The Colombian national parks agency announced the temporary closure of the Tayrona National Park on Tuesday, February 17, citing threats against park staff by armed groups.

Tayrona, located on the country’s northern Caribbean coast, is one of the country’s most visited national parks, attracting as many as 750,000 visitors from around the world each year.

Its closure comes amid a war between two criminal organizations fighting to control territory and strategic drug trafficking routes in the region.

“The National Government announced the temporary closure of Tayrona National Natural Park as a preventive measure to protect the lives and safety of visitors, communities, and officials, and to ensure their security,” read a government statement on Tuesday. 

The dispute began with an operation on February 11 to dismantle “unauthorized constructions in the protected area” in the park. The director of the national parks agency explained that these included houses, bathrooms, and hiking trails built without state permission.

The demolition prompted threats online against park personnel, according to the government. The situation escalated on Monday, February 16, when locals blocked park employees from entering Tayrona. They also reportedly took over government functions, charging tourists for access and allowing people to enter without formal registration. 

“This created a situation that prevents a minimum level of security from being ensured within the protected area,” said authorities.

While the government did not specify who it believes to be behind the actions, the closure comes amid a mounting turf war in the area between two criminal organizations: the Conquering Self-Defense Forces of the Sierra Nevada (ACSN) and the Gaitanist Army of Colombia (EGC), or Clan del Golfo, designated a terrorist organization by the United States last December. 

“This latest escalation in Tayrona is yet another chapter in this very unfortunate territorial contest that’s been underway now for several years,” said Elizabeth Dickinson, deputy director for Latin America at the International Crisis Group. 

For decades, the ACSN – under different names – has controlled the Sierra Nevada, Tayrona and the city of Santa Marta through a web of powerful family clans. But in recent years, the EGC has been pushing east along the coast from its stronghold in the Gulf of Urabá, trying to displace the ACSN.

The EGC’s long-term goal is to reach the border with Venezuela and surround the key coca-producing region of Catatumbo, says Dickinson. 

“[The Sierra Nevada] is sort of a route on the route to their goal. And… the effect on the civilian population from both sides has been pretty devastating,” said the analyst, who noted a rise in forced confinement, recruitment, and targeted killings.

While tourists tend to be insulated from criminal violence in the area, with armed groups preferring to profit from drugs and prostitution, Tayrona’s closure may signal a shift. 

But local tourism operators tell a different story; they say the closure has nothing to do with the security situation. Instead, members of the community say the problem is that the government, which collects revenue from ticket sales, is not re-investing it in the park. 

“The communities are tired, and the Indigenous people are tired because they don’t receive the money either; it’s taken to Bogotá,” said Luis Eduardo Muñoz, a local leader. 

He explained that members of the community took action to renovate vital tourism infrastructure in the park because the national government failed to invest in it. When the state demolished it, they protested.

“Why do they have to resort to extreme measures and try to close the park if it is necessary for people’s livelihoods?” said Muñoz, who called for dialogue between the government and local leaders.

Although the cause of the closure remains disputed, security analysts nevertheless say it underscores increasing insecurity in the Sierra Nevada region around Tayrona. 

It also marks another setback for President Gustavo Petro’s peace process, with the government actively engaged in negotiations with both the ACSN and the EGC.

Petro said the ACSN had signed a deal after Tayrona’s closure to guarantee civilian safety and suspend attacks on state security forces. 

But the prospect of a peace deal remains uncertain as the group faces a mounting threat from the EGC.

“I think the fundamental question remains the tactical situation on the ground because, of course, they can’t negotiate if they’re under immediate threat from another force,” said Dickinson.

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Bogotá, Colombia – On February 10, the Grenoble Prosecutor’s Office launched a worldwide call for victims or witnesses of Jacques Leveugle, a teacher arrested in 2024 in France and accused of sexually assaulting at least 89 minors around the world since 1967.

During a press conference, French prosecutor Étienne Manteaux said that the sexual predator was reported in 2023 by one of his nephews, who discovered a USB drive containing written memoirs, pictures, and other documents related to the abuse of teenagers. 

The French Embassy in Colombia called for witnesses to come forward to identify potential abuse victims in the country, as Leveugle worked as a teacher in Bogotá on two occasions between 1996 and 2023.

The suspect was living in Morocco when the investigation began, but had spent his life moving between Switzerland, Germany, Portugal, Algeria, Nigeria, the Philippines, New Caledonia, Colombia, and France. In all of these countries, he allegedly targeted minors while working in educational or social roles.

Authorities revealed that in his “autobiography,” the alleged abuser gave horrendous details about 89 teenagers, between 13 and 17 years old, being manipulated and abused from 1967 to 2022.

“We need Jacques Leveugle’s name to be known because the objective is to reach the victims and encourage them to come forward,” Manteaux confirmed.

He said that 40 of the 89 victims had been identified and that authorities were working to find the rest. 

“Sometimes names are not even mentioned; we are facing a wall in certain situations… This call for witnesses is to allow victims we haven’t been able to identify to come forward,” the prosecutor explained. “Perhaps not all victims are recorded in these documents.”

Manteaux also said that the man, who has been under arrest since 2024 and never officially graduated as an educator, also confessed in his writings to killing two women: his mother and one of his aunts.

The uphill battle to find victims in Colombia

Investigations revealed that Jacques Leveugle spent several years living in and visiting Colombia between 1996 and 2000, and again from 2000 to 2023. 

In an interview with Caracol Radio, the prosecutor confirmed that the sexual predator worked as a French teacher in a shelter for children and teenagers in the capital city, Bogotá.

“It’s hard to reach victims outside France; that’s why we have made a special invitation to Colombian victims. We need them and their experiences to understand what this man really did,” he said during the call, adding that they decided to take a “traditional” approach due to the difficulty of reaching witnesses.

Authorities are also trying to determine if Leveugle had collaborators and what his “modus operandi” was to ensure that none of the teenagers ever complained or reported the abuse to the police.

Latin America Reports contacted the Grenoble Prosecutor’s Office, and they confirmed that the investigation remains active and ongoing in Colombia. They also committed to briefing the media on any significant breakthroughs as they continue to work toward identifying more victims internationally.

The French Embassy in Bogotá has shared the channels established to find Colombian victims:

Anyone with information or seeking to report an incident can communicate via email at sr-grenoble-leveugle@gendarmerie.interieur.gouv.fr or by calling the international hotline at +33 800 005 321.

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Failures in Colombia’s health system were highlighted this week after a young boy died from “completely preventable” complications from blood condition after going off treatment for two months.

Seven-year-old Kevin Acosta was rushed to hospital in Pitalito, Huila, on February 8 after falling off his bike and hitting his head, a situation complicated by his hemophilia.

According to his mother Katherine Pico, the boy required regular injections of clotting factors to prevent the genetic condition that can cause fatal bleeding if untreated.

But due to failings by his health insurer, Nueva EPS, Kevin had missed his regular injections for two months, and on the day of his accident he was denied emergency doses even while bleeding from his head in the hospital in Pitalito.

When the health insurer finally agreed to evacuate Kevin by air ambulance 24 hours later to Bogotá, where clotting factors were available, the blood loss was severe. Kevin died four day later in the Intensive Care Unit of the Hospital de la Misericordia in Bogotá.

Since then, Kevin’s death has caused huge indignation in Colombia both among medical experts who claim the death was preventable and critics of the current government’s political intervention in the health system which has left many users worse off.

Get off your bike

Adding to the furor, President Gustavo Petro waded into the debate blaming the mother for allowing Kevin to ride a bicycle.

“A hemophiliac child shouldn’t ride a bike; it’s a matter of prevention. We need to know if the doctor or the health system isn’t providing education, because mothers don’t learn about it, especially given the low educational levels in Colombia,” he said.

His own health minister, Guillermo Jaramillo, added: “Children with hemophilia should be restricted from activities that can generate violent trauma,” he said.

These comments were challenged by patient’s rights groups, who pointed out that cyclists with hemophilia have competed in the Tour de France, and medical experts who emphasized that in recent decades in Colombia prevention has been based on weekly or monthly injections of “clotting factors” which allowed hemophiliacs to lead normal lives.

Many medical experts concurred that children with regular prophylaxis to prevent excess bleeding could, and should, integrate in physical activities.  

“The child died from the accident, but the reason he died was because he didn’t have the medication,” Dr Sergio Robledo, president of the Colombian League of Hemophiliacs, told Blu Radio.  “Prevention in hemophilia means having the drugs, not locking the child up at home.”

“For more than 20 years in Colombia we have not had any [hemophilia] deaths specifically due to a lack of medicine,” Robledo continued.

Chaotic plan

Kevin’s case was symptomatic of problems in Colombia’s health system which had worsened under the Petro government, Denis Silva told the Bogotá Post this week.

Silva, spokesperson for Paciente Colombia, a coalition of 202 patients’ rights groups, said Kevin’s death was “100 per cent avoidable”.

“If Kevin had been given the prophylaxis or given the treatment when he went to the clinic to coagulate his blood, the situation would have been different”.

Kevin’s mother had been asking Nueva EPS for the life-saving medicines since December, he said, but they were never delivered because the EPS had “failed to pay the clinic” that administered the drug in Pitalito.

Blame for these errors should bounce back to the Petro government, said Silva. State entities had forcibly intervened in Nueva EPS in 2024, claiming fraud in the huge health insurer, and were thereafter legally responsible for managing the entity that covered 11 million Colombians.

Interventions in EPS insurers was not unusual in Colombia, he said. Previous governments had done the same to avoid a crisis for patients.

But were timely actions to “administrate, improve and, where necessary, rescue” the health insurers, though in some cases they were shuttered and patients moved to other companies. Petro’s current takeovers were more chaotic and linked to political overhaul of the health system, he said.

Health system in crisis

This agenda was heavily criticized in an opinion article ‘How Politics Destroyed Colombia’s Model Healthcare System’, by Colombian-based journalist Luke Taylor and published in the prestigious British Medical Journal in January.

Referring to President Petro’s “bungled reforms”, the story claimed that maternity wards and neonatal units were shutting their doors, emergency departments becoming overwhelmed, and training programs for specialist doctors being shut down.

It also quoted the Colombian president as stating that health companies were being “run by crooks”, even as the his government’s interventions triggered a slew of complaints by patients suddenly finding their health care a lot worse.

For patients with chronic ailments reliant on monthly checkups and regular medical supply, the decline was becoming an existential threat, said Colombia’s ombudsman, Iris Marín, this week.

Kevin Acosta was “yet another victim of the failures in the availability and access to medicines that thousands of Colombians face today, in order to access timely treatments that are crucial for their health”.

According to documents released by Nueva EPS, Pico had tried to transfer her son’s care from Huila to Santander department, then switched back to Huila, suggesting a paperwork logjam had delayed the treatment. In another statement, it denied suspending the prophylaxis.

Need for treatment

This was “a big lie” said Pico, talking to Semana, since even before the administrative switch the local clinic treating Kevin had told her in early January that Nueva EPS had ended its contract. Without payments from the EPS, the clinic was forced to suspend treatment.

“By January we had no medication, no appointments, nothing,” said Pico.

Her position was supported by the fact that, across the country, other chronic or rare disease sufferers – including hemophiliac suffers in Pico’s same family – were reporting the same shortages, in many cases linked to contractual or payment problems with health suppliers. 

ACHOP, the Colombian Association of Pediatric Hematology and Oncology, warned in a public communication that children and adolescents “were not receiving in a timely and continuous manner the essential medicines to preserve their lives in conditions of dignity”.

These shortages fell mostly on patients with the state-intervened Nueva EPS, confirmed hemophilia specialist Dr Jorge Peña, who said he regularly treated dozens of children with the condition.

Talking to Caracol Radio, Dr Peña said that children with other insurers were receiving their prophylaxis on time and were “happy, free from bleeding, and going to school as usual”.

“In comparison Nueva EPS patients are not getting the medicines, and I see them every day with bleeding. They can’t go to school.”

Leaked records

Meanwhile attempts by the government and President Petro to push back on Pico even while grieving her son’s death caused condemnation across the political spectrum, particularly since the state had taken over Nueva EPS.

“The responsibility is clear: when the state intervenes and controls, it is held accountable,” said Senator Jorge Robledo on X.

“The healthcare system already had problems, but under this government it’s worse. And meanwhile, more and more Colombians are suffering from illnesses that medicine knows how to treat.”

More criticism piled on President Petro after he leaked details from the Kevin Acosta’s medical records during a speech in La Guajira. Patient spokesperson Denis Silva called on the government to respect patient confidentiality

“These are confidential in Colombia,” said Silva. “By law the EPS insurer should guard the medical records, and no-one should access them without permission from the family”.

The leaks came even as the state agency overseeing the system, the Superintendency of Health (also known as Supersalud), announced an investigation into the Kevin’s care, including looking at “administrative barriers and the delivery of medication by Nueva EPS and the service provider”. This audit should clarify differences in accounts from the family and Nueva EPS.

But even with results pending, President Petro again doubled down in a speech claiming the family was primarily responsible for Kevin’s health outcomes.

“It’s the family that first of all cares for its children,” he said, “Not everything is the responsibility of the state, because the state can’t respond to everything, otherwise we lose our liberty”.  

Colombians living with hemophilia might want those liberties to include the right to life-saving drugs – and to ride a bike.

