis for his allegations of voter fraud, there is no evidence of software manipulation determining presidential election results in Colombia.

In a razor-thin race, observers would be wise to wait for the scrutinized vote count to declare a winner. But for now, Petro’s warnings about election-rigging appear to be largely overblown.

The post The truth behind Petro’s claims of Colombia voting fraud appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

Families move closer to justice over the downing of Avianca Flight 203, blamed on Pablo Escobar.

Colombia’s Congress held a hearing on Wednesday on the bombing of Avianca Flight 203 for the first time since it happened on November 27, 1989. 

The explosion killed all 107 people on board shortly after take-off from Bogotá on its way to Cali, and has been widely attributed to Pablo Escobar’s Medellin Cartel.

Families have long demanded truth, justice and reparations for the attack, considered one of Colombia’s deadliest acts of narco-related violence.

The hearing, held as a political oversight session, focused on truth, justice, memory and reparations for victims of narcoterrorism.

The Attorney General’s Office has led the investigation for decades, but families say the process has been “painfully slow.”

“It is a case that remains in a preliminary stage, as if it had happened this morning,” Gonzalo Enrique Rojas Peña, son of one of the victims, told The Bogotá Post.

Rojas was 10 years old when his father, Gonzalo Hernán Rojas Castro, was killed. He now represents families of victims of the bombing.

“Many aspects have not been clarified by the state, particularly regarding who planned and carried out the attack, and the possible involvement of other actors,” he explained.

The hearing highlighted questions that remain unanswered, including the identity of all those responsible and the current status of investigations.

Authorities initially attributed the attack to an assassination attempt on presidential candidate César Gaviria, who did not board the plane on the advice of his security team.

Later investigations concluded that a young man boarded the plane with explosives under orders from the Medellín Cartel, one of the most violent drug trafficking organisations in Colombia’s history. Questions around the case, however, persist, and victims continue to seek justice.

Just one person was jailed for the attack: Dandeny Muñoz Mosquera, known as “La Quica”, who was sentenced to three life terms in the United States, although he has repeatedly denied involvement.

The session was convened by the Human Rights Commission of the Chamber of Representatives and led by Representative Juan Daniel Peñuela. The National Centre for Historical Memory, the Victims’ Unit and the Ministry of the Interior were present, alongside families of victims, many of whom spoke about their loved ones.

However, two key institutions — the Attorney General’s Office and the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) — did not attend, despite being formally invited.

“On one hand we had two national institutions, but on the other it was unfortunate that the Fiscalía and the JEP did not attend. It is unfortunate that responses remain very ambiguous,” Gonzalo said.

The hearing also addressed the issue of reparations, which families say they have spent decades waiting for.

The Victims’ Unit said it will convene working groups to address long-standing gaps in registration and documentation that affect families’ access to reparations under Colombia’s 2011 Victims Law. The law provides recognition, financial compensation, symbolic measures and psychosocial support for victims of armed conflict.

Claudia Peñón was 17 years old when her father was killed on the flight in 1989.

“He was an excellent man and a hardworking man. He had the hope of seeing me graduate from high school, and he never got to do that,” she told The Bogotá Post, adding so many people’s lives were shattered that fateful day. “One hundred and seven families’ lives were left shattered. One hundred and seven families had their dreams destroyed.”

Her mother always expected answers, but died ten years ago without receiving them or reparations.

“She never got to see real restitution, never got to see justice in that situation. And honestly, so many other families have been failed too — and we’re still fighting,” she said. 

Families are also pushing for stronger memory-building efforts.

While there have been initiatives to recognize victims of armed conflict, the history of narcoterrorism has often been marginal in official narratives.

During the hearing, the National Centre for Historical Memory said the case has not yet been developed as a dedicated exhibition in Colombia’s planned Museum of Memory. It is included in broader reports and timelines, but could still be incorporated through a future “memory initiative”.

The hearing triggered formal follow-up steps from state institutions.

Congress will send official requests to the Attorney General’s Office over its absence and may refer the matter to the Procuraduría for review.

But for many families, the session underscored a deeper reality: after 37 years, there has been no new judicial breakthrough and no clear path to resolution.

“I think the day was partially positive,” said Gonzalo.  “I feel calm that other families were able to have a space to receive more information about the case. But there is still more to do.”

The post Colombia congress holds hearing on 1989 plane bombing blamed on Pablo Escobar appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

Confused about the upcoming Colombian presidential election? We’re here to help you with a set of cheat sheets on the top candidates so you can follow the local news. Today we’re looking at poll leader Iván Cepeda of the Pacto Histórico.

Who is Iván Cepeda?

Iván Cepeda Castro is a leftist politician who has served in the Colombian senate for the last 12 years. Before that, he was a Congressman for a term. Born in Bogotá to activist politician parents, the family was forced into exile in Soviet Czechia and Cuba in his youth. At 63 years of age, he’s notably older than his main rivals.

His father was assassinated for political reasons in 1994, something that has unsurprisingly contributed enormously to his sociopolitical views. He was a young communist, but long since moved away from that, preferring to concentrate on social analysis, activism and campaigning against rightist corruption.

He represents the Pacto Histórico ruling coalition, meaning that he benefits from the popularity of the current president Gustavo Petro. That’s no surprise, as they’ve been firm friends and comrades for years, with the president supporting his bid.

In comparison to his mentor, Cepeda is far more serious. Petro often plays the cuddly socialist grandpa, going off on tangents about free love and so forth. Cepeda is much more of a hardline Maoist academic who is well up for a long march through the institutions. He lacks the charisma of Petro, coming across more professorial and dry.

Is he polling well?

Very. He’s absolutely nailed on for the second round, with the only real question being how high his vote share is. There is some speculation that he may come second, but more likely he will be comfortably in front of the two rightest candidates.

The trickier part is the second round, when the right will be consolidated behind one person rather than split in two. He’s still often favourite against both Abelardo de la Espriella and Paloma Valencia, but likely prefers the former.

While he’s been out in front all through the campaigning process, he’s not really gone anywhere, simply sitting on 38-43% in every poll. While that’s admirable consistency, it also calls into question his ability to draw in the undecided voters.

He’s a marmite candidate, with very few informed voters neutral on him. Either you think he’s the saviour of the republic who can make Colombia more equal or you think he’s a dangerous revolutionary who will ruin the country. A lot of votes are for him under any circumstance and as many are against him under any circumstance.

What’s his campaign like?

Firmly leftist, unsurprisingly. He’s also leaning heavily into being the continuity candidate for the Petro government. That makes sense, with approval levels riding high after the giant minimum wage increase this year. While that might yet be a problem down the line, it’s electoral dynamite.

However, his campaigning has been rather lacklustre. He’s not a natural orator in the way that Petro is, and he lacks charisma, coming across as a dry theoretical academic. Perhaps aware of this, his team have arranged rallies where he can preach to the converted and otherwise keeping him out of the spotlight.

In reality, much of his campaigning is being done by others. Petro is the key figure here, with the president right up against the line of not technically campaigning. However, the head of state is taking a lot of actions that are clearly designed to help Cepeda, as well as constantly using his pulpit to call for the continuation of his ideas.

Complementing this is an incredibly powerful influencer/social push. Much of this is fairly organic, with Pacto supporters used to activism and intuitively good at promoting their candidate. It fits in well with his man of the people image. The biggest meme is ‘Solo pacto en esta mondá’. Notably, Cepeda himself isn’t the draw, with variations on the phrase namechecking Petro.

Combined with his very loose manifesto (see below), his campaign messaging is basically that only the Pacto will stand up for the people, especially those that have been treated poorly by the state. There’s little in the way of concrete offers, just a call for loyalty.

So what’s in his manifesto then?

You can read it for yourself online, but have a big pot of tea ready: it outdoes Marx and Engels at a whopping 433(!) pages long. A lot of that is AI images, while the actual propuestas are hidden away between rambling discourse, tangential essays, theoretical musings and diary entries. Notably, it is mostly in the past and present tenses.

A recurring theme is the involvement of civil society via what he calls the poder constituyente, especially youth and women’s groups. He claims he will call all political and social actors to the table in a mesa de diálogo nacional aimed at forming concrete proposals.

This will be implemented by a new Alianza Público-Popular which will allow civil groups to directly manage state funds. Both ethnic minority and campesino territories will be recognised and organised. There will be a Banco del Pueblo to improve access to financial instruments for poorer people as well as the unbanked.

Security is not a priority, but the key aim is to dismantle armed groups that are ‘successors of paramilitaries’. Iván Cepeda will continue the extant peace talks set up by Petro, but with a red line over assassinations of social leaders. Coca farmers will be encouraged to turn away from illegality via crop substitution.

