The Bogotá Short Film Festival – BOGOSHORTS – is strengthening its international footprint at the 79th Cannes Film Festival with a major presence at the Short Film Corner | Rendez-vous Industry, positioning Colombian and regional filmmakers before one of the world’s most influential film markets.
From May 13 to 24, this leading platforms for Latin America’s short films will present two curated collections of short films at Cannes while deepening industry ties through networking events, producer exchanges and strategic collaborations aimed at increasing international visibility for emerging Latin American talent.
The initiative marks the second consecutive year that the BOGOSHORTS universe has secured a prominent place within Cannes’ Cinema de Demain section, the festival’s platform dedicated to discovering the next generation of filmmakers.
This year, BOGOSHORTS will showcase 10 short films divided into two programs: BOGOSHORTS World Tour – Winners Colombia and BOGOSHORTS World Tour – Latin American Talents. The films will be available to accredited industry professionals through the Short Film Corner space within the Marché du Film and on Cinando, the industry networking platform used by festival programmers, producers, critics and institutional representatives.
The Colombian selection includes five award-winning films from the festival’s 23rd edition: Agachar el rostro, directed by Camilo Medina Noy; Un aparato para detectar fantasmas, by Mauricio Maldonado; Malas posturas, directed by Juan Pablo Castro; Mi viche todo el día, by Juan Camilo Moreno; and Luz de luna, directed by Claudia Alejandra Rivera Guarnizo.
The Latin American showcase brings together a new generation of filmmakers from across the region, including Uruguay’s stop-motion short Lodo, Mexico-Cuba co-production Cicatriz de fe, Mexican production Carne, Colombian short La ley de las acciones, and Chilean production Petra y el sol.
A delegation of 17 filmmakers and producers connected to these projects will attend Cannes in person, participating in a packed agenda of panels, workshops, masterclasses, project presentations and networking sessions.
For BOGOSHORTS founder and director Jaime E. Manrique, the presence at Cannes reflects a broader mission to ensure short films from Colombia and Latin America gain stronger access to international markets.
“Ensuring that Colombian and Latin American short film talent has a stronger presence and greater opportunities for international projection and connection is one of BOGOSHORTS’ core missions,” Manrique said in a statement.
“Thanks to the agreement with the Short Film Corner | Rendez-vous Industry at the Cannes Film Festival and the articulation with our film market, this goal is not only possible, but strengthened for the second consecutive year with the participation of a young Colombian producer in the New Producers Room.”
That producer is Melisa Zapata Montoya, who stands out as the only Latin American participant selected for the 2026 edition of the New Producers Room, a Cannes initiative that supports 10 promising short film producers from around the world.
Created in 2022, the New Producers Room is designed for producers who have already completed at least two short films and are seeking international co-production opportunities. The program combines online sessions with presentations in Cannes and facilitates meetings with potential collaborators, investors and creative partners.
Zapata, recognized for projects such as Menguante (2017), Paloquemao (2020) and the feature project Pétalos de sangre (2027), joins the group through BOGOSHORTS’ recommendation, reinforcing the festival’s role as a bridge between Colombian talent and the global industry.
As part of its collaboration with Cannes, BOGOSHORTS will also select one of the 10 New Producers Room participants to attend the next edition of the BFM — BOGOSHORTS Film Market in Bogotá this December.
The selected producer will receive a tailored industry agenda and enter the BFM incubator, designed to strengthen project development and long-term professional growth. Manrique will make the selection directly in Cannes after reviewing the participating projects.
The BFM, now preparing for its 10th edition, has become one of Colombia’s most important spaces for short film development and international co-production, serving as a platform for emerging filmmakers seeking access to wider distribution networks.
Beyond screenings and business meetings, BOGOSHORTS will host a reception on May 19 at Colombia’s national stand in Cannes with support from Proimágenes Colombia. The event will bring together Latin American filmmakers, producers and institutional allies as part of its strategy to consolidate international partnerships and present future global calls for participation.
The organization will also sponsor the closing cocktail of the New Producers Room, further increasing its visibility within Cannes’ professional circuit.
The Latin American talents collection was supported by Chile’s Cortos en Grande Festival and Uruguay’s Festival del Nuevo Cine – Detour, underscoring the regional collaboration behind the initiative.
For BOGOSHORTS, the growing presence at Cannes is part of a long-term internationalization strategy that extends beyond festival screenings.
It is an effort to position short film not as a stepping stone to feature filmmaking, but as a vital creative and industrial format in its own right – one capable of opening doors for a new generation of Latin American storytellers with many of the world’s leading industry professionals.
