Colombia’s Runoff Could Reshape Investment, Energy, and Labor Policy

Colombia’s first-round presidential election, held Sunday, May 31, 2026, produced a result that crystallizes the country’s political exhaustion with both the governing left and the traditional right. Criminal defense attorney and political outsider Abelardo de la Espriella placed first with more than 10.3 million votes. Leftist Senator Iván Cepeda, a close ally of outgoing President Gustavo Petro and the lead architect of the administration’s Paz Total peace policy, finished second with just under 9.7 million votes. The two will face each other in a runoff election on June 21.

Senator Paloma Valencia, the candidate backed by former President Álvaro Uribe and the standard-bearer of his Uribismo movement, placed a distant third, receiving less than 7% of the vote — fewer than 1.7 million ballots. Former Medellín mayor and Antioquia governor Sergio Fajardo received just over one million votes, while former Bogotá mayor Claudia López finished below 1%, with approximately 225,000 votes. The remaining minor candidates combined for just over 1% of the total.

Under Colombia’s electoral system, the top two finishers advance to a runoff if no candidate surpasses 50% in the first round. The June 21 vote will determine who assumes the presidency on August 7.

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The Candidates: Background and Context

Abelardo de la Espriella, 47, has never held elected office. He built a national profile over more than two decades as a high-profile defense attorney, founding De La Espriella Lawyers in 2002, with offices in Colombia and the United States. His client roster has included controversial figures: he represented Alex Saab, a Colombian-born businessman who became a close associate of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and was implicated in a scheme to launder proceeds from Venezuela’s food-assistance program, the Comité Local de Abastecimiento y Producción (CLAP). Saab was extradited to the United States, convicted, and later granted clemency before being re-arrested in Venezuela in early 2026. De la Espriella also represented members of the Nule family in connection with the Carrusel de Contratos — a major contracting scandal tied to infrastructure works at Bogotá’s El Dorado airport corridor. He has additionally been reported to have represented individuals linked to organized crime.

De la Espriella has drawn comparisons to figures such as US President Donald Trump and El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele. His campaign has centered on hard-line security policy, including proposals for large-scale incarceration, expanded military operations against armed groups, and the rejection of negotiations with guerrilla organizations. He is reported to hold Italian and US citizenship in addition to his Colombian nationality, and is said to own property in Florida.

In a notable departure from his defense work, de la Espriella took the side of a victim in a high-profile acid-attack case, acting as a private prosecutor to secure a stronger sentence for the perpetrator — an episode that raised his public profile beyond the defense bar.

Iván Cepeda, 63, enters the runoff as the consolidated candidate of the Colombian left and Petro’s Pacto Histórico coalition. He is the primary legislative architect of Paz Total, the Petro administration’s policy of negotiating simultaneously with multiple armed actors, including the ELN and FARC dissident factions. Cepeda’s family background includes deep ties to the Colombian left: his father was secretary general of the Communist Party, and was assassinated. Cepeda himself studied in communist Bulgaria during the soviet era. The two finalists have an established legal and political history: Uribe attempted to bring criminal charges against Cepeda while both served in the Senate, but the Supreme Court determined that Uribe had fabricated the accusations and attempted to bribe witnesses — a case that resulted in Uribe’s criminal conviction.

“If nothing changes, Abelardo wins.” — Loren Moss, Finance Colombia

The Electoral Map

The geographic distribution of the vote reflects deep regional divisions. Cepeda carried Bogotá, which has trended left for years, particularly in lower-income districts on the city’s south and west sides. Antioquia — historically the heartland of Uribismo and home to Medellín, the country’s second-largest city — voted more than two to one for de la Espriella, a result that signals the weakening grip of Uribe’s movement even in its traditional stronghold.

The heart of coffee-growing country — the departments of Caldas, Risaralda, and Quindío also went to de la Espriella. Caquetá, a sparsely populated department in southern Colombia that has suffered sustained guerrilla violence from both the ELN and FARC dissident groups, voted for de la Espriella as well, a result we may interpret as a direct rejection of Petro and Cepeda’s Paz Total.

Cepeda carried Colombia’s Pacific coast, including the chronically neglected department of Chocó, as well as the sparsely populated Amazonas and Putumayo departments bordering Peru and Brazil, and the northern Caribbean coast. The Caribbean coast result is notable, as the region has historically suffered from underdevelopment, infrastructure deficits, and significant income inequality. Norte de Santander with its Catatumbo region on the Venezuelan border and experiencing severe armed-group activity — voted for de la Espriella, a result consistent with public exhaustion over security policy.

The Political Context: From Uribe to Petro and Beyond

Colombia’s current political trajectory is rooted in decisions made across the past two decades. President Uribe served two terms in the early 2000s and, together with then-Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos, mounted a sustained military campaign against the FARC that significantly weakened the insurgency. Santos later broke from Uribe after assuming the presidency, governing independently and ultimately negotiating a peace agreement with the FARC — a deal that Uribe actively opposed. A plebiscite on the accord failed, but Santos used legislative maneuvering to implement it anyway.

Uribe’s next handpicked candidate, Iván Duque, won the 2018 election but finished his term with approximately 30% approval. Members of his own party publicly distanced themselves from him — Senator María Fernanda Cabal, a staunch Uribista, called Duque a “mamerto” (leftist idiot) while he was still in office. Under his administration, indicators on crime and guerrilla activity worsened, and armed groups including the ELN rebuilt operational capacity that had been degraded under Uribe and Santos.

Petro’s administration has not met initial fears of a Venezuelan-style democratic breakdown: Congress has largely blocked the most radical components of his agenda, including attempts to nationalize the private pension system and convert the healthcare system to a single-payer model. However, crime has increased, armed groups have expanded their operational footprints, and the security situation in several regions has worsened. Paz Total is widely seen as having produced few tangible results.

Uribe himself was convicted of witness tampering and attempted bribery in the case he had brought against Cepeda. Though released from house arrest after conviction, the judges who authorized his release are now reportedly under investigation for judicial corruption. Valencia’s poor performance in the first round — despite being Uribe’s chosen standard-bearer — suggests that Uribismo as a political force is waning, with its core constituency aging and new generations of voters disengaged from the Uribe legacy.