Corruption will be dealt with by the Secretary for Transparency of the Presidency being given full independence and the Fiscalía receiving an Institute for Macrocorruption, as well as beefing up existing systems. Civil society will be encouraged to involve themselves in these processes.

A new Ley de Austeridad Republicana will be brought in to limit state spending via civil servants in an attempt to cut costs. He will reduce the salaries of the president’s office immediately and encourage his ministers to do the same. There will be greater scrutiny of public spending across all levels of the state. Again, no details.

More interesting is the promise to give victims of corruption resources, partially funded by seizure of illegal gains. All of this will be aimed at the parts of the country with the highest rates of corruption and impunity.

Victims of the conflict, meanwhile, will benefit from a new acuerdo nacional which will aim to deliver further reparations. He will also make sure that the 2016 peace agreement is carried out as originally planned, focusing on the Planes de Desarollo con Enfoque Territorial (PDET) for the areas most affected.

International relations will not revolve around the interests of Washington or Miami (?), but rather the national interest. The plan is for autonomy and integration, again involving civil society to work with foreign-based counterparts.

For rural areas, there will be 30,000km of minor roads built to improve connections to far-flung places, known as the vías para la paz. There will also be more rights to participate in politics, defend territory, improve connectivity and services, more land restitution and so on, none of which is clearly defined or detailed in numbers.

Rubbish is on the agenda, unlike any other candidate. He promises to strengthen and enforce recycling schemes and the basura cero initiative. Revitalisation and regrowth of urban areas is also under plan. On transport, he says he will rejuvenate trains as well as sort out the roads.

Who is he running with?

Aida Marina Quilcué Vivas is an Indigenous activist and current senator of the Republic. While she won’t bring any votes with her, this is a huge signal from the Pacto that they are serious about Indigenous representation.

Her selection shows Pacto confidence that they don’t need to reach out and form alliances with other groups. The advantage is that Quilcué and Cepeda will agree on virtually everything, in sharp contrast to Petro and Francia Márquez.

Quilcué has been an active part of the campaign, rallying supporters across the country, especially in rural and Indigneous areas. She’s chastised Abelardo for using the jaguar as a symbol. She’s also clashed with Paloma Valencia over indigenous rights in Cauca.

Is he a communist guerrilla that will expropriate my property?

No, he’s not. He was a young communist, but distanced himself from the party (against the wishes of his family) three and a half decades ago. He’s not a guerilla either and never has been, despite his closeness to M-19. He’s a leftist for sure, but that is not synonymous with communism either in act or desire.

The reason this gets so much traction is that he has certainly been close to guerilla groups, either working with them or in peace talks. He doesn’t help this by his actions, often going out of his way to avoid criticising groups that have a nominally leftist agenda, while specifying that he wants to go after ex-paras.

What’s all this about the Caso Uribe?

Iván Cepeda has been a fierce critic of Álvaro Uribe dating all the way back to when Uribe was in the Casa de Nariño. In many ways, the ex-president has defined Cepeda’s political career as much as Petro, though as sworn enemy rather than comrade. 

Cepeda accused the ex-president of links to paramilitarism, relating to the falsos positivos case and others. After repeated attacks in the Senate, Uribe filed a defamation writ against Cepeda, which was eventually annulled. In turn, Uribe found himself under investigation for allegedly attempting to influence witnesses in that case.

Vindication came last year with a Bogotá court ruling in favour of Cepeda after over a decade of deliberation. However, it was only a partial victory, with the ex-president only being declared guilty of fraude procesal y soborno en actuación judicial.

This means there is absolutely no love lost between the two, with Uribe’s preferred candidate Paloma Valencia and Iván Cepeda frequently clashing in the Senate and in the media. Abelardo de la Espriella also is close to Uribe, having represented him legally.

Any skeletons in his closet?

Yes. He has a habit of ignoring things that aren’t connected to paramilitarism or the peace process, ending up as one of the most absent senators in the last couple of years. He also has habitually evaded making clear statements on his health following his diagnosis of bowel cancer. He claims it is in remission, but rumours swirl that it is not. 

Then there’s the Operation Fénix affair. He was allegedly namechecked in emails found in a raid on a FARC base. It’s never been fully proved or denied, but has always hung over him. Added to the controversy over recent audioclips by guerrillas referring to him as a comrade, it fuels the fire for those who see him as too close to armed groups.

So, can he succeed?

Yes, he can and is probably the favourite at the moment. It would be absolutely shocking were he not to get to the second round and he matches up well with both of the two people he’s likely to face there.

Of the two rightists, he probably wants to see Abelardo against him. While he carries a threat as a markedly anti-establishment candidate in contrast to Cepeda’s life in politics, he will also turn off some of the anti-left candidates, especially those who want someone serious.

Voto en blanco could then become the decider. If we end up with a situation where a high number of voters decide they want neither option, Cepeda is likely in luck. It’s entirely possible that he could win without crossing 50% of the vote.

The popularity of Petro works in his favour, as does the minimum wage issue. Many will want further increases and see him as the best way to get that done. This may not be a vote for him so much as for the Pacto, but they all count.

However, there are no guarantees. He will get very few voters coming across from eliminated candidates. The key battle here will be turnout, which usually increases by 5-10 percentage points for the runoff.

The post Candidate guides for the 2026 Colombian elections: Iván Cepeda appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

Confused about the upcoming Colombian presidential election? We’re here to help you with a set of cheat sheets on the top candidates so you can follow the local news. Today we’re looking at Paloma Valencia of the Centro Democrático.

Who is Paloma Valencia?

Paloma Susana Valencia Laserna is a conservative politician who has represented the Centro Democrático in the Senate for 12 years. She won her primary battle with three million votes in March, confirming her position as the establishment rightist candidate.

Anti-establishment types, look away now. Her paternal grandfather Guillermo León Valencia was President of the Republic from 1962-66, while her maternal grandfather Mario Laserna Pinzón founded the Universidad de los Andes.

Perhaps not coincidentally, that’s her alma mater, studying economics there before a Master’s in creative writing at New York University. She’s been heavily involved in politics for two decades now, originally as a candidate for Alas Equipo Colombia before jumping ship to the Centro Democrático.

Her faith is deeply important to her, as is tradition. Coming from the circle of the Popayán elite, she is a fairly standard conservative on most cultural and social issues. On the economy, she tacks more to a neoliberal line.

Is she polling well?

Not as well as she would like. While she won comfortably in the March primaries as part of the Gran Consulta por Colombia, she has since fluctuated around 15-25%, usually rising and falling in rhythm with rightist rival Abelardo de la Espriella.

Most recent polling has her in third place a week out from the election, which is a problem. She does outperform Abelardo in head-to-head matchups with Iván Cepeda in most polls, which her messaging will want to lean into over the coming week.

What’s her campaign like?

Centrism, slightly improbably. As one of two rightists in an election with a clearly dominant leftist candidate, two flailing centrists and a host of also-rans, she’s positioning herself as the closest to the centre of the viable options.

However, she’s firmly of the right, although tempered somewhat by her far more liberal vicepresidential candidate Juan Daniel Oviedo. This is best evidenced by the fact she is very much ‘la que dice Uribe’, clearly having the backing of the controversial yet still influential ex-president.

Her campaign logo features a cross, with religion playing a large role for her stance on many cultural and social issues. She leans heavily into those as a conservative. Colombia Más Grande is the slogan, but they don’t use it particularly well.

If elected, she would be Colombia’s first ever female head of state (with a first ever gay vicepresident too), although she’s not really leant into that much as you might think. As with much else, she’s not managing to cut through particularly well on socials or make a big splash in the national debate.

So what’s in her manifesto then?

You can read it for yourself online, under the name 111puntos. You even get an extra point for free. It’s fairly well presented, laid out and supported, but that’s not necessarily going to win any votes. Overall, other than a massive reliance on AI, there’s no big surprise or radical shakeup here, more a return to the old ways of doing things.

Paloma is certainly no dove when it comes to security and crime, promising a tough line. COP$20tn over four years for the armed forces in order to modernise and rebuild, finishing at 4% of annual GDP destined for the forces. That includes recruiting 30,000 more military personnel and the same number of police officers.

The rest of the money will go on increasing pay, conditions and so forth as well as a big push on tech. Drones are the centrepiece for investment, but cyberdefence is also highlighted as an area that needs urgent investment. 

Slightly more old-school is her plan to militarise key transportation routes immediately. More of the same with coca farms: more spraying that allegedly won’t affect ecosystems or people, combined with subsidies for substitution. The fact that neither of those things have worked for decades isn’t stopping her.

On the other side of the coin, Paloma Valencia promises zero impunity: “el que la hace, la paga”. That means more powers to seize illicit gains and more prison sentences for those found guilty of corruption, reducing the number of casa por carcel sentences. 22,000 more penitentiary places and 19,000 more prisoners.