Qatar Airways has affirmed its expansion in the Americas with the launch of new flight operations to Caracas, Venezuela, and Bogotá, Colombia, commencing from 22 July 2026. The service represents a significant milestone for the airline, as Qatar Airways becomes the first Gulf carrier to serve Venezuela, and the first airline to operate flights from the Middle East to Caracas and Bogotá. This expansion underscores the airline’s commitment, announced last year, to strengthening global connectivity for the region.
Qatar Airways flights to Caracas (CCS) and Bogotá (BOG)
Qatar Airways will operate two weekly flights to Caracas and Bogotá, further enhancing connectivity to, and from, the Americas. The flight schedule has been designed to provide smooth onward connections through Hamad International Airport to key markets including Australia, China, Japan, Lebanon, South Korea, and the United Arab Emirates. This offers passengers greater flexibility and seamless transfer options across Qatar Airways’ global network.
Departing every Wednesday and Sunday:
The addition of Caracas and Bogotá marks both the 15th and 16th destinations in the Americas served by Qatar Airways. The airline began serving South America in 2010 with its inaugural flight to Brazil’s São Paulo.
The government of Ecuador, led by President Daniel Noboa, announced a reduction in the so-called “security tariff” applied to imports from Colombia, lowering it from 100% to 75% effective June 1, 2026.
The decision was announced in an official statement from Ecuador’s presidency, which said the measure “reaffirms the national government’s willingness to move toward bilateral cooperation mechanisms on security matters, promoting greater coordination between both countries and strengthening the development of the border region.”
More information about the “security tariff”: Colombia and Ecuador Escalate Trade Tensions with Tariffs Raised to 100%.
Differences between the governments of Gustavo Petro and Noboa have escalated since 2025, driven by political, commercial and border security disagreements.
In April 2025, Petro initially said he could not recognize Noboa’s election, arguing that Ecuador’s electoral process had taken place “under a state of emergency” and with military presence during voting. However, he later reversed his position and attended Noboa’s inauguration ceremony on May 24, 2025, in Quito.
Since then, both countries have faced disputes related to border security, trade and energy transportation, leading to a gradual escalation in tariffs. Import duties increased progressively from 30% to 50% and later reached 100% on April 9, 2026.
Read: Colombia to Reinforce Border Security with Ecuador Amid Escalating Trade Tensions.
“Unfortunately, it is not possible to reach agreements with someone who does not share the same commitment to fighting narco-terrorism. Since we adopted this measure, violent deaths along the northern border have decreased by 33%. In the future, it will be possible to talk with a government that is truly committed to fighting crime and drug trafficking,” Noboa wrote on X on April 10, 2026, while defending the tougher trade measures.
The tariff reduction announced by Ecuador coincides with the Colombian government’s earlier decision not to raise its own tariffs to 100%, a move seen as a sign of moderation that could help ease diplomatic and commercial tensions between the two countries.
The dispute has particularly affected Colombian border regions such as Nariño and Cauca, which are already facing security challenges linked to the presence of illegal armed groups and recent violent attacks.
Read: Rising Violence in Colombia: Highway Explosion Leaves 21 Dead, Dozens Injured.
Colombia’s Minister of Commerce, Industry and Tourism, Diana Marcela Morales Rojas, said that “what we are seeing is that Ecuador’s initial strategy did not produce the expected effects on Colombia and instead generated distortions within its own trade system.”
In that regard, “Colombia has maintained and will continue to maintain a permanent willingness for technical dialogue and cooperation, with the same seriousness with which it adopts its policy decisions. Along that path, we are ready to move forward,” the minister added on X.
Meanwhile, Colombian Foreign Minister Rosa Villavicencio said during an interview broadcast by La FM that the government would seek to “resume dialogue with Ecuador in hopes of restoring relations, reducing those tariffs and returning to the trade flow we previously had.”
Colombia is heading toward the first round of presidential elections on May 31, 2026, with 13 candidates in the race, in a scenario marked by political fragmentation and a strong concentration of voter support among a few contenders.
The next president will take office on August 7, following the end of President Gustavo Petro’s term, marking the transition from the country’s first left-wing government in recent history.
According to pre-election polls, only five candidates exceed 2% in voter intention, leaving most with limited chances of reaching the presidential palace. Among the leading contenders are Iván Cepeda, the candidate of the ruling Pacto Histórico, who leads polls with between 35% and 43% support; right-wing candidate Abelardo de la Espriella, with between 16% and 24%; and Paloma Valencia of the Centro Democrático party, with between 14% and 21%.
A second group includes centrist candidates Claudia López, polling between 3% and 4%, and Sergio Fajardo, at around 2.5%, reflecting a fragmented vote within that political segment.
As the campaign unfolds, candidates have selected their running partners as a key strategy to broaden their electoral appeal.
Iván Cepeda has chosen Aida Quilcué, an Indigenous Nasa leader from southwestern Colombia, reinforcing the campaign’s leftist profile and its emphasis on including historically marginalized communities in political decision-making.