What to Expect Before June 21

Both campaigns will intensify mobilization efforts over the coming three weeks. Cepeda’s movement — Colombia Humana and the broader Pacto Histórico coalition — has historically relied on organized mobilizations, including indigenous community-led mingas, labor unions, and allied social movements. Cepeda’s running mate Senator Aida Quilcué is an indigenous activist, a choice expected to energize those constituencies. FECODE, the Federación Colombiana de Trabajadores de la Educación (Colombia’s main teachers’ federation), is expected to align officially with Cepeda, though individual teachers may not follow union leadership in their voting choices.

On the right, Paloma Valencia issued a public endorsement of de la Espriella immediately following the first-round results. Business community organizations, including ANDI (the Asociación Nacional de Empresarios de Colombia) and Fenalco (the Federación Nacional de Comerciantes), do not formally endorse candidates, but their members are widely understood to favor a government that supports private enterprise and market-oriented policy. De la Espriella holds no congressional constituency, meaning whichever candidate wins will face the same dynamic Petro encountered: a fragmented Congress that is likely to act as a check on executive authority.

The question of centrist voter alignment remains open. Fajardo and López are not expected to formally endorse either finalist, and the direction of their combined approximately 1.2 million votes is uncertain.

Winners and Losers by Sector

For international investors and executives operating in Colombia, the policy differences between the two candidates are substantive across several key sectors.

Petroleum and Natural Gas: De la Espriella has stated unequivocally that he will restart petroleum exploration and licensing, which the Petro administration blocked. Ecopetrol S.A. (NYSE: EC; BVC: ECOPETROL), Colombia’s state-controlled oil company, which also holds producing assets in the US Permian Basin and Gulf of Mexico, has operated under a government that halted new drilling permits. The consequences have included a decline in future production capacity at a time when global oil prices have risen due to Middle East tensions. Colombia has been forced to import natural gas at elevated prices to meet existing domestic demand — including from transportation fleets that were converted to natural gas under government incentive programs. Cepeda would be expected to continue or deepen current restrictions on fossil fuel expansion.

Healthcare: The Petro-Cepeda platform favors a government single-payer model. The administration has already taken over several Entidades Promotoras de Salud (EPS) — Colombia’s managed-care intermediaries — placing the healthcare system in legal and financial uncertainty. Private clinics, hospitals, and physicians who wish to operate outside a government-controlled framework would benefit from a de la Espriella administration. Cepeda’s healthcare agenda would accelerate the shift toward government-managed care.

BPO, Tech, and Call Centers: The BPO sector — which provides large volumes of formal employment, particularly in Medellín, Bogotá, Cali, and Barranquilla — was significantly affected by Petro-era minimum wage increases of 16% and 23% in successive years. These increases created contract renegotiation pressures with international clients, some of whom have shifted or considered shifting operations to competing jurisdictions including Honduras, Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, and Guatemala. At the CX Summit, the industry’s main annual event held in Cartagena, the son of Álvaro Uribe appeared as an invited keynote speaker — a gesture that could be interpreted within the industry as an implicit signal of political alignment. A de la Espriella government, with its orientation toward labor market deregulation and reduced regulatory burden, would be viewed more favorably by this sector. Current Colombian labor law prohibits part-time employment contracts and places significant restrictions on dual employment, making workforce flexibility difficult for businesses that operate outside traditional 40-hour weekly structures.

Mining: The Petro administration has been less aggressive toward mining than toward petroleum, but sector participants expect a more permissive regulatory environment under de la Espriella, and continued constraints under Cepeda.

Security and Tourism: Both candidates have stated support for tourism promotion, but the sector’s trajectory is more directly linked to security conditions. Under current policies, several regions that were accessible to domestic and international travelers several years ago have experienced increased armed-group activity, effectively closing them to tourism. A de la Espriella administration is expected to pursue a more aggressive military posture toward the ELN and FARC dissident factions; a Cepeda government would likely continue dialogue-first approaches. The outcome will directly affect which parts of Colombia’s territory remain accessible to investment and tourism.

Foreign Relations: A de la Espriella government is expected to restore a broadly cooperative relationship with the United States, which deteriorated under Petro following several high-profile diplomatic incidents. De la Espriella has expressed admiration for US President Donald Trump, and reports indicate he holds US citizenship and owns property in Florida. Relations with Ecuador, which have been strained by mutual tariff escalations between Petro and Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa, would be expected to normalize. Relations with Venezuela under Cepeda would likely continue along the current allied trajectory, while a de la Espriella government would be expected to take a more critical posture toward Caracas. China and Russia would find a more receptive diplomatic environment under Cepeda, and a cooler one under de la Espriella.

The Poor and Informal Workers: Cepeda’s campaign argues that minimum wage increases and expanded state services benefit lower-income Colombians. Critics counter that elevated formal labor costs have pushed more employment into the informal sector — which currently accounts for approximately half the Colombian workforce — depriving those workers of pension contributions, health benefits, and job security. De la Espriella’s platform, which emphasizes business formation, security, and labor market deregulation, would be presented as generating more formal-sector job creation. The actual distributional effects of either approach remain contested.

The Outlook

Assuming current polling trends hold and Uribista voters consolidate behind de la Espriella as expected following Valencia’s endorsement, de la Espriella enters the runoff as the frontrunner. Cepeda’s path to victory depends on driving high turnout among his base, securing support from centrist voters who did not vote for either finalist in the first round, and potentially benefiting from any missteps by de la Espriella in the final three weeks of campaigning.

The first-round results produced no major electoral violence. The ELN announced a temporary halt to armed actions during the voting period. Authorities detained some individuals reportedly attempting to purchase votes in rural areas, but no large-scale incidents were recorded.

The incoming president will face a Congress with no natural majority aligned to the executive, a healthcare system in partial administrative disarray, a petroleum sector whose future production trajectory is in question, and regions where state presence remains contested by armed groups. The June 21 runoff will determine which vision — market-oriented restructuring or continuation of the Petro project — Colombia pursues for the next four years.

The Venezuelan government on Wednesday published a declaration saying it regretted recent violence in the Catatumbo region of Colombia just days after Bogotá announced bombing in cooperation with Caracas.

The statement muddies the waters about whether or not Venezuela was involved in the military operations against the National Liberation Army (ELN) rebels near the two countries’ joint border, which allegedly killed 7 guerrilla fighters. 

“The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela expresses its profound concern and regrets the escalation of violence in the border region of Catatumbo,” read a statement shared on X by Foreign Minister Yvan Gil.

The declaration came after Colombian President Gustavo Petro said on Monday that he had ordered the bombing in cooperation with Venezuela. 

