Colombia votes on May 31 with its presidential race concentrated around three candidates whose platforms diverge on nearly every dimension of economic and security policy relevant to foreign investors. For corporate executives, institutional investors, and multinational operations with Colombian exposure, the choice between senator Iván Cepeda, senator Paloma Valencia, and defense attorney Abelardo de la Espriella carries direct, measurable implications for the regulatory environment, foreign direct investment (FDI) conditions, energy sector licensing, and geopolitical alignment through at least 2030.
No candidate is projected to clear the 50%-plus-one threshold required to win outright on May 31, making a runoff election on June 21 the expected outcome. The question that will determine the direction of that runoff — and by extension the next administration — is which of the two opposition candidates finishes second.
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The final-week polling picture shifted substantially, and the trajectory matters as much as the snapshot. The CONDOR weighted aggregate — which incorporates surveys from six polling firms and applies greater weight to more recent data — placed the race as of May 23 at: Cepeda 36.3%, De la Espriella 29.1%, Valencia 16.7%.
Invamer, one of Colombia’s most established polling firms, surveyed 3,800 respondents across 152 municipalities between May 13 and May 20, registering Cepeda at 44.6%, De la Espriella at 31.6%, and Valencia at 14.0%. The Centro Nacional de Consultoría (CNC) published a survey conducted May 22 and 23 showing Cepeda at 33.4%, De la Espriella at 30.9%, and Valencia at 12.6%.
Comparing those figures to the Fundación Génesis Crea survey from May 4 through May 11 — which placed Cepeda at 35.1%, Valencia at 25.4%, and De la Espriella at 21.6% — indicates a multi-poll trend of De la Espriella gaining approximately nine to ten percentage points in three weeks while Valencia shed a comparable share. AS/COA’s poll tracker confirms the directional consistency across firms.
Atlas Intel, which published figures more favorable to De la Espriella, is currently under investigation by Colombia’s Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE) for potential methodology violations and could face suspension of its operations. Those figures are treated with caution in this analysis.
Runoff modeling diverges between firms. Fundación Génesis Crea showed Valencia defeating Cepeda 49.1% to 44.7% in a second-round matchup — meaning she was the stronger opposition candidate in that scenario. The Guarumo/Ecoanalítica survey found Cepeda losing all hypothetical runoff scenarios, including against De la Espriella. Two minor candidates — former senator Clara López and former Chocó governor Luis Gilberto Murillo — withdrew and endorsed Cepeda before the first round, a consolidation that appears to have had limited effect on his polling numbers.
Finance Colombia reported in May that the campaign has been marked by an unusual absence of traditional televised debates. Cepeda declined to participate in events organized by major media outlets, stating that proposed formats lacked neutrality. Former Bogotá Mayor Claudia López, herself a candidate, said publicly that Cepeda’s refusal was motivated by an unwillingness to defend his record as the architect of President Gustavo Petro‘s Paz Total security negotiation strategy.
Public security is the top voter concern heading into the election. InSight Crime documented that the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) launched a major offensive against FARC dissident factions in Norte de Santander in early 2025, resulting in mass civilian casualties in the Catatumbo region. In Chocó and Antioquia, the ELN and the Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC), commonly known as the Clan del Golfo, are competing for control of illegal gold mining corridors and drug trafficking routes. In Cauca, FARC dissident factions have established territorial control in areas where state presence has collapsed.
Cepeda’s approach to security is defined by his role as the principal legislative architect of Paz Total. As chair of the Senate‘s peace commission, he designed the framework that extended negotiating status to the ELN, FARC dissident groups, and the Clan del Golfo. His stated rationale is that targeting the financial leadership of drug networks rather than foot soldiers produces more durable results — a position that has academic backing in narcotics policy literature. In practice, Paz Total produced ceasefires that were repeatedly violated, and security indicators in conflict-affected departments deteriorated during the Petro administration. A Cepeda presidency is expected to continue the negotiated settlement model, with the military operating under political constraints.
Valencia’s security platform is based on reinstating Seguridad Democrática, the doctrine associated with former president Álvaro Uribe’s administrations from 2002 to 2010. The core elements are expanded military presence in rural conflict zones, dismantling of rural criminal networks, and resumption of extradition agreements with the United States — which Petro suspended, effectively shielding cartel leadership from US federal prosecution. The Uribe-era approach resulted in measurable reductions in homicide rates, forced displacement, and ELN and FARC territorial control, though human rights organizations documented serious abuses by security forces during that period.
De la Espriella has stated explicitly that his government would have no peace process. He advocates for a model similar to El Salvador’s under President Nayib Bukele: mass incarceration, construction of high-security prison facilities, classification of guerrilla and cartel organizations as foreign terrorist organizations, and broad military offensives. He has not detailed how such operations would be financed or how the mass detention model would interact with Colombia’s Constitutional Court, which has repeatedly constrained executive security powers.
For the armed groups operating in Norte de Santander and Cauca, the historical record indicates that Colombia’s criminal organizations respond more acutely to sustained, institutionally grounded military pressure and functioning extradition pipelines than to political rhetoric. By that measure, Valencia’s platform — which rebuilds the institutional security apparatus incrementally — represents a more structurally credible threat to the ELN and the Estado Mayor Central (EMC) FARC dissidents. For the Clan del Golfo leadership, extradition to the United States has historically been the principal deterrent, and Valencia’s program explicitly restores it.
