Much-loved Colombian movie set to get Hollywood makeover
Ubeimar Rios plays Oscar, a failed poet, in the Colombian film Un Poeta. Photo: Ocúltimo y Medio de Contención Producciones
A Hollywood version of award-winning Colombian film Un Poeta, rumored to star actor Bill Murray, has angered Latin American fans of the movie worried the remake could be lost in translation.
The 2025 Cannes favorite – it won a jury prize in the coveted un certain regard category – features a down-at-heel poet and was filmed in Medellín with a mix of professional and first-time actors.
News of a U.S. copy has sparked strong reactions from Colombian audiences convinced the darkly satirical Spanish-language version is strong enough to pull in audiences worldwide on its own merits.
“This film is a brilliant Latin-American movie made less than one year ago,” said Mexican critic Jesús Iglesias on his Peli de La Semana (‘Film of the Week’) website.
Filmmakers should allow more time for the original to circulate before creating another version, including with subtitles for foreign viewers, he added.
Historically film companies had waited two or three decades before remaking a movie. The fast-track English-language copy of Un Poeta showed “a lack of respect for Latin American artists,” argued Iglesias.
While there was no official confirmation this week that Ghostbusters star Bill Murray would take the leading role, The Hollywood Reporter announced that the English-language version would be scripted by Nathan Silver and produced by Ben Saïd, a French Tunisian well known for his avant-garde movies.
The Colombian original of Un Poeta, directed by Simón Mesa Soto, wowed critics in May 2025 and later scored a whopping 92 per cent on Rotten Tomato’s audience poll.
The two-hour movie follows the tribulations of middle-aged Oscar, a failed poet wandering the streets of Medellín in a drunken stupor and ruing the lack of literature in his home society. His life turns around after meeting a young student he mentors in a poetry competition.
This tale of redemption, starring first-time actor Ubeimar Rios as the failed poet, was “a hilarious fable about trying to lead a creative life and failing miserably at making ends meet,” according to a review in Variety magazine.
Much of the movie’s charm was its setting in Medellín and nod to the characteristics of paisa culture, Colombian critic and film industry expert Jazid Contreras told The Bogotá Post.
“Some cultural aspects will be hard to translate,” he said. “The risk is Hollywood produces an oversimplified watered-down version which often happens when movies are adapted to other cultures.”
But the U.S. film industry’s haste to remake the movie could also be seen positively, said Contreras.
“In some ways it’s a vote of confidence that here in Colombia we can make films with stories that are universal and which can move audiences in any part of the world.”
World’s top telenovela
Historically, few Colombian TV and movie productions had been adapted for foreign consumption, said Contreras. The standout exception being the 1999 series Yo Soy Betty, La Fea which in 2006 transferred to the U.S. as Ugly Betty.
Ugly Betty was a prime example of a successful switch to an English-language version, said Contreras.
The original Colombian series was recast in New York as a show that touched on themes of exclusion, classism, racism and migration, with Betty coming from a poor Mexican family.
Ugly Betty also boosted the career of America Ferrera who became the first Latina actress to win a lead actress Emmy Award, along with a Golden Globe.
But the social themes tapped by the original show travelled a lot further than New York: the Colombian production would go on to hold the world record from most remakes according to the Guiness Book of Records.
Adaptions have now been produced in 28 countries, including Algeria, Greece, Vietnam, China and Mexico.
Moonlighting
Part of Betty’s success as a universal figure was that local versions fitted her story to the cultural context, said Contreras.
That was also the hope of creator of Un Poeta, Simón Mesa Soto, for his tragicomic hero’s move to Hollywood.
Pushing back at criticism of the English-language remake, the Colombian filmmaker toldThe Hollywood Reporter that producer Ben Saïd had been captivated by the original character of Oscar, but could take the U.S. version in new directions.
“He felt a strong connection to the main character, so much so that he wanted to use him as inspiration for his next film. Not to make an identical adaptation of the original, but to incorporate elements that would align with his own artistic vision,” said Mesa Soto.
A remake would not diminish the quality of the original film, he said.
And in a reflection perhaps on his movie’s main character, Mesa Soto noted that artists frequently faced financial struggles in Colombia: the director had himself moonlighted as a university teacher while making the movie, his only way to get by.
The Hollywood deal would be a welcome financial boost, he said.
“Of course, there are people who can afford to reject an offer like this and make films with their own money because they have it. But that’s not my case,” he concluded.
E-motos are currently banned from Bogotá’s cycle paths but use them anyway. New rules could make enforcement easier. Photo: S.Hide.
New rules on electric motorbikes could shift the battle of the bike lanes in Bogotá, where transit authorities are already struggling to contain the tide of battery-powered vehicles.
A law governing the burgeoning use of “VELMPUs” (Vehículos Eléctricos Livianos de Movilidad Personal Urbana), as they are officially known, is being tabled by the Ministry of Transport.
This covers the dizzying array of e-bikes, electric scooters, electric motorbikes and even motorized unicycles being deployed by commuters around the city.
The bill, which has just ended its consultation period and is expected to be signed into law in July, will impose stricter safety rules and also require registration of vehicles, though they will remain exempt from number plates, insurance or the need for licensed riders.
Last week transport minister María Fernanda Rojas described the bill as an “historic step in personal electric mobility in Colombia”.
“We will have clear rules in terms of speed, rules such as wearing of helmets, also the infrastructure for these types of vehicles,” she said.
Legislation will also better define categories of vehicles, their power and top speed. Crucially, it also gives city transit authorities the discretion to ban specific categories of VELMPUs from cycle paths. This should end years of confusing messaging on where you can and can’t ride them.
Tiny pedals
This would be a welcome development for Bogotá where the city’s 677 kilometers (420 miles) of dedicated bike lanes – the most extensive of any city in Latin America – are reserved for pedal cycles, electric scooters and e-bikes but prohibited for electric motorbikes.
This might come as surprise to the city’s cyclists: on any given day thousands of e-motos are zipping down the ciclorutas.
In a 10-minute survey by The Bogotá Post of one of the capital’s busiest cycle routes – following the Avenida NQS – we counted 66 pedal bikes, 12 electric scooters and 38 electric motorbikes.
That means a third of the users were technically breaking the law, despite the on-site presence of Guias de Movilidad – council mobility guides – directing traffic around the bike lane.
“We’re not here to fine people, just to advise them,” a mobility guide Eduardo Díaz told The Bogotá Post. “People need first to be informed. Punishments will come later.”
One problem was that the businesses selling electric motorbikes were misinforming buyers, he said. The tiny pedals mounted on the rear were more for decoration and did not qualify them as a proper pedaled vehicle. “They’re fooling their customers that they are bike-lane legal,” he added.
That message has been amplified by posters around the city last week saying: “Don’t let them trick you! Ciclomotores can’t use the bike lanes!”
“Don’t let them fool you”: Bogotá’s mobility secretariat has been trying to ban e-motos from bike lanes but with little impact. Photo: S. Hide.
No need for speed
The new legislation regulates several older laws on electric mobility – from 2017, 2022 and most recently Law 2486 of 2025 – which have struggled to keep pace with innovations in electric vehicle design and their capabilities.
A key improvement will be how to categorize light electric vehicles, according to Bogotá mobility expert Carlos Prado. “Before we had a terrible situation, with different interpretations of the law,” Prado told The Bogotá Post.
E-motos regularly invade pedestrian walkways. Photo: S. Hide.
Electric motorbikes and scooters will now be defined as: “Vehicles assisted or pushed by an electric motor, of reduced weight, for individual use in urban settings, whose power does not exceed 1000 watts.”
E-bikes, or battery-assisted pedal bikes, will be limited to a maximum power of 250 watts.
The new national legislation also caps any VELMPU using a cycle lane at 25 kilometers per hour (15mph), equivalent to a fast pedal bike rider.
But Pardo is concerned that many vehicles are able to go much faster: “In an ideal world, all those devices would have a manufacturing speed limit of 25 kph.”
The legislation also requires any device sold to have a speedometer and factory-installed speed limiter within the motor.
But Pardo points out these limiters are not tamper-proof – videos are already circulating online showing users how to override these restrictions.
International attention was drawn to the dangers of high-speed crashes on cycle lanes last week after an illegal e-scooter hit a cycle on the Queensboro Bridge in New York; the Blade model scooter is advertised as reaching 80 kilometers per hour (50 mph).
Rules for VELMPUs, or light electric vehicles, being proposed by the Ministry of Transport, and slated to become law in July.
Legal status
In Colombia, another initiative will oblige the owners of all electric vehicles to register them with the Registro Unico Nacional de Transporte, (RUNT), Colombia’s transport data base.
To be street legal, all VELMPUs will require a visible identification plaque showing the brand, model, year, unique registration, and maximum velocity.
This will allow transit officers and police to quickly revise and check VELMPUs, at check points for example, but also allow owners of new vehicles to be fully aware of their legal status on dedicated bike lanes, for example.
Any final say on Bogotá’s bike lanes could still be up for debate and decided by the Secretaria de Movilidad.
Right now, with its publicity blitz, the Secretaria de Movilidad seems set on protecting its pedal-bike population and the infrastructure that has won Colombia’s capital the title of second-best city to cycle in Latin America (after Niteroi, in Brazil).
Bogotá transit guides can advise users to respect cycle path rules, but have no power to enforce. Photo: S. Hide.
Looking the other way
But then there is the problem of how to eject e-motos from the bike lanes. Currently Bogotá only has 16 bicycle-mounted transit agents dedicated to 677 kilometers of ciclorutas.
Forcing electric motorbikes onto public roads will also cause a backlash. Just in Bogotá, in 2025, some 255 motorbike riders died in crashes with 10,000 injured. Protecting cycle paths could come at a high human cost.
And on open roads, electric motorbikes will be competing with urban traffic without number plates or insurance, with no mechanical checks, and ridden by untrained and unlicensed drivers.
Perhaps surprisingly, one of the harshest criticisms of this plan comes from the motorcycle industry itself.
“We are deeply concerned about the growth of informality and illegality in the sale of electric motorcycles. They are sold as if they were simple electric bicycles, but in practice they function as motorized vehicles,” said Iván García, director of the chamber of motorcycles at ANDI, the Colombian Business Association, writing in De Moto magazine.
“The most serious issue is that they are not registered, they lack mandatory insurance, and they don’t meet any minimum safety requirements. Today, nobody knows how many there are, where they are, or where they are being driven, and this represents a growing risk to road safety and to consumers.”
In the same article, journalist and motorbike fan, Lina Posada, criticized the state for allowing electric motorbikes “to grow out of control”.
“Those who defend the right to mobility might argue that any means of transportation is valid,” she said. “But when these vehicles end up in the hands of people without training, expertise, or knowledge of the rules, the debate ceases to be about mobility and becomes about the right to life.”
The Ministry of Transport has gone some way to meet that challenge: it proposes that in future all lightweight electric vehicles will require headlamps, stop lights, turning lights, horns, and front and rear brakes. Riders will require helmets and reflective clothing after dark.
But for Posado these regulations still fall short: “We are already seeing the consequences in regions where traffic authorities are nonexistent or prefer to look the other way”.
This reflects a dilemma facing many cities across the globe: how to ride the revolutionary wave in electrical personal transport which transforms how people move across congested cities while reducing pollution. But also staying safe.
Shops were barred from selling alcohol. Credit: Bogotá Post archives.
The Mayor of Bogotá, Carlos Fernando Galán, brought forward a scheduled citywide alcohol ban by 24 hours in a move that has enraged business owners and nightlife operators.
Under Decree 191, the ‘dry law’ (Ley Seca), which restricts the sale and consumption of alcohol hours before and during the voting period, came into effect in Bogotá at 6PM on Friday, 24 hours earlier than in the rest of the country.
While the move is purportedly to maintain order and security ahead of presidential elections on Sunday, many have questioned why Bogotá’s ban was extended at the last minute.
In a statement, Asobares, the country’s leading trade association that represents food and drink establishments, said that “continuing to enforce such restrictions is to impose outdated measures on a modern service economy, which currently sustains thousands of families”.
In the document, Asobares points out that nearly 100,000 workers (such as waiters, DJs, and security staff) will lose their shifts, which is a big hit because they earn up to 70% of their weekly pay during those days.
After the announcement, many establishments were forced to cancel events. For example, Theatron, one of the largest entertainment venues in Latin America, canceled a scheduled club night called ‘Theatron on Radio: Parcial Final y a Perrear’.
