Have you done your traspaso? If not, read on….

Colombia’s cancilleria (foreign affairs ministry) was reminding foreign residents this week of the 2026 deadline to transfer their old resident visas to the new 5-year electronic visa scheme.

“Anyone with these visas, granted under previous regulations, must complete the mandatory process before October 31, 2026, before the Visa Authority,” announced the government, referring to resident ‘R’ visas issued before October, 2022, when new visa regulations came into effect.

Failure to transfer your visa by October 31 could lead to sanctions or even losing your residency status.

And even though the October deadline seems far away, the Cancilleria are expecting a flood of last-minute applications. Our advice is: don’t leave it to the last minute. Government websites are clunky at the best of times and you will need at least one appointment with Migración, which will be harder to get as the deadline approaches.

To avoid last-minute panic, here’s a quick Q and A to get ahead of the game…

I have a permanent ‘R’ residents visa in my passport. Surely that’s OK?

No. Under new laws passed in 2022 (law 5477 to be precise), all R visas for long-term residents are now subject to a transfer every five years, which also coincides with the lifespan of the Cedula Extranjeria (Colombian-issued ID card). So even if the visa stamp in your passport says indefinida, you still need to do the transfer.

The traspaso applies to:

• All Resident (R) visas issued before October 21, 2022.
• Any new R e-visas after five years (the expiry date is written on the visa).
• If you change passports for any reason (expired, lost or stolen).

If you have a passport about to expire it makes sense to renew the passport before the visa transfer.

So, do I have to start the whole visa application process again?

No. The traspaso is relatively simple and can be done mostly online, directly with the Cancilleria website. Although touted as a ‘transfer’, in most cases you will be issued with a new visa number in an electronic format that will be sent to you by email. You can then print your own e-visa and carry it with your passport and store it in your phone.

Other steps require visiting your nearest Migración office.

What are the steps?

1. Obtain your Migration Movement Certificate from the nearest Migration Office.
2. Apply online for visa traspaso. Wait for the e-visa to be issued.
3. Register your new e-visa and apply for a new Cedula Extranjeria ID card online.
4. Make an appointment with Migration Office for your biometric data.
5. Collect your new Cedula Extranjeria ID card.

How much does it cost?

Around US$ 213 in total at current exchange rates. This breaks down to: US$25 for the Migration Movement Certificate, US$54 for the visa study, US$54 for the visa issuance, US$80 for a new replacement ID card (Cedula de Extranjeria).

What’s the Migration Movement Certificate?

Before applying for the traspaso, you need to obtain Certificado de Movimientos Migratorios, which is a printed certificate issued by Migración showing your entrances and exits from Colombia. The purpose of the certificate is to show your presence in Colombia. If you have been absent from the country for more than two years your residency status is automatically cancelled. You can apply and pay for the certificate online at the Migración website Formulario Único de Trámites page.

Be careful to select the centro facilitador (Migration office) that is closest to you because you must collect the printed certificate in person from the office. Also select the 10-year option for the certificate’s timeframe.

Does that mean hours of queuing?

Not usually. One you have applied online, Migración will send you an email within three days notifying that your certificate is ready. You can go to the office and skip the lines by showing the email to the door staff. The counter staff will then print off the certificate. There is usually no need to make an appointment.

Can I get the certificate from overseas?

At present, Migración is only giving the option to collect the certificate in person in Colombia. This is one way to ensure that the visa holder is resident in Colombia. The option to collect in an overseas – i.e. at Colombian consulates – could change in the future.  

OK, so what about the visa transfer?

Now you need to the visa website at  www.cancilleria.gov.co, and navigate to the visa page called the SITAC. Note there are English and Spanish pages (the Spanish version sometimes works better).

Fill in your details to enter the system, then select ‘Visa traspaso’ from the dropdown menus. You will also be asked to click on the timeframe when your original ‘R’ visa was issued. You will then be told what documents to present; these can be uploaded in PDF.

What documents are required?

This varies depending on your type of Resident visa and when it was issued, but generally:

• Scan of your original R visa.
• Scan of your passport main page.
• Scan of your current Cedula Extranjeria.
• Scan of your most recent migration entry stamp to Colombia.
• Scan of your Migratory Movements Certificate issued by Migración.
• Letter requesting the transfer, explaining the reason for the request (i.e. ‘para cumplir con Ley 5477 de 2022’).
• Passport-style digital photo meeting the specifications.

Holders of permanent resident visas do not need to provide any more information. Other types of R visas might require evidence that the conditions under which the visa was granted still applies.

How do I pay?

The fees are divided into a US$54 ‘study’ fee, which is paid on submission of the documents. When the visa transfer is approved you pay an additional ‘visa issuance fee’ of US$54. Payment is also online by Colombian PSE bank transfer scheme, or you can use Visa or Mastercard credit cards. 

Is that the traspaso done?

No. Once your e-visa is sent to you be email, you need to register your visa and apply for a new Cedula Extranjeria ID card within 15 days of receiving the new e-visa. The initial application and payment is done online, using the Formulario Único de Trámites page. Tick the Cedula Extranjeria box and select your nearest Migración office from the drop-down menu.

You’ll need to provide more information, scans, and an US$80 payment.

Surely that’s the end of it?

Nope. Now you need to make an appointment with the same Migración office to provide biometric data for your new CE. To make an appointment, first register with the website here.  Slots for the following week are allocated often at 5pm on Sunday, so try at this time.

If there are no slots available, take a screenshot of the appointment page as you can later use this as evidence to prove you were trying to comply with the 15-day plan (Migración sometimes sanction visa holders for not registering on time).

If you do not get an appointment within 15 days don’t worry; with your screenshots of the full agendas, Migracion are unlikely to complain. Everyone knows the system is overloaded.

What about my Cedula de Extranjeria?

Another delay: some people wait months for the plastic card, though lately the wait has been getting shorter. You can use your old CE or your passport in the meantime.

Should I hire a commercial visa company to do the paperwork?

The Cancilleria recommends applicants to apply directly for the traspaso directly via the website. However, commercial visa companies can assist with the paperwork but will charge a fee up to several hundred dollars. Try the process yourself before seeking professional help.

Just don’t leave it too late…

The post Long-term foreign residents reminded to transfer ‘R’ visas in 2026 appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

On March 22, American Airlines flight attendant Eric Gutierrez went missing after a night out in Medellín.

Less than a week later, authorities found his body in a river three hours away from the city. They concluded he had not died of natural causes. 

The U.S-Salvadoran citizen’s murder is the latest in a string of tourist deaths in the Colombian city famous for its nightlife. 

But, in conversation with The Bogotá Post, Medellín’s Secretary of Security, Manuel Villa Mejía, offered reassurances that the city remains a safe destination for tourists and shared tips to stay safe.

Is Medellin a safe destination?

Gutiérrez, 32, appears to have been a victim of scopolamine robbery, in which thieves use the toxic drug to daze and incapacitate their targets. For years, this method has been well documented in Colombia, which is believed to have the highest number of cases in the world.

Medellín has a reputation as a party city and, accordingly, is often associated with stories about scams, druggings, and robberies.

But Villa Mejía insisted that the city does not tolerate criminal activities: “Our message is clear: there is no place for crime in Medellín.”

He highlighted the city’s recent security strategy to tackle crime, including increasing police presence in nightlife hotspots, dismantling gangs, and enhancing video surveillance.

The Secretary of Security noted how safety in Medellín – once the world’s murder capital – has dramatically improved in recent decades. 

“Today is an example of how security can be improved through strategy, consistent effort, and institutional coordination,” said Villa Mejía.

He noted that the city’s homicide rate has fallen for two consecutive years, now standing at 10 per 100,000 inhabitants.

Villa Mejía compared this rate to U.S. cities like Atlanta (51), Washington D.C. (51), and Chicago (73). 

“Although there is still a long way to go—since the only acceptable figure is zero—these advances reinforce our commitment to continue working every day to protect the lives, safety, and peace of mind of those who live in and visit the city,” said the Secretary of Security. 

Tips to stay safe

While Villa Mejía defended Medellín’s record on crime, he also said that tourists must take precautions to avoid ending up victims of robbery or worse.

“We invite all travelers to enjoy the city at their leisure, but also to exercise caution and act responsibly,” said Villa Mejía.

He recommended that travellers use trusted transportation, avoid displaying large amounts of money or expensive jewellery in public, and stay in safe areas where police are present. 

Villa Mejía also stressed the dangers of meeting strangers, especially online. He added that travellers who meet a stranger in person should avoid accepting drinks from them and not follow them to an unknown location. 

“The main recommendation is to stay in control of your surroundings,” concluded the Secretary of Security.

The post Medellin reassures tourists after US flight attendant death appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

Segunda Marquetalia ordered the attack last year according to trial testimony.

Revelations that former FARC leaders ordered the 2025 killing of Miguel Uribe have heightened political tensions in the run-up to the May presidential elections.

The 39-year-old Colombian senator and presidential hopeful was gunned down by a Bogotá gang hired by the Segunda Marquetalia, an armed group created by disgruntled guerrillas hiding in Venezuela, according to testimony revealed in court.

The senator was shot down by a 15-year-old assassin at an open-air political rally in the barrio of Modelia in June, 2025. Uribe died of head wounds two months later.

After months of investigations and multiple arrests, state prosecutors were last week finally able to link the local gang that carried out the hit with the armed group.  

See also: Who ordered the murder of presidential candidate Miguel Uribe?

The breakthrough came during the trial of Bogotá-based gang leader Simeón Pérez Marroquín, also known as ‘El Viejo’, who admitted he had hired the local Plata o Plomo (‘Silver or Lead’) gang to carry out the killing on behalf of the Segunda Marquetalia armed group.

“The deal was that they would pay one billion pesos [US$270,000] for the senator’s death,” said Marroquín in a statement reported by magazine Semana.

Right hand man

Confirmation of involvement by an armed group founded by former FARC leaders sparked a political spat between front-runners for the upcoming presidential election.

Right-wing candidate Paloma Valencia was quick to accuse the Petro government of negotiating peace with the Segunda Marquetalia – even while the armed group was plotting the murder of Uribe.

See also: Peace Plan has caused more conflict, says thinktank

Valencia referred to Marroquín’s statements that the hit was organized by veteran guerrilla Zarco Aldinever, the right-hand man of the group leader Iván Márquez, in early 2025.

At this time Aldinever was nominated a ‘peace manager’ by the Petro government, meaning any arrest warrants were suspended and the rebel was free to roam. This despite the collapse of peace talks with the Segunda Marquetalia at the end of 2024.

Valencia further pointed to the closeness between her main election rival Iván Cepeda and leaders of the armed group.

Old photo

“The killer of Miguel Uribe is photographed hugging Iván Cepeda,” she wrote on X, attaching  a photo of her rival with Segunda Marquetalia founder Iván Márquez.  

In fact, the photo of Cepeda dated from the 2016 FARC peace talks, explained President Petro in a strongly worded statement defending his friend and political ally.

“The photo shows Iván Cepeda’s attempt to help [the Santos government] achieve peace. At that time, the entire FARC was ready for peace,” said.

Iván Márquez was number two in the FARC at the time and widely respected for his role in the negotiations.

Petro went on to blame his predecessor, right-wing president Iván Duque, for undermining the FARC peace process that forced former guerrilla leaders like Márquez back to arms and the Segunda Marquetalia.

Following the 2016 deal, some former FARC leaders had been “entrapped by state prosecutors with fake drug charges”, he said, leading to extradition requests from the United States.

Faced with this legal pressure several top commanders, including Iván Márquez and Jesus Santrich, fled to Venezuela in 2018 before emerging on video a year later to announce their new incarnation as the Segunda Marquetalia, named after the village in the Tolima department where the original FARC first formed in 1964.

The armed group was active in drug trafficking and illegal mining along the Colombia-Venezuela border, in the departments such as Vichada and Guainía, according to a profile by InsightCrime. The leadership is suspected of hiding out in Venezuela.