The Petro administration enacted a series of minimum wage increases totaling more than 60% over four years — including a 16% increase for 2023, the largest single-year hike in Colombian history, and a 23.78% increase for 2026 — restructured labor regulations to expand premium pay requirements for night, weekend, and holiday shifts, and raised corporate tax rates to fund social spending programs. The Asociación Nacional de Empresarios de Colombia (ANDI) characterized the regulatory environment as adverse to private investment. Finance Colombia tracked a material decline in FDI in the extractive sector over the same period.
Cepeda supported those labor and fiscal reforms throughout their legislative passage. His platform extends the Petro model: increased state social spending, continued land redistribution programs, and maintenance of the current wage and labor cost structure. For companies with established Colombian operations, the regulatory environment is manageable; for companies evaluating market entry or operational expansion, the cost structure adds friction.
Valencia’s economic program emphasizes corporate stability and private sector investment as the primary mechanisms of job creation. Her vice-presidential running mate, Juan Daniel Oviedo — former director of DANE, Colombia’s national statistics agency — represents a technocratic orientation focused on reducing structural market distortions, streamlining public procurement, and scaling back state administrative overhead. Oviedo’s appointment is a direct signal to the business community that economic management would be data-driven rather than ideologically directed. Oviedo also publicly identifies as a member of the LGBTQ+ community, a departure from the traditional social conservatism of Centro Democrático.
De la Espriella’s economic orientation is pro-business with protectionist elements. His vice-presidential candidate, José Manuel Restrepo — who served as Colombia’s Finance Minister and Commerce Minister — provides institutional credibility on fiscal and trade policy. Restrepo’s presence on the ticket signals commitment to fiscal discipline and regulatory reduction in the extractive and commercial sectors. De la Espriella’s personal style, however, introduces operational uncertainty; his campaign has generated multiple high-profile controversies, including a public altercation with Caracol Noticias journalist María Lucía Fernández during a live broadcast and a formal apology following misconduct allegations by journalist Laura Rodríguez of Piso 8 FM.
Ecopetrol holds a 31.5% stake in the Gunflint oil field in the Gulf of Mexico.
The extractive sector is the most consequential economic policy dimension for international capital. Ecopetrol (NYSE: EC; BVC: ECOPETROL) — Colombia’s state-controlled energy company and the largest corporation in the country — has operated under exploration restrictions during the Petro administration, which has opposed new fossil fuel contracts on climate grounds.
Cepeda’s position extends the Petro framework: mandatory transition away from fossil fuels, heavy restrictions or outright prohibitions on new oil and gas exploration contracts, and stringent environmental licensing requirements for open-pit mining operations. Foreign investment would be directed by policy toward green hydrogen, ecotourism, and smallholder agriculture. For the multinational oil majors with Colombian operations and for institutional investors in the mining sector, a Cepeda presidency represents a continuation of the current constraints and, in some contract scenarios, an accelerated wind-down of Colombian portfolios.
In a related development, Finance Colombia reported in May that Ecopetrol’s president, Ricardo Roa, has been formally charged in connection with alleged campaign spending violations during Petro’s 2022 presidential campaign. The case will be inherited by whoever takes office in August.
Valencia’s position is that hydrocarbon revenues are essential to Colombia’s macroeconomic stability and that the country cannot exit the sector before alternative revenue structures exist. Her platform actively encourages FDI in petroleum exploration, is open to regulated fracking, and commits to clearing the environmental licensing backlog that has stalled multiple large-scale gold and copper mining projects. For energy and mining companies currently blocked by administrative delays, this represents the most direct path to project advancement.
De la Espriella’s position goes further: essentially deregulating the environmental licensing process for major extraction projects on the grounds that Colombia’s economic sovereignty takes precedence over environmental restrictions he characterizes as externally imposed. The practical constraint is whether a De la Espriella administration would have the institutional coherence and congressional support to deliver regulatory rollback, given that his movement has no established political party structure and entered the race through an independent signature campaign.
The US Embassy in Bogotá is said to be the 3rd largest US mission in the world (photo: Loren Moss)
Colombia’s relationship with the United States deteriorated materially under Petro, who aligned Colombia with Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro, pursued closer ties with China and Russia, and suspended extradition agreements. US counternarcotics cooperation was strained throughout the period.
Cepeda is committed to what he describes as a multipolar foreign policy — maintaining functional diplomatic channels with Washington and Brussels while deepening strategic and commercial relationships with China and Russia. His alignment with regional left-of-center governments in Mexico, Brazil, and Bolivia would position Colombia as part of a Latin American bloc that has grown increasingly skeptical of US regional leadership. For US companies operating in Colombia, this trajectory does not mean immediate operational disruption, but it reduces Colombia’s utility as a reliable counterpart on security cooperation, counter-narcotics intelligence sharing, and trade dispute resolution.
Valencia positions a return to the Western alignment as a core objective. She would prioritize restoring the US-Colombia relationship, reinforcing the bilateral Free Trade Agreement, and reestablishing intelligence-sharing mechanisms that were reduced under Petro. Her framing positions Colombia as a democratic anchor in a region experiencing authoritarian pressures.
