An express kidnapping highlights the risks of taking a taxi in Colombia’s capital. What happened, and how to avoid it happening to you.

Bogotá breathed a collective sigh of relief on Tuesday morning when news broke of the safe arrival home of Diana Ospina, a rola missing for almost 40 hours after being kidnapped by a taxi she had hailed in the street after a night out in Chapinero.

Ospina was the latest victim of El Paseo Millonario, the ‘millionaire ride’, where passengers riding in yellow public taxis are physically attacked and forced to hand over cash and valuables.

The technique varies, but victims are usually targeted late at night in busy streets in party zones outside restaurants or discotheques, then driven to a quiet spot where two accomplices of the driver climb in the back seat and threaten the passenger with knives, guns or syringes.

See also: Bogotá’s Murder Mosaic

The following ordeal can last minutes or hours or even days. Victims are intimidated with beatings or stab wounds, and hooded or blindfolded. Some are killed, as in the case of a university professor found dead on the outskirts of the city in January this year.

Foreigners are also targeted: in 2013, a DEA officer Terry Watson was stabbed to death in a Bogotá taxi after two assailants jumped in the back seat. Authorities later said the army veteran resisted the attack. Seven taxi drivers were later captured and extradited to the U.S. to face charges for his murder.

According to police data, during 2025 in Bogotá there were registered 37 cases of kidnapping for ransom or extortion, though these crimes are highly under-reported. This is because the same gangs threaten the victims to keep quiet, and in the case of taxi gangs, know where their targets live.

Publicity blitz

In the case of Ospina, her kidnap started early Sunday morning when she hailed a yellow taxi that took her to within one block of her home in Engativá, where two men from a following taxi climbed in the back, threatened her and took her blindfolded for a three-hour driver around the city while using her phone and bank cards.

The ordeal did not end there. Ospina was then passed on to another kidnap group operating in the south of the city and held in a house there while more extortion demands were made. Late on Monday night, after being captive for nearly 40 hours, Ospina was dropped off in the hills above Bogotá where she eventually walked to a police station for assistance.

According to information on FM radio, from contacts close to the family, the kidnap gang released her after the “feeling pressure from the media blitz” with social media platforms widely publicising her disappearance. Other news reports stated they released her only after draining 50 million pesos (US$15,000) from her bank accounts.

This week the authorities were still hunting the perpetrators, expecting arrests imminently.

Your world in your phone

The Ospina case highlights how smartphones have upped the risks for kidnap victims in Colombia.

Whereas in the past a paseo millonario was usually a short-term event – passengers held for an hour while the gang used their bankcards at an ATM – criminals nowadays are eyeing much bigger profits from emptying bank accounts held on smartphones.

The insistence by banks and other financial platforms to use biometric approvals such as face recognition or fingerprint scanning has created the need for gangs to keep their targets captive for many days, in some cases drugging them into compliance or subduing them through threats of violence.

See also: Bogotá Police take down gang drugging victims in Teusaquillo and Chapinero

The rise of the digital nomads in Colombia often with juicy crypto accounts accessed through their phones has also created opportunities for tech savvy criminals. After such attacks, platforms are reluctant to reimburse funds arguing that they were transferred with the biometric approval of the victim.

One thing is clear: apart from increased financial losses, the longer victims are held captive the worse their outcome, both in terms of physical and psychological damage, the risk of sexual violence, or death from an overdose of the powerful drugs such as burundanga administered by the gangs.

The Canaries

Bogotá has more than 55,000 public taxis circulating on any given day sometimes referred to as ‘Los Canarios’ (the canaries) after their yellow cars and a popular telenovela depicting taxi drivers. It is worth noting that taxi drivers are themselves frequently the victims of robbery, extortions and murder.

Yellow taxi companies in Bogotá are registered and controlled by the Secretería de Movilidad with each driver given a Tarjeta de Control, the plasticized card hanging down the seat back that – in theory – displays the name, details and photo of the driver as well as the fare scale, and is revalidated every month.

In Bogotá, passengers can independently check the status of registered drivers by entering the numberplate into the menu at SIMUR at  www.simur.gov.co/conductores-de-taxi.

But in a random test by The Bogotá Post, out of 10 taxis entered by number plate, only six had a registered driver. Four were reported “without an active registration”.

That lack of control is further weakened by the fact that registered taxistas often allow other drivers to take the wheel, said transport companies this week.

“We work on good faith, but we can’t guarantee that drivers don’t hand over their cars to other persons to commit crimes,” Maria  Botero, manager of Radiotaxis told Noticias Caracol.

In the case of Ospina, the taxis that abducted her were quickly identified along with their owners, but not the actual attackers. One car was not currently registered on SIMUR.

No dar papaya

How to avoid becoming a victim? A good tip is to use a ride platforms like Didi, Cabify, Uber or Indrive. Some like Didi are also linked to the yellow public taxis, but safer because the ride is traced. At times hailing a street taxi is the only option because app cars are far off, and you weigh the risks of standing on the street, or (as in the case of Diana Ospina) the app ride is suddenly cancelled.

Attacks are usually at night, on weekends, on persons leaving bars or restaurants. But passengers can be targeted in daytime, particularly in financial districts or leaving a bank. If you are riding the yellow taxis, here are some ways to no dar papaya, as they say in Bogotá (‘don’t be a sucker’).

Before going out:

• Carry a clean phone with no banking apps and limited personal data. Many people in Bogotá are now leaving their financial transactions on a second phone or tablet stored safely at home.
• Carry a wad of cash. Perhaps counterintuitively, in the digital world cash makes you less of a target. And it is easy to hand over.
• If you do carry a bank card, take just one linked to a low-balance account.

Getting the taxi:

• Travel in a group. Criminals generally target solo passengers.
• Check the taxi numberplate in SIMUR, see above. This takes seconds and confirms if there is a registered driver. If not, walk away.
• Take a photo of the taxi numberplate, send to friends or family. Ensure the driver sees you doing this.
• Before entering a taxi, look carefully to ensure there is no-one hidden inside.
• Check the Tarjeta de Control photo with the actual driver. Do this before setting off.
• Check doors can be locked and unlocked from the passenger seat.

During the trip:

• Lock doors on both sides.
• Share your real-time location with a family member or friend.

Signs of danger:

• The driver changes the route without explanation.
• The taxi turns onto dark or deserted streets.
• The driver suddenly stops to pick up other persons.
• Motorcycles or other cars or taxis closely follow the vehicle.

During an attack:

• Prioritize your physical safety.
• Give up any valuables without resistance.

If you suspect someone you know has been abducted by a taxi gang, call the GAULA special police unit (Grupos de Acción Unificada por la Libertad Personal) that deals with extortion and kidnapping, on Line 165.

“Safe taxi” zones

Even with these precautions, street taxis are still a risk, and a growing one according to Bogotá security authorities who during 2025 arrested at least 20 persons from several different Paseo Millonario gangs such as La 57 and La Zona T.

A recent advance by the city has been the recognition of the crime as “kidnap with extortion”, with up to 40 years in jail for perpetrators.

Another nitiative announced by the Secretaría de Seguridad this week was taxi seguro zones where uniformed teams patrol outside nightspots and assist revellers to take only registered taxis.

But while mediatic, such initiatives are likely to have only limited impact. Taxi gangs are generally compact, with three people, and mobile so they can cruise new zones. And new gangs seem to pop up as quickly as old ones are taken down.

So while the city can celebrate the safe return of Diana Ospina, and hopefully soon see her attackers rounded up, there will be plenty more candidates for the Millionaire Ride.  

The post Paseo Millionario: don’t be taken for a ride appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

Thousands of miles from Bogotá, in the frozen trench lines of eastern Ukraine, Colombian accents have become a familiar sound of war.

Between 1,000 and 2,000 Colombian nationals are currently serving in the ranks of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, according to recent investigations, while as many as 7,000 have passed through the country’s defence forces since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022. Their presence has turned Colombia into the single largest source of foreign fighters in Ukraine’s war effort – and estimated 25% – and an unexpected human bridge between two distant conflicts.

What might once have been dismissed as a story of mercenaries and combat-tested veterans has evolved into something far more complex: a shadowy window into the globalization of military labor.

Many of those arriving in Ukraine have witnessed close-hand Colombia’s internal conflict, which for more than six decades has forged one of Latin America’s most experienced armed orces. Trained in counterinsurgency, reconnaissance and irregular warfare, Colombian fighters bring a skillset that has proven adaptable to the grinding, attritional combat of the Donbas.

Ukrainian commanders have taken notice. In some units, Colombians have made up a majority of infantry personnel, valued for their endurance and battlefield discipline. Their roles range from trench warfare to fortification building and increasingly to drone operations, a defining feature of the war.

Yet their journey to the frontlines is rarely driven by ideology.

A steady stream of Colombian soldiers leaves active service each year, often in their late 30s or early 40s. While formal reintegration programmes exist, many veterans struggle to transition into civilian life. Salaries drop sharply after retirement, and the domestic private security sector is saturated. For some, Ukraine offers an economic lifeline.

Combat pay of between US$3,000 and US$5,000 a month – several times the average Colombian wage – is supplemented by signing bonuses and compensation packages for families in the event of death. The contrast is stark enough to turn war into a viable, if perilous, form of employment.

“Colombians understand the risks … yet they still come,” one Ukrainian officer involved in recruitment told local media.