Asobares also highlighted that beyond nightlife venues, the measure disrupts the entire supply chain, negatively impacting the revenue of producers, distributors, transport workers, and farmers who supply the formal commercial sector.
“Security should not be achieved at the expense of the right to work and economic stability,” Camilo Ospina, Asobares President, told The Bogotá Post. “Bogotá needs to show that it is a mature capital, capable of holding a peaceful election day without needing to declare the temporary bankruptcy of its most productive sectors”.
President Gustavo Petro. Image credit: @infopresidencia via X.
Just days away from Colombia’s first-round presidential election, incumbent President Gustavo Petro continues to sound the alarm about voter fraud.
On Tuesday, he repeated claims that the National Registrar’s Office is allowing the vote to be manipulated against his party’s candidate, Senator Iván Cepeda.
Petro renewed calls for citizens to supervise the vote count, describing it as the only way to avoid fraud: “Only the physical vigilance of millions of people can overcome the algorithm manipulations that the Registrar’s Office refused to prevent.”
But are the president’s claims of vulnerabilities in the voting system valid?
A decade-long dispute
Petro’s claims stem from a long-running grudge with Thomas Greg & Sons, a multinational security and printing company tasked with issuing Colombian passports and overseeing electoral logistics.
According to Petro, the firm cannot be trusted with the sensitive task of printing, delivering, and processing vote counting forms.
While the president’s claims have widely been dismissed by electoral institutions as reckless, there is some foundation for them.
Following the 2014 legislative elections, the evangelical political party, MIRA, filed a legal petition against the Registrar’s Office, claiming a discrepancy between the ballot pre-count (filled out by citizen juries in a form known as E-14) and the digitized tally of the vote (filled out by officials in the E-24 form).
MIRA claimed to have evidence of manipulation of the software used for “voting, information, transmission, or tabulation of election results,” which was managed by a subsidiary of Thomas Greg & Sons.
After a lengthy four-year legal case, the Council of State (Consejo de Estado), the highest court overseeing the government, issued a ruling in favor of MIRA. It found evidence of destruction of electoral material and inconsistencies between the E-14 and E-24 forms.
Crucially, the Council of State said that it could not confirm that voting software had been sabotaged because it did not have access to the source code of the software during the elections.
Without the original code, it was impossible to know if the system had been tampered with.
The body issued a clear recommendation to prevent repetitions of the dispute in future elections: “Direct the Electoral Organization to acquire the necessary vote-counting software for use within the state—that is, software owned by the organization itself—which allows for full traceability of the vote-counting process from the polling stations through to the official declaration of the election results.”
In other words, it recommended that electoral authorities roll out their own software, rather than relying on third party providers.
But 12 years later, Thomas Greg & Sons remains in charge of the electoral software; according to the Registrar’s Office, purchasing proprietary software and operating the corresponding data centers is not feasible.
The Registrar’s Office has launched an advertisement campaign defending the integrity of the voting process. Image credit: Alfie Pannell.
While Petro continues to lobby for a fully state-owned system, he has concentrated his efforts on mitigating the risks of a repeat of the 2014 source code issue.
The president has repeatedly demanded that the Registrar’s Office share the source code with the government and the public, which he says would allow them to prevent a repeat of the situation in 2014.
But the Registrar’s Office maintains that there is no need, suggesting that publicizing the code would leave the software more vulnerable to attacks and defending internal audit processes.
Petro rebutted, calling the claim “an immense lie”.
Other types of fraud
As well as warning about software manipulation, the president has also raised the alarm about differences between the pre-count and the official, scrutinized count. Ahead of the March elections, he warned that the pre-count may not accurately reflect the results.
Petro’s concerns stem from the 2022 legislative elections in which over half a million votes for his Historic Pact coalition were excluded in the pre-count and later revealed in the scrutiny.
Rather than software, the culprit for the discrepancy, which in total represented a 5.49% difference, was human error; the Electoral Observation Mission (MOE) had warned the ballot sheets were designed in a way that could lead to Historic Pact votes being neglected.
But the 2022 vote appears to be an outlier, with the MOE reporting just a 0.28% discrepancy between the pre-count and the scrutinized votes in March’s legislative elections.
Petro’s mistrust in the pre-count may be valid in the case of a tight race with razor-thin margins but not so much if there is a clear winner. And, in any case, the scrutiny process should clear up any doubts.
“In Colombian elections, it is judges who determine electoral disputes and not a logistical operator such as Thomas Greg & Sons,” explained Sergio Guzmán, director at Colombia Risk Analysis, a political risk think tank.
Bigger fish to fry
While Petro aims his crusade against Thomas Greg & Sons, a firm which he has clashed with on a range of issues, there are other, more prescient threats to electoral integrity.
“I think that concerns about voters being coerced to vote are legitimate… but I think concerns that somebody will steal the election are overblown,” said Guzmán.
International observers including the United Nations have warned that violence may undermine the elections, particularly in areas under armed group control.
Vote buying is also a well-documented phenomenon in many regions of the country.
While Petro has some basis for his allegations of voter fraud, there is no evidence of software manipulation determining presidential election results in Colombia.
In a razor-thin race, observers would be wise to wait for the scrutinized vote count to declare a winner. But for now, Petro’s warnings about election-rigging appear to be largely overblown.
Families move closer to justice over the downing of Avianca Flight 203, blamed on Pablo Escobar.
Avianca Boeing 727-21 HK-1803, which was downed in 1989. Image credit: Richard Vandervord via Wikimedia Commons.
Colombia’s Congress held a hearing on Wednesday on the bombing of Avianca Flight 203 for the first time since it happened on November 27, 1989.
The explosion killed all 107 people on board shortly after take-off from Bogotá on its way to Cali, and has been widely attributed to Pablo Escobar’s Medellin Cartel.
Families have long demanded truth, justice and reparations for the attack, considered one of Colombia’s deadliest acts of narco-related violence.
The hearing, held as a political oversight session, focused on truth, justice, memory and reparations for victims of narcoterrorism.
The Attorney General’s Office has led the investigation for decades, but families say the process has been “painfully slow.”
“It is a case that remains in a preliminary stage, as if it had happened this morning,” Gonzalo Enrique Rojas Peña, son of one of the victims, told The Bogotá Post.
Rojas was 10 years old when his father, Gonzalo Hernán Rojas Castro, was killed. He now represents families of victims of the bombing.
Gonzalo Rojas alongside his late father. Image credit: Catherine Ellis.
“Many aspects have not been clarified by the state, particularly regarding who planned and carried out the attack, and the possible involvement of other actors,” he explained.
The hearing highlighted questions that remain unanswered, including the identity of all those responsible and the current status of investigations.
Authorities initially attributed the attack to an assassination attempt on presidential candidate César Gaviria, who did not board the plane on the advice of his security team.
Later investigations concluded that a young man boarded the plane with explosives under orders from the Medellín Cartel, one of the most violent drug trafficking organisations in Colombia’s history. Questions around the case, however, persist, and victims continue to seek justice.
Just one person was jailed for the attack: Dandeny Muñoz Mosquera, known as “La Quica”, who was sentenced to three life terms in the United States, although he has repeatedly denied involvement.
The session was convened by the Human Rights Commission of the Chamber of Representatives and led by Representative Juan Daniel Peñuela. The National Centre for Historical Memory, the Victims’ Unit and the Ministry of the Interior were present, alongside families of victims, many of whom spoke about their loved ones.
However, two key institutions — the Attorney General’s Office and the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) — did not attend, despite being formally invited.
“On one hand we had two national institutions, but on the other it was unfortunate that the Fiscalía and the JEP did not attend. It is unfortunate that responses remain very ambiguous,” Gonzalo said.
Gonzalo Rojas at the hearing on May 27. Image credit: Catherine Ellis.
The hearing also addressed the issue of reparations, which families say they have spent decades waiting for.
The Victims’ Unit said it will convene working groups to address long-standing gaps in registration and documentation that affect families’ access to reparations under Colombia’s 2011 Victims Law. The law provides recognition, financial compensation, symbolic measures and psychosocial support for victims of armed conflict.
Claudia Peñón was 17 years old when her father was killed on the flight in 1989.
“He was an excellent man and a hardworking man. He had the hope of seeing me graduate from high school, and he never got to do that,” she told The Bogotá Post, adding so many people’s lives were shattered that fateful day. “One hundred and seven families’ lives were left shattered. One hundred and seven families had their dreams destroyed.”
Her mother always expected answers, but died ten years ago without receiving them or reparations.
“She never got to see real restitution, never got to see justice in that situation. And honestly, so many other families have been failed too — and we’re still fighting,” she said.
Families are also pushing for stronger memory-building efforts.
While there have been initiatives to recognize victims of armed conflict, the history of narcoterrorism has often been marginal in official narratives.
During the hearing, the National Centre for Historical Memory said the case has not yet been developed as a dedicated exhibition in Colombia’s planned Museum of Memory. It is included in broader reports and timelines, but could still be incorporated through a future “memory initiative”.
The hearing triggered formal follow-up steps from state institutions.
Congress will send official requests to the Attorney General’s Office over its absence and may refer the matter to the Procuraduría for review.
But for many families, the session underscored a deeper reality: after 37 years, there has been no new judicial breakthrough and no clear path to resolution.
“I think the day was partially positive,” said Gonzalo. “I feel calm that other families were able to have a space to receive more information about the case. But there is still more to do.”
Paris, London and New York are more often associated with culture, finance and history than with dangerous heat. Yet each summer all three are increasingly exposed to extreme temperatures they were never designed to withstand.
Like many dense urban areas, they amplify heat through what is known as the “urban heat island effect”. This reflects the way that warmth is trapped in concrete, asphalt and glass, turning hot days into hazardous ones.
With skyscrapers made of glass and steel, roadways encased in cement and blocks of residential apartments, New York traps heat like few other metropolitan centres. In fact, the city has one of the highest urban heat island effects in the United States, a measurement of thermal difference between urban and rural areas.
Heat kills more than 500 New Yorkers every year, a grim statistic that exacerbates inequalities along the lines of race and class. While many people escape to the seaside or countryside to find relief, others remain in cities where the heat can be harder to avoid and more difficult to endure. Yet these uneven experiences of urban heat are not new. In cities such as London, Paris and New York, coping with hot summers has long been shaped by inequality.
Across the 19th and 20th centuries, urban residents developed a range of strategies to manage extreme heat in densely built environments. Our research for the Melting Metropolis project examines everyday experiences of heat. Here are some of the ways people have coped with these conditions in the past and what they reveal about living with heat in the city.
London
For most historic urbanites, escaping the confines of their home provided the greatest relief from the heat. In the mid-20th century, some Londoners escaped to the roof of their apartment building to catch the cooling breezes that swirled above the city’s streets.
For many others, since the 19th century, public spaces have provided the greatest respite from heat in their homes. Londoners turned to the shade provided by trees in nearby parks, paddled in water fountains or went for cooling dips in lidos and ponds.
Historic urbanites have also tried to cope with the heat at home. In contrast to those who sought relief from the heat in public spaces, wealthier Londoners used money and technology to keep cool. In the 19th century they purchased imported ice from Norway or employed servants to operate fans.
Paris
In the heatwaves of the 19th century, Parisians also headed out in search of relief. Like Londoners, they made extensive use of the parks that urban planners embedded into the fabric of the city during the late 19th-century Haussmann-era redesign. But it was not only dense greenery that provided respite from the heat: the trees planted along the avenues of the city offered shelter from the rays of the sun on hot summer days.
Although the Seine held great potential for cooling down, bathing in its waters was banned in the middle of the 19th century. Despite the official ban, photographic records show that some Parisians in search of freshness broke the law and took the plunge.
To keep cool indoors, the more privileged 19th-century Parisians used ice imported from northern regions or collected locally during the winter and stored in ice houses until temperatures rose. Ice remained a luxury item until the late 1870s, when technological developments allowing ice to be made artificially lowered its cost and widened its accessibility.
Daily life in Paris – including in the summer – had undergone thorough transformations by the middle of the 20th century. Air conditioning began to gain momentum but some traditional ways to cool down have remained at the core of summer life: crowds continue to swarm café terraces, the banks of the Seine stay packed with people, 19th-century water fountains are still used to refill water bottles.
