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Colombia’s Three Presidential Front-Runners Draw Divergent Maps for Foreign Capital, Security, and Rule of Law

25 May 2026 at 22:03

Colombians face three sharply different futures in May 31 vote

Colombia votes on May 31 with its presidential race concentrated around three candidates whose platforms diverge on nearly every dimension of economic and security policy relevant to foreign investors. For corporate executives, institutional investors, and multinational operations with Colombian exposure, the choice between senator Iván Cepeda, senator Paloma Valencia, and defense attorney Abelardo de la Espriella carries direct, measurable implications for the regulatory environment, foreign direct investment (FDI) conditions, energy sector licensing, and geopolitical alignment through at least 2030.

No candidate is projected to clear the 50%-plus-one threshold required to win outright on May 31, making a runoff election on June 21 the expected outcome. The question that will determine the direction of that runoff — and by extension the next administration — is which of the two opposition candidates finishes second.

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A Race Reshaped by Late Polling

The final-week polling picture shifted substantially, and the trajectory matters as much as the snapshot. The CONDOR weighted aggregate — which incorporates surveys from six polling firms and applies greater weight to more recent data — placed the race as of May 23 at: Cepeda 36.3%, De la Espriella 29.1%, Valencia 16.7%.

Invamer, one of Colombia’s most established polling firms, surveyed 3,800 respondents across 152 municipalities between May 13 and May 20, registering Cepeda at 44.6%, De la Espriella at 31.6%, and Valencia at 14.0%. The Centro Nacional de Consultoría (CNC) published a survey conducted May 22 and 23 showing Cepeda at 33.4%, De la Espriella at 30.9%, and Valencia at 12.6%.

Comparing those figures to the Fundación Génesis Crea survey from May 4 through May 11 — which placed Cepeda at 35.1%, Valencia at 25.4%, and De la Espriella at 21.6% — indicates a multi-poll trend of De la Espriella gaining approximately nine to ten percentage points in three weeks while Valencia shed a comparable share. AS/COA’s poll tracker confirms the directional consistency across firms.

Atlas Intel, which published figures more favorable to De la Espriella, is currently under investigation by Colombia’s Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE) for potential methodology violations and could face suspension of its operations. Those figures are treated with caution in this analysis.

Runoff modeling diverges between firms. Fundación Génesis Crea showed Valencia defeating Cepeda 49.1% to 44.7% in a second-round matchup — meaning she was the stronger opposition candidate in that scenario. The Guarumo/Ecoanalítica survey found Cepeda losing all hypothetical runoff scenarios, including against De la Espriella. Two minor candidates — former senator Clara López and former Chocó governor Luis Gilberto Murillo — withdrew and endorsed Cepeda before the first round, a consolidation that appears to have had limited effect on his polling numbers.

Finance Colombia reported in May that the campaign has been marked by an unusual absence of traditional televised debates. Cepeda declined to participate in events organized by major media outlets, stating that proposed formats lacked neutrality. Former Bogotá Mayor Claudia López, herself a candidate, said publicly that Cepeda’s refusal was motivated by an unwillingness to defend his record as the architect of President Gustavo Petro‘s Paz Total security negotiation strategy.

Security Policy: The Three Approaches to Armed Groups

Public security is the top voter concern heading into the election. InSight Crime documented that the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) launched a major offensive against FARC dissident factions in Norte de Santander in early 2025, resulting in mass civilian casualties in the Catatumbo region. In Chocó and Antioquia, the ELN and the Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC), commonly known as the Clan del Golfo, are competing for control of illegal gold mining corridors and drug trafficking routes. In Cauca, FARC dissident factions have established territorial control in areas where state presence has collapsed.

Grafiti of the ELN and ex-FARC Mafia near Corinto, Cauca (Credit: Henry Shuldiner)Cepeda’s approach to security is defined by his role as the principal legislative architect of Paz Total. As chair of the Senate‘s peace commission, he designed the framework that extended negotiating status to the ELN, FARC dissident groups, and the Clan del Golfo. His stated rationale is that targeting the financial leadership of drug networks rather than foot soldiers produces more durable results — a position that has academic backing in narcotics policy literature. In practice, Paz Total produced ceasefires that were repeatedly violated, and security indicators in conflict-affected departments deteriorated during the Petro administration. A Cepeda presidency is expected to continue the negotiated settlement model, with the military operating under political constraints.

Valencia’s security platform is based on reinstating Seguridad Democrática, the doctrine associated with former president Álvaro Uribe’s administrations from 2002 to 2010. The core elements are expanded military presence in rural conflict zones, dismantling of rural criminal networks, and resumption of extradition agreements with the United States — which Petro suspended, effectively shielding cartel leadership from US federal prosecution. The Uribe-era approach resulted in measurable reductions in homicide rates, forced displacement, and ELN and FARC territorial control, though human rights organizations documented serious abuses by security forces during that period.