Another study by Fundacion Ideas para La Paz estimated the group to have 530 armed combatants in 2025, an increase of 15% on 2024, and work mostly in the eastern plains of Colombia.

A hunt is on

In a press conference on Tuesday, Valencia accused Cepeda and other left-wing lawmakers of backing the former FARC commanders in their legal battles back in 2018, creating a chain of events leading to the creation of recycled armed group.

“Congressmen like Cepeda defended [Marquéz and Santrich] …and didn’t allow them to be extradited. If these thugs had been extradited, Miguel Uribe would be alive today,” she said.

In his own press statement Cepeda called Valencia’s comments “a dirty political game” and issued a challenge to the candidate, and her political mentor right-wing former president Álvaro Uribe, to back up the accusations in court.

“It’s infamy to accuse me or President Petro to have any type of involvement in such a deplorable deed as the assassination of senator and presidential pre-candidate Miguel Uribe,” he said.

Meanwhile this week the Colombian attorney general’s office launched a fresh hunt for the leaders of the Segunda Marquetalia, offering around million-dollar rewards for the capture of seven commanders including Iván Márquez and Zarco Aldinever.  

In fact, Aldinever was reported killed by rival armed group ELN in Venezuela during a squabble over a cocaine shipment in August last year – the same month that Miguel Uribe died – according to Colombian state forces at the time.    

This week Colombia’s Minister of Defense Pedro Sanchez walked back that claim saying no body had ever been found and that the initial report of Aldinever’s death – sent from the Segunda Marquetalia itself – could be disinformation.

“At this time, the position is clear: without a body there is no confirmation of death, and that is why all institutional resources remain active to locate him,” said Sanchez.

Underworld connections

Closer to home, the Segunda Marquetalia’s influence in Bogotá was under scrutiny after Simeón Marroquín’s testimony shed light on the murky connections with the city’s underworld.

Marroquín admitted that in previous decades he had acted as an urban operative for the FARC guerrillas, a hired gun ready to carry out orders in the city.

“I never wore camouflage, but while I was here in Bogotá, I was a miliciano. Guerrilla missions would come up, and I’d carry them out, but I was never in the ranks.”

His contacts with the FARC continued to the Segunda Marquetalia that tapped him for the Uribe killing.

Early in 2025, Marroquín was invited to a secret meeting in Cúcuta close to the Venezuelan border where, according to his testimony, Aldinever offered him one billion pesos for the crime (US$270,000) and another 600 million pesos (US$160,000) to “bribe the justice system” to deflect attention from the guerrilla group.

The motive for the killing was not clearly revealed by Marroquín, though a text message later found on his phone sent to his guerrilla paymasters talked of an “eye for an eye”, suggesting the former rebels were out for revenge.

Chilling revelation

Uribe was selected as an influential senator, scion of a right-wing political family, and popular candidate for this year’s presidential elections. He was also an easy target for assassins with his regular visits to communities where he had walkabouts to engage with local voters.

In the first few months of 2025, Marroquín worked his underworld connections to hire the Plata o Plomo gang which in turn lured the 15-year-old gunman who shot and wounded Miguel Uribe in a small park in the barrio of Modelia on June 7.

See also: Arrests made – but still questions in Uribe shooting.

Marroquín’s account paints a picture of a loose network of petty criminals lured by cash rather than political interests, ignorant of the details of both their intended target and the paymasters behind the plot.

The middleman saw the hit as a “good business opportunity” but also a chance to rekindle his role as urban operative for a guerrilla organization.

Marroquín’s plan unraveled after the 15-year-old gunman and various low-level gang members were detained in the hours and days following the June attack, creating a trail leading to his own capture in October.

“What’s done is done”

One chilling revelation was the order from above for Marroquín to kill low-level gang members to cut links to the guerrilla masterminds. This included murdering alias Gabriela, who transported the weapon and was present on the day of the shooting.

Marroquín refused to kill Gabriela, telling investigators “I didn’t have the heart for that because she was very young.” But he did send her by bus to the city of Florencia where the guerrillas were lying in wait.

#ATENCIÓN | "No hay palabras que justifiquen dicho acto, pero pues ya está hecho (…)", fueron las palabras con las que Simeón Pérez Marroquín, alias ‘El Viejo’, pidió perdón a la familia del senador y precandidato presidencial Miguel Uribe Turbay, tras reconocer que fue el… pic.twitter.com/btgnOsTEF7

— ÚltimaHoraCaracol (@UltimaHoraCR) March 20, 2026

The 19-year-old never made it; police investigators, already on Gabriela’s trail, organized for the bus to “break down” some miles before Florencia. Her arrest there and subsequent interrogation lead to Marroquín’s capture and eventual exposing of the links to the Segunda Marquetalia.

Last week, during the court process, Simeón Marroquín attempted to apologize for his role in the killing of Miguel Uribe.

“There are no words to justify my actions, but what’s done is done,” he said on camera from his cell, addressing his victim’s family – Uribe was married with four children – and asking forgiveness. He was then sentenced to 22 years in prison.

How quickly Colombian investigators can find Zarco Aldinever or other Segunda Marquetalia commanders, dead or alive, or hiding in Venezuela, remains to be seen.

The post Political tensions rise as guerrilla group revealed to be behind Miguel Uribe’s murder appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

Nine months after the shooting of presidential candidate Miguel Uribe Turbay in a leafy Bogotá park, the gang behind the killing have been rounded up and are facing justice.

The masterminds, though, are still at large. Circumstantial evidence points to a political assassination called in by an ex-FARC faction called the Segunda Marquetalia. But other theories exist.

And as the country prepares for the next rounds of elections, the youthful Uribe – seen by many as a presidential hopeful – is conspicuous by his absence.

We look back at killing that rocked Bogotá in 2025, and who might be behind it.

How did the shooting unfold?

Uribe was gunned down in Parque El Golfito, a green space in bustling Modelia on the western edge of Bogotá, on June 7, during a walkabout in the barrio where he met local business owners and climbed on a beer crate to deliver an impromptu address to a small crowd.

See also: Miguel Uribe hospitalized after assassination attempt

The senator was shot at close range twice in the head by a 15-year-old gunman wielding a Glock pistol in the crowd, who then fled but was himself shot in the leg by Uribe’s protection squad and captured in a nearby street.

Uribe was hospitalized and underwent several emergency surgeries before dying from his wounds on August 11, more than two months later.

Who was Miguel Uribe?

The 39-year-old senator was nationally recognized and scion of a political family. His grandfather Julio César Turbay was president from 1978 to 1982, and his mother the journalist Diana Turbay kidnapped by the Medellín cartel in 1991 who died in a botched rescue attempt, a tragedy immortalized by Gabriel García Márquez in his non-fiction book News of a Kidnapping.

Even though he was raised as a legacy politician, and a key candidate for the right-wing Centro Democratico, Uribe nevertheless garnered support across the political spectrum for his hard work and attention to detail, more technocrat than populist, and potentially a unifying figure.

It was perhaps typical of Uribe that the day he was shot he in an unsung corner of the city meeting everyday folks.

What was the impact of his assassination?

Many mourned the loss of the young senator, married with four children.  In reality, Uribe’s death was just one of many in Colombia during 2025 with 187 social leaders and human rights defenders murdered nationwide, according to data from conflict thinktank Indepaz.

The senator’s killing had an outsized impact for several reasons. First, Bogotá, unusually for a megacity, has almost half the homicide rate than many smaller cities and some rural areas with long-running conflicts between gangs and armed groups.

Secondly, the many feared Uribe’s attack signaled a return to the 1980s when a wave of political killings – usually by extreme right-wing forces against left wing targets in cahoots with drug cartels – plagued Bogotá and many other Colombian cities.

But united condemnation of the attack quickly degenerated to finger-pointing between political factions with Uribe’s lawyer filing a complaint against President Gustavo Petro for alleged “harassment” of the senator.

Was Petro to blame?

An early theory floated by the late senator’s lawyer was that the attack was a “hate crime”, which in Colombia covers persecution for ideological views. The argument went that Petro crossed the line with his itchy Twitter finger: in their complaint the lawyer presented a 20-page document with 42 presidential tweets disparaging Uribe. 

While acknowledging that Petro was in no way linked to the physical attack, he had created a “favorable environment” for anyone with a serious grudge to take out the senator, said the lawyers, though this didn’t explain why a 15-year-old – not a likely candidate for political grievances – was coerced to pull the trigger.

And by the end of June new evidence emerged from the shooter himself. The youth didn’t even know who his target was the senator, or indeed who was Miguel Uribe.

And other pieces of the puzzle fell into place, clarifying that the shooter was hired for cash by an organized criminal gang that had planned the killing in detail.

If it was so well planned, why did they get caught?

Good question. The contract killers calling themselves Plata o Plomo (‘Silver or Lead’) left a trail of evidence starting with the wounded gunman captured with minutes of the shooting.

Next to fall was Carlos Mora, alias ‘El Veneco’, who drove the young assassin, followed a few days later by 19-year-old Katherine Martínez, alias ‘Gabriela’, who delivered the pistol.

Gabriela’s arrest gave the first clues to a wider conspiracy: the webcammer was tracked down to the regional capital of Florencia, Caquetá, a jungle department of Colombia with high presence of armed groups.

CCTV footage from Modelia placed her inside the car with the gunman, and she later confessed to transporting the gun itself.With CCTV footage, and information from Gabriela and El Veneco, other key members of the gang were soon rounded up including two other getaway drivers and a middleman for hiring the 15-year-old.

Seems like a very amateur operation…

Plata o Plomo was a loose group of criminals drawn from the Bogotá underworld, and many had worked together before. The leader was Elder José Arteaga, alias Chipi, who in a rather unlikely twist also ran a hair salon in Engativá.

When not trimming beards, Chipi was immersed in crime with a history of extortion, violence and armed robbery, and was  linked to the murder of a Mexican businessman in Medellín in 2024.

See also: Arrests made but still questions in Uribe shooting.

He was also quite ruthless: according to Gabriela, Chipi was planning to cover his tracks by killing both El Veneco and the 15-year-old hired assassin. Being captured early likely saved their lives.

Chipi himself became the subject of a national manhunt until his luck ran out on July 5. He was captured hiding in a house in Engativá by a special police unit a month after the shooting, just a few kilometers from where it took place.

So, case closed?

Not so fast. Chipi was just one link in a longer chain. According to Gabriela, now a key witness, the hairdresser  told her the murder contract was for 700 million pesos, around US$190,000.

This amount of cash pointed to a bigger player. 

In Colombia there are plenty of candidates to choose from, and no shortage of pundits to point the finger.

Examples please?

Sure. Journalist and presidential hopeful Vicky Dávila accused Iván Mordisco, commander of the Estado Mayor Central – EMC – a dissident FARC faction fighting the state in the southwest of the country. She claimed to have insider information from military intelligence that also pointed to the likelihood of more assassinations of right-wing figures.

Her theory was backed by interior minister Armando Benedetti, who also saw reason for the EMC to stir up trouble in Bogotá as revenge for the war being waged against the group in Cauca.

However, no direct evidence was presented, and that the EMC denied any involvement, calling the allegations “a media strategy”.

Petro claimed involvement by the mysterious “Board”, a mythical super-cartel fused from drug gangs, guerrillas and paramilitaries. Petro portrayed himself as another potential victim: The Board was also plotting his own assassination, he said.

Wow. Anyone and everyone could have done it.

Exactly. Pick the political flavor of your favorite conspiracy.  More fanciful pitches were that the extreme right had planned it themselves to stoke a coup against Petro – who would likely get the blame – and at the same time eliminate the popular Uribe from the candidate’s list.

Or that the extreme left wanted to take out an effective political opponent from the presidential race.

One problem for investigators was the complex networks between criminal gangs, drug cartels and guerrilla groups, partly worsened by Petro’s Total Peace plan which had split armed groups into smaller and more dangerous factions.

See also: Peace Plan has caused more conflict, says thinktank

The Plata o Plomo gang was clearly working for financial gain. But despite capturing eight members by the end of August, the important detail of who paid them – and why – was yet to be revealed.