New York
In the 19th century, the tenements of New York City were filled with people sleeping on roofs, sweating on fire escapes, and avoiding the sweltering indoors. The wealthy simply fled the city for countryside estates. Newspapers called these seasonal migrants “heat refugees”.
When seeking outdoor relief, most 19th-century New Yorkers headed to the beach – the city is an island, after all. But by the 20th century, they were also planing block parties with plenty of ice from corner store bodegas. On occasion, they also cracked open fire hydrants – a relief strategy that has become a classic trope of New York City summers.
Future heat waves
For as long as episodes of extreme heat in cities have affected urban life, urbanites have developed ways to cope. Today, cities are taking heat more seriously when they look to the future and working towards adaptation strategies. The disastrous heatwave of 2003 served as a wake-up call in Paris, which implemented a heat plan the following year and continues to work on ways to make the city more liveable in the summer.
Central to New York’s climate resilience plans, air conditioning has become a political battleground in activists’ fight for a “right to cooling” (a bundle of legislation championed by local environmental justice organisations).
Though it can compound the problem of climate change, technologically aided cooling keeps people alive as we all find ways to weather the intensifying heat. In May 2026, the UK’s Climate Change Committee declared that the British way of life is under threat from heat.
In June, London will launch its heat plan for the capital, a first step in supporting the city and its residents to live better with extreme heat.
About the author:Chloe Dutell is a Postdoctoral Research Associate, School of Histories, Languages and Cultures Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Liverpool.
The article is reproduced from The Conversation thanks to a Creative Commons licence
Confused about the upcoming Colombian presidential election? We’re here to help you with a set of cheat sheets on the top candidates so you can follow the local news. Today we’re looking at Paloma Valencia of the Centro Democrático.
Who is Paloma Valencia?
Paloma Valencia, candidate for the Colombian presidential election 2026. Photo courtesy of Wikicommons
Paloma Susana Valencia Laserna is a conservative politician who has represented the Centro Democrático in the Senate for 12 years. She won her primary battle with three million votes in March, confirming her position as the establishment rightist candidate.
Anti-establishment types, look away now. Her paternal grandfather Guillermo León Valencia was President of the Republic from 1962-66, while her maternal grandfather Mario Laserna Pinzón founded the Universidad de los Andes.
Perhaps not coincidentally, that’s her alma mater, studying economics there before a Master’s in creative writing at New York University. She’s been heavily involved in politics for two decades now, originally as a candidate for Alas Equipo Colombia before jumping ship to the Centro Democrático.
Her faith is deeply important to her, as is tradition. Coming from the circle of the Popayán elite, she is a fairly standard conservative on most cultural and social issues. On the economy, she tacks more to a neoliberal line.
Is she polling well?
Not as well as she would like. While she won comfortably in the March primaries as part of the Gran Consulta por Colombia, she has since fluctuated around 15-25%, usually rising and falling in rhythm with rightist rival Abelardo de la Espriella.
Most recent polling has her in third place a week out from the election, which is a problem. She does outperform Abelardo in head-to-head matchups with Iván Cepeda in most polls, which her messaging will want to lean into over the coming week.
What’s her campaign like?
Centrism, slightly improbably. As one of two rightists in an election with a clearly dominant leftist candidate, two flailing centrists and a host of also-rans, she’s positioning herself as the closest to the centre of the viable options.
That’s her offer
However, she’s firmly of the right, although tempered somewhat by her far more liberal vicepresidential candidate Juan Daniel Oviedo. This is best evidenced by the fact she is very much ‘la que dice Uribe’, clearly having the backing of the controversial yet still influential ex-president.
Her campaign logo features a cross, with religion playing a large role for her stance on many cultural and social issues. She leans heavily into those as a conservative. Colombia Más Grande is the slogan, but they don’t use it particularly well.
If elected, she would be Colombia’s first ever female head of state (with a first ever gay vicepresident too), although she’s not really leant into that much as you might think. As with much else, she’s not managing to cut through particularly well on socials or make a big splash in the national debate.
So what’s in her manifesto then?
You can read it for yourself online, under the name 111puntos. You even get an extra point for free. It’s fairly well presented, laid out and supported, but that’s not necessarily going to win any votes. Overall, other than a massive reliance on AI, there’s no big surprise or radical shakeup here, more a return to the old ways of doing things.
Paloma is certainly no dove when it comes to security and crime, promising a tough line. COP$20tn over four years for the armed forces in order to modernise and rebuild, finishing at 4% of annual GDP destined for the forces. That includes recruiting 30,000 more military personnel and the same number of police officers.
The rest of the money will go on increasing pay, conditions and so forth as well as a big push on tech. Drones are the centrepiece for investment, but cyberdefence is also highlighted as an area that needs urgent investment.
Slightly more old-school is her plan to militarise key transportation routes immediately. More of the same with coca farms: more spraying that allegedly won’t affect ecosystems or people, combined with subsidies for substitution. The fact that neither of those things have worked for decades isn’t stopping her.
On the other side of the coin, Paloma Valencia promises zero impunity: “el que la hace, la paga”. That means more powers to seize illicit gains and more prison sentences for those found guilty of corruption, reducing the number of casa por carcel sentences. 22,000 more penitentiary places and 19,000 more prisoners.
There will be 50 new casas de justicia and mobile courts to tour the country visiting rural locations that are currently not served by the legal systems. All of this is working towards an aim to get congestion in the system from 48% down to 0. Ominously, there’s also a promise of a law to “regulate protest and punish vandalism”.
New laws on corruption are to be brought in, mostly focused around greater transparency using tech. That means blockchain to record transactions and deals as well as AI to analyse potential discrepancies. There will be greater enforcement of existing regulations and a guardian of public integrity to oversee processes.
On the economy, it’s all about recovering confidence from the international market. That will be done by getting infrastructure and mining production back up to pre-pandemic levels (6%+), USD$10mn more in exports and growth over five percent annually.
More FDI to the tune of USD$2bn annually, 25% of GDP to go into internal investment and reducing the deficit by COP$50tn. How is she going to pay for all this? With, err, tax cuts for homeowners and businesses, efficiency savings of 25% and debt refinancing. Good luck with all that.
She’s the only candidate to really take the healthcare crisis seriously. First up is a promise to resolve 10 million blocked prescriptions, appointments and so on in the first 100 days. She plans to send doctors to patients in rural areas, not the other way round.
This will be paid for by a COP$9tn investment. A third of that is destined for delivery of outstanding operations and prescriptions, the rest for paying accumulated state debt to healthcare operators. Many taxpayers won’t like the latter.
Energy faces a similar situation: paying off state debts to operators within the first three months. The goal here is to avoid blackouts and brownouts in the short term, while putting in place structures to avoid the same issues over the long term.
Turning on the taps for both oil and gas lies at the heart of this plan, with a reboot of exploration and extraction projects. Partly, this is to attract AI database and server investment. There’s also support for renewables and alternatives, but it seems more of an afterthought.
Her plan on international relations is to ride two horses. Free competition with China and more co-operation on infrastructure and exports from Colombia. At the same time, leadership in Donald Trump’s Shield of the Americas project while guaranteeing that only the Colombian Armed Forces will operate in national territory.
There will be 187,000 free school places for talented children, 150,000 grants for vulnerable children and 10 public superschools. ICETEX loans, in line with other countries, will only be repayable when you have a salary. COLFUTURO will be rescued as well. The 16 biggest urban centres will have psycho-social units to look out for vulnerable children.
Businesses employing people under 28 will receive a subsidy of up to 30% of minimum wage for a year. Agricultural workers will receive better lines of credit, three million hectares of land formalised and a million new farming zones designated. Tourism is projected to double, with new routes opened for Asia and Europe.
There is a heavy focus on the grey economy. Informal workers will have access to seed capital, loans, a virtual wallet and a host of other possibilities. The goal is to offer help without persecution.
Pensioners will all be covered unconditionally, regardless of law or budget changes as well as three million vulnerable adults to receive subsidies. Each child born into poverty will have COP$500,000 put aside as seed capital to start saving.
Infrastructure starts off with 35,000km of new roads as well as increased satellite connectivity for marginalised communities. There will be 1 million new homes built, with a quarter of those directly subsidised. A million further homes will receive new or improved potable water access.
Finally, the environment. The brakes will go on for deforestation and the national parks will be protected from guerrilla activity. Local families will be given subsidies in order to protect areas of natural interest. Money generated from mining will be ploughed back into environmental protection.
Who is she running with?
Oviedo has been a key asset for the Paloma Valencia campaign
Juan Daniel Oviedo, former head of DANE and candidate in the last race for Bogotá mayor. In that contest, he managed to force Gustavo Bolívar into third place in a two-horse race, showcasing his impressive campaigning ability. He came second in the Gran Consulta with over a million votes, reinforcing his reputation.
He’s been more visible than Paloma Valencia for much of the campaign and is much more active than either of the other two undercards. That was the reason he was brought in – to appeal to more liberal voters and to provide an injection of energy on socials. He’s delivered in spades on both accounts.
However, there are a couple of issues here. Firstly, he runs the risk of overshadowing Paloma Valencia with his charisma and presence. Secondly, by joining her campaign he lost some of those centrist voters who saw it as a betrayal to join forces with the Centro Democrático.
They certainly aren’t natural bedfellows, with Oviedo a fair bit left of Valencia on a lot of economic issues. More profound splits are found on social issues. For example, Oviedo is out and proud while Valencia stands against gay adoption and marriage. Awkward at best.
— Álvaro Uribe Vélez (@AlvaroUribeVel) May 18, 2026
Uribe is still firmly behind Paloma Valencia
That’s a bit unfair on a candidate with a long and storied political career of her own. However, while she isn’t just Uribe’s candidate, she certainly makes a lot of having his passionate backing.
That’s been a mixed blessing for a while now, with Uribe’s influence waning as the years pass. While his candidate won in 2018, they failed to even make the second round in 2014 and 2022 and we could well be on for a repeat of that.
The ex-president certainly casts a long shadow and that’s not always positive, especially with Oviedo also shining bright. Support for Uribe has dwindled over the past two decades, as Colombian demographics change profoundly.
However, Uribe does retain a large swell of support and also commands the biggest party machine of the candidates in the race. The Centro Democrático will be able to make a huge campaigning push on and offline across the entire country, which may be underreported.
Any skeletons in her closet?
A few, mainly over her combative social media use while in the Senate. Paloma Valencia has largely avoided serious controversy though, with most of her twitterstorms being differences of opinion rather than accusations of impropriety.
She accused now-president Gustavo Petro of corruption in 2018 following the Odebrecht affair. This amounted to grainy footage of him receiving cash at an unknown point. That was archived as being far too flimsy to be evidence of anything at all.
In 2022 she defended the Colombian state’s actions during the armed conflict, saying that while there may have been errors and atrocities, they were legitimate and in defence of the country. That unsurprisingly met with a huge backlash from various quarters.
Una narrativa mucho más constructiva (y verdadera) es: Los para y la guerrrilla fueron y son monstruosos. El Estado cometió errores y atrocidades, pero era legítimo y fundamentalmente estuvo en la defensa de los ciudadanos.
— Paloma Valencia L (@PalomaValenciaL) July 29, 2022
An extraordinary claim from Paloma Valencia here
There is one case hanging over Paloma Valencia still. Her link to Uribe led to her questioning the legitimacy of a key witness in the case against him. In turn, the witnesses defence lawyers filed a defamation case against the senator, over which the Supreme Court has ordered a conciliatory process. That has not yet concluded.
She’s also clashed with Cepeda’s vicepresidential candidate Aida Quilcué over indigenous rights in Cauca. Indeed, she’s gone as far as to suggest splitting the entire department in two, one for Indigenous Colombians only, something many view as racially motivated.
So, can she succeed?
Yes, she can. Next weekend is arguably a harder test for her than a second round would be if she gets through. Similar concerns swirled around her in the Gran Consulta por Colombia, but she ended up sailing through comfortably.
If she can repeat that trick, she matches up better than anyone else against Iván Cepeda. However, that’s very far from guaranteed, as they’re closely matched. It’s assumed that she’ll gain a lot of Abelardo voters, but that may not be true. The anti-left will flock to her, but the anti-establishment might not.
Her main draw is presenting herself as the only viable sensible candidate. In part that’s with Oviedo on board, in part that both Cepeda and de la Espriella are seen as populist. There’s a lot of centrist voters that will hold their noses and vote for her along those lines.