“I gave the order to bomb the ELN camp in accordance with the agreement reached with the Bolivarian government of Venezuela,” wrote Petro on X.

Petro appeared to allude to an agreement with Caracas to cooperate on tackling cross-border crime following his visit to Venezuela in April. 

But Caracas appeared to wash its hands of the recent bombing operation; while it did not directly acknowledge the bombing or Petro’s statement, its declaration said that it “rejects any armed action that compromises the peace, stability, and security of border communities.” 

It added that the only way to preserve peace and stability in the region is through “mechanisms of understanding and mutual respect, avoiding actions that can aggravate tensions or generate greater risks for border populations, who for decades have faced the consequences of a conflict out of their control.”

Since last year, Catatumbo has been the site of what has been described as “the most serious humanitarian crisis of recent times” in Colombia. In January 2025, a family of three, including a nine-month-old baby, was killed, marking the collapse of fragile peace pacts between the ELN and the Frente 33 – a dissident faction of the demobilized FARC rebels – and triggering a humanitarian crisis on a scale not seen in the country for over a decade.

The Red Cross said that 2025 was one of the most complicated years for humanitarian conditions in Colombia: more than 235,000 people were individually displaced, over 176,000 people have been unable to move freely because of armed conflict, and there has also been a sharp increase in cases of mass displacements.

Venezuela’s statement highlights the cross-border nature of the conflict, noting that the country “has historically suffered the consequences of Colombian internal conflict.” Colombian armed groups like the ELN and dissident FARC factions have traditionally had a significant presence in Venezuela and were known to have ties to the Nicolás Maduro regime.

But both the interim government under Delcy Rodríguez and Petro have been under pressure from the White House to confront guerrilla groups.

The post Venezuela contradicts Colombia cooperation claims about military strikes near border appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

Petro’s “Total Peace” strategy is under pressure ahead of presidential elections as violence by armed groups escalates

An explosive attack on the Pan-American Highway near the municipality of Cajibío, in Colombia’s Cauca department, left at least 21 people dead and 56 injured, Defense Minister Pedro Sánchez Suárez confirmed.

The attack occurred Saturday, April 25, on one of the main roads in the country’s southwest, an area historically affected by the presence of illegal armed groups.

The minister attributed the attack to alias “Marlon,” described as one of the most wanted leaders in the region, “for whom we are offering a reward of up to $1.4 million USD,” he said.

According to local media reports cited by El Tiempo, “the attack was initially intended to target army troops. However, a change in military plans reportedly led to the explosive being detonated while civilians were passing through the area.”

The impact of the attack was significant. Spain’s El País reported “that the explosion created a large crater, left the road covered in debris, and forced rescue operations that lasted several hours due to difficult access conditions.”

Cauca Governor Octavio Guzmán described the incident as one of the most serious attacks in the region in decades. “What happened on April 25 constitutes the most brutal and ruthless attack against civilians in decades,” he said.

The attack comes amid a resurgence of violence in southwestern Colombia, where illegal armed groups linked to drug trafficking, illegal mining and other illicit economies operate. Authorities continue operations in the area as investigations proceed to clarify the circumstances of the attack and determine responsibility.

According to reports by BBC Mundo, alias “Marlon” is a dissident FARC leader identified as Iván Jacobo Idrobo Arredondo, “the alleged head of the Jaime Martínez structure, part of the Estado Mayor Central (EMC),” one of the country’s most powerful illegal armed groups.

Operations and arrests

As part of response operations, the National Police reported the capture of José Alex Bitoco, alias “David” or “Mi Pez,” identified as the leader of the Dagoberto Ramos structure, another illegal armed faction, who is believed to have acted under orders from alias “Marlon”.

National Police Director Gen. William Rincón Zambrano said the detainee “will have to answer for the wave of terrorist activity” and linked him directly to the attack, stating that “he is responsible for what happened on April 25 in the El Túnel sector on the Pan-American Highway.”

The Defense Ministry reiterated that alias “Marlon” remains a priority target. “He is a high-value target, and we are searching for him with all the capabilities of the state. We have deployed a dedicated intelligence task force to locate him,” Sánchez said, confirming a reward of up to $1.4 million USD for information leading to his capture.

Context: criticism of “Paz Total” policy (Total Peace)

The attack comes amid growing security deterioration in Colombia, intensifying criticism of President Gustavo Petro’s “Total Peace” policy. The Ideas for Peace Foundation (FIP) has warned of a possible failure of the strategy, noting that “less than four months before the end of the government, the lack of progress in peace negotiations and the deterioration of security have become one of the main points of criticism of the Petro administration.”

According to the think tank, during the current administration “the number of disputed territories between illegal actors has nearly doubled, and the number of members in these structures has increased by 85%: they now total more than 27,000 members, including armed individuals and support networks.”

This figure not only represents a significant increase but also places the country at levels similar to, and even higher than, those seen before the peace process with the FARC began. Between 2011 and 2012, the estimate stood at around 26,800 members, compared with 14,600 at the end of Iván Duque’s administration in 2022.

The recent increase has also been rapid. According to the FIP, armed groups grew by 23.5% over the past year (from December 2024 to December 2025), reflecting a swift reconfiguration of these structures. At the same time, violence has intensified. Analysts such as Professor Karol Solís Menco note that over the weekend of April 25–26 alone, “26 terrorist attacks of varying magnitude” were recorded across the country.

Political analysis outlets point to a structural dynamic. According to La Silla Vacía, “Cauca is not experiencing an isolated event, but rather a phase of intensifying territorialized violence, marked by fragmentation among armed actors and a type of violence capable of producing national-level impacts.”

In this context, FARC dissident groups have once again taken center stage in the conflict. “Once again, attention is turning to FARC dissidents. Every attack, every gas cylinder bomb, every assault in Valle and Cauca ends with the same name on the table: the Jaime Martínez structure, one of the strongest groups of Iván Mordisco’s Estado Mayor Central,” El País reported.

Violence indicators also reflect sustained deterioration. “In the first four months of 2026, Colombia has already recorded 48 massacres, with 229 victims, most of them civilians, according to Indepaz. It is the highest figure in the past decade. With these numbers, which represent only a partial picture of the country’s violence, this election year is shaping up to be the most violent since the 2016 peace agreement with the now-defunct FARC guerrilla group,” the same outlet reported.