De la Espriella takes the most explicit pro-US position in the race. La Silla Vacía reported that De la Espriella or entities linked to his campaign donated more than $90,000 USD to the US Republican Party, a fact that raises questions about the nature and expectations of those relationships. He has publicly aligned himself with the populist right in the United States, takes a hostile posture toward China, Russia, and Venezuela, and has characterized his security approach as consistent with a transactional alliance with Washington focused on counter-narcotics enforcement and cartel designation as foreign terrorist organizations.
“Ese pisco robó a 200 mil colombianos.” — Claudia López, former Mayor of Bogotá, referring to presidential candidate Abelardo de la Espriella’s legal representation of DMG pyramid scheme founder David Murcia Guzmán, during a presidential campaign event.
All three candidates have stated commitments to fighting corruption, though their approaches and focal points differ in ways that are material to the institutional environment for business operations.
Cepeda’s legislative record includes serious, documented work investigating paramilitary infiltration of Colombia’s political institutions — the period known as parapolítica — and pursuing accountability for those cases. His blind spot, his critics argue, is corruption within the current administration. When Ecopetrol’s Ricardo Roa was formally charged in connection with Petro’s 2022 campaign, the response from the Pacto Histórico coalition was subdued. Cepeda has been Álvaro Uribe’s primary judicial antagonist in the Senate; a Cepeda administration would offer no institutional protection to Uribe and would be expected to support the full progress of judicial proceedings against him. For left-wing politicians facing legal exposure, including former Medellín mayor Daniel Quintero, a Cepeda administration would be expected to be more receptive to amnesty frameworks.
Valencia’s approach to anti-corruption is structural rather than prosecutorial: strengthening the independence of the Contraloría General de la República and the Fiscalía General de la Nación, implementing digital transparency in public procurement, and reducing informal executive influence over judicial processes. She would be expected to apply political and rhetorical pressure on behalf of Uribe — her political mentor and a close ally — though her legislative track record indicates a degree of institutional independence from Centro Democrático party orthodoxy.
De la Espriella’s anti-corruption rhetoric centers on severe criminal penalties for corrupt officials. The credibility of that position is complicated by his professional history, which is examined in detail below.
De la Espriella’s campaign has faced sustained scrutiny over his client history as one of Colombia’s highest-profile criminal defense attorneys. The record is documented in reporting by El Colombiano, El Espectador, and the investigative outlet Corrupción al Día.
Abelardo de la Espriella (screen capture from Twitter video)
His documented client roster includes Salvatore Mancuso, the former supreme commander of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) paramilitary network; multiple legislators convicted in the parapolítica scandal, which established systematic infiltration of Colombia’s congress by paramilitary organizations; David Murcia Guzmán, the operator of the DMG pyramid scheme that defrauded an estimated 200,000 Colombian investors; the Nule Primos, convicted of large-scale public contract fraud; and Álex Saab, the Colombian businessman extradited to the United States on charges of acting as the primary money launderer for the Maduro government in Venezuela. According to Corrupción al Día, De la Espriella’s legal fees from Saab reportedly reached $12 million USD and included private aircraft travel.
De la Espriella’s response to this line of criticism rests on due process principles: that every accused person is entitled to vigorous legal defense regardless of the charges, and that his ability to navigate Colombia’s criminal code at its most complex levels demonstrates the expertise required to enforce the law from the executive branch. The argument has legal validity as a principle. The specific issue for foreign compliance officers and US government counterparts is the Saab representation: the same Nicolás Maduro whose regime De la Espriella’s campaign now characterizes as an ideological enemy received legal services from De la Espriella’s firm when the representation was commercially available.
The Fiscalía investigated De la Espriella in connection with alleged paramilitary links in 2009 and again in 2012; both investigations were dismissed for insufficient evidence, and he carries no convictions or active investigations on those matters.
Iván Cepeda (from Twitter)
Critics of Iván Cepeda, including Enrique Gómez of the Salvación Nacional party, have argued that his family background constitutes evidence of structural alignment with guerrilla movements. The record on this point merits examination.
Cepeda is the son of Manuel Cepeda Vargas, who served as Secretary-General of the Colombian Communist Party and as a senator for the Unión Patriótica (UP), a left-wing political movement that was systematically exterminated by a combination of state actors and paramilitary organizations during the 1980s and 1990s. Manuel Cepeda Vargas was assassinated on August 9, 1994. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights subsequently found the Colombian state responsible for his murder. The FARC-EP named its Frente Urbano Manuel Cepeda Vargas — an urban front operating within the Bloque Occidental — in the elder Cepeda’s honor.
The Fundación Paz y Reconciliación (PARES) has documented that Iván Cepeda’s relationship with his father’s political positions was more complex than the family lineage alone suggests. After studying in Bulgaria in 1981, Cepeda broke from his father’s Soviet-oriented communist framework and aligned with democratic leftists including Bernardo Jaramillo Ossa, who publicly rejected the FARC’s armed strategy. Cepeda has repeatedly stated his repudiation of the FARC’s use of his father’s name. No documented evidence connects him to operational coordination with current armed groups.