De la Espriella has stated explicitly that his government would have no peace process. He advocates for a model similar to El Salvador’s under President Nayib Bukele: mass incarceration, construction of high-security prison facilities, classification of guerrilla and cartel organizations as foreign terrorist organizations, and broad military offensives. He has not detailed how such operations would be financed or how the mass detention model would interact with Colombia’s Constitutional Court, which has repeatedly constrained executive security powers.

For the armed groups operating in Norte de Santander and Cauca, the historical record indicates that Colombia’s criminal organizations respond more acutely to sustained, institutionally grounded military pressure and functioning extradition pipelines than to political rhetoric. By that measure, Valencia’s platform — which rebuilds the institutional security apparatus incrementally — represents a more structurally credible threat to the ELN and the Estado Mayor Central (EMC) FARC dissidents. For the Clan del Golfo leadership, extradition to the United States has historically been the principal deterrent, and Valencia’s program explicitly restores it.

Business Climate and Employment Conditions

The Petro administration enacted a series of minimum wage increases totaling more than 60% over four years — including a 16% increase for 2023, the largest single-year hike in Colombian history, and a 23.78% increase for 2026 — restructured labor regulations to expand premium pay requirements for night, weekend, and holiday shifts, and raised corporate tax rates to fund social spending programs. The Asociación Nacional de Empresarios de Colombia (ANDI) characterized the regulatory environment as adverse to private investment. Finance Colombia tracked a material decline in FDI in the extractive sector over the same period.

Cepeda supported those labor and fiscal reforms throughout their legislative passage. His platform extends the Petro model: increased state social spending, continued land redistribution programs, and maintenance of the current wage and labor cost structure. For companies with established Colombian operations, the regulatory environment is manageable; for companies evaluating market entry or operational expansion, the cost structure adds friction.

Valencia’s economic program emphasizes corporate stability and private sector investment as the primary mechanisms of job creation. Her vice-presidential running mate, Juan Daniel Oviedo — former director of DANE, Colombia’s national statistics agency — represents a technocratic orientation focused on reducing structural market distortions, streamlining public procurement, and scaling back state administrative overhead. Oviedo’s appointment is a direct signal to the business community that economic management would be data-driven rather than ideologically directed. Oviedo also publicly identifies as a member of the LGBTQ+ community, a departure from the traditional social conservatism of Centro Democrático.

De la Espriella’s economic orientation is pro-business with protectionist elements. His vice-presidential candidate, José Manuel Restrepo — who served as Colombia’s Finance Minister and Commerce Minister — provides institutional credibility on fiscal and trade policy. Restrepo’s presence on the ticket signals commitment to fiscal discipline and regulatory reduction in the extractive and commercial sectors. De la Espriella’s personal style, however, introduces operational uncertainty; his campaign has generated multiple high-profile controversies, including a public altercation with Caracol Noticias journalist María Lucía Fernández during a live broadcast and a formal apology following misconduct allegations by journalist Laura Rodríguez of Piso 8 FM.

Foreign Investment, Oil, and Mining

Ecopetrol holds a 31.5% stake in the Gunflint oil field in the Gulf of Mexico.

Ecopetrol holds a 31.5% stake in the Gunflint oil field in the Gulf of Mexico.

The extractive sector is the most consequential economic policy dimension for international capital. Ecopetrol (NYSE: EC; BVC: ECOPETROL) — Colombia’s state-controlled energy company and the largest corporation in the country — has operated under exploration restrictions during the Petro administration, which has opposed new fossil fuel contracts on climate grounds.

Cepeda’s position extends the Petro framework: mandatory transition away from fossil fuels, heavy restrictions or outright prohibitions on new oil and gas exploration contracts, and stringent environmental licensing requirements for open-pit mining operations. Foreign investment would be directed by policy toward green hydrogen, ecotourism, and smallholder agriculture. For the multinational oil majors with Colombian operations and for institutional investors in the mining sector, a Cepeda presidency represents a continuation of the current constraints and, in some contract scenarios, an accelerated wind-down of Colombian portfolios.

In a related development, Finance Colombia reported in May that Ecopetrol’s president, Ricardo Roa, has been formally charged in connection with alleged campaign spending violations during Petro’s 2022 presidential campaign. The case will be inherited by whoever takes office in August.

Valencia’s position is that hydrocarbon revenues are essential to Colombia’s macroeconomic stability and that the country cannot exit the sector before alternative revenue structures exist. Her platform actively encourages FDI in petroleum exploration, is open to regulated fracking, and commits to clearing the environmental licensing backlog that has stalled multiple large-scale gold and copper mining projects. For energy and mining companies currently blocked by administrative delays, this represents the most direct path to project advancement.