The legal and political framing of these fighters remains contested. In December 2025, the Colombian Congress ratified the United Nations convention against mercenaries, a move backed by the leftist government of President Gustavo Petro.

Under the Convention’s definition, however, most Colombians serving in Ukraine are not considered mercenaries. They are formally integrated into Ukraine’s military structures, receive equal pay to local troops and operate under state command rather than private contracts.

Even so, President Petro has cast the phenomenon as a form of exploitation, warning of the risks faced by citizens drawn into distant war, including the conflict in south Sudan.

Those causes are visible not only in Colombia’s labor market but also in Ukraine’s evolving military structure. As the war has dragged on, Kyiv has reorganized its foreign units, integrating international volunteers into larger brigades to improve coordination and access to heavy weaponry. The shift has further embedded foreign fighters – Colombians among them – into the core of Ukraine’s defensive operations.

The human cost of this integration has been steep. Estimates from the Atlantic Council claim that between 300 and 550 Colombians have been killed in Ukraine since 2022, making them the foreign nationality with the highest number of combat deaths. In Kyiv, Colombian flags now appear among the growing patchwork of memorials to fallen soldiers – a quiet testament to the war’s global reach.

Despite the losses, recruitment has continued. Military analysts say the phenomenon reflects deeper structural failures. Colombia’s decades-long conflict produced a large pool of highly trained personnel, but the transition to civilian life has lagged behind. Skills honed in war have limited application in the formal economy, leaving many veterans in a precarious position.

This dynamic has fed what some researchers describe as a transnational market for military labor, operating in the grey zones of international law. Fighters move between conflicts not necessarily out of allegiance, but out of necessity – carrying their expertise with them.

The implications extend beyond Ukraine. Security analysts warn that the eventual return of battle-hardened veterans, particularly those trained in emerging technologies such as drone warfare, could pose risks if criminal organizations seek to absorb their skills.

For now, however, the flow continues in one direction.

On a recent winter evening in Kyiv, a Colombian veteran reflected on the reality behind the headlines. “Tell Colombians not to come,” he said quietly. “More die than return.”

It is a warning that captures the paradox at the heart of this story: a war that is both distant and deeply connected, drawing in those for whom the frontlines are not just a cause, but a last resort.

In that sense, the presence of Colombians in Ukraine is not an anomaly. It is a signal – of how modern conflicts intersect, and of how the consequences of one war can echo, years later, in another.

The Colombian government temporarily closed last week PNN Tayrona National Natural Park following threats against park staff and escalating violence between rival armed groups fighting for control of drug trafficking corridors along the Caribbean coast.

The shutdown, announced on Feb. 17 by Parques Nacionales Naturales de Colombia, was described as a preventive measure to protect visitors, local communities and officials.

“The National Government announced the temporary closure of PNN Tayrona as a preventive measure to protect the lives and safety of visitors, communities, and officials, and to ensure their security,” the agency said in a statement.

Tayrona, located near the city of Santa Marta in the foothills of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, is one of Colombia’s most visited protected areas, drawing as many as 750,000 visitors annually. Known for its white-sand beaches and dense tropical forest, the park is a pillar of the tourism economy in the Magdalena department.

The closure comes amid an intensifying turf war between the Conquering Self-Defense Forces of the Sierra Nevada (ACSN) and the Gaitanist Army of Colombia (EGC), better known as the Clan del Golfo, a criminal organization designated as a terrorist group by the United States.

Authorities say the immediate trigger for the crisis was a Feb. 11 operation to dismantle unauthorized constructions within the protected area, including houses, bathrooms and hiking trails built without state permission.

According to the parks agency, the demolitions prompted threats on social media directed at park personnel. Tensions escalated on Feb. 16 when local residents blocked employees from entering the park. Officials said individuals then began charging tourists for access and allowing entry without formal registration, effectively taking over certain administrative functions.

“This created a situation that prevents a minimum level of security from being ensured within the protected area,” authorities said.

While the government has not formally attributed responsibility for the threats, the timing of the closure has drawn attention to the deteriorating security environment in northern Colombia. Recent confrontations between the Clan del Golfo and the ACSN in nearby municipalities, including Aracataca, have led to forced displacements and heightened fears about the stability of the region.

Colombia’s Ombudsman’s Office has previously warned of the presence of both groups in and around Tayrona, citing risks ranging from extortion to sexual violence. The violence, analysts say, reflects a broader struggle for control over strategic drug trafficking corridors extending into the departments of Cesar and La Guajira.

Yet the official narrative has been complicated by contrasting statements from government negotiators engaged in talks with the ACSN.

Mauricio Silva, the government’s chief negotiator in a socio-legal dialogue with the ACSN, said the decision to close the park was driven largely by climatic and preventive considerations. While acknowledging the existence of security risks and territorial control by armed groups in parts of the Sierra Nevada, Silva said it would be inappropriate to assign criminal responsibility without completed judicial investigations.

“One thing is to recognize the delicate security situation in the territory, and another is to point to specific perpetrators without proof,” Silva said, underscoring the government’s cautious position amid ongoing negotiations.

Local tourism operators have also questioned the link between the closure and the armed conflict. Some community leaders argue that the dispute stems in part from longstanding grievances over how ticket revenues are managed. They contend that funds collected by the central government are not sufficiently reinvested in infrastructure and local development within the park and surrounding communities.

The crisis has exposed deeper tensions over who exercises effective authority in one of Colombia’s most emblematic tourist destinations. Indigenous communities, national authorities and armed groups all operate in the broader Sierra Nevada region, where state presence has historically been uneven.

Although tourists in Tayrona have generally been insulated from direct violence — with armed groups preferring to profit indirectly through extortion, drug trafficking and prostitution — the park’s closure has raised concerns that the conflict could increasingly disrupt legitimate economic activity.

For the department of Magdalena, where tourism  depends on Tayrona as key source of revenue, the shutdown represents both a security and economic setback. Hotel operators and tour agencies in Santa Marta have reported cancellations since the announcement, though officials have not provided a timeline for reopening.

The government has said the closure will remain in effect until minimum security conditions can be guaranteed. Meanwhile, the dispute underscores the fragile balance between conservation, tourism and public saefty in a region where armed actors continue to expand their territorial control.

Student leaders declare ‘indefinite strike’ at Bogotá’s sprawling Universidad Nacional as controversial rector reappointed.  

In another twist in the saga of who runs the ‘Nacho’, Colombia’s largest public university, controversial candidate Ismael Peña was formally inducted as rector last week ending a two-year legal wrangle.

Peña was sworn in during a small private ceremony on Thursday just days after a Bogotá tribunal ordered his reinstatement in the job. This followed the resignation last November of another rector whose possession was ruled illegitimate by Colombia’s state council.

Read more: Court Ruling Expected to Spark Trouble at the National University.

The initial controversy was sparked in 2024 in the highly politicized campus when a popular candidate, Leopoldo Múnera, lost out to Peña in the last voting round by the university council.

#BOGOTÁ | Este es el panorama a esta hora (6:53 p.m.) en la calle 26 a la altura de la Universidad Nacional.

Los servicios troncales que transitan realizan retornos en Corferias y Concejo de Bogotá.

Los vehículos particulares no pueden circular en sentido Oriente-Occidente.… pic.twitter.com/WWfyIrqwXi

— ÚltimaHoraCaracol (@UltimaHoraCR) February 19, 2026

The ensuing strikes and protests galvanized the university for four months setting back the academic agenda and creating an exhausting three-term year in 2025, from which students and professors are only just recovering.

Protests and vandalism spilled over onto major nearby transport routes around the Bogotá campus. In Bogotá, the Nacho sits in the corner of the busy Avenida NQS and Avenida El Dorado, two of the most vital throughfares for both public and private transport.

Return of Torres

Even as news of Peña’s legal victory and imminent reinstatement was announced last week, students and supporters quickly blocked the Avenida El Dorado forcing Transmilenio buses to suspend operations and thousands of commuters to make their way on foot.

Student assemblies at the university’s two main campuses, Bogotá and Medellin, called for “indefinite strikes” to protest Peña reinstatement.

To add to the confusion, the Bogotá campus was also invaded by a large group of campesinos from Cauca whose later protests detained workers in government buildings, part of a plan to draw attention to conflict-related problems in their department.

On Friday, when The Bogotá Post visited the university, most of the faculties were closed but the campus was filled with students busy painting fresh murals to celebrate the return of the remains to the campus of Camilo Torres, a revolutionary priest and founder of the university Sociology Department, who joined the ELN guerrillas and was killed in action against the army in 1966.

See also: Remains of Rebel Priest Set to Return to Bogotá.

Many students gave their views on the return of Peña but  declined to be fully identified.

Roberto, a sociology student selling food in the campus, said he supported the strike to “preserve the autonomy of the university”. Peña was seen as an unpopular candidate “linked to private interests that will privatize the curriculum and syphon off profits”, he said.

Corporate spinoffs

Similar sentiments were expressed across the campus: that Peña was being parachuted in with the backing of the Centro Democratic party to advance both a right-wing agenda and disburse lucrative contracts to a select group of private companies.

According to an investigation by magazine La Raya last year, Peña was the continuity candidate for “a parallel administration system” embedded in a company called Rotorr that dished out deals on behalf of the university, but bypassed internal auditing procedures leaving an opaque tangle of beneficiaries.

During his rectorship Múnera described these corporate spinoffs as engaging in “crimes against the university” and flagged them to the judicial authorities, but so far with no clear resolution.