What the family history does establish is the ideological framework through which Cepeda processes security policy: a belief, grounded in personal and political experience, that the Colombian state’s institutional violence has been as destructive as guerrilla violence, and that negotiated settlements are structurally preferable to military solutions. That framework generates Paz Total. It also generates a posture toward ELN and FARC dissident negotiators that prioritizes process continuity over verified compliance — a disposition that armed groups have demonstrably exploited to maintain territorial and operational positions while negotiation frameworks provided legal cover.
Paloma Valencia (image Twitter)
The comparison to former president Iván Duque (2018–2022) comes up regularly in discussions of Valencia’s political independence. Duque, who had limited independent political standing before Uribe selected him, was perceived throughout his term as governing within constraints set by his patron — a dynamic that Colombian political cartoonists characterized as ventriloquism.
Valencia’s profile differs materially. She is the granddaughter of former Colombian president Guillermo León Valencia, carries her own political lineage, and has served in the Senate for over a decade, building positions on agrarian reform, judicial modernization, and indigenous land rights that have placed her at variance with standard Centro Democrático positions on those issues. She won the Gran Consulta por Colombia primary on March 8 with more than 45% of the vote — over 3.2 million Colombians — establishing a democratic mandate distinct from any party endorsement.
She would be expected to use institutional and rhetorical channels to support Uribe in the ongoing judicial proceedings against him, and to apply pressure on the trajectory of those cases. Whether that constitutes political interference with judicial independence or normal advocacy within democratic norms is a question on which observers disagree. What the legislative record does not support is the characterization of Valencia as incapable of independent governance.
Press freedom carries an indirect but measurable correlation with rule-of-law quality, which in turn affects operational risk for companies that rely on regulatory predictability and transparent legal processes.
Cepeda has maintained a posture toward critical media that mirrors President Petro’s practice of characterizing adversarial outlets as acting in the interests of economic elites. Under Petro, this produced a systematic exclusion of critical media from official information flows and persistent rhetorical delegitimization of independent journalism, though the press remained legally free to operate. A Cepeda administration would be expected to continue this pattern.
Valencia’s background in Colombia’s traditional political and intellectual establishment, combined with a decade in a party that has faced sustained critical coverage from Colombia’s major outlets, points toward a conventional institutional relationship with the press — adversarial at times, but within professional norms.
De la Espriella’s conduct during the campaign provides direct evidence of his approach. He publicly called Caracol Noticias journalist María Lucía Fernández “ignorant” in a live interview. He issued a formal apology after journalist Laura Rodríguez of Piso 8 FM made allegations of inappropriate conduct. His campaign strategy has drawn comparisons to the approach of Argentine president Javier Milei and US president Donald Trump in its use of direct digital channels to circumvent traditional media while publicly attacking outlets that publish critical coverage. The press would remain legally protected under a De la Espriella administration, but the operational environment for investigative journalism would be hostile.
The question of which candidate is most aligned with free-market principles requires a distinction that the international business press frequently elides: the difference between economic deregulation and political authoritarianism. These can, and in this election do, exist independently.
De la Espriella’s platform is often described in international coverage as the most pro-market. His deregulation proposals for the extractive sector and his corporate tax rhetoric support that reading in the economic domain. His security platform, however, involves a substantial expansion of state coercive power: mass detention operations, a mega-prison construction program, and the suspension of standard due process protections to facilitate rapid incarceration of criminal suspects. The Cato Institute‘s framework of economic freedom as inseparable from civil liberties would categorize a state powerful enough to detain people without standard procedural protections as a state that represents an institutional risk to property rights and contract enforcement as well.
Valencia’s platform, anchored by Oviedo’s technocratic program of structural market reform — reduced administrative barriers, streamlined procurement, smaller state overhead, maintained civil liberties — represents the closest approximation to coherent market liberalism available in this field. It does not carry the rhetorical force of De la Espriella’s deregulation proposals, but it has more institutional grounding.
Cepeda’s platform is the furthest from market liberalism by any standard measure: state-directed investment allocation, wealth redistribution through tax and transfer mechanisms, state expansion in healthcare and pension administration, and agrarian land redistribution. His program is continuous with the Petro administration’s economic framework.
Claudia López, senator of Colombia. (Credit: Patty Suescún)
Several other candidates remain on the ballot and are drawing small but potentially consequential vote shares in a first round where the margin between second and third place could be narrow.
Claudia López, former mayor of Bogotá running under the Con Claudia Imparables coalition, positions herself as a progressive centrist with a documented anti-corruption record. Her polling has not broken 3.5% in major surveys, and her high polarization ratings from her mayoral term limit her growth ceiling. Her attacks on De la Espriella during the campaign — she publicly called him a “defender of the mafia” in reference to his client history — have been among the most pointed in the race, and factually grounded on the public record.
Sergio Fajardo, making his third consecutive presidential run under Dignidad y Compromiso, continues to represent a technocratic, education-focused centrism grounded in his work transforming Medellín in the early 2000s. He has not broken 3.5% in any major poll in this cycle.
Roy Barreras, running under La Fuerza de la Paz following his Frente por la Vida primary victory, is one of the most experienced political operatives in Colombia, having been part of multiple coalition governments across ideological lines over two decades. He polls below the threshold for meaningful first-round impact.