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2026 has started off unusually wet, with downpours in Bogotá and floods elsewhere in Colombia. What’s going on and how can you help?

While this is meant to be the dry season for most of Colombia, it’s instead been raining heavily. Vast swathes of the Caribbean region have flooded, and in Bogotá, it’s led to collapses in the traffic systems. That’s led to an emergency declaration by the president and frantic relief efforts (links at article end).

Colombian president Gustavo Petro has declared a state of emergency yet again to address the situation in the northern department of Córdoba and elsewhere. While the emergency measures were declared for Córdoba, this was later extended to 22 departments, underlining the severity of the situation.

Within the capital, flash floods have swamped roads and forced traffic to grind to a halt as well as collapsing roofs and flooding buildings. Luckily, Bogotá has so far escaped the levels of damage seen elsewhere in the nation.

Barrios such as Nicolás de Federman have been hit by hailstorms heavy enough to resemble a blizzard, leaving them carpeted in white as though snowed in while the autopista norte has been forced to close as it resembles a swamp.

One silver lining to the rainclouds is that the reservoirs will be nice and full, alleviating fears that Bogotá will be forced to return to water rationing, as happened in 2024. That will be little comfort to many who have lost everything in the floods.

Why is it raining so much?

Colombia’s weather monitors, IDEAM, have explained that there are four main factors: the Madden and Julian wave; high Amazonian humidity; a lack of winds to move that humidity and la Niña-esque conditions.

All put together, these four factors combine to make a perfect storm and unseasonably high January rainfall levels. That’s continued into February and with March and April around the corner there is little relief in sight.

That’s led to half the country being put on alert for potential floods and high precipitation, which leads to all sorts of other trouble such as landslides. Colombia’s disaster relief agency UNGRD is underprepared currently, having endured corruption scandals recently.  

This is meant to be the dry season, too. Bogotá in particular is meant to receive heavy rain October-December and April, not January and February. In fact, these months are normally characterised by blazing sunshine, clear skies and hot temperatures.

Adding to the confusion is the fact that we’re supposed to be heading into an El Niño cycle, meaning dry weather and lower rainfall than expected. Instead, we’ve had the precise opposite so far. While Colombia is the world’s rainiest country, it’s not meant to fall in January and February, at least not in the north.

Floods in the Caribbean

The rains have been annoying and disruptive in Bogotá, but other parts of the country have faced genuine devastation. First among those is the department of Córdoba, which has suffered widespread floods. However, over half the country has been affected.

The capital of Córdoba, Montería, is the worst hit major city in the country, with thousands of people evacuated in the city and surrounds. Over a quarter of a million people have been directly affected by the rains nationally.

Sadly, politics have come into play here too, with Petro clashing with regional governor Erasmo Zuleta over the management of the department. The pair have had a lot of differences over the years. He also said he was initially unable to land in Córdoba due to the risk of an attack.

More reasonable are Petro’s claims that the situation has been exacerbated by water management systems such as reservoirs. These have diverted normal water flows and critically diminished the region’s ability to handle pressure from unusual weather patterns. Zuleta’s response is that the national government oversees the Urrá hydro plant.

The worst affected regions are on the Caribbean coast, with Uraba Antioqueño, La Guajira and Sucre joining Córdoba, but the Amazon and Pacific regions have also seen unusually high rainfall for the start of the year.

There has been flooding in Medellín, as well as the risk of landslides in hillside comunas, while coastal cities such as Cartagena have had heavy downpours and storms, affecting much-needed tourism income in high season as beaches close.

Even when the rains stop, the long term effects will take years to overcome. Already, bad actors are starting to take advantage of the situation, with desperate houseowners paying through the nose for boaters to rescue their belongings before thieves arrive.

Fields that are now underwater will take an age to fully drain and even longer to recover from the damage currently being wrought upon them. Thousands upon thousands of hectares of farmland will be unusable for the near future.

With what looks like a fraught year ahead for Colombia, this is an unwanted extra pressure to deal with and exposes the fragility of infrastructure in the face of increased climate change pressure. Whoever wins the next election, investment will be needed to avoid similar problems going forward. 

The Cruz Roja Colombiana are taking donations of clothes and building materials at their Salitre centre (Av.68 #68b-31), and you can donate money directly on this link. The local government in Bogotá is also organising donation drives on this link.

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Judges ordered the recapture this week of a Violeta Arango Ramírez, a prime suspect in the 2017 bombing of Bogotá’s Andino shopping mall, after she lost her legal protections as an ELN peace manager.

The Colombian attorney general’s office requested that Arango, thought to be active in the ranks of the ELN guerrillas, “be found immediately to comply with an order for prison detention” based on accusations she was a key participant in the attack that left three dead and 10 more injured.

Arango, a sociologist, was previously arrested in 2022, but then released from prison to assume the role of a gestora de paz (‘peace manager’) during peace talks between the ELN and the the Petro government.

The controversial release was criticised at the time by survivors and families of victims of the Andino attack as Arango remained a key suspect. By being nominated as a gestora de paz, Arango was allowed both her freedom and temporary avoidance of homicide and terrorism charges while whe was “collaborating with the peace process”.  

This week’s recapture order followed breakdowns in government talks with the ELN with the Justice Department officially removing many combatants’ designations as peace managers. The news gave a glimmer of hope for justice after nine years of uncertainty as to who was behind the attack.

Arango herself has always denied any involvement in the attack, pointing to a plot from within the state prosecutors’ office to frame left-wing activists during the political fallout from the 2016 FARC peace deal.

Pamphlet bombs

The Andino attack unfolded during the evening of Saturday, June 17, 2017, inside the crowded women’s restroom of the busy shopping mall at a peak hour. It was the eve of Father’s Day.

A bomb placed in a toilet cubicle exploded killing one French and two Colombian citizens and maimed at least eight more women in or around the restroom.

Police investigators quickly blamed the Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo or MRP, a left-wing group that had evolved in Bogotá’s public universities and was dedicated to mediatic events such as dangling flags from buildings and letting off weak explosives that launched political leaflets into the air.

Over the space of two years the MRP had targeted public spaces outside tax offices, health insurers and banks with messages such as: “Today in Colombia the peace process is a business plan”, and “Health in Colombia is a problem of democracy”.

In the months following the attack, a dozen suspects accused of being linked to the MRP were rounded up, detained over many months, then tried and released after none of the evidence against them could be proven in court.

Meanwhile an alternative theory emerged: that the Andino bombing was part of a right-wing plot carried out to destabilise the then-Santos government’s closeness to left-wing guerrilla groups in the wake of the historic 2016 peace process with the FARC, previously Colombia’s most powerful armed group.

False positives

In this narrative, the MRP, with its history of small-scale attacks and rumoured links to the larger ELN guerrilla group, made a convenient scape-goat.

Investigators claimed to have found similarities between the Andino bomb and the pamphlet explosives, but an analysis by news website Las2Orillas at the time pointed out that the attorney general’s office at the time “had a long history of fabricating evidence” to bring down left-wing political targets, partly as a distraction from their own implications in high profile corruption cases.

Violeta Arango, an activist with links to left-wing causes, found herself officially accused of being an MRP leader and coordinator with the much larger ELN guerrilla group.

She avoided capture and publicy declared herself the victim of a “falso positivo”, or false positive, referring to the practice by the Colombian military of murdering civilians and disguising their bodies as guerrilla combatants.

“This legal persecution I am suffering, along with my family who are being harassed and abused, is nothing more than a setup by the police and the attorney general’s office,” she wrote in an open letter, before fleeing Bogotá.

What happened next is subject to speculation. According to Arango herself, she escaped into the arms of the ELN (literally, as she became the romantic partner of a senior commander) fearing for her life in the face of “political persecution”.  

But her smooth transition into the ELN guerrilla’s Darío Ramírez Castro Front – active in the conflict zone of Sur de Bolívar – also seemed to vindicate the prosecution’s narrative of her links to urban terrorism.

Alias ‘Talibán’

Meanwhile in Bogotá, 10 other people were detained as suspected MRP members linked to the attack.

After searches of their homes, some were accused of carrying false IDs, carrying weapons, and, in some cases, having printed plans of the Andino shopping centre showing entrances and exits, and notes which appeared to show preparations for the bombing, and USB sticks with messages from the MRP.

But in many cases the police arrests and searches were themselves found to be illegal and without due process which, added to the flimsy evidence presented in court, lead to the the cases falling apart under legal scrutiny.

Some of these investigations were later examined in a documentary called Andino File: A Judicial Set-up? produced by journalism collective La Liga Contra el Silencio. One of the main accused, Iván Ramírez, described how the police produced CCTV used to identify him “scoping out the Andino”. This “evidence” later turned out to be video of a regular mall worker with a similar look.

In another twist, Ramírez described how the police themselves invented the aliases to which the suspects were presented as a “terrorist cell” to the media; for example, ‘El Calvo’, ‘Japo’, ‘Aleja’ and, in the case of the bearded sociologist, ‘Talibán’. The scary name stuck and Ramírez was thereafter referred to by Colombia media as ‘alias Talíban’.

He was also constantly described by prosecutors as the “explosives expert” of the MRP cell, a charge he consistently denied.

Ramírez was released from custody in 2021 after spending four years in pre-trial detention, during which time every case against him collapsed. But even after his release he continued to be “linked to the investigation”.

Peace managing

Then in June 2022, Violeta Arango, now in the ELN, was captured in the Sur de Bolívar in the same military operation that killed her partner, known as Pirry.

According to a post on X by the then minister of defence, Diego Molano, alias Pirry was “one of the top ELN commanders responsible for attacks on the civilian population, forced recruitment, and terrorism”.  

Arango was jailed for her guerrilla links even while the process continued against her for the Andino bombing.

That panorama changed when Petro Gustavo took the presidency in August 2022; with peace talks in the air, and after a visit from a Cuban and Norwegian delegation to her jail, Arango was released to her gestora de paz role in November that year. She resurfaced a month later in Caracas, Venezuela, as part of the ELN talks with the Petro government.

This appearance caused anger among the Andino victims. Pilar Molano, who lost a leg in the explosion, told Vorágine magazine that “it’s insane that they let her out and put her in the peace negotiations with the ELN”.

Six years after the Andino attack, in April 2023, the prosecutor’s office again filed charges against Arango based on evidence that prior to the bombing she had downloaded plans of the shopping mall from the Internet.

Cell structures

The indictment formally accused Arango of the “detailed planning” of the bomb attack. It further alleged that Arango was a senior member of the MRP “responible for attracting new members to the criminal organization in Bogotá and apparently participated in at least 21 terrorist attacks against EPS headquarters, public transport and infrastructure”.

With this week’s recapture order the case can move ahead – assuming she can be found.

Any trial could shed light on the who and why of the Andino bombing, and also the complex backstory of ‘Violeta’. But, given the shambolic history of the judicial process, it could also put the investigation back to square one.

In interviews in the intervening years leaders of MRP have repeatedly denied their groups involvement, as well as denying any links to the ELN, or any connections to the original suspects.

But the truth might be hard to find even within the two armed groups; both the ELN and the MRP are known to work in cell structures which plan autonomous actions often without the co-members or leaders aware.

Such was the case with the devastating car bomb that killed 20 young police recruits in Bogotá in 2019, initially denied by the ELN – their leadership claimed not to know of the plot – but eventually taking responsibility.

An unusual element of the Andino bombing is that no armed group or political movement has ever taken responsibility. And so far the prosecutors have not only failed to pin the attack on the MRP, but also ignored alternative lines of investigations such as a false flag operation by paramilitary or right-wing groups.

Lawyer for the Andino victims and survivors Franciso Bernate, said this week that “on behalf of the 11 female victims we hope Violeta is found so she can respond to these grave accusations”.

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Stark figures show expansion of fighting groups under ‘Paz Total’.

Colombia’s illegal armed groups have grown by 84 per cent during the three years of the Petro government’s Paz Total plan, thinktank Fundacion Ideas para la Paz (FIP) announced last week.

The alarming data showed the country’s main guerrilla factions and organised crime gangs totalled 27,000 active members at the end of 2025, adding 5,000 new recruits in just 12 months.

And humanitarian crises associated with the expansion of illicit economies, such as combats, displacements or confinement of communities, attacks on social leaders and extortion were also on the rise.

According to Gerson Arias, co-author of FIP’s El Deterioro de la Seguridad Marca el Inicio de 2026 (Deteriorating Security Marks the Start of 2026), the endless peace talks played out under President Petro’s expansive Paz Total policy had only incentivised armed groups to grow in terms of fighters, weapons and territory.

“Paz Total was based on a state ceasefire – but without any conditions put on the groups, such as ceasing recruitment, including child recruitment, or ending expansion,” he told The Bogotá Post.

“As such, the policy gave a gigantic strategic advantage to the armed groups to strengthen their fighting forces.”

Big surge

The biggest surge was in the organised crime group Clan de Golfo, up by 30 per cent to 9,840 active agents, reported FIP (see chart below).

Next in terms of size was the ELN, the guerrilla group dominating the eastern borderlands of Colombia, with 6,810 members, an increase of 9 per cent.