There will be 50 new casas de justicia and mobile courts to tour the country visiting rural locations that are currently not served by the legal systems. All of this is working towards an aim to get congestion in the system from 48% down to 0. Ominously, there’s also a promise of a law to “regulate protest and punish vandalism”.

New laws on corruption are to be brought in, mostly focused around greater transparency using tech. That means blockchain to record transactions and deals as well as AI to analyse potential discrepancies. There will be greater enforcement of existing regulations and a guardian of public integrity to oversee processes.

On the economy, it’s all about recovering confidence from the international market. That will be done by getting infrastructure and mining production back up to pre-pandemic levels (6%+), USD$10mn more in exports and growth over five percent annually.

More FDI to the tune of USD$2bn annually, 25% of GDP to go into internal investment and reducing the deficit by COP$50tn. How is she going to pay for all this? With, err, tax cuts for homeowners and businesses, efficiency savings of 25% and debt refinancing. Good luck with all that.

She’s the only candidate to really take the healthcare crisis seriously. First up is a promise to resolve 10 million blocked prescriptions, appointments and so on in the first 100 days. She plans to send doctors to patients in rural areas, not the other way round.

This will be paid for by a COP$9tn investment. A third of that is destined for delivery of outstanding operations and prescriptions, the rest for paying accumulated state debt to healthcare operators. Many taxpayers won’t like the latter.

Energy faces a similar situation: paying off state debts to operators within the first three months. The goal here is to avoid blackouts and brownouts in the short term, while putting in place structures to avoid the same issues over the long term.

Turning on the taps for both oil and gas lies at the heart of this plan, with a reboot of exploration and extraction projects. Partly, this is to attract AI database and server investment. There’s also support for renewables and alternatives, but it seems more of an afterthought.

Her plan on international relations is to ride two horses. Free competition with China and more co-operation on infrastructure and exports from Colombia. At the same time, leadership in Donald Trump’s Shield of the Americas project while guaranteeing that only the Colombian Armed Forces will operate in national territory.

There will be 187,000 free school places for talented children, 150,000 grants for vulnerable children and 10 public superschools. ICETEX loans, in line with other countries, will only be repayable when you have a salary. COLFUTURO will be rescued as well. The 16 biggest urban centres will have psycho-social units to look out for vulnerable children.

Businesses employing people under 28 will receive a subsidy of up to 30% of minimum wage for a year. Agricultural workers will receive better lines of credit, three million hectares of land formalised and a million new farming zones designated. Tourism is projected to double, with new routes opened for Asia and Europe.

There is a heavy focus on the grey economy. Informal workers will have access to seed capital, loans, a virtual wallet and a host of other possibilities. The goal is to offer help without persecution.

Pensioners will all be covered unconditionally, regardless of law or budget changes as well as three million vulnerable adults to receive subsidies. Each child born into poverty will have COP$500,000 put aside as seed capital to start saving.

Infrastructure starts off with 35,000km of new roads as well as increased satellite connectivity for marginalised communities. There will be 1 million new homes built, with a quarter of those directly subsidised. A million further homes will receive new or improved potable water access.

Finally, the environment. The brakes will go on for deforestation and the national parks will be protected from guerrilla activity. Local families will be given subsidies in order to protect areas of natural interest. Money generated from mining will be ploughed back into environmental protection.

Who is she running with?

Juan Daniel Oviedo, former head of DANE and candidate in the last race for Bogotá mayor. In that contest, he managed to force Gustavo Bolívar into third place in a two-horse race, showcasing his impressive campaigning ability. He came second in the Gran Consulta with over a million votes, reinforcing his reputation. 

He’s been more visible than Paloma Valencia for much of the campaign and is much more active than either of the other two undercards. That was the reason he was brought in – to appeal to more liberal voters and to provide an injection of energy on socials. He’s delivered in spades on both accounts.

However, there are a couple of issues here. Firstly, he runs the risk of overshadowing Paloma Valencia with his charisma and presence. Secondly, by joining her campaign he lost some of those centrist voters who saw it as a betrayal to join forces with the Centro Democrático.

They certainly aren’t natural bedfellows, with Oviedo a fair bit left of Valencia on a lot of economic issues. More profound splits are found on social issues. For example, Oviedo is out and proud while Valencia stands against gay adoption and marriage. Awkward at best. 

Why do people say she’s ‘la que dice Uribe’?

Pido respetuosamente votar por Paloma Valencia. pic.twitter.com/HpS5XjGdVw

— Álvaro Uribe Vélez (@AlvaroUribeVel) May 18, 2026

That’s a bit unfair on a candidate with a long and storied political career of her own. However, while she isn’t just Uribe’s candidate, she certainly makes a lot of having his passionate backing.

That’s been a mixed blessing for a while now, with Uribe’s influence waning as the years pass. While his candidate won in 2018, they failed to even make the second round in 2014 and 2022 and we could well be on for a repeat of that.

The ex-president certainly casts a long shadow and that’s not always positive, especially with Oviedo also shining bright. Support for Uribe has dwindled over the past two decades, as Colombian demographics change profoundly.

However, Uribe does retain a large swell of support and also commands the biggest party machine of the candidates in the race. The Centro Democrático will be able to make a huge campaigning push on and offline across the entire country, which may be underreported. 

Any skeletons in her closet?

A few, mainly over her combative social media use while in the Senate. Paloma Valencia has largely avoided serious controversy though, with most of her twitterstorms being differences of opinion rather than accusations of impropriety.

She accused now-president Gustavo Petro of corruption in 2018 following the Odebrecht affair. This amounted to grainy footage of him receiving cash at an unknown point. That was archived as being far too flimsy to be evidence of anything at all.

In 2022 she defended the Colombian state’s actions during the armed conflict, saying that while there may have been errors and atrocities, they were legitimate and in defence of the country. That unsurprisingly met with a huge backlash from various quarters.

Una narrativa mucho más constructiva (y verdadera) es: Los para y la guerrrilla fueron y son monstruosos. El Estado cometió errores y atrocidades, pero era legítimo y fundamentalmente estuvo en la defensa de los ciudadanos.

— Paloma Valencia L (@PalomaValenciaL) July 29, 2022

There is one case hanging over Paloma Valencia still. Her link to Uribe led to her questioning the legitimacy of a key witness in the case against him. In turn, the witnesses defence lawyers filed a defamation case against the senator, over which the Supreme Court has ordered a conciliatory process. That has not yet concluded.

She’s also clashed with Cepeda’s vicepresidential candidate Aida Quilcué over indigenous rights in Cauca. Indeed, she’s gone as far as to suggest splitting the entire department in two, one for Indigenous Colombians only, something many view as racially motivated.

So, can she succeed?

Yes, she can. Next weekend is arguably a harder test for her than a second round would be if she gets through. Similar concerns swirled around her in the Gran Consulta por Colombia, but she ended up sailing through comfortably. 

If she can repeat that trick, she matches up better than anyone else against Iván Cepeda. However, that’s very far from guaranteed, as they’re closely matched. It’s assumed that she’ll gain a lot of Abelardo voters, but that may not be true. The anti-left will flock to her, but the anti-establishment might not.

Her main draw is presenting herself as the only viable sensible candidate. In part that’s with Oviedo on board, in part that both Cepeda and de la Espriella are seen as populist. There’s a lot of centrist voters that will hold their noses and vote for her along those lines.

Having said all that, centrism isn’t in vogue in many places globally and Colombia is no exception. That may block her even getting to a final face-off and her chances of winning rest with anti-Cepeda votes. More than any other candidate, hers would be a loveless victory.

The post Candidate guides for the 2026 Colombian elections: Paloma Valencia appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

Confused about the 2026 Colombian presidential elections? We’re here to help you with a set of cheat sheets on the top candidates so you can follow the local news. First we’re looking at Abelardo de la Espriella of Defensores de la Patria.

Who is Abelardo de la Espriella?

Abelardo de la Espriella hails from Montería, which he makes great play of. He was actually born in Bogotá, as well as studying in various universities here. He rose to fame as a defence lawyer, eventually setting up his own firm, De La Espriella Lawyers Enterprise. Their clients have been varied (more of that later).

He has a colourful background alongside his legal activity, releasing two albums of classical and traditional music as well as launching De La Espriella Style, his menswear line. He also has his fingers in other pies, including rum, wine and coffee, several books and a foundation to help impoverished kids.

A former atheist, he saw the light in the pandemic and came around to Catholicism, which is convenient for winning votes in a deeply religious country. He holds Italian and US passports. He takes pride in his appearance, often suited and tidily-bearded but switching to sombreros vueltiaos or guayaberas when appropriate.

While he has a varied and successful background in business, he has no experience at all in government, either at local or national level. He is leaning into that, taking the mantle of the outsider candidate and promising to do politics differently. Courting controversy is second nature for this bullish and outspoken candidate.