Miguel Uribe Londoño, running under Partido Demócrata, represents a younger-generation conservative platform emphasizing fiscal discipline and private sector growth, broadly consistent with Valencia’s program. He also polls below 3.5%.
Carlos Caicedo, running on a regionalist platform emphasizing decentralization away from Bogotá, draws support primarily from the Costa Caribe. His structural argument about Colombia’s administrative over-centralization is substantively grounded, though his national profile is insufficient to affect the first-round outcome.
For international capital with Colombian exposure, the three-way race produces three materially different operational scenarios.
A Cepeda victory — which remains the single most likely first-round outcome based on available polling — would signal continuity of the Petro-era regulatory framework: sustained capital outflow pressure, high corporate tax rates, no new fossil fuel exploration contracts for Ecopetrol (NYSE: EC; BVC: ECOPETROL) or private operators, continued labor cost escalation, and a foreign policy trajectory away from Washington. Colombian equity valuations would be expected to remain under pressure. The mining licensing backlog would continue to accumulate. A Cepeda administration would not replicate Venezuela’s economic trajectory — Colombia’s independent central bank, Banco de la República, its functioning constitutional court, and its institutional depth provide meaningful buffers — but the investment headwinds would be structural rather than cyclical.
A Valencia victory would represent the sharpest regulatory reversal available in this field. Ecopetrol exploration contracts would be expected to advance. The mining licensing backlog would be addressed. US bilateral relations would be restored, reactivating security intelligence cooperation and trade facilitation mechanisms. The Colombian peso would be expected to strengthen as country risk premium declined. The path to that outcome now requires her to either close the gap significantly on De la Espriella in the first round or rely on runoff polling that showed her as the stronger second-round candidate — data that predates the most recent polling shift.
A De la Espriella victory introduces the widest distribution of possible outcomes. The upside scenario involves Restrepo managing fiscal and trade policy competently, genuine regulatory rollback in the extractive sector, aggressive extradition resumption, and security operations that reduce the physical risk premium in conflict-affected departments including Cauca, Norte de Santander, and Chocó. The downside scenario involves recurring crises generated by De la Espriella’s personal conduct, conflicts of interest arising from his former client relationships, and authoritarian security measures that attract international human rights attention and complicate bilateral relationships. Restrepo’s presence on the ticket reduces the probability of the downside scenario but does not eliminate it.
The current polling trend indicates that right-wing voters are consolidating around De la Espriella at Valencia’s expense. Whether that consolidation produces a runoff between De la Espriella and Cepeda — and whether the runoff produces a left or right-wing government — remains uncertain. What the polling data does not support is the scenario, widely assumed until recently, of a Cepeda-Valencia runoff in which Valencia was positioned as the structurally stronger opposition candidate.
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On May 13, Claribel Moreno was found dead in a rural area of Jamundí, Valle del Cauca, after spending almost five years dedicated to searching for her daughter demanding truth, justice, and reparations.
Moreno was shot four times while riding a motorcycle, according to authorities, who added that investigations into who the shooting are ongoing.
Activist groups say the killing highlights the pattern of violence against women in Colombia and the perils of seeking truth and justice.
Moreno’s daughter, Natalia Buitrago, was 22 when she disappeared in Cartagena on August 18, 2021, after reportedly traveling with friends and her husband to celebrate her birthday.
Moreno accused Natalia’s husband, Hernán Darío Jiménez, of being behind her disappearance, citing a history of domestic violence. She highlighted alleged inconsistencies and contradictions in his testimony and said that years earlier he had been arrested in Mexico City for involvement in a drug trafficking network.
According to a statement from feminist collectives supporting Moreno’s search for justice, there is evidence that plane tickets were purchased in Natalia’s name and that she had left the country. It also alleged thauit immigration authorities and other state entities have not responded to this matter.
Moreno conducted her own investigation: she traveled to Cartagena, Bogotá, and Pereira to gather testimonies and information in the hope of clarifying what happened and finding her daughter. She always stressed that she believed her daughter had been a victim of human trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation.
Following that, she said she faced threats and physical attacks, which forced her other daughter to leave the country. Moreno denounced this harassment to the media and in congressional hearings, as well as criticizing what she described as failures in the investigations, as well as institutional and state abandonment and revictimization.
“I feel that the Colombian State abandoned me throughout this process, in this search. Today I call on all of you who are present here to help me in this search and not to leave all the mothers forgotten, nor our daughters. My daughter Natalia deserves to be searched for, she deserves to be found,” she said in a congressional hearing.
As part of the search for her daughter, Moreno created social media accounts such as TikTok and Instagram to raise awareness about the case. She danced like her daughter in videos explaining the case and embraced youthful audiovisual languages to help the message reach more people. Moreno became known online and among victims groups for leading the search for her daughter ever since.
“She tried to raise awareness about the case through digital media; she more or less understood how public opinion works. Women searching for their loved ones instinctively understand what they need to do to make noise,” said Isabella Vargas, activist with the Olga Castillo collective – a feminist collective that accompanied Castillo, another mother who sought justice for her daughter, who was sexually abused by U.S. military personnel.