Maybe the gang was scared to reveal the backers?

Quite likely. In the dog-eat-dog world of Colombian crime, and where people in jail are regularly murdered, spilling the beans is not recommended. But one more key suspect was emerging:  a mysterious character known as ‘El Viejo’.

His capture came at the end of October after months of police work. Clues emerged from messages from El Viejo on Gabriela’s phone. She also confessed to transporting guns and explosives for him on various occasions in Bogotá.

Soon police had a name, Simeón Pérez Marroquín, and a place, in a remote fortified farmstead on the vast plains of Meta. A helicopter team swooped in and took him back to Bogotá.

So where did El Viejo lead?

El Viejo, the ninth capture in the Uribe case, was the most significant. While Chipi coordinated the killing on the ground, it seems El Viejo was closer to the backers.

Another key detail suggests the plot was months in the making: El Viejo was stalking Uribe in March, three months before the shooting in Modelia, and making notes on the senators movements and bodyguards.

Moreover, El Viejo, while living partly in Usme in the south of Bogotá, and on the farm in Meta, also had links to an area of Caquetá known as a stronghold of Segunda Marquetalia.

Segunda Marquetalia? Sounds more like a Cuban singer…

In fact, a recycled FARC guerrilla group named after the original rebel hideout in Tolima. Its leaders were senior commanders who abandoned the peace process in 2019 after persecution by the right-wing Duque government and threats to extradite them to the U.S.

State prosecutors accused some of drug trafficking, charges the commanders claimed were invented. According to Insight Crime, the group lead by Iván Márquez – formerly number two in the FARC – reactivated rebel units in both Colombia and Venezuela, where the group had hidden camps.

But in 2021 Colombian special forces pursued the leaders in Venezuelan territory killing three of the top commander. Further fighting in 2022 wounded Márquez, in fact he was declared dead by Colombian authorities before reappearing in a video in 2024, though he is rumoured to have suffered severe injuries.

A reason to get angry?

Perhaps. A plausible theory is that the Segunda Marquetalia was seeking revenge and targeted Miguel Uribe as a visible – and vulnerable – figure of the Colombian right wing.

Colombian prosecutors claim to have found a digital trail linking El Viejo with the “criminal circle” of Iván Márquez’s armed group. And his stalking of Uribe months before the shooting suggests a long-term plot.

And if such a plot existed, it coincided with the breakdown of peace talks between Petro’s government and the Segunda Marquetalia at the start of 2025, perhaps another spur to action.

But this evidence is yet to be tested in court.  El Viejo is jailed while awaiting trial for aggravated homicide, even while prosecutors are offering him a legal deal for information leading to the ultimate masterminds.

So will El Viejo talk?

That’s what investigators are hoping for. Two of the gang so far sentenced, Gabriela and El Veneco, have collaborated for reduced sentences, both getting 20 years in jail.

With presidential elections in May, and candidates on the stump, Colombia needs clarity.

The post Who ordered the murder of presidential candidate Miguel Uribe? appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

On March 8, for the first time in Colombia’s history, an artificial intelligence candidate appeared on ballot papers across the country. 

Gaitana IA (AI) ran for the Indigenous seat in the Senate and the House of Representatives in the northern state of Sucre.

While Gaitana did not win a seat in either of the country’s legislative bodies, it has sparked debate about the role of AI in Colombian politics.

With the ballots counted, Gaitana won a total of under 3,000 votes – less than 2% of the total votes for the Indigenous seat – suggesting that many people remain skeptical of this new digital approach.

Many questions have emerged surrounding Gaitana, such as why the Registraduría—the Colombian entity in charge of validating and accepting candidates—permitted this unprecedented candidacy, or what the intentions were behind the AI.

“Many local media outlets talked about an AI going to Congress, but that is not the case; they are humans leading the project,” Gaitana’s co-founder, Natalia Aase, told The Bogotá Post. 

“It is actually a consensus tool developed by our community members, between 14 and 25 years old, from the Senú community of Reparo Torrente, in Coveñas,” she explained.

Rather than planning for the AI to assume office, Gaitana was devised as a democratic experiment underpinned by real human candidates

Aase detailed how the platform was designed to work: Colombian citizens could subscribe through a link to virtually participate and propose various debates regarding topics such as healthcare, women’s rights, and more. These interactions would also feed the AI database.

Once an initiative reached a collective consensus, the people occupying the seats in Congress would “decide the direction of the proposed laws.”

The two humans represented by Gaitana were Carlos Redondo Rincón, a Mechatronics Engineer from the Senú community, who was running for Senate, and Luz Rincón, an Embera-Katio Indigenous sociologist, who was seeking a seat in the House of Representatives.

The co-founder of Gaitana also revealed that the team conducted deep research into global democratic models, such as the one in Norway, and compared them with their own community dynamics.

As the research advanced, the team found that their community in Senú had already established a model of social interaction that worked well, prompting them to launch a digital project modeled on their own practices.  

This meant digitizing their traditional way of reaching a consensus; in the Senú community, men, women, and youth gather around tables to discuss specific topics, such as women’s health or local fishing.

“Gaitana IA is not a generative AI; it is a participatory AI. What does that mean? Well, it is not ChatGPT. Instead, it takes the information provided by the users and organizes it,” pointed out Aase. “Transparency and security are the most important things for us; that is why we use blockchain technology—a system of blocks—to power this platform.”

According to Aase, the project was born from a motivation to prevent corruption and explained that with ‘Gaitana AI’, the decisions are not made by a single person but must be approved by at least 100 people. 

“You might be able to manipulate one individual, but you cannot manipulate a hundred if you don’t even know who they are,” she concluded.

The post ‘Gaitana IA’: The AI candidate that ran in Colombia’s elections appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

Medellín, Colombia – Prominent female journalists, writers, academics and columnists in Colombia have drafted and signed a declaration titled ‘No to the pact of silence’ in response to former president Andrés Pastrana’s appearance in the Jeffrey Epstein files.

Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002) was mentioned 57 times in files linked to Epstein, who was convicted for sexual trafficking and exploitation of minors before his death in 2019. The ex-president appeared in the batch of documents released last November by the U.S. Justice Department.

The declaration called on Pastrana to issue a statement as a matter of public interest, posed 20 questions to the ex-president, and demanded urgent measures to protect women and girls in Colombia.

‘No to the pact of silence’

The Epstein files have caused scandal across the world, implicating some of the world’s richest and most powerful people, including names like Bill Clinton and Andrew Mountbatten-Windsor.

Epstein and his partner, Ghislaine Maxwell, were both convicted for their involvement in the sex trafficking network. Epstein was found dead in 2019 in his prison cell in New York and Maxwell has been in prison since 2022.

In Colombia, the release last November of 3 million additional files linked to investigations into Epstein revealed connections between Pastrana and the late billionaire.

These included: a photo of Pastrana and Maxwell wearing Colombian Air Force uniforms at a military base; compromising emails with Maxwell; testimonies in which Maxwell said the two were friends and that she flew a Black Hawk helicopter in Colombia; and an alleged flight on a private plane with Epstein and disgraced modelling agent Jean Luc Brunel, who was accused of procuring minors for the late financier.

The ‘No to the pact of silence’ declaration was conceived mostly by female journalists while they were investigating Pastrana’s involvement in the files. 

The statement was published on February 24, signed by 35 women, but has since been opened up to include other women through one-to-one invitations.

“The crimes committed by Epstein and Maxwell, and their extensive network of accomplices among the world’s social, political, financial, and intellectual elites, must be subject to exposure, investigation, thorough analysis, and, if applicable sanctions,” the declaration stated.

Colombian journalist Ana Cristina Restrepo, one of the creators and signatories of the declaration, spoke to The Bogotá Post about the reasons behind it.

“It is of public interest in several aspects. First, because he is a person who was elected by popular vote. He was a President of the Republic, and with greater responsibility comes greater scrutiny from citizens,” said Restrepo.

Currently, the declaration has 171 signatures that meet three requirements: to be a woman, to be a feminist, and to have a public voice. Signatures must also be made in individual names, not on behalf of collectives. 

While there were men that showed support and wanted to sign the statement, Restrepo explained that only women were allowed: “Many thanks, but they – men – can write their own declaration. Why didn’t they think of it before?” “It has a symbolic power that we are all women,” she added.

The statement also took aim at the wider issue of sexual violence in Colombia. It highlighted that more than 50 minors are abused per day, according to the Institute of Legal Medicine in 2025. Also, in the last five years more than 100,000 girls and adolescents were victims of sexual abuse, according to the Colombian Family Welfare Institute (ICBF).

“Women’s human rights and the primacy of girls’ rights are historic achievements: protecting them is a mandatory duty. We demand that the silence surrounding the mentions of Andrés Pastrana in the Epstein files be broken,” the declaration stated.

Restrepo said that the pact of silence their statement seeks to redress is “one arm of something bigger”: a patriarchal pact that has existed for centuries.

“It is a tacit pact among men who hold power and belong to the elites to protect one another in the different things they do – not only sexual crimes, but also, let’s say, economic matters,and issues in society. They cover for each other,” she explained.

20 questions after more than 20 years of silence

In addition to calling for an end to the pact of silence, the declaration posed 20 questions to Pastrana. These were drafted based on the Epstein files, but also with other evidence, following a methodological journalistic investigation by Restrepo, Diana Salinas and the Cuestión Pública team, Daniel Coronell and Ana Bejarano. 

“Everything is based on published and known facts, not on assumptions,” Restrepo explained.

Each question has a lengthy preamble that contains corroborated evidence including pictures, email threads, timelines, interviews, and testimonies. All questions have to do with Pastrana’s relationship with Epstein and Maxwell, their meetings, mentions in the list, contradictions in his statements and related matters.

“Asking questions is not incrimination,” she said. “We are saying: If he has nothing to hide, then answer.”

The enduring pact of silence

Since the declaration was released, many prominent figures have come to Pastrana’s defense. 

Following its publication, Pastrana’s former ministers and others who were part of his administration issued a statement of solidarity with the ex-president: “We know Andrés Pastrana and we worked with him as part of his administration… He is a good man of strong values, respectful of his family and human dignity. His character and his track record do not correspond to being involved in infamous conduct,” the statement said. 

The signatories have also faced verbal attacks since the declaration was published, including from public figures. One of the primary sources of the abuse has been the former president’s brother, Juan Carlos Pastrana, with Restrepo saying, “he has been one of the most violent.”

For Restrepo, this reaction highlights the very problem the declaration seeks to redress – that powerful men protect their own. 

She also noted that the so-called ‘pact of silence’ extends far beyond Colombia.

“The U.S. Department of Justice releases the Epstein files. In other words, they already knew this information and had it stored… There are files from 2003; there are files that are more than 20 years old,” said Restrepo.

“How do you manage to keep information about a network involved in trafficking and sexual exploitation of minors for more than 20 years if not through a pact of silence? So it is a pact of silence that exists not only in Colombia, but also among elites around the world,” she concluded.

Featured image description: Split image of former President Andres Pastrana and the initial declaration signed by 35 women.

Featured image credit: @AndresPastrana_ via X.

The post Top female journalists demand answers over Colombia ex-president’s Epstein links appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

Colombia kicked off its electoral year with the Senate and House elections last weekend, alongside consultas for presidential runs. Who’s come out ahead?

The Colombian elections of 2026 started last week, with the Senate and Cámara finalising their seats for the next parliament. The presidential elections will take place at the end of May, with a second round in June if necessary.

The presidential elections also had a hand in last week’s results, with consultas to decide on who would represent groups of candidates with similar politics. That saw Claudia López, Roy Barreras and Paloma Valencia take the honours in their respective consultas.

When all was said and done, the results showed that traditional parties and candidates had generally performed poorly, with new candidates doing well and a difference in the traditional balance of power.

So, a week on and with the dust having settled as final results come in from all over the country, who’s up and who’s down after the first Colombian elections of 2026?  