Is he polling well?

He started strongly towards the end of last year, then seemed to have dipped as we moved into springtime. Since the March elections though, he’s picked up the pace again and is peaking again at just the right time.

He’s now ahead of Paloma again with most pollsters and stands a good chance of making the second round, where he faces a strong challenge against Cepeda. His incredibly divisive rhetoric and persona mean that he doesn’t match up easily in a one-on-one.

Like many populists in the caudillo mould, he splits opinions – while he wins a lot of hearts and minds, so too does he turn a lot of people against him. Very few people are neutral on Abelardo, which means he could struggle to win the more centrist voters, even against Cepeda. Expect voto en blanco to do well if he’s in the second round.

What’s his campaign like?

Pick your adjective depending on how you view him generally: controversial, innovative, problematic, fierce, strong, crass, outspoken. What’s unarguable is that it is very much focused on him, features a lot of show and spin and is extremely light on detail.

Very much in the vein of a Trump or Bukele, two key influences he acknowledges himself, he positions himself as the outsider candidate compared to the professional politicians in the race. This has not only been successful elsewhere, but almost took Rodolfo Hernández to the presidency four years ago.

Interestingly, Abelardo de la Espriella is in one way openly following a very similar line to the leftists he claims to hate. He is courting “los que nunca” against “los que siempre”, fitting his position as the outsider candidate. His promises often revolve directly around shaking everything up.

So what’s in his manifesto then?

You can read it for yourself online, or what is there at least. It’s barely a manifesto and more a collection of ideas, positions and wishes. He focuses heavily on law and order with a generous side serving of efficiency savings. Quite how any of this will get done or whether it’s viable is often unclear.

First thing on the agenda is that he’s tough on crime. He’s proposed 10 megacarceles in the Bukele mould, a ‘primera linea’ of reservists and veterans and a new bloque de búsqueda for barrios. He targets a 30% reduction in gender-based violence and 40% cut in feminicides. That involves an accelerated 24/7 judicial process in 72 hours maximum. 

More widely, he wants to reform and better fund the armed forces in order to both establish state control of territory and enforce the state monopoly on arms. That carries over into his stance on armed groups. He wants to eliminate 330,000 hectares of coca farms using any and all tools available to him. That means spraying, manual elimination, express recuperation of proceeds of crime and so on.

Para cambiar a Colombia primero hay que sobrevivirle a quienes no quieren que cambie. pic.twitter.com/h6Tf8refWr

— De La Espriella Presidente (@AbelardoPTE) May 17, 2026

The mano dura is also set to come down on politicians. He’s fiercely anti-corruption, which he defines broadly. He plans to start with Ecopetrol and then clean out state organisations of their links to “narco-trafficking, corruption and bad management”.

Politicians and administrators that are not corrupt won’t be safe, either. He promises zero tolerance for ineptitude and inefficiency. He wants results within 100 days and those with empty hands will be told to sling their hook. Ambassadors have been told they need to promote the country, not just shoot whisky on the public purse.

Tax avoidance is also on the radar – Abelardo de la Espriella wants to use AI to radically improve DIAN’s processes and deal with widespread avoidance. Subsidies will also be revised to make sure they are going to the right places.

He wants to recover energy self-sufficiency and to restart drilling and exploration as well. Gas is his main focus, although rare earth mining is also highlighted, alongside reform of the costly ElectroCaribe. A main driver is drawing a clear line between legal and illegal mining.

The national budget will also benefit from the efficiency savings – merging or abolishing agencies he sees as redundant such as the Ministerio de Igualdad. That’s part of a shock plan to save around 3.1% of GDP.

With those savings, the aim is to get the deficit to -4.8%(!) within the first year, falling to under 3.5% or lower by 2030. Dovetailing with that is a promise to anchor the debt/GDP ratio at no higher than 55%. All this will require annual growth of at least 3% with 5%+ targeted.

On education, there is to be greater focus on technology, as well as a ‘virtual university’ and free computers in schools. Unsurprisingly, details are limited. A STEM program specifically aimed at girls will be set up to deal with the tech gender gap.

Rural communities are a key part of his voter base and he’s promising 600,000 new jobs outside cities as well as 100,000 young people to receive education on improved farming methods and use of tech. 2 million hectares are to be delivered to the people.

Rounding up, there will be COP$125bn aimed at co-investment or seed capital for creative projects; mass sterilisation of stray animals to reduce populations and 200,000 carers to be given subsidies.

Who is he running with?

José Manuel Restrepo, the closest thing to an aristocrat that a two-century-old republic can have. He claims direct descendency from revolutionary hero Francisco de Paula Santander. In sharp contrast to Abelardo, he’s a classic buttoned-down conservative.

He served under Duque as Ministro de Hacienda following the botched intent at fiscal reform, having previously been at Comercio. Outside of politics he has been rector of three different universities, most notably the Rosario, his alma mater alongside Bath and the LSE. 

However, given that Abelardo de la Espriella loves the limelight, his undercard is not a key part of this campaign. While the other two real candidates have genuinely strong vice-presidential candidates, Abelardo is doing all the heavy lifting himself.

What’s all this El Tigre stuff?

Abelardo understands the importance of branding, and this is a key part of his appeal. He says that the big cat represents courage, ferocity and independence, all of which are qualities he identifies with. In a country where blankets featuring tigers are a staple of many homes, this is a good brand to have.

Tigre in Colombia can refer to tigers or jaguars, both of which he uses, though the former are more common. That means video screens with dancing tigers on them, tiger-print shoes up for sale and a whole lot more. He’s often to be seen wearing tiger-print clothes.

Cepeda’s running mate Aida Quilcué has publicly asked him to stop using jaguars as part of this, claiming they hold a special significance for Indigenous Colombians. Abelardo de la Espriella has predictably ignored that.

Any skeletons in his closet?

Sort of. There’s certainly a great deal of controversy, but a lot of it he simply leans into and doesn’t see as problematic at all. That’s true of personal attacks on Paloma Valencia,  as well as frequent homophobic and sexist outbursts.

It’s less true of his past as a criminal defence lawyer, an area that often makes him quite touchy. He has represented some pretty shady characters, including Álvaro Uribe himself. Jorge Pretelt and David Guzmán are just two high-profile clients accused of corruption that de la Espriella has defended.

In fairness, his firm has also taken on some genuinely important defences, most notably Natalia de la Ponce and Rosa Elvira Cely. However, even this is disputed, with family members taking to Instagram to dispute his take on that and suggest it was more about financial interest.

Then there’s the outstanding allegations that the firmas he collected in order to be able to run were improperly registered. He won 5 million, more than any other Colombian, of which 3 million were ruled invalid. That still leaves him comfortably over the threshold, but raises questions about his support. 

So, can he succeed?

Yes, he can. It’s nowhere near guaranteed that he’ll make the second round, of course, and he absolutely has the potential to do or say something that will torpedo his campaign. However, he’s a maverick and is campaigning well, which makes him unpredictable.

He is offering easy solutions to complex problems, but that’s often popular with the electorate. Get past the rhetoric and he identifies a lot of key problems and his proposals could be a good thing. He just doesn’t make it clear exactly how this is going to happen.

More to the point, Abelardo de la Espriella represents the outsider position compared to everyone else: he really is not a professional politician like them, for good or for bad. Again, that’s popular with many voters after decades of incompetence from technocrats.

Comparisons with Trump in the USA or Bukele in El Salvador are clichéd, but they stand up. He frequently flirts with sexism and homophobia while mocking opponents, but claims innocence, he promises a hard line on crime and he avoids clarity over his proposals. Both those candidates won comfortably with similar electorates to Colombia.

If he gets to the second round, he could win due to a dislike of the other candidate, as that will almost certainly be Cepeda. In that case, there could be a lot of voters holding their noses to vote either for or against him. At the moment, that’s a coin flip.

The post Candidate guides for the 2026 Colombian elections: Abelardo de la Espriella appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

A large military contingent has been sent to Cauca today to halt clashes between members of the Nasa and Misak communities fighting over ancestral territory.

The first of 500 troops arrived in Popayán, the department capital, to be ferried by helicopters to the hills around Sylvia in northern Cauca where members of both indigenous groups were fighting on Thursday. The violent confrontation led to seven deaths and more than 100 people injured, some seriously, according to latest reports.

Colombia’s minister of defence Pedro Sánchez, announcing the troop deployment, said the death toll was likely to rise as both military and state institutions gained access to the zone.

Videos posted online showed people from both communities fighting with machetes, spears and home-made explosives. But many dead and injured had gunshot wounds, suggesting firearms were being used, said Sánchez.

Leaders called for calm today, and Colombia’s president Gustavo Petro appealed to both sides to re-start talks over the contested land.