Dissident FARC groups also grew, some by almost a quarter, such as CNEB (Coordinadora Nacional Ejercito Bolivariano) which despite drawn-out peace talks with the Petro government – and numerous plans for a disarmament – ended the year 25 per cent bigger than started, now numbering 2,089.

And these were probably underestimates, said Arias. The FIP figures were based on military and intelligence data collected annually since 2002,and generally considered to be lower than the actual numbers.

“We tend to undermeasure illegal activity. It’s impossible to say with precision, but we would say the real data could be 20% or 30% higher,” he concluded.

Unlucky 13

These numbers included both armed fighters – often uniformed and carrying heavy weaponry – and support members tasked with infiltrating civilian communities to “ensure compliance”, often carrying pistols. Armed groups were increasingly deploying explosives by drones.

According to the FIP report, none of the negotiation processes had managed to curb their recruitment capacity.

Territorial expansion had also triggered disputes over illegal gold mining, coca, and trafficking routes. The FIP report identified 13 zones where two or more groups were facing off, more than twice the number of disputed territories that Petro inherited from the Duque government in 2022.

Top in terms of combat last year were Catatumbo in Norte de Santander, and areas of Guaviare, Cauca, Nariño, Valle and Arauca (see map).

But even departments considered peaceful in recent years, such as Tolima and Huila, were being drawn back into the fray, said Arias.

This rise in conflict brought a host of humanitarian impacts. Armed groups strictly controlled their zones, at times displacing or confining populations, but also imposing daily controls such as travel permissions and ID cards.

Last year, according to UN figures quoted by FIP, one million mostly rural Colombians were affected by armed group controls, tripling the number recorded in 2024.

Civilians in the crosshairs

And according to Arias, the government had itself increased the risks to civilians by involving them as third parties in the peace talks while failing in any robust plan to pacify the zone.

“Petro reached partial agreements with the groups – even while they were still armed, still controlling, extorting, confining and pressuring civilian communities. There was no cost to the armed groups,” said the researcher.

Part of the problem was that Paz Total had initially failed to link to any coherent military strategy that could had protected civilian communities. This had put civic leaders “in the crosshairs of armed groups” as one side accused them of siding with the other.  

The statement is backed by a graph showing a year-on increase since 2022 in attacks both between armed groups, and against civilians and state forces. Last year there were 150 attacks on civilian targets.

In fact, by Arias’s estimate Colombia had gone back to 2011 in terms of the numbers of non-state armed actors – 27,000 – potentially in conflict.

That compared to a recent low of 12,800 combatants in 2018, two years after former president Santos signed the 2016 peace deal with the FARC guerrillas.

From bad to worse

In fact, to explain the current situation, Arias pointed to failures in the both the current administration and the previous right-wing government under Ivan Duque.

Taking over in 2018, Duque rolled back many of the agreements made with the FARC sending many ex-combatants back to the bush along with a wave of new combatants.

But then left-leaning Gustavo Petro, taking over in 2022, surprised even his own military advisers by declaring a unilateral ceasefire. This was the opening salvo of the Paz Total policy which announced negotiations with armed groups and criminal gangs on multiple fronts – in some cases even without informing them.

Petro’s plan was conceived “with good intentions”, said Arias, but had put misplaced trust in armed groups busy enriching themselves by illegal activities and with little incentive to demobilize.

By comparison, during the 2013-16 process with the FARC, the military forces under Santos had continued operations against the guerrilla up until the final signing: “This pressure incentivised the FARC to take serious decisions in terms of the peace process,” he said.

Too little, too late

The failings of Paz Total were apparent on the ground in the first few months of inception in 2022, with community organisations raising the alarm over the increased fighting between groups.

It took until late 2024 for the state military to step up offensive actions in areas such as Cauca, with battles against the dissident FARC factions of Ivan Mordisco. Then, in early 2025, the Catatumbo region of Norte de Santander caught fire with fierce combat between the ELN and FARC 33, leading to the largest humanitarian crisis in Colombia’s recent history.

But it took until August last year for President Petro himself to acknowledge that the policy had “not achieved peace”.

During 2025 military actions increased by 30 per cent, but with reduced state forces – many experienced soldiers and commanders had left – facing stronger armed groups, said Arias.

“The offensive came slowly and without an analysis of what was required to combat the strengthened armed groups.”

“Years of intelligence capacity was lost, along with military presence and air deployment. This explains why – despite the offensives – there are few concrete improvements for many communities.”

For soldiers on the ground, the job got harder under Paz Total with a strengthened enemy and less military intelligence to rely on. According to President Petro’s own presentation to the Trump Whitehouse early this month, 360 state forces have been killed “in the fight against drug trafficking” in the last three years, with 1,680 wounded.

But even away from the front line, Paz Total was not up to the monumental task of negotiating peace with multiple armed groups given that most governments had failed to pacify even one.

At whatever cost

“Paz Total never evaluated the institutional capacity required. It’s good to say: ‘we have to negotiate with everyone’. But that requires a method,” said Arias.

The government often pushed talks ahead even without any legal framework that would allow, constitutionally, the state to make peace with certain criminal gangs, or groups of recycled combatants that had previously demobilised. This created a credibility gap which continued to undermine the peace initiative.

“Even today, no group has taken a serious position on disarming or demobilisation or reducing violence,” said Arias.

FIP also questioned the government’s own seriousness in finalizing any negotiations, terming Paz Total an “electoral peace”; endless rounds of talks through the upcoming election period.  

It’s a strategy Arias condemned: “This government seems intent on continuing the process at whatever costs and put the burden of resolution on the next government. This is politically irresponsible.”

Lack of concrete results could also taint future processes, he said.

“The poor results have thrown doubt on the idea that political solutions to conflict is the best route, which is very worrying, and eventually exposes communities to more risk.”

His main message – and the key finding of the FIP report – was that ending conflict in Colombia required more than goodwill, he told The Bogotá Post.

“It’s incoherent to talk of ‘peace or security’. We need to talk of ‘peace and security’. Without that, we’ve gone backwards.”

The post Peace plan has caused more conflict, says thinktank. appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

Bogotá, Colombia — In the past week, Colombians have taken to the streets on two occasions to defend the government’s minimum wage increase as it faces legal attacks by business sectors. 

On January 28 and February 3, Colombians marched in major cities in support of the landmark 23% wage increase established at the end of last year.

But the future of Decree 1469, which established what the government has called a “living wage”, remains uncertain.

“This is a major step forward by the government of Gustavo Petro. It is not just an increase; it is the dignification of workers’ wages in Colombia. That is why, as union members and as teachers, we support this mission, which directly impacts people’s everyday lives,” Oscar Patiño, an attendee of the January 28 march, told The Bogotá Post. 

For Patiño, a teacher and union leader, the protest represented a demand that the Council of State act as a guarantor of workers’ rights through its role in defining public policy.

He was part of a wave of sit-in protests in cities across the country called by labor unions, with the backing of the government, to defend the minimum wage hike. The 23% raise brings the monthly base salary to COP$1,750,905 (USD$477) and the transportation allowance to COP $249,095 (USD$68). 

In Bogotá, the demonstration was joined by Labor Minister Antonio Sanguino and lawmakers from the pro-government bloc, including Senator Wilson Arias.

“This increase no longer leaves workers’ wages below key economic indicators. It is for the improvement of their quality of life,” said another attendee, who did not want to be named.

As well as raising the base salary, December’s decree incorporated the concept of a “living wage” as an additional criterion for setting the increase. This concept is not new: it is enshrined in Article 53 of Colombia’s Political Constitution and in International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention No. 131 of 1970.

“In that ruling, the Constitutional Court reminds the government that when setting wages, remuneration must be minimum, I quote, ‘living, and adjustable,’” said Mery Laura Perdomo, a lawyer specializing in labor, social security, and constitutional law. 

The “living wage” responds to the real cost of living, unlike the minimum wage, which barely covers basic needs. “This helps generate conditions for a dignified life in a Social State governed by the rule of law … The major shift is from a minimum wage to a living wage,” said Labor Minister Antonio Sanguino.

The government passed the decree raising wages unilaterally after failing to reach consensus with government representatives, business associations and labor unions. It determined the base salary raise based on economic criteria such as inflation (CPI), GDP, the contribution of wages to national income, inflation targets, and productivity.

But the decree generated dissatisfaction among business associations and parts of the public, prompting them to pursue legal action. 

Perdomo notes that there are two types of challenges to the wage increase: tutela actions—arguing violations of fundamental rights, specifically due process or harm to certain companies—and a lawsuit seeking the annulment of the decree.

“I believe there are no sufficient legal grounds for a potential declaration of unconstitutionality,” Perdomo said, noting that the decree grounds its constitutionality in ILO conventions, the constitution, and technical and economic studies and criteria. “There are constitutional, legal, jurisprudential, and technical-economic grounds to say that this minimum wage decree could not be declared unconstitutional.”

So far, tutela actions have not succeeded, according to Perdomo. As for the annulment lawsuit—filed by the National Federation of Merchants (Fenalco)—it is currently under review and awaiting evaluation by the assigned judge, according to the Colombian economic magazine Portafolio. The claim argues that constitutional and legal criteria were disregarded.

Portafolio also reports that the risks of the legal debate lie in the possibility that, while a final decision is pending, the Council of State could not only annul the decree but also order a provisional suspension of the wage increase.

But Perdomo warned this would be an unpopular move ahead of next month’s legislative elections: “Politically, this is risky in an electoral context, since a large portion of the population—especially low-income earners—is satisfied with the minimum wage increase. Overturning it could sour the political climate on the eve of elections and have a real impact on voting intentions.”

Meanwhile, Petro’s ruling Pacto Historico coalition, which has formed into a party ahead of the elections, has made a point of championing the minimum wage increase. 

On Tuesday, it called for rallies across the country to support the living wage, justice, and labor dignity. 

“The living wage is not a favor; it is a right. A dignified life begins with fair work, and this mobilization reminds us that labor dignity is the foundation of social justice,” declared Health Minister Guillermo Alfonso Jaramillo from Bogotá’s Plaza de Bolívar.

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A picture frame with a kind message and smiles all round: was the Colombia-USA meeting at the White House an unalloyed success?

Colombian president Gustavo Petro’s trip to Washington to meet his counterpart Donald Trump seems to have gone very well. The build-up had been pretty good, with Trump praising Petro and both sides avoiding inflammatory rhetoric.

So well did it go, in fact, that Petro ended up with a signed photobook memory of the encounter on first name terms. Trump’s handwritten note said it was a great honour to have met Petro, adding “I love Colombia”. For his part, Petro said his team was looking for solutions and invited Trump to visit Cartagena.

Trump was effusive in his praise for the Colombian president, noting that they had “not exactly been the best friends” but that he never felt offended by Petro’s rhetoric. That’s par for the course with the US leader, as he seems to often make up with people after fierce words. He ended by saying he thought Petro was terrific and they got along great.

¿Qué me quiso decir Trump en esta dedicatoria?
No entiendo mucho el inglés pic.twitter.com/biNGKcVBu2

— Gustavo Petro (@petrogustavo) February 3, 2026

From being sworn enemies all through last year and with sharp words exchanged just a month ago peace has broken out with surprising speed between Donald and Gustavo. In a way, it’s more of a frenemy relationship than a bromance, with both realising that it suits them better to work together for the time being.

They’re also quite similar politicians, if polar opposites politically, which means they probably understand each other better than the rest of us do. Long-winded speeches to large rallies of supporters, unpredictable behaviour, constant use of socials – they basically work in the same way towards different ends.

Fears of Petro having to walk into the famed Oval Office bearpit were laid aside the night before when it was confirmed as a behind-closed-doors meeting. That was relatively unsurprising, given the Colombia president’s reluctance to speak English.

Also in the room were the presidents’ teams, including JD Vance and Marco Rubio on the US side. However, Petro made it clear that the reunion was between himself and Trump.

The crux of the meeting was over cocaine exports, which Petro said was mainly organised from abroad, naming Dubai, Madrid and Miami as their ‘capitals’. He said sharing information and working together was key and that he had passed names to the American administration.

An insider speaking to Colombian news source El Tiempo said that they thought Trump had bought the idea that the war on drugs had to be fought against cartel leaders and not campesinos. They said that Trump had said they would go after the bosses.

Venezuela was a topic of conversation too, with both countries looking towards reestablishing relations following the fall of Maduro. For Colombia, that involves controlling the flow of drugs across the long border in the east as well as working on oil and gas exports.

Quito and Bogotá have been engaged in a tit-for-tat tariff war in recent weeks, which is of course Trump’s speciality. He’s agreed to step in and mediate, which is good news for Colombia as he is a key ally of Ecuadorian president Noboa.

This is not full co-operation though, as some important things have yet to be resolved. Petro remains on the Clinton List and he noted that neither himself and Trump were given to changing their ways of thinking about things. Trump mentioned sanctions, but was not clear what that referred to.

Cordial tones and friendly words might not be concrete action, but it’s a significant difference from where we were just a month ago. The USA might not be everyone in Colombia’s favourite country, but it remains a key international relationship with strong links between the nations on many levels.

At the end of the meeting, Petro came out with MAGA hats, not his usual choice of attire. He then later took to socials to show off his customisation – an ‘S’ scrawled after ‘America’. That’s a thankfully restrained and playful take that shouldn’t raise any heckles, but serves to underline the point that for all the warm words, they have sharp differences of opinion.