De la Espriella’s position goes further: essentially deregulating the environmental licensing process for major extraction projects on the grounds that Colombia’s economic sovereignty takes precedence over environmental restrictions he characterizes as externally imposed. The practical constraint is whether a De la Espriella administration would have the institutional coherence and congressional support to deliver regulatory rollback, given that his movement has no established political party structure and entered the race through an independent signature campaign.

Foreign Policy: Washington Alignment vs. Multipolar Strategy

The US Embassy in Bogotá is said to be the 3rd largest US mission in the world (photo: Loren Moss)

The US Embassy in Bogotá is said to be the 3rd largest US mission in the world (photo: Loren Moss)

Colombia’s relationship with the United States deteriorated materially under Petro, who aligned Colombia with Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro, pursued closer ties with China and Russia, and suspended extradition agreements. US counternarcotics cooperation was strained throughout the period.

Cepeda is committed to what he describes as a multipolar foreign policy — maintaining functional diplomatic channels with Washington and Brussels while deepening strategic and commercial relationships with China and Russia. His alignment with regional left-of-center governments in Mexico, Brazil, and Bolivia would position Colombia as part of a Latin American bloc that has grown increasingly skeptical of US regional leadership. For US companies operating in Colombia, this trajectory does not mean immediate operational disruption, but it reduces Colombia’s utility as a reliable counterpart on security cooperation, counter-narcotics intelligence sharing, and trade dispute resolution.

Valencia positions a return to the Western alignment as a core objective. She would prioritize restoring the US-Colombia relationship, reinforcing the bilateral Free Trade Agreement, and reestablishing intelligence-sharing mechanisms that were reduced under Petro. Her framing positions Colombia as a democratic anchor in a region experiencing authoritarian pressures.

De la Espriella takes the most explicit pro-US position in the race. La Silla Vacía reported that De la Espriella or entities linked to his campaign donated more than $90,000 USD to the US Republican Party, a fact that raises questions about the nature and expectations of those relationships. He has publicly aligned himself with the populist right in the United States, takes a hostile posture toward China, Russia, and Venezuela, and has characterized his security approach as consistent with a transactional alliance with Washington focused on counter-narcotics enforcement and cartel designation as foreign terrorist organizations.

“Ese pisco robó a 200 mil colombianos.” — Claudia López, former Mayor of Bogotá, referring to presidential candidate Abelardo de la Espriella’s legal representation of DMG pyramid scheme founder David Murcia Guzmán, during a presidential campaign event.

Corruption and Judicial Independence

All three candidates have stated commitments to fighting corruption, though their approaches and focal points differ in ways that are material to the institutional environment for business operations.

Cepeda’s legislative record includes serious, documented work investigating paramilitary infiltration of Colombia’s political institutions — the period known as parapolítica — and pursuing accountability for those cases. His blind spot, his critics argue, is corruption within the current administration. When Ecopetrol’s Ricardo Roa was formally charged in connection with Petro’s 2022 campaign, the response from the Pacto Histórico coalition was subdued. Cepeda has been Álvaro Uribe’s primary judicial antagonist in the Senate; a Cepeda administration would offer no institutional protection to Uribe and would be expected to support the full progress of judicial proceedings against him. For left-wing politicians facing legal exposure, including former Medellín mayor Daniel Quintero, a Cepeda administration would be expected to be more receptive to amnesty frameworks.

Valencia’s approach to anti-corruption is structural rather than prosecutorial: strengthening the independence of the Contraloría General de la República and the Fiscalía General de la Nación, implementing digital transparency in public procurement, and reducing informal executive influence over judicial processes. She would be expected to apply political and rhetorical pressure on behalf of Uribe — her political mentor and a close ally — though her legislative track record indicates a degree of institutional independence from Centro Democrático party orthodoxy.

De la Espriella’s anti-corruption rhetoric centers on severe criminal penalties for corrupt officials. The credibility of that position is complicated by his professional history, which is examined in detail below.

De la Espriella’s Legal Career: The Documented Record

De la Espriella’s campaign has faced sustained scrutiny over his client history as one of Colombia’s highest-profile criminal defense attorneys. The record is documented in reporting by El Colombiano, El Espectador, and the investigative outlet Corrupción al Día.

Abelardo de la Espriella (screen capture from Twitter video)

Abelardo de la Espriella (screen capture from Twitter video)

His documented client roster includes Salvatore Mancuso, the former supreme commander of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) paramilitary network; multiple legislators convicted in the parapolítica scandal, which established systematic infiltration of Colombia’s congress by paramilitary organizations; David Murcia Guzmán, the operator of the DMG pyramid scheme that defrauded an estimated 200,000 Colombian investors; the Nule Primos, convicted of large-scale public contract fraud; and Álex Saab, the Colombian businessman extradited to the United States on charges of acting as the primary money launderer for the Maduro government in Venezuela. According to Corrupción al Día, De la Espriella’s legal fees from Saab reportedly reached $12 million USD and included private aircraft travel.