Feminist and women’s collectives in Bogotá that knew Moreno organized a gathering at the Pola monument on May 15 to commemorate her. Claribel was close to the feminist movement and attended its gatherings carrying her purple and pink sign demanding justice for her daughter: “Not all of us are here, Natalia is missing.”
“She was a woman who found refuge in the feminist movement. She reached out to us on several occasions, participated in our sit-ins and marches, and we embraced her in her struggle… It deeply pains us because this struggle has been about finding justice for all of us. It hurts us greatly that another mother is gone and that the State left her unprotected. We hold the State responsible,” Vargas said.
With an altar, candles, flowers, a bonfire, and a speech about conscientious objection to sexual exploitation, the tribute demanded justice for both Moreno and her daughter.
The post Colombia mother searching for missing daughter since 2021 killed in Valle del Cauca appeared first on The Bogotá Post.
Colombian authorities have captured the alleged crime boss “Mison,” also known as the “invisible narco”, who played a key role in facilitating the arrival of the Venezuelan criminal group Tren de Aragua in the capital Bogotá
The suspect, also known as “El Viejo,” was detained in Ecuador and handed over to Colombian authorities at the Rumichaca international border crossing under an Interpol notice, in a joint operation with Ecuadorian officials.
In Colombia, he is wanted on charges including aggravated conspiracy, homicide, drug trafficking and illegal weapons possession. A judge has ordered his pre-trial detention.
Authorities say Mison was the leader of “Los Maracuchos,” a criminal network with a strong presence in three Bogotá districts – Kennedy, Santa Fe and Los Mártires. For more than a decade, he allegedly operated under the guise of a nightlife entrepreneur, owning bars, nightclubs and informal rental properties known as “pagadiarios.”
Mayor Carlos Fernando Galán described the arrest as one of the most significant blows to organized crime in the city in recent years, calling the suspect “almost a myth” within criminal circles.
“He appeared to be a businessman in Bogotá’s nightlife economy, but in reality he was a central figure in a complex criminal structure,” Galán said.
According to investigators, the establishments he controlled served as hubs for drug distribution and were linked to serious crimes, including killings and torture. Among the venues identified by authorities are sites known as “Los Potrillos” and “Hotel Negro.”
Police also allege that Mison played a decisive role in enabling the expansion of Tren de Aragua into Bogotá around 2018, exploiting vulnerable migrant populations to recruit and train individuals for criminal activities. The group, which originated in Venezuela, has expanded across Latin America and is increasingly associated with organized crime in Colombia’s urban centers.
Bogotá Police Chief General Giovanni Cristancho said the arrest followed a two-year investigation involving cross-border cooperation. “He maintained a double life as a businessman while coordinating criminal operations,” noted Cristancho. “He was a pioneer in using ‘pagadiarios’ as operational centers to consolidate territorial control.”
Authorities said Mison fled to Ecuador in 2024 following intensified police pressure in Bogotá, where he continued operating under the cover of a merchant until his location was confirmed.
Prosecutors estimate that he accumulated assets worth more than 20 billion pesos (approximately $5 million), including rural properties, vehicles and real estate held through third parties. Officials say he generated monthly criminal revenues of up to 2 billion pesos through drug trafficking, extortion and other illicit activities.
Bogotá Security Secretary César Restrepo said the suspect’s influence extended beyond narcotics, linking him to extortion networks and contract killings.
“This is not a distant trafficker. He directly fueled violence in Bogotá and is responsible for significant harm to victims across the city,” Restrepo said.
Authorities believe the arrest will disrupt criminal structures tied to drug trafficking and urban violence, although they caution that such networks often adapt quickly.
If convicted, Mison could face a prison sentence of up to 32 years.
The operation is the latest in a series of high-profile security actions in Bogotá, as authorities seek to regain control over criminal networks and restore public safety in key areas of the capital.
Mayor Galán said the result demonstrates that sustained investigations and coordinated efforts can weaken organized crime groups.
On March 22, American Airlines flight attendant Eric Gutierrez went missing after a night out in Medellín.
Less than a week later, authorities found his body in a river three hours away from the city. They concluded he had not died of natural causes.
The U.S-Salvadoran citizen’s murder is the latest in a string of tourist deaths in the Colombian city famous for its nightlife.
But, in conversation with The Bogotá Post, Medellín’s Secretary of Security, Manuel Villa Mejía, offered reassurances that the city remains a safe destination for tourists and shared tips to stay safe.
Gutiérrez, 32, appears to have been a victim of scopolamine robbery, in which thieves use the toxic drug to daze and incapacitate their targets. For years, this method has been well documented in Colombia, which is believed to have the highest number of cases in the world.
Medellín has a reputation as a party city and, accordingly, is often associated with stories about scams, druggings, and robberies.
But Villa Mejía insisted that the city does not tolerate criminal activities: “Our message is clear: there is no place for crime in Medellín.”
He highlighted the city’s recent security strategy to tackle crime, including increasing police presence in nightlife hotspots, dismantling gangs, and enhancing video surveillance.
The Secretary of Security noted how safety in Medellín – once the world’s murder capital – has dramatically improved in recent decades.
“Today is an example of how security can be improved through strategy, consistent effort, and institutional coordination,” said Villa Mejía.
He noted that the city’s homicide rate has fallen for two consecutive years, now standing at 10 per 100,000 inhabitants.