Quilcué has served as a governor and Indigenous authority in her community and, like Cepeda, is a victim of Colombia’s armed conflict: her husband was killed by state agents in 2008. She has been affiliated with the Regional Indigenous Council of Cauca (CRIC) and the National Indigenous Organization of Colombia (ONIC). She presents herself publicly as an Indigenous leader, human rights defender and senator (2022–2026), without reporting formal higher education credentials.
Abelardo de la Espriella has selected former Finance, and Commerce, Industry and Tourism Minister, Juan Manuel Restrepo, as his running mate, forming a ticket focused on security and economic strengthening. “That is a capability I have because I understand productivity, competitiveness and economic development,” Restrepo told La Silla Vacía during his registration.
Restrepo is an economist with a specialization in finance from Rosario University, a master’s degree in economics from the London School of Economics, a specialization in senior management from INALDE Business School, and a doctorate in higher education leadership from the University of Bath. He has also served as rector of three major universities in Colombia.
Juan Daniel Oviedo, a former Bogotá city councilor, is running alongside Paloma Valencia of the Centro Democrático party. As economist from Universidad del Rosario, Oviedo holds a master’s degree in mathematical economics and econometrics and a Ph.D. in economics from the University of Toulouse in France.
He previously served as head of Colombia’s National Statistics Agency (DANE) during the Iván Duque administration and ran for mayor of Bogotá in 2023.
His vice presidential bid gained momentum after securing more than 1.2 million votes in the March 8 inter-party primary, finishing second. His selection aims to attract centrist and center-right voters and strengthen Valencia’s chances of advancing to a potential runoff.
However, his nomination has sparked controversy, as it marks the first time the right-wing party has chosen a candidate with liberal positions on issues such as women’s rights and LGBTQ+ rights.
Claudia López selected Leonardo Huerta, a university professor of law and philosophy, as her running mate. According to Spain’s El País, he comes from “a working middle-class family,” is the youngest of four siblings, and is married with two children.
Huerta is a lawyer from Universidad Libre and holds a degree in philosophy from the Technological University of Pereira. He has a master’s degree in administrative law and is a doctoral candidate in law. His public sector experience includes serving as education secretary in Pereira and as a deputy ombudsman for health issues during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020.
Sergio Fajardo selected Edna Bonilla as his running mate, reinforcing a campaign centered on education and dialogue. Bonilla previously served as Bogotá’s education secretary during Claudia López’s administration (2020–2023).
She is a public accountant from the National University of Colombia, holds a tax specialization from Externado University and a doctorate in political studies. During the campaign launch, Fajardo said: “We will work together to deliver the serious and safe change Colombia needs. To move beyond polarization and build bridges instead of trenches.”
Voter participation
According to Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil, which oversees elections, a total of 41,421,973 citizens are eligible to vote in Colombia and abroad in the first round of the presidential election. Of these, 21,298,492 are women and 20,123,481 are men.
If no candidate secures more than 50% of the vote, a runoff election will be held on June 21, 2026, between the top two candidates.
Former Medellín mayor and former presidential pre-candidate Daniel Quintero has been appointed as Colombia’s new National Superintendent of Health, a decision that has sparked controversy across political and social sectors due to ongoing judicial and disciplinary investigations against him.
The National Health Superintendence is responsible for safeguarding the rights of users within the health system, overseeing Health Promoting Entities (also called EPS) and Health Service Providers (IPS), and monitoring the use of public finances allocated to the sector, areas that President Gustavo Petro has sought to reform during his administration.
The appointment comes amid a complex situation in Colombia’s health system. During his administration, President Petro presented two structural reform proposals aimed at reshaping the system, including major changes to the role of EPS. Both initiatives were rejected by Congress.
Following these legislative setbacks, the government has pursued reforms through administrative measures and decrees, including the intervention of several of the country’s largest EPS, which together serve more than 23 million affiliates (More information: Colombian President Gustavo Petro Seeks To Restructure Colombian Health Care Despite Congressional Rejection by Finance Colombia).
During his swearing-in, Quintero said his administration would strengthen oversight of the system. “It is time to put an end to abuses by the EPS,” he said.
The appointment has drawn criticism from organizations and political figures who question both his background as an electronic engineer and his legal situation. Transparency for Colombia said the designation “is inappropriate because it places a political figure widely questioned for using public office to favor private interests in charge of addressing the health crisis, instead of appointing individuals with the training, knowledge, and experience required to resolve it.”
The organization also called on the Attorney General’s Office to expedite ongoing investigations. “We respectfully call on the Attorney General’s Office (FGN) to ensure that cases involving Daniel Quintero move forward swiftly, respecting due process guarantees while delivering results in light of the seriousness of the allegations,” it said.