Cauca, where the attack took place, is considered one of the most sensitive regions. “Cauca is particularly complex because it combines multiple layers of conflict: the historic presence of Indigenous, peasant and Afro-descendant communities; illicit economies; Pacific corridors; disputes over drug trafficking routes; control of the Pan-American Highway; and the presence of FARC dissidents, particularly structures linked to Iván Mordisco,” El País said.

Experts agree that part of the difficulty lies in the design and implementation of the government’s strategy. “Early implementation was a valuable innovation in intent, but it failed to ensure minimum conditions of verification and institutional coherence,” said analyst Germán Valencia of the Peace and Reconciliation Foundation (Pares).

Taken together, these factors have led various sectors to conclude that the “Total Peace” policy faces serious structural limitations amid a scenario of armed fragmentation and territorial expansion by illegal groups.

Colombia’s security forces believe FARC dissident leader Iván Mordisco is alive but seriously wounded following a major aerial bombardment in the remote department of Vaupés, dealing a significant blow to one of the country’s most powerful armed groups.

Uncertainty over the fate of Mordisco — whose real name is Néstor Gregorio Vera Fernández — mounted over the weekend after the military reported six people killed in the strike, raising expectations that the elusive commander might be among the dead.

But Colombia’s forensic authority, Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal, confirmed on March 29 that none of the bodies recovered from the operation corresponded to the rebel leader.

“After concluding forensic studies on six bodies received on March 28, it was determined that they correspond to four women and two men,” the agency said in a statement, adding that Mordisco was not among them.

Authorities said two of the women have yet to be formally identified. One of the victims is believed to have been a minor, aged between 16 and 17, according to officials.

The bombardment — one of the most powerful in recent months — targeted a jungle encampment linked to the dissident group’s Amazonas Bloc, considered part of Mordisco’s inner security ring. The operation combined air-to-ground strikes with a ground assault by elite units from Colombia’s military.

According to the armed forces, the offensive forms part of a broader escalation of operations against dissident factions that rejected the 2016 peace agreement with the FARC and resumed armed activity.

Military intelligence cited by local media indicates Mordisco was present in the area at the time of the attack and may have escaped wounded. Authorities say he is now “on the move” as troops attempt to close in on his location.

The head of Colombia’s Armed Forces, General Hugo Alejandro López Barreto, said the operation had “significantly affected the logistical and criminal capabilities” of the group, noting that weapons, explosives, communications equipment and computers were seized.

Among the items recovered were a pair of glasses resembling those used by Mordisco — a recurring detail in previous operations where the rebel leader narrowly escaped capture.

Security forces have since launched a large-scale containment operation in Vaupés, deploying troops, aircraft and surveillance drones in an effort to prevent his escape. “The objective is to establish a cordon — no one enters, no one leaves,” a security source said.

Mordisco, regarded as the top commander of the so-called Estado Mayor Central (EMC), has long been one of Colombia’s most wanted men. Authorities have placed a reward of 5 billion pesos (about $1.3 million) for information leading to his capture, while the United States has offered up to $5 million.

Despite sustained military pressure, he has repeatedly evaded capture. Officials say he has survived at least a dozen prior bombardments.

The latest operation follows a series of blows against his network earlier this month, including the arrest of several relatives and close associates in different parts of the country.

Government figures show that of 18 major operations carried out against illegal armed groups under President Gustavo Petro, 12 have targeted structures linked to the EMC.

The offensive comes as Petro’s “Total Peace” security strategy has stalled with illegal armed groups, including the National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrilla.

A confirmed injury or eventual capture of Mordisco would represent a major symbolic and operational victory for the government, potentially weakening one of the most hardline factions still engaged in conflict.

For now, uncertainty over his movements remains. While authorities have ruled out his death, the extent of his injuries — and his ability to continue commanding operations — is still unclear.

What is evident is that Colombian forces believe they are closer than ever to their target.

The new members of Congress will take office on July 20, the official start of the new legislative term.

On March 8, Colombia elected the Congress that will exercise legislative authority during the 2026–2030 term. From more than 3,200 candidates, voters chose the 102 senators (upper house) and 182 members of the House of Representatives (lower house) who will make up the country’s legislative branch.

According to preliminary reports from the Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil (RNEC), with 98.4% of polling stations counted, equivalent to 19,220,365 votes tallied, the new Congress has been defined electorally, however, it should be noted that these seat projections correspond to the official preliminary count, which still must go through several formal procedures before the final results are certified.

How the Senate Race is Shaping Up?

The Pacto Histórico, the party of current President Gustavo Petro, obtained around 22% of the vote (4,402,601), which would allow it to increase its representation from 20 senators in the current legislature to approximately 25 seats in the next term.

In second place is the Centro Democrático, the party of former President Álvaro Uribe, with about 15% of the vote (3,020,459), potentially increasing its representation from 13 to 17 seats.

The Partido Liberal would rank third with 13 seats (2,268,658 votes). It would be followed by the Alianza por Colombia, led by the Green Party, with 10 seats (1,899,096 votes), and the Partido Conservador, also with 10 seats (1,859,493 votes).

Other wins in the Senate include Party of La U (9 seats), Cambio Radical (7), the Ahora Colombia coalition (5), which backs presidential candidate Sergio Fajardo, and Salvación Nacional (4), the movement of presidential candidate Abelardo de la Espriella. The two remaining seats correspond to the special indigenous constituency.

In terms of losses in representation, the Partido Conservador would be the most affected, losing five of its current 15 seats. Cambio Radical would lose four, the Greens three, La U two, while Liberals and Ahora Colombia would each lose one seat.

Among the prominent figures who would be left out of the new Senate is former President Álvaro Uribe, who occupied position number 25 on his party’s list and would not obtain a seat if the Centro Democrático secures only 17 seats. Green Party senator Angélica Lozano, known for promoting legislation related to transparency, would also lose her seat.

Likewise, movements such as the coalition that supported Juan Daniel Oviedo and the Partido Oxígeno, led by former presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt, who was kidnapped for years by the now-defunct FARC guerrilla group, would fail to surpass the minimum threshold required to obtain Senate representation (3% of the total vote).

On the other hand, the performance of the Salvación Nacional movement, led by presidential candidate Abelardo de la Espriella, stands out. In its first participation in a congressional election, the party would surpass the electoral threshold and secure four senators.

What About the House of Representatives?