Having said all that, centrism isn’t in vogue in many places globally and Colombia is no exception. That may block her even getting to a final face-off and her chances of winning rest with anti-Cepeda votes. More than any other candidate, hers would be a loveless victory.
Confused about the 2026 Colombian presidential elections? We’re here to help you with a set of cheat sheets on the top candidates so you can follow the local news. First we’re looking at Abelardo de la Espriella of Defensores de la Patria.
Who is Abelardo de la Espriella?
Abelardo de la Espriella hails from Montería, which he makes great play of. He was actually born in Bogotá, as well as studying in various universities here. He rose to fame as a defence lawyer, eventually setting up his own firm, De La Espriella Lawyers Enterprise. Their clients have been varied (more of that later).
He has a colourful background alongside his legal activity, releasing two albums of classical and traditional music as well as launching De La Espriella Style, his menswear line. He also has his fingers in other pies, including rum, wine and coffee, several books and a foundation to help impoverished kids.
Abelardo de la Espriella has always loved the limelight
A former atheist, he saw the light in the pandemic and came around to Catholicism, which is convenient for winning votes in a deeply religious country. He holds Italian and US passports. He takes pride in his appearance, often suited and tidily-bearded but switching to sombreros vueltiaos or guayaberas when appropriate.
While he has a varied and successful background in business, he has no experience at all in government, either at local or national level. He is leaning into that, taking the mantle of the outsider candidate and promising to do politics differently. Courting controversy is second nature for this bullish and outspoken candidate.
Is he polling well?
Abelardo de la Espriella in 2017. Photo courtesy of wikicommons.
He started strongly towards the end of last year, then seemed to have dipped as we moved into springtime. Since the March elections though, he’s picked up the pace again and is peaking again at just the right time.
He’s now ahead of Paloma again with most pollsters and stands a good chance of making the second round, where he faces a strong challenge against Cepeda. His incredibly divisive rhetoric and persona mean that he doesn’t match up easily in a one-on-one.
Like many populists in the caudillo mould, he splits opinions – while he wins a lot of hearts and minds, so too does he turn a lot of people against him. Very few people are neutral on Abelardo, which means he could struggle to win the more centrist voters, even against Cepeda. Expect voto en blanco to do well if he’s in the second round.
What’s his campaign like?
Pick your adjective depending on how you view him generally: controversial, innovative, problematic, fierce, strong, crass, outspoken. What’s unarguable is that it is very much focused on him, features a lot of show and spin and is extremely light on detail.
Very much in the vein of a Trump or Bukele, two key influences he acknowledges himself, he positions himself as the outsider candidate compared to the professional politicians in the race. This has not only been successful elsewhere, but almost took Rodolfo Hernández to the presidency four years ago.
Interestingly, Abelardo de la Espriella is in one way openly following a very similar line to the leftists he claims to hate. He is courting “los que nunca” against “los que siempre”, fitting his position as the outsider candidate. His promises often revolve directly around shaking everything up.
So what’s in his manifesto then?
You can read it for yourself online, or what is there at least. It’s barely a manifesto and more a collection of ideas, positions and wishes. He focuses heavily on law and order with a generous side serving of efficiency savings. Quite how any of this will get done or whether it’s viable is often unclear.
First thing on the agenda is that he’s tough on crime. He’s proposed 10 megacarceles in the Bukele mould, a ‘primera linea’ of reservists and veterans and a new bloque de búsqueda for barrios. He targets a 30% reduction in gender-based violence and 40% cut in feminicides. That involves an accelerated 24/7 judicial process in 72 hours maximum.
More widely, he wants to reform and better fund the armed forces in order to both establish state control of territory and enforce the state monopoly on arms. That carries over into his stance on armed groups. He wants to eliminate 330,000 hectares of coca farms using any and all tools available to him. That means spraying, manual elimination, express recuperation of proceeds of crime and so on.
Para cambiar a Colombia primero hay que sobrevivirle a quienes no quieren que cambie. pic.twitter.com/h6Tf8refWr
— De La Espriella Presidente (@AbelardoPTE) May 17, 2026
Abelardo is firmly positioned as a hardliner on crime and security
The mano dura is also set to come down on politicians. He’s fiercely anti-corruption, which he defines broadly. He plans to start with Ecopetrol and then clean out state organisations of their links to “narco-trafficking, corruption and bad management”.
Politicians and administrators that are not corrupt won’t be safe, either. He promises zero tolerance for ineptitude and inefficiency. He wants results within 100 days and those with empty hands will be told to sling their hook. Ambassadors have been told they need to promote the country, not just shoot whisky on the public purse.
Tax avoidance is also on the radar – Abelardo de la Espriella wants to use AI to radically improve DIAN’s processes and deal with widespread avoidance. Subsidies will also be revised to make sure they are going to the right places.
He wants to recover energy self-sufficiency and to restart drilling and exploration as well. Gas is his main focus, although rare earth mining is also highlighted, alongside reform of the costly ElectroCaribe. A main driver is drawing a clear line between legal and illegal mining.
The national budget will also benefit from the efficiency savings – merging or abolishing agencies he sees as redundant such as the Ministerio de Igualdad. That’s part of a shock plan to save around 3.1% of GDP.
With those savings, the aim is to get the deficit to -4.8%(!) within the first year, falling to under 3.5% or lower by 2030. Dovetailing with that is a promise to anchor the debt/GDP ratio at no higher than 55%. All this will require annual growth of at least 3% with 5%+ targeted.
On education, there is to be greater focus on technology, as well as a ‘virtual university’ and free computers in schools. Unsurprisingly, details are limited. A STEM program specifically aimed at girls will be set up to deal with the tech gender gap.
Rural communities are a key part of his voter base and he’s promising 600,000 new jobs outside cities as well as 100,000 young people to receive education on improved farming methods and use of tech. 2 million hectares are to be delivered to the people.
Rounding up, there will be COP$125bn aimed at co-investment or seed capital for creative projects; mass sterilisation of stray animals to reduce populations and 200,000 carers to be given subsidies.
Who is he running with?
José Manuel Restrepo, the closest thing to an aristocrat that a two-century-old republic can have. He claims direct descendency from revolutionary hero Francisco de Paula Santander. In sharp contrast to Abelardo, he’s a classic buttoned-down conservative.
He served under Duque as Ministro de Hacienda following the botched intent at fiscal reform, having previously been at Comercio. Outside of politics he has been rector of three different universities, most notably the Rosario, his alma mater alongside Bath and the LSE.
However, given that Abelardo de la Espriella loves the limelight, his undercard is not a key part of this campaign. While the other two real candidates have genuinely strong vice-presidential candidates, Abelardo is doing all the heavy lifting himself.
What’s all this El Tigre stuff?
Abelardo understands the importance of branding, and this is a key part of his appeal. He says that the big cat represents courage, ferocity and independence, all of which are qualities he identifies with. In a country where blankets featuring tigers are a staple of many homes, this is a good brand to have.
Dancing tigers, because of course.
Tigre in Colombia can refer to tigers or jaguars, both of which he uses, though the former are more common. That means video screens with dancing tigers on them, tiger-print shoes up for sale and a whole lot more. He’s often to be seen wearing tiger-print clothes.
Cepeda’s running mate Aida Quilcué has publicly asked him to stop using jaguars as part of this, claiming they hold a special significance for Indigenous Colombians. Abelardo de la Espriella has predictably ignored that.
Any skeletons in his closet?
Sort of. There’s certainly a great deal of controversy, but a lot of it he simply leans into and doesn’t see as problematic at all. That’s true of personal attacks on Paloma Valencia, as well as frequent homophobic and sexist outbursts.
It’s less true of his past as a criminal defence lawyer, an area that often makes him quite touchy. He has represented some pretty shady characters, including Álvaro Uribe himself. Jorge Pretelt and David Guzmán are just two high-profile clients accused of corruption that de la Espriella has defended.
In fairness, his firm has also taken on some genuinely important defences, most notably Natalia de la Ponce and Rosa Elvira Cely. However, even this is disputed, with family members taking to Instagram to dispute his take on that and suggest it was more about financial interest.
Then there’s the outstanding allegations that the firmas he collected in order to be able to run were improperly registered. He won 5 million, more than any other Colombian, of which 3 million were ruled invalid. That still leaves him comfortably over the threshold, but raises questions about his support.
So, can he succeed?
Yes, he can. It’s nowhere near guaranteed that he’ll make the second round, of course, and he absolutely has the potential to do or say something that will torpedo his campaign. However, he’s a maverick and is campaigning well, which makes him unpredictable.
He is offering easy solutions to complex problems, but that’s often popular with the electorate. Get past the rhetoric and he identifies a lot of key problems and his proposals could be a good thing. He just doesn’t make it clear exactly how this is going to happen.
More to the point, Abelardo de la Espriella represents the outsider position compared to everyone else: he really is not a professional politician like them, for good or for bad. Again, that’s popular with many voters after decades of incompetence from technocrats.
Comparisons with Trump in the USA or Bukele in El Salvador are clichéd, but they stand up. He frequently flirts with sexism and homophobia while mocking opponents, but claims innocence, he promises a hard line on crime and he avoids clarity over his proposals. Both those candidates won comfortably with similar electorates to Colombia.
If he gets to the second round, he could win due to a dislike of the other candidate, as that will almost certainly be Cepeda. In that case, there could be a lot of voters holding their noses to vote either for or against him. At the moment, that’s a coin flip.
Misak community meeting in the Cauca hills during clashes on Thursday. Photo: X
A large military contingent has been sent to Cauca today to halt clashes between members of the Nasa and Misak communities fighting over ancestral territory.
The first of 500 troops arrived in Popayán, the department capital, to be ferried by helicopters to the hills around Sylvia in northern Cauca where members of both indigenous groups were fighting on Thursday. The violent confrontation led to seven deaths and more than 100 people injured, some seriously, according to latest reports.
Colombia’s minister of defence Pedro Sánchez, announcing the troop deployment, said the death toll was likely to rise as both military and state institutions gained access to the zone.
Videos posted online showed people from both communities fighting with machetes, spears and home-made explosives. But many dead and injured had gunshot wounds, suggesting firearms were being used, said Sánchez.
Leaders called for calm today, and Colombia’s president Gustavo Petro appealed to both sides to re-start talks over the contested land.
Troops arriving in Cauca on Friday.
“I have requested a meeting with the highest authorities of the Misak and Nasa peoples to guarantee peaceful coexistence,” tweeted Petro. He offered to broker talks next week.
Petro’s government has been attempting to resolve historical territorial issues with indigenous communities who often lack legal land titles through the Agencia Nacional de Tierras (ANT), the national land agency.
An “interethnic pact” was urgently needed in Cauca to return fertile land to original communities for agricultural crops, said Petro. The expertise of indigenous farmers could turn the tide of drug trafficking in the region, he added.
Conflict hotspot
Cauca, in southwest Colombia, is one of the country’s most conflicted regions with multiple armed groups in conflict with the state.
It is also home to some of Colombia’s largest indigenous communities, such as Nasa that inhabit large tracts of highlands that span the Andean massif and defend their land with both political bodies – powerful lobbies such as the CRIC or Consejo Regional Indigena del Cauca – and self-defense forces known as Guardia Indigena.
In Cauca, the Guardia Indigena are frequently targeted by armed groups and members of CRIC are victims of kidnap or assassination.
Vice-presidential candidate Aida Quilcué, herself Nasa, survived an abduction attempt in February this year when armed men intercepted her vehicle in the highlands of Cauca. She was rescued by Guardia Indigena who trailed her into the mountains.
This week’s clashes erupted after simmering dispute over 800 hectares (2,000 acres) of páramo highlands bordering the Pitayó Reserve, belonging to Nasa, and Guambia territory of the Misak.
CRIC indigenous guards from Cauca marching in Bogotá during the 2019 protests. Photo: S. Hide
Political twist
According to members of the communities, the plot of land had three springs and was of cultural and spiritual significance to both groups. But in 2023 the ANT appeared to award titles to Nasa based on colonial maps from the colonial era of the 1750s, and act that infuriated Misak who also claimed it as their ancestral territory.
In the aftermath of Thursday’s clashes, opposition politicians were quick to blame the Petro government for fomenting the violence, accusing the ANT of favoring the Nasa reserve and CRIC – widely seen as allied with Petro’s Pacto Historico party – of using the ANT judgment to invade Misak territory.