Despite these controversies, Peña’s return was boosted by support from the Consejo Superior Universitario, the highest decision-making body of public universities in Colombia, that unanimously agreed to respect the tribunal ruling, clearing any final legal hurdles.

Strike Down

In another unexpected outcome, an online poll of students revealed that a majority were against the suspension of classes.

 The initial strike call came after a hastily convened student assembly on the Bogotá campus where some student representatives later complained that their voices were not heard.

“There was one classmate, he raised his hand and they wouldn’t let him speak. So, the next day we decided to conduct a survey to ask the students if they agreed with the strike,” student representative Kevin Arriguí told City TV.

The results, based on a total of 5,438 respondents, showed that 56 per cent (3,060 students) disagreed with the strike, while only 36 per cent (2,141 students) supported it. There were 237 undecideds.

Tellingly, the online strike survey had a higher participation among students than last year’s vote to install a Constituyente Universitaria – a people’s body – that is now in place.

Some students consulted on the campus by The Bogotá Post last week were mindful of the outcome of the 2024 strike which lasted several months and created hardships, particularly for poor students from rural areas who had spent money to travel to the capital to study, only to face severe interruptions to their curriculums and the risk of having to study another year to gain their degrees.

“We don’t want Peña. People are angry. But we don’t want to stop the term either,” said Carla, a student outside the newly constructed 70,000-million-peso arts faculty building.

Fragile mobility

Finding a compromise could be problematic. Activists on the campus were pressuring undergraduates to not attend classes and most lessons were abandoned. Some professors offered their classes on-line.

The student assembly planned this week at the Bogotá site could reverse the strike plans, though this seems unlikely. The general mood among students on the campus was that they would “block Peña, whatever it takes”.

Such talk is common at a university that is a petri dish for the national condition and at times – literally – a battleground for political divisions, particularly in a city nominated as the country’s “protest capital”.

This was revealed by data published in an El Espectador op-ed this week which showed Bogotá had 1,678 mass mobilization recorded during 2025, roughly 32 per week, and an increase of 17 per cent on the previous year.

While celebrating this increase as a “symptom of democracy”, it also pointed out that these protests “affected public order and the fragile mobility of millions of Bogotanos”.  

 That included two million people using the Transmilenio each day, with a majority of these on lines passing close to the Universidad Nacional. Easy targets for agitators based on the campus.

Which is why trouble at the Nacho generally means headaches for the whole city.

The post More trouble at Bogotá’s Universidad Nacional? appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

Apple is moving fairly quickly through this particular beta cycle, with beta 2 arriving already for iOS 26.4, iPadOS2 26.4, macOS Tahoe 26.4, and the rest of the OS 26.4 suite. The first beta debuted just a week ago. Anyone enrolled in the beta testing programs can find and download the OS 26.4 beta 2 ... Read More

The Colombian national parks agency announced the temporary closure of the Tayrona National Park on Tuesday, February 17, citing threats against park staff by armed groups.

Tayrona, located on the country’s northern Caribbean coast, is one of the country’s most visited national parks, attracting as many as 750,000 visitors from around the world each year.

Its closure comes amid a war between two criminal organizations fighting to control territory and strategic drug trafficking routes in the region.

“The National Government announced the temporary closure of Tayrona National Natural Park as a preventive measure to protect the lives and safety of visitors, communities, and officials, and to ensure their security,” read a government statement on Tuesday. 

The dispute began with an operation on February 11 to dismantle “unauthorized constructions in the protected area” in the park. The director of the national parks agency explained that these included houses, bathrooms, and hiking trails built without state permission.

The demolition prompted threats online against park personnel, according to the government. The situation escalated on Monday, February 16, when locals blocked park employees from entering Tayrona. They also reportedly took over government functions, charging tourists for access and allowing people to enter without formal registration. 

“This created a situation that prevents a minimum level of security from being ensured within the protected area,” said authorities.

While the government did not specify who it believes to be behind the actions, the closure comes amid a mounting turf war in the area between two criminal organizations: the Conquering Self-Defense Forces of the Sierra Nevada (ACSN) and the Gaitanist Army of Colombia (EGC), or Clan del Golfo, designated a terrorist organization by the United States last December. 

“This latest escalation in Tayrona is yet another chapter in this very unfortunate territorial contest that’s been underway now for several years,” said Elizabeth Dickinson, deputy director for Latin America at the International Crisis Group. 

For decades, the ACSN – under different names – has controlled the Sierra Nevada, Tayrona and the city of Santa Marta through a web of powerful family clans. But in recent years, the EGC has been pushing east along the coast from its stronghold in the Gulf of Urabá, trying to displace the ACSN.

The EGC’s long-term goal is to reach the border with Venezuela and surround the key coca-producing region of Catatumbo, says Dickinson. 

“[The Sierra Nevada] is sort of a route on the route to their goal. And… the effect on the civilian population from both sides has been pretty devastating,” said the analyst, who noted a rise in forced confinement, recruitment, and targeted killings.

While tourists tend to be insulated from criminal violence in the area, with armed groups preferring to profit from drugs and prostitution, Tayrona’s closure may signal a shift. 

But local tourism operators tell a different story; they say the closure has nothing to do with the security situation. Instead, members of the community say the problem is that the government, which collects revenue from ticket sales, is not re-investing it in the park. 

“The communities are tired, and the Indigenous people are tired because they don’t receive the money either; it’s taken to Bogotá,” said Luis Eduardo Muñoz, a local leader. 

He explained that members of the community took action to renovate vital tourism infrastructure in the park because the national government failed to invest in it. When the state demolished it, they protested.

“Why do they have to resort to extreme measures and try to close the park if it is necessary for people’s livelihoods?” said Muñoz, who called for dialogue between the government and local leaders.

Although the cause of the closure remains disputed, security analysts nevertheless say it underscores increasing insecurity in the Sierra Nevada region around Tayrona. 

It also marks another setback for President Gustavo Petro’s peace process, with the government actively engaged in negotiations with both the ACSN and the EGC.

Petro said the ACSN had signed a deal after Tayrona’s closure to guarantee civilian safety and suspend attacks on state security forces. 

But the prospect of a peace deal remains uncertain as the group faces a mounting threat from the EGC.

“I think the fundamental question remains the tactical situation on the ground because, of course, they can’t negotiate if they’re under immediate threat from another force,” said Dickinson.

The post Colombia’s popular Tayrona National Park closes over alleged armed group threats appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

Bogotá, Colombia – On February 10, the Grenoble Prosecutor’s Office launched a worldwide call for victims or witnesses of Jacques Leveugle, a teacher arrested in 2024 in France and accused of sexually assaulting at least 89 minors around the world since 1967.

During a press conference, French prosecutor Étienne Manteaux said that the sexual predator was reported in 2023 by one of his nephews, who discovered a USB drive containing written memoirs, pictures, and other documents related to the abuse of teenagers. 

The French Embassy in Colombia called for witnesses to come forward to identify potential abuse victims in the country, as Leveugle worked as a teacher in Bogotá on two occasions between 1996 and 2023.

The suspect was living in Morocco when the investigation began, but had spent his life moving between Switzerland, Germany, Portugal, Algeria, Nigeria, the Philippines, New Caledonia, Colombia, and France. In all of these countries, he allegedly targeted minors while working in educational or social roles.

Authorities revealed that in his “autobiography,” the alleged abuser gave horrendous details about 89 teenagers, between 13 and 17 years old, being manipulated and abused from 1967 to 2022.

“We need Jacques Leveugle’s name to be known because the objective is to reach the victims and encourage them to come forward,” Manteaux confirmed.

He said that 40 of the 89 victims had been identified and that authorities were working to find the rest. 

“Sometimes names are not even mentioned; we are facing a wall in certain situations… This call for witnesses is to allow victims we haven’t been able to identify to come forward,” the prosecutor explained. “Perhaps not all victims are recorded in these documents.”

Manteaux also said that the man, who has been under arrest since 2024 and never officially graduated as an educator, also confessed in his writings to killing two women: his mother and one of his aunts.

The uphill battle to find victims in Colombia

Investigations revealed that Jacques Leveugle spent several years living in and visiting Colombia between 1996 and 2000, and again from 2000 to 2023. 

In an interview with Caracol Radio, the prosecutor confirmed that the sexual predator worked as a French teacher in a shelter for children and teenagers in the capital city, Bogotá.

“It’s hard to reach victims outside France; that’s why we have made a special invitation to Colombian victims. We need them and their experiences to understand what this man really did,” he said during the call, adding that they decided to take a “traditional” approach due to the difficulty of reaching witnesses.

Authorities are also trying to determine if Leveugle had collaborators and what his “modus operandi” was to ensure that none of the teenagers ever complained or reported the abuse to the police.

Latin America Reports contacted the Grenoble Prosecutor’s Office, and they confirmed that the investigation remains active and ongoing in Colombia. They also committed to briefing the media on any significant breakthroughs as they continue to work toward identifying more victims internationally.

The French Embassy in Bogotá has shared the channels established to find Colombian victims:

Anyone with information or seeking to report an incident can communicate via email at sr-grenoble-leveugle@gendarmerie.interieur.gouv.fr or by calling the international hotline at +33 800 005 321.

The post Frenchman accused of abusing 89 minors may have victims in Colombia appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

Failures in Colombia’s health system were highlighted this week after a young boy died from “completely preventable” complications from blood condition after going off treatment for two months.

Seven-year-old Kevin Acosta was rushed to hospital in Pitalito, Huila, on February 8 after falling off his bike and hitting his head, a situation complicated by his hemophilia.