De la Espriella’s response to this line of criticism rests on due process principles: that every accused person is entitled to vigorous legal defense regardless of the charges, and that his ability to navigate Colombia’s criminal code at its most complex levels demonstrates the expertise required to enforce the law from the executive branch. The argument has legal validity as a principle. The specific issue for foreign compliance officers and US government counterparts is the Saab representation: the same Nicolás Maduro whose regime De la Espriella’s campaign now characterizes as an ideological enemy received legal services from De la Espriella’s firm when the representation was commercially available.

The Fiscalía investigated De la Espriella in connection with alleged paramilitary links in 2009 and again in 2012; both investigations were dismissed for insufficient evidence, and he carries no convictions or active investigations on those matters.

Cepeda’s Family History and Ideological Background

Iván Cepeda (from Twitter)

Iván Cepeda (from Twitter)

Critics of Iván Cepeda, including Enrique Gómez of the Salvación Nacional party, have argued that his family background constitutes evidence of structural alignment with guerrilla movements. The record on this point merits examination.

Cepeda is the son of Manuel Cepeda Vargas, who served as Secretary-General of the Colombian Communist Party and as a senator for the Unión Patriótica (UP), a left-wing political movement that was systematically exterminated by a combination of state actors and paramilitary organizations during the 1980s and 1990s. Manuel Cepeda Vargas was assassinated on August 9, 1994. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights subsequently found the Colombian state responsible for his murder. The FARC-EP named its Frente Urbano Manuel Cepeda Vargas — an urban front operating within the Bloque Occidental — in the elder Cepeda’s honor.

The Fundación Paz y Reconciliación (PARES) has documented that Iván Cepeda’s relationship with his father’s political positions was more complex than the family lineage alone suggests. After studying in Bulgaria in 1981, Cepeda broke from his father’s Soviet-oriented communist framework and aligned with democratic leftists including Bernardo Jaramillo Ossa, who publicly rejected the FARC’s armed strategy. Cepeda has repeatedly stated his repudiation of the FARC’s use of his father’s name. No documented evidence connects him to operational coordination with current armed groups.

What the family history does establish is the ideological framework through which Cepeda processes security policy: a belief, grounded in personal and political experience, that the Colombian state’s institutional violence has been as destructive as guerrilla violence, and that negotiated settlements are structurally preferable to military solutions. That framework generates Paz Total. It also generates a posture toward ELN and FARC dissident negotiators that prioritizes process continuity over verified compliance — a disposition that armed groups have demonstrably exploited to maintain territorial and operational positions while negotiation frameworks provided legal cover.

Paloma Valencia (image Twitter)

Paloma Valencia (image Twitter)

Valencia and the Uribe Question

The comparison to former president Iván Duque (2018–2022) comes up regularly in discussions of Valencia’s political independence. Duque, who had limited independent political standing before Uribe selected him, was perceived throughout his term as governing within constraints set by his patron — a dynamic that Colombian political cartoonists characterized as ventriloquism.

Valencia’s profile differs materially. She is the granddaughter of former Colombian president Guillermo León Valencia, carries her own political lineage, and has served in the Senate for over a decade, building positions on agrarian reform, judicial modernization, and indigenous land rights that have placed her at variance with standard Centro Democrático positions on those issues. She won the Gran Consulta por Colombia primary on March 8 with more than 45% of the vote — over 3.2 million Colombians — establishing a democratic mandate distinct from any party endorsement.

She would be expected to use institutional and rhetorical channels to support Uribe in the ongoing judicial proceedings against him, and to apply pressure on the trajectory of those cases. Whether that constitutes political interference with judicial independence or normal advocacy within democratic norms is a question on which observers disagree. What the legislative record does not support is the characterization of Valencia as incapable of independent governance.

Press Freedom and the Media Environment

Press freedom carries an indirect but measurable correlation with rule-of-law quality, which in turn affects operational risk for companies that rely on regulatory predictability and transparent legal processes.

Cepeda has maintained a posture toward critical media that mirrors President Petro’s practice of characterizing adversarial outlets as acting in the interests of economic elites. Under Petro, this produced a systematic exclusion of critical media from official information flows and persistent rhetorical delegitimization of independent journalism, though the press remained legally free to operate. A Cepeda administration would be expected to continue this pattern.

Valencia’s background in Colombia’s traditional political and intellectual establishment, combined with a decade in a party that has faced sustained critical coverage from Colombia’s major outlets, points toward a conventional institutional relationship with the press — adversarial at times, but within professional norms.

