A federal jury in the United States has awarded coal producer Drummond Company Inc. $256 million after finding that a prominent human-rights attorney and his associates orchestrated a campaign of false accusations linking the company to paramilitary violence in Colombia.

The verdict, delivered on January 15 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, marks one of the largest legal victories Drummond has secured in its long-running effort to counter claims alleging ties to illegal armed groups during Colombia’s internal conflict.

Jurors ruled unanimously that Washington-based attorney Terrence P. Collingsworth and his organization, International Rights Advocates (IRAdvocates), knowingly made false and defamatory statements accusing Drummond of financing paramilitary organizations operating in Colombia. The panel also found that Collingsworth and IRAdvocates violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), determining they engaged in a coordinated scheme involving extortion, bribery of witnesses, witness tampering, wire fraud, money laundering, obstruction of justice and conspiracy.

According to court filings and testimony presented at trial, the defendants allegedly used fabricated narratives and paid testimony to pressure Drummond through lawsuits and media campaigns in the United States, Colombia and Europe. Jurors concluded there was “clear and convincing evidence” that Collingsworth either knew his claims were false or acted with reckless disregard for the truth.

Drummond had brought two lawsuits against Collingsworth and his network: one alleging defamation and another invoking the federal RICO statute. The jury awarded $52 million in damages for defamation and $68 million under the RICO claims. Under U.S. law, RICO damages are automatically tripled, bringing the total award to $256 million.

The case centered heavily on payments made to Colombian witnesses who had testified in earlier lawsuits accusing Drummond of supporting right-wing paramilitary groups. Evidence showed that more than $400,000 had been paid to individuals including Jaime Blanco Maya and Jairo de Jesús Charris, also known as “El Viejo Miguel,” without disclosure to courts.

The jury further found that other alleged co-conspirators were involved in the broader scheme, including Colombian attorney Iván Alfredo Otero Mendoza and Dutch businessman Albert van Bilderbeek, both of whom were also held liable under RICO.

Drummond’s lead trial counsel, Trey Wells of Starnes Davis Florie LLP, said the verdict vindicated the company after decades of reputational damage. “This verdict is further proof that Drummond has never had any ties whatsoever to illegal armed groups,” Wells said in a statement. “For years the company endured malicious accusations and false narratives that have now been categorically rejected by an American jury.”

Drummond has operated in Colombia since the late 1980s and is one of the largest exporters of Colombian coal. The company has faced multiple lawsuits over the past two decades in U.S. courts alleging it supported paramilitary groups blamed for killings near its mining operations — claims Drummond has consistently denied. The Company said the ruling exposesd a coordinated effort to damage Drummond’s reputation and extract financial settlements through legal pressure based on false testimony. “The case documents demonstrate a deliberate strategy to harm Drummond commercially and reputationally through fabricated allegations,” the company noted.

Drummond reiterated its commitment to ethical operations in Colombia, stressing that it has complied with national laws since beginning activities in the country and maintains strict corporate governance standards.

The verdict is expected to have far-reaching implications for ongoing and future transnational litigation involving corporate accountability claims, particularly cases reliant on testimony sourced in conflict zones.

For much of the past decade, Colombia built a reputation as one of travel’s great value destinations: culturally rich, visually stunning, and refreshingly affordable. A strong U.S. dollar, competitive hotel rates, and inexpensive food and transport helped turn cities like Medellín and Cartagena into global favorites, while smaller destinations thrived on a steady flow of backpackers and eco-tourists.

This equation is now changing. And faster than the industry expected.

The Colombian peso has strengthened sharply, trading this week near 3,630 to the U.S. dollar, its highest level since mid-2021. For foreign visitors, the effect is immediate and tangible: fewer pesos per dollar at the ATM, and higher costs across nearly every aspect of a trip – from meals and hotel stays to transportation and tours.

The shift is perhaps most visible at the table. Consider a classic Caribbean staple: deep-fried mojarra, served whole with coconut rice and patacones. At La Estrella, a popular local eatery in Cartagena, the dish costs about COP$40,000 per person. Order the same fish at a beachside stall and the price climbs to COP$60,000. In a high-end Old City restaurant, plated with foraged greens and linen service, it can reach COP$120,000 per person.

At today’s exchange rate, that translates to roughly $11, $16, and $33 — still accessible by international standards, but a noticeable jump from the Colombia many travelers remember.