Quintero, who served as mayor of Medellín from 2020 to 2023, faces more than 40 criminal and disciplinary complaints related to alleged corruption during his administration. Among them is the “Aguas Vivas” case, involving the sale of a forest reserve land plot exceeding 140,000 square meters. In that case, prosecutors have already filed charges for alleged embezzlement, undue interest in public contracts, and misconduct in office, although no conviction has been issued.
Criticism has also emerged from within the government. Carlos Carrillo, head of Colombia’s National Unit for Disaster Risk Management, said that “Quintero is currently on trial for crimes against public administration. He has the right to defend himself, but the Pacto Histórico has no reason to bear the political cost of his legal troubles; we owe him nothing and he brings us nothing.”
Quintero will be the fifth health superintendent appointed during Petro’s administration. His tenure is expected to be temporary, as a new president will take office on August 7, 2026, and will have the authority to appoint a new head of the agency.
Colombian authorities have seized and safely deactivated a commercial drone carrying improvised explosive materials just 5.4 kilometers from Bogotá’s El Dorado International Airport and the nearby Military Air Transport Command (CATAM), raising fresh security concerns in the capital three weeks before the country’s May 31 presidential election.
The discovery marks a significant escalation from recent unauthorized drone sightings that twice forced temporary flight suspensions at El Dorado, Colombia’s busiest airport, and highlights growing fears that tactics once largely confined to conflict zones in the southwest and Catatumbo region are now reaching the capital.
According to preliminary police and military reports, the device was located in the locality of Kennedy, near the Río Bogotá, after a security alert issued by prosecutors in Popayán, Cauca, prompted specialized units of the Colombian Air Force (FAC) and National Police to track suspicious coordinates in southern Bogotá.
Authorities found what appeared to be a makeshift encampment before locating the commercial drone, its battery and an explosive charge separated from the fuselage.
Anti-explosives officers later confirmed the device had been modified with a non-conventional fiber-optic guidance system, a method increasingly used by illegal armed groups to evade electronic signal jammers designed to disable unmanned aircraft.
Investigators said the drone carried approximately 258 grams of C4 explosive material inside a PVC tube fitted with an improvised detonator.
The device was safely neutralized by National Police explosives experts and transferred to the Attorney General’s Office – Fiscalía General – for forensic analysis and the opening of a criminal investigation.
Authorities have not publicly identified those responsible or confirmed the intended target, but officials noted the location placed the drone within minutes of both El Dorado International Airport and CATAM, one of Colombia’s most strategic military aviation facilities.
Security analysts say the use of fiber-optic spools as a guidance mechanism resembles tactics recently documented in Catatumbo and southwestern Colombia, particularly among the National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrilla and FARC dissident factions under the command of alias “Iván Mordisco.”
A similar drone equipped with the same system was discovered in Popayán on April 25 during a wave of attacks blamed on FARC dissidents in Cauca, while another was found the same day in Villavicencio, the departmental capital of Meta.
The appearance of such devices in Bogotá has raised alarm among security officials, particularly given the proximity to civilian and military aviation infrastructure.
Pilots and aviation experts warn that even small commercial drones can cause catastrophic damage if they collide with an aircraft during takeoff or landing. A drone carrying explosives near an airport runway significantly increases the potential for a large-scale tragedy.
The discovery also comes at a politically sensitive moment, with Colombia entering the final weeks before its presidential election on May 31, as security and public order remain dominant campaign issues amid rising violence in the departments of Antioquia, Chocó, and Norte de Santander.
The leftist government of President Gustavo Petro has faced intense criticism over deteriorating security conditions, particularly following road bombing attributed to illegal armed groups in Cauca, Valle del Cauca, Nariño and Catatumbo, where the use of drones for surveillance and attacks has become increasingly common.
Last month, drone sightings near El Dorado airport twice forced authorities to suspend all air operations, disrupting domestic and international flights and exposing vulnerabilities near the country’s principal air gateway.
On April 30, Aerocivil halted airport operations after the Colombian Aerospace Force confirmed the presence of a drone in the Engativá district near the airport perimeter. Two aircraft were forced to carry out missed approaches, including an international LATAM Airlines Boeing 787 arriving from Santiago, Chile, while another domestic flight was diverted to Armenia, Quindío.
Just two days earlier, on April 28, another drone was detected near El Dorado, triggering a 45-minute suspension of takeoffs and landings while military personnel deployed anti-drone systems and visual searches.
Defense Minister Pedro Sánchez later confirmed that operations had been temporarily canceled because of the possible drone sighting, although no confirmed target was found.
Aerocivil has repeatedly warned that unauthorized drone activity near airports represents a grave threat to aviation safety and can result in criminal prosecution.