Villa Mejía compared this rate to U.S. cities like Atlanta (51), Washington D.C. (51), and Chicago (73).
“Although there is still a long way to go—since the only acceptable figure is zero—these advances reinforce our commitment to continue working every day to protect the lives, safety, and peace of mind of those who live in and visit the city,” said the Secretary of Security.
While Villa Mejía defended Medellín’s record on crime, he also said that tourists must take precautions to avoid ending up victims of robbery or worse.
“We invite all travelers to enjoy the city at their leisure, but also to exercise caution and act responsibly,” said Villa Mejía.
He recommended that travellers use trusted transportation, avoid displaying large amounts of money or expensive jewellery in public, and stay in safe areas where police are present.
Villa Mejía also stressed the dangers of meeting strangers, especially online. He added that travellers who meet a stranger in person should avoid accepting drinks from them and not follow them to an unknown location.
“The main recommendation is to stay in control of your surroundings,” concluded the Secretary of Security.
The post Medellin reassures tourists after US flight attendant death appeared first on The Bogotá Post.
The search for Eric Fernando Gutiérrez Molina, a 32-year-old US flight attendant reported missing since March 22, concluded Friday following the discovery of a body in rural Antioquia, about two and a half hours south of Medellín. Medellín Mayor Federico Gutiérrez confirmed that the remains were located between the municipalities of Jericó and Puente Iglesias, stating there is a very high probability they belong to the American Airlines (NASDAQ: AAL) employee.
Gutiérrez Molina, a Salvadoran-American national who lived in Texas, arrived in Medellín on a commercial flight via José María Córdova International Airport. He was last seen alive on Sunday, March 22, after visiting commercial establishments in the El Poblado neighborhood. Investigations by the Secretaría de Seguridad y Convivencia suggest the victim was targeted by criminals using scopolamine, a sedative that can be used to incapacitate victims for robbery. According to witness statements, Gutiérrez Molina and another flight attendant were approached at a nightclub by individuals who lured them to another venue in Itaguí, a southwestern suburb of Medellín. While the companion flight attendant was able to make it back to her hotel, ill and disoriented, Gutiérrez Molina remained missing for five days.
“We have very clear leads on those responsible,” stated Mayor Federico Gutiérrez. “I have requested that justice be served and that the perpetrators be sought for extradition to the United States if necessary.”
The body was spotted by residents of Puente Iglesias floating in the Río Piedra ravine. The Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses is currently conducting formal identification and an autopsy in Medellín. Mayor Gutiérrez reported that he has personally informed the victim’s father, the US Ambassador to Colombia, and the Consul General at the US Embassy in Bogotá regarding the development. The mayor stated that investigators have identified alleged perpetrators and expressed his intent to seek their extradition to the US.
Desde el pasado Domingo, estamos en la búsqueda de Eric Gutiérrez un ciudadano Estadounidense que se encuentra desaparecido.
Lamentablemente acaba de ser encontrado un cuerpo sin vida, entre el municipio de Jericó y Puente Iglesias.
Existe…— Fico Gutiérrez (@FicoGutierrez) March 27, 2026
This problem is not new. Criminals have been using scopolamine to prey on both Colombians and foreigners for years. Just last week, the Alcaldía de Medellín (Medellín Mayor’s Office) announced the capture of two women, aged 19 and 34, accused of drugging and robbing foreigners in Parque Lleras. The Policía Nacional and the Fiscalía General de la Nación (Colombia Attorney General’s Office) conducted raids in the Caicedo and Villa Hermosa neighborhoods to dismantle the operation. The suspects reportedly offered escort services as a facade to move victims to tourist accommodations, where they administered benzodiazepines such as clonazepam to facilitate the theft of high-value belongings and cash.
Manuel Villa Mejía, Secretary of Security and Convivencia, stated that the captured women had extensive judicial records for aggravated robbery. During the operations, authorities seized mobile devices, identification documents belonging to other women, and a firearm. Villa Mejía emphasized that the city is utilizing intelligence and focused operations to close pathways for those who instrumentalize tourism for criminal purposes. These actions are part of a broader strategy to weaken the financial operations of networks that continue to target international visitors in El Poblado.
Finance Colombia has also reported on the capture of the Queen of Scopolamine, who led a network dedicated to drugging and robbing tourists in Parque Lleras. Despite prior law enforcement successes against structures like Las Barbies and The Ghetto, predatory crime remains a concern for the international investment community and business travelers.
photo of Mr. Gutierrez from social media
Colombian authorities on Wednesday arrested Ángel Esteban Aguilar Morales, alias “Lobo Menor”, an alleged senior figure in the Ecuadorian criminal group Los Lobos and suspected intellectual author behind the 2023 assassination of Ecuadorian presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio.
The arrest took place at El Dorado International Airport, where Aguilar Morales arrived on a commercial flight from Mexico, according to Colombia’s migration authority.
Officials said the suspect attempted to evade detection using false identification as a Colombian citizen, but biometric verification and international intelligence-sharing mechanisms exposed his true identity. He was detained under an Interpol red notice and handed over to judicial authorities pending extradition proceedings.