In a Facebook post right-wing presidential candidate Paloma Valencia accused Nasa’s community in the Pitayó reserve of breaking negotiations to take the disputed territory by force.
In a further twist, Valencia implicated Quilcué, the running mate of her main political rival Iván Cepeda in this month’s presidential elections. Quilcué, who previously led CRIC and was openly supported by the organization in her vice-presidential bid, had pushed the dispute, claimed Valencia.
“Instead of deciding to resolve the issues, the Nasa then decided to advance and invade the Misak territory,” she added.
Allowed to fester
According to an analysis by El Espectador, the conflict stemmed from a misunderstanding of 2023’s ANT declaration, which was an interim finding leaving a “wide margin of interpretation” for who owned the land.
Nasa interpreted the finding as an excuse to use the land traditionally inhabited by Misak, and in return the Misak community blocked access roads.
In March this year the governor of the Pitayó reserve Edinson Pacho condemned the Misak for causing economic damage to farmers unable to take their products to market.
In turn, this week Misak representative Liliana Pechenche accused the “armed forces of the CRIC” – the Guardia Indigena – of killing at least two Misak men and kidnapped 10 more of the Guambia community during the escalation.
She also denied the Misak were armed, claiming this was false information spread by the Nasa to justify their armed incursion: “We are at risk of physical extermination through persecution; we are a peaceful people.”
Both sides agreed on one thing: that the government and its ANT agency had allowed the misunderstanding to fester for several years despite warning signs that violence was brewing.
CRIC, which according to its website represents many indigenous groups including Misak in Cauca, rejected the appropriation of the conflict by national politicians.
“These situations cannot be used to deepen the division between fraternal communities,” it said in a statement.
“These conflicts…are the result of historical decisions and institutional omissions …to generate disputes, confusion, fragmentation and confrontations between indigenous groups,” it concluded.
By Friday a tense calm had settled on the area according to observers, with hopes for a quiet weekend before talks planned for next week.
On April 20, the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) – Colombia’s transitional justice mechanism – released a report on the impacts suffered by animals in the context of the armed conflict.
The JEP’s report, conducted in partnership with the University of Essex, found that an animal is killed or injured every 30 minutes due to the armed conflict.
Animal rights activists say the release represents a step forward in publicizing the often invisibilized violence inflicted upon animals in war.
The report was developed through the construction of a database using 237 national, regional, and local media outlets, and 600 X accounts belonging to social and environmental organizations, as well as State entities and multilateral organizations.
Based on the information collected, they made an individual categorization referring to domestic animals, and a collective one referring to species, that is, wild animals. In this context, 100,252 domestic animals faced violence and 44 species are at imminent risk of extinction as a result of the armed conflict.
Thirty-two percent of the recorded cases involving animals were directly linked to military actions, including armed confrontations, ambushes, and attacks. The impacts were not distributed evenly across the territory; there are regions where armed conflict, illegal economies, and environmental richness converge, intensifying the harm. For example, Antioquia is the department with the highest concentration of species threatened by the conflict.
“We realized that most cases involved incidents such as accidents with landmines, anti-personnel mines, ambushes against the public security forces, harassment of the public security forces, and armed confrontations. These were some of the situations in which animals were killed or injured. They were also affected by forced displacement,” Laura Ojeda, a researcher on the JEP’s Investigation and Prosecution Unit who contributed to the report, explained.
Forced abandonment was one of the most documented forms of harm identified in the report, largely because it was closely tied to the victimization of caregivers within the dynamics of the conflict. 27% of the recorded cases — corresponding to approximately 900,000 animals — involved forced abandonment.
The report also identified nine ways in which animals were used throughout the armed conflict: as means of transportation; as devices to detonate explosive artifacts; as instruments to inflict pain and suffering – torture –; as sentinels for rapid alerts; as surveillance tools; in practices of bioterrorism involving zoonotic diseases; as propaganda tools; as amulets or part of esoteric rituals; and as a means to intimidate communities and extort payments from business owners and farmers.
Visibilizing animal suffering
The report comes as part of the JEP’s efforts to recognize the environment within its processes of justice, truth, and reparation. This release, the third in a series of three, is the first to focus on the specific forms of violence suffered by animals.
“It is part of a strategy to recognize all forms of life that have been victims of the armed conflict in Colombia,” Ojeda told The Bogotá Post.
For Senator Andrea Padilla of the Green Alliance (Alianza Verde) party, the report represents a major step forward for animal rights.
She notes that harm to animals is usually addressed as a collateral issue, as damage to property under a framework of harm to human assets.
“Animals have always been excluded from any moral consideration, from any legal consideration, even from news coverage,” the senator told The Bogotá Post.
Senator Andrea Padilla delivers a speech on animal rights. Image credit: @andreanimalidad via X
The team behind the report faced the challenge of shifting the narrative away from the legal framework which refers to animals only as part of the natural environment.
Instead, it adopted a “differential” approach from natural sciences, in collaboration with La Enredadera & co, a scientific outreach collective.
For Luis Carlos Posso, anthropologist and member of the collective, the report represents an exception to the “unavoidable anthropocentrism permeating the law.”
Senator Padilla highlighted the animal rights implications: “I believe it is only fair that sentient beings capable of emotions, affection, and social, moral, and emotional lives are also considered as affected by the conflict.”
Padilla added that understanding the impact of the conflict on animals deepens the appreciation of the human toll of violence.
“When we understand that there are bonds of affection there, family bonds that are abruptly broken by war, we can also see the conflict in a deeper way — that is, we can understand the deepest forms of harm being caused,” said the senator.
Animals as victims of the armed conflict
In addition to detailing the harms inflicted upon animals, the report proposes various reparative measures. These include habitat restoration, veterinary care in conflict zones, public veterinary care networks, the inclusion of animals in memory and truth processes, protection measures for at-risk species, and conservation initiatives.
However, there is still a long way to go before animals can be fully recognized as victims.
“Legally they are not things, but they are also not rights-holders. If they are not rights-holders, they cannot be recognized as victims,” explains Ojeda.
Colombian law recognizes animals as sentient beings, and laws such as the Ángel Law reflect significant progress in their rights. Currently, there is a bill advancing in congress that seeks to historically and legally recognize animals and ecosystems as victims of the internal armed conflict, prohibiting their use as instruments of war and ordering their essential reparation. This is Bill No. 012 of 2025, led by Senator Esmeralda Hernández of the Pacto Histórico party.
Senator Padilla explained that the success of the legal changes will depend on whoever is elected as the next president.
“Undoubtedly, this report holds great value. It not only offers another perspective on the armed conflict, but also explicitly incorporates animals into the analysis of war, harm, and peace,” said Senator Padilla. She added that animals must be involved in reparations processes, insisting, “peace must include animals, or it will not be complete.”
Totó la Momposina at the Sala Barts, Barcelona. Image credit: Dani Alvarez via Flickr
Colombia is mourning the death of legendary singer and dancer Totó la Momposina, the artist who carried the rhythms of the Caribbean coast to audiences around the world.
Totó’s death was disclosed in a statement by Colombia’s Ministry of Culture today, which described her as “the eternal master”, praising her decades-long contribution to Cumbia, Porro, Mapalé and Bullerengue music.
Her family confirmed that Totó died on Sunday, May 17, in Celaya, Mexico at age 85, after years battling neurocognitive health complications.
Born Sonia Bazanta Vides in 1940 in Talaigua Nuevo, Bolívar, near the historic river town of Mompox, Totó devoted her life to preserving and promoting traditional Caribbean music rooted in African, Indigenous and Spanish influences.
For more than six decades, Totó became the voice of Colombia’s Caribbean soul. Raised in a musical family — her father was a drummer and her mother a singer and dancer — she began performing at an early age before later studying folklore and music in Bogotá, Paris and Cuba.
In 1982, she accompanied Gabriel García Márquez to Stockholm during his Nobel Prize ceremony, where she performed Colombian Caribbean music before international dignitaries — a moment that became part of the country’s cultural history.
Her international breakthrough came with the 1993 album La Candela Viva, released through Peter Gabriel’s Real World label, which introduced global audiences to the song “El Pescador” and to authentic Colombian rhythms.
Over the years, Totó collaborated with and influenced artists across genres, while her music was sampled by international musicians including Jay-Z and Major Lazer. Her song “Latinoamérica” alongside Calle 13 won her two Latin Grammy Awards in 2011. She officially retired from performing in 2022 due to health complications.
Totó received numerous honors throughout her career, including the Womex Award in 2006, Colombia’s Life and Work Award in 2011, and the Latin Grammy Award for Musical Excellence in 2013.
Colombian President Gustavo Petro honored the singer in a post on X today, calling her “an exalted figure of Colombian Caribbean art and culture,” adding, “may she fly high to the stars.”
Her family also announced that a tribute honoring the singer-songwriter will be held on May 27 at the National Capitol in Bogotá, as the country prepares to bid farewell to one of the most influential voices in its cultural history.
Clarito Moreno holds a picture of her missing daughter. Image credit: @clarita_moreno23 via instagram
On May 13, Claribel Moreno was found dead in a rural area of Jamundí, Valle del Cauca, after spending almost five years dedicated to searching for her daughter demanding truth, justice, and reparations.
Moreno was shot four times while riding a motorcycle, according to authorities, who added that investigations into who the shooting are ongoing.
Activist groups say the killing highlights the pattern of violence against women in Colombia and the perils of seeking truth and justice.
Moreno’s daughter, Natalia Buitrago, was 22 when she disappeared in Cartagena on August 18, 2021, after reportedly traveling with friends and her husband to celebrate her birthday.
Moreno accused Natalia’s husband, Hernán Darío Jiménez, of being behind her disappearance, citing a history of domestic violence. She highlighted alleged inconsistencies and contradictions in his testimony and said that years earlier he had been arrested in Mexico City for involvement in a drug trafficking network.
According to a statement from feminist collectives supporting Moreno’s search for justice, there is evidence that plane tickets were purchased in Natalia’s name and that she had left the country. It also alleged thauit immigration authorities and other state entities have not responded to this matter.
Moreno conducted her own investigation: she traveled to Cartagena, Bogotá, and Pereira to gather testimonies and information in the hope of clarifying what happened and finding her daughter. She always stressed that she believed her daughter had been a victim of human trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation.
Following that, she said she faced threats and physical attacks, which forced her other daughter to leave the country. Moreno denounced this harassment to the media and in congressional hearings, as well as criticizing what she described as failures in the investigations, as well as institutional and state abandonment and revictimization.
“I feel that the Colombian State abandoned me throughout this process, in this search. Today I call on all of you who are present here to help me in this search and not to leave all the mothers forgotten, nor our daughters. My daughter Natalia deserves to be searched for, she deserves to be found,” she said in a congressional hearing.
As part of the search for her daughter, Moreno created social media accounts such as TikTok and Instagram to raise awareness about the case. She danced like her daughter in videos explaining the case and embraced youthful audiovisual languages to help the message reach more people. Moreno became known online and among victims groups for leading the search for her daughter ever since.
“She tried to raise awareness about the case through digital media; she more or less understood how public opinion works. Women searching for their loved ones instinctively understand what they need to do to make noise,” said Isabella Vargas, activist with the Olga Castillo collective – a feminist collective that accompanied Castillo, another mother who sought justice for her daughter, who was sexually abused by U.S. military personnel.
Feminist and women’s collectives in Bogotá that knew Moreno organized a gathering at the Pola monument on May 15 to commemorate her. Claribel was close to the feminist movement and attended its gatherings carrying her purple and pink sign demanding justice for her daughter: “Not all of us are here, Natalia is missing.”
“She was a woman who found refuge in the feminist movement. She reached out to us on several occasions, participated in our sit-ins and marches, and we embraced her in her struggle… It deeply pains us because this struggle has been about finding justice for all of us. It hurts us greatly that another mother is gone and that the State left her unprotected. We hold the State responsible,” Vargas said.
With an altar, candles, flowers, a bonfire, and a speech about conscientious objection to sexual exploitation, the tribute demanded justice for both Moreno and her daughter.
Abelardo de la Espriella supporters drive down Avenida La Esmeralda in Bogota on May 17, 2026. Image credit: John Boscawen.
Hundreds of cars briefly blocked all three lanes of Avenida La Esmeralda in the center of Bogotá on Sunday afternoon as supporters of hard-right Abelardo de la Espriella gathered to show their support for his candidacy two weeks before the presidential elections kick off.