Making the Americas great again would be in everyone’s best interest and thankfully it seems like they may be able to put egos and differences aside in order to pursue that. If the bonhomie of this week can be converted into meaningful results, it could make a lot of people’s lives better. That’s something to hope for.

The post Petro and Trump: New Besties? appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

We analyse recent homicide figures in Colombia’s capital.

Last month we looked at the latest homicide data for the city: in 2025 violent deaths went down 3.4% on the previous year. These 1,165 killings gave Bogotá – with a population of around 8 million – a homicide rate of 14.8 deaths per 100,000 of the population.

This month we look deeper into this statistic.  Why homicides? Though an imperfect indicator, murder rates do give an insight into insecurity in a zone as they are often the extreme outcome of robberies gone wrong, gang feuds, political violence, domestic violence, fights, targeted killings, drugging of victims and bungled kidnappings. Put simply, the number of bodies means the amount of crime.  

Crime patchwork

Where are homicides happening? In our own analysis of Bogotá’s 20 districts (see map below) the gritty downtown area of Sant Fe has the highest rate of 54 killings per 100,000 inhabitants, followed by nearby Los Martíres with 47, and Ciudad Bolívar with 33.

Sant Fe, like many Bogotá districts, is a patchwork of agreeable barrios, such as the touristy Las Aguas for example, and historic La Candelaria (with just three homicides last year) juxtaposed with crime-ridden neighborhoods.

But in the southwest corner of Santa Fe lies San Bernardo, or ‘Samber’ as it is known locally, generally recognized as the most dangerous barrio in Bogotá, a hub for gangs selling drugs to street people and the scene of several fatal grenade attacks in 2025.

Santa Fe is a reminder that in Bogotá safer streets are often just a block away from no-go zones. Rolos and long-term residentslearn to navigate these invisible barriers.

To emphasize this point, Santa Fe, statistically the most dangerous district in the city, lies adjacent to the leafy district of Teusaquillo with a homicide rate of 5 per 100,000 in 2025 (amounting to nine deaths), which according to this metric makes it the safest district in Bogotá.

Less grim up north

Other districts registering less than 10 killings per 100,000 in 2025 are the more upmarket northern districts of the city: Chapinero, Usaquén, Suba, Fontibón and Engativá. And as in most years, there is a gradient towards safer barrios in the north, with the dividing line running roughly along the Avenida El Dorado (Av Calle 26).

But in terms of reducing crime, there are success stories in the south. While still the most dangerous district, Santa Fe has reduced its homicide rate by 28 per cent in 2025 alongside Bosa, Usme and Antonio Nariño, all with reductions in double digits.

These results are hard to assess; organized criminal gangs are present in all these areas, so the peace could be transitory and a result of rival gangs declaring a truce, or one gang leveraging control, rather than societal shifts or better policing.

In some cases, large-scale operations have had an impact, combing security and social services in a carrot and stick approach called megatomas. In Santa Fe, for example, following the grenade attacks, the Bogotá administration both militarized the barrio and flooded it with development programs to support the huge homeless population there. This approach seems to have worked, at least temporarily.

On the negative side, three central districts (Puente Aranda, San Cristóbal and Rafael Uribe Uribe) have seen a spike in killings, a reminder of the balloon effect; pushing down on crime in one zone just forces it to pop up somewhere else.

Sicario scenarios

What’s behind the killings? Police databases do not reveal motives, but media coverage and occasional analyses by Bogotá’s Secretaría de Seguridad give insights into the city’s mean streets. 

Targeted killings, usually carried out by paid hitmen (sicarios), are for the city the visible tip of an underworld iceberg of organized crime. Hits are carried out often on the street or public spaces against identified victims by professional gunslingers sometimes recruited specifically for the job with promises of cash.

Clear-up rates are low: in June last year city councilors complained that in the first half of 2025 out of 521 homicides, 156 were targeted hits, for which only 16 people had been arrested. “In other words, 90 per cent of assassinations on Bogotá go unpunished,” pointed out councilor Julián Espinosa in one debate.

This was despite the city police’s vaunted Plan Candado – Padlock Strategy – of mobile rapid response teams and drones to quickly catch perpetrators by locking down zones within minutes of a major crime.

The most high-profile killing was the gunning down of senator and presidential candidate Miguel Uribe, shot in the head during a walkabout in a Bogotá park. The police quickly apprehended the small-time gangsters behind the shooting in June 2025, including the 15-year-old shooter, but today despite nine arrests are no closer to revealing the paymasters behind the hit.

Another unsolved assassination was the targeted killing of emerald czar Hernando Sánchez, shot dead while walking with his family in a leafy northern suburb of Usaquén in April last year. The military-style killing, by a sniper hiding in nearby woodlands, was identical to the mysterious murder nine months before of a fellow emerald baron, known as Pedro Pechuga, also unresolved.

Weapons of choice

Despite Colombia having restrictions for private ownership of firearms, the majority of 2025 killings were with guns, at 703, according to the police database. Other weapons recorded were knives (304), blunt objects (84) and grenades (6).

This pattern has persisted for decades; Colombia, and its capital, are flooded with illegal firearms, many of them from the estimated 600,000 guns smuggled south across the border from the U.S. each year.  Just in the first four months of 2025, police confiscated 8,466 illegal weapons across the country

According to Carolina Ortega, a political scientist at the National University, and quoted by  UPI, illegal guns were used in 78 per cent of killings in Colombia.

Easy access to guns also raised the risk of spontaneous killings, according to data from the Secretaria de Seguridad which showed that40 per cent of Bogotá homicides followed a dispute, argument or scuffle.

Most of these happened outside on the street, late in the evening, and “amidst scenes of revelry and excessive alcohol consumption”, said the report, released as part of a media campaign called “Take a second before you shoot…”.

Violent machismo

Femicides went down on 2025, both in Bogotá and at national level, according to data released this week by the Observatorio de Mujeres y Equidad de Género de Bogotá.

In Bogotá during 2025 there were 97 females killed, around 8% of total violent deaths. Of these, 20 were classified as femicides. This was slightly less than in 2024 (22 deaths) and mirrored a similar reduction (7%) nationally. Nationally, approximately one killing in five of a female was later classified as a femicide, the “violent expression of machismo”, said the study.  

A study by Bogotá’s Secretaria de la Mujer found that in 49 per cent of cases in the capital, the women had suffered physical violence in the weeks before the murder, and 40 per cent had previously sought help from the police.

According to observatory data, last year Secretaria staff supported 142,688 women, of which 48% were facing violence, a slight reduction on the previous years. The 2025 figures were a reminder that although more warning signs were being detected, timely intervention was not always possible, said the report.

“Femicide does not arise from nothing: it is foreshadowed, repeated, and often normalized before reaching its most tragic outcome,” it concluded.

Pay up – or pay the price

In 2025 many Bogotá murders were linked to extortion demands, with gangs ruthlessly gunning down small business owners if they failed to pay protection money. Sometimes shop staff or a passerby were also killed or injured, in some case with grenades or explosives.

Protection rackets are nothing new in the city, but cases and killings skyrocketed post-pandemic partly because of turf wars between gangs diversifying from the drug trade and Venezuelan gangs linked to the transnational group Tren de Aragua with names like Las Satanás and Los Coyotes.

Extortion reached epidemic proportions in 2024, with an average of 200 cases a month, and continued into 2025 with a rash of crimes such as the killings of informal minibus drivers in the south of Bogotá.

Overall, Bogotá in 2025 saw extortion go down by 20 per cent compared to 2024, though it was still higher than any year during the previous decade. And already in the first month of 2026 there have been several murders linked to extortion demands including a grenade attack on a nightclub in Los Mártires last week which killed one and injured a dozen more.

Millionaire’s ride

Another death last week, that of a university professor found dead and incinerated on the outskirts of the city, highlighted increased cases of Bogotá’s infamous Paseo Millonario, where armed gangs working with taxi drivers attack and extort passengers, often torturing them to reveal bank details while they empty their accounts.

Victims are often targeted late at night leaving bars or restaurants. In a chilling twist, recent cases pointed to victims being subdued with ketamine, with the drug either killing or severely incapacitating the victim.

According to data from the GAULA (Anti-Kidnapping and Extortion Group), 40 Paseo Millonario cases were reported in 2025, a rise of 207 per cent on the previous year. Even that figure was thought to be a huge underestimate since many victims were too scared to come forward. Hotspots were in Chapinero, Kennedy, Bosa, Ciudad Bolívar, and Fontibón.

In one case a taxi gang held a victim for 19 hours, prompting the Attorney General’s Office to reclassify such crimes as “kidnapping” with a potential 42-year prison sentence. In theory this prompted the police to start responding more robustly to a crime that has plagued Bogotá for decades.

Perpetrators of these high-impact crimes were also more likely now to get locked up, with 47 imprisoned last year out of the 52 captured, which was way above average jailing rate of 6 percent of criminals arrested, according to Bogotá police chief Giovanni Cristancho, talking to RCN News last week.

But he also admitted that the understaffed police force was struggling to keep up with constantly emerging kidnap gangs, usually small teams of four or five people which could easily move around the city.

“As soon as we reinforce one area, such as around Calle 85, the modus operandi shifts to other zones,” he told RCN.

It’s that randomness, and the risk of being drugged – or worse – that makes the Paseo Millonario one of the most feared crimes in Bogotá. And for 2026, the one to watch.

The post Bogotá’s murder mosaic appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

Colombian president Gustavo Petro is in the US capital for a crunch summit on bilateral relations. What’s behind it and what could happen?

After months of extremely strained relations with the US, Colombian president Gustavo Petro is now in Washington to meet his counterpart Donald Trump. The actual head-to-head is scheduled for tomorrow, Tuesday February 3rd. The Colombian team also includes key advisors such as the Canciller, Interior Minister, the USA business envoy and the Defense Minister.

While both sides have cooled their rhetoric, there’s plenty of unpredictability in both camps and past relations have been rocky to say the least. Petro and other members of his delegation had to be issued temporary visas just for the diplomatic visit, as Trump had previously cancelled his visa in September. 

That also applied to highly controversial Interior Minister Armando Benedetti, as well as members of Petro’s family. Before leaving, the president tweeted a particularly unusual post on X specifying that he’d visited his mother before leaving in a mildly ominous tone. He then expounded on love and sex in a non-sequiter.

Empiezo mi jornada de comunicación intensa con el gobierno de los EEUU, con mi entrevista con el representante de negocios de los EEUU en Colombia McNamara.

Antes de esta reunión he visitado a mi mamá para despedirme.

Les dejo la foto de mi mamá antes de casarse y de su amor… pic.twitter.com/7GmkV0hVwd

— Gustavo Petro (@petrogustavo) February 1, 2026

Petro is also somewhat predictably calling for protesters to fill the Bolívar square (as long it’s not raining) to defend the minimum wage increase, democracy and peace in Colombia. The first two have nothing to do with the Washington summit, while the latter isn’t seriously under threat from the US at this point.

Why is the Colombian president visiting Washington this week?

This was Trump’s offer after the war of words following Nicolás Maduro’s capture in early January. He initially suggested a phone call, after which a follow-up invitation to meet face to face in the White House was offered. 

After that initial call, the pair appeared to have ended up on relatively good terms, and for now there appears to be a wary calm between the Palacio Nariño and the White House. It’s too early to talk of a bromance, but there was certainly a rapid de-escalation.

The US president pointedly praised Petro’s tone in his tweet after they spoke over the phone, indicating that the Colombian president had been rather less bullish one on one compared to his public speeches and tweets. That hasn’t changed much in recent weeks.

Petro appears to have struck a far more conciliatory note when actually talking to the US president on Wednesday. For his part, Donald Trump also turned down the heat, saying it was a great honour to speak with the Colombian president and reaffirming his respect for the Colombian people.

The Colombian president went on to say that he had cleared the air and underlined that he is not connected to the illegal drug trade. He pointed out that he has stepped up seizures of drugs and has in fact been threatened various times over his life by drug cartels.

He’s gone further over the past week or so, claiming that estimates of Colombian coca crop capability in production are wildly inaccurate, especially when they come from foreign observers. He hasn’t helped matters by refusing to publish his own figures, but a recent high-profile seizure off the coast of Portugal won’t have hurt.

Petro was highly critical of Trump’s actions in the Caribbean from the outset. He warned Trump “not to wake the jaguar”, denounced his strikes on boats in international waters and convened an emergency meeting of the UN security council to investigate the Maduro affair.

Bad blood between the pair goes back a long way, with Trump’s grandstanding over deportations of Colombian nationals being met with strong pushback from Petro. Although the Colombian president eventually backed down from initial threats to not let the planes in, he met the deportees upon landing and symbolically undid their handcuffs.

Petro’s fierce criticism of the military build up in the Caribbean and Trump’s position on migration in terms of ICE and so forth had led to him and his estranged wife Veronica Alcócer being stuck on the Clinton List along with advisor and Interior Minister, Armando Benedetti.

The truth is that antagonistic public rhetoric plays well for both Petro and Trump, regardless of how much damage it may do to the reputation of either country. They both get to play the big man and impress their base, which both need right now in the face of domestic woes.