The allocation of seats in the House of Representatives follows a different process from that of the Senate, making it difficult to project the final distribution in the early stages of the vote count.

This is because the calculation is conducted department by department, once the RNEC determines the seat allocation formula and electoral quotient in each of the 32 States and the Capital District of Bogotá.

According to report number 45 from the RNEC, with 99.03% of votes counted, the main parties have obtained the following preliminary nationwide results:

• Centro Democrático: 2,551,706 votes.
• Partido Liberal: 2,101,877 votes.
• Partido Conservador: 1,967,996 votes.
• La U: 1,044,778 votes.
• Pacto Histórico: 913,990 votes.
• Cambio Radical: 803,721 votes.
• Alianza Verde: 654,071 votes.
• Salvación Nacional: 436,365 votes.

Because the House of Representatives elections involve parties, movements, and coalitions with strong local and regional influence, several smaller political organizations are expected to win seats, as they must surpass regional thresholds rather than a national one.

The Highlight: a Fragmented Congress that Will Require Coalitions

With the preliminary distribution of seats in both the Senate and the House of Representatives, projections suggest that Colombia’s next president will need to govern through legislative coalitions, as has occurred under President Gustavo Petro and his predecessors.

Presidential candidates Iván Cepeda, of the Pacto Histórico, and Paloma Valencia, of the Centro Democrático, would begin the next political phase with the largest congressional blocs, although neither would have enough seats to govern alone.

Traditional parties such as the Liberal, Conservador, Cambio Radical, and La U, which together could account for more than 40% of the new congress, have not yet decided which presidential candidate they will support, a situation similar to what occurred in the previous election. These parties could therefore become kingmakers, capable of facilitating, or blocking, governability depending on the alliances and coalitions they choose to form.

For that reason, the coming weeks are expected to be marked by intense political negotiations, as presidential contenders attempt to build alliances that would allow them to secure legislative support.

For candidates such as Sergio Fajardo, whose Ahora Colombia coalition would obtain only five senators, or Abelardo de la Espriella, whose Salvación Nacional movement would have four, the challenge will be significantly greater.

Above photo: Polling station during Colombia’s congressional elections. Photo courtesy of the Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil.

Former Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) commanders have for the first time in Colombian history freely admitted the armed group’s role in recruiting more than 18,677 children during five decades of their armed conflict with the state.

In a five-page document signed by Rodrigo Londoño, alias ‘Timochenko’, and five other demobilized senior leaders, the former fighters recognized their role in forcing minors into a life under arms.

Colombia’s peace court, known as the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP), had previously determined that the six defendants, all former members of the FARC secretariat, carried responsibility for the crimes of recruitment of minors under 15 years of age, mistreatment torture and murder of children, sexual and reproductive violence, and prejudice against minors with diverse sexual orientations or gender identities.

See also: Peace plan has caused more conflict, says thinktank.

In the letter to the court the six defendants admitted the acts and asked for forgiveness.

“There are no words to repair these deeds,” said Londoño in a televised address widely circulated this week. “Today with honesty and clarity we recognize our role.”

“We ask forgiveness from direct and indirect victims, and from society in general.”

Londoño, who was the FARC’s last field commander up until the peace signing, said he recognized that the rebel’s actions had “stolen childhoods” as young combatants faced constant fear and death.

Historical whitewashing

Londoño also acknowledged that “the homicides, forced abortions, acts of gender-based violence, and reproductive violence caused serious physical and psychological damage that still persists”.

The statement was a milestone in Case 07 of Colombia’s JEP, the special court charged with untangling crimes committed by all sides during the state conflict with the FARC.

Case 07 was opened in 2019 and has since officially recognized 18,677 victims, of which 54 per cent are children themselves recruited, and 46 per cent families who lost children to the conflict.

Other actors in Colombia’s armed conflict have used minors as well. According to Crisis Group, “right-wing paramilitary groups” counted some 2,800 children within their ranks when they demobilized in the mid-2000s.

Historically the FARC whitewashed their role in the recruitment of minors, and during the 2016 peace process vigorously denied accusations of abducting children or threatening families to hand over their children.

According to the FARC’s own narrative, many young recruits joining the Marxist guerrilla group were “volunteers escaping poverty”. The leadership traditionally downplayed reports of sexual abuse, forced abortions and the murders and disappearances of children as political propaganda.

As recently as 2015, FARC commanders were claiming that the armed group “under no circumstance recruited children, or anyone else, forcefully,” according to a Human Rights Watch report critical of the guerrilla’s position.

Never coming home

HRW’s own investigations had identified victims as young as 12 who were tied up by the guerrillas and threatened to be killed if they tried to resist. In other cases, kids were tricked with offers of presents or cash before being forced to fight under arms.

The report also cited cases of older commanders abusing girls as young as 12 in some incidents forcing them to use contraception or to have abortions.

According to JEP data presented under Case 07, child victims were present in the FARC ranks across 16 departments of Colombia, almost the whole territory controlled by the guerrilla group at its peak. Recruitment peaked between 1999 and 2013 but continued to 2016, the year of the peace accord between the rebels and the state.

Accredited to the case were 2,000 individual victims recruited as children but now adults, the JEP announced this week.

Also part of the group were families of 485 children recruited into the ranks who “never returned home”. The JEP had joined with the UPBD (Unidad de Búsqueda de Personas dadas por Desaparecidas) missing persons unit to try and locate the remains of those missing persons.

Details from Case 07 also highlighted the large numbers of minors taken from indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities, with 9,000 registered victims from six ethnic groups.

Restorative Justice

According to JEP proceedures, FARC leaders’ statements this week were an important step forward in the restorative justice process. The special peace court works with a system of dialogues between accused perpetrators and victims.

Information released by the court this week defined Case 07 as still in the dialogue phase with both private and public audiences were expected in the future where victims would given the opportunity to recount their experiences.

In line with previous cases, the former FARC leaders, could chose to respond to the crimes in front of the victims. Any punishment could come in the form of an eight-year sentence of restricted liberties for the former FARC leaders, though not jail time.

As part of the sentence the JEP might recommend restorative programs – a form of social work – in agreements made with the victims.   

For its part, the former FARC secretariat announced its full support for this process. In a taped statement former commander Julián Galló also accepted his role in the crimes.

“Our compromise is to work in the future so that hopefully these cases don’t keep on occurring,” he said.

