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Colombia’s Presidential Race Marked by Polarization, Divided Right and Absence of Debates

As Colombia nears its presidential vote, two candidates have endorsed Iván Cepeda and eight others remain below 3.5% in polls

With less than two weeks remaining before Colombia’s presidential election, whose first round is scheduled for May 31, three candidates are concentrating most voter support and competing for access to the presidential palace, Casa de Nariño: ruling coalition senator Iván Cepeda, candidate of the left-wing Pacto Histórico party; senator Paloma Valencia, representing the right-wing Centro Democrático party; and lawyer and businessman Abelardo de la Espriella, a figure of Colombia’s far right.

Although 13 candidates will appear on the ballot, two contenders: Clara López and Luis Gilberto Murillo, withdrew their campaigns to support Cepeda, while the remaining candidates have failed to surpass 3.5% voter support in pre-elections polls, a figure close to the statistical margin of error.

If polling trends hold, no candidate is expected to secure the 50% plus one vote needed to win outright in the first round, making a runoff election on June 21, 2026, highly likely.

Cepeda has remained relatively stable in polls, with voter support ranging between 35% and 43%, effectively securing his place in a second round if trends continue.

The key question: Who will face Cepeda in a runoff?

The main electoral uncertainty centers on who will finish second and challenge the ruling coalition in a likely runoff.

Under Colombia’s electoral system, only the two candidates receiving the highest vote totals advance to the second round. The fragmentation of the political right has complicated efforts to consolidate support behind either Valencia or De la Espriella.

Polls suggest a competitive scenario. Valencia has registered between 14% and 21% voter support, while De la Espriella fluctuates between 16% and 24%, depending on the poll and methodology used.

The lack of unity between the two camps stems from both ideological differences and their political structures. Valencia is a member of the political party founded by former President Álvaro Uribe, while De la Espriella entered the race through an independent signature campaign, marking the first time Colombia’s far right has emerged as a viable contender for the presidency.

A campaign shaped by the absence of public debates

The presidential campaign has been marked by an unusual lack of debates among the leading candidates.

Cepeda has refused to participate in events organized by media outlets, arguing that proposed formats do not offer guarantees of neutrality or what he describes as “fair rules” established by news organizations.

As a result, part of the political confrontation has shifted to Congress, where both Cepeda and Valencia currently serve in the Senate.

Critics, however, have challenged Cepeda’s decision. Former Bogotá Mayor and presidential candidate Claudia López argued that his absence from debates reflects that “Cepeda does not want to take responsibility for the failures of Total Peace (Paz Total),” the negotiation policy with armed groups promoted by President Gustavo Petro, in which Cepeda played a key role as a lawmaker.

Instead of regular debates, the campaign has been dominated by disputes over media formats, digital presence, social media strategies and public controversies aimed at amplifying candidates’ visibility.

De la Espriella embraces confrontation

One of the candidates who has most effectively capitalized on the digital environment is Abelardo de la Espriella, whose political strategy has been compared to right-wing populist leadership styles such as those of Argentine President Javier Milei and US President Donald Trump.

In recent weeks, De la Espriella has faced several media controversies, including an incident involving journalist Laura Rodríguez of Piso 8 FM, for which he later apologized after accusations of inappropriate sexual conduct. He also clashed live on air with television presenter María Lucía Fernández of Caracol Noticias, whom he called “ignorant.”

Questions also emerged following reports by digital outlet La Silla Vacía regarding donations linked to the US Republican Party.

Despite the controversies, the strategy appears to be strengthening his electoral standing. An Atlas Intel poll for Semana magazine, published May 15, showed De la Espriella surpassing Valencia by a two-to-one margin for the first time, with 32.9% support compared with 16.7%.

However, the polling firm is currently under investigation by Colombia’s National Electoral Council (CNE) amid concerns over whether its methodology complies with national standards. If irregularities are confirmed, the firm could face suspension of its operations in Colombia.

Valencia seeks to broaden support toward the political center

Meanwhile, Valencia has sought to expand her electoral base by shifting strategically toward the political center.

As part of that effort, on May 17 she officially introduced her proposal “Mámá No Está Sola (Mom Is Not Alone),” aimed at female heads of household and focused on access to credit, employment and housing property. The proposal also includes a promise to deliver 1 million homes prioritized for women community leaders.