It’s entirely possible that both sides will have a relatively amiable meeting in which progress is made, before going back to lightly criticising one another in order to please their local audiences. Trump seems not to mind people doing that, even going so far as to encourage NYC mayor Zohran Mamdani to call him a fascist in a recent meeting. 

What can Petro’s team come back with?

There are a number of points to cover and a range of different outcomes on each. Military and security cooperation and guarantees are perhaps most important, with drug exportation, migration, ICE, visas and tariffs also on the table.

Much will depend on whether the meeting is televised or behind closed doors. Petro will by far prefer the latter and likely want to avoid as much as possible the media bearpit that Trump often sets up for visiting politicians.

Colombia will be looking for guarantees and assurances that US military action won’t happen on local soil. There’s no suggestion that Trump is looking to do that in the short term anyway, but it’s not hard to believe that could change, for example making a strike on cartel leaders within Colombian borders.

The USA might refuse to give an official guarantee but indicate that the option is currently off the table, which would still calm tensions significantly. Petro has made it clear he considers US military action a real danger. There’s also the possibility that the countries could agree to work together and cooperate. Again, this is likely to be far more palatable to the Colombian public.

Information sharing and support in terms of hardware and technology would be of great use to the Colombian military, after all, and both countries share a common interest in cracking down on the cartels, at least on paper.

Trump might demand a greater show of good faith from Petro in terms of action taken to combat the cartels, which is tricky. The Colombian state has been relatively efficient over the last three years at capturing drug smugglers and received little credit for it from Washington.

Colombian governments of all hues have struggled to deal with the problems of armed non-state actors, whether paramilitaries, cartels, guerillas or any mix of the above. Trump has little patience for this sort of thing and is results-oriented. That could be an excuse for unilateral action or could lead to an offer of help. Colombia will want the second of those options.

No economic instrument is more beloved by Donald Trump than tariffs, his self-declared ‘favourite word in the language’. Colombia is currently still at the global standard of 10% and won’t want that to change. That means it could be a powerful negotiating tool and Trump has threatened an increase in tariff rates at various points, as he does with many countries.

Colombia has turned more and more towards China in recent years, with Beijing helping guide construction of the Metro project in Bogotá. Trump may be looking to try and keep Colombia closer to the US economically, as fewer and fewer Latin countries treat their northern neighbour as the most important part of their trade network.

Visas, too, have been contentious. Waiting times at the US embassy were getting better but often involve months of waiting time. That hasn’t been helped by the recent freeze on residency visas for a swathe of countries including Colombia.

Speeding up processing times in Bogotá for basic American tourist and business visas would be relatively low-hanging fruit in negotiations. If both sides could agree, that would make a lot of people’s lives a lot easier and be popular in Colombia. 

In the best case scenario, Colombians can hope for no additional tariffs, military guarantees and cooperation and an easing on visas. In the worst case, Trump will impose drastic new economic measures, cancel a load of visas and keep a strong military presence in the Caribbean with eyes towards Colombia.

The end result will probably be somewhere in the middle of all that. Given the relatively calm immediate build-up to the trip, it’s most likely that an accord can be reached that both sides can present as positive if not perfect. It doesn’t suit either side to have a massive bust-up at this point, but we are talking about two politicians with a reputation for fits of pique.

More cynically-minded people may wonder if a more personal deal may be struck as well – Petro off the Clinton list and his US visa reinstated. He’s talked before about wanting to tour the world as a public speaker on social and environmental issues and this would make that easier.

Whatever does happen in the meeting, it will be pivotal for relations between the US and Colombia. With the country being one of the last in Latin America to have the USA as their biggest trade partner, that affects many ordinary people.

For the business community, the impact of potential tariffs or restrictions could be huge. For NGOs and rights workers, re-establishing foreign aid would be very useful. For ordinary folk, further controls or freezes on visas would be a real pain. For everyone, a sense that military action was definitely off the table would bring much-needed peace of mind.

The post Mr Petro goes to Washington appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

ELN guerrillas have announced the recovery of iconic revolutionary Camilo Torres. They now want his body returned to Bogotá’s National University.

Colombia’s largest rebel army, the ELN – at war with the state since 1964 – have alerted the world to the likely discovery of the long-lost remains of Camilo Torres.

The fighting priest, killed in combat with the army 60 years ago, has been found by government forensic teams in the department of Santander, the ELN said in a press statement this week.

The ELN leaked the news before the Unidad de Búsqueda de Personas Dadas por Desaparecidas (UBPD) could finalize technical tests, but it was widely expected that the search is now ended for the respected cura and university professor who became a revolutionary martyr.

The ELN said they hoped his remains “would be respected and returned to the Bogotá campus of the National University”.

In the early 1960s, the young Torres was a chaplain, professor and founder of the faculty of sociology at the tempestuous Universidad Nacional. Today, the charismatic priest still figures strongly in campus iconography with his image and quotes decorating many walls.

From priest to combatant

An exponent of liberation theology – a strand of Catholicism calling for social justice in an era of extreme poverty in Latin American – Torres took to the hills in 1965 with the ELN, then a fledgling guerrilla group aligning itself with Marxist ideology.

Calling himself Argemiro, the priest quickly became an influential link between the rebels and the church, respected across the political spectrum, and a spiritual influence on socialist movements across the continent.

His most famous quote, still echoing through liberation theology, was: “If Jesus were alive today, he would be a guerrillero”.

A photo of Torres appeared in a flyer printed by the ELN in January 1966, with the academic pictured in uniform clutching a rifle alongside the words: “From the mountains of Colombia, I intend to continue the fight, weapons in hand, until I achieve power for the people. Not one step back! Liberation or death!”.

Friends divided

The latter came quicker than expected. Torres was killed in combat aged 37 on February 15, 1966, in his first action against state forces. The firefight took place in the rugged terrain around El Carmen de Chucurí, Santander.

Ironically, the army operation that killed Torres was led by General Álvaro Valencia Tovar, a childhood friend of the rebel priest. In an old article on Las 2 Orillas, the general described the pair’s friendship over many years, even while taking separate political paths; a potent reminder of personal ties tested by Colombia’s civil conflict.

According to Valencia Tovar, the ELN had prepared a deadly ambush in a jungle gorge with 35 fighters – including Torres – lying in wait for an army patrol. But the soldiers, even while taking heavy fire, outflanked the guerrillas and killed five of the ELN fighters. Torres was among the dead.

Thereafter the story was muddled: according to Valencia Tovar, the general himself took Torres’ remains to a military pantheon close to Bucaramanga, the regional capital of Santander, perhaps a form of honour for his former friend. But the exact location was never disclosed, a bone of contention with the guerrilla group who wanted to mourn their martyr.

In another historical twist, years later a video emerged of a young Juan Manual Santos – the future centre-right president of Colombia – declaring he was an “acolyte” of Torres, who was in fact his uncle.

In 2016, the then president Santos, perhaps as a gesture towards his own deceased uncle, but also as a signg of good faith during a peace process with the ELN, promised a state search for the remains of his fallen uncle. That peace process failed, like many others.

Playing for time

Over 70 years of conflict the Ejército de Liberación Nacional has proved hard to pin down: the on-off negotiations with the current Petro government mark the seventh cycle of peace talks spanning seven presidential terms since 1992, with the guerrillas still fighting.

Today, many observers see these negotiation cycles as cynical ploys by the Marxist-Leninist rebels to hold off military pressure while expanding their own territory and illicit activities, which today extends to cocaine production, illegal gold mining, extortion, kidnapping and human trafficking.

According to a profile by thinktank InsightCrime, in the last 20 years the ELN have become increasingly active in neighbouring Venezuela where they act as a mercenary army for the Chavista regime with a strong role on controlling the borders.

That dynamic shifted after the U.S. military operation in early January in Venezuela to detain autocratic leader Nicólas Maduro.

Now less welcome in Venezuela, and facing an increasingly hostile Petro government, even while entangled in a turf war with dissident FARC groups in northeast Colombia, the ELN fighters are feeling the pressure.

Blood and fire

On January 12 this year, the ELN proposed another bite at the peace apple with a new ‘national accord’. This though was quickly rejected by President Petro, who wrote on X that the guerrillas had to renounce their illicit activities – primarily gold and cocaine – before coming to the table.

During the first three years of his term, Petro suffered several perfidies by the ELN such as their surprise attacks on rival groups in the coca enclave of Catatumbo last year that left hundreds dead and thousands displaced.

Responding to the ELN offer Petro, said he had “already offered an agreement, but they destroyed it with blood and fire, and by killing humble peasants”.

It is likely the Colombian president is now holding off until after his meeting with the Trump administration in Washington scheduled for February 3.  Any reconciliation between Petro and the U.S. president – their relationship has been rocky – could open the door for increased military support to combat the ELN, designated as a terrorist organization by the U.S. State Department since 1997.

Colombia’s ‘Che‘

Such a deal, combined with changes in Venezuela, could tilt the conflict in favour of Colombian state forces. And while still a potent fighting force, the ELN could prefer an escape route via the negotiation table in 2026 if talks open up with Petro or his successor.

With that in mind, it is probable that finding of Camilo Torres – miraculously close to the 60th anniversary of his death – is no coincidence, but rather a strategy in the poker game between state and guerrillas.

The wait now is for final confirmation of the remains by the UBPD.  Meanwhile the search unit is keeping mum on how, where, and when the body was found.

And if the ELN are claiming Torres as their own, then so is Petro: “The body of Father Camilo Torres Restrepo will be respected and laid to rest with honours,” he said on X this week, painting the priest as a national hero.

Perhaps putting him in the spotlight is a nod to Petro’s own rebel credentials as a former member of M-19 guerrilla group. And Torres is a timely reminder of how the ELN rebels – recently accused of human slavery in illicit mining camps  – are far removed from their ideological roots.

Where both sides agree is that his final resting place should be the National University campus in Bogotá. That´s a start. Sixty years after his death the fighting priest, seen by some as Colombia’s Che Guevara, could have a new role in bringing peace.

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A simmering spat over candidates for government posts boiled up this week with revelations that a Bogotá university was faking professional titles for workers in Petro’s administration.

According to congress members revealing the scandal, 24 public servants got top contracts using dodgy titles from Universidad Fundación San José, a mold-breaking higher education institute once famed for accessible courses, but now under scrutiny for selling degrees.

They also accused Petro and his education chiefs of dragging their feet in investigating the university for the suspected fraud case.  

“Petro’s promises for education come to nothing,” said house representative Catherine Juvinao after she claimed to have identified 24 cases where officials and contractors in top government entities appeared to have been hired with diplomas from the Univerisity Foundation San José without all the tests.

One stand-out case was a government functionary who, according to university records, graduated in four quite different degrees – Business Administration, Industrial Engineering, Public Accounting and International Marketing – on the same day.

“This is one of the most serious cases. Who graduates with four degrees on the same day?,” the representative said in an interview with Semana magazine.

According to Juvinoa, the university handed out diplomas to students who had failed to complete the independent technical tests, known as PruebaPro, and in some cases had not studied at all.

Fake titles for plum jobs?

Although academic fraud has occured regularly in Colombia – and similar scandals have rocked previous governments – the investigations by Juvinao and her team are targeting an administration that promised to turn its back on corruption.

This week’s revelations followed last year’s political dogfight over the proposed appointment of 23-year-old Juliana Guerrero as vice-minister of youth. The candidate, who was close to both Petro and his education minister, was already embroiled in controversies over private use of police planes. Then in September she was found to have falsified her accounting qualifications at the university.

After public pressure the university rescinded the degree, and Guerrero herself told Caracol news that she intended to take the independent exams to regain her title in November.

Further investigations revealed a bigger suspicion: that the Petro government was routinely using the university – with which it had contracts – to fudge academic requirements for candidates favoured for plum jobs.

This week Juvinao accused  Petro government or running a “Cartel of Dodgy Diplomas” in cahoots with the San José university. “It’s bad news that our first left-wing government ended up being a monument to mediocrity, captured by an institution,” she said.

The state was “closing the door to those who studied hard by merit,” she said, while calling for a probe by the Attorney General’s office, adding that: “we have all the evidence to support any investigation”.

Political Attacks

For its part, the Ministry of Education announced this week it was investigating the University Foundation San José related to the case of Guerrero, Petro’s preferred candidate for the Ministry of Youth.

In the same communication, the ministry strongly denied it had any link to “illicit activities related to the expedition of academic titles”.

The Colombian president repeatedly defended Guerrero’s nomination for the post last year even after her degree was pulled by the university. Her only error was to claim her title before taking the final exam, he said, suggesting a storm in a teacup. The attacks were personal and political, he added.

“So, Juliana’s graduation exam, after completing her studies, was registered for in July and is scheduled for next November. Is that the summary of this scandal?” he wrote on X.

At first view Petro’s gesture seemed on target; young candidates, particularly female, get torrents of abuse in the rough-and-tumble of Colombian politics, often facing a public scrutiny less applied to old-school politicos.

But looking back that defence now seems misplaced: financial data revealed this month showed Guerrero had paid for her degree course long after receiving her diploma – almost unheard of in Colombia – while the university itself confirmed that she “never went to classes or presented exams nor complied with the accounting program”.

Doubling down

This week Petro doubled down on his defense of the University Foundation San José, claiming the accusations by the opposition unfairly focused on “poor single mothers” trying to get ahead.