De la Espriella’s conduct during the campaign provides direct evidence of his approach. He publicly called Caracol Noticias journalist María Lucía Fernández “ignorant” in a live interview. He issued a formal apology after journalist Laura Rodríguez of Piso 8 FM made allegations of inappropriate conduct. His campaign strategy has drawn comparisons to the approach of Argentine president Javier Milei and US president Donald Trump in its use of direct digital channels to circumvent traditional media while publicly attacking outlets that publish critical coverage. The press would remain legally protected under a De la Espriella administration, but the operational environment for investigative journalism would be hostile.

The Ideological Spectrum: Market Liberalism to State Direction

The question of which candidate is most aligned with free-market principles requires a distinction that the international business press frequently elides: the difference between economic deregulation and political authoritarianism. These can, and in this election do, exist independently.

De la Espriella’s platform is often described in international coverage as the most pro-market. His deregulation proposals for the extractive sector and his corporate tax rhetoric support that reading in the economic domain. His security platform, however, involves a substantial expansion of state coercive power: mass detention operations, a mega-prison construction program, and the suspension of standard due process protections to facilitate rapid incarceration of criminal suspects. The Cato Institute‘s framework of economic freedom as inseparable from civil liberties would categorize a state powerful enough to detain people without standard procedural protections as a state that represents an institutional risk to property rights and contract enforcement as well.

Valencia’s platform, anchored by Oviedo’s technocratic program of structural market reform — reduced administrative barriers, streamlined procurement, smaller state overhead, maintained civil liberties — represents the closest approximation to coherent market liberalism available in this field. It does not carry the rhetorical force of De la Espriella’s deregulation proposals, but it has more institutional grounding.

Cepeda’s platform is the furthest from market liberalism by any standard measure: state-directed investment allocation, wealth redistribution through tax and transfer mechanisms, state expansion in healthcare and pension administration, and agrarian land redistribution. His program is continuous with the Petro administration’s economic framework.

Minor Candidates: The Rest of the Ballot

Claudia López, senator of Colombia. (Credit: Patty Suescún)

Claudia López, senator of Colombia. (Credit: Patty Suescún)

Several other candidates remain on the ballot and are drawing small but potentially consequential vote shares in a first round where the margin between second and third place could be narrow.

Claudia López, former mayor of Bogotá running under the Con Claudia Imparables coalition, positions herself as a progressive centrist with a documented anti-corruption record. Her polling has not broken 3.5% in major surveys, and her high polarization ratings from her mayoral term limit her growth ceiling. Her attacks on De la Espriella during the campaign — she publicly called him a “defender of the mafia” in reference to his client history — have been among the most pointed in the race, and factually grounded on the public record.

Sergio Fajardo, making his third consecutive presidential run under Dignidad y Compromiso, continues to represent a technocratic, education-focused centrism grounded in his work transforming Medellín in the early 2000s. He has not broken 3.5% in any major poll in this cycle.

Roy Barreras, running under La Fuerza de la Paz following his Frente por la Vida primary victory, is one of the most experienced political operatives in Colombia, having been part of multiple coalition governments across ideological lines over two decades. He polls below the threshold for meaningful first-round impact.

Miguel Uribe Londoño, running under Partido Demócrata, represents a younger-generation conservative platform emphasizing fiscal discipline and private sector growth, broadly consistent with Valencia’s program. He also polls below 3.5%.

Carlos Caicedo, running on a regionalist platform emphasizing decentralization away from Bogotá, draws support primarily from the Costa Caribe. His structural argument about Colombia’s administrative over-centralization is substantively grounded, though his national profile is insufficient to affect the first-round outcome.

Investment Implications

For international capital with Colombian exposure, the three-way race produces three materially different operational scenarios.

A Cepeda victory — which remains the single most likely first-round outcome based on available polling — would signal continuity of the Petro-era regulatory framework: sustained capital outflow pressure, high corporate tax rates, no new fossil fuel exploration contracts for Ecopetrol (NYSE: EC; BVC: ECOPETROL) or private operators, continued labor cost escalation, and a foreign policy trajectory away from Washington. Colombian equity valuations would be expected to remain under pressure. The mining licensing backlog would continue to accumulate. A Cepeda administration would not replicate Venezuela’s economic trajectory — Colombia’s independent central bank, Banco de la República, its functioning constitutional court, and its institutional depth provide meaningful buffers — but the investment headwinds would be structural rather than cyclical.

A Valencia victory would represent the sharpest regulatory reversal available in this field. Ecopetrol exploration contracts would be expected to advance. The mining licensing backlog would be addressed. US bilateral relations would be restored, reactivating security intelligence cooperation and trade facilitation mechanisms. The Colombian peso would be expected to strengthen as country risk premium declined. The path to that outcome now requires her to either close the gap significantly on De la Espriella in the first round or rely on runoff polling that showed her as the stronger second-round candidate — data that predates the most recent polling shift.