Circular problem

Repetition was already happening, according to a report published last month by Crisis Group called Kids on the Front Lines: Stopping Child Recruitment in Colombia. According to the Brussels-based think tank, the practice had “boomed in the last decade” even since the FARC demobilized under the peace process in 2016.

A new generation of armed groups still relied on minors to maintain territorial control, said the report, with 620 cases reported in 2024: “Children carry out high-risk tasks, suffer abuse, and are punished with death if caught escaping.”

Ruthless gangs were using social media posts to reel vulnerable youngsters into the conflict with false promises of wealth, status and protection, said Crisis Group. Families faced reprisals if they spoke out, the report added.

And with increased competition between fractionated armed groups, minors were being pushed to the front lines: “Kids now fight in high-risk combat roles.”

Colombia’s circular problem of child recruitment was highlighted this week by JEP magistrate Lily Rueda, presiding over Case 07, in conversation with El Espectador. The message from the peace courts was “more relevant then ever” after data from UNICEF showed that the recruitment of children in Colombia had increased by 300% in the last five years.

“This is an opportunity to reiterate our commitment to investigating and prosecuting these acts of violence against children, which constitute war crimes and are not subject to amnesty, not even in the context of peace agreements,” she said

“Victims who survived recruitment in the past should not be victimized again by the recruitment of their own sons and daughters in the present day.”

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Colombia’s transitional justice system has reached a morally charged milestone. The seven former commanders of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC-EP) guerrilla have formally accepted responsibility for the recruitment of 18,677 minors during the country’s decades-long internal conflict, acknowledging not only the scale of the practice but also the sexual and reproductive abuses that accompanied it.

The admission, submitted to the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP), marks a shift in tone from earlier, more defensive statements. It comes as the country approaches the tenth anniversary of the 2016 peace agreement, signed between President Juan Manuel Santos and Rodrigo Londoño, and at a moment that has opened a more complex struggle over truth and accountability.

The signatories of the letter are Rodrigo Londoño Echeverry, known by his wartime alias “Timochenko”, along with Pastor Alape Lascarro, Julián Gallo Cubillos, Milton de Jesús Toncel Redondo, Pablo Catatumbo Torres, Rodrigo Granda Escobar and Jaime Alberto Parra Rodríguez.

In a video delivered to the tribunal’s Chamber for Acknowledgment of Truth, the seven former members of the guerrilla’s last Secretariat “ask forgiveness from the victims and society for the recruitment and use of girls and boys,” as well as for “cruel treatment, homicides, sexual, reproductive and prejudice-based violence” inflicted within their ranks.

The language is unusually direct. The tribunal, in turn, has accepted these declarations as “a starting point for designing direct restorative encounters with victims,” emphasizing that the process remains ongoing and conditional. This is not, it insists, “a conclusion but the beginning of a more demanding phase” of recognition.

The figures involved are stark. The JEP has identified 18,677 victims of child recruitment between 1996 and 2016, number that exposes what it calls a “violence that was invisible, even to the state itself.” Prior to the tribunal’s investigation, official records had produced only 387 cases and 45 sentences, five of them acquittals – a gap that hints at the scale of impunity.

The crimes extend far beyond recruitment. The tribunal has organized its findings into five “macro-criminal patterns”: the enlistment of minors, including those under 15; mistreatment, torture and killings within the ranks; sexual violence; reproductive violence, including forced contraception and abortions; and persecution based on sexual orientation or gender identity.

Particularly striking is the acknowledgment of reproductive control. The former commanders concede that the imposition of contraceptive methods and the forced termination of pregnancies constituted forms of violence that “violated the dignity and integrity” of those affected – most of them girls and adolescents. Such practices, long alleged by victims, had previously been downplayed or denied.

The JEP’s statement underscores the scale and diversity of those harmed. More than 11,000 victims are formally accredited in Case 07, including some 2,000 individuals and over 9,000 members of Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities. For these groups, the consequences were not merely individual but collective. The recruitment of children, the tribunal notes, “aggravated the risk of physical and cultural extinction” for several communities.

The social geography of the crime is also revealing. Recruitment thrived in peripheral regions where state presence was weak and armed actors exercised de facto authority over vulnerable populations. Children were drawn in through coercion, deception or, in some cases, the promise of protection in violent environments. Once inside, many encountered a regime of discipline and control that blurred the line between indoctrination and abuse.

The tribunal is explicit about the enduring damage. Victims, it says, continue to live with “profound emotional, psychological and physical harm,” often compounded by stigma and exclusion. Many are still reconstructing “their life projects and identities,” a process that has stretched into adulthood.

Crucially, the JEP frames the former commanders’ admission not as an act of closure but as an invitation—to victims and to society. In its words, “this is not a point of arrival, but the beginning of an encounter” between those responsible and those who suffered. Whether that encounter leads to reconciliation or renewed grievance remains uncertain.

Under Colombia’s transitional justice model, such acknowledgments carry legal consequences. Full and truthful admissions can lead to alternative sentences for reparations and restorative measures rather than prison. The tribunal is now assessing whether the former commanders’ statements meet that threshold. Victims, for their part, are being asked to “read, listen and weigh” the declarations and decide what they mean for their own processes.

Early reactions have been met with skepticism and resignation. Some victims’ representatives have described the statements as a “first step toward dialogue,” while noting that they fall short of a complete account.

The broader political context complicates matters. Colombia’s security situation has deteriorated in large swathes of the country, with dissident factions and other armed groups recruiting minors even as the state grapples with the legacy of past conflicts. The JEP itself alludes to this continuity, calling on “society as a whole, including new structures of violence,” to ensure non-repetition.

That appeal highlights the paradox at the heart of Colombia’s peace process. The country has made significant strides in uncovering the truth about past atrocities, yet struggles to prevent their recurrence. Transitional justice, in this sense, is both retrospective and urgently contemporary.

The former FARC leaders, for their part, have pledged to remain on the “dialogical and restorative path” and to participate in encounters with victims. They speak of the “deep and lasting damage” caused by their actions and express willingness to contribute to guarantees of non-repetition. Whether these commitments translate into tangible repair will depend on what follows.

For now, the significance of the moment lies less in what has been resolved than in what has been acknowledged. The recruitment of children – once a peripheral issue in public debates – has been placed at the center of Colombia’s reckoning with its violent past.

As the JEP puts it, recognizing these crimes “enables a broader reflection” on how to ensure that childhood is never again sacrificed to war. It is a sober ambition. Colombia has, at last, begun to confront one of the conflict’s darkest truths. Whether it can fully reckon with it remains an open question.