Winners

It was a good day for the government, with the Pacto Histórico gaining seats and a low turnout for the leftist consulta. The Centro Democrático, too, had a good afternoon. Paloma won her consulta handily and the party overall also gained seats in borth houses.

Pacto Historico

The governing party had a spectacular Sunday, simply said. They increased their presence in both chambers and became the largest single party to boot. The Senate remains without a clear majority, but they are in a very strong position indeed, even without the former FARC combatientes’ curules.

On top of that, other results largely went their way. The leftist consulta that Cepeda was blocked from running in was a washout as the Pacto told their supporters to stay away. Prominent critics of the party from other parties such as Robledo, Miranda, Betancourt and Juvinao all crashed out as well.

While an overall majority in either house is far from within their grasp, the Senate now leans slightly more left than right, with left and centre-left senators adding up to 53. On top of that, after an often rocky government, it’s clear that they haven’t lost their base, indeed even expanding.

Paloma Valencia

A fortnight ago, Paloma Valencia’s campaign seemed to be stuttering. She was polling in single figures for first round intentions for the presidency and making few public appearances other than the mass debates for the Gran Consulta por Colombia. There was even a worry that she might suffer an upset in that consulta.

Fast forward to today and it’s a very different picture indeed. The latest polling shows her rocketing in popularity, now standing at around 20%. That’s because she picked up over three million votes in that consulta.

Then she picked the runner up in that race as her VP ticket, a smart move on her side to try and attract voters more in the centre as well as boost her in the capital. It’s not a landslide move, but it’s canny and the presidential race will likely come down to small margins. 

Juan Daniel Oviedo

Technically a loser, in the sense that he was a clear second to Valencia in the Gran Consulta. However, he picked up over a million votes, paying off his mortgage and significantly outperforming expectations. He also opened the door for some new paths in his political adventure. 

It had looked like his next step was to concentrate on a tilt for Bogotá mayor, having come in second last time around after another strong campaign. He then pulled a remarkable volte-face, accepting Valencia’s offer to run on her ticket.

That’s a move that puts him potentially in a different league than before, very much on the national stage now. It’s come at an enormous reputational price though, with many that voted for him feeling betrayed as he runs on a rightist ticket. He can claim that it’s centrist as much as he likes, but few see it that way.

Influencers

Electorates worldwide are losing patience with technocrats and politics as usual. That’s as true in Colombia as anywhere else, with a number of influencers running and doing fairly well. This is a trend that has been open for a while and shows no sign of slowing down.

Former adult actress Amaranta Hank won a spot for the Pacto Historico, while the White Elephant took a seat for the Partido Verde, having started out as a content creator looking to expose corruption and poor spending practices.

Safety

Despite fears of electoral violence and a turbulent run-up to election day, it was a relatively calm Sunday in the end. There was an attack on a voting centre in Meta, plus another couple of issues elsewhere, but overall it was a good sign for the upcoming presidential elections.

Losers

There were plenty of losers last week, with several high-profile candidates for the presidential race crashing out in their consultas. That saw Vicky Dávila unconvincingly claiming she wasn’t a loser and Enrique Peñalosa falling at the first hurdle again among others.

Farewell, too, for some familiar faces. Ingrid Betancourt failed to make the cut for Senate, losing her seat alongside her party. Jorge Robledo, the leftmost critic of Petro did likewise. Miguel Polo Polo unsurprisingly lost his seat as an Afro-Colombian representative, replaced by a principled lawyer, which delighted many.

In general, old parties and old faces fared poorly, with incumbency working against many. A striking exception to that was the party for ex-FARC combatants, Comunes. To their surprise, but no one else’s, they failed to meet the threshold for representation.

Roy Barreras

Standing in the leftwing consulta, Roy won in the sense that he saw off the threat from controversial former Medellín mayor Daniel Quintero. However, the Pacto campaign to not vote in consultas laid his lack of support bare.

Viejos Verdes

The Partido Verde managed to limit their losses in terms of seats, remaining at a similar level as before. However, there has been a significant change in who takes those curules. They had an open list, meaning that no-one was assured of a place.

Voters made it clear that they wanted to see new blood, with government critics Katherine Miranda and Cathy Juvinao voted out, along with Inti Asprilla and Angelica Lozano. 

The old Frente Nacional

For much of the last century, the Liberales and Conservadores absolutely dominated Colombian politics. For most of this century they’ve avoided running viable presidential candidates, preferring to hold their power in the Senate, Cámara and local politics. 

This time out they have taken a big hit in both houses, losing five seats between them and no longer being in the top level of voting blocs. Due to the fragmented nature of the parliament, they retain some kingmaking powers, but are a shadow of what they once were.

A big question now looms for both parties ahead of next year’s local elections. Just as the Pacto will feel they can make some big gains there, so too will the Liberales and Conservadores worry they might take more damage.

Claudia López

The former Bogotá mayor faced no real opposition in her consulta, sailing through with over 90% of the vote. However, that was 90% of not very much and she failed to get voters out to show support in the way that Valencia and Oviedo did. She faces an uphill slog from here.

Sergio Fajardo and Abelardo de la Espriella

Neither of this pair were in consultas, instead going to the second round. That’s meant they’ve been kept out of the headlines and lost momentum as well as having some unfortunate results.

The scale of the turnout for Valencia shows she’s a viable contender to Aspriella on the right and her leap in polling is matched by a significant downturn for el tigre. For Fajardo, it’s even worse: voters are largely abandoning the centre and technocratic politicians.

Trust in the system

 With the governing party repeatedly questioning the openness and fairness of the elections, this was rough. There have been a number of reports coming out questioning the practices of various voting centres and plenty of allegations, particularly from the left.

On top of that, a couple of candidates were arrested on voting day with big bags of cash that were allegedly to be used in vote-buying. While corruption in electoral processes is likely nowhere near as widespread as many claim, it’s clearly still an issue, especially in rural zones.

Centrist politics

Other than Juan Daniel Oviedo, centrists had a bad day at the polls, especially the centre-right. While the Centro Democrático and Pacto Historico gained votes on the flanks of both right and left, parties close to the centre lost out. 

Cambio Radical took a big hit, as did the conservatives, with Abelardo de la Espriella’s new Salvación Nacional party gaining three seats from literally nowhere. The partido de la U also lost a seat while Ahora! won another two seats. Poor turnout for the centrist consulta also means there seems to be little support on the presidential level.

What happens next?

The presidential election on May 31 is now very much the focus of attention. Iván Cepeda still leads the polls comfortably, with Paloma Valencia and Abelardo de la Aspriella splitting the rightwing vote at the moment. However, with over two months of campaigning time ahead, there is plenty of time for everything to change.

Gustavo Petro has shown little sign of intending to follow the guidelines on not campaigning, making references to Oviedo and Valencia as well as thinly-disguised references to Cepeda and so on. Expect this to continue and ever more strongly worded warnings from the registraduría to be ignored.

It’s also likely that there will be ever more rhetoric over electoral fraud, with the Pacto campaign leaning heavily into that already and working on raising awareness of the issue ahead of the voting for the first round.

There’s currently a very good chance that the presidential campaigns will get pretty ugly, with lots of negative campaigning and attack ads. There is no love lost between the candidates and plenty of bad blood on all sides. We’ll keep you up to date with things as the campaigns develop.

The post Colombian elections 2026: Winners and Losers after March Madness appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

We take a quick dive down Avenida Caracas where the raised railway is both a wonder and worry.

For citizens used to the snail’s pace of work on their city’s infrastructure, the rapid rising of the Bogota’s Metro over their heads is something to behold.

With 11 kilometers of concrete viaduct completed, and many more clicks of columns in place, not to mention stations and interchanges emerging from the rubble, the megaobra is officially at 73% completion.

For rolos who have waited three generations for a train – the first Metro plan was made in 1942 – this advance is nothing short of a miracle.

Not everyone is happy. Last week small business owners along Avenida Caracas, the last south-north sector of the construction, took to the streets to protest the “destruction and insecurity” of their neighborhoods.

“The Metro advances. The community recedes,” said the banners the protesters hung across the formerly busy throughfare now converted into a construction site.

As is typical in Bogotá protests, it was public transport in the form of Transmilenio buses that were blocked forcing thousands of commuters to walk sections of their journey home.

Hanging on by a thread

The protests ended, but the problems continued for Avenida Caracas.

This week the central section of the wide avenue was taken up by construction teams supporting the massive overhead beam launcher that dropped the pre-cast viaduct sections into place 15 meters above the street.

Meanwhile, car traffic was banned from the main artery while Transmilenio buses threaded their way past graffitied concrete columns. Pedestrians scurried out of the temporary bus stations and fast away from the apocalyptic scenes, more Blade Runner than Springtime in Paris.

Local shopkeepers told The Bogotá Post this week that business had never been bleaker.

“We’re hanging on by a thread,” said Carlos Torres of clothes store 80’s American World, on the corner of Calle 60. “We’ve had no financial help from the district, and takings are down by 80 per cent.”

He had been forced to suspend their health insurance payments for the last year and were struggling to pay the rent, he said.

Danger down below

Footfall had “fallen massively” said Angela Cruz on her way to a hair salon across the road, with people avoiding the dusty streets, partly from fear of robberies.

Avenida Caracas was “always a bid dodgy”, she said, but the attraction for thieves of the building works, with materials and machinery to pilfer, had increased insecurity.

“We’re worried when it’s finished the support columns and dark areas under the Metro will become full of attackers.”

That the Metro would shelter criminals was a recurring concern for residents. Concept drawings of the finished line depicted idyllic leafy walkways with pedestrians pushing prams.

But as every resident of the city already knows, any tunnel, underpass or covered area becomes a hotspot for crime.

And whereas the Metro planners had robust plans to control access to the overhead trains to ensure commuters travel in peace – in contrast to the Transmilenio where anyone can jump on or off – there were no clear plans to protect open spaces below.

“Walking home just got harder,” said Cruz.

Bogotá’s ‘Berlin Wall’

Similar concerns were raised recently in a speech by President Gustavo Petro when he railed against the elevated Metro plan – now near completion – as a boondoggle for property speculators and claimed that Avenida Caracas was being “destroyed by the oligarchy”.

He further suggested that the raised railway would become a “Berlin Wall, separating the rich from poor”.

Such rhetoric was not unexpected from the mandate who long championed an underground Metro, though failed to get it moving during his own term as Bogotá’s mayor (2012 to 2015). He might yet get his way; plans for Line 2, currently on the drawing board, are for an underground Metro running east west beneath the city’s wealthier northern barrios.

See also: Going Underground, Petro threatens to derail Metro.

The final plan to build Line 1 overhead, while controversial, was taken for economic reasons and speed of construction during the second mayorship of Enrique Penalosa – the founder of Bogotá Transmilenio bus system and implacable political opponent of Petro – in 2016.

The elevated Line 1 of the Metro will be 24 kilometers – one of the longest urban light rails on the continent – and have 16 stations including 10 interchanges with the Transmilenio bendy-bus network.   

Much of the line runs through poorer barrios in the south-west of the city where, even with the work unfinished, some economic benefits were being proclaimed.  

Just get it done

Thinktank ProBogotá, in a study with the Unversidad de los Andes, reported a rise in residential property values of 11 per cent in areas around Line 1. Such increases could generate investment in undeveloped pockets of the city.

In the long term, Avenida Caracas businesses were also predicting a boost from the Metro. Just not yet.

“Right now, times are hard,” said business owner Adenay Flores.  He had seen profits plunge in the 18 months since construction began, he said, while painting the entrance to his Moscu pawnbrokers.

But he also recognized that the Metro was vital to the mobility of the city and could transform lives of people living in less accessible areas.

“Yes, we’ve had hardships. But this is the evolution of the city, I totally support the Metro. Once finished it will bring people back to Avenida Caracas,” he said. “But they need to get it done.”

It was a sentiment echoed by many business owners we talked to in the shadow of the concrete viaduct: torn between welcoming the future mass transit system while keeping their financial heads above water.

“We’re suffering, but we still want the Metro. It will bring better times,” Carlos Torres from the clothes shop told The Bogotá Post. “Until then, we just have to hang on.”