Thursday’s discovery, however, suggests the threat may extend far beyond operational disruption.
For Bogotá, the concern is no longer simply rogue recreational drones interfering with airport traffic, but the possibility that explosive-equipped devices linked to Colombia’s armed conflict are now within reach of the nation’s capital – and its most critical infrastructure.
For thousands of Colombians planning their long-awaited European summer escape, the season of sun-drenched piazzas, Mediterranean beaches and packed airport terminals may come with unexpected advice: think local.
From Madrid and Paris to Rome and Athens, the 2026 summer travel season is approaching under the shadow of a mounting aviation crisis linked to the ongoing blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow maritime corridor through which nearly a fifth of the world’s oil supply normally passes. Since late February, when the United States and Israel escalated military operations against Iran, the region has become the epicenter of a global energy shock, sending jet fuel prices soaring and forcing airlines across Europe to begin trimming routes.
For travelers departing from Colombia — many of them booking multi-city holidays months in advance — the message is becoming increasingly clear: flexibility may be as important as a valid passport.
The warning signs began in mid-April, when the head of the International Energy Agency cautioned that Europe had “maybe six weeks of jet fuel left” if supply routes from the Gulf remained blocked. Kerosene, the refined petroleum product that powers most commercial aircraft, depends heavily on imports and refining chains linked to the Middle East. With shipping through Hormuz effectively frozen, that supply chain is under extraordinary pressure.
Although major airlines have sought to reassure passengers that immediate shortages are not yet critical, the economics are already biting. Jet fuel prices have reportedly doubled since the start of the crisis, squeezing carriers already operating on tight summer margins.
Low-cost airline Transavia became the latest carrier to announce flight cancellations for May and June, following similar moves by Ryanair, easyJet, Vueling and Volotea. The airlines cited the prohibitive cost of fuel and difficulties securing kerosene imports from Gulf suppliers.
On Thursday, more than 1,200 flights were cancelled, impacting travelers in Spain, England, France and Portugal. Barcelona and Amsterdam emerged as the airports most affected by delays.
For Colombian travelers, the risk is not necessarily that transatlantic flights from Bogotá to Europe will vanish overnight, but that onward connections within Europe — often booked separately on budget carriers — could be the first casualties.
A direct flight to Madrid may still depart on time, but the low-cost connection to Naples, Santorini or Dubrovnik could disappear after takeoff.
That creates a financial domino effect. Missed hotel reservations, prepaid train tickets, cruise departures and internal tours can quickly transform a dream holiday into an expensive logistical nightmare.
The Airports Council International Europe has warned that regional airports face an “existential threat” if airlines continue cutting capacity. Smaller airports, from Orly to Girona, and secondary tourist destinations are especially vulnerable because passengers on those routes tend to be more price-sensitive and airlines can pull service faster.
Even Germany’s flagship carrier Lufthansa recently cut 20,000 summer flights through its regional subsidiary CityLine, signaling that the strain is reaching far beyond the low-cost market.
Then there is the second concern unsettling travelers this season: public health alerts surrounding cases of Hantavirus contagion following the confirmed outbreak onboard the luxury cruise ship MV Hondius. A total of 146 people from 23 different countries remain aboard the vessel under “strict precautionary measures,” operator Oceanwide Expeditions said Thursday.
Though far less likely to disrupt flights than the fuel crisis, the outbreak has added another layer of anxiety for travelers heading to popular beach resorts, countryside retreats and nature-heavy itineraries across Europe. Health officials are urging tourists to remain cautious in cabins, campsites and rural accommodations where rodent exposure can increase infection risks.
For most travelers, the risk remains manageable with basic precautions, but it reinforces the same lesson of the COVID19 pandemic: preparation matters, so be ready for extra biosecurity screenings on arrival or to fly the 10-hour red-eye with a facemask.
Travel advisors are now recommending Colombians heading abroad this summer avoid rigid itineraries and consider refundable bookings wherever possible. Booking flights and connections under a single airline alliance can also offer stronger passenger protections than stitching together separate low-cost tickets.
Travel insurance, often treated as an afterthought, may become the smartest purchase of the trip.
Passengers should also monitor airline notices closely, especially if flying with budget carriers operating regional European routes. Some cancellations may come with limited notice, and rebooking options during peak summer weeks can be both scarce and expensive.
Industry analysts say much depends on diplomacy. If negotiations between Washington and Tehran resume and maritime traffic through Hormuz partially reopens, the worst-case scenario may be avoided. But if the blockade persists into June, Europe could face a genuine aviation squeeze just as millions of tourists arrive for the high season.
For Colombians dreaming of Paris cafés, Greek islands or the Amalfi Coast, Europe remains open — but no longer predictable.