Medellín, Colombia – On Thursday morning, a drone dropped a mortar shell on a home in Segovia, a town in the northeast of the Antioquia department, killing three occupants of the house and leaving one critically injured.

The police identified the victims as María Cecilia Silva Silva and her two adult children, Yalusan Cano Silva and Alsonso de Jesús Silva. Silva’s other son was also wounded in the attack.

Segovia is a key center for illegal gold mining and is being contested by multiple armed groups, including the Gaitanist Army of Colombia (EGC), also known as the Clan del Golfo, and dissident groups of the now-defunct FARC rebels.

Authorities are still working to establish if the attack was directed at the family or if it was an error by the drone operators, an increasingly common occurrence as drones become the latest technology used in Colombia’s internal armed conflict. 

According to the Secretary of Security of Antioquia, General Luis Eduardo Martínez Gúzman, the victims were “a family who have nothing to do with the conflict, who were simply attacked by a drone.” 

Martínez highlighted the danger of these devices, suggesting that the explosive device was detached from the drone, which means the mortar could “fall anywhere.”

The Director of the National Police in Colombia, General William Oswaldo Rincón Zambrano, released a statement of condemnation: “[we] categorically reject this criminal act which plunges a Colombian family into mourning and demonstrates the contempt of illegal armed groups for human life and dignity.” 

He also reported that state security forces have headed to the area where the attack took place in order to verify what happened and assist in locating and capturing those responsible. He also expressed solidarity with the victims and their families.

The Governor of Antioquia, Andrés Julián Rendón took to social media to blame the security policies of the national government for the attack: “Who in their right mind could consider that this government has achieved transformations for Colombia?”

Rendón criticized President Gustavo Petro for negotiating with the armed groups involved in the conflict in Segovia, part of the leftist leader’s “total peace” policy. 

“This is the so-called ‘total peace’: concessions for criminals and burials for civilians. Antioquia demands an unwavering military offensive, full backing for the security forces, and zero leniency towards the criminals,” said Rendón. 

Drone attacks, both against armed groups as well as against security forces and the civilian population, have become widespread in Colombia. Between April 2024 and February 2026, the government recorded 418 attacks using drones. 

Tackling the mounting security crisis is a key issue in upcoming elections, which the United Nations warns may be undermined by the armed conflict.


Featured image description: Drone with GoPro digital camera mounted

Featured image credit: Don McCullough, Wikimedia Commons

The post Drone attack on home in Colombia kills three, injures one appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

Colombia is at risk of sliding back into one of the darkest chapters of its recent history, according to a stark new report by the United Nations, which warns that escalating violence, territorial control by illegal armed groups and political instability are eroding hard-won human rights gains.

The annual assessment by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights paints a troubling picture of 2025: a country where armed actors have deepened their grip over rural regions, civilians are increasingly trapped in conflict zones, and the implementation of the 2016 peace accord is under growing strain.

At the heart of the report lies a central warning — Colombia faces the “possibility of reverting” to pre-peace agreement levels of violence, particularly in territories where the state remains weak or absent.

Armed groups expand control

Across large swathes of the country — from the Catatumbo in Norte de Santander to the Pacific coast — non-state armed groups and criminal organizations have consolidated control over vulnerable populations, imposing what the report describes as “illegal armed governance”.

The criminal groups mentioned- Clan del Golfo, ELN, FARC dissidents – are responsible for a wide range of abuses: forced displacement, confinement, selective killings, sexual violence and the recruitment of children. Entire communities, especially Indigenous and Afro-Colombian populations, are subjected to coercion and forced participation in illicit economies. “Afro-descendant communities, particularly in regions such as Chocó, continue to face severe human rights violations due to the presence and social control exercised by non-state armed groups,” claims the report.

Even in areas where a single armed group dominates and overt violence is less visible, the UN notes that civilians live under strict systems of control, with basic freedoms curtailed and fear pervasive.

The UN documented 53 verified massacres in 2025, leaving 174 victims, the vast majority attributed to armed groups fighting over control of illegal economies such as drug trafficking.

The report also highlights a disturbing increase in indiscriminate attacks, including the use of explosives and drones in populated areas. Cities such as Cali were directly affected, with civilian casualties mounting as conflict spills into urban spaces.

In one incident in the southern department of Huila, a motorcycle bomb targeting a police station killed civilians and injured dozens, underscoring the growing risks faced by ordinary Colombians.

Child Recruitment

One of the report’s most alarming findings is the worsening situation for children.

The UN verified 150 cases of child recruitment in 2025, though it warns this represents only a fraction of the true scale due to underreporting and fear of retaliation. Armed groups are increasingly using social media platforms to lure minors, glamorising violence and illegal economies.

In some cases, children recruited into armed groups were later killed during military operations, raising further concerns about protection mechanisms.

Schools have also become battlegrounds. Armed groups have occupied educational spaces, disrupted classes and used them as recruitment grounds, particularly among Indigenous communities at risk of cultural and physical extinction.

Gender-based violence

The report details systematic patterns of sexual violence, exploitation and coercion, particularly against women and girls in conflict zones.

Armed groups have imposed control over reproductive rights, restricted access to healthcare and, in some cases, forced pregnancies. Girls are often recruited through manipulation and emotional coercion, only to face abuse, forced labour and sexual violence once under the control of armed actors.

Indigenous, Afro-descendant and migrant women are disproportionately affected, facing layered vulnerabilities exacerbated by institutional absence.

Pre-Election violence

As Colombia moves through a politically sensitive period, the report identifies a sharp rise in preelectoral violence.

The killing of the right-wing presidential candidate Miguel Uribe Turbay in August 2025 marked a dramatic escalation, while the UN recorded 18 assassinations and 126 attacks or threats against political leaders and candidates.

Nearly 650 municipalities were classified as high-risk zones by Colombia’s Ombudsman, raising concerns about the integrity of democratic participation.

The report also points to a surge in digital harassment. “Violence has also extended into the digital space, with an increase in hate speech and discriminatory discourse on social media platforms.”

Humanitarian conditions have deteriorated significantly. According to UN data, mass forced displacement rose by 85% compared with 2024, driven largely by clashes between armed groups. In Catatumbo alone, nearly 90,000 people were displaced, alongside a wave of killings, kidnappings and child recruitment.