“I have requested a meeting with the highest authorities of the Misak and Nasa peoples to guarantee peaceful coexistence,” tweeted Petro. He offered to broker talks next week.

Petro’s government has been attempting to resolve historical territorial issues with indigenous communities who often lack legal land titles through the Agencia Nacional de Tierras (ANT), the national land agency.

An “interethnic pact” was urgently needed in Cauca to return fertile land to original communities for agricultural crops, said Petro. The expertise of indigenous farmers could turn the tide of drug trafficking in the region, he added.

Conflict hotspot

Cauca, in southwest Colombia, is one of the country’s most conflicted regions with multiple armed groups in conflict with the state.

It is also home to some of Colombia’s largest indigenous communities, such as Nasa that inhabit large tracts of highlands that span the Andean massif and defend their land with both political bodies – powerful lobbies such as the CRIC or Consejo Regional Indigena del Cauca – and self-defense forces known as Guardia Indigena.

In Cauca, the Guardia Indigena are frequently targeted by armed groups and members of CRIC are victims of kidnap or assassination.

See also – Cauca bombs: What’s Going On?

Vice-presidential candidate Aida Quilcué, herself Nasa, survived an abduction attempt in February this year when armed men intercepted her vehicle in the highlands of Cauca. She was rescued by Guardia Indigena who trailed her into the mountains.

This week’s clashes erupted after simmering dispute over 800 hectares (2,000 acres) of páramo highlands bordering the Pitayó Reserve, belonging to Nasa, and Guambia territory of the Misak.

Political twist

According to members of the communities, the plot of land had three springs and was of cultural and spiritual significance to both groups. But in 2023 the ANT appeared to award titles to Nasa based on colonial maps from the colonial era of the 1750s, and act that infuriated Misak who also claimed it as their ancestral territory.

In the aftermath of Thursday’s clashes, opposition politicians were quick to blame the Petro government for fomenting the violence, accusing the ANT of favoring the Nasa reserve and CRIC – widely seen as allied with Petro’s Pacto Historico party – of using the ANT judgment to invade Misak territory.

In a Facebook post right-wing presidential candidate Paloma Valencia accused Nasa’s community in the Pitayó reserve of breaking negotiations to take the disputed territory by force.

In a further twist, Valencia implicated Quilcué, the running mate of her main political rival Iván Cepeda in this month’s presidential elections. Quilcué, who previously led CRIC and was openly supported by the organization in her vice-presidential bid, had pushed the dispute, claimed Valencia.

“Instead of deciding to resolve the issues, the Nasa then decided to advance and invade the Misak territory,” she added.

Allowed to fester

According to an analysis by El Espectador, the conflict stemmed from a misunderstanding of 2023’s ANT declaration, which was an interim finding leaving a “wide margin of interpretation” for who owned the land.

Nasa interpreted the finding as an excuse to use the land traditionally inhabited by Misak, and in return the Misak community blocked access roads.

In March this year the governor of the Pitayó reserve Edinson Pacho condemned the Misak for causing economic damage to farmers unable to take their products to market.

In turn, this week Misak representative Liliana Pechenche accused the “armed forces of the CRIC” – the Guardia Indigena – of killing at least two Misak men and kidnapped 10 more of the Guambia community during the escalation.

She also denied the Misak were armed, claiming this was false information spread by the Nasa to justify their armed incursion: “We are at risk of physical extermination through persecution; we are a peaceful people.”

Both sides agreed on one thing: that the government and its ANT agency had allowed the misunderstanding to fester for several years despite warning signs that violence was brewing.

CRIC, which according to its website represents many indigenous groups including Misak in Cauca, rejected the appropriation of the conflict by national politicians.

“These situations cannot be used to deepen the division between fraternal communities,” it said in a statement.

“These conflicts…are the result of historical decisions and institutional omissions …to generate disputes, confusion, fragmentation and confrontations between indigenous groups,” it concluded.

By Friday a tense calm had settled on the area according to observers, with hopes for a quiet weekend before talks planned for next week.

The post Troops arrive in Cauca to calm clashes between indigenous communities. appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

On April 20, the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) – Colombia’s transitional justice mechanism – released a report on the impacts suffered by animals in the context of the armed conflict. 

The JEP’s report, conducted in partnership with the University of Essex, found that an animal is killed or injured every 30 minutes due to the armed conflict.

Animal rights activists say the release represents a step forward in publicizing the often invisibilized violence inflicted upon animals in war.

The report was developed through the construction of a database using 237 national, regional, and local media outlets, and 600 X accounts belonging to social and environmental organizations, as well as State entities and multilateral organizations.

Based on the information collected, they made an individual categorization referring to domestic animals, and a collective one referring to species, that is, wild animals. In this context, 100,252 domestic animals faced violence and 44 species are at imminent risk of extinction as a result of the armed conflict.

Thirty-two percent of the recorded cases involving animals were directly linked to military actions, including armed confrontations, ambushes, and attacks. The impacts were not distributed evenly across the territory; there are regions where armed conflict, illegal economies, and environmental richness converge, intensifying the harm. For example, Antioquia is the department with the highest concentration of species threatened by the conflict.

“We realized that most cases involved incidents such as accidents with landmines, anti-personnel mines, ambushes against the public security forces, harassment of the public security forces, and armed confrontations. These were some of the situations in which animals were killed or injured. They were also affected by forced displacement,” Laura Ojeda, a researcher on the JEP’s Investigation and Prosecution Unit who contributed to the report, explained. 

Forced abandonment was one of the most documented forms of harm identified in the report, largely because it was closely tied to the victimization of caregivers within the dynamics of the conflict. 27% of the recorded cases — corresponding to approximately 900,000 animals — involved forced abandonment.

The report also identified nine ways in which animals were used throughout the armed conflict: as means of transportation; as devices to detonate explosive artifacts; as instruments to inflict pain and suffering – torture –; as sentinels for rapid alerts; as surveillance tools; in practices of bioterrorism involving zoonotic diseases; as propaganda tools; as amulets or part of esoteric rituals; and as a means to intimidate communities and extort payments from business owners and farmers.

Visibilizing animal suffering

The report comes as part of the JEP’s efforts to recognize the environment within its processes of justice, truth, and reparation. This release, the third in a series of three, is the first to focus on the specific forms of violence suffered by animals. 

“It is part of a strategy to recognize all forms of life that have been victims of the armed conflict in Colombia,” Ojeda told The Bogotá Post.

For Senator Andrea Padilla of the Green Alliance (Alianza Verde) party, the report represents a major step forward for animal rights. 

She notes that harm to animals is usually addressed as a collateral issue, as damage to property under a framework of harm to human assets.

“Animals have always been excluded from any moral consideration, from any legal consideration, even from news coverage,” the senator told The Bogotá Post.

The team behind the report faced the challenge of shifting the narrative away from the legal framework which refers to animals only as part of the natural environment.

Instead, it adopted a “differential” approach from natural sciences, in collaboration with La Enredadera & co, a scientific outreach collective.

For Luis Carlos Posso, anthropologist and member of the collective, the report represents an exception to the “unavoidable anthropocentrism permeating the law.”

Senator Padilla highlighted the animal rights implications:  “I believe it is only fair that sentient beings capable of emotions, affection, and social, moral, and emotional lives are also considered as affected by the conflict.”

Padilla added that understanding the impact of the conflict on animals deepens the appreciation of the human toll of violence.

“When we understand that there are bonds of affection there, family bonds that are abruptly broken by war, we can also see the conflict in a deeper way — that is, we can understand the deepest forms of harm being caused,” said the senator.

Animals as victims of the armed conflict

In addition to detailing the harms inflicted upon animals, the report proposes various reparative measures. These include habitat restoration, veterinary care in conflict zones, public veterinary care networks, the inclusion of animals in memory and truth processes, protection measures for at-risk species, and conservation initiatives.

However, there is still a long way to go before animals can be fully recognized as victims.

“Legally they are not things, but they are also not rights-holders. If they are not rights-holders, they cannot be recognized as victims,” explains Ojeda.

Colombian law recognizes animals as sentient beings, and laws such as the Ángel Law reflect significant progress in their rights. Currently, there is a bill advancing in congress that seeks to historically and legally recognize animals and ecosystems as victims of the internal armed conflict, prohibiting their use as instruments of war and ordering their essential reparation. This is Bill No. 012 of 2025, led by Senator Esmeralda Hernández of the Pacto Histórico party.

Senator Padilla explained that the success of the legal changes will depend on whoever is elected as the next president. 

“Undoubtedly, this report holds great value. It not only offers another perspective on the armed conflict, but also explicitly incorporates animals into the analysis of war, harm, and peace,” said Senator Padilla. She added that animals must be involved in reparations processes, insisting, “peace must include animals, or it will not be complete.”