This summer, the best souvenir may not be a photograph from the Mediterranean, but the peace of mind that comes from having a Plan B.
At Nohra Haime Gallery, in Manhattan’s white-walled Chelsea district, Cartagena-based artist Ruby Rumié is asking a deceptively simple question: How are the children?
It is not a casual greeting, nor the sentimental title of a new exhibition. Instead, it draws from the Maasai expression “Kasserian Ingera,” a phrase that measures the wellbeing of an entire community through the condition of its youngest members. If the children are well, the society is functioning; if they are not, everything else is called into question.
For Rumié, whose socially engaged practice has long examined dignity, memory and the politics of the body through installation and portrait photography, the question becomes the conceptual spine of her latest New York presentation. The exhibition, titled ¿How Are the Children?, marks a significant moment for the Cartagena-based artist, bringing her work once again into an international conversation that moves between Latin America, the Caribbean and the wider Global South.
Rather than beginning with a grand theoretical premise, the project emerged from something quieter: an old newspaper clipping documenting the disappearance of several children on a distant island. Nearly lost among family albums and forgotten papers, the fragment offered no resolution, only a trace. For Rumié, that absence became more powerful than explanation.
The result is an exhibition that does not attempt to solve a mystery but instead inhabits a state of unresolved concern. It asks viewers to remain with discomfort rather than consume a narrative neatly packaged for closure. In a cultural moment increasingly shaped by speed, certainty and spectacle, this refusal feels deliberate.
Within the work’s imagined structure, eleven children leave behind the violences of contemporary life: the pressure to perform, the normalization of fear, and the relentless demand to adapt to adult systems of productivity and control. Their destination is a volcano, a symbol that carries both danger and possibility.
Rumié anchors that image in a distinctly Colombian geography: the Totumo Mud Volcano, located between Cartagena and Barranquilla on Colombia’s Caribbean coast. Known locally as both a tourist curiosity and a place of ancestral ritual, the volcano is less about eruption than immersion. Visitors descend into a dense crater of warm mineral mud, confronting the instinctive fear of sinking—only to discover that the body floats.
This paradox sits at the heart of the exhibition and of Rumié’s photographic narratives.
Using portrait photography staged on the sandy slopes surrounding Totumo, she transforms her young subjects into something resembling living ceramics. Their bodies, coated in volcanic mud, appear sculptural and elemental – figures suspended between portrait and artifact, between childhood and myth. The mud gives them a tactile permanence, as though they have emerged from the earth itself rather than simply stood before the camera.
Here, mud is not scenic backdrop but primary material and metaphor. It is organic and mineral, medicinal and unsettling. It obscures the body while revealing something more essential beneath the surface. Covered in mud, distinctions of age, class, gender and origin begin to dissolve. The body ceases to be an object for display and returns to its simplest state: matter.
There is a quiet political force in that gesture. In a world saturated by images and increasingly hostile standards of beauty, the act of covering oneself in mud becomes a rejection of polished performance. It resists visibility as spectacle and proposes instead a form of symbolic density—one in which the body is not consumed but encountered.
The children in Rumié’s exhibition do not perform innocence. They do not dramatize suffering for the viewer’s emotional satisfaction. Instead, they surround the volcano with calm insistence, each holding a red ribbon that descends from its summit into their hands. The ribbon suggests connection rather than rescue, lineage rather than alarm. The volcano ceases to be a site of threat and becomes something closer to a shared origin: a matrix, a beginning.
That restraint is perhaps the work’s greatest strength. Rumié avoids the familiar traps of political art that over-explains its intentions or aestheticizes trauma into digestible symbolism. Instead, she builds an atmosphere of attention. The exhibition trusts silence. It asks not for interpretation alone, but for ethical presence.
This has been a defining feature of Rumié’s extensive projects. Her work often moves between installation, photography and social intervention, examining how communities remember violence and how institutions choose to see – or not – the vulnerable. Her native Cartagena, with its layered histories of colonialism, tourism and exclusion, remains both context and counterpoint.
Showing this work in New York adds another dimension. Chelsea galleries are not typically spaces associated with collective care or recetive to questions of social reparations. Yet that friction is productive. To pose “How are the children?” in the commercial heart of the international art market is to redirect attention from value to responsibility.
It is also a reminder that contemporary Latin American art is often at its most compelling when it resists exotic labels and insists on moral complexity instead. Rumié does not offer folklore, nor easy allegory. She offers a question as elusive as the landscape itself, echoing the vast and shifting terrains once depicted by the Prussian explorer Alexander von Humboldt during his travels across the continent.
And perhaps that is Rumié’s point. The exhibition offers no definitive answers, nor any final declaration of hope or despair. Instead, it leaves visitors carrying the weight of the original inquiry – returned intact, urgent and impossible to ignore, just like a volcano.