The post In the shadow of the Metro appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

Colombians voted for a new Congress on March 8 in an election that stretched across thousands of rural towns and villages, where geography, infrastructure and the legacy of armed conflict continue to shape how citizens participate in democracy.

“I don’t like politics,” said Silvia Bedoya, 52, a resident of San Pedro de los Milagros in the mountains north of Medellín. “Instead of uniting people to move the country forward, it tends to divide us.”

Despite that frustration, Bedoya said voting still matters. “If you vote, at least you have the chance to raise your voice about something you don’t like,” she said. “If you don’t vote, you just have to accept what happens.”

More than 40 million Colombians were eligible to vote in the elections, with 13,493 polling stations installed nationwide, including 7,482 in rural areas, according to the National Registry Office. Security forces said they deployed 120,000 police officers across the country to guarantee the vote in the nation’s 1,104 municipalities.

The scale of the operation reflects the logistical challenges of voting in rural Colombia, where many communities remain separated by mountains, unpaved roads and long travel distances.

In San Pedro de los Milagros, a cattle-farming municipality in the Andean department of Antioquia, voters arriving at polling stations described a mixture of civic duty, skepticism toward politicians and concern over the country’s economic and social problems.

Mauricio Martínez, 47, declined to say who he supported, but emphasized the importance of participation. “Voting is the greatest right and duty we have as citizens,” he said.

Others said their choices were shaped by dissatisfaction with the government of President Gustavo Petro, Colombia’s first leftist president, whose progressive agenda – including a major land reform program – has drawn both support and criticism in rural areas.

Maicol Jovani Sepulveda, 28, said he voted for the right-wing Democratic Center (Centro Democrático) party after losing faith in promises he believed would help young people. “I believed they were going to help us study,” he said. “But I didn’t receive a scholarship and I couldn’t go to university, so I was disappointed.”

The Democratic Center won more than 40% of the vote for both the Senate and the House of Representatives in San Pedro de los Milagros, a 24% increase from 2022. Across the department of Antioquia, it was also the most voted list with over 31% of votes, followed by the ruling leftist Historic Pact (Pacto Histórico) coalition with 16%.

Some voters in the town said their support for the right reflected growing frustration with Petro’s government. Among them was María Regina Avendaño Muñoz, 63, who said she cast her vote for Centro Democrático after feeling disappointed with the administration: “I’m very sad because he promised change and convinced many young people and teachers who voted for him.”

Beyond individual concerns, analysts say structural barriers have long shaped political participation in rural Colombia.

Rural voters play an important role in Colombia’s political landscape. Although the country’s largest voting blocs are concentrated in major cities, the countryside has long been central to debates over land ownership, security and development – issues that have shaped the country’s decades-long armed conflict and remain at the center of national politics.

“When we talk about political participation, we’re really talking about processes of democratization – who gets to speak and under what conditions,” Bladimir Ramirez Valencia, a professor at the University of Antioquia’s Institute of Regional Studies who works with farmers’ organizations, told Latin America Reports.

Historically, he said, rural communities have faced both violence and logistical obstacles that limit their ability to vote. About 75% of the victims of Colombia’s armed conflict have been civilians, many of them farmers, according to historical estimates.

Distance alone can also be a barrier. “For many communities, polling stations used to be three or four hours away,” Ramírez said. “Bringing voting sites closer to those places is fundamental.”

Authorities expanded electoral infrastructure for the 2026 vote, increasing the number of polling stations by 5,5% in rural areas compared with the previous 2022 election.

In some regions of Antioquia, Ramírez said, rural residents traveled to voting sites on foot or by chiva, the brightly colored buses that connect remote villages with municipal centers.

Recent government policies may also be shaping political engagement in the countryside. Programs related to land reform, land restitution and rural development have helped strengthen the government’s legitimacy among some farming communities, Ramirez said. “When farmers feel they are being heard and see policies reaching their territories, that can influence how they participate politically.”

Still, rural voting patterns remain complex and vary widely by region. “You can find campesino families involved in social movements defending their land,” Ramírez said. “But when elections arrive, they still vote for traditional parties.”

Across Colombia’s countryside, the election reflected both deep skepticism toward politics and the determination of rural voters to take part in a democratic process that has historically been harder to reach in the country’s most remote regions.

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… but Centro Democratico bounces back, while small parties lose out in March 8 voting.

Last Sunday’s elections brought mixed results to Colombia’s capital with the left-wing Pacto Historico party cementing its position as most popular party in the city even while its main opponent the Centro Democratico showed relatively bigger gains.

With 18 Bogotá seats up for grabs in the Chamber of Representatives, the Pacto Historico, backed by President Gustavo Petro, took a majority of eight, an increase of one seat from the previous period.

And by garnering 900,000 votes the incumbent party upped its count by more than 100,000 compared to 2022, when it was also the most popular party in the city.

But by some comparisons the right-wing Centro Democratico’s result was even more impressive, surging from two to four seats on March 8, totalling 700,000 votes, up from around 300,000 in 2022.

In Bogotá, as at national level, the losers were the smaller independent parties often citizen-led or based on niche issues. Also failing was the Nuevo Liberalismo party, founded by mayor Carlos Galán, which failed to pick up a single seat, a sign perhaps of citizen discontent with the capital’s current administration.

The demise of the small and independents reflected a national trend of voter gravitation towards the two bigger parties, Centro Democratico and Pacto Historico, whose top candidates – Paloma Valencia and Iván Cepeda – are likely contenders for the presidential slug-out in May. 

The remaining Bogotá seats went to smaller traditional parties the Green Alliance (2), and the Liberal Party (1), with one seat awarded to the upstart Salvacion Nacional formed by firebrand right-wing presidential candidate Abelardo De La Espriella.

Political phenomenon

The stand-out result in the Bogotá caucus was Centro Democratico’s first-time congressional candidate Daniel Briceño who captured 262,000 votes for his seat in the chamber.

Not only did Briceño get the highest congressional vote across Colombia, he also out-voted the entire list of senators – which get elected nationally – with one of the historically highest ever recorded in Colombia for a camara or senado representative.

The 34-year-old lawyer was being hailed this week as a political phenomenon. Briceño is currently serving on Bogotá city council where he campaigns against corruption, cronyism and waste through a clever combination of social media and forensic takedowns of his political targets.

The influencer made his name by digging into big data on government databases that has allowed him to uncover contracts and documents embarrassing to the administration of Gustavo Petro.

Since then, he has gained both an online following and voter base by scrutinizing and exposing mismanagement at all government levels.

Defend every vote

Briceño’s jump to congress was mirrored on the political left in Bogotá by the rise of influencers Laura Beltran, aka Lalis, and Daniel Monroy, who both won seats for Pacto Historico.

Despite their success at the urns on March 8, both Monroy and Beltran amplified claims of fraud in the days after the election.

Beltran, posting on X, issued a media alert begging for lawyers in the city to volunteer their time as scrutineers to check the recount after detecting “the winds of fraud”.

“We are defending each vote for the Pacto Historico. In Bogotá we have the chance to recover one more seat,” she said, suggesting the party could up its count to nine.

Monroy, for his part, made a widely echoed claim that  “votes for Pacto Historico are disappearing”.

So far there is no evidence of electoral fraud, though changes in the final vote could come about from errors corrected in the final scrutiny taking place in Bogotá this week.

Meanwhile preliminary declarations by European Union electoral observers  – 145  were deployed to Colombia – stated that the voting process had been “transparent, accurate and well-organized”.

Voter turnout for Bogotá was 48 per cent, similar to the level of participation across the country, with the capital providing 15 per cent of the national vote. A higher turnout is expected for the May presidential elections.

The post Election boost for Pacto Historico in Bogotá … appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

Colombia’s former president Alvaro Uribe Velez will participate in this Sunday’s congressional election following his conviction and subsequent acquittal for procedural fraud and bribery of a public official. 

While he is last in line for a seat in his party’s list, the Centro Democrático, or Democratic Center, hopes his name will help it secure between 18 and 20 seats in the 103-seat Senate.

Uribe is returning to the ballots after resigning from the Senate in 2020, when the Supreme Court began proceedings against him over witness tampering allegations.

In Colombia’s congressional elections, parties and party coalitions can run either closed lists, where voters choose only the party and seats go to candidates in a predetermined order, or open lists, where voters can select individual candidates. Since the Democratic Center is running a closed list, being number 25 means that Uribe is the least likely candidate to get a seat in Congress for his party.

“The political strategy of placing Uribe in the 25th position is highly effective for pulling in votes and taking advantage of voters’ lack of understanding [about how closed lists work],” political advisor Felipe García told The Bogotá Post. 

The Democratic Center is a hyper-personalized party whose votes rely heavily on the stature of Uribe as the natural leader of Colombia’s political right. Therefore, it is likely that voters will go to the polls on Sunday to vote for whoever Uribe endorsed, regardless of whether he himself ends up being elected.

Legal battle

The legal case against Uribe centered on a libel suit he had brought against Senator Iván Cepeda Castro, the current leftist presidential frontrunner, who accused Uribe of being involved with paramilitary death squads. 

Uribe and Cepeda represent opposite poles of Colombia’s political spectrum. Uribe is a conservative, hardline anti-guerrilla leader, whereas Cepeda supports peace negotiations with rebels.

While investigating a separate case to the libel inquiry, authorities overheard in a wiretap that Uribe’s lawyer, Diego Cadena, had contacted jailed paramilitaries to change their testimony in Uribe’s favor.

This evidence became key to a July 2025 ruling which made Uribe Colombia’s first ex-president to be criminally convicted, with judge Sandra Heredia sentencing him to 12 years of house arrest. 

But the politician’s lawyers appealed the ruling and in October, the Superior Court of Bogotá acquitted Uribe of all charges, as the wiretap evidence against him was illegally collected.

A month before his acquittal, the Democratic Center – which was founded by Uribe – announced that its former leader would be number 25 on the party’s Senate candidate closed list.

Uribe’s 2020 resignation from the senate was seen as both a legal and political move, since it meant that his case would be picked up by the Attorney General’s Office, which at the time was headed by Francisco Barbosa Delgado, an ally of the former president.

After several failed attempts to close the case and after Barbosa left office as attorney general, the office formally charged former president Álvaro Uribe Vélez with bribery and witness tampering in May 2024. By that time, Uribe’s defense team was already alleging that the politician was the victim of lawfare.

Recently, the prosecution team in the Uribe trial and alleged victims of paramilitaries announced they would file an extraordinary appeal before the Supreme Court. The ruling is expected to carry greater legal significance than political or public impact, according to García.

Many victims’ groups celebrated Uribe’s conviction as a symbolic victory. Uribe was the president during the ‘false positives’ killings — cases in which Colombian soldiers killed civilians and falsely presented them as guerrilla members killed in combat.

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As Colombia’s northern Córdoba province continues to grapple with the aftermath of mass flooding, current and former government officials allege a pattern of mismanagement involving the Urrá hydroelectric dam.

President Gustavo Petro has accused the dam’s operators of committing an “environmental crime”, blaming corporate greed on the current natural disaster which has affected as many as 78,000 families. 

Meanwhile, the former Director of the Land Restitution Unit in Córdoba claims she was removed from her position to prevent the Urrá dam from returning land to local Indigenous groups.

Urrá’s role in the flooding

The crisis in Córdoba began at the end of January when unseasonably heavy rainfall triggered flash floods, overflowing rivers, and landslides. As of March 2, 15,000 evacuated people are still living in temporary shelters in the region, according to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. 

While climate change is a key factor in the disaster – which occurred during the dry season – there are also indications of man-made causes. 

“All flooding of Urrá onto farmers’ land is a continuation of an existing environmental crime,” wrote Petro in a post on X on February 8, claiming that the dam allowed its reservoirs to fill up excessively “out of pure greed.”

The president called for the immediate resignation of the president of Urrá, Juan Acevedo Rocha, who stepped down days later. However, Acevedo denies wrongdoing and maintains the dam’s levels were 90cm below the maximum permitted. 