“Private universities…allow these working women to study faster,” he said. “[Politicians] to gain votes shouldn’t destroy working women. I expect a public apology from these congresswomen to the working women of Colombia.”

To complicate the president’s narrative, referring to the Guerrero case, the university announced it had “detected and denounced a fraud” and had itself requested the attorney general’s office to investigate. It also promised to “stregthen internal audits” to prevent future cheating.

Representative Juvinao told Semana told Semana magazine that the Guerrero case suggested corruption in the form of cash for qualifications, and was likely “the tip off an iceberg”.

“There is a deliberate strategy to fabricate qualifications to fit the needs of Petro’s government departments,” she said.

In a country where people struggle for further education – and value highly their hard-earned academic qualifications – what started as an online spat over a youth representative is becoming a scandal with much more scope.

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Bogotá’s mayor and security chiefs celebrated some positive results last week with stats showing an overall reduction of high-impact crimes in the city during 2025, with the murder rate dropping in the city even as violent deaths increased across Colombia.

“In Bogotá in 2025, there were fewer homicides robberies, fewer vehicle thefts, fewer motorcycle thefts, fewer cases of extortion, more drug seizures, more weapons seizures, and more arrests,” said Bogotá´s mayor Carlos Galán, presenting a security scorecard showing security shifts in the first two years of his administration.

Some decreases were significant, such as extortion cases dropping by 20 per cent, stolen car cases by 22 per cent and commercial theft by 30 per cent. Others were less impressive: street robberies only reduced by 6 per cent, and cases of sexual violence by 8 per cent.

Homicides, perhaps the most significant metric, reduced last year by just 3.4%, with 1,165 killings recorded on the national police database compared to 1,214 in 2024. This gave Bogotá – with a population of around 8 million – a current homicide rate of 14.8 deaths per 100,000 of the population, according to the standard formula used to compare deaths across varying population sizes.

Limited success

This was way short of Mayor Galán’s stated goal of 8 deaths per 100,000 during his four-year tenure, but a better result than the national one. At 14.8, Bogotá’s homicide rate was considerably lower than Colombia’s national figure of 25.9 deaths per 100,000 of the population, based the alarming total of 12,484 violent deaths reported nationwide – a two per cent increase on the previous year.

City security secretary César Restrepo also pointed out that Bogotá had proportionally less murders than other major cities such as Bucaramanga, Cartagena, Barranquilla, Pereira and Cali (see table below). Medellín, however, bested the capital with a reduced rate of 11.7 per 100,000.

And in our own comparison with cities worldwide, Bogotá’s homicide rate was lower than Washington D.C. (17 per 100,000) Baltimore (23 per 100,000) or New Orleans (33 per 100,000) but much higher than most European cities such as London (currently at 1 per 100,000) or Berlin (3 per 100,000).

Backdrop of violence

The challenges facing Bogotá in reducing violence against a national backdrop of increasing insecurity were highlighted in a recent study by think tank Centro de Paz y Seguridad Externadista which compared homicides rates between recent national governments.

The current Petro government reported 40,633 violent deaths during its first three years, an increase of 11 per cent over the same period for the Juan Manuel Santos government (2014 to 18) and seven per cent higher than during Ivan Duque’s tenure from 2018 to 2022.

The data pointed to a failure of the Petro’s Paz Total (‘Total Peace’) process which reduced military pressure on illegal armed groups allowing them to expand their range and illegal activities in the last three years, concluded the report.

“Although the government insists that the national conflict is de-escalating, the figures point to another scenario: homicidal violence remains at high levels,” said study leader Andrés González in December presenting the findings on YouTube.

González also pointed out that while most territorial battles took place in rural areas, the effects reflected in urban hubs where local crime groups – often with links to larger armed groups – used lethal violence in conflicts linked to extortion and micro trafficking.

Catch and release

Another challenge for Bogotá’s security was the low conviction rate for captured criminals, according to city police chief Giovanni Cristancho in an interview with El Tiempo. Out of 33,000 criminals arrested in the city in 2025, less than 10 per cent ended up in jail, he said.

Criminals showed little fear of the justice system, and many caught by the police were multiple offenders, said Christancho, with the police having to “catch the same person 20 times”.

Recycling criminals back on the streets was “outside the control of the district government”, security chief Restrepoalso told  El Tiempo last week, but recognised it reflected badly on the city administration.

“Most citizens express their annoyance because criminals are either released or not convicted. As long as these other conditions remain unresolved, all the results we announce will continue to generate frustration among the public,” he said

This chimed with a common perception in Bogotá that even if the police are clamping down, the justice system as a whole is failing the city. Those concerns were echoed in a recent public survey by city watchdog Bogotá Como Vamos that found that a  62% of respondents perceived Bogotá as less secure, the highest figure recorded since 2008.

Catch and kill

Low conviction rates could explain the resurgence of vigilante justice being meted out by frustrated rolos in recent years, with groups of citizens organizing to capture and beat offenders, sometimes tying them to lampposts or parading them naked through neighborhood and posting videos on social media.

Barrio justice has long been a problem in Bogotá; a study from 2016, reported in The Bogotá Post, showed an average of one lynching death every three days over a 12 month period in the city.

A more recent phenomenon in the city is the rise of fleets of armed private security guards mounted on motorbikes chasing down stolen vehicles.

One company, Self Security GPS, uses satellite tracking and immobilizer devices to recover stolen vehicles, but also regularly posts alarming videos of their ‘commandos’ taking down car thieves, sometimes with dramatic shoot-outs on the street with passers-by diving for cover.

According to data from the mayor’s office, at the last count, there were 150,000 private security guards “supporting security in Bogotá” – far outnumbering the 17,500 uniformed police.

Increasingly though, frustration among everyday citizens has boiled over into drastic reactions to street crime. Such an attempt at instant justice ended in tragedy last week with three deaths after a Bogotá driver was robbed at gunpoint by two masked robbers on a motorbike; the victim gave chase and crushed the fleeing assailants with his pick-up truck. In the ensuing multi-vehicle crash one of the robbers was killed, along with two innocent travelers who also lost their lives.   

Statistically, not a good start to 2026.  

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A week on from the extraordinary events of the third of January, where does Colombia stand, what happens next and what do people think?

Despite aggressive rhetoric, Colombian president Gustavo Petro and US president Donald Trump have ended up on relatively good terms over the last week after Maduro’s capture, and for now there appears to be a wary calm between the Palacio Nariño and the White House. It’s too early to talk of a bromance, but there’s certainly been a rapid de-escalation.

The US president pointedly praised Petro’s tone in his tweet after they spoke over the phone on Wednesday, indicating that the Colombian president had been rather less bullish one on one compared to his public speeches and tweets.

Petro also seems happy with the conversation, saying that he had cleared the air and underlining that he is not connected to the illegal drug trade. He pointed out that he has stepped up seizures of drugs and has in fact been threatened various times over his life by drug cartels.

Esto es Histórico.

Hablaremos con Trump, de la Paz del Continente, de la soberanía , de un Pacto por la Vida basado en las energías limpias. Se puede descarbonizar la matriz de EEUU si se vuelve real el potencial de energías limpias de Suramérica pic.twitter.com/0bqPP2lAYe

— Gustavo Petro (@petrogustavo) January 8, 2026

Petro had criticised his counterpart in the White House all week, convened protests against the US military’s actions in Venezuela and called an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council, of which Colombia is a temporary member.

However, Petro appears to have struck a far more conciliatory note when actually talking to the US president on Wednesday. For his part, Donald Trump also turned down the heat, saying it was a great honour to speak with the Colombian president and that they would talk further in person at the White House.

Petro has confirmed that this will take place in the first week of February. He’s also invited interim Venezuelan president Delcy Rodríguez to visit the Palacio Nariño for talks.

Alongside his usual flurry of tweets, Petro had been setting this in motion, with his Interior Minister (and former ambassador to Venezuela) Armando Benedetti sending a memo to the US underlining their commitment to fighting drug production.

Antagonism serves both sides

Petro has been highly critical of Trump’s actions in the Caribbean from the outset. He has warned Trump “not to wake the jaguar” and denounced his strikes on boats over the last few months.

Bad blood between the pair goes back a long way, but has really ramped up in recent weeks. Even before the extraordinary events of last weekend, Petro’s fierce criticism of the military build up in the Caribbean had led to him and his estranged wife Veronica Alcócer being stuck on the Clinton List.

The truth is that antagonistic public rhetoric plays well for both Petro and Trump, regardless of how much damage it may do to the reputation of either country. They both get to play the big man and impress their base, which both need right now in the face of domestic woes.

Presidente Donald J. Trump sobre la llamada con el Presidente Gustavo Petro: https://t.co/1lTgSYF8hb

— US Embassy Bogota (@USEmbassyBogota) January 8, 2026

Trump doesn’t seem to mind Petro’s words, as long as he gets his way. That fits with his previous actions, including his fallout when running against current Secretary of State Marco Rubio. He says Petro’s been very hostile, but that’s all in the past.

For Petro, this also sets him up nicely for his post-presidential life. In an interview this week he expressed a desire to tour the world speaking at conferences and the international exposure this week has been good for that. On top of that, Trump will likely lift the restrictions on him and his family as a reward for toeing the US line.

What’s the feeling in the calles?

One could have been forgiven for not noticing the midweek protests. Despite the best efforts of hyperbolic foreign journos, Bogotá has been far from a seething cauldron of dissent. In reality, a few hundred Petro diehards trooped out as expected.

Most Colombians are well aware of the reality of Maduro’s rule and the abuses carried out in its name. Apart from a very few outliers, there is no love lost for Nicolás Maduro and an overwhelming satisfaction that he’s no longer Venezuelan president.

That’s not to say, though, that Colombians are wildly happy about the current situation. Colombia is a very different country to her neighbour, but there remains a relatively well-founded concern among many that there may be attacks on Colombian territory.

Anti-American sentiment is not exactly thriving, but graffiti and the like is already going up in certain parts of the city. There’s little to no appetite in the country for any US military activity in Colombia, even against cartels or guerrillas.

Worries still linger over the possibility of other repercussions. The waits for American visas have only just started to come down, with new appointments a year hence. Many worry that will increase again and that extant visas for expat Colombians may be affected too.

Tariffs, too, are never far from people’s minds, although Trump’s current position towards Colombia seems to be benign. Tourism will possibly be affected, both in the short and medium term.

Of course, Bogotá has a thriving Venezuelan expat community as well. While there is general delight at Maduro being arrested, there remain justifiable fears over what comes next. Delcy Rodríguez is seemingly no-one’s first choice and most hope for the promise of free and fair elections.

The Plaza de Bolívar and many others around both Bogotá and Colombia have seen large groups of Venezuelans gathering both to celebrate Maduro’s fall and to call for a transition towards a proper democracy. Most, however, are just getting on with life and wary of reading too much into things at present.

A particular trend has been for exiled Venezuelans to take to social media in order to decry what they often see as ‘Venezuelasplaining’. Many accounts are keen to point out that while the US might only be interested in oil, neither were China, Russia and Iran after arepa recipes.

Venezuelan man:

“Those who say that the U.S. is only interested in our oil, I ask you: What do you think the Russians and the Chinese wanted here?

The recipe for arepas?" pic.twitter.com/BWpCmCxFGI

— Visegrád 24 (@visegrad24) January 4, 2026

As for other Colombian politicians, there’s been a mixed reaction. The Centro Democrático has had a well-coordinated and fierce response, aggressively trying to connect Petro and his allies to Maduro, with some success.

Others are resisting the temptation to use Venezuela as a political football, preferring to cautiously celebrate Maduro’s capture while expressing concern both about the manner it was done and the current political inclarity in the country.

What happens next?

For now, Delcy Rodríguez appears to be in control of Venezuela. She’s been sworn in as president and Trump says she’s committed to working with Washington. That means allowing US oil companies in, buying American goods and stopping shadow fleet sales.

While Trump had initially been dismissive of Maria Corina Machado, saying she had little support or respect in Venezuela, he’s changed his position a little and has a meeting lined up with her soon. This may be connected to her apparent offer to share her Nobel Peace Prize with him.

Regime enforcers have been on maneuvers throughout the past week to quieten internal dissent and quell momentum towards thoughts of a full democratic transition. The ELN has stepped up operations near to the Venezuelan border and Iván Mordisco has suggested a coalition of guerrillas to fight interventionism.

Plenty remains unclear about the whole situation. Trump has expressed a lot of opinions and thoughts but hasn’t elaborated on what the details behind any of it might be. There’s also a worrying lack of corroboration from other players. 

Rodríguez and Petro haven’t really confirmed his takes on their talks, nor have oil companies definitively committed to full investment. At the moment, it seems like all parties are reasonably happy with the state of play but keeping options open. 

Petro gets to play the plucky leader standing up to US imperialism, shoring up his party’s base at home ahead of coming elections while burnishing his reputation overseas. Trump gets to be the decisive commander in chief that took out a rival, while Rodríguez has received a promotion.

For now, it really could go in a number of different directions and small actions might be the things that push the country in certain directions. There are lots of cards on the table and plenty of big decisions to be taken.

Worryingly, the most likely scenario at the moment seems to be that the regime continues in power, just with a new leader and a new-found willingness, however reluctant, to work with the USA. For the ordinary Venezuelan, tragically, little much has changed as things stand.