Aguilar Morales is considered a high-ranking member of Los Lobos, an Ecuador-based criminal organization linked to narcotrafficking, contract killings, illegal mining, and broader transnational crime. Authorities allege he played a central role in planning the killing of Villavicencio, whose assassination during the 2023 campaign sent shockwaves across the region.
The arrest comes at a delicate moment in bilateral relations. Colombia and Ecuador are this week attempting to defuse a growing diplomatic and security crisis following the discovery of an unexploded device inside Colombian territory near the border between the departments of Nariño and Putumayo. The incident has triggered sharp exchanges between the governments of President Gustavo Petro and Ecuador’s leadership, amid mutual accusations over cross-border security threats.
Colombia’s migration chief Gloria Esperanza Arriero López said the capture underscores the country’s determination to confront transnational criminal networks, particularly as tensions with Ecuador highlight the porous and contested nature of the shared border.
“This result demonstrates that Colombia has strong institutions and coordinated security forces working to close the space for criminal organizations, regardless of their origin,” Arriero said.
Colombian officials said Aguilar Morales had been under surveillance following intelligence tracking his movements through Medellín and Itagüí before traveling to Mexico. Authorities credited close cooperation with Mexican counterparts for locating and intercepting him as part of a multinational operation referred to by Petro as “Jericó.”
Petro described the suspect as one of the most significant figures linked to the Villavicencio assassination and alleged ties to dissident Colombian armed factions, including networks associated with “Iván Mordisco,” as well as Mexican cartels — evidence, he said, of the expanding integration of regional criminal economies.
According to investigators, Aguilar Morales had previously been sentenced in Ecuador to 20 years in prison for murder in 2013, but was granted conditional release in 2022 after serving half his sentence. Authorities allege he used falsified documents to meet legal reporting requirements while continuing criminal operations across borders.
The arrest marks a major development in the Villavicencio case and comes as Ecuador grapples with escalating violence linked to organized crime and drug trafficking routes. The slain candidate had campaigned on an anti-corruption platform and vowed to dismantle criminal networks, placing him squarely in their crosshairs.
Colombian authorities said the capture also demonstrates the importance of trilateral coordination between Colombia, Ecuador and Mexico in dismantling organized crime structures. Aguilar Morales is expected to face extradition as Ecuador seeks to prosecute those responsible for orchestrating the assassination.
The timing of the arrest — against the backdrop of rising diplomatic tensions and border security concerns — is likely to reinforce calls for deeper regional cooperation to address increasingly interconnected criminal threats operating across the Andes.
Colombia and Ecuador have started exchanging trade retaliations after Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa announced a 30% “security” tariff on imports from Colombia, escalating tensions between Andean neighbours over border security cooperation.
Noboa said the measure would take effect on Feb. 1 and would remain in place until Colombia shows “real commitment” to jointly tackle drug trafficking and illegal mining along the shared frontier. He made the announcement from Davos, where he is attending the World Economic Forum.
“We have made real efforts of cooperation with Colombia… but while we have insisted on dialogue, our military continues facing criminal groups tied to drug trafficking on the border without any cooperation,” Noboa said in a post on X, citing an annual trade deficit of more than $1 billion.
Colombia’s foreign ministry rejected the tariff in a formal protest note, calling it a unilateral decision that violates Andean Community (CAN) rules, and proposed a ministerial meeting involving foreign affairs, defence, trade and energy officials on Jan. 25 in Ipiales, Colombia’s southern border city.
The government of President Gustavo Petro also announced a 30% tariff on 20 products imported from Ecuador in response, though it has not specified the items. Diana Marcela Morales, Colombia’s Minister of Commerce, Industry and Tourism (MinCIT) said Ecuador’s exports covered by the retaliatory measure total some $250 million, and described the policy as “temporary” and “revisable.”
Fedexpor, Ecuador’s exporters federation, said non-oil exports to Colombia rose 4% between January and November 2025, and that the Colombian market receives more than 1,130 Ecuadorian export products. The top exports include wood boards, vegetable oils and fats, canned tuna, minerals and metals, and processed food products.
The dispute has also spread into the energy sector. Colombia’s Ministry of Mines and Energy said on Thursday it had suspended international electricity transactions with Ecuador, citing climate-related pressure on domestic supply and the need to prioritise national demand amid concerns over a possible new El Niño weather cycle.
Ecuador has struggled with severe droughts in recent years, triggering long power cuts in 2024 and 2025 in a country where roughly 70% of electricity generation depends on hydropower, while Colombia has supplied electricity during periods of shortage.
President Petro noted that Colombia acted in solidarity during Ecuador’s worst drought in 60 years. “I hope Ecuador has appreciated that when we were needed, we responded with energy,” Petro said on Wednesday.
Following Colombia’s electricity suspension, Ecuador announced new tariffs on transporting Colombian crude through its heavy crude pipeline system. Environment and Energy Minister Inés Manzano said the oil transport fee through the OCP pipeline would reflect “reciprocity,” without giving details.
Colombia and Ecuador share a 600-kilometre border stretching from the Pacific coast to the Amazon, where Colombian armed groups and criminal networks operate, including organisations involved in drug trafficking, arms smuggling and illegal mining. Relations between Petro and Noboa, who sit on opposite ends of the political spectrum, have frequently been strained.
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