Former Colombian Foreign Minister Álvaro Leyva Durán launched a blistering attack against President Gustavo Petro just days before Colombia heads to the polls on May 31, warning of what he described as looming threats to the country’s democratic institutions and accusing the government of preparing to reject an unfavorable electoral outcome.

In a lengthy manifesto published Tuesday on the social media platform X under the title “Propuesta de Álvaro Leyva Durán al País para las Elecciones,” the veteran Conservative politician claimed Petro fears both political defeat and possible legal consequences should right-wing presidential candidate Abelardo De la Espriella emerge victorious.

“Petro knows that his future depends on his successor protecting him from justice,” Leyva wrote, adding that De la Espriella “could win the elections in the first round.”

According to Leyva, the former member of the M-19 guerrilla and senator understands that with De la Espriella in office, “he himself could end up in prison. And that is why he has sought to derail the candidate and will refuse to recognize his victory.”

The explosive accusations mark the latest escalation in the increasingly bitter campaign season ahead of what analysts are calling one of Colombia’s most polarized elections in decades. Leyva, once one of Petro’s closest political allies and his first foreign minister, has in recent months become one of the president’s fiercest critics.

In the manifesto, Leyva intertwined personal memories of Colombia’s turbulent political history with warnings about what he believes is unfolding behind the scenes of the current administration.

“At my age, I know these kinds of stories well,” he wrote, before recalling his close relationship with slain Conservative leader Álvaro Gómez Hurtado.

“My father, Jorge Leyva, gave me at birth the name of his friend Álvaro Gómez Hurtado. When I was 12 years old, Álvaro would speak to me about politics and explain the world to me with a globe.”

Leyva recounted how Gómez and his own father were exiled after the 1953 military coup, and how decades later he worked alongside Gómez politically, even helping negotiate his release after he was kidnapped by the M-19 guerrilla movement in 1988.

“In 1995, after leaving a lecture at Sergio Arboleda University, Álvaro Gómez and I shook hands for the last time,” Leyva wrote. “Because minutes later, I watched in horror as he was assassinated in his car. It was a national tragedy.”

The former minister used Gómez’s legacy as a contrast to his eventual disillusionment with Petro.

“Because of that, I believed I could work with Gustavo Petro,” he said. “When he invited me to become his minister, I accepted because I believed him to be an honorable man. But I was wrong.”

Leyva then delivered some of his harshest remarks yet against the president.

“I came to know the monster from within: his vileness and degradation,” he wrote. “At enormous personal and family cost, I dared to denounce his baseness and his disrespect for the office.”

He added: “Because character demands that one not remain silent in the face of ignominy. And because of everything I witnessed, because of the rotten environment in which he (Petro) moves, I know what the government is plotting.”

Leyva also alleged that Petro’s radicalised supporters to intimidate opponents and manipulate the electoral process. “Today, while Abelardo wages a major democratic battle, Petro incites his followers to commit all kinds of outrages,” he wrote. “There has even been talk of snipers during the campaign.”

Without providing evidence, Leyva claimed that attempts had been made to invalidate De la Espriella’s candidacy, suppress favorable polling data and mobilize state-backed political machinery to influence the vote.

“On election day, rivers of money will flow in an attempt to stop De la Espriella,” he warned.

The former foreign minister also accused Petro of laying the groundwork to dispute the legitimacy of the election itself.

“The president has also spent months constructing a narrative of electoral manipulation,” Leyva wrote. In this way, according to the author, he is “weaving an argument to reject an adverse electoral outcome” that he already senses is inevitable. “That is the false ace up Petro’s sleeve,” he continued. “And like any gambler fueled by hatred, he will use it.”

Leyva also referenced U.S. Republican lawmakers from Florida, María Elvira Salazar and Rick Scott, claiming both were aware of the risks facing Colombia’s democratic process. “Scott is an ally of Colombian democracy and correctly sensed what the national government is planning,” he wrote.

In one of the most dramatic sections of the manifesto, Leyva proposed that Petro temporarily step aside if he alleges fraud after either the first or second round of voting.

“I make a proposal: if in the first or second round Petro claims there was fraud, he should step down from office under the terms of Article 193 of the Constitution,” Leyva wrote.

He suggested that the vice president temporarily assume office while an international commission made up of U.S. lawmakers, European parliamentarians, the Vatican and the United Nations review the vote count and oversee the transition of power before August 7.