A De la Espriella victory introduces the widest distribution of possible outcomes. The upside scenario involves Restrepo managing fiscal and trade policy competently, genuine regulatory rollback in the extractive sector, aggressive extradition resumption, and security operations that reduce the physical risk premium in conflict-affected departments including Cauca, Norte de Santander, and Chocó. The downside scenario involves recurring crises generated by De la Espriella’s personal conduct, conflicts of interest arising from his former client relationships, and authoritarian security measures that attract international human rights attention and complicate bilateral relationships. Restrepo’s presence on the ticket reduces the probability of the downside scenario but does not eliminate it.

The current polling trend indicates that right-wing voters are consolidating around De la Espriella at Valencia’s expense. Whether that consolidation produces a runoff between De la Espriella and Cepeda — and whether the runoff produces a left or right-wing government — remains uncertain. What the polling data does not support is the scenario, widely assumed until recently, of a Cepeda-Valencia runoff in which Valencia was positioned as the structurally stronger opposition candidate.

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Holland & Knight Taps Energy Lawyer José Vicente Zapata to Lead Bogotá Office

25 May 2026 at 20:46

Energy and M&A specialist takes helm of 70-lawyer Bogotá practice

Holland & Knight has named José Vicente Zapata executive partner of its Bogotá office, the firm announced on May 4, 2026. Zapata will oversee day-to-day management of the office while continuing to lead his energy practice, which focuses on corporate, contractual, and commercial matters, with an emphasis on spin-offs and mergers and acquisitions. He succeeds Enrique Gómez Pinzón, who has served as executive partner since the office opened in 2012 and will now take the title of executive partner emeritus while continuing his corporate, M&A, finance, and international arbitration practice.

Zapata has been with Holland & Knight for nearly 12 years and co-chairs the firm’s Venezuela Focus Team, a group of partners who advise clients with interests in that country. His regulatory work covers environmental, energy, and natural resources matters, as well as corporate compliance, including the design of ethics programs and compliance with Colombia’s Sistema de Autocontrol y Gestión del Riesgo Integral de Lavado de Activos y Financiación del Terrorismo (SAGRILAFT) anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorism financing regime. He also handles liability cases involving contractual and non-contractual damages.

“I look forward to continuing to strengthen our team’s offerings in advising Colombian companies and guiding international clients to navigate entry into the Colombian market.” — José Vicente Zapata, Executive Partner, Holland & Knight Bogotá

Zapata earned his LL.M. in Sustainable Development and International Business Law from McGill University in Montreal and his J.D. from the Pontificia Universidad Javeriana in Bogotá. He has been ranked in Energy & Natural Resources: Environment by Chambers Global and Chambers Latin America since 2014, was named to The Legal 500 Latin America Hall of Fame in Environment in 2025 and 2026, and is regularly listed in The Best Lawyers in Colombia.

“I look forward to continuing to strengthen our team’s offerings in advising Colombian companies and guiding international clients to navigate entry into the Colombian market,” Zapata said in a written statement.

Bob Grammig, Holland & Knight’s chair and chief executive officer, said Zapata’s appointment was intended to focus the office on growth in Colombia and across Latin America. Gómez Pinzón said he would continue to support the office in his emeritus role.

The Bogotá office now houses nearly 70 lawyers. Its practice covers cross-border deals and international trade; mergers, acquisitions, and joint ventures; oil, gas, and mining projects; environmental assessments, liability, and compliance; taxation; labor law; intellectual property, trademark, and patent registration; antitrust and consumer law; capital markets, venture capital, and private equity; international licensing and franchising; project finance and foreign investment; corporate reorganizations and financial restructurings; litigation and international arbitration; and private wealth services.

Holland & Knight’s Latin America Practice Group includes more than 200 attorneys working on cross-border M&A, joint ventures, private equity and financing transactions, and disputes involving Latin America. The firm overall counts approximately 2,200 lawyers and other professionals across 35 offices. Founded in 1889, it provides representation in litigation, corporate and finance, real estate, healthcare, and government matters.

The leadership transition comes as international firms continue to deepen their footprint in Bogotá to serve foreign investors entering Colombian energy, infrastructure, and natural resources markets, and to advise Colombian corporates pursuing transactions abroad.

Frontera Energy Pivots to Pure-Play Colombian Infrastructure as Shareholders Approve $750 Million USD Parex Sale

25 May 2026 at 20:37

Infrastructure pivot frees up $1.3 billion USD for shareholders

Frontera Energy Corporation (TSX: FEC) (OTCQX: FECCF) reported first-quarter 2026 net income from continuing operations of $13.1 million USD and adjusted EBITDA of $28.5 million USD, as the Calgary-based company moves to close the sale of its Colombian exploration and production portfolio to Parex Resources Inc. (TSX: PXT) and reposition itself as a standalone Colombian infrastructure company anchored by its pipeline and port assets.