¿How Are the Children? opens on 7 May at Nohra Haime Gallery
Nohra Haime Gallery: 500A West 21st Street, New York.
Fabio Enrique Ochoa Vasco, a former insider of the defunct Medellín Cartel, and once accused by Pablo Escobar of betrayal and marked for death, has quietly returned to Colombia after serving a prison sentence in the United States, drawing renewed attention to the discreet return of aging narcotics operatives to the country.
Ochoa Vasco, known among the cartel’s henchmen as “Kiko Pobre” or “Carlos Mario,” returned to Medellín roughly two and a half months ago after completing a nine-year prison term in the United States for drug trafficking and money laundering, according to judicial sources.
Now 65, he is reportedly living in the Antioquia capital under a low profile, far from the notoriety that once surrounded his role inside the world’s most violent cocaine empire.
His return also reflects a broader trend in Colombia, where former cartel figures, paramilitary commanders and extradited traffickers are quietly re-entering civilian life after serving lengthy prison terms abroad, often without pending criminal cases at home.
Ochoa Vasco was part of the Medellín Cartel faction led by Fernando Galeano and Gerardo Moncada, two of Escobar’s most powerful associates who controlled major cocaine routes from the municipality of Itagüí.
Known respectively as “El Negro” and “Kiko,” Galeano and Moncada were once among Escobar’s closest allies, but their relationship collapsed in 1992 when Escobar accused them of hiding millions of dollars from him while he was serving his negotiated prison sentence inside La Catedral, the luxury prison he built for himself in Envigado.
Both men were tortured and murdered inside the prison on Escobar’s orders, triggering one of the most violent internal purges in the cartel’s history.
Ochoa Vasco, who had worked closely with their network, was forced into hiding as Escobar reportedly branded him a traitor and sought to have him killed.
He later aligned himself with Los Pepes — the vigilante alliance of Escobar’s most feared enemies and whose acronymn stood for “Persecuted by Pablo Escobar”. Escobar’s relentless campaign of car bombings and assassinations contributed to the cartel boss’s downfall before he was killed by Colombian security forces in Medellín on December 3, 1993.
But the end of Escobar did not signal the end of Ochoa Vasco’s criminal career.
According to the U.S. Department of State, he had been involved in international narcotics trafficking since the early 1980s and was allegedly responsible for sending between six and eight tons of cocaine per month from Colombia to the United States.
U.S. authorities described him as the head of a drug trafficking organization that moved multi-ton shipments of cocaine by speedboats and cargo ships from Colombia to Central America for eventual distribution in the United States.
Investigators also linked him to the now-demobilized United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, or AUC, the right-wing paramilitary organization founded by cattle ranchers in the middle Magdalena River valley, and under command of Carlos and Fidel Castaño.
In September 2004, prosecutors in the Middle District of Florida indicted Ochoa Vasco on charges of narcotics trafficking and money laundering. He also had a previous narcotics conviction in the United States and remained a fugitive on an earlier 1989 indictment from the Southern District of Florida.
He was captured in Venezuela in 2009 and extradited to the United States, where he was sentenced to nine years in prison.
With that sentence completed and no active judicial proceedings pending in Colombia, Ochoa Vasco was been able to return to Medellín without major public attention.
His case mirrors that of other former Medellín Cartel figures who have returned after decades in U.S. prisons.
Fabio Ochoa Vásquez, the youngest member of the powerful Ochoa family and one of the cartel’s best-known figures, returned to Colombia in December 2024 after serving nearly 30 years behind bars in the United States.
Now 69, he reportedly lives in Antioquia and has resumed the family’s long-standing horse breeding business.
Carlos Enrique Lehder Rivas, one of the cartel’s most eccentric members and who oversaw Pablo’s Caribbean cocaine routes, also returned to Colombia in March 2025 after serving 33 years in U.S. custody.
At 75, Lehder now moves between Bogotá and Medellín after all Colombian charges against him were closed.
One of the earliest and most infamous examples was Griselda Blanco, the so-called “Black Widow,” widely considered a pioneer of cocaine trafficking into Florida and New York during the 1970s.
After serving roughly 20 years of a U.S. sentence, she was deported to Medellín in 2004 and lived quietly there until she was shot dead by motorcycle gunmen outside a butcher shop in 2012.
The return of these figures underscores the long afterlife of Colombia’s drug wars.
Many of the men and women once at the center of cartel violence are now elderly, legally free, and living once again in the same cities where their criminal empires flourished.
For many Colombians, their quiet reintegration raises uncomfortable questions about justice, memory and how a country still marked by the legacy of narcotics violence confronts the survivors of that era.