Currency is only part of the story

While peso strength explains much of the increase, Colombia’s tourism sector is also grappling with sharply higher operating costs following a 23% increase in the national minimum wage, enacted by presidential decree under President Gustavo Petro.

From the government’s perspective, the measure was framed as a necessary response to inflation and cost-of-living pressures. For hotels, tour operators, and travel agencies, however, the speed and scale of the increase have posed significant challenges.

The Colombian Hotel and Tourism Association (Cotelco) has warned that the decision places particular strain on an industry where labor accounts for a large share of costs. According to Cotelco, roughly 70% of hotel workers are part of operational teams — including housekeeping, front desk staff, maintenance, kitchens, and security — leaving businesses highly exposed to wage adjustments.

Cotelco has also pointed to recent changes in labor rules, such as higher pay for Sunday and holiday shifts and the earlier start of night-shift premiums, which further increase payroll expenses. Looking ahead, the sector faces additional pressure in July 2026, when Colombia’s legally mandated reduction of the workweek to 42 hours takes effect, a complex adjustment for hotels that operate around the clock.

Rising costs beyond wages

Labor is not the only expense rising. Hotels and tourism businesses are also absorbing higher energy and gas tariffs, including a 20% energy surcharge introduced in 2025, which disproportionately affects establishments that operate continuously and rely heavily on air conditioning, refrigeration, and water systems.

Transportation costs are climbing as well. Higher toll fees and fuel prices have pushed up the cost of airport transfers, private drivers, and overland travel between destinations, quietly adding to tourists’ final bills. These increases are particularly noticeable for travelers moving between regions — for example, from Cartagena to Santa Marta, or through the Coffee Axis by road.

Price increases are not felt evenly across the country.

In large cities such as Bogotá and Medellín, intense competition has helped cushion the blow. These markets offer a wide range of accommodation, from budget hostels and short-term rentals to international five-star hotels, giving travelers flexibility and keeping price growth relatively contained.

In contrast, smaller resort and nature destinations face sharper pressure. In places like Palomino, wedged between the Caribbean Sea and the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, or Salento in the Coffee Axis, accommodation options are limited. Boutique eco-lodges and family-run hotels dominate, and supply cannot easily expand.

In these destinations, rising labor and operating costs are passed on more quickly to guests, making price hikes more visible — and sometimes harder to justify.

According to Anato, Colombia’s association of travel agencies, the wage increase has also disrupted long-term planning. Many tourism businesses had projected annual cost increases of 8% to 12%, not nearly double that figure.

For inbound tourism, which operates on long booking cycles, the timing is especially problematic. Rates, packages, and contracts with international wholesalers for 2026 were often negotiated under different macroeconomic assumptions, limiting companies’ ability to adjust prices after the fact.

Anato has also warned of a double squeeze: rising costs at home combined with a stronger peso, which reduces the real value of revenues earned in foreign currency.

Pay more – Higher expectations

Most travelers are not inherently opposed to paying more for Colombia. What they increasingly expect, however, is visible improvement in exchange.

Higher prices bring sharper scrutiny of cleanliness, waste management, and environmental standards, particularly in coastal areas where beach pollution and informal tourism practices remain persistent concerns. As Colombia positions itself as a higher-value destination, arbitrary pricing, lack of regulation could erode sustainable tourism.

Internal security is another critical factor. As costs rise, long-standing security concerns, especially in rural areas and off-the-beaten path travel corridors, weigh heavily in  destination choice. Travelers paying mid-range or premium prices expect predictability and safety to match the cost.

Looking ahead, a further strengthening of the peso toward 3,500 per dollar would intensify pressure on Colombia’s tourism sector as competition and air connectivity across the region grows fiercer.

Colombia now finds itself competing directly with the all-inclusive efficiency of Mexico’s Riviera Maya and the Dominican Republic, the well-established eco-tourism model of Costa Rica, and the increasingly curated cultural and nature offerings of Guatemala. These destinations have spent years refining price with product, investing in infrastructure, security, and environmental enforcement.

Colombia’s transition from affordable standout to mid-range contender is still underway. Currency strength and wage growth can signal economic maturity, but without tangible improvements in security, the country risks losing travelers to emerging destinations across the Middle East and South East Asia. The message is clear: Colombia remains compelling – but no longer discounted. Whether higher prices translate into a better consumer experience will determine how well the country holds its place in an increasingly crowded travel market.