Total revenues from continuing operations were $26.8 million USD in the first quarter, compared with $26.9 million USD in the fourth quarter of 2025 and $25.1 million USD in the first quarter of 2025. Net loss for the period, including discontinued operations, was $15.4 million USD, reflecting a $28.5 million USD net loss from the Colombian E&P assets now classified as held for sale.

“In total, this strategy will have unlocked approximately $1.3 billion of capital for investors.” — Gabriel de Alba, Chairman of the Board, Frontera Energy Corporation

The Parex transaction

On April 30, 2026, Frontera shareholders approved a plan of arrangement under which Parex Resources, through a wholly-owned subsidiary, will acquire all of Frontera’s Colombian upstream business — including its oil and gas exploration and production assets, a reverse-osmosis water-treatment facility, and a palm-oil plantation. The transaction carries an enterprise value of $750 million USD. The cash purchase price consists of $500 million USD payable at closing, subject to customary adjustments, plus an additional $25 million USD contingent payment tied to specified development milestones to be achieved within 12 months of closing.

At the same shareholder meeting, investors approved a reduction of Frontera’s capital account of up to $647 million CAD (approximately $470 million USD) to fund a return of capital to shareholders from the net proceeds of the transaction. The Supreme Court of British Columbia issued its final order approving the arrangement on May 4, 2026. Closing remains subject to the satisfaction of remaining conditions and is expected in May 2026.

Chairman Gabriel de Alba said the company would retain roughly $50 million USD of cash to support growth opportunities at the remaining infrastructure business, including an LNG regasification project being developed in partnership with Ecopetrol (NYSE: EC) (BVC: ECOPETROL). “In total, this strategy will have unlocked approximately $1.3 billion of capital for investors,” de Alba said.

ODL pipeline drives cash flow

Frontera holds a 35 percent equity interest in the Oleoducto de los Llanos (ODL) crude oil pipeline, which connects the Rubiales, Quifa, Caño Sur, Llanos-34, and other production blocks to the Monterrey and Cusiana stations in the department of Casanare. ODL’s share of income contributed $14.2 million USD to Frontera in the first quarter, compared with $15.1 million USD a year earlier, with the year-over-year decline reflecting higher depreciation, amortization, and operating costs.

ODL transported 233,875 barrels per day in the first quarter of 2026 at an average tariff of $4.70 USD per barrel, compared with 236,387 barrels per day at $4.73 USD per barrel in the first quarter of 2025. The pipeline declared $185 million USD in total dividends, of which $64.7 million USD is net to Frontera. The company expects to receive those distributions during 2026 in installments of approximately 40 percent in the second quarter, 35 percent in the third quarter, and 25 percent in the fourth quarter.

Long-term debt at Frontera totaled $167.8 million USD at the end of the first quarter and is expected to decline to approximately $131 million USD by year-end 2026, primarily through scheduled amortizations and cash-sweep mechanisms tied to ODL cash flows. From May 2025 through December 2026, long-term debt is expected to fall by more than $100 million USD.

Puerto Bahía expands cargo mix

Puerto Bahía, the multipurpose maritime terminal located in Cartagena adjacent to the Bocachica access channel and near the Reficar refinery, generated $12.7 million USD in revenue in the first quarter of 2026, compared with $10.0 million USD in the same period a year earlier. The 150-hectare facility comprises a hydrocarbons terminal with nominal capacity of 2,672,000 barrels and a general cargo terminal. Frontera holds a 99.97 percent equity interest in the port.

General cargo growth offset weaker liquids volumes. The general cargo terminal handled 38,067 roll-on/roll-off (RORO) units in the first quarter, more than double the 18,223 units handled a year earlier, alongside 3,851 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs) of containerized cargo, up from 1,256 TEUs in the first quarter of 2025. Break-bulk volumes declined to 25,216 tons/m³ from 41,198 tons/m³. RORO dwell times shortened from 40 days to 31 days year over year.

The liquids terminal handled 36,937 barrels per day in the first quarter of 2026, down from 51,579 barrels per day a year earlier. Ecopetrol volumes accounted for 26,273 barrels per day, Frontera-related volumes for 7,389 barrels per day, and other third-party volumes for 3,275 barrels per day. The company attributed the decline mainly to lower third-party throughput and the absence of certain trading flows.

Operating costs at the port rose to $7.6 million USD in the first quarter from $5.0 million USD a year earlier, driven by increased infrastructure maintenance in the liquids terminal and higher cargo volumes in the general cargo facility.