Petro later took aim at Urrá’s environmental impact in the region, citing the disappearance of wetlands: “Urrá was not built to generate energy but to dry up the nation’s land and damage the entire natural flow of water in Córdoba.”

Large swaths of swampland have been drained as a result of the dam blocking water flows, which has freed up land for economic purposes like agriculture and cattle ranching.

“The drying of swamps affected the natural capacity of ecosystems to regulate flooding,” wrote Carolina García Londoño, President of the Antioquia Chapter of the Colombian Geological Society, in a column for news website La Silla Vacia.

García also described “poor management” of the dam in relation to regulating water overflow. 

“It is clear that there were failures in communication with downstream communities. They were not informed in a timely manner of the opening of the floodgates,” affirmed the disaster management expert.

An alleged pattern of corruption

Controversy surrounding the Urrá dam is not new, with the project embroiled in scandal as far back as the 1990s. In 1998, the Constitutional Court ruled that the project did not consult local Indigenous groups before beginning construction on their native land, breaching the 1991 Constitution.

But a court later accepted Colombian government arguments that the dam was vital to the country’s energy needs, with the concession that Urrá would pay indemnities to Indigenous communities.

Yet local Indigenous leaders, notably Kimy Pernía Domicó, publicly campaigned against Urrá, saying it did not comply with its commitments to Embera Katío communities. Pernía was killed in 2001 by the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), a prominent paramilitary group.

Years later, Ana Cristina Muñoz was appointed to the Land Restitution Unit in Córdoba and Bajo Cauca, overseeing the return of lands illegally confiscated during Colombia’s decades-long armed conflict.

“I found sufficient evidence proving that the Urrá hydroelectric plant controls 123,000 hectares of land belonging to the Emberá Katío people,” Muñoz told Latin America Reports.

But in September 2024, just one day before she was due to meet 21 Indigenous authorities to sign a formal petition for the return of land restitution from Urrá, Muñoz was removed from her position.

She alleges that she was sacked because she planned to order the restitution of lands from Urrá to the local Embera Katío Indigenous population: “Urrá was directly involved in my departure.”

Following the flooding, Muñoz has been actively campaigning in Córdoba on the promise of justice for victims of the environmental disaster.

Running as part of the Frente Amplio Unitario, she hopes to finally enact land reforms in Córdoba by being elected to the Senate.

“We need to revisit this issue, through a legal battle, to see what we can achieve,” said Muñoz

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Colombian Defence Minister Pedro Sánchez urged the public not to trust the National Liberation Army’s (ELN’s) promise to observe a ceasefire during elections this weekend.

In a speech on Monday, Sánchez cast doubt on the ELN’s pledge last month to not launch any attacks during the election period, saying: “It is very easy for them to lie.”

The defense minister reiterated calls for the public to remain vigilant ahead of the legislative elections and presidential primaries scheduled for Sunday, which have been overshadowed by the threat of violence.

“The ELN recently distributed a pamphlet stating that it will not interfere with the elections,” Sanchez said at a press conference in Bogotá on Monday. “Let us remember what happened in December, when they said they would not harm any Colombian,” continued the minister, referring to the deaths of Colombian soldiers during an ELN Christmas ceasefire. 

Sánchez also highlighted additional potential threats to the electoral process coming from dissident factions of the now-defunct Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). 

He said the groups led by Calarcá and Mordisco, as well as criminal organizations such as Los Pachenca and Los Conquistadores de la Sierra, should be closely monitored due to their past acts of violence, particularly interference in efforts to maintain a peaceful electoral environment.

To prevent any possible guerrilla attacks, Sánchez said the government has enacted extraordinary security measures across the country. 

“In response to these threats, we have deployed offensive operations and a security deployment that has allowed us to establish operational control of the area, without denying that the threat persists, but also without denying our will and our capacity to neutralize it,” added Sanchez.

The government has mobilized 246,000 members of the security forces, who will protect more than 13,000 polling stations across the country, according to the minister. Enhanced training is also taking place along with special measures such as drone‑jamming systems. 

Ahead of the elections, Sánchez reported that four ELN members, including one nicknamed “El Mono”, were arrested on March 1 for planning and carrying out terrorist actions against civilians as well as extortion. 

A Colombian Army report from 2025 recorded 165 ELN-related captures, 47 voluntary surrenders, and 15 minors recovered from armed groups during military operations.

Yet, the ELN’s stance toward the election remains unchanged, with its national leadership declaring unilateral ceasefires and emphasizing that it will continue acting in accordance with its policy in favor of the people and their freedom to act.

Previous attacks by the ELN

In the past, the ELN, officially recognized as a terrorist organization in Colombia and the United States, has carried out attacks on security forces, violence towards civilians, and kidnappings for political purposes.

Notably, the group has also launched attacks while engaging in peace negotiations, such as the car bomb at a police academy in Bogotá in 2019, one of the deadliest terrorist attacks in modern Colombian history, which killed 22 people and injured 66. 

President Ivan Duque, who was in office at the time, condemned the attack as a “miserable terrorist act” and vowed to bring those responsible to justice.

Fresh peace talks between the Gustavo Petro administration broke down in early 2025 when the ELN was blamed for violent clashes in the Catatumbo region which affected more than 90,000 people, according to the United Nations. 

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Former Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) commanders have for the first time in Colombian history freely admitted the armed group’s role in recruiting more than 18,677 children during five decades of their armed conflict with the state.

In a five-page document signed by Rodrigo Londoño, alias ‘Timochenko’, and five other demobilized senior leaders, the former fighters recognized their role in forcing minors into a life under arms.

Colombia’s peace court, known as the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP), had previously determined that the six defendants, all former members of the FARC secretariat, carried responsibility for the crimes of recruitment of minors under 15 years of age, mistreatment torture and murder of children, sexual and reproductive violence, and prejudice against minors with diverse sexual orientations or gender identities.

See also: Peace plan has caused more conflict, says thinktank.

In the letter to the court the six defendants admitted the acts and asked for forgiveness.

“There are no words to repair these deeds,” said Londoño in a televised address widely circulated this week. “Today with honesty and clarity we recognize our role.”

“We ask forgiveness from direct and indirect victims, and from society in general.”

Londoño, who was the FARC’s last field commander up until the peace signing, said he recognized that the rebel’s actions had “stolen childhoods” as young combatants faced constant fear and death.

Historical whitewashing

Londoño also acknowledged that “the homicides, forced abortions, acts of gender-based violence, and reproductive violence caused serious physical and psychological damage that still persists”.

The statement was a milestone in Case 07 of Colombia’s JEP, the special court charged with untangling crimes committed by all sides during the state conflict with the FARC.

Case 07 was opened in 2019 and has since officially recognized 18,677 victims, of which 54 per cent are children themselves recruited, and 46 per cent families who lost children to the conflict.

Other actors in Colombia’s armed conflict have used minors as well. According to Crisis Group, “right-wing paramilitary groups” counted some 2,800 children within their ranks when they demobilized in the mid-2000s.

Historically the FARC whitewashed their role in the recruitment of minors, and during the 2016 peace process vigorously denied accusations of abducting children or threatening families to hand over their children.

According to the FARC’s own narrative, many young recruits joining the Marxist guerrilla group were “volunteers escaping poverty”. The leadership traditionally downplayed reports of sexual abuse, forced abortions and the murders and disappearances of children as political propaganda.

As recently as 2015, FARC commanders were claiming that the armed group “under no circumstance recruited children, or anyone else, forcefully,” according to a Human Rights Watch report critical of the guerrilla’s position.

Never coming home

HRW’s own investigations had identified victims as young as 12 who were tied up by the guerrillas and threatened to be killed if they tried to resist. In other cases, kids were tricked with offers of presents or cash before being forced to fight under arms.

The report also cited cases of older commanders abusing girls as young as 12 in some incidents forcing them to use contraception or to have abortions.

According to JEP data presented under Case 07, child victims were present in the FARC ranks across 16 departments of Colombia, almost the whole territory controlled by the guerrilla group at its peak. Recruitment peaked between 1999 and 2013 but continued to 2016, the year of the peace accord between the rebels and the state.

Accredited to the case were 2,000 individual victims recruited as children but now adults, the JEP announced this week.

Also part of the group were families of 485 children recruited into the ranks who “never returned home”. The JEP had joined with the UPBD (Unidad de Búsqueda de Personas dadas por Desaparecidas) missing persons unit to try and locate the remains of those missing persons.

Details from Case 07 also highlighted the large numbers of minors taken from indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities, with 9,000 registered victims from six ethnic groups.

Restorative Justice

According to JEP proceedures, FARC leaders’ statements this week were an important step forward in the restorative justice process. The special peace court works with a system of dialogues between accused perpetrators and victims.

Information released by the court this week defined Case 07 as still in the dialogue phase with both private and public audiences were expected in the future where victims would given the opportunity to recount their experiences.

In line with previous cases, the former FARC leaders, could chose to respond to the crimes in front of the victims. Any punishment could come in the form of an eight-year sentence of restricted liberties for the former FARC leaders, though not jail time.

As part of the sentence the JEP might recommend restorative programs – a form of social work – in agreements made with the victims.   

For its part, the former FARC secretariat announced its full support for this process. In a taped statement former commander Julián Galló also accepted his role in the crimes.

“Our compromise is to work in the future so that hopefully these cases don’t keep on occurring,” he said.

Circular problem

Repetition was already happening, according to a report published last month by Crisis Group called Kids on the Front Lines: Stopping Child Recruitment in Colombia. According to the Brussels-based think tank, the practice had “boomed in the last decade” even since the FARC demobilized under the peace process in 2016.

A new generation of armed groups still relied on minors to maintain territorial control, said the report, with 620 cases reported in 2024: “Children carry out high-risk tasks, suffer abuse, and are punished with death if caught escaping.”

Ruthless gangs were using social media posts to reel vulnerable youngsters into the conflict with false promises of wealth, status and protection, said Crisis Group. Families faced reprisals if they spoke out, the report added.

And with increased competition between fractionated armed groups, minors were being pushed to the front lines: “Kids now fight in high-risk combat roles.”

Colombia’s circular problem of child recruitment was highlighted this week by JEP magistrate Lily Rueda, presiding over Case 07, in conversation with El Espectador. The message from the peace courts was “more relevant then ever” after data from UNICEF showed that the recruitment of children in Colombia had increased by 300% in the last five years.

“This is an opportunity to reiterate our commitment to investigating and prosecuting these acts of violence against children, which constitute war crimes and are not subject to amnesty, not even in the context of peace agreements,” she said

“Victims who survived recruitment in the past should not be victimized again by the recruitment of their own sons and daughters in the present day.”

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Health authorities have activated over 200 free vaccination points across the city this week after two measles cases were reported.

The highly contagious virus, which is airborne and can cause serious health problems for young children, was detected in travelers from Mexico who had arrived in Bogotá and then fallen ill. Another imported case was found outside the capital.

In response the city’s District Health Secretariat said it had activated protocols to isolate the cases and had laboratories on hand to help with tracking any potential spread in the city.

Bogotá’s health secretary Gerson Bermont emphasized the need for a swift response: “Bogotá has all the infrastructure and human resources to provide technical support for diagnostic processes, he said. “The key is to act promptly to reduce local transmission.”

Measles was one of the most contagious viruses in existence and could be transmitted even by breathing, he warned. The best protection was with the MMR (measles, mumps, and rubella) vaccine, with two doses 97% effective at preventing the disease. The three people reported this week were unvaccinated.

In June last year U.S. embassies around the world took the unusual step of issuing a warning that measles was an “ongoing global risk” and advised citizens going abroad to get jabbed.

“Travelers can catch measles in many travel settings including travel hubs like airports and train stations, on public transportation like airplanes and trains, at tourist attractions, and at large, crowded events,” said the notice.

“Infected travelers can bring the disease back to their home communities where it can spread rapidly among people who are not immune.”