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As the year winds to an end, the Bogotá Post looks back at 2025 in Colombia

2025 might well be looked back upon in years to come as the calm before the storm. An early sign of the potentially troubled waters ahead was the assassination of Senator Miguel Uribe in early June. Other themes included friction with the US, political deadlock and a sense that much is being put off for next year.

Relations with the USA started badly after Trump was sworn in, as he deported Colombian immigrants in chains on military planes. Petro at first refused to receive the flights, before relenting and allowing them to land but greeting the travellers and treating them with dignity.

From there it got worse, with Petro turning up on the New York streets protesting while on a visit to the UN. Trump in turn has no love for Petro, calling him a bad guy and putting him and his family on the Clinton List, alongside highly controversial longtime advisor Armando Benedetti. It also emerged at that point that Petro had separated from Veronica Alcocer some time ago.

After the US started bombing alleged narco ships in international waters in the Caribbean, things took an even darker turn. Petro, like most world leaders, was highly critical of US operations in the Caribbean, leading Trump to warn that “he could be next”.

Bogotá herself kept on with business as usual, although that’s not always a good sign. Mayor Gálan has little to show at the mid point of his time in the Palacio Liévano. Crime and rubbish are the most visible signs of a city that sometimes feels stuck in place, although the Metro seems to be on track.

Away from the febrile world of Colombian politics, there was plenty going on in cultural fields, from an impressive Copa América run by the superpoderosas to possibly the best festival Cordillera yet in Bogotá.

Violence mars the start of 2026 campaigning

Senator Miguel Uribe was assassinated at the start of his electoral bid in a worrrying reminder of what can happen in Colombian politics. The politician was shot a number of times in the head while making a visit to Modelia and put into intensive care for a month before passing.

One shooter, just 15 years of age was shot and captured at the scene by Uribe’s protection. Other suspects and accomplices were relatively quickly captured, although the intellectual author of the crime remains unclear. While social networks have been hothouses of rumours and propaganda, candidates have thankfully so far stayed largely clear of commenting.  

Runners and riders for the presidency have emerged and started the process of thinning the field. The Liberales, Conservadores and Cambio Radical are yet to declare their representatives. However, there are still six candidates for political parties and another 14 who have acquired the requisite 635,000 signatures to run as independents.

Among the latter names there are some big names such as Claudia López, Luis Murillo, Abelardo de Espriella and Vicky Dávila. There’s also a number of seeming no-hopers, but remember that was Rodolfo Hérnandez this time last year and he got to the second round as a semi-protest candidate.

Iván Cepeda is Petro’s successor candidate for Pacto Historico, while the Centro Democrático have plumped for Paloma Valencia. Sergio Fajardo is back in the race again, for Dignidad y Compromiso. That means no place for some high profile heavyweights such as Maria Fernanda Cabal, Susana Muhamed and Gustavo Bolívar.

High-profile roadblocks, change by the back door

One of the constants in Colombian politics in 2025 was that major reforms and were blocked and delayed, yet a few things were snuck in through alternative measures. This was exemplified by Petro declaring economic emergency in a constitutionally dubious manner.

The reforma de salud was sunk again in the springtime, but by mid-year MinSalud had gone ahead with some of the changes anyway. This may well be reversed by an incoming government next year, meaning that EPSs remain somewhat in limbo.

Cómo así que no hay que castigar alcohol cuando más se tiene alcohol en la mercancía, ¿no sabe que es la droga que más produce muerte y daños en los sistemas presupuestales de salud? Menos alcohol en las personas y la sociedad es productivo y beneficioso para la vida. Aquí no se… https://t.co/GFbT4Wx0k5

— Gustavo Petro (@petrogustavo) December 31, 2025

Major budget changes are unlikely to get through under anyone, so failing to get this done can’t really be laid at Petro’s door. However, he’s gone ahead with what he can do: enormous hikes in the minimum salary, IVA abolished on certain items, demanding that pension funds divest from foreign investments and repatriate their savings.

Paz Total is looking more and more like Fracaso Total as time ticks on. At best, talks with various groups are going nowhere, while other talks have essentially collapsed. Trump declaring the Gaitanistas a terrorist group has muddied the waters even further. The ELN, Colombia’s largest remaining guerilla force, in particular have intensified operations.

While some of that has underlined the difference between their rhetoric and reality, with December’s paro nacional affecting little of the country, other attacks have been bloody and worrying, with the increased use of drones a dangerous direction of travel.

Economic uncertainty?

Whether the economy is doing well or not and whether that is because or in spite of the government will depend mainly on your fellings towards Petro. It’s a mixed bag with plenty of caveats on both sides. GDP growth has been good and ahead of expectation, with unemployment continuing to fall and inflation slowing. Those new jobs are largely formal, too.  

However, the GDP growth isn’t as fast as it could be, while it’s outperforming regionally, it’s behind the global average. Unemployment is at a low point for the century, but is still mainly informal and the rate of decrease is slowing. It’s hard to guess how the recently announced minimum wage hike to COP$2,000,000 will affect this.

Much more worrying is that much of this may be built on sand. While Petro has struggled to get big-ticket bills through the legislature, he’s quietly done things behind the scenes that have ramped up public spending. He’s betting on that being an investment which will keep delivering in the long run. If not, it will be an albatross for future governments.

Inflation remains at 5.3% annually, not calamitous, but stubbornly high. The cost of living, too, is ever-increasing, not helped by uncertainty in global trade routes. Despite all that wind and bluster between Trump and Petro, tariffs remain at the standard 10% for the time being.

Petro finally got his reforma laboral over the line, in some ways a major achievement considering the opposition it faced in the Senate. However, the text of the bill is somewhat underwhelming. For the main part, there are minor changes such as a cap on overtime and night shifts starting two hours earlier as well as solidifying full time contracts as the norm.

The most substantial change is a commitment to make online providers such as Rappi pay social security and workplace risk contributions for their workers. This may find the devil is in the details in terms of bringing it into reality.

Colombia also brought the Bre-B system of instant payments online. This is already having a huge impact in a country where digital payments are widespread and popular. Long term, this provides a base for increasing transparancy and reducing corruption. However, questions remain over the infrastructure underpinning these systems.

Transport no longer stuck in a jam

The really big local news has been that the Metro is progressing as planned. This might not seem like big news, but given how long the project spent in planning and the tendency of the president to stick his beak in, it’s just good to see something being done.

The first trains have arrived in the country and are running tests while the towering columns of the track are in place all over the city. Today, that means pain as Transmi stations close and traffic is rerouted, but all is in place for a fully integrated public transport system in the future.

RegioTram is also more or less on schedule, although it will need to be reworked to connect with the Bogotá systems, after it was pointed out that the planned stations are a fair distance away from the trnasmi and Metro. Regardless, connecting satellite towns with the capital is a gamechanging proposal.

Life in the city remains irritating due to continued high crime levels and the seeming refusal of Carlos Fernando Galán to do anything about rubbish on the streets. The best that can be said about Gálan at this point is that he has done little of note, hardly a glowing resumé, given his ambitions coming into office.

Culture vultures

The capital saw a celebration of Latino music as Festival Cordillera 2025 confirmed the event’s stature as a lodestone of music in Colombia. With Festival Estéreo Picnic 2025 providing a balance that focuses on anglophone music, the capital is well set. However, with both those festivals in the Parque Bolívar, Rock al Parque is struggling to stay relevant.

Plenty of other bands were touring throughout the year too, with Bogotá increasingly on the map for big-name world superstars. That means enduring the likes of Guns N’ Roses, but also means that rolos can see contemporary stars like Dua Lipa.

Former busker Ed Sheeran popped up on stage as a surprise guest of J Balvin in December, while another Brit unsurprisingly failed to turn up because that’s what Morrissey does these days. Latinos across Instagram responded by trolling the famous vegetarian with meat recipes.

Elsewhere online, Colombian food performed well on a host of dubious internet polls, sparkign waves of reposted joy throughout the year. In more dispiriting news, Club Colombia Negra was discontinued by Bavaria, meaning you have few chances to neck the country’s last widely available dark lager.

For those more interested in staying home, Colombia’s first ever board games convention took place in November. Ludotopia was an undisputed success, attracting the likes of Wingspan artist Ana Maria Martínez (who teased the upcoming expansion for Wingspan South America, Central America and Caribbean) and proving that Bogotá retains a dynamic and evolving cultural scene.

Colombia fall just short again

The women’s football team came into the Copa América on good form and were within seconds of taking the title. With two minutes of regular time to go, Mayra Ramírez put Colombia ahead for the third and seemingly last time at 3:2. Brazilian superstar supersub Marta, in her last tournament, broke Colombian hearts as she rolled back the years with a last gasp equalizer in the sixth minute of injury time.

The drama wasn’t over, as she then put Brazil in front for the first time in extra time before Leicy Santos equalized and took the game to penalties. There, the game slipped through the fingers of the superpoderosas as perma-champions Brazil showed their experience. They took the shoot out 5:4 for their 9th title in ten Copa Américas.

The men’s team, also runners up in their Copa América, ground their way to qualification for next year’s World Cup in North America. Conmebol was a slogfest this time around, with everyone except Argentina involved in taking points off each other and goals in short supply.

Eventually, Colombia found form, only losing a single game in the year and finishing with a goalfest against Venezuela, beating their fierce rivals 6-3 in the last game. That leaves Colombia 13th in the FIFA rankings – unlucky for some maybe, but not coach Nestor Lorenzo.

On the local stage, Santa Fe reclaimed the liga apertura for Bogotá, triumphing in Medellín over Independiente thanks to an inspired performance from Wigan legend Hugo Rodellega. Knocking out Millos and El Tigre Falcao on the way made it even sweeter. Junior of Barranquilla took the finalizácion, with Nacional winning the Copa Colombia. The latter was a Medellín derby and marred by a pitch invasion and violence at the end.

Cricket Colombia hit a six as MinDeportes officially recognised the gentleman’s game as a sport in the country. This opens up the field for more funding and support for events. They also welcomed a visiting team from Trinidad and Tobago as well as setting a T20 record for a last wicket chase in the Gulf Series against México.

What’s coming next?

Next year promises much more drama in Colombia, with national elections set to be hard-fought. This is an unusual cycle, as the country is preparing to see who will succeed a leftist president. Whether there will be continuity, a sharp tack rightwards or a drive for the centre is still anyone’s guess.

The lineups for the capital’s big music festivals seem strong, with a supporting cast of superstars also set to tour. The men’s football team have a relatively straightforward group in the World Cup and will fancy themselves to do well.

Our predictions for 2026 will be coming in the next few days, but whatever comes to pass, we’ll be here to keep you in the loop with what’s happening in Colombia and why. We got some of the 2025 calls right, after all. right Happy new year from the Bogotá Post – your English voice in Colombia!

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The National Liberation Army (ELN), a Colombian guerrilla group, concluded its 72-hour armed strike this morning, putting an end to days of tension in many parts of the country. 

The action –a common tactic in Colombia which aims at paralyzing movement by threatening violence against those who do not stay home – left at least three people dead, with incidents registered in 13 departments across the country.

The ELN declared the strike to oppose United States “imperialism” and military threats in the region, with analysts warning White House aggression in the region could empower the guerrillas.

What happened during the strike?

Police attributed various violent actions over the weekend to the ELN. Shortly after the strike began on Sunday, cylinder bombs appeared on key roadways across the country, disrupting land travel.

While over a dozen departments registered incidents, transport in Norte de Santander was particularly affected, with the main road from the capital, Cúcuta, to Pamplona closed due to a bomb.

An attack on a police station in Norte de Santander also claimed the life of an ambulance driver, who reportedly got caught in the crossfire. Two more corpses were found in a Cúcuta neighborhood near the Venezuelan border, which are being investigated as linked to the strike.

In addition to police stations, the rebels attacked other government installations, blowing up a toll booth in Barrancabermeja, Santander, and injuring a worker.

In a particularly grim incident, two policemen in Cali, Colombia’s third city, were killed in a bomb attack on Tuesday morning.

The ELN also burned an intercity bus in the Antioquia department.

‘On the offensive’

The ELN’s actions over the weekend marked the group’s first national-level armed strike since early 2022.

While its leaders signalled an openness to resume peace talks with the state just months ago, the rebels’ actions this week suggest a renewed aggression towards the government.

“The ELN is quite literally on the offensive. It is difficult to know what they want at this time,” said Laura Bonilla, deputy director of the Colombian Peace and Reconciliation Foundation (Pares). 

The analyst explained that the actions highlighted a shift in the methods used by the ELN, notably an increase in the use of indiscriminate explosives like cylinder bombs and drones. 

“The implication of this is that these are weapons that produce a greater effect on civilians,” Bonilla told The Bogotá Post.

In 2024, there was an 89% increase in the number of victims of explosive attacks in Colombia, according to the International Committee for the Red Cross.

Bonilla also noted that the ELN is growing more aggressive as the White House ramps up pressure in the region. 

The group declared the strike to “protest the threat of imperialist intervention in our country as a new phase of Trump’s neo-colonial plan.”

According to Bonilla, the ELN has been “paradoxically empowered” by Washington’s growing militancy, as it fuels their claims to be an anti-imperialist bastion. As Trump promises land strikes on Venezuela, where the ELN has a stronghold, the group may grow more active and more aggressive in Colombia.