According to his mother Katherine Pico, the boy required regular injections of clotting factors to prevent the genetic condition that can cause fatal bleeding if untreated.

But due to failings by his health insurer, Nueva EPS, Kevin had missed his regular injections for two months, and on the day of his accident he was denied emergency doses even while bleeding from his head in the hospital in Pitalito.

When the health insurer finally agreed to evacuate Kevin by air ambulance 24 hours later to Bogotá, where clotting factors were available, the blood loss was severe. Kevin died four day later in the Intensive Care Unit of the Hospital de la Misericordia in Bogotá.

Since then, Kevin’s death has caused huge indignation in Colombia both among medical experts who claim the death was preventable and critics of the current government’s political intervention in the health system which has left many users worse off.

Get off your bike

Adding to the furor, President Gustavo Petro waded into the debate blaming the mother for allowing Kevin to ride a bicycle.

“A hemophiliac child shouldn’t ride a bike; it’s a matter of prevention. We need to know if the doctor or the health system isn’t providing education, because mothers don’t learn about it, especially given the low educational levels in Colombia,” he said.

His own health minister, Guillermo Jaramillo, added: “Children with hemophilia should be restricted from activities that can generate violent trauma,” he said.

These comments were challenged by patient’s rights groups, who pointed out that cyclists with hemophilia have competed in the Tour de France, and medical experts who emphasized that in recent decades in Colombia prevention has been based on weekly or monthly injections of “clotting factors” which allowed hemophiliacs to lead normal lives.

Many medical experts concurred that children with regular prophylaxis to prevent excess bleeding could, and should, integrate in physical activities.  

“The child died from the accident, but the reason he died was because he didn’t have the medication,” Dr Sergio Robledo, president of the Colombian League of Hemophiliacs, told Blu Radio.  “Prevention in hemophilia means having the drugs, not locking the child up at home.”

“For more than 20 years in Colombia we have not had any [hemophilia] deaths specifically due to a lack of medicine,” Robledo continued.

Chaotic plan

Kevin’s case was symptomatic of problems in Colombia’s health system which had worsened under the Petro government, Denis Silva told the Bogotá Post this week.

Silva, spokesperson for Paciente Colombia, a coalition of 202 patients’ rights groups, said Kevin’s death was “100 per cent avoidable”.

“If Kevin had been given the prophylaxis or given the treatment when he went to the clinic to coagulate his blood, the situation would have been different”.

Kevin’s mother had been asking Nueva EPS for the life-saving medicines since December, he said, but they were never delivered because the EPS had “failed to pay the clinic” that administered the drug in Pitalito.

Blame for these errors should bounce back to the Petro government, said Silva. State entities had forcibly intervened in Nueva EPS in 2024, claiming fraud in the huge health insurer, and were thereafter legally responsible for managing the entity that covered 11 million Colombians.

Interventions in EPS insurers was not unusual in Colombia, he said. Previous governments had done the same to avoid a crisis for patients.

But were timely actions to “administrate, improve and, where necessary, rescue” the health insurers, though in some cases they were shuttered and patients moved to other companies. Petro’s current takeovers were more chaotic and linked to political overhaul of the health system, he said.

Health system in crisis

This agenda was heavily criticized in an opinion article ‘How Politics Destroyed Colombia’s Model Healthcare System’, by Colombian-based journalist Luke Taylor and published in the prestigious British Medical Journal in January.

Referring to President Petro’s “bungled reforms”, the story claimed that maternity wards and neonatal units were shutting their doors, emergency departments becoming overwhelmed, and training programs for specialist doctors being shut down.

It also quoted the Colombian president as stating that health companies were being “run by crooks”, even as the his government’s interventions triggered a slew of complaints by patients suddenly finding their health care a lot worse.

For patients with chronic ailments reliant on monthly checkups and regular medical supply, the decline was becoming an existential threat, said Colombia’s ombudsman, Iris Marín, this week.

Kevin Acosta was “yet another victim of the failures in the availability and access to medicines that thousands of Colombians face today, in order to access timely treatments that are crucial for their health”.

According to documents released by Nueva EPS, Pico had tried to transfer her son’s care from Huila to Santander department, then switched back to Huila, suggesting a paperwork logjam had delayed the treatment. In another statement, it denied suspending the prophylaxis.

Need for treatment

This was “a big lie” said Pico, talking to Semana, since even before the administrative switch the local clinic treating Kevin had told her in early January that Nueva EPS had ended its contract. Without payments from the EPS, the clinic was forced to suspend treatment.

“By January we had no medication, no appointments, nothing,” said Pico.

Her position was supported by the fact that, across the country, other chronic or rare disease sufferers – including hemophiliac suffers in Pico’s same family – were reporting the same shortages, in many cases linked to contractual or payment problems with health suppliers. 

ACHOP, the Colombian Association of Pediatric Hematology and Oncology, warned in a public communication that children and adolescents “were not receiving in a timely and continuous manner the essential medicines to preserve their lives in conditions of dignity”.

These shortages fell mostly on patients with the state-intervened Nueva EPS, confirmed hemophilia specialist Dr Jorge Peña, who said he regularly treated dozens of children with the condition.

Talking to Caracol Radio, Dr Peña said that children with other insurers were receiving their prophylaxis on time and were “happy, free from bleeding, and going to school as usual”.

“In comparison Nueva EPS patients are not getting the medicines, and I see them every day with bleeding. They can’t go to school.”

Leaked records

Meanwhile attempts by the government and President Petro to push back on Pico even while grieving her son’s death caused condemnation across the political spectrum, particularly since the state had taken over Nueva EPS.

“The responsibility is clear: when the state intervenes and controls, it is held accountable,” said Senator Jorge Robledo on X.

“The healthcare system already had problems, but under this government it’s worse. And meanwhile, more and more Colombians are suffering from illnesses that medicine knows how to treat.”

More criticism piled on President Petro after he leaked details from the Kevin Acosta’s medical records during a speech in La Guajira. Patient spokesperson Denis Silva called on the government to respect patient confidentiality

“These are confidential in Colombia,” said Silva. “By law the EPS insurer should guard the medical records, and no-one should access them without permission from the family”.

The leaks came even as the state agency overseeing the system, the Superintendency of Health (also known as Supersalud), announced an investigation into the Kevin’s care, including looking at “administrative barriers and the delivery of medication by Nueva EPS and the service provider”. This audit should clarify differences in accounts from the family and Nueva EPS.

But even with results pending, President Petro again doubled down in a speech claiming the family was primarily responsible for Kevin’s health outcomes.

“It’s the family that first of all cares for its children,” he said, “Not everything is the responsibility of the state, because the state can’t respond to everything, otherwise we lose our liberty”.  

Colombians living with hemophilia might want those liberties to include the right to life-saving drugs – and to ride a bike.

The post Young hemophilia patient dies after delay in life-saving medicines appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

2026 has started off unusually wet, with downpours in Bogotá and floods elsewhere in Colombia. What’s going on and how can you help?

While this is meant to be the dry season for most of Colombia, it’s instead been raining heavily. Vast swathes of the Caribbean region have flooded, and in Bogotá, it’s led to collapses in the traffic systems. That’s led to an emergency declaration by the president and frantic relief efforts (links at article end).

Colombian president Gustavo Petro has declared a state of emergency yet again to address the situation in the northern department of Córdoba and elsewhere. While the emergency measures were declared for Córdoba, this was later extended to 22 departments, underlining the severity of the situation.

Within the capital, flash floods have swamped roads and forced traffic to grind to a halt as well as collapsing roofs and flooding buildings. Luckily, Bogotá has so far escaped the levels of damage seen elsewhere in the nation.

Barrios such as Nicolás de Federman have been hit by hailstorms heavy enough to resemble a blizzard, leaving them carpeted in white as though snowed in while the autopista norte has been forced to close as it resembles a swamp.

One silver lining to the rainclouds is that the reservoirs will be nice and full, alleviating fears that Bogotá will be forced to return to water rationing, as happened in 2024. That will be little comfort to many who have lost everything in the floods.

Why is it raining so much?

Colombia’s weather monitors, IDEAM, have explained that there are four main factors: the Madden and Julian wave; high Amazonian humidity; a lack of winds to move that humidity and la Niña-esque conditions.

All put together, these four factors combine to make a perfect storm and unseasonably high January rainfall levels. That’s continued into February and with March and April around the corner there is little relief in sight.

That’s led to half the country being put on alert for potential floods and high precipitation, which leads to all sorts of other trouble such as landslides. Colombia’s disaster relief agency UNGRD is underprepared currently, having endured corruption scandals recently.  

This is meant to be the dry season, too. Bogotá in particular is meant to receive heavy rain October-December and April, not January and February. In fact, these months are normally characterised by blazing sunshine, clear skies and hot temperatures.

Adding to the confusion is the fact that we’re supposed to be heading into an El Niño cycle, meaning dry weather and lower rainfall than expected. Instead, we’ve had the precise opposite so far. While Colombia is the world’s rainiest country, it’s not meant to fall in January and February, at least not in the north.

Floods in the Caribbean

The rains have been annoying and disruptive in Bogotá, but other parts of the country have faced genuine devastation. First among those is the department of Córdoba, which has suffered widespread floods. However, over half the country has been affected.

The capital of Córdoba, Montería, is the worst hit major city in the country, with thousands of people evacuated in the city and surrounds. Over a quarter of a million people have been directly affected by the rains nationally.