A landmark ruling by the Superior Tribunal of Bogotá has delivered one of the strongest judicial rebukes yet of the narrative surrounding Colombia’s 2021 National Strike, concluding that some of the most destructive episodes of violence during the protests were not spontaneous acts of social unrest but part of a coordinated criminal strategy involving illegal armed groups.
The decision, issued by the Criminal Chamber of the tribunal under magistrate Jaime Andrés Velasco Velasco Muñoz, found that several of those prosecuted for violent acts in the capital maintained operational ties with cells linked to the Second Manuel Marulanda Vélez, a dissident faction of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – FARC.
For years, much of the public debate framed the violence of the so-called Paro Nacional as the uncontrolled overflow of legitimate citizen protests sparked by social inequality, police abuse, unemployment and widespread anger over the government of then-President Iván Duque.
But after reviewing wiretaps, surveillance records, testimonies and digital communications, the court concluded that several of the attacks that paralyzed Bogotá followed a clear operational structure, with leadership roles, territorial coordination and instructions issued in advance.
According to the ruling, some defendants acted in coordination with illegal armed actors to organize attacks on police command posts, TransMilenio stations, commercial establishments and strategic road corridors across the capital.
“For the magistrates, these were not isolated or improvised actions,” the ruling stated. “There existed an organized structure with assigned functions, defined leadership and a chain of command.”
The 2021 protests initially erupted after Duque introduced a controversial tax reform proposal during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. The measure, widely criticized for placing additional burdens on the middle and working classes during an economic crisis, quickly ignited nationwide demonstrations.
Although the government later withdrew the reform, the protests escalated into weeks of nationwide unrest, marked by deadly confrontations between demonstrators and security forces, the burning of police stations, attacks on public transport infrastructure and prolonged road blockades that crippled supply chains across Colombia.
In Bogotá alone, dozens of TransMilenio stations were vandalized or destroyed, CAI neighborhood police posts were torched, and mobility across major avenues such as Las Américas, Carrera Séptima and Autonorte was severely disrupted.
Elsewhere, especially in southwestern Colombia, blockades led to shortages of fuel, medical oxygen and basic food supplies, with business leaders warning of millions of dollars in economic losses and humanitarian consequences for vulnerable communities.
The tribunal’s ruling argues that at least part of that violence was not the natural escalation of protest, but the result of deliberate planning.
Investigators identified several WhatsApp groups allegedly used to coordinate simultaneous actions across the city. Among the names cited in the judicial file were groups linked to strategic corridors such as “Américas,” “Carrera Séptima,” “Autonorte,” “Autosur” and “Caracas.”
According to prosecutors, these digital channels were used to organize blockades, assign responsibilities and plan attacks against public infrastructure.
The court also found that some young defendants had been tasked with recruiting new members and expanding influence within university environments, both public and private, strengthening support networks and facilitating operational logistics.
One of the most significant findings involved intercepted communications that allegedly referenced support from higher-ranking commanders connected to FARC dissidents.
For the magistrates, this reinforced the conclusion that there was external coordination behind the violence, rather than a purely spontaneous citizen uprising.
The ruling now sharply challenges the long-promoted narrative of the unrest as exclusively peaceful social protest and instead reframes part of the National Strike as coordinated urban sabotage carried out under the cover of legitimate public discontent.
It also revives scrutiny of the national strike committee and senior left-wing political leaders, including current President Gustavo Petro, who strongly supported the demonstrations and positioned himself as one of the loudest critics of Duque’s handling of both the protests and the pandemic.
Critics argue that political backing from opposition leaders helped legitimize actions that moved far beyond peaceful protest, allowing criminal actors to operate behind the shield of social mobilization while deepening institutional instability.
The protests also unfolded at one of the most fragile moments of the COVID-19 emergency, when Colombia was still facing high ICU occupancy, strict mobility restrictions and biosecurity measures intended to limit mass contagion.
Large demonstrations and road blockades directly violated those restrictions, and critics maintain that the protests contributed to additional infections and unnecessary strain on an already overwhelmed public health system.
For opponents of Petro and sectors of the business community, the ruling is less a revelation than a delayed institutional acknowledgment of what many citizens experienced firsthand: burned police stations, destroyed public transport, food shortages and entire cities brought to a standstill.
After evaluating the full body of evidence, the court sentenced three of the principal defendants to 19 years in prison for terrorism and criminal conspiracy. A fourth defendant received a 10-year prison sentence.
The tribunal also imposed fines exceeding 1 billion pesos, reflecting the severe damage caused to both public and private infrastructure.
Far from closing the chapter on the National Strike, the ruling reopens one of Colombia’s deepest political wounds: whether the country witnessed a legitimate social uprising, or whether parts of it were, from the beginning, a calculated strategy of destabilization supported by organized criminal networks.
For many Colombians, the answer may shape how the country remembers 2021—and who must ultimately be held responsible.
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