The post ‘Invisible damage’: Report on violence against animals in Colombia conflict appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

Colombian banks have access to millions of customer conversations: through their service lines, in their chats, and across their digital channels – including their Twitter and Instagram pages. Those interactions contain the real causes behind the complaints, repeating friction patterns, and the exact words customers use when something goes wrong.

The situation is dire. In late 2025, Colombia’s Financial Superintendency received 2.76 million complaints related to banking services and operations; two-thirds of customers had at least one complaint that warranted taking the time to lodge with their bank. And the single most common reason for complaints was unrecognized transactions, accounting for 39.8% of cases. 

Beyond pointing out a deficit in one bank or financial institution, the throughline remains: Colombia faces ongoing structural problems that plague customers across the country. 

With manual auditing, a company can review just 3% of its interactions – the remaining 97% are uncharted territory. That’s precisely where the intelligence that could meaningfully reduce those 2.76 million complaints lives. 

What’s clear is that nearly 40% of complaints boil down to the same problem: unrecognized transactions. What remains hazy, however, is what is behind the phenomenon – because of the unprocessed data and information. 

Is it concentrated on specific products, or are certain customer segments facing this more than others? These are considerations – critical to solving the root cause – that a 3% snapshot of the picture can never answer. 

Yet the raw data is there: customers interacting with chatbots or speaking to a representative on the phone almost always includes the core details to unravel the mystery: the issue, the time, the place – all this information against the backdrop of the account holder details that are on file. 

That untold information is the salve needed to treat the systemic issue that continues to fester. 

Evidently, leaning on manual approaches to managing customer care is not sufficient. The nationwide customer care headaches in Colombian banking will only get worse, at the cost of customer loyalty and brand reputation. 

Technology can therefore not be left out of the equation; AI models are now sophisticated enough to not only analyze millions of customer conversations but also reason and learn through that data to simulate human response and decision-making. 

Cognitive AI, for one, is able to contextualize information as well, even in complex situations. In fact, 75% of customer care leaders view AI as a force for strengthening human intelligence, not replacing it. 

And that innovation exists on local soil, built for the particular needs of Colombia’s banking ecosystem. 

One Colombian startup, Kognia, has built Alan CX Insights precisely for this. Kognia’s platform analyzes 100% of contact center interactions and turns that mass of conversations into identified root causes, detected patterns, and concrete improvement recommendations.

“Reducing complaints and getting to the crux of these issues is about so much more than simply closing tickets faster. It’s about empowering banks and customers alike, creating a system where people feel seen and heard, while building much-needed trust,” said Luis Guillermo Pardo, CEO of Kognia. 

“We designed Alan CX Insights to remove the pain points from the process and the guesswork that only compounds confusion. It’s about bringing transparency and the full story to light, on a constant basis, for each and every case.” 

With Alan CX Insights, every customer interaction is logged and audited – no more closed cases without resolution. The platform also extracts insights and feeds these back to create a constantly-improving and accurate system.

Already, the startup is seeing more than promising results: customer satisfaction has risen by 40% as the platform has driven first-contact resolution by 25%. Whereas manual processes take up to weeks to action complaints, Kognia’s AI can simultaneously process thousands of interactions. 

These numbers are pertinent to another dimension of Colombia’s systemic issues: accessibility to secure financial services. According to reports, 29.3% of complaints stemmed from low-value deposits. So, digital banking means lower-income account holders are no longer removed from the equation – in theory. 

But when friction occurs in their transactions, banks run the alarming risk of these account holders – who can’t resolve an issue with their basic savings in the current setup – walking away from the system altogether. 

Banks sit on a slew of siloed digital systems made up of millions of transaction records, customer and account records, service logs, and more. More often than not, these systems don’t speak to each other, making it difficult to build a coherent picture of any single customer’s journey, let alone identify patterns across millions.

Innovations like Kognia’s Alan CX Insights bridge those gaps, ensuring a logged complaint leads to an identified root cause and a prompt resolution so it doesn’t repeat. 

Now, amid the AI boom sweeping through Latin America, conversation intelligence and AI-driven CX analysis are strategic differentiators that grant banks and financial institutions an invaluable competitive advantage. 

Colombia’s banks are not short of data. But they do lack the time and manual resources to answer every customer’s complaints – and customers’ patience is waning. The tools now exist to turn those complaints into intelligence.

Featured image: Jhonny Estrada via Unsplash+

Disclosure: This article mentions clients of an Espacio portfolio company.

The post Colombian banking’s customer care is in disarray – could this local startup fix that? appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

Colombia is mourning the death of legendary singer and dancer Totó la Momposina, the artist who carried the rhythms of the Caribbean coast to audiences around the world. 

Totó’s death was disclosed in a statement by Colombia’s Ministry of Culture today, which described her as “the eternal master”, praising her decades-long contribution to Cumbia, Porro, Mapalé and Bullerengue music.

Her family confirmed that Totó died on Sunday, May 17, in Celaya, Mexico at age 85, after years battling neurocognitive health complications.

Born Sonia Bazanta Vides in 1940 in Talaigua Nuevo, Bolívar, near the historic river town of Mompox, Totó devoted her life to preserving and promoting traditional Caribbean music rooted in African, Indigenous and Spanish influences.

For more than six decades, Totó became the voice of Colombia’s Caribbean soul. Raised in a musical family — her father was a drummer and her mother a singer and dancer — she began performing at an early age before later studying folklore and music in Bogotá, Paris and Cuba. 

In 1982, she accompanied Gabriel García Márquez to Stockholm during his Nobel Prize ceremony, where she performed Colombian Caribbean music before international dignitaries — a moment that became part of the country’s cultural history.

Her international breakthrough came with the 1993 album La Candela Viva, released through Peter Gabriel’s Real World label, which introduced global audiences to the song “El Pescador” and to authentic Colombian rhythms.

Over the years, Totó collaborated with and influenced artists across genres, while her music was sampled by international musicians including Jay-Z and Major Lazer. Her song “Latinoamérica” alongside Calle 13 won her two Latin Grammy Awards in 2011. She officially retired from performing in 2022 due to health complications.

Totó received numerous honors throughout her career, including the Womex Award in 2006, Colombia’s Life and Work Award in 2011, and the Latin Grammy Award for Musical Excellence in 2013.

Colombian President Gustavo Petro honored the singer in a post on X today, calling her “an exalted figure of Colombian Caribbean art and culture,” adding, “may she fly high to the stars.” 

Her family also announced that a tribute honoring the singer-songwriter will be held on May 27 at the National Capitol in Bogotá, as the country prepares to bid farewell to one of the most influential voices in its cultural history.

The post Totó la Momposina, Colombia’s treasured Caribbean singer, dies at 85 appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

On May 13, Claribel Moreno was found dead in a rural area of Jamundí, Valle del Cauca, after spending almost five years dedicated to searching for her daughter demanding truth, justice, and reparations. 

Moreno was shot four times while riding a motorcycle, according to authorities, who added that investigations into who the shooting are ongoing. 

Activist groups say the killing highlights the pattern of violence against women in Colombia and the perils of seeking truth and justice. 

Moreno’s daughter, Natalia Buitrago, was 22 when she disappeared in Cartagena on August 18, 2021, after reportedly traveling with friends and her husband to celebrate her birthday.

Moreno accused Natalia’s husband, Hernán Darío Jiménez, of being behind her disappearance, citing a history of domestic violence. She highlighted alleged inconsistencies and contradictions in his testimony and said that years earlier he had been arrested in Mexico City for involvement in a drug trafficking network. 

According to a statement from feminist collectives supporting Moreno’s search for justice, there is evidence that plane tickets were purchased in Natalia’s name and that she had left the country. It also alleged thauit immigration authorities and other state entities have not responded to this matter.

Moreno conducted her own investigation: she traveled to Cartagena, Bogotá, and Pereira to gather testimonies and information in the hope of clarifying what happened and finding her daughter. She always stressed that she believed her daughter had been a victim of human trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation.

Following that, she said she faced threats and physical attacks, which forced her other daughter to leave the country. Moreno denounced this harassment to the media and in congressional hearings, as well as criticizing what she described as failures in the investigations, as well as institutional and state abandonment and revictimization.

“I feel that the Colombian State abandoned me throughout this process, in this search. Today I call on all of you who are present here to help me in this search and not to leave all the mothers forgotten, nor our daughters. My daughter Natalia deserves to be searched for, she deserves to be found,” she said in a congressional hearing.

As part of the search for her daughter, Moreno created social media accounts such as TikTok and Instagram to raise awareness about the case. She danced like her daughter in videos explaining the case and embraced youthful audiovisual languages to help the message reach more people. Moreno became known online and among victims groups for leading the search for her daughter ever since.