Good coverage

Recent data from the U.S. Centre for Disease Control (CDC) showed outbreaks in every region of the world with high caseloads in Mexico, Yemen, Indonesia, Pakistan, India, Angola and Laos.

 The World Health Organization (WHO)  declared Colombia free of measles in 2014, after intensive campaigns across the country by vaccination teams brought MMR to remote corners of the country.

Measles vaccine coverage in the country was 93 per cent for the first dose, according to data on the WHO immunization dashboard, a reasonable result for a country with access challenges for health teams

Bogotá last saw cases in 2019, when 11 persons were affected by the disease, according to data from the city’s Observatorio de Salud.  

To avoid local spread from the imported cases this week, more than 200 vaccination points were activated across the city, with details in this link of locations and opening times. Most of the sites are in existing health facilities though all are welcome and the measles vaccine is free.

The city health authorities were offering free immunization with the triple MMR vaccines (measles, mumps and rubella) known in Colombia as SRP (sarampión, rubéola y paperas) or a double vaccine of SR (just measles and rubella). Any unvaccinated or partially vaccinate person between six months old and 60 years old was encouraged to get jabbed.

The risk to Colombia “could not be underestimated” Bermont told Blu Radio this week.

“It’s bad news what’s happening in the Americas,” he said. “Last year there were 15,000 measles cases across the region. Just in Mexico there were 32 deaths”.

Bermont said mass immunization was the best method to avoid an outbreak, but region had become vulnerable from anti-vax messaging by pressure groups that gained influence during the Covid-19 pandemia.  

“We have to also recognize that today there are also health authorities in the world that throw doubt on the effectiveness of the vaccine.”

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Colombians head to the polls on March 8 for what is, formally, a legislative election. In practice, it is something more consequential: a stress test of the country’s political coalitions ahead of the May 31 presidential race already defined by fragmentation – and by mounting security concerns for right-wing candidates.

The vote for Congress matters. But the country will be watching the consultas presidenciales—three parallel primaries that function as a de facto first round. In them, Colombians vote less for programs than for trajectories: continuity, rupture, or something in between.

On the right, Paloma Valencia is poised to dominate La Gran Consulta, a coalition spanning moderate conservatives, independent liberals, and slate of well-known political leaders. Polling places her far ahead of her rivals, with margins large enough not merely to win, but to define the bloc itself. In a pre-Petro era, such a coalition might have fractured under its contradictions, but today, it coheres around one single objective: opposition to the government of Gustavo Petro and the restoration of order- political, fiscal, and territorial.

Valencia’s strength is not only electoral; it is structural. She inherits the Centro Democrático machinery and the disciplined base loyal to former two-term president Álvaro Uribe, whose legacy continues to shape Colombia’s right. But her challenge begins the moment she wins. The right is not unified—it is merely aligned. To convert alignment into victory, she will need to reach out to Abelardo de la Espriella, a pro-Bukele, pro-Milei, lawyer whose mass appeal is rooted in a more visceral, anti-left electorate. If Valencia succeeds in clinching La Gran Consulta, the right could reach May 31 not only united, but energized. If she fails, she risks replaying a familiar Colombian pattern: ideological proximity undone by personal rivalries.

With “El Tigre” de la Espriella lurking in the shadows, the right looks ascendant. Uribe Vélez now faces the daunting challenge of fusing his CD base with Espriella’s fervent Defensores de la Patria.

A Spectral Center

Claudia López is expected to win her consultation comfortably, aided as much by the absence of strong rivals as by the presence of loyal supporters. Her likely vote total- perhaps around one million—will be spun as a comeback. In reality, it reflects the residual strength of her partisan mayoralty and Bogotá-based electorate.

The absence of Sergio Fajardo from the Consulta de las Soluciones underscores the fragmentation of Colombia’s center. A strong showing by López will force a choice: seek alliances quickly or face marginalization after March 8. Even a López–Fajardo ticket would face sharp criticism from within their respective bases, and risk a repeat of the 2022 election season in which Sergio Fajardo’s campaign imploded under the weight of Petrismo or Uribismo.

On the left, the situation is more fluid – and more revealing.

The exclusion of Iván Cepeda has transformed the Frente por la Vida into a contest between two practitioners of political adaptation: Roy Barreras and Daniel Quintero. Neither represents the ideological hardline of Petrismo. Both instead offer variations of what might be called continuity without commitment – a “Petrismo 2.0” calibrated for chaise-lounge socialists.

Barreras relies on organization, his tenure as a loyal Petro “insider”, and the quiet efficiencies of Colombia’s territorial elites. Quintero counters with a direct, anti-Uribe narrative amplified through social media. Each seeks not to replace Petro, but to reinterpret him. Yet the Barreras-versus-Quintero contest feels less like a continuation of an embattled political project than an attempt for both candidates to repackage their political futures.

The most important actor on the left may be Petro himself – precisely because of his absence. By declining to endorse the consultation, he has deprived it of coherence. The result is a referendum on his government without his direct participation, and turnout that may struggle to reach even one million voters. In political terms, that is not a mobilization. It is a warning.

What emerges from these three contests is not a country coalescing, but one sorting itself into sharper, more disciplined minorities. The right is concentrated and motivated. The left is divided and improvisational. The center is present, but peripheral.

Then there is the largest bloc of all: those who will not participate. Polling suggests that a majority of Colombians will abstain from the primaries altogether. This is not apathy in the conventional sense. It reflects something more structural –  a growing distance between citizens and political mechanisms that no longer seem to mediate power so much as ratify it.

In that respect, March 8 clarifies less about who will win than about how Colombia now conducts politics. Elections no longer aggregate a national will; they stage competitions between organized intensities. Victory belongs not to the broadest coalition, but to the most cohesive one.

By Sunday night, the candidates will claim momentum. Some will have earned it. Others will have inherited it. But all will confront the same reality: the path to the presidency no longer runs through the mythical Colombian center. It runs through blocs – disciplined, polarized, and increasingly unwilling to transcend partisan loyalties for the greater good.

Applications for the prestigious scholarship programme opened this week and will close on May 12. 

The Fulbright Commission launched its 2023 scholarship scheme earlier this week, offering 51 Colombians the chance to study postgraduate degrees at some of the best universities in the United States. Applications opened on February 21 and will close on May 12. 

The Fulbright Commission is one of the biggest scholarship programmes in the world, offering funding to students from 157 countries. 

The Colombian branch of the initiative is jointly financed by the US State Department, the Colombian government, and a number of NGOs and political bodies from both countries. Last year it celebrated its 65th anniversary and since its launch, more than 5,200 students have received financial aid from the commission. 

The scheme aims to support students from groups underrepresented in academia, in particular first-generation scholars, women, indigenous peoples, people of Afro-Caribbean descent, and disabled people. There are also specific opportunities for those seeking to study a STEM subject at Master’s or PhD level. 

The nature of the scholarships depends on individuals’ programmes of choice, but in general, they cover all academic expenses, living costs, plane tickets, a basic insurance policy and visa costs. 

On completion of their degrees, Colombian Fulbright scholars are required to return to the country for at least two years during which time they should share the knowledge they have acquired during their time in the United States. 

The Executive Director of the commission, Diana Basto Castro said that the organisation is looking for people from across the country who will act as “agents of change” and who have a desire “to transform their lives and the lives of those in their communities”. 

Six forms of postgraduate scholarship are available:

• Minciencias scholarship: Up to 40 places available for people interested in research. 80% of recipients will be undertaking STEM degrees and at least 12 will belong to ethnic groups. 
• Scholarship for communities of Afro-descent: Three places are available for people from communities of raizales, palenqueras or of afro-descent. There is no restriction on degree subjects.
• Scholarship for agricultural and rural development: Three places are available for master’s students carrying out a research project focusing on cocoa production in Colombia. The scheme is part of the ‘acuerdo de cacao para la paz’ and aims to promote sustainable production and agricultural climate resilience.
• Indigenous communities scholarship: One place for a student from an indigenous community to study a master’s or PhD in any area of study. 
• Saldarriaga Concha scholarship: One spot for a student with a disability to carry out a master’s programme.
• J. William Fulbright scholarship for the mitigation of climate change: Three opportunities for students undertaking degrees focusing on adaptation to and mitigation of climate change. 

Candidates are required to have completed an undergraduate degree before 31st December 2022 and have a qualification in English. 

There are also funding opportunities for English-teaching programmes and non-degree academic-professional development activities. 

More information about the scholarships is available at the Fulbright Commission’s website.

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Medellín, Colombia – On Thursday morning, a drone dropped a mortar shell on a home in Segovia, a town in the northeast of the Antioquia department, killing three occupants of the house and leaving one critically injured.

The police identified the victims as María Cecilia Silva Silva and her two adult children, Yalusan Cano Silva and Alsonso de Jesús Silva. Silva’s other son was also wounded in the attack.

Segovia is a key center for illegal gold mining and is being contested by multiple armed groups, including the Gaitanist Army of Colombia (EGC), also known as the Clan del Golfo, and dissident groups of the now-defunct FARC rebels.

Authorities are still working to establish if the attack was directed at the family or if it was an error by the drone operators, an increasingly common occurrence as drones become the latest technology used in Colombia’s internal armed conflict. 

According to the Secretary of Security of Antioquia, General Luis Eduardo Martínez Gúzman, the victims were “a family who have nothing to do with the conflict, who were simply attacked by a drone.” 

Martínez highlighted the danger of these devices, suggesting that the explosive device was detached from the drone, which means the mortar could “fall anywhere.”

The Director of the National Police in Colombia, General William Oswaldo Rincón Zambrano, released a statement of condemnation: “[we] categorically reject this criminal act which plunges a Colombian family into mourning and demonstrates the contempt of illegal armed groups for human life and dignity.” 

He also reported that state security forces have headed to the area where the attack took place in order to verify what happened and assist in locating and capturing those responsible. He also expressed solidarity with the victims and their families.

The Governor of Antioquia, Andrés Julián Rendón took to social media to blame the security policies of the national government for the attack: “Who in their right mind could consider that this government has achieved transformations for Colombia?”

Rendón criticized President Gustavo Petro for negotiating with the armed groups involved in the conflict in Segovia, part of the leftist leader’s “total peace” policy. 

“This is the so-called ‘total peace’: concessions for criminals and burials for civilians. Antioquia demands an unwavering military offensive, full backing for the security forces, and zero leniency towards the criminals,” said Rendón. 

Drone attacks, both against armed groups as well as against security forces and the civilian population, have become widespread in Colombia. Between April 2024 and February 2026, the government recorded 418 attacks using drones. 

Tackling the mounting security crisis is a key issue in upcoming elections, which the United Nations warns may be undermined by the armed conflict.


Featured image description: Drone with GoPro digital camera mounted

Featured image credit: Don McCullough, Wikimedia Commons

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An express kidnapping highlights the risks of taking a taxi in Colombia’s capital. What happened, and how to avoid it happening to you.

Bogotá breathed a collective sigh of relief on Tuesday morning when news broke of the safe arrival home of Diana Ospina, a rola missing for almost 40 hours after being kidnapped by a taxi she had hailed in the street after a night out in Chapinero.

Ospina was the latest victim of El Paseo Millonario, the ‘millionaire ride’, where passengers riding in yellow public taxis are physically attacked and forced to hand over cash and valuables.

The technique varies, but victims are usually targeted late at night in busy streets in party zones outside restaurants or discotheques, then driven to a quiet spot where two accomplices of the driver climb in the back seat and threaten the passenger with knives, guns or syringes.

See also: Bogotá’s Murder Mosaic

The following ordeal can last minutes or hours or even days. Victims are intimidated with beatings or stab wounds, and hooded or blindfolded. Some are killed, as in the case of a university professor found dead on the outskirts of the city in January this year.

Foreigners are also targeted: in 2013, a DEA officer Terry Watson was stabbed to death in a Bogotá taxi after two assailants jumped in the back seat. Authorities later said the army veteran resisted the attack. Seven taxi drivers were later captured and extradited to the U.S. to face charges for his murder.