LPG and LNG projects advance

Puerto Bahía’s liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) project began initial operations in March 2026, providing capacity to handle up to 10,000 tons per month. The terminal is targeted to become fully operational during the first quarter of 2028. Capital expenditures during the first quarter totaled $1.0 million USD, including $0.4 million USD for major tank maintenance and $0.3 million USD for the LPG project.

The company is also advancing an LNG regasification project at Puerto Bahía in partnership with Ecopetrol, intended to support Colombia’s domestic gas supply as domestic production declines. Frontera is also pursuing expansion of containerized cargo operations.

Discontinued operations

Following the execution of the arrangement agreement, the Colombian E&P assets are now classified as discontinued operations under IFRS 5. Colombian production averaged 36,700 barrels of oil equivalent per day in the first quarter of 2026, comprising 25,394 barrels per day of heavy crude, 8,653 barrels per day of light and medium crude combined, 5,706 thousand cubic feet per day of conventional natural gas, and 1,652 barrels of oil equivalent per day of natural gas liquids. That compares with 39,010 barrels of oil equivalent per day a year earlier.

The operating netback from the discontinued Colombian operations was $41.79 USD per barrel of oil equivalent in the first quarter of 2026, compared with $34.22 USD per barrel of oil equivalent in the first quarter of 2025, supported by a higher Brent reference price of $78.38 USD per barrel against $74.98 USD per barrel a year earlier.

Frontera retains exploration and development interests in Guyana through subsidiaries that include CGX Energy Inc. (TSXV: OYL), which is not part of the Parex transaction. The company’s go-forward portfolio will be anchored by the ODL pipeline stake and Puerto Bahía, with the infrastructure business generating approximately $77 million USD of distributable cash flow in 2025, according to the management information circular dated March 30, 2026.

Above photo courtesy Frontera Energy Corporation.

Colombia Posts 6.7% Growth in March Visitor Arrivals and Signs Mexican Airport Promotion Deal

25 May 2026 at 20:17

Q1 visitor count tops 1.58 million as Mexico push targets World Cup

Non-resident visitor arrivals to Colombia grew 6.7% in March 2026 compared to the same month of the previous year, and the country received 1,584,378 non-resident visitors during the first quarter, according to figures from Migración Colombia processed by the Ministerio de Comercio, Industria y Turismo.

In March alone, 541,720 non-resident visitors entered the country. Of that total, 419,150 were foreign non-resident visitors, representing 5.3% year-over-year growth, while the cruise segment recorded 58,186 passengers, a 41.2% increase over the same month in 2025.

For executives and investors evaluating Colombia’s tourism, hospitality, and aviation sectors, the data indicate continued recovery in international arrivals and a measurable expansion of cruise traffic, two segments that directly affect hotel occupancy, retail spending in coastal cities such as Cartagena and Santa Marta, and the pipeline of inbound foreign exchange.

“Colombian tourism is going through a significant period of international expansion. Colombia is recording sustained growth in visitor arrivals while strengthening its connectivity and expanding its presence in strategic markets,” said Diana Marcela Morales Rojas, Minister of Commerce, Industry and Tourism.

Air connectivity figures

According to the Aeronáutica Civil de Colombia (Aerocivil), 4,483,077 passengers were transported on scheduled flights in February 2026, a 9.4% increase compared to the same month of the prior year. International arrivals grew 11.9% while domestic traffic increased 7.3%.

Between January and February 2026, scheduled flights moved 9,906,749 passengers, an 8.2% increase over the same period in 2025. The figures reflect ongoing expansion in commercial aviation capacity into Colombian airports, including the principal international gateways in Bogotá, Medellín, Cartagena, and Cali.

Mexico airport campaign tied to World Cup

Following Colombia’s participation as guest of honor at the Tianguis Turístico de México, the Ministerio de Comercio, Industria y Turismo signed an agreement with more than 20 Mexican airports to display the country’s “Descubre la Diversidad de Colombia, El País de la Belleza” campaign during the FIFA World Cup season.

The campaign will run in terminals operated by the Mexican federal government, including airports in Mexico City, Toluca, Tulum, and Cancún. The Mexican market represents one of the larger sources of regional intra-Latin American travel and is expected to see elevated transit volumes during the World Cup, which Mexico will co-host with the United States and Canada in summer 2026.

“Colombia is positioning itself as an increasingly visible and competitive destination in international markets. These alliances allow us to expand the country’s presence in strategic global venues, increase visitor arrivals, and continue positioning tourism as an engine of economic development for the regions,” Morales Rojas said.

The ministry indicated that Colombia’s presence at the Tianguis Turístico also produced bilateral conversations on expanding air connectivity and promotional cooperation with Mexican tourism operators, though specific route announcements or carrier commitments tied to the agreement were not disclosed.

Above photo: Mexico pavilion at the 2015 ANATO Vitrina Turistica trade show in Bogotá (photo: Loren Moss)

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