Valencia’s candidacy also marks a historic first for Colombia’s political right: it is the first time a major conservative party has nominated a woman for president.

Her vice presidential running mate, former Bogotá councilman Juan Daniel Oviedo, has openly identified as a member of the LGBTQ+ community, a move that represents a significant shift for the Centro Democrático traditionally conservative electorate.

Colombia appears headed for a runoff

With a highly fragmented field and no signs of consolidation among right-wing candidates, Colombia appears increasingly likely to hold a presidential runoff on June 21, 2026.

Barring a major shift in polling trends, the contest seems set to come down to Iván Cepeda and whichever opposition candidate manages to emerge from an increasingly competitive battle within Colombia’s political right.

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Andean Community Orders Colombia and Ecuador to Dismantle Tariffs and Trade Restrictions

A tariff dispute between Colombia and Ecuador escalated to 100% duties on Colombian imports after Ecuador cited a lack of cooperation on border security

The Andean Community of Nations (CAN) ordered Colombia and Ecuador to dismantle, within 10 business days, the trade restrictions and tariff measures imposed since late 2025, concluding that they violate the legal framework governing the regional bloc composed of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru.

The decision was adopted through three resolutions issued May 8, 2026, by the CAN General Secretariat, led by Gonzalo Gutiérrez Reinel, following an assessment of trade disputes that emerged between the two countries amid tensions related to border security and commerce.

The organization concluded that several measures implemented by Quito and Bogotá violate the Cartagena Agreement, the founding treaty of Andean integration, which prohibits restrictions on intraregional trade among member states.

More information about the “security tariff”: Colombia and Ecuador Escalate Trade Tensions with Tariffs Raised to 100%.

Ecuador ordered to lift border restrictions and “security tariff”

The first resolution, No. 2581, ruled in favor of Colombia in a complaint related to Ecuador’s decision to limit bilateral land trade to a single border crossing. The General Secretariat classified the measure as a “restriction on Andean subregional trade” and granted Ecuador 10 business days to withdraw it.

The resolution also urged both countries to strengthen bilateral cooperation on border security matters.

“To urge the Republic of Ecuador and the Republic of Colombia to strengthen bilateral cooperation and coordination mechanisms in border control (…) through joint actions, without affecting the normal development of subregional trade,” the organization stated in Resolution 2581.

Meanwhile, Resolution 2582 ordered Ecuador to eliminate the so-called “security tariff” imposed exclusively on Colombian imports, which initially stood at 30% and later escalated to 100%.

According to CAN, the measure violates the Trade Liberalization Program established under the Cartagena Agreement and constitutes a “disguised tariff.”

The General Secretariat concluded that the so-called Customs Control Service Fee (TSCA) or “security tariff” does not qualify as a legitimate fee because it does not compensate for an individualized service to importers, but instead finances general state functions related to intelligence and strategic security.

Ecuador was given a maximum of 10 business days to dismantle the measure and formally report compliance. So far, the government of President Daniel Noboa has not issued an official response to the resolutions.

CAN also orders Colombia to dismantle countermeasures

“I have no problem removing tariffs on Ecuadorian products in the same manner and timeline in which they were imposed,” Petro wrote on X after the ruling became public.

The third resolution, No. 2583, rejected the trade countermeasures adopted by Colombia in response to Ecuador.

The government of President Gustavo Petro had issued Decree 0170, later tightened through Decree 0455, imposing reciprocal tariffs ranging from 30% to 75% on Ecuadorian products and restricting the entry of rice, potatoes, onions, and fishery products through specific border crossings.

CAN concluded that these measures are also incompatible with Andean community regulations.

Trade dispute rooted in security tensions

The commercial dispute between the two countries intensified beginning in late 2025 and reached its peak in April 2026, when both governments progressively increased tariffs and trade restrictions, citing concerns related to border security and anti-narcotics enforcement.

The tensions particularly affected border regions, where business groups and transport operators warned of disruptions to trade flows and rising logistical costs.

CAN’s resolutions now seek to restore free trade conditions within the Andean bloc and reduce diplomatic tensions between two of its largest economies.

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