Sadly, politics have come into play here too, with Petro clashing with regional governor Erasmo Zuleta over the management of the department. The pair have had a lot of differences over the years. He also said he was initially unable to land in Córdoba due to the risk of an attack.

More reasonable are Petro’s claims that the situation has been exacerbated by water management systems such as reservoirs. These have diverted normal water flows and critically diminished the region’s ability to handle pressure from unusual weather patterns. Zuleta’s response is that the national government oversees the Urrá hydro plant.

The worst affected regions are on the Caribbean coast, with Uraba Antioqueño, La Guajira and Sucre joining Córdoba, but the Amazon and Pacific regions have also seen unusually high rainfall for the start of the year.

There has been flooding in Medellín, as well as the risk of landslides in hillside comunas, while coastal cities such as Cartagena have had heavy downpours and storms, affecting much-needed tourism income in high season as beaches close.

Even when the rains stop, the long term effects will take years to overcome. Already, bad actors are starting to take advantage of the situation, with desperate houseowners paying through the nose for boaters to rescue their belongings before thieves arrive.

Fields that are now underwater will take an age to fully drain and even longer to recover from the damage currently being wrought upon them. Thousands upon thousands of hectares of farmland will be unusable for the near future.

With what looks like a fraught year ahead for Colombia, this is an unwanted extra pressure to deal with and exposes the fragility of infrastructure in the face of increased climate change pressure. Whoever wins the next election, investment will be needed to avoid similar problems going forward. 

The Cruz Roja Colombiana are taking donations of clothes and building materials at their Salitre centre (Av.68 #68b-31), and you can donate money directly on this link. The local government in Bogotá is also organising donation drives on this link.

The post Rain, rain, go away appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

Judges ordered the recapture this week of a Violeta Arango Ramírez, a prime suspect in the 2017 bombing of Bogotá’s Andino shopping mall, after she lost her legal protections as an ELN peace manager.

The Colombian attorney general’s office requested that Arango, thought to be active in the ranks of the ELN guerrillas, “be found immediately to comply with an order for prison detention” based on accusations she was a key participant in the attack that left three dead and 10 more injured.

Arango, a sociologist, was previously arrested in 2022, but then released from prison to assume the role of a gestora de paz (‘peace manager’) during peace talks between the ELN and the the Petro government.

The controversial release was criticised at the time by survivors and families of victims of the Andino attack as Arango remained a key suspect. By being nominated as a gestora de paz, Arango was allowed both her freedom and temporary avoidance of homicide and terrorism charges while whe was “collaborating with the peace process”.  

This week’s recapture order followed breakdowns in government talks with the ELN with the Justice Department officially removing many combatants’ designations as peace managers. The news gave a glimmer of hope for justice after nine years of uncertainty as to who was behind the attack.

Arango herself has always denied any involvement in the attack, pointing to a plot from within the state prosecutors’ office to frame left-wing activists during the political fallout from the 2016 FARC peace deal.

Pamphlet bombs

The Andino attack unfolded during the evening of Saturday, June 17, 2017, inside the crowded women’s restroom of the busy shopping mall at a peak hour. It was the eve of Father’s Day.

A bomb placed in a toilet cubicle exploded killing one French and two Colombian citizens and maimed at least eight more women in or around the restroom.

Police investigators quickly blamed the Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo or MRP, a left-wing group that had evolved in Bogotá’s public universities and was dedicated to mediatic events such as dangling flags from buildings and letting off weak explosives that launched political leaflets into the air.

Over the space of two years the MRP had targeted public spaces outside tax offices, health insurers and banks with messages such as: “Today in Colombia the peace process is a business plan”, and “Health in Colombia is a problem of democracy”.

In the months following the attack, a dozen suspects accused of being linked to the MRP were rounded up, detained over many months, then tried and released after none of the evidence against them could be proven in court.

Meanwhile an alternative theory emerged: that the Andino bombing was part of a right-wing plot carried out to destabilise the then-Santos government’s closeness to left-wing guerrilla groups in the wake of the historic 2016 peace process with the FARC, previously Colombia’s most powerful armed group.

False positives

In this narrative, the MRP, with its history of small-scale attacks and rumoured links to the larger ELN guerrilla group, made a convenient scape-goat.

Investigators claimed to have found similarities between the Andino bomb and the pamphlet explosives, but an analysis by news website Las2Orillas at the time pointed out that the attorney general’s office at the time “had a long history of fabricating evidence” to bring down left-wing political targets, partly as a distraction from their own implications in high profile corruption cases.

Violeta Arango, an activist with links to left-wing causes, found herself officially accused of being an MRP leader and coordinator with the much larger ELN guerrilla group.

She avoided capture and publicy declared herself the victim of a “falso positivo”, or false positive, referring to the practice by the Colombian military of murdering civilians and disguising their bodies as guerrilla combatants.

“This legal persecution I am suffering, along with my family who are being harassed and abused, is nothing more than a setup by the police and the attorney general’s office,” she wrote in an open letter, before fleeing Bogotá.

What happened next is subject to speculation. According to Arango herself, she escaped into the arms of the ELN (literally, as she became the romantic partner of a senior commander) fearing for her life in the face of “political persecution”.  

But her smooth transition into the ELN guerrilla’s Darío Ramírez Castro Front – active in the conflict zone of Sur de Bolívar – also seemed to vindicate the prosecution’s narrative of her links to urban terrorism.

Alias ‘Talibán’

Meanwhile in Bogotá, 10 other people were detained as suspected MRP members linked to the attack.

After searches of their homes, some were accused of carrying false IDs, carrying weapons, and, in some cases, having printed plans of the Andino shopping centre showing entrances and exits, and notes which appeared to show preparations for the bombing, and USB sticks with messages from the MRP.

But in many cases the police arrests and searches were themselves found to be illegal and without due process which, added to the flimsy evidence presented in court, lead to the the cases falling apart under legal scrutiny.

Some of these investigations were later examined in a documentary called Andino File: A Judicial Set-up? produced by journalism collective La Liga Contra el Silencio. One of the main accused, Iván Ramírez, described how the police produced CCTV used to identify him “scoping out the Andino”. This “evidence” later turned out to be video of a regular mall worker with a similar look.

In another twist, Ramírez described how the police themselves invented the aliases to which the suspects were presented as a “terrorist cell” to the media; for example, ‘El Calvo’, ‘Japo’, ‘Aleja’ and, in the case of the bearded sociologist, ‘Talibán’. The scary name stuck and Ramírez was thereafter referred to by Colombia media as ‘alias Talíban’.

He was also constantly described by prosecutors as the “explosives expert” of the MRP cell, a charge he consistently denied.

Ramírez was released from custody in 2021 after spending four years in pre-trial detention, during which time every case against him collapsed. But even after his release he continued to be “linked to the investigation”.

Peace managing

Then in June 2022, Violeta Arango, now in the ELN, was captured in the Sur de Bolívar in the same military operation that killed her partner, known as Pirry.

According to a post on X by the then minister of defence, Diego Molano, alias Pirry was “one of the top ELN commanders responsible for attacks on the civilian population, forced recruitment, and terrorism”.  

Arango was jailed for her guerrilla links even while the process continued against her for the Andino bombing.

That panorama changed when Petro Gustavo took the presidency in August 2022; with peace talks in the air, and after a visit from a Cuban and Norwegian delegation to her jail, Arango was released to her gestora de paz role in November that year. She resurfaced a month later in Caracas, Venezuela, as part of the ELN talks with the Petro government.

This appearance caused anger among the Andino victims. Pilar Molano, who lost a leg in the explosion, told Vorágine magazine that “it’s insane that they let her out and put her in the peace negotiations with the ELN”.

Six years after the Andino attack, in April 2023, the prosecutor’s office again filed charges against Arango based on evidence that prior to the bombing she had downloaded plans of the shopping mall from the Internet.

Cell structures

The indictment formally accused Arango of the “detailed planning” of the bomb attack. It further alleged that Arango was a senior member of the MRP “responible for attracting new members to the criminal organization in Bogotá and apparently participated in at least 21 terrorist attacks against EPS headquarters, public transport and infrastructure”.

With this week’s recapture order the case can move ahead – assuming she can be found.

Any trial could shed light on the who and why of the Andino bombing, and also the complex backstory of ‘Violeta’. But, given the shambolic history of the judicial process, it could also put the investigation back to square one.

In interviews in the intervening years leaders of MRP have repeatedly denied their groups involvement, as well as denying any links to the ELN, or any connections to the original suspects.

But the truth might be hard to find even within the two armed groups; both the ELN and the MRP are known to work in cell structures which plan autonomous actions often without the co-members or leaders aware.

Such was the case with the devastating car bomb that killed 20 young police recruits in Bogotá in 2019, initially denied by the ELN – their leadership claimed not to know of the plot – but eventually taking responsibility.

An unusual element of the Andino bombing is that no armed group or political movement has ever taken responsibility. And so far the prosecutors have not only failed to pin the attack on the MRP, but also ignored alternative lines of investigations such as a false flag operation by paramilitary or right-wing groups.

Lawyer for the Andino victims and survivors Franciso Bernate, said this week that “on behalf of the 11 female victims we hope Violeta is found so she can respond to these grave accusations”.

The post Is justice in sight for the Andino mall bombing victims? appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

Protest and military action raised the prospect of regime change in Iran and Venezuela, and the voices of both countries’ diasporas were heard loud and clear through the media of their host nations.