Colombian President Gustavo Petro on Monday decreed a 23.7% increase in the country’s minimum wage for 2026, the largest real rise in at least two decades, bypassing negotiations with unions and business groups and sparking warnings from economists, bankers and employers over inflation, job losses and rising informality.

The decree lifts the monthly minimum wage to 1.75 million pesos (U.S$470), or close to 2 million pesos including transport subsidies, and will apply to roughly 2.5 million workers when it takes effect next year. Petro said the measure aims to reduce inequality and move Colombia toward a “living minimum wage” that allows workers to “live better.”

But business associations, financial analysts and opposition lawmakers said the scale of the increase — far above inflation and productivity trends — risks destabilising the labour market and the broader economy.

According to calculations based on official data, with inflation expected to close 2025 at around 5.3% and labour productivity growth estimated at 0.9%, a technically grounded adjustment would have been close to 6.2%. The gap between that benchmark and the decreed hike exceeds 17 percentage points, the largest deviation on record.

Informality and job losses

Colombia’s minimum wage plays an outsized role in the economy, serving not only as the legal wage floor but also as a reference for pensions, social security contributions and public-sector pay.

Banking association Asobancaria warned that increases far above productivity can generate unintended effects. Citing data from the national statistics agency DANE, the group noted that 49% of employed Colombians — about 11.4 million people — earn less than the minimum wage, mostly in the informal economy, while only 10% earn exactly the minimum wage. Former director of DANE and economist Juan Daniel Oviedo believes that an increase that only benefits one-out-of-ten workers will stump job creation. “A minimum wage of 2 million pesos will make us move like turtles when it comes to creating formal jobs  — something we need to structurally address poverty in Colombia.”

Retail association FENALCO described the decision as “populist” and said the talks had been a “charade.” Its president, Jaime Alberto Cabal, said the process ignored technical, economic and productivity variables and would hit small businesses hardest.

Lawmakers also raised concerns about the impact on independent workers and contractors in the agricultural sectors, especially hired-help on coffee planations. Carlos Fernando Motoa, a senator from the opposition Cambio Radical party, said the decision would push vulnerable workers out of the formal system.

“The unintended effects of this improvised handling of the minimum wage will end up hitting independent workers’ pockets,” Motoa said. “Many will be forced to choose between eating or paying for health and pension contributions.”

Economists warned that micro, small and medium-sized enterprises — which account for the majority of employment — may respond by cutting staff, reducing hours or shifting workers into informal arrangements to cope with higher payroll and social security costs.

Inflation and rates at risk

Analysts also cautioned that the wage hike could reignite inflation, complicating the central bank’s easing cycle. Central bank economists have forecast 2026 inflation at 3.6%, down from 5.1% expected in 2025, but several analysts said those projections may now need revising.

In an interview with Reuters, David Cubides, chief economist at Banco de Occidente, called the increase “absolutely unsustainable,” warning it would affect government payrolls, pension liabilities and the informal labour market.

“Inflation forecasts will have to be revised,” Cubides said, adding that interest rates could rise again in the medium term as a result.

The impact is amplified by Colombia’s ongoing reduction in the legal workweek. From July 2026, the standard workweek will fall to 42 hours, meaning the hourly minimum wage will rise by roughly 28.5%, further increasing labour costs.

The decree comes six months before the presidential election on May 31, 2026, and is viewed by critics of Colombia’s first leftist administration as an electoral gamble aimed at shoring up support for the ruling coalition’s candidate, Senator Iván Cepeda.

Opposition senator Esteban Quintero, from the Democratic Center party, warned that Colombia risked repeating the mistakes of other Latin American countries that pursued aggressive wage policies.

“Careful, Colombia. We cannot repeat the history of our neighbours,” Quintero said. “Populism is celebrated at first — and later the costs become unbearable.”

Former finance minister and presidential hopeful Mauricio Cárdenas said the decision would inevitably lead to layoffs, particularly in small businesses already operating on thin margins, and described the policy as “economic populism” whose costs would materialise after the election cycle.

“The employer ends up saying, ‘I can’t sustain this payroll,’” Cárdenas said. “People are laid off, and many end up working for less than the minimum wage. In the end, nothing is achieved.”

Liberal Party senator Mauricio Gómez Amín said the increase risked becoming a political banner rather than a technical policy tool.

“Without technical backing, a 23% increase translates into inflation, bankruptcies and fewer job opportunities,” Gómez Amín said. “Economic populism always sends the bill later.”