Confinement — where communities are effectively trapped by armed actors — has also increased, restricting access to food, healthcare and livelihoods, particularly in departments such as Chocó and Cauca.

Despite these challenges, the report acknowledges partial progress in implementing the 2016 Final Accord with the ex-Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrilla.

While land reform initiatives have advanced, delays in formal land titling and uneven territorial implementation continue to limit impact of the 2016 agreement. The killing of 45 former FARC combatants in 2025 — a 36% increase from the previous year — highlights ongoing security gaps in reintegration efforts. “The United Nations Verification Mission documented the continued killing of former FARC, underscoring persistent security risks despite a peace agreement.”

A recurring theme throughout the United Nations report is the insufficient presence of the state in conflict-affected regions. It warns that weak institutional reach continues to limit protection for civilians and the effective implementation of security and development policies. The report also notes that “coca cultivation rose by 3% to 262,000 hectares in 2024,” although growth has slowed for a third consecutive year, cautioning that underfunded substitution programmes risk undermining efforts to transition to legal economies.

In many cases, responses by security forces have been too slow or insufficient to prevent abuses or protect communities.

A critical moment for Colombia

The UN concludes that Colombia stands at a pivotal juncture.

Without stronger coordination, sustained investment and a renewed focus on protecting civilians, the country risks undermining nearly a decade of peacebuilding.

“The persistence of violence and the strengthening of armed groups continue to gravely affect the civilian population,” the United Nations warns — a stark signal that security conditions are deteriorating across Colombia. As the country enters a polarised election season, the report suggests the stakes are no longer confined to preserving the 2016 peace accord, but to preventing a broader erosion of state authority and civilian protections in territories most at risk.

President Gustavo Petro is confronting explosive accusations of treason and complicity after a Noticias Caracol investigative report revealed alleged channels of communication and the transfer of highly classified military intelligence from the Armed Forces to FARC dissidents led by alias Calarcá. The report broadcast on Sunday has plunged the leftist administration into political turmoil and prompted immediate demands for congressional and judicial action.

Caracol’s year-long investigation is grounded in over 100 digital files from seized computers, cellphones, and encrypted chats, as well as damning testimony from Calarcá himself. According to the news outlet, the documents contain references to sensitive military information, including operational details and warnings about troop movements, that dissident commanders allegedly received from contacts inside state institutions. Noticias Caracol also included the video testimony from Calarcá who described President Petro as an “ally.”

The broadcast identified two senior figures repeatedly named in the seized material: General Juan Miguel Huertas, head of the Army’s personnel command, and Wilmar Mejía, a senior official of the National Intelligence Directorate (DNI). General Huertas was reinstated by President Petro in July this year, and Mejía, is a former member of the M-19 guerrilla. According to Caracol, the dissident files portray those officials as conduits through which intelligence moved from the state to the armed group. The report further alleges that, on multiple occasions, official vehicles were used to transport members of the dissident organization away from military pressure.

Caracol reported that the Fiscalía General de la Nación has had custody of the seized technical evidence since July 2024, after a convoy carrying seven dissident members, including Calarcá himself, was detained at a military check-point near Medellín, Antioquia. The convoy was being escorted by personnel from the National Protection Unit (UNP) and was carrying a chache of weapons, cash as well as an under-age combatant. Days after the incident, President Petro named Calarcá a “peace envoy” and secured his release. Despite the material that became part of an investigation by the Attorney General’s Office into collusion between the UNP and FARC dissidents,  Caracol claims, the Fiscalía has not initiatated any judicial actions prior to Sunday’s broadcast.

Noticias Caracol also tied Calarcá’s structure to high-impact attacks against the Colombian state. The dissident commander is identified by investigators as the mastermind behind the downing of a U.S-manufactured ‘Black Hawk’ helicopter in Amalfi, Antioquia, on October 21. The attack with an improvised drone resulted in 13 members of the National Police killed, and marked one of the most serious blows against counter-narcotics operations in the department. According to Caracol, the internal files seized from the guerrilla include references to preparations and communications surrounding the assault.

The dissident FARC commander is also considered one of the intellectual authors behind the June 7 assassination of presidential candidate Miguel Uribe Turbay, attack that shook the national political landscape and remains under investigation.

The investigation further highlights that communications between Calarcá and goverment officials referenced plans to create front companies modeled after the Convivir self-defense groups, and document the visit of a Chinese businessman to guerrilla camps in Catatumbo to discuss weapons fabrication and illegal gold-mining ventures. Caracol presented these elements as part of the dissidents’ own internal operational planning.

The revelations have been widely framed as proof of a deep institutional failures and evidence of a political strategy that has benefited the expansion of illegal armed groups. Opposition leaders claim that the files show deep state-level penetration by dissidents and security breaches that have put the lives of Colombia’s soldiers and police at extreme risk.

Within hours of the report, public condemnations were immediate and forceful. Former FARC hostage and presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt issued a statement demanding urgent action: “Congress must prosecute Petro now. Treason against the homeland is the greatest crime of a president. The congressmen are prevaricating by not doing so. The Supreme Court of Justice must act now. Our democracy is in maximum danger. Our army must refrain from obeying the criminals who have taken over the presidency and the Attorney General’s Office. Petro must leave now.”

Senator María Fernanda Cabal of the Centro Democrático party announced she would file a formal complaint with the House Accusations Committee. “Gustavo Petro must be held accountable before the justice system. I will file a formal complaint with the House Accusations Committee so that it investigates the alleged support from the FARC for his presidential campaign, revealed by Noticias Caracol, as well as the infiltration by alias ‘Calarcá’ into the Military Forces and the DNI,” she said.

President Petro — along with other senior government officials implicated in the scandal, including Vice President Francia Márquez — has not issued an official statement responding to Caracol’s core claims: that dissident commanders received classified military intelligence; that state resources and official vehicles were used to assist dissident mobility; and that high-level officials were named in internal dissident files as intermediaries.

As judicial authorities face growing pressure to respond, and Congress confronts calls to open formal proceedings against President Petro, the nation is entering what analysts describe as one of the most serious confrontations between civilian authority and the military-intelligence establishment in decades. The fallout from Caracol’s disclosures is widening rapidly, and for now, Petro’s silence can only cement the government’s complicity with illegal armed groups financed by drug trafficking. And proof that the U.S administration of President Donald Trump claims to have by adding Petro and close family members to the so-called ‘Clinton List’.