De la Espriella himself was campaigning in Valledupar, but his campaign called for Abelardistas in over 70 municipalities around the country to come out and show their support by convening a noisy caravan.
While many Colombian families relaxed in neighboring Parque Simón Bolívar, a few hundred die-hard supporters of the far-right populist showman answered the call.
The hallmark of de la Espriella’s campaign for the presidency is its promotion of sincere patriotic fervour, and this passion was very much on display.
Colombian flags and football jerseys, vallenato, vuvuzelas, balloons and the words “Firme por la Patria” (Steadfast for the Homeland) abounded.
While the lanes filled up, the self-titled Defensores de la Patria (Defenders of the Homeland) honked their horns, danced, took photos, chatted and saluted one another. Some applied camouflage paint to their faces to get in character.
Vendors were selling Colombia flags and mango biche while children danced to songs hailing El Tigre’s achievements and virtues.
Some Abelardistas donned fake military fatigues and camouflage face paint. Image credit: John Boscawen.
Speaking to The Bogotá Post, some of those present said they were attracted to de la Espriella as an aspirational figure who makes them feel proud to be Colombian. Others are attracted by his personal values.
For Adriana, waving her flag in the middle of the road, “it is very important that he is a family man, he works hard for his family, he takes his family with him everywhere, and they are very close.”
She believes young people turn to crime because they lack the pride and self-confidence to make something of themselves, describing Abelardo as the kind of role model who could “inspire young people to make a positive contribution to society.”
Others had come along to demonstrate their implacable opposition to a government led by Iván Cepeda, the left-wing candidate currently leading in the polls.
Aron, wearing a baseball cap emblazoned with de la Espriella’s face, is saluting passersby. He explained his view that, “Petro is a socialist, but Cepeda is a communist. Petro is progressive, but Cepeda wants to completely change the country. He doesn’t believe in private property.”
His friend, Doris, added that, “Cepeda will take us down the path of Venezuela.”
Time and again participants reported that they believe Abelardo will bring freedom to Colombia.
For some, that meant freedom of speech, which they feel has been curtailed under Petro.
For others, freedom meant freedom from crime and corruption, which Abelardo will end by “ruling with an iron fist.”
For yet others, freedom meant an end to economic regulations that they see as inhibiting economic competition.
Everyone who spoke to The Bogotá Post said Colombia needed “saving” from something – which varied from person to person – and that Abelardo was that “savior”.
One man even said, “If we don’t win, they will have stolen it from us.” Accounts affiliated to de la Espriella’s campaign have been disseminating fake polling that shows him winning 86% of the vote.
Nevertheless, his supporters are pragmatic enough to vote tactically. Every person I spoke to admitted they would vote for right-wing Paloma Valencia in the second round, if Abelardo does not get through, in order to keep Cepeda from power. After an hour of stationary honking, the convoy, led by an enormous dumpster truck, set off on its tour of the city, and the mango biche sellers drifted back into the park.
Less than three weeks before Colombians head to the polls in presidential elections, centrist candidate Claudia Lopez’s odds at victory are slim, to say the least.
Since winning the primary contest to lead the Consultation of Solutions (Consulta de las Soluciones) bloc in March, the silver-haired former mayor of Bogotá has been criss-crossing the country to win over moderate voters.
But the latest polls report the 56-year-old’s share of the vote as being in the low single digits.
Dressed in her signature gilet and sipping from a mug of coffee, the former Harvard University guest lecturer says in flawless English that she wants to do the interview in Spanish – “I need to get people to vote for me,” she jokes.
With little to lose, López speaks candidly about her time in office, her views on other politicians, and her experience on the campaign trail.
Watch the full interview here
Reflections on her mayorship
López, who steered Bogotá through the Covid-19 pandemic and a mass wave of anti-government protests, speaks proudly of her stint as mayor from 2020 to 2024.
The presidential hopeful rattles off a list of her achievements in office: her management of the Covid-19 pandemic, lifting 600,000 women out of poverty, and rolling out Bogotá’s public bicycle network.
López also speaks candidly about the problems during her mayorship, which spanned the administrations of presidents Iván Duque and Gustavo Petro.
“Interestingly, I ended up having an easier relationship with President Duque, a right-winger, than with my left-wing president, whom I voted for,” says López.
López, who publicly backed Petro’s candidacy, describes friction between the national government and the mayor’s office.
“President Petro is an effusive leader, but he is too effusive, very machista, and I, well, I don’t agree with that; if there’s one thing I can’t stand in my life, it’s the abuse of power.”
On the campaign trail
Today, the former senator finds herself trying to carve out a place in a noisy election cycle marked by political extremes and polarization.
Her coalition’s platform is based on three pillars: security and territorial governance; equality and social justice; and regional development without corruption.
López’s shift to the center has drawn some criticism, including from voters who note the former Green Alliance member’s u-turn on key environmental issues like fracking.
Last year, she declared: “If god gave us oil, coal, and gas, that is what we will use.”
“I maintain this stance,” insists López, adding she opposes the Petro administration’s pause on all oil and gas exploration. “Stopping gas exploration means halting Colombia’s energy transition – it’s a mistake.”
López argues the policy has damaged the economy and reduced funds for investment and development.
Instead, she backs a gradual transition: “I estimate that the transition in Colombia from fossil fuels to cleaner energy sources will take us about 25 years, give or take.”
The candidate believes in preserving biodiversity, saying she would not authorize mineral exploration in the country’s forests or protected areas, marking a softer stance than some of her opponents.
Among her rivals, López is especially critical of right-wing criminal defense attorney Abelardo de la Espriella.
“He is the only candidate – let’s put it this way – whom I would absolutely never vote for. He is a defender of mobsters. He is a shadowy character,” says López.
De la Espriella notoriously represented figures linked to paramilitary death squads, the head of the worst pyramid scheme in Colombian history, and Alex Saab, considered the frontman for corruption schemes by former Venezuelan dictator Nicolas Maduro.
López argues that he is an Uribista – a supporter of the politics of right-wing ex-president Álvaro Uribe – but is on a different “side of the coin” to Uribe’s chosen candidate, Paloma Valencia.
“Paloma is definitely a supporter of Uribe, but she’s never exactly been a defender of mobsters,” explains López.
The ex-mayor refused to rule out voting for Valencia or for leftist candidate Ivan Cepeda, the two frontrunners alongside de la Espriella.
But López, a lesbian woman, is staunchly critical of Valencia’s stance on LGBTQ+ rights. The candidate for Uribe’s Democratic Center (Centro Democrático) party opposes adoption by same-sex couples while her party has blocked bans on conversion therapy.
She is particularly critical of Juan Daniel Oviedo, a gay politician, for agreeing to be Valencia’s running mate in March.
“I regret that Juan Daniel Oviedo feels compelled to play along with that anti-rights agenda. In fact, I believe he is the only person who has been told to his face that he is not considered an equal human being, that he is not considered a citizen with the same rights, and that they do not trust him to raise a child,” says López.
Despite her objections to Valencia, López says she still will not rule out voting for her in the second round, citing the improbable possibility that Paloma faces de la Espriella in a run-off.
But the former mayor maintains she would not endorse Valencia and Oviedo in any eventuality: “I wouldn’t campaign for them, ask anyone to vote for them, or endorse them.”
Looking to the future
Finally, faced with nearly impossible odds in May’s elections, López projects a springy optimism about her political future.
“I’m very happy with the campaign I’ve run, and I’m very grateful to the Colombian people,” says the candidate, stressing that it is just her first stab at the presidency.
“Ours is a new grassroots movement; we only just collected the signatures last year, so I feel grateful, happy, and very excited, and I’m going to continue in politics and continue working to build Colombian social democracy.”
Delcy Rodríguez and Gustavo Petro pictured at a meeting in Caracas in April. Image credit: Colombia President’s Office.
The Venezuelan government on Wednesday published a declaration saying it regretted recent violence in the Catatumbo region of Colombia just days after Bogotá announced bombing in cooperation with Caracas.
The statement muddies the waters about whether or not Venezuela was involved in the military operations against the National Liberation Army (ELN) rebels near the two countries’ joint border, which allegedly killed 7 guerrilla fighters.
“The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela expresses its profound concern and regrets the escalation of violence in the border region of Catatumbo,” read a statement shared on X by Foreign Minister Yvan Gil.
The declaration came after Colombian President Gustavo Petro said on Monday that he had ordered the bombing in cooperation with Venezuela.
“I gave the order to bomb the ELN camp in accordance with the agreement reached with the Bolivarian government of Venezuela,” wrote Petro on X.
Petro appeared to allude to an agreement with Caracas to cooperate on tackling cross-border crime following his visit to Venezuela in April.
But Caracas appeared to wash its hands of the recent bombing operation; while it did not directly acknowledge the bombing or Petro’s statement, its declaration said that it “rejects any armed action that compromises the peace, stability, and security of border communities.”
It added that the only way to preserve peace and stability in the region is through “mechanisms of understanding and mutual respect, avoiding actions that can aggravate tensions or generate greater risks for border populations, who for decades have faced the consequences of a conflict out of their control.”
Since last year, Catatumbo has been the site of what has been described as “the most serious humanitarian crisis of recent times” in Colombia. In January 2025, a family of three, including a nine-month-old baby, was killed, marking the collapse of fragile peace pacts between the ELN and the Frente 33 – a dissident faction of the demobilized FARC rebels – and triggering a humanitarian crisis on a scale not seen in the country for over a decade.
The Red Cross said that 2025 was one of the most complicated years for humanitarian conditions in Colombia: more than 235,000 people were individually displaced, over 176,000 people have been unable to move freely because of armed conflict, and there has also been a sharp increase in cases of mass displacements.
Venezuela’s statement highlights the cross-border nature of the conflict, noting that the country “has historically suffered the consequences of Colombian internal conflict.” Colombian armed groups like the ELN and dissident FARC factions have traditionally had a significant presence in Venezuela and were known to have ties to the Nicolás Maduro regime.
But both the interim government under Delcy Rodríguez and Petro have been under pressure from the White House to confront guerrilla groups.
2025 was worst humanitarian crisis in over a decade, says report.
Delegates from the International Committee of the Red Cross in Colombia. Photo: ICRC
Colombia’s armed groups must stop targeting civilians, urged the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) this week in a report highlighting the country’s intensifying conflict.
In 2025 the impact of armed conflict on communities was the worst recorded in a decade, said the ICRC, with all indicators showing mistreatment of civilians on the rise.
Quoting statistics from Colombia’s victim support unit – the UARIV – the human rights organization reported more than 87,000 persons displaced in mass events by conflict or threats, and a further 235,000 forced to uproot their lives individually.
Also in 2025, at various times more almost 177,000 people were confined in their communities by aggression by armed groups, either by combat or closing of transport routes.
And in a shocking figure, 965 persons were killed or injured by explosives, often delivered by drones, an increase of 34% on the previous year (2024). Most victims were civilians.
“The scale of this human tragedy cannot be described by numbers alone but is reflected in the suffering of entire communities living in fear of fighting,” said the ICRCs Colombia chief Olivier Dubois, presenting the findings.
“Families are forced to leave everything behind in order to survive, the search for thousands of missing persons, and the shattered lives of boys and girls scarred by war,” he added.
New forms of warfare
The ICRC has a key role in promoting International Humanitarian Law (IHL) in armed conflicts – the so-called ‘rules of war’ – of which an important part is keeping civilians out of the crossfire. The Geneva-based organization, which has been present in Colombia for decades, said upholding these rules depended on decisions by the armed actors themselves.
This was an increasingly difficult task given the breakdown of formerly hierarchical armed groups into numerous factions. And with new forms of warfare.
“In 2025, our teams worked in a context marked by the intensification and transformation of armed conflict dynamics, including an increasing use of new technologies, such as the use of drones, with significant consequences on civilians’ daily lives,” said Dubois.
The increase of explosive hazards – booby traps, landmines and drone bombs – affected civilians as clashes intensified in departments such as Norte de Santander, Cauca, Antioquia and Valle.
In these areas a total of 75 civilians were affected by landmines, and more than 540 injured or killed by “controlled detonation devices and launched explosive devices”, a term that includes a range of improvised devices from roadside bombs to armed drones and clumsy pipe mortars firing cooking gas cylinders packed with explosives.
Intimidation and power
The rise in drone-dropped bombs had not only intensified in the conflict but “generated fear, uncertainty and serious harm among affected communities”.