Venezuelan exiles in the U.S. were, according to the popular narrative, broadly behind President Donald Trump and his plan to “run Venezuela,” as the nickname “MAGAzuelans” suggests. Meanwhile, the Iranian diaspora rallied behind Prince Reza Pahlavi as he positioned himself as a leader-in-waiting, projecting an image of unified exile support.

Diasporas are often treated by media and policymakers as monolithic blocs — politically unified, ideologically coherent and ready to be mobilized for regime change. But as a scholar of migration and security in Latin America, I know this assumption misunderstands how diaspora communities form, evolve and engage politically.

Iranian and Venezuelan émigrés might broadly oppose their current governments — having left them, this is unsurprising. But they are far from unified on what should replace those governments, who should lead or how change should come about.

Migration waves shape politics

Diasporas are not uniform because their constituent populations did not arrive all at once, from the same places or for the same reasons. Each migration wave carries distinct political orientations shaped by the circumstances of departure.

The tendency of diasporas to become politically frozen at the moment of departure appears across contexts. El Salvador’s diaspora in the United States, which first left during the 1980s civil war, developed a reputation for being “stuck in the ’80s” — mentally still fighting battles that had long since ended at home.

This temporal displacement has consequences. Iranian-American sociologist Asef Bayat, writing about the Iranian diaspora, argues that exile opposition to the ruling government back home “suffers from a political disease, positioning itself against the movement it claims to support.”

In other words, diaspora activists may advocate positions that resonate with Western audiences but find little support among those actually living under authoritarian rule. This lack of accountability to political consequences back home can rankle the constituencies on whose behalf they seek to advocate.

Research on the Venezuelan diaspora reflects similar dynamics. A 2022 study found that Venezuelan exiles hold more extreme anti-government views than those who remained.

Despite this presumed disconnection, homeland politicians often devote disproportionate attention to those who have left. The logic is simple: emigrants send money home — accounting for as much as 25% of gross domestic product in some Central American and Caribbean countries. Politicians assume that this financial power translates into political influence over remittance-receiving relatives.

One party official in El Salvador told me: “If we get one Salvadoran in Washington to support us, that gives us five votes in El Salvador — and it doesn’t even matter if the one in Washington votes.”

My own research tested this assumption using polling and voting data across Latin America and found it to be exaggerated. Remittances and family communication mostly reinforce existing partisan sympathies rather than swing votes.

But the belief in diaspora influence matters politically — and diaspora voters can be weaponized by authoritarian leaders. El Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele, in his successful and plainly unconstitutional 2024 reelection bid, expanded external voting through online balloting, increasing diaspora votes by 87-fold over the previous election.

Diasporas can influence home-country politics through several channels: direct voting, financial support for opposition movements, lobbying host governments and transmitting democratic values through what sociologist Peggy Levitt calls “social remittances.” Other research has found that remittances can undermine dictatorships by helping fund opposition activities.

Yet authoritarian governments have developed sophisticated countermeasures. Freedom House recorded more than 1,200 incidents of physical transnational repression against dissidents — including assassinations, abductions and unlawful deportation — between 2014 and 2024 involving 48 governments.

The limits of exile politics

For Venezuela and Iran, these lessons counsel caution. Nearly 8 million Venezuelans have fled their homeland — the largest displacement crisis in the Western Hemisphere. Iranian emigration accelerated after the 2022 protests.

Both diasporas contain passionate activists, wealthy donors and would-be leaders positioning themselves for future rule. But passion does not equal unity, and visibility does not equal representation.

The loudest voices on social media — or those amplified by U.S. officials and media — may represent narrow slices of diverse communities. There may be consensus on opposing the government back home, but far less agreement on what should be done or how change should occur.

Nor does diaspora opposition necessarily translate into regime vulnerability. Authoritarian states have learned to insulate themselves from diaspora pressure while simultaneously using emigration as a safety valve, turning potential dissidents into remittance-senders.

Diasporas can contribute to democratic change through funding, advocacy and the transmission of democratic values. But ultimately, the path to democratic change in Venezuela, Iran and elsewhere will be determined by those who remain, not those who left. Diasporas can support that struggle; they cannot substitute for it.

About the author: Michael Paarlberg is Associate Professor of Political Science at Virginia Commonwealth University.

This article is reproduced from The Conversation under a Creative Commons licence.

Singapore has never been shy about scale. But this season, the city’s appetite for monumentality takes on a distinctly Latin American accent. For the first time, the work of Colombian master Fernando Botero makes his Singapore debut with the largest exhibition of his work ever showcased in Asia.

Spanning galleries, inter-active theatres and extensive public gardens, the landmark show presents more than 130 works, positioning the city-state as a hub for global Botero immersion. As the largest presentation of the Medellín-born artist (1932-2023), and timed to coincide with Singapore Art Week, Botero in Singapore unfolds across gallery walls, immersive media spaces and public gardens.

“My father loved Singapore,” remarked the artist’s son Fernando Botero Zea to The Strait Times, highligting that with this retrospective, the country now “has the highest concentration of Botero per capita”.

At the heart of the programme is Heart of Volume, a major gallery exhibition at IMBA Theatre, presenting more than 100 works drawn directly from the Botero family collection. Spanning seven decades, the exhibition traces the evolution of what the artist famously described not as exaggeration, but as “volume”: a formal strategy that lends weight, humour and authority to everyday scenes, portraits, still lifes and reimagined art-historical references.

Seen up close, the discipline behind Botero’s apparent abundance becomes clear. Small watercolours and intimate studies reveal a careful calibration of colour and balance, while larger canvases demonstrate his lifelong dialogue with European painting traditions—from Renaissance composition to modernist distortion—filtered through a distinctly Colombian sensibility. The effect is quietly didactic without ever feeling academic, a curatorial tone well suited to Singapore’s measured cultural landscape.

If Heart of Volume offers intimacy, Garden Grandeur delivers spectacle. Extending across the Silver Garden at Gardens by the Bay, ten monumental bronze sculptures bring Botero’s work into the rhythm of daily life. A towering Horse—more than three meters tall and weighing three tonnes – anchors the display, joined by familiar figures such as Adam and Eve, The Dancers and Woman on Horse. Installed against a backdrop of tropical greenery and glass conservatories, the sculptures feel less like foreign imports and more like temporary citizens of the city.

This democratic impulse was central to Botero’s thinking. As his son, Fernando Botero Zea, noted at the opening, the artist believed that public art should be touched, photographed and shared—an ethos that fits neatly with Singapore’s highly social public spaces. Here, Botero’s bronzes become meeting points and landmarks, their generous forms softening the city’s precision with a dose of playfulness.

The exhibition also introduces Life in Fullness, the world’s first immersive Botero experience: a 45-minute audiovisual journey narrated by his son, combining archival footage, animation and storytelling. It is a humanizing counterpoint to the grand scale elsewhere, framing Botero as father, provocateur and craftsman—an artist whose work often invites smiles, but is underpinned by a serious engagement with power, politics and art history.

Beyond the artworks themselves, Botero in Singapore signals a broader shift. Latin American artists have long been underrepresented in Southeast Asia’s major exhibition circuits, despite Singapore’s ambition to position itself as a global cultural hub. This collaboration—between IMBA, the Fernando Botero Foundation, and Colombia’s diplomatic mission—suggests a growing appetite for narratives that extend beyond the usual Euro-American axis.

There is also a certain symmetry at play. Botero’s art, with its emphasis on presence rather than speed, arrives in a city known for efficiency and control. His figures occupy space unapologetically; they slow the viewer down. In Singapore’s gardens and galleries, that insistence on taking up room feels less like excess and more like quiet persuasion.

As Singapore Art Week draws international collectors, curators and critics to one of the most affluent cities in Asia, Botero’s debut is both timely and long-overdue. It is not a retrospective weighed down by reverence, but a confident, outward-looking presentation that invites the public in – free of charge in the Gardens, and without intimidation indoors.

Botero’s Singapore moment is less about spectacle than about accessibility. His volumes, for all their heft, carry a lightness of spirit, and a persuasive contribution that art should always coexist alongside everyday life.

Apple has scheduled an event for Wednesday, March 4, and it’s a good bet that updated hardware will be unveiled. Somewhat unusually, Apple has scheduled the event for three different locations around the world; New York, London, and Shanghai. Usually Apple just hosts events at their Cupertino Apple Park location, so making this a global ... Read More

Apple has released the first beta versions of macOS Tahoe 26.4, ipadOS 26.4, iOS 26.4, along with the rest of the OS 26.4 beta suite. The new betas are available now to registered developers and soon after for public beta testers. In the first beta builds, macOS Tahoe 26.4, ipadOS 26.4, iOS 26.4 all introduce ... Read More

Colombian President Gustavo Petro on Sunday mounted a forceful defence of his government’s 23.7% minimum wage increase for 2026, pledging to issue a temporary decree to keep the so-called “vital wage” in place after the Council of State provisionally suspended the original measure.

Speaking in a televised address on Feb. 15, Petro said that while he disagreed with the high court’s decision, he would respect the judicial process and comply by issuing a transitory administrative decree, pending a final ruling.

“The vital wage will remain in place until the new decree is issued,” Petro said, rejecting claims that the increase had triggered inflation or job losses and insisting that workers’ purchasing power must not be subordinated to shifting economic variables.