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The United States today classified the Gaitanist Army of Colombia (EGC), Colombia’s most powerful armed group, a foreign terrorist organization (FTO).

The EGC, or Clan del Golfo, has expanded its criminal enterprise in Colombia in recent years, consolidating control over lucrative illicit economies like cocaine and illegal gold mining, as well as extorting large-scale enterprise.

While its designation as an FTO could assist authorities in unravelling the organization’s financial structure, analysts say it may threaten ongoing peace talks in Qatar between the EGC and the Colombian government.

“Today, the Department of State is designating Clan del Golfo as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT),” wrote Secretary of State Marco Rubio in a statement on Tuesday morning. 

“Based in Colombia, Clan del Golfo is a violent and powerful criminal organization with thousands of members. The group’s primary source of income is cocaine trafficking, which it uses to fund its violent activities,” continued the memo.

Who are the EGC?

The EGC was born from the remnants of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), a paramilitary group responsible for grave human rights abuses in the late 1990s and early 2000s.

Since then, it has re-branded itself several times; for a time it called itself the Urabeños, then the Clan del Golfo, honoring its heartland in the Gulf of Urabá in northern Colombia; it later changed its name to the Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AGC); most recently, the group adopted the EGC moniker. 

In recent years, the group has argued that it is a political actor in Colombia’s decades-long internal conflict, but its origins were strictly focused on making money illicitly. 

In the past decade, the organization has rapidly expanded beyond northern Colombia into as many as 20 departments across the country, exerting control in both rural and urban areas. 

“On the one hand, the group is an organized crime structure that manages various legal and illegal businesses and, on the other hand, it has also formed a uniformed army,” explained Gerson Arias, conflict and security investigator at the Ideas for Peace Foundation (FIP), a Colombian think tank.

Today, the group counts between 3,000 and 3,500 uniformed troops among its ranks while it has a further 6,000 members who form part of its broader crime structure of extorting businesses, according to Arias. 

“The main threat facing Colombia today is represented by the Clan del Golfo and its military and economic structure, both legal and illegal,” the analyst told The Bogotá Post.

What does the FTO designation change?

Following Washington’s sanctions, anyone deemed to be providing material support to the EGC can be brought to trial in a U.S. court. 

“Not only could cases be brought against members of the Clan del Golfo, but against any businessmen, facilitators, logistics operators, or anyone who provides even something as simple as buying them a meal,” explained Elizabeth Dickinson, Deputy Director for Latin America at International Crisis Group.

She told The Bogotá Post that the FTO designation could therefore “open some interesting doors” by exposing links between the EGC and legal enterprise, adding “this is an organization that has deep tentacles in the business world.”

The move could also provide a pretext for military action against the EGC in Colombia, with the Trump administration saying in recent weeks that drug production in any country is a legitimate target.

“An FTO in and of itself is not a justification for military action. However, it has historically been a step along the road to paving a narrative politically that could lead to the U.S. considering military action,” said Dickinson.

Impact on peace negotiations

In September, the first round of negotiations took place between EGC and Colombian state negotiators in Doha, mediated by the Qatari government.

A second round in December led to the signing of a “commitment to peace”, with the first step towards demobilization planned for March 2026. 

But the State Department’s FTO designation threatens to derail talks, according to analysts.

“I think there’s a lot of pending questions right now about the future of negotiations with this group,” said Dickinson. 

She stressed the progress made in talks so far, including a commitment to take a census of children fighting in the ranks of armed groups and return them to the state.

FIP’s Arias warned that the FTO classification will complicate both the subject of talks and the logistics of engaging in negotiations.

He noted that EGC negotiators will struggle to attend talks safely outside of Colombia and that Colombian authorities will be unable to provide credible non-extradition guarantees to the group’s leaders.

But Dickinson warned of the dangers of ending negotiations: “This organization is the largest threat to peace and security in Colombia. I think it will be important for the Colombian authorities and their country partners in mediation to consider what could be the implications of if peace talks were to end.”

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The Colombian National Liberation Army (ELN) has declared a 72-hour nationwide armed strike beginning on Sunday in protest against increased US military activity in Latin America.

In a statement, the group warned Colombians not to travel via the country’s roadways or navigable rivers during the three day window; while the group said it would not harm civilians, armed strikes are enforced through violence, with previous iterations involving vehicle burnings and civilian casualties.

The action will be the first national-level armed strike since 2022 and comes amid an ongoing U.S. boat bombing campaign – which the Pentagon says has targeted ELN members – as well as White House threats of further intervention, including land strikes in Colombia.

“We, the peoples’ forces of Colombia, protest the threat of imperialist intervention in our country as a new phase of Trump’s neo-colonial plan, which aims to sink its claws even deeper into Latin American and Caribbean territories,” read a decree emitted on Friday by the ELN.

On multiple occasions, U.S. President Donald Trump has floated the idea of striking drug production targets within Colombian borders; Colombia is the world’s largest producer of cocaine and the ELN is known to be a key actor in the drug trade.

The communiqué said the strike would begin at 6:00 AM on Sunday, December 14 and last until the same time on Wednesday. 

While it instructed civilians not to travel by road or river during the three day window, it maintained that its “road control units will respect civilians and their property,” but advised regular people not to mix with soldiers in order to “avoid accidents.”

Although the measures are purportedly national, analysts say they are unlikely to affect the whole country.

“In practical terms, this is a national announcement, but it has a limited impact because the ELN does not have a national presence,” Gerson Arias, investigator at the Ideas for Peace Foundation (FIP), a Colombian think-tank, told The Bogotá Post.

Arias said the bulk of the effect will be seen in areas of ELN control, especially in Colombia’s northeast and in the western departments of Cauca, Nariño and Chocó.

The last time the ELN implemented a nationwide armed strike was in 2022, with incidents across 17 departments including vehicle burnings and road blockages intended to protest the Ivan Duque administration (2018-2022).

But the ELN regularly uses smaller scale armed strikes to exert control over specific areas, usually in rural regions. Experts say that the guerrillas often use the actions as a guise to secure drug transit corridors and facilitate the movement of soldiers and contraband.

Rights groups criticize armed strikes for producing a host of deleterious effects on affected populations, with forced confinement impeding access to education, food, and healthcare. 

While the ELN’s decree did not explicitly mention U.S. threats against Venezuela, the group is known to have a presence in the country and has recorded ties with the Nicolás Maduro regime.

Much of the guerrilla group’s territory lies on the border with Venezuela and any U.S. attack on Colombia’s neighbor would also threaten the ELN, according to FIP’s Arias. 

“The ELN is well aware that it may be affected by some of the measures taken by the United States,” said the analyst.

The group has already been directly impacted by Trump’s boat bombing campaign, with U.S. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth saying an October 17 strike on an alleged drug vessel had killed three ELN members. The rebels denied the claim, insisting they do not smuggle drugs. 

The ELN’s armed strike declaration underscores the complex panorama of armed groups in the region and their ties to government, drug trafficking, and border zones. While the impact of the action is yet to be seen, the announcement shows the far-reaching consequences of the White House’s mounting military pressure in the region.

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U.S. President Donald Trump said he would not rule out land attacks in any drug producing country on Tuesday, moments after criticizing cocaine production in Colombia.

“I hear Colombia, the country of Colombia, is making cocaine. They have cocaine manufacturing plants, OK, and then they sell us their cocaine. We appreciate that very much. But yeah, anybody that’s doing that and selling it into our country is subject to attack,” Trump told reporters at the White House on Tuesday afternoon.

In response, Colombian President Gustavo Petro warned that such an attack “would be a declaration of war,” telling Trump not to damage “two centuries of diplomatic relations.”

Trump’s comments come amid mounting tensions in the Caribbean, where the U.S. has amassed forces since September. While Washington has so far only attacked alleged drug boats, killing at least 80 people, Trump said on Tuesday he plans to expand the campaign to land strikes “very soon.”

While Venezuela and the Nicolás Maduro regime have been the primary focus of the pressure campaign, Petro’s criticism of the strikes aggravated already tense relations between Bogotá and Washington. In October, the White House sanctioned Petro after he alleged the U.S. had killed a Colombian fisherman in a September boat strike, accusing the South American leader of being “an illegal drug dealer.”

“I think the U.S. has been very clear that they have a problem with Petro, but that they have a very productive relationship with Colombian institutions and particularly the security forces,” explained Elizabeth Dickinson, Deputy Director for Latin America at International Crisis Group.

“For that reason, I think it would be extremely unlikely that there would be a strike on Colombian soil,” Dickinson told The Bogotá Post.

Today is not the first time Trump has floated strikes on Colombian territory, with the president in November saying he would be “proud” to destroy cocaine factories in Colombia.

Colombia is the world’s largest producer of cocaine and the United Nations recently estimated that potential cocaine production increased by 50% in 2023. Trump has personally blamed Petro for this increase but the Colombian president cites his government’s commitment to dismantling cocaine laboratories, often with U.S. cooperation.

But the White House has also shown its ability to distinguish between Colombia’s government and its security forces. When he decertified Colombia as a drug cooperation partner in September, Trump praised the country’s army and police and said “the failure of Colombia to meet its drug control obligations over the past year rests solely with its political leadership.”

For that reason, any strike in Colombia is likely to be done in cooperation with the country’s security and intelligence agencies, according to Dickinson.

“If there were to be a unilateral strike, I think that there would be a massive diplomatic fallout,” added the analyst, “but in practice, the relationship likely would survive.”

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Electronic jamming and missiles are two of the risks identified by US regulators.

Major airlines cancelled flights from Bogotá to Caracas this week after US regulators warned of “heightened military activity” around Venezuela.

Avianca and LATAM suspended flights through Venezuelan airspace, along with at least five other airlines, as a response to a Federal Aviation Authority NOTAM (Notice to Airmen) that reported “Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) interference” around Maiquetía “Simón Bolívar” International Airport, which serves nearby Caracas.

The warnings were linked to military exercises under way in Venezuela, a response to threats from US forces massing in the Caribbean and aerial attacks on suspect drug boats, some originating from Venezuelan waters.

Colombia’s own airline regulator, Aeronáutica Civil de Colombia, repeated the FAA’s warning but said that air operators in Colombia could take “autonomous decisions” over flights to Venezuela.

On Monday several airlines were continuing direct flights from Bogotá, such as Wingo, Avior (a Venezuelan airline) and Satena (a commercial airline linked to the Colombian Ministry of Defense). Copa offered connections via Panama.

Mobile missiles

The list of airlines suspending flights continued to grow on Monday night with TAP, Turkish Airlines, Iberia and GOL being joined by Air Europa and Plus Ultra.

This came despite pushback from Venezuela’s Instituto Nacional de Aeronáutica Civil (INAC) which threatened to punish airlines for following the FAA’s recommendations.  According to a report in Aviation Online, airlines avoiding Caracas could in the long term lose access to the country’s airspace.

INAC also issued an ultimatum for airlines suspending flights “to resume services within a 48-hour period” or risk losing their landing permits.

Meanwhile the US FAA issued a more detailed FAA backgrounder clarifying that Venezuela had “at no point expressed an intent to target civil aviation”.

It did, however, seem concerned that the current context could trigger an air accident.

Venezuela, it said, had mobilized “thousands of military and reserve forces” with access to shoulder-mounted anti-aircraft missiles, or MANPADs (man-portable air defense systems), capable of downing low-altitude aircraft.

This followed comments by Maduro last month that his military were in possession of Russian-made Igla-S missiles “with no fewer than 5,000 of them in key anti-aircraft defense positions to guarantee peace, stability, and tranquility”.

Jammers and spoofers

The more immediate risk was to electronic systems, said the FAA documents, with several civil aircraft recently reporting interference while transiting Venezuela, in some cases causing “lingering effects throughout the night”.

“GNSS jammers and spoofers can affect aircraft out to 250 nautical miles [450 kilometres] and can impact a wide variety of critical communication, navigation, surveillance, and safety equipment on aircraft.”

The FAA said it would “continue to monitor the risk environment for US civil aviation operating in the region and make adjustments, as appropriate, to safeguard U.S. civil aviation”.

In fact, the US airlines stopped all direct commercial and cargo flights into Venezuela as part of an order issued in 2019, related to sanctions against the Maduro regime, widely seen as illegitimate, with the US State Department offering a bounty of US$50 million “for information leading to the arrest and / or conviction” .

Open to talks

Commentators on US – Venezuelan relations this week said that FAA announcement was not necessarily a sign of imminent US military action. Former Associated Press analyst Dan Perry told News Nation that the FAA warning was “a message that they [the FAA] expected the country to become unstable”, but did not point to a ground invasion.

For most observers, the NOTAM was a continuation of the maximum pressure strategy pursued by Washington against the Maduro regime, including a recent decision to declare the Cártel de los Soles — a disconnected group of corrupt military officers who facilitate drug shipments — as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.

Last week Maduro said he was open to talks with Washington, according to AP News, though US President Trump underscored that military action was “still on the table”.

In recent months the US has sent eight navy ships, a submarine, an aircraft carrier and 10,000 service members to the Caribbean. And since August, US firepower has killed at least 83 people in aerial attacks on speedboats suspected of running drugs; for anyone arriving in Venezuela, air is still safer than sea.

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