The report also described scant regard for civilian spaces as explosives were found scattered in fields, roads and even schools, stated the report.
“The way in which hostilities are conducted, and weapons are used, has direct implications for civilians and civilian property”, it added.
The ICRC also warned of the horror of sexual violence within the conflict framework, though often hidden and unreported. From its own presence in zones dominated by armed groups, the ICRC was aware that rape and abuse survivors faced stigmatization and fear of reprisals.
This created barriers for victims seeking care and assistance and under-reporting of cases: “The available figures do not reflect the true scale of this phenomenon,” said the report.
Armed groups used sexual violence as a form of intimidation and a show of power, but in some cases also as a form of punishment in communities under their control.
The report also called on armed groups to stop recruiting minors: “No person under the age of 18 should be recruited, used or involved in hostilities under any circumstances,” it said.
The humanitarian crisis observed last year was not a sudden phenomenon, explained the ICRC, but rather the culmination of year-on deterioration since 2018.
Bad month for civilians
A public bus burnt by armed men on a highway on May 12th. Photo: X
The report follows a calamitous month for Colombia in terms of civilian victims. In late April, 21 bus passengers were killed in Cauca when the EMC armed group exploded a roadside bomb by a queue of stopped traffic.
And in early May a young journalist was tortured and murdered by suspected Frente 36 dissidents in a rural area close to Briceño, Antioquia.
The report’s findings chime with those from thinktanks and UN agencies that have rung alarm bells over growing conflict and abuses by armed groups.
In February, UNICEF warned of a spike in child recruitment with numbers rising 400 per cent over five years, with one minor forced into conflict on average every 20 hours.
The same month thinktank Fundacion Ideas para la Paz (FIP) published data showing that Colombia’s illegal armed groups had grown by 84 per cent during the three years of the Petro government’s Paz Total policy
Armed groups had cynically used rounds of negotiations to expand both in numbers and territory, FIP analyst Gerson Arias told The Bogotá Post.
“As such, the policy gave a gigantic strategic advantage to the armed groups to strengthen their fighting forces,” he said.
War without ideology
A common theme between conflict commentators was the lack of ideology among today’s armed groups, lowering any humanitarian impulses. This even though these groups at times mimicked the uniforms, logos and terminology of former rebel movements with social agendas such as the FARC-EP.
“Any ideological dimension of these groups has been replaced by the dynamics of illegal markets,” Gerson told The Bogotá Post last week. “The dimension now is military strength to sustain those markets.”
From the 1960s to the 1980s Colombia’s guerrilla movements were close to rural communities. That relationship was now predatory, said Gerson. “Communities in Cauca, for example, don’t feel represented or protected by these armed groups who attack them, confine them and recruit their children,” he explained.
The question now is: will the current crop of combatants heed the ICRC’s call this week to respect civilian communities?
ICRC’s Olivier Dubois said that while the context was challenging, international humanitarian law should be foremost in the minds of all fighters in the conflict.
In particular, he called on armed groups to protect children from war, and respect spaces such as schools. He also called for an end to forced disappearances, of which the ICRC recorded 308 new cases last year, on top of the 132,000 historical cases reported by the authorities over six decades of conflict.
“No one should go missing, and no family should have to endure the uncertainty of not knowing what happened or where their loved one is. Preventing the disappearance of persons is an obligation imposed by Interntional Humanitarian Law on all parties to armed conflicts,” he said.
“Upholding international humanitarian law is fundamental to limit suffering in armed conflicts. When these rules are not respected, suffering is exacerbated”.
A crowd at International Workers’ Day in Medellín, 2026. Image credit: Cristina Dorado Suaza.
Colombian Minister of Labor, Antonio Sanguino, said the government was “on the verge” of issuing a decree outlining a path to collective reparations for trade unions at a rally in Medellín on May 1.
The government had previously pledged to pay state reparations to the trade unions movement, which it has recognized as a victim of the Colombian armed conflict.
Colombia remains one of the most dangerous countries in the world for trade unionists, accounting for 63% of all anti-union murders worldwide between 1971 and 2023, according to the Ministry of Labor of Colombia, citing data from the International Labour Organization (ILO).
The ministry had previously announced that President Gustavo Petro would sign a decree on May 1 establishing “180 remedial measures for the labor movement.”
While the measure did not materialize on International Workers’ Day, Sanguino maintained it was imminent and hailed the symbolic importance of the historic plans, telling the crowd, “so that our dead are not forgotten, so that our disappeared are present in every action of the government.”
The measures are part of the integrated collective reparation plan (PIRC) created under the umbrella of the peace process by the Victims Unit. The PIRC was developed in collaboration with labor unions and victims—a historic milestone for the Colombian trade union movement which suffered 15,481 acts of violence between 1970 and 2021.
On May 1st, thousands of Colombian workers gathered in Parque de las Luces in Medellín for International Workers’ Day.
The march began at the Teatro Pablo Tobón Uribe at 9:00 AM while an event scheduled for 12:30 p.m. saw the president and members of his cabinet give speeches alongside social organizations and labor unions.
Speaking at the rally, Sanguino praised the city and the province’s workers: “Antioquia is a people that resists—a resilient people that has fought for its rights and for workers’ rights since the time of María Cano… Today is not Labor Day—work is an activity. It is Workers’ Day.”
Gustavo Petro speaks at International Workers’ Day in Medellín, 2026. Image credit: Cristina Dorado Suaza.
Meanwhile, the crowd chanted “Antioquia is not (ex-President Álvaro) Uribe.” Banners and signs praised Gustavo Petro and his administration. There were also slogans and imagery referencing figures such as Betsabé Espinal – the Antioquian woman who led the first women’s strike in Colombia – and Che Guevara.
“I went out to march for workers’ rights because today, as every year, each and every worker in this country is recognized,” said Gladys Maya, a teacher.
The Colombian government outlined its progress on labor rights and the measures included in the labor reform: increasing the “living” minimum wage, reducing working hours, improving pay for night shifts and Sunday work, and raising benefits for older adults.
“This is not a favor; it is justice,” said Claribed Palacios, president of the Unión de Trabajadoras Afrocolombianas del Servicio Doméstico – an Afro-Colombian domestic workers’ union – regarding progress in labor rights for workers in the sector under the new government, such as mandatory formal employment contracts.
The rally also addressed the status of the pension reform, with Gustavo Petro urging the Constitutional Court of Colombia to fully approve it.
“Dignity is the foundation of the human person, and it is achieved when a person can feel that their rights are beginning to be realized and respected. Dignity is what we bring today,” said Petro.
The president also spoke about the upcoming elections, saying that his government will guarantee democracy through a “free and dignified vote,” but that he “hopes” the next administration will continue the change and social reforms.
“Let them not return us to horror; let them not return us to La Escombrera,” said Petro, referring to a mass grave uncovered in Medellín’s Comuna 13 district.
As the civilian death toll rises to 21, here’s a closer look at conflict in southwest Colombia.
Police anti-explosives experts remove half a tonne of explosives from a drainage channel in Cauca last week. The find follows a deadly attack by dissidents that killed 21 travelers. Photo: Policia Nacional
Colombian armed group the Estado Mayor Central (EMC) has admitted its role in the massive roadside bomb near the small town of Cajibío that killed 21 civilians and injured 60 others in Cauca on April 25, the worst such attack in the country’s recent history.
In a message, the EMC said “we cannot hide or justify the error” which resulted from buried explosives aimed at military targets but which they detonated in a queue of vehicles held at a roadblock.
Cajibío was one of 37 coordinated attacks over five days in Cauca and the neighboring Valle department, conflict analyst Gerson Arias of Fundacion Ideas para la Paz (FIP) told The Bogotá Post.
“This was a message of terror from the EMC who wanted to show their military superiority in the region,” he maintained.
And despite admitting its error, the EMC showed no signs of slowing its offensive in recent days. On Thursday police experts defused 600 kilos of explosives found wedged in a drainage tunnel near Piendamó, Cauca, potentially avoiding a fresh tragedy.
Civilian targets
Military sources told news media after the Cajibío bomb that the EMC fighters had likely set a trap on the Via Panamericana, the main route linking Cali and Popayán. They buried the massive bomb then forced trucks to block the highway before retreating to the wooded hillsides as a long queue of traffic formed on the busy road.
When troops arrived in their heavily armored tanquetas – fortified troop carriers with turret guns – they sensed a trap and parked several hundred meters from the blocked road, then moved on foot through the wooded hillside to engage the guerrillas.
An EMC fighter then remotely detonated the roadside bomb striking 15 civilian vehicles, killing 21 people and injuring 60. The combatants escaped in the aftermath.
Arias believes that despite their original plan to kill military targets, the EMC fighters chose to blow up civilian vehicles: “They decided to detonate; it was a decision by the EMC.”
Vehicles damaged by the roadside bomb at El Tunel, Cajibío, Cauca last April 25. Photo: X.
The resulting carnage was one of the highest civilian death tolls from a single incident in Colombian history, last seen on this scale in 2002 when a gas cylinder packed with high explosives detonated in a church in Bojayá, Chocó, killing 79 local people.
The deadly nature of homemade bombs, or ‘IEDs’ as they are called in military parlance (Improvised Explosive Devices), was shown again in August last year when 13 policemen were killed in Antioquia by a buried cylinder bomb that destroyed a helicopter.
Armed groups growing
Who was behind the Cajibío bomb? The EMC are remnants of the FARC’s 6th Front, formed by guerrillas that rejected the 2016 peace process, now called ‘disidencias’, or dissidents.
The EMC still uses the FARC name, uniforms and logo, and its leaders mimic the ideology of former FARC icons such as ‘Tirofijo’ insisting it is a “political insurgent force”.
Last week Colombia’s defense minister was swift to blame the EMC’s Frente Jaime Martínez which is under the command of alias Marlon, a former FARC commander freed from jail in 2016 as a signatory to the peace deal but who returned to the fray.
The Cauca-based Frente Jaime Martínez numbered around 600 combatants, one of the most powerful units in the Bloque Occidental of the EMC, explained Arias. FIP data showed the EMC numbering around 3,300 fighters spread across southern Colombia, an estimated growth of 23% during 2025. Around 60% of those were concentrated in southwest Colombia.
“Cauca is a strategic point for illicit mining and narcotrafficking, all the armed groups are seeking dominance, and this means intensive recruitment of young people into their ranks,” said Arias.
Cauca’s Andean massif, rugged highlands that provide shelter for armed groups. Photo: S. Hide.
The mountainous department is a heartland of Colombia’s illicit economies, straddling both the Andean cordillera and the Pacific lowlands with topography perfect for both hiding rebel armies and providing lush hillsides for coca crops and marijuana.
Cocaine production needs large cropping areas, 32,000 hectares of coca bushes covered the Cauca hillsides by the last count (Indepaz, 2024). And since Spanish colonial times the lowland riverbeds have provided a source of gold, today mined illegally with destructive heavy machinery paid for by cocaine profits.
Inland links
Cauca has no proper roads linking the highlands coast, though there are numerous clandestine ‘conflict tracks’, mule trails and navigable rivers to the Pacific. A labyrinth of mangrove swamps provides cover for boats running an estimated 70% of Colombia’s cocaine product to central America and beyond.
The department’s east is formed by the ‘Cauca Boot’, a foot-shaped chunk of mountainous terrain long held by rebel groups which penetrates as far as the Caquetá jungle linking the eastern Llanos plains and Amazon region to the Pacific coast.
This corridor created a vital link between the interior of the country and the EMC’s Bloque Oriental, in the eastern plains and jungles, Arias told The Bogotá Post.
Map of Cauca and neighboring departments, and recent conflict events.
Cauca was also bisected by the Via Panamericana, the highway running down the mountain and linking three main cities – Cali, Popayán, Pasto – and on to Ecuador to the south. This neuralgic route was easily blocked or attacked by armed groups, he said.
Combat units like the Frente Jaime Martínez would likely have autonomy from the top leadership of the EMC and could plan and execute their own actions, explained Arias.
“They articulate and communicate with the EMC structure, but are not necessarily subordinate,” he said.
Failed peace plan
EMC message. They still use the FARC logo.
The EMC was originally included in Petro’s sweeping Paz Total (Total Peace) initiative in 2022, but after repeated infractions by the armed group – including murdering four indigenous children the group had forcibly recruited – talks broke down in 2024.