The Council of State questioned the technical justification and procedural basis of the December decree that lifted the monthly minimum wage to 1.75 million pesos ($470) – close to 2 million pesos including transport subsidies – forcing the government to revisit the measure barely six weeks after it took effect on Jan. 1.

Rather than retreating, Petro escalated the confrontation, calling for nationwide demonstrations on Feb. 19 to defend what he described as a historic social gain for Colombian workers.

“We’ll see each other in all public squares across Colombia,” the president wrote on social media, framing the dispute as a struggle over dignity and constitutional labour rights rather than a technical wage-setting debate.

Petro anchored his argument in Constitutional Court ruling C-815 of 1999, which he said obliges governments to consider not only inflation and productivity but — “with prevailing character” – the constitutional mandate to guarantee a minimum, vital and mobile wage.

Even higher wage not ruled out

In a move that further unsettled markets and business groups, the government signalled that the revised decree could maintain – or even exceed – the original 23.7% increase.

Labour Minister Antonio Sanguino said on Monday that “nothing is ruled out” as the government reconvenes the Permanent Commission on Wage and Labour Policy, bringing unions and employers back to the negotiating table.

The president himself suggested that a true “vital wage” should be closer to 2.15 million pesos, well above the current level.

Sanguino said the commission would review updated economic indicators from the national statistics agency DANE and the finance ministry, including inflation data for early 2026 and labour market trends from 2025.

Inflation and employment debate intensifies

Petro dismissed warnings that the wage hike could fuel inflation or unemployment, arguing that recent data contradict those claims. In a post on “X”, he said that even with Central Bank’s inflation forecasts near 6.4%, wage growth would remain strong and support domestic production and productivity. “It would be a national stupidity to lower the vital wage,”added  Petro, affirming also that the country’s first leftist administration would still listen to business leaders.

Economists and employers, however, remain sceptical. Financial analysts claim the suspension highlights institutional concerns over policy predictability, and fear the standoff could undermine investor confidence at a time when Colombia is grappling with deep fiscal debt and high labour informality.

The wage dispute has sharpened tensions between Colombia’s Executive, judiciary and private sector, just three months before first-round presidential elections in May 31.

The outcome of the Council of State’s final ruling – and whether the Executive succeeds in forging a late compromise with employers — will shape not only labour costs in 2026 but also a broader debate over economic governance and the autonomy of the Banco de la República.

For now, the minimum wage remains in legal limbo — enforced by decree, contested in court, and to be defended by his political base this week on the street.

The freshly released macOS Tahoe 26.3 update has resolved an accessibility issue where the “Reduce Transparency” feature was not working properly on the Mac. Before macOS Tahoe 26.3, toggling the switch on would leave considerable transparent effects, including in sidebars, headers, titlebars, search boxes, and more, leading to situations where text would overlap and interface ... Read More

Stark figures show expansion of fighting groups under ‘Paz Total’.

Colombia’s illegal armed groups have grown by 84 per cent during the three years of the Petro government’s Paz Total plan, thinktank Fundacion Ideas para la Paz (FIP) announced last week.

The alarming data showed the country’s main guerrilla factions and organised crime gangs totalled 27,000 active members at the end of 2025, adding 5,000 new recruits in just 12 months.

And humanitarian crises associated with the expansion of illicit economies, such as combats, displacements or confinement of communities, attacks on social leaders and extortion were also on the rise.

According to Gerson Arias, co-author of FIP’s El Deterioro de la Seguridad Marca el Inicio de 2026 (Deteriorating Security Marks the Start of 2026), the endless peace talks played out under President Petro’s expansive Paz Total policy had only incentivised armed groups to grow in terms of fighters, weapons and territory.

“Paz Total was based on a state ceasefire – but without any conditions put on the groups, such as ceasing recruitment, including child recruitment, or ending expansion,” he told The Bogotá Post.

“As such, the policy gave a gigantic strategic advantage to the armed groups to strengthen their fighting forces.”

Big surge

The biggest surge was in the organised crime group Clan de Golfo, up by 30 per cent to 9,840 active agents, reported FIP (see chart below).

Next in terms of size was the ELN, the guerrilla group dominating the eastern borderlands of Colombia, with 6,810 members, an increase of 9 per cent.

Dissident FARC groups also grew, some by almost a quarter, such as CNEB (Coordinadora Nacional Ejercito Bolivariano) which despite drawn-out peace talks with the Petro government – and numerous plans for a disarmament – ended the year 25 per cent bigger than started, now numbering 2,089.

And these were probably underestimates, said Arias. The FIP figures were based on military and intelligence data collected annually since 2002,and generally considered to be lower than the actual numbers.

“We tend to undermeasure illegal activity. It’s impossible to say with precision, but we would say the real data could be 20% or 30% higher,” he concluded.

Unlucky 13

These numbers included both armed fighters – often uniformed and carrying heavy weaponry – and support members tasked with infiltrating civilian communities to “ensure compliance”, often carrying pistols. Armed groups were increasingly deploying explosives by drones.

According to the FIP report, none of the negotiation processes had managed to curb their recruitment capacity.

Territorial expansion had also triggered disputes over illegal gold mining, coca, and trafficking routes. The FIP report identified 13 zones where two or more groups were facing off, more than twice the number of disputed territories that Petro inherited from the Duque government in 2022.

Top in terms of combat last year were Catatumbo in Norte de Santander, and areas of Guaviare, Cauca, Nariño, Valle and Arauca (see map).

But even departments considered peaceful in recent years, such as Tolima and Huila, were being drawn back into the fray, said Arias.

This rise in conflict brought a host of humanitarian impacts. Armed groups strictly controlled their zones, at times displacing or confining populations, but also imposing daily controls such as travel permissions and ID cards.

Last year, according to UN figures quoted by FIP, one million mostly rural Colombians were affected by armed group controls, tripling the number recorded in 2024.

Civilians in the crosshairs

And according to Arias, the government had itself increased the risks to civilians by involving them as third parties in the peace talks while failing in any robust plan to pacify the zone.

“Petro reached partial agreements with the groups – even while they were still armed, still controlling, extorting, confining and pressuring civilian communities. There was no cost to the armed groups,” said the researcher.

Part of the problem was that Paz Total had initially failed to link to any coherent military strategy that could had protected civilian communities. This had put civic leaders “in the crosshairs of armed groups” as one side accused them of siding with the other.  

The statement is backed by a graph showing a year-on increase since 2022 in attacks both between armed groups, and against civilians and state forces. Last year there were 150 attacks on civilian targets.

In fact, by Arias’s estimate Colombia had gone back to 2011 in terms of the numbers of non-state armed actors – 27,000 – potentially in conflict.

That compared to a recent low of 12,800 combatants in 2018, two years after former president Santos signed the 2016 peace deal with the FARC guerrillas.

From bad to worse

In fact, to explain the current situation, Arias pointed to failures in the both the current administration and the previous right-wing government under Ivan Duque.

Taking over in 2018, Duque rolled back many of the agreements made with the FARC sending many ex-combatants back to the bush along with a wave of new combatants.

But then left-leaning Gustavo Petro, taking over in 2022, surprised even his own military advisers by declaring a unilateral ceasefire. This was the opening salvo of the Paz Total policy which announced negotiations with armed groups and criminal gangs on multiple fronts – in some cases even without informing them.

Petro’s plan was conceived “with good intentions”, said Arias, but had put misplaced trust in armed groups busy enriching themselves by illegal activities and with little incentive to demobilize.

By comparison, during the 2013-16 process with the FARC, the military forces under Santos had continued operations against the guerrilla up until the final signing: “This pressure incentivised the FARC to take serious decisions in terms of the peace process,” he said.

Too little, too late

The failings of Paz Total were apparent on the ground in the first few months of inception in 2022, with community organisations raising the alarm over the increased fighting between groups.

It took until late 2024 for the state military to step up offensive actions in areas such as Cauca, with battles against the dissident FARC factions of Ivan Mordisco. Then, in early 2025, the Catatumbo region of Norte de Santander caught fire with fierce combat between the ELN and FARC 33, leading to the largest humanitarian crisis in Colombia’s recent history.

But it took until August last year for President Petro himself to acknowledge that the policy had “not achieved peace”.

During 2025 military actions increased by 30 per cent, but with reduced state forces – many experienced soldiers and commanders had left – facing stronger armed groups, said Arias.

“The offensive came slowly and without an analysis of what was required to combat the strengthened armed groups.”

“Years of intelligence capacity was lost, along with military presence and air deployment. This explains why – despite the offensives – there are few concrete improvements for many communities.”

For soldiers on the ground, the job got harder under Paz Total with a strengthened enemy and less military intelligence to rely on. According to President Petro’s own presentation to the Trump Whitehouse early this month, 360 state forces have been killed “in the fight against drug trafficking” in the last three years, with 1,680 wounded.

But even away from the front line, Paz Total was not up to the monumental task of negotiating peace with multiple armed groups given that most governments had failed to pacify even one.

At whatever cost

“Paz Total never evaluated the institutional capacity required. It’s good to say: ‘we have to negotiate with everyone’. But that requires a method,” said Arias.

The government often pushed talks ahead even without any legal framework that would allow, constitutionally, the state to make peace with certain criminal gangs, or groups of recycled combatants that had previously demobilised. This created a credibility gap which continued to undermine the peace initiative.

“Even today, no group has taken a serious position on disarming or demobilisation or reducing violence,” said Arias.

FIP also questioned the government’s own seriousness in finalizing any negotiations, terming Paz Total an “electoral peace”; endless rounds of talks through the upcoming election period.  