While supporters argue the measure will boost purchasing power at the start of 2026, analysts cautioned that the short-term gains could be offset by higher prices, job losses and a further expansion of Colombia’s informal economy — already one of the largest in Latin America.

The U.S. seizure of an oil tanker off the Venezuelan coast appears designed to further squeeze the economy of President Nicolás Maduro’s government. The Dec. 10, 2025 operation — in which American forces descended from helicopters onto the vessel — followed months of U.S. military buildup in the Caribbean and was immediately condemned by Venezuela as “barefaced robbery and an act of international piracy.”

The seized tanker, according to reports, is a 20-year-old supertanker called Skipper, capable of carrying around 2 million barrels of oil.

According to the Trump administration, the vessel was heading to Cuba. Given its size, however, it is far more likely that the final destination was China. Tankers of this scale are rarely used for short Caribbean routes; much smaller vessels typically serve Cuba.

The tanker had been sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury in 2022 for carrying prohibited Iranian oil. At the time, it was alleged that the ship — then known as Adisa — was controlled by Russian oil magnate Viktor Artemov and linked to an oil smuggling network.

On the surface, the seizure was unrelated to U.S. sanctions imposed on Venezuela in 2019 and expanded in 2020 to include secondary sanctions on third parties doing business with Caracas.

Venezuelan officials have therefore described the move as unprecedented, and they are largely correct. While Iranian tankers have been seized in the past for sanctions violations, this marks the first time a vessel departing Venezuela with a Venezuelan crew has been taken.

The Trump administration has signaled it intends to seize not only the cargo but the ship itself — a significant loss for the owning company. Because the shipment was sold under a “Free on Board” contract, the buyer assumed responsibility once the vessel left Venezuelan waters.

Nonetheless, the seizure represents a clear escalation in pressure on Venezuela. Reports indicate that around 30 other tankers operating near the country face some form of sanction. These vessels are part of a shadow fleet designed to evade restrictions while transporting oil from Venezuela, Russia, and Iran.

The message from Washington is unambiguous: more seizures may follow as the U.S. seeks to further squeeze Venezuelan oil revenues.

Venezuela’s economy remains overwhelmingly dependent on oil. Although official figures have not been published for seven years, most analysts estimate that oil accounts for more than 80% of exports, with some placing the figure above 90%.

Most Venezuelan oil is sold on the black market, largely to independent refiners in China. Chinese state-owned firms avoid these purchases to limit sanctions exposure, while authorities in Beijing tend to overlook shipments to non-state entities — particularly when tankers conceal their true origin.

An estimated 80% of Venezuelan oil ultimately goes to China through this channel. About 17% is exported to the United States under a Treasury license granted to Chevron, while roughly 3% goes to Cuba, often on subsidized terms.

Oil also accounts for around 20% of Venezuela’s GDP and more than half of government revenue, making the sector indispensable to Maduro’s survival.

Crucially, Venezuela’s oil industry was already in steep decline before U.S. sanctions began. Production peaked at 3.4 million barrels per day in 1998, fell to 2.7 million by the time Maduro took office in 2013, and dropped to 1.3 million barrels per day by 2019.

The 2019 oil sanctions shut Venezuela out of the U.S. market, forcing it to rely more heavily on China and India. When secondary sanctions followed in 2020, Europe and India halted purchases altogether. Combined with the pandemic-driven oil slump, production collapsed to just 400,000 barrels per day.

Output has since recovered to about 1 million barrels per day, aided largely by Chevron’s continued operations.

To sustain exports, Venezuela relies on a shadow fleet that uses false flags, renamed vessels, and manipulated transponders. Cargoes are sometimes transferred at sea — posing major environmental risks — before being relabeled in transit hubs such as Malaysia and shipped on to China.

The tanker seizure had little immediate impact on global oil prices due to ample supply and Venezuela’s limited market share. However, a more aggressive U.S. campaign could change that calculus.

For Venezuelan oil prices, the consequences may be sharper. Already heavily discounted due to sanctions risk, Venezuelan crude is now likely to be sold at even steeper reductions. Buyers will demand higher discounts and fewer prepayments, while export volumes may fall, forcing production cuts that are costly to reverse.

The result will be further pressure on the limited revenues Maduro depends on to keep the Venezuelan state afloat.

About the author:
Francisco J. Monaldi, Ph.D., is the Wallace S. Wilson Fellow in Latin American Energy Policy and director of the Latin America Energy Program at the Center for Energy Studies at Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy.

This article is reproduced from The Conversation under a Creative Commons licence