“She tried to raise awareness about the case through digital media; she more or less understood how public opinion works. Women searching for their loved ones instinctively understand what they need to do to make noise,” said Isabella Vargas, activist with the Olga Castillo collective – a feminist collective that accompanied Castillo, another mother who sought justice for her daughter, who was sexually abused by U.S. military personnel.

Feminist and women’s collectives in Bogotá that knew Moreno organized a gathering at the Pola monument on May 15 to commemorate her. Claribel was close to the feminist movement and attended its gatherings carrying her purple and pink sign demanding justice for her daughter: “Not all of us are here, Natalia is missing.”

“She was a woman who found refuge in the feminist movement. She reached out to us on several occasions, participated in our sit-ins and marches, and we embraced her in her struggle… It deeply pains us because this struggle has been about finding justice for all of us. It hurts us greatly that another mother is gone and that the State left her unprotected. We hold the State responsible,” Vargas said.

With an altar, candles, flowers, a bonfire, and a speech about conscientious objection to sexual exploitation, the tribute demanded justice for both Moreno and her daughter.

The post Colombia mother searching for missing daughter since 2021 killed in Valle del Cauca appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

Hundreds of cars briefly blocked all three lanes of Avenida La Esmeralda in the center of Bogotá on Sunday afternoon as supporters of hard-right Abelardo de la Espriella gathered to show their support for his candidacy two weeks before the presidential elections kick off.

De la Espriella himself was campaigning in Valledupar, but his campaign called for Abelardistas in over 70 municipalities around the country to come out and show their support by convening a noisy caravan.

While many Colombian families relaxed in neighboring Parque Simón Bolívar, a few hundred die-hard supporters of the far-right populist showman answered the call.

The hallmark of de la Espriella’s campaign for the presidency is its promotion of sincere patriotic fervour, and this passion was very much on display.

Colombian flags and football jerseys, vallenato, vuvuzelas, balloons and the words “Firme por la Patria” (Steadfast for the Homeland) abounded.

While the lanes filled up, the self-titled Defensores de la Patria (Defenders of the Homeland) honked their horns, danced, took photos, chatted and saluted one another. Some applied camouflage paint to their faces to get in character.

Vendors were selling Colombia flags and mango biche while children danced to songs hailing El Tigre’s achievements and virtues.

Speaking to The Bogotá Post, some of those present said they were attracted to de la Espriella as an aspirational figure who makes them feel proud to be Colombian. Others are attracted by his personal values. 

For Adriana, waving her flag in the middle of the road, “it is very important that he is a family man, he works hard for his family, he takes his family with him everywhere, and they are very close.”

She believes young people turn to crime because they lack the pride and self-confidence to make something of themselves, describing Abelardo as the kind of role model who could “inspire young people to make a positive contribution to society.”

Others had come along to demonstrate their implacable opposition to a government led by Iván Cepeda, the left-wing candidate currently leading in the polls.

Aron, wearing a baseball cap emblazoned with de la Espriella’s face, is saluting passersby. He explained his view that, “Petro is a socialist, but Cepeda is a communist. Petro is progressive, but Cepeda wants to completely change the country. He doesn’t believe in private property.”

His friend, Doris, added that, “Cepeda will take us down the path of Venezuela.”

Time and again participants reported that they believe Abelardo will bring freedom to Colombia. 

For some, that meant freedom of speech, which they feel has been curtailed under Petro.

For others, freedom meant freedom from crime and corruption, which Abelardo will end by “ruling with an iron fist.”

For yet others, freedom meant an end to economic regulations that they see as inhibiting economic competition.

Everyone who spoke to The Bogotá Post said Colombia needed “saving” from something – which varied from person to person – and that Abelardo was that “savior”.

One man even said, “If we don’t win, they will have stolen it from us.” Accounts affiliated to de la Espriella’s campaign have been disseminating fake polling that shows him winning 86% of the vote. 

Nevertheless, his supporters are pragmatic enough to vote tactically. Every person I spoke to admitted they would vote for right-wing Paloma Valencia in the second round, if Abelardo does not get through, in order to keep Cepeda from power. After an hour of stationary honking, the convoy, led by an enormous dumpster truck, set off on its tour of the city, and the mango biche sellers drifted back into the park.

The post Inside a pro-Abelardo de la Espriella rally in Bogotá appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

Less than three weeks before Colombians head to the polls in presidential elections, centrist candidate Claudia Lopez’s odds at victory are slim, to say the least.

Since winning the primary contest to lead the Consultation of Solutions (Consulta de las Soluciones) bloc in March, the silver-haired former mayor of Bogotá has been criss-crossing the country to win over moderate voters.

But the latest polls report the 56-year-old’s share of the vote as being in the low single digits.

Dressed in her signature gilet and sipping from a mug of coffee, the former Harvard University guest lecturer says in flawless English that she wants to do the interview in Spanish – “I need to get people to vote for me,” she jokes. 

With little to lose, López speaks candidly about her time in office, her views on other politicians, and her experience on the campaign trail.

Watch the full interview here

Reflections on her mayorship

López, who steered Bogotá through the Covid-19 pandemic and a mass wave of anti-government protests, speaks proudly of her stint as mayor from 2020 to 2024.

The presidential hopeful rattles off a list of her achievements in office: her management of the Covid-19 pandemic, lifting 600,000 women out of poverty, and rolling out Bogotá’s public bicycle network.

López also speaks candidly about the problems during her mayorship, which spanned the administrations of presidents Iván Duque and Gustavo Petro.

“Interestingly, I ended up having an easier relationship with President Duque, a right-winger, than with my left-wing president, whom I voted for,” says López. 

López, who publicly backed Petro’s candidacy, describes friction between the national government and the mayor’s office.

“President Petro is an effusive leader, but he is too effusive, very machista, and I, well, I don’t agree with that; if there’s one thing I can’t stand in my life, it’s the abuse of power.”

On the campaign trail

Today, the former senator finds herself trying to carve out a place in a noisy election cycle marked by political extremes and polarization.

Her coalition’s platform is based on three pillars: security and territorial governance; equality and social justice; and regional development without corruption.

López’s shift to the center has drawn some criticism, including from voters who note the former Green Alliance member’s u-turn on key environmental issues like fracking.

Last year, she declared: “If god gave us oil, coal, and gas, that is what we will use.”

“I maintain this stance,” insists López, adding she opposes the Petro administration’s pause on all oil and gas exploration. “Stopping gas exploration means halting Colombia’s energy transition – it’s a mistake.”

López argues the policy has damaged the economy and reduced funds for investment and development. 

Instead, she backs a gradual transition: “I estimate that the transition in Colombia from fossil fuels to cleaner energy sources will take us about 25 years, give or take.”

The candidate believes in preserving biodiversity, saying she would not authorize mineral exploration in the country’s forests or protected areas, marking a softer stance than some of her opponents.

Among her rivals, López is especially critical of right-wing criminal defense attorney Abelardo de la Espriella.

“He is the only candidate – let’s put it this way – whom I would absolutely never vote for. He is a defender of mobsters. He is a shadowy character,” says López.

De la Espriella notoriously represented figures linked to paramilitary death squads, the head of the worst pyramid scheme in Colombian history, and Alex Saab, considered the frontman for corruption schemes by former Venezuelan dictator Nicolas Maduro. 

López argues that he is an Uribista – a supporter of the politics of right-wing ex-president Álvaro Uribe – but is on a different “side of the coin” to Uribe’s chosen candidate, Paloma Valencia.

“Paloma is definitely a supporter of Uribe, but she’s never exactly been a defender of mobsters,” explains López.

The ex-mayor refused to rule out voting for Valencia or for leftist candidate Ivan Cepeda, the two frontrunners alongside de la Espriella.

But López, a lesbian woman, is staunchly critical of Valencia’s stance on LGBTQ+ rights. The candidate for Uribe’s Democratic Center (Centro Democrático) party opposes adoption by same-sex couples while her party has blocked bans on conversion therapy. 

She is particularly critical of Juan Daniel Oviedo, a gay politician, for agreeing to be Valencia’s running mate in March. 

“I regret that Juan Daniel Oviedo feels compelled to play along with that anti-rights agenda. In fact, I believe he is the only person who has been told to his face that he is not considered an equal human being, that he is not considered a citizen with the same rights, and that they do not trust him to raise a child,” says López.

Despite her objections to Valencia, López says she still will not rule out voting for her in the second round, citing the improbable possibility that Paloma faces de la Espriella in a run-off.

But the former mayor maintains she would not endorse Valencia and Oviedo in any eventuality: “I wouldn’t campaign for them, ask anyone to vote for them, or endorse them.”

Looking to the future

Finally, faced with nearly impossible odds in May’s elections, López projects a springy optimism about her political future.