In October that year Petro called off the talks and ordered the military to attack EMC heartlands in Cauca. The ensuing Operation Perseus sparked intense combat around the town of El Plateado in the Micay Canyon, historically a hideout for the FARC and now an EMC stronghold.
FIP has been critical of Paz Total and in February this year published data showing that armed groups had used the façade of peace talks to expand both their ranks and territory.
According to Arias, Petro’s government failed to understand the strategic importance Cauca had to the armed groups, as well as underestimating the control the EMC had over local communities.
Many rural families were reliant on coca growing and gold mining in a region lacking state presence: “There’s been a historical process of armed groups coopting civilian and ethnic communities,” said Arias.
This was evident in the civilian uprisings – asonadas – against state forces leading to incidents such as the 57 soldiers forcibly detained by a community in El Tambo in June 2025.
But the armed groups also preyed on the host population, he said, particularly victimizing the indigenous communities which make up 20% of Cauca’s population. EMC commanders frequently forced indigenous youth to join their ranks, creating conflict with the Nasa and Misak people of the area.
Contacts ofThe Bogotá Post living in rural Cauca – who declined to be named – said that armed groups controlled communities with networks of spies and even used surveillance drones to monitor movements.
A person needing to travel in or out of the zone controlled by a particular armed group needed permission and had to carry ID cards issued by community councils under orders of the armed group.
Anyone rejecting these restrictions was threatened and displaced, and particularly social leaders who spoke out against the armed groups risked being assassinated: 12 in Cauca so far in 2026.
The Cauca cauldron
Strength in numbers was a contributing factor to EMC aggression in the region, said Arias. FIP data showed a steady increase in armed attacks against both civilian structures and military targets since 2016, peaking at 175 recorded incidents last year (see graph below).
Year on increase in coflict events, Cauca and Valle, 2010-2026. Source: FIP
Not all events involved state forces; the EMC was under pressure from rival groups such as the ELN, Segunda Marquetalia and EMBF dissidents. All want a share of Cauca’s illicit economies.
And while waging a conflict of asymmetric warfare, often resorting to terror tactics, the EMC was also demonstrating military dominance with armed drones that put the Colombian military on the back foot.
“Out of 500 attacks, 408 were using drones,” said Arias. “The conflict is changing direction, but state strategies are not adapting to respond to this new technology.”
But beyond a military response, the state needed to implement a strategy of well-planned and sustainable social interventions to stem the resurgence of the armed groups.
In Cauca, this was a huge challenge, said Arias. For now, groups like the EMC were sticking to illicit gold and narcotrafficking, even if it meant constant conflict to deter and weaken state forces.
“They are on the attack to show they are the bosses,” he said.
Medellín, Colombia – Medellín Mayor Federico Gutiérrez prompted outrage last week after “censoring” a new book on M-19 guerrilla history at a public library.
Gutiérrez cancelled a talk of the book on April 21, saying that it glorifies terrorism and has no place in a public library.
The cancellation has drawn widespread criticism, with many observers citing the hypocrisy of the move one month after UNESCO designated Medellín as its 2027 World Book Capital.
Shortly before an event for the book at a public library on April 21, Gutiérrez announced on X: “This event will be cancelled. In Medellin, there will never be room for the glorification of terrorism. The M-19 was not a ‘romantic tale’: it was a terrorist armed group that left victims, pain, and death in Colombia.”
Attendants at the packed auditorium were visibly opposed to the measure, according to newspaper El País. Although staff removed microphones and speakers and the police surrounded the building, spectators remained in their seats.
“Our city respects the memory of the victims; no to propaganda for those that wielded weapons. This event has an obviously political character, and no public entity can host it,” the mayor continued.
But the book’s author, sociology professor Jaime Rafael Nieto, insisted that the government should not be able to censor events like the one last week: “This is not a space for government officials, but for writers, artists and citizens,” he told Spanish newspaper El País via phone call.
The April 19th Movement (M-19) guerrilla was founded in the early 1970s and became a violent urban actor, perpetrating kidnappings and killings in cities as well as symbolic crimes including the theft of libertador Simon Bolívar’s sword from its resting place and the Palace of Justice siege which left over 100 dead.
Incumbent leftist Colombian President Gustavo Petro – who has routinely publicly clashed with rightist Gutiérrez – was an M-19 militant, operating under the nome de guerre “Aureliano”.
He joined in the criticism of Gutiérrez’s move, writing on X: “The M-19 after making peace, was a legal movement with legal status. What you’re doing is censorship. Those who censor books end up burning them, and then they end up burning humans at stakes. Don’t censor; let minds and thoughts be free.”
Medellín’s history of books: a reformed city
Colombia’s second-largest city has seen a 542% rise in bookstores over the past seven decades, and is home to over 110 bookstores and 25 libraries – many of which were transformed from former prisons and police facilities, as per UNESCO.
“Medellín has become an international reference for urban and cultural transformation, where books and libraries play a crucial role in bringing positive social change. [Its] designation as World Book Capital 2027 is a powerful message on how culture can build peace and social cohesion,” noted Khaled El-Enany, UNESCO director-general.
The city’s literary turn is thus inseparable from its broader reinvention. Having been named the world’s “murder capital” in 1991, when 16 people were murdered daily on average, it has spent decades recasting itself through culture and education.
In 2004, then-mayor Sergio Fajardo – now a presidential candidate for the upcoming May 31, 2026 election – deployed a plan to combat structural violent patterns, investing in the city’s poorest neighborhoods. Libraries, metrocables and cultural centers were planted in the hillside of comunas, once the most dangerous neighborhoods in the Americas.
Over a 15-year period, Medellin built 60 cultural facilities in areas with the highest poverty, historic violence and population densities, and by 2024, the city recorded 300 homicides per 100,000 people – the lowest since 1942.
The result is a city that has made literary culture central to its identity. Every September, the Fiesta del Libro y la Cultura (Celebration of Books and Culture) – backed by $9 billion Colombian pesos ($2.5 million USD) from the mayor’s office – draws hundreds of national and international guests to its botanical gardens, parks and cultural centers.
The city also hosts an annual edition of the Hay Festival, the prestigious Welsh literary gathering.
Banned in the city of books
Regardless of Mayor Gutiérrez’s disapproval, the event on April 21 continued, with organizers stressing they consulted with the attendees what they believed should be done.
“There were three options: cancelling the event, going someplace different, or reaffirming our condition of citizens which occupy the city’s public space,” they said. Meanwhile, Nieto confirmed that the launch had been scheduled a month prior, and that the decision to go ahead in spite of the mayor’s outrage was an “act of civil resistance.”
“[The book is about] interpreting how the M-19 emerged and what its characteristics were. It isn’t about justifying its actions, because then the investigation would take on a partisan bias, and that’s not the case,” the M-19: From War to Politics author added.
The M-19 has become a contentious subject in Colombian politics since the election of Petro in 2022 as the country’s first leftist president, although the group demobilized in 1990.
Petro joined the urban guerrilla at 17 years old, but not as a combatant. As per Colombian news outlet La silla vacía, he was arrested by armed forces in 1985, and spent 18 months in prison, where he directed the jail library.
One of Petro’s greatest feats as an M-19 militant, in fact, was promoting the peace process that saw the group’s turn to peace and legality from 1989 to 1990. Most recently, the head of state celebrated his birthday on the anniversary of the armed group’s founding.
Nieto believes that studying M-19 history is imperative to understanding Petro’s government, and his book’s thesis: the M-19 was the Colombian armed actor that best knew how to combine war with politics.
“Every act of war produced political effects. And that made it a political actor,” he told El País.
Medellín, Colombia – Medellín Mayor Federico Gutiérrez prompted outrage last week after “censoring” a new book on M-19 guerrilla history at a public library.
Gutiérrez cancelled a talk of the book on April 21, saying that it glorifies terrorism and has no place in a public library.
The cancellation has drawn widespread criticism, with many observers citing the hypocrisy of the move one month after UNESCO designated Medellín as its 2027 World Book Capital.
Shortly before an event for the book at a public library on April 21, Gutiérrez announced on X: “This event will be cancelled. In Medellin, there will never be room for the glorification of terrorism. The M-19 was not a ‘romantic tale’: it was a terrorist armed group that left victims, pain, and death in Colombia.”
Attendants at the packed auditorium were visibly opposed to the measure, according to newspaper El País. Although staff removed microphones and speakers and the police surrounded the building, spectators remained in their seats.
“Our city respects the memory of the victims; no to propaganda for those that wielded weapons. This event has an obviously political character, and no public entity can host it,” the mayor continued.
But the book’s author, sociology professor Jaime Rafael Nieto, insisted that the government should not be able to censor events like the one last week: “This is not a space for government officials, but for writers, artists and citizens,” he told Spanish newspaper El País via phone call.
The April 19th Movement (M-19) guerrilla was founded in the early 1970s and became a violent urban actor, perpetrating kidnappings and killings in cities as well as symbolic crimes including the theft of libertador Simon Bolívar’s sword from its resting place and the Palace of Justice siege which left over 100 dead.
Incumbent leftist Colombian President Gustavo Petro – who has routinely publicly clashed with rightist Gutiérrez – was an M-19 militant, operating under the nome de guerre “Aureliano”.
He joined in the criticism of Gutiérrez’s move, writing on X: “The M-19 after making peace, was a legal movement with legal status. What you’re doing is censorship. Those who censor books end up burning them, and then they end up burning humans at stakes. Don’t censor; let minds and thoughts be free.”
Medellín’s history of books: a reformed city
Colombia’s second-largest city has seen a 542% rise in bookstores over the past seven decades, and is home to over 110 bookstores and 25 libraries – many of which were transformed from former prisons and police facilities, as per UNESCO.
“Medellín has become an international reference for urban and cultural transformation, where books and libraries play a crucial role in bringing positive social change. [Its] designation as World Book Capital 2027 is a powerful message on how culture can build peace and social cohesion,” noted Khaled El-Enany, UNESCO director-general.
The city’s literary turn is thus inseparable from its broader reinvention. Having been named the world’s “murder capital” in 1991, when 16 people were murdered daily on average, it has spent decades recasting itself through culture and education.
In 2004, then-mayor Sergio Fajardo – now a presidential candidate for the upcoming May 31, 2026 election – deployed a plan to combat structural violent patterns, investing in the city’s poorest neighborhoods. Libraries, metrocables and cultural centers were planted in the hillside of comunas, once the most dangerous neighborhoods in the Americas.
Over a 15-year period, Medellin built 60 cultural facilities in areas with the highest poverty, historic violence and population densities, and by 2024, the city recorded 300 homicides per 100,000 people – the lowest since 1942.
The result is a city that has made literary culture central to its identity. Every September, the Fiesta del Libro y la Cultura (Celebration of Books and Culture) – backed by $9 billion Colombian pesos ($2.5 million USD) from the mayor’s office – draws hundreds of national and international guests to its botanical gardens, parks and cultural centers.
The city also hosts an annual edition of the Hay Festival, the prestigious Welsh literary gathering.
Banned in the city of books
Regardless of Mayor Gutiérrez’s disapproval, the event on April 21 continued, with organizers stressing they consulted with the attendees what they believed should be done.
“There were three options: cancelling the event, going someplace different, or reaffirming our condition of citizens which occupy the city’s public space,” they said. Meanwhile, Nieto confirmed that the launch had been scheduled a month prior, and that the decision to go ahead in spite of the mayor’s outrage was an “act of civil resistance.”
“[The book is about] interpreting how the M-19 emerged and what its characteristics were. It isn’t about justifying its actions, because then the investigation would take on a partisan bias, and that’s not the case,” the M-19: From War to Politics author added.
The M-19 has become a contentious subject in Colombian politics since the election of Petro in 2022 as the country’s first leftist president, although the group demobilized in 1990.
Petro joined the urban guerrilla at 17 years old, but not as a combatant. As per Colombian news outlet La silla vacía, he was arrested by armed forces in 1985, and spent 18 months in prison, where he directed the jail library.
One of Petro’s greatest feats as an M-19 militant, in fact, was promoting the peace process that saw the group’s turn to peace and legality from 1989 to 1990. Most recently, the head of state celebrated his birthday on the anniversary of the armed group’s founding.
Nieto believes that studying M-19 history is imperative to understanding Petro’s government, and his book’s thesis: the M-19 was the Colombian armed actor that best knew how to combine war with politics.
“Every act of war produced political effects. And that made it a political actor,” he told El País.