According to police data, during 2025 in Bogotá there were registered 37 cases of kidnapping for ransom or extortion, though these crimes are highly under-reported. This is because the same gangs threaten the victims to keep quiet, and in the case of taxi gangs, know where their targets live.

Publicity blitz

In the case of Ospina, her kidnap started early Sunday morning when she hailed a yellow taxi that took her to within one block of her home in Engativá, where two men from a following taxi climbed in the back, threatened her and took her blindfolded for a three-hour driver around the city while using her phone and bank cards.

The ordeal did not end there. Ospina was then passed on to another kidnap group operating in the south of the city and held in a house there while more extortion demands were made. Late on Monday night, after being captive for nearly 40 hours, Ospina was dropped off in the hills above Bogotá where she eventually walked to a police station for assistance.

According to information on FM radio, from contacts close to the family, the kidnap gang released her after the “feeling pressure from the media blitz” with social media platforms widely publicising her disappearance. Other news reports stated they released her only after draining 50 million pesos (US$15,000) from her bank accounts.

This week the authorities were still hunting the perpetrators, expecting arrests imminently.

Your world in your phone

The Ospina case highlights how smartphones have upped the risks for kidnap victims in Colombia.

Whereas in the past a paseo millonario was usually a short-term event – passengers held for an hour while the gang used their bankcards at an ATM – criminals nowadays are eyeing much bigger profits from emptying bank accounts held on smartphones.

The insistence by banks and other financial platforms to use biometric approvals such as face recognition or fingerprint scanning has created the need for gangs to keep their targets captive for many days, in some cases drugging them into compliance or subduing them through threats of violence.

See also: Bogotá Police take down gang drugging victims in Teusaquillo and Chapinero

The rise of the digital nomads in Colombia often with juicy crypto accounts accessed through their phones has also created opportunities for tech savvy criminals. After such attacks, platforms are reluctant to reimburse funds arguing that they were transferred with the biometric approval of the victim.

One thing is clear: apart from increased financial losses, the longer victims are held captive the worse their outcome, both in terms of physical and psychological damage, the risk of sexual violence, or death from an overdose of the powerful drugs such as burundanga administered by the gangs.

The Canaries

Bogotá has more than 55,000 public taxis circulating on any given day sometimes referred to as ‘Los Canarios’ (the canaries) after their yellow cars and a popular telenovela depicting taxi drivers. It is worth noting that taxi drivers are themselves frequently the victims of robbery, extortions and murder.

Yellow taxi companies in Bogotá are registered and controlled by the Secretería de Movilidad with each driver given a Tarjeta de Control, the plasticized card hanging down the seat back that – in theory – displays the name, details and photo of the driver as well as the fare scale, and is revalidated every month.

In Bogotá, passengers can independently check the status of registered drivers by entering the numberplate into the menu at SIMUR at  www.simur.gov.co/conductores-de-taxi.

But in a random test by The Bogotá Post, out of 10 taxis entered by number plate, only six had a registered driver. Four were reported “without an active registration”.

That lack of control is further weakened by the fact that registered taxistas often allow other drivers to take the wheel, said transport companies this week.

“We work on good faith, but we can’t guarantee that drivers don’t hand over their cars to other persons to commit crimes,” Maria  Botero, manager of Radiotaxis told Noticias Caracol.

In the case of Ospina, the taxis that abducted her were quickly identified along with their owners, but not the actual attackers. One car was not currently registered on SIMUR.

No dar papaya

How to avoid becoming a victim? A good tip is to use a ride platforms like Didi, Cabify, Uber or Indrive. Some like Didi are also linked to the yellow public taxis, but safer because the ride is traced. At times hailing a street taxi is the only option because app cars are far off, and you weigh the risks of standing on the street, or (as in the case of Diana Ospina) the app ride is suddenly cancelled.

Attacks are usually at night, on weekends, on persons leaving bars or restaurants. But passengers can be targeted in daytime, particularly in financial districts or leaving a bank. If you are riding the yellow taxis, here are some ways to no dar papaya, as they say in Bogotá (‘don’t be a sucker’).

Before going out:

• Carry a clean phone with no banking apps and limited personal data. Many people in Bogotá are now leaving their financial transactions on a second phone or tablet stored safely at home.
• Carry a wad of cash. Perhaps counterintuitively, in the digital world cash makes you less of a target. And it is easy to hand over.
• If you do carry a bank card, take just one linked to a low-balance account.

Getting the taxi:

• Travel in a group. Criminals generally target solo passengers.
• Check the taxi numberplate in SIMUR, see above. This takes seconds and confirms if there is a registered driver. If not, walk away.
• Take a photo of the taxi numberplate, send to friends or family. Ensure the driver sees you doing this.
• Before entering a taxi, look carefully to ensure there is no-one hidden inside.
• Check the Tarjeta de Control photo with the actual driver. Do this before setting off.
• Check doors can be locked and unlocked from the passenger seat.

During the trip:

• Lock doors on both sides.
• Share your real-time location with a family member or friend.

Signs of danger:

• The driver changes the route without explanation.
• The taxi turns onto dark or deserted streets.
• The driver suddenly stops to pick up other persons.
• Motorcycles or other cars or taxis closely follow the vehicle.

During an attack:

• Prioritize your physical safety.
• Give up any valuables without resistance.

If you suspect someone you know has been abducted by a taxi gang, call the GAULA special police unit (Grupos de Acción Unificada por la Libertad Personal) that deals with extortion and kidnapping, on Line 165.

“Safe taxi” zones

Even with these precautions, street taxis are still a risk, and a growing one according to Bogotá security authorities who during 2025 arrested at least 20 persons from several different Paseo Millonario gangs such as La 57 and La Zona T.

A recent advance by the city has been the recognition of the crime as “kidnap with extortion”, with up to 40 years in jail for perpetrators.

Another nitiative announced by the Secretaría de Seguridad this week was taxi seguro zones where uniformed teams patrol outside nightspots and assist revellers to take only registered taxis.

But while mediatic, such initiatives are likely to have only limited impact. Taxi gangs are generally compact, with three people, and mobile so they can cruise new zones. And new gangs seem to pop up as quickly as old ones are taken down.

So while the city can celebrate the safe return of Diana Ospina, and hopefully soon see her attackers rounded up, there will be plenty more candidates for the Millionaire Ride.  

The post Paseo Millionario: don’t be taken for a ride appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

Student leaders declare ‘indefinite strike’ at Bogotá’s sprawling Universidad Nacional as controversial rector reappointed.  

In another twist in the saga of who runs the ‘Nacho’, Colombia’s largest public university, controversial candidate Ismael Peña was formally inducted as rector last week ending a two-year legal wrangle.

Peña was sworn in during a small private ceremony on Thursday just days after a Bogotá tribunal ordered his reinstatement in the job. This followed the resignation last November of another rector whose possession was ruled illegitimate by Colombia’s state council.

Read more: Court Ruling Expected to Spark Trouble at the National University.

The initial controversy was sparked in 2024 in the highly politicized campus when a popular candidate, Leopoldo Múnera, lost out to Peña in the last voting round by the university council.

#BOGOTÁ | Este es el panorama a esta hora (6:53 p.m.) en la calle 26 a la altura de la Universidad Nacional.

Los servicios troncales que transitan realizan retornos en Corferias y Concejo de Bogotá.

Los vehículos particulares no pueden circular en sentido Oriente-Occidente.… pic.twitter.com/WWfyIrqwXi

— ÚltimaHoraCaracol (@UltimaHoraCR) February 19, 2026

The ensuing strikes and protests galvanized the university for four months setting back the academic agenda and creating an exhausting three-term year in 2025, from which students and professors are only just recovering.

Protests and vandalism spilled over onto major nearby transport routes around the Bogotá campus. In Bogotá, the Nacho sits in the corner of the busy Avenida NQS and Avenida El Dorado, two of the most vital throughfares for both public and private transport.

Return of Torres

Even as news of Peña’s legal victory and imminent reinstatement was announced last week, students and supporters quickly blocked the Avenida El Dorado forcing Transmilenio buses to suspend operations and thousands of commuters to make their way on foot.

Student assemblies at the university’s two main campuses, Bogotá and Medellin, called for “indefinite strikes” to protest Peña reinstatement.

To add to the confusion, the Bogotá campus was also invaded by a large group of campesinos from Cauca whose later protests detained workers in government buildings, part of a plan to draw attention to conflict-related problems in their department.

On Friday, when The Bogotá Post visited the university, most of the faculties were closed but the campus was filled with students busy painting fresh murals to celebrate the return of the remains to the campus of Camilo Torres, a revolutionary priest and founder of the university Sociology Department, who joined the ELN guerrillas and was killed in action against the army in 1966.

See also: Remains of Rebel Priest Set to Return to Bogotá.

Many students gave their views on the return of Peña but  declined to be fully identified.

Roberto, a sociology student selling food in the campus, said he supported the strike to “preserve the autonomy of the university”. Peña was seen as an unpopular candidate “linked to private interests that will privatize the curriculum and syphon off profits”, he said.

Corporate spinoffs

Similar sentiments were expressed across the campus: that Peña was being parachuted in with the backing of the Centro Democratic party to advance both a right-wing agenda and disburse lucrative contracts to a select group of private companies.

According to an investigation by magazine La Raya last year, Peña was the continuity candidate for “a parallel administration system” embedded in a company called Rotorr that dished out deals on behalf of the university, but bypassed internal auditing procedures leaving an opaque tangle of beneficiaries.

During his rectorship Múnera described these corporate spinoffs as engaging in “crimes against the university” and flagged them to the judicial authorities, but so far with no clear resolution.

Despite these controversies, Peña’s return was boosted by support from the Consejo Superior Universitario, the highest decision-making body of public universities in Colombia, that unanimously agreed to respect the tribunal ruling, clearing any final legal hurdles.

Strike Down

In another unexpected outcome, an online poll of students revealed that a majority were against the suspension of classes.

 The initial strike call came after a hastily convened student assembly on the Bogotá campus where some student representatives later complained that their voices were not heard.

“There was one classmate, he raised his hand and they wouldn’t let him speak. So, the next day we decided to conduct a survey to ask the students if they agreed with the strike,” student representative Kevin Arriguí told City TV.

The results, based on a total of 5,438 respondents, showed that 56 per cent (3,060 students) disagreed with the strike, while only 36 per cent (2,141 students) supported it. There were 237 undecideds.

Tellingly, the online strike survey had a higher participation among students than last year’s vote to install a Constituyente Universitaria – a people’s body – that is now in place.

Some students consulted on the campus by The Bogotá Post last week were mindful of the outcome of the 2024 strike which lasted several months and created hardships, particularly for poor students from rural areas who had spent money to travel to the capital to study, only to face severe interruptions to their curriculums and the risk of having to study another year to gain their degrees.

“We don’t want Peña. People are angry. But we don’t want to stop the term either,” said Carla, a student outside the newly constructed 70,000-million-peso arts faculty building.

Fragile mobility

Finding a compromise could be problematic. Activists on the campus were pressuring undergraduates to not attend classes and most lessons were abandoned. Some professors offered their classes on-line.

The student assembly planned this week at the Bogotá site could reverse the strike plans, though this seems unlikely. The general mood among students on the campus was that they would “block Peña, whatever it takes”.

Such talk is common at a university that is a petri dish for the national condition and at times – literally – a battleground for political divisions, particularly in a city nominated as the country’s “protest capital”.

This was revealed by data published in an El Espectador op-ed this week which showed Bogotá had 1,678 mass mobilization recorded during 2025, roughly 32 per week, and an increase of 17 per cent on the previous year.

While celebrating this increase as a “symptom of democracy”, it also pointed out that these protests “affected public order and the fragile mobility of millions of Bogotanos”.  

 That included two million people using the Transmilenio each day, with a majority of these on lines passing close to the Universidad Nacional. Easy targets for agitators based on the campus.

Which is why trouble at the Nacho generally means headaches for the whole city.

The post More trouble at Bogotá’s Universidad Nacional? appeared first on The Bogotá Post.