“I’m very happy with the campaign I’ve run, and I’m very grateful to the Colombian people,” says the candidate, stressing that it is just her first stab at the presidency.

“Ours is a new grassroots movement; we only just collected the signatures last year, so I feel grateful, happy, and very excited, and I’m going to continue in politics and continue working to build Colombian social democracy.”

Featured image description: Claudia Lopez.

Featured image credit: Billy Ramsey.

The post In conversation with Claudia López, ex-mayor of Bogotá and presidential candidate appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

The Venezuelan government on Wednesday published a declaration saying it regretted recent violence in the Catatumbo region of Colombia just days after Bogotá announced bombing in cooperation with Caracas.

The statement muddies the waters about whether or not Venezuela was involved in the military operations against the National Liberation Army (ELN) rebels near the two countries’ joint border, which allegedly killed 7 guerrilla fighters. 

“The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela expresses its profound concern and regrets the escalation of violence in the border region of Catatumbo,” read a statement shared on X by Foreign Minister Yvan Gil.

The declaration came after Colombian President Gustavo Petro said on Monday that he had ordered the bombing in cooperation with Venezuela. 

“I gave the order to bomb the ELN camp in accordance with the agreement reached with the Bolivarian government of Venezuela,” wrote Petro on X.

Petro appeared to allude to an agreement with Caracas to cooperate on tackling cross-border crime following his visit to Venezuela in April. 

But Caracas appeared to wash its hands of the recent bombing operation; while it did not directly acknowledge the bombing or Petro’s statement, its declaration said that it “rejects any armed action that compromises the peace, stability, and security of border communities.” 

It added that the only way to preserve peace and stability in the region is through “mechanisms of understanding and mutual respect, avoiding actions that can aggravate tensions or generate greater risks for border populations, who for decades have faced the consequences of a conflict out of their control.”

Since last year, Catatumbo has been the site of what has been described as “the most serious humanitarian crisis of recent times” in Colombia. In January 2025, a family of three, including a nine-month-old baby, was killed, marking the collapse of fragile peace pacts between the ELN and the Frente 33 – a dissident faction of the demobilized FARC rebels – and triggering a humanitarian crisis on a scale not seen in the country for over a decade.

The Red Cross said that 2025 was one of the most complicated years for humanitarian conditions in Colombia: more than 235,000 people were individually displaced, over 176,000 people have been unable to move freely because of armed conflict, and there has also been a sharp increase in cases of mass displacements.

Venezuela’s statement highlights the cross-border nature of the conflict, noting that the country “has historically suffered the consequences of Colombian internal conflict.” Colombian armed groups like the ELN and dissident FARC factions have traditionally had a significant presence in Venezuela and were known to have ties to the Nicolás Maduro regime.

But both the interim government under Delcy Rodríguez and Petro have been under pressure from the White House to confront guerrilla groups.

The post Venezuela contradicts Colombia cooperation claims about military strikes near border appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

2025 was worst humanitarian crisis in over a decade, says report.

Colombia’s armed groups must stop targeting civilians, urged the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) this week in a report highlighting the country’s intensifying conflict.

In 2025 the impact of armed conflict on communities was the worst recorded in a decade, said the ICRC, with all indicators showing mistreatment of civilians on the rise.

Quoting statistics from Colombia’s victim support unit – the UARIV – the human rights organization reported more than 87,000 persons displaced in mass events by conflict or threats, and a further 235,000 forced to uproot their lives individually.

Also in 2025, at various times more almost 177,000 people were confined in their communities by aggression by armed groups, either by combat or closing of transport routes.

And in a shocking figure, 965 persons were killed or injured by explosives, often delivered by drones, an increase of 34% on the previous year (2024). Most victims were civilians.

“The scale of this human tragedy cannot be described by numbers alone but is reflected in the suffering of entire communities living in fear of fighting,” said the ICRCs Colombia chief Olivier Dubois, presenting the findings.

“Families are forced to leave everything behind in order to survive, the search for thousands of missing persons, and the shattered lives of boys and girls scarred by war,” he added.

New forms of warfare

The ICRC has a key role in promoting International Humanitarian Law (IHL) in armed conflicts – the so-called ‘rules of war’ – of which an important part is keeping civilians out of the crossfire. The Geneva-based organization, which has been present in Colombia for decades, said upholding these rules depended on decisions by the armed actors themselves.

This was an increasingly difficult task given the breakdown of formerly hierarchical armed groups into numerous factions. And with new forms of warfare.

“In 2025, our teams worked in a context marked by the intensification and transformation of armed conflict dynamics, including an increasing use of new technologies, such as the use of drones, with significant consequences on civilians’ daily lives,” said Dubois.

The increase of explosive hazards – booby traps, landmines and drone bombs – affected civilians as clashes intensified in departments such as Norte de Santander, Cauca, Antioquia and Valle.

In these areas a total of 75 civilians were affected by landmines, and more than 540 injured or killed by “controlled detonation devices and launched explosive devices”, a term that includes a range of improvised devices from roadside bombs to armed drones and clumsy pipe mortars firing cooking gas cylinders packed with explosives.

Intimidation and power

The rise in drone-dropped bombs had not only intensified in the conflict but “generated fear, uncertainty and serious harm among affected communities”.

The report also described scant regard for civilian spaces as explosives were found scattered in fields, roads and even schools, stated the report.

“The way in which hostilities are conducted, and weapons are used, has direct implications for civilians and civilian property”, it added.

The ICRC also warned of the horror of sexual violence within the conflict framework, though often hidden and unreported. From its own presence in zones dominated by armed groups, the ICRC was aware that rape and abuse survivors faced stigmatization and fear of reprisals.

This created barriers for victims seeking care and assistance and under-reporting of cases: “The available figures do not reflect the true scale of this phenomenon,” said the report.

Armed groups used sexual violence as a form of intimidation and a show of power, but in some cases also as a form of punishment in communities under their control.

The report also called on armed groups to stop recruiting minors: “No person under the age of 18 should be recruited, used or involved in hostilities under any circumstances,” it said.

The humanitarian crisis observed last year was not a sudden phenomenon, explained the ICRC, but rather the culmination of year-on deterioration since 2018.

Bad month for civilians

The report follows a calamitous month for Colombia in terms of civilian victims. In late April, 21 bus passengers were killed in Cauca when the EMC armed group exploded a roadside bomb by a queue of stopped traffic.

And in early May a young journalist was tortured and murdered by suspected Frente 36 dissidents in a rural area close to Briceño, Antioquia.

See also: Colombian journalist found dead days after being reported missing

The report’s findings chime with those from thinktanks and UN agencies that have rung alarm bells over growing conflict and abuses by armed groups.

In February, UNICEF warned of a spike in child recruitment with numbers rising 400 per cent over five years, with one minor forced into conflict on average every 20 hours.

The same month thinktank Fundacion Ideas para la Paz (FIP) published data showing that Colombia’s illegal armed groups had grown by 84 per cent during the three years of the Petro government’s Paz Total policy

Armed groups had cynically used rounds of negotiations to expand both in numbers and territory, FIP analyst Gerson Arias told The Bogotá Post.

“As such, the policy gave a gigantic strategic advantage to the armed groups to strengthen their fighting forces,” he said.

War without ideology

A common theme between conflict commentators was the lack of ideology among today’s armed groups, lowering any humanitarian impulses. This even though these groups at times mimicked the uniforms, logos and terminology of former rebel movements with social agendas such as the FARC-EP.

“Any ideological dimension of these groups has been replaced by the dynamics of illegal markets,” Gerson told The Bogotá Post last week. “The dimension now is military strength to sustain those markets.”

From the 1960s to the 1980s Colombia’s guerrilla movements were close to rural communities. That relationship was now predatory, said Gerson. “Communities in Cauca, for example, don’t feel represented or protected by these armed groups who attack them, confine them and recruit their children,” he explained.

The question now is: will the current crop of combatants heed the ICRC’s call this week to respect civilian communities?

ICRC’s Olivier Dubois said that while the context was challenging, international humanitarian law should be foremost in the minds of all fighters in the conflict.

In particular, he called on armed groups to protect children from war, and respect spaces such as schools. He also called for an end to forced disappearances, of which the ICRC recorded 308 new cases last year, on top of the 132,000 historical cases reported by the authorities over six decades of conflict.

“No one should go missing, and no family should have to endure the uncertainty of not knowing what happened or where their loved one is. Preventing the disappearance of persons is an obligation imposed by Interntional Humanitarian Law on all parties to armed conflicts,” he said.

“Upholding international humanitarian law is fundamental to limit suffering in armed conflicts. When these rules are not respected, suffering is exacerbated”.

The post ICRC tells Colombian armed groups to ‘stop targeting civilians’. appeared first on The Bogotá Post.