It’s a strategy Arias condemned: “This government seems intent on continuing the process at whatever costs and put the burden of resolution on the next government. This is politically irresponsible.”

Lack of concrete results could also taint future processes, he said.

“The poor results have thrown doubt on the idea that political solutions to conflict is the best route, which is very worrying, and eventually exposes communities to more risk.”

His main message – and the key finding of the FIP report – was that ending conflict in Colombia required more than goodwill, he told The Bogotá Post.

“It’s incoherent to talk of ‘peace or security’. We need to talk of ‘peace and security’. Without that, we’ve gone backwards.”

The post Peace plan has caused more conflict, says thinktank. appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

Apple has released MacOS Sequoia 15.7.4 and MacOS Sonoma 14.8.4 as system software updates for the Sonoma and Sequoia operating systems, focusing on security patches for Mac users who are not running macOS Tahoe. Separately, macOS Tahoe 26.3, iOS 26.4, ipadOS 26.3, watchOS 26.3, tvOS 26.3, along with iOS 18 updates, are also available for ... Read More

International airlines are rapidly re-establishing services to Venezuela, signalling a cautious but commercially significant reopening of the country’s aviation market. On Thursday, February 12, Colombia’s Avianca resumed a daily direct flights between Bogotá and Caracas.

The move restores one of the most important air corridors in northern South America and comes amid a flurry of announcements from carriers across Europe, the Americas and the Middle East seeking to regain access to a market that has been largely closed since 2019.

The flagship carrier claims that this key route was restored after a “comprehensive evaluation of operational conditions and aviation safety,” carried out in coordination with Colombian and Venezuelan authorities.

Avianca’s daily round trip flight will operate with an A320 aircraft, departing Bogotá (AV142) at 07:40 a.m. and returning from Caracas (AV143) at 12:10 p.m.

The resumption reflects the strong commercial ties between Colombia and Venezuela, as well as growing confidence among airlines that operational, regulatory and security conditions now allow for a gradual return.

For Avianca, which has operated in Venezuela for more than 60 years, the route carries both symbolic and strategic weight. The carrier said the service would strengthen regional connectivity and support trade, tourism and business travel between the two countries, which share deep economic and social ties disrupted during years of political confrontation and border closures.

Avianca’s return is part of a broader recalibration by the global aviation industry following Venezuela’s political transition and the end of Nicolás Maduro’s rule. Airlines had largely withdrawn from the country after the suspension of international flights, currency controls, safety concerns and U.S. sanctions made operations increasingly unviable.

Now, with demand for travel surging among Venezuela’s large diaspora and regional business community, carriers are moving quickly to reclaim market share — albeit cautiously, with a close eye on regulatory approvals and security assessments.

In January, American Airlines said it was ready to resume daily service to Venezuela, positioning itself as the first U.S. carrier to formally announce plans to return after nearly seven years. The airline said flights would remain subject to U.S. government approval and security evaluations, and has not yet announced a launch date.

“We have a more than 30-year history connecting Venezuelans to the U.S., and we are ready to renew that relationship,” said Nat Pieper, American’s chief commercial officer, underscoring the airline’s focus on family reunification, business travel and trade.

Before suspending operations in 2019, American was the largest U.S. airline serving Venezuela, having entered the market in 1987. The carrier said it remains in close contact with federal authorities and is working with regulators, unions and internal teams to ensure a compliant return.

While direct U.S.–Venezuela flights remain pending, regional alternatives are already expanding. Panama-based Copa Airlines has enabled ticket sales since late January allowing passengers to travel between Caracas and Miami via Panama under a single reservation, restoring a key transit option for Venezuelan travellers.

European and Latin American airlines have moved faster, with firm restart dates announced over the next six weeks. Spain’s Air Europa will resume Madrid–Caracas flights on February 17, followed by Laser Airlines the next day. LATAM Airlines plans to restart flights from Bogotá on February 23, while Colombian low-cost carrier Wingo will relaunch Medellín–Caracas services on March 1.

Further afield, Turkish Airlines will begin flights between Istanbul and Caracas on March 3, marking the return of a long-haul intercontinental connection. Spain’s low-cost Plus Ultra will also start services that same day, while Brazil’s GOL plans to resume flights from São Paulo on March 8.

TAP Portugal is scheduled to restore Lisbon–Caracas flights by the end of March.

The pace of announcements reflects both pent-up demand and a race among carriers to secure early-mover advantage in a market that, while still fragile, offers long-term potential. Venezuela’s population of more than 28 million, combined with millions of citizens living abroad, represents a sizeable base for leisure, family and humanitarian travel.

Yet challenges remain. Airlines face currency risks, infrastructure constraints and the possibility of renewed political or regulatory instability. Industry executives say most carriers are returning with limited capacity and flexible schedules, allowing them to scale operations up or down as conditions evolve.

For now, the reopening of Venezuela’s airspace is being driven less by optimism than by calculated risk-taking. Airlines are betting that gradual political normalization and the easing of restrictions will allow them to rebuild routes profitably — without repeating the costly exits of the past decade.

Avianca’s daily Bogotá–Caracas service may therefore serve as an early test case. If demand proves resilient and operations remain stable, more capacity is likely to follow. If not, airlines may once again find themselves navigating turbulence in one of Latin America’s most complex markets.

Still, after years of near-total isolation, Venezuela’s reappearance on international departure boards marks a turning point — one that global airlines are keen not to miss

Colombia’s goldenberry symbolized the country’s push into high-value fruit exports. Now, it faces a turf war at home from a fruit with far greater global recognition: the blueberry. While blueberry cultivation has expanded rapidly across Colombia over the past decade, producers say the industry remains far from becoming a fully fledged export powerhouse.

Colombia currently has close to 1,000 hectares planted with blueberries, concentrated mainly in the Andean departments of Boyacá and Cundinamarca, which together account for almost the entire cultivated area. Smaller projects are emerging in Antioquia and other regions, bringing national production to an estimated 20,000 tonnes a year.

That marks a dramatic rise from just 40 hectares planted a decade ago. In the past two years alone, between 150 and 200 additional hectares have been planted, reflecting growing interest from investors and farmers seeking alternatives to traditional crops.

Yet despite this momentum, industry leaders warn that Colombia’s blueberry sector still lacks the scale, investment and coordination needed to compete seriously in international markets.

“Blueberries are one of the fastest-growing fruit crops in Colombia, but we are still very far from consolidating a true export agroindustry,” said Camilo Lozano, vice-president of Asocolblue, the national blueberry growers’ association, in an interview with La República.

Lozano argues that Colombia’s potential far exceeds its current footprint. “The country could easily reach 5,000, 6,000 or even 10,000 hectares,” he said. “But that won’t happen overnight. We need more investment, greater scale and the entry of larger producers.”

Peru offers a stark comparison. In 2012, Peruvian blueberry exports were worth just US$400,000. Today, they exceed US$3 billion, supported by more than 22,000 hectares of plantations. Colombia, Lozano notes, shares many of the same advantages that fuelled Peru’s rise: favourable soils, competitive labour costs, efficient logistics and the ability to produce year-round.

“These are the same conditions that made Colombia the world’s leading exporter of cut flowers,” he said.

Blueberries are particularly attractive because they are already deeply embedded in global consumer markets. In North America and Europe, they are a staple product, unlike many tropical fruits that require costly marketing campaigns to build demand.

“In the United States and Canada, consumers already know blueberries,” Lozano said. “You don’t have to explain what they are or how to eat them.”

At present, around 90 per cent of Colombia’s Arandano exports are destined for the United States, with Europe a distant second. Asia remains largely out of reach due to phytosanitary barriers and long shipping times, which can exceed 30 days by sea.

Even in established markets, Colombia struggles to meet minimum volume requirements. International buyers often request several containers per week, but domestic supply remains too fragmented to deliver consistently.

“Today, we get clients asking for five containers a week, and we can’t even fill one,” Lozano admitted. “Only two companies export blueberries by sea on a regular basis.”

The domestic market, however, tells a different story. According to industry estimates, formal blueberry sales in Colombia exceed 200 billion pesos (about US$50 million) annually. Imports — mainly from Peru and Chile — add another 50 billion pesos, highlighting the gap between local demand and national production.

That imbalance underscores both the opportunity and the challenge facing Colombian growers. While consumption is rising, domestic supply remains insufficient, and many producers lack the technical expertise and capital required to expand efficiently.

Asocolblue, which brings together 28 producers, has repeatedly warned that blueberries are not a crop for improvisation. Establishing a commercial plantation requires high upfront investment, technical knowledge, strict quality standards and long-term planning.

“This is not traditional agriculture,” Lozano said. “It’s an agro-industrial business.”

The association operates technical, export and marketing committees aimed at professionalising the sector and ensuring that growth does not come at the expense of productivity or sustainability.

For farmers who succeed, the rewards can be significant. Blueberries offer relatively stable international prices and allow producers to integrate into global supply chains, generating employment, foreign exchange and long-term income. “It allows the producer to make a qualitative leap — from farmer to agro-industrialist,” Lozano said. “It’s essentially an agricultural factory.”

For now, Colombia’s farmers across the Altiplanto Boyacense are enjoying their blueberry boom, but the story is more one of promise than parity with terrirorial rivals, such the uchuva and feijoa. Whether it can replicate the success of its flower industry — or Peru’s meteoric rise — will depend on how quickly investment, scale and coordination catch up with ambition.