“Think about it, Gustavo. Think about it carefully,” Leyva concluded. “Because the alternative will not end well for you. Abelardo De la Espriella will be the next president. And you will have to accept that reality, whether you like it or not.”

The ongoing investigations have now been joined by a new complaint filed by presidential candidate Claudia López

Colombia’s House Investigation and Accusation Committee has opened an ex officio investigation into President Gustavo Petro over alleged improper political participation ahead of the country’s presidential election on May 31, 2026, amid growing scrutiny over the president’s neutrality during the campaign.

The decision became public Tuesday, May 26, through an official document in which the committee said the investigation stems from “recent statements and social media posts” by the head of state “related to alleged participation in politics in connection with the upcoming presidential elections.”

“This Legal Investigation and Accusation Committee is legally obligated, under the powers granted by Law 600 of 2000 (Article 27) and Law 5 of 1992, to initiate an ex officio criminal investigation for the crime of Political Intervention (Article 422 of the Criminal Code),” the document states.

The order was signed by Gloria Arizabaleta, chair of the Investigation and Accusation Committee and a House representative from the ruling Pacto Histórico party.

Although Colombia’s president is considered the natural leader of his political movement, in this case, Pacto Histórico, whose presidential candidate is Iván Cepeda, Colombian law imposes restrictions on public officials regarding electoral participation.

In Colombia, public officials are subject to the principle of political neutrality, preventing them from intervening in electoral controversies or using their positions to influence citizens’ votes in favor of a particular party or candidate, although they retain their individual right to vote.

Article 422 of Colombia’s Criminal Code (Law 599 of 2000) establishes penalties for improper political intervention, including prison sentences and disqualification from holding public office. Such conduct may also result in disciplinary sanctions under Colombia’s General Disciplinary Code.

Claudia López files separate complaint

Presidential candidate Claudia López also filed a formal complaint before the same committee, alleging lack of electoral guarantees and abuse of power by the president.

“We filed before the House Investigation Committee a 58-page complaint with evidence of President Gustavo Petro’s improper participation in politics and the lack of electoral guarantees. His attacks against my campaign, abuse of power and blatant political interference cannot be accepted,” López said in a social media post.

Inspector General requests report on complaints

Meanwhile, Colombia’s Inspector General’s Office requested a detailed report from the committee regarding existing complaints against Petro related to alleged improper political participation.

The request was signed by Inspector General Gregorio Eljach, who asked for a “detailed report listing complaints against the President of the Republic” to be delivered within three days.

However, the scope of the Inspector General’s Office remains limited because, under Colombia’s institutional system, it holds disciplinary authority over lawmakers and local officials, while constitutional authority to investigate the president rests with the House of Representatives.

“The Executive Branch is overwhelmingly powerful compared with the others, and the president, as head of the state’s public administration, has extraordinary powers and tremendous influence over society,” Eljach told El Tiempo newspaper, referring to the president’s social media activity and its possible impact on voters.

According to El País newspaper in Cali, the Investigation and Accusation Committee currently has around 12 complaints against Petro related to alleged political intervention.

The investigation opens in the final stretch of a presidential campaign in which Petro has sought to maintain political influence through support for ruling coalition candidate Iván Cepeda, who currently leads voter intention polls ahead of the first round.

Colombians face three sharply different futures in May 31 vote

Colombia votes on May 31 with its presidential race concentrated around three candidates whose platforms diverge on nearly every dimension of economic and security policy relevant to foreign investors. For corporate executives, institutional investors, and multinational operations with Colombian exposure, the choice between senator Iván Cepeda, senator Paloma Valencia, and defense attorney Abelardo de la Espriella carries direct, measurable implications for the regulatory environment, foreign direct investment (FDI) conditions, energy sector licensing, and geopolitical alignment through at least 2030.

No candidate is projected to clear the 50%-plus-one threshold required to win outright on May 31, making a runoff election on June 21 the expected outcome. The question that will determine the direction of that runoff — and by extension the next administration — is which of the two opposition candidates finishes second.

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A Race Reshaped by Late Polling

The final-week polling picture shifted substantially, and the trajectory matters as much as the snapshot. The CONDOR weighted aggregate — which incorporates surveys from six polling firms and applies greater weight to more recent data — placed the race as of May 23 at: Cepeda 36.3%, De la Espriella 29.1%, Valencia 16.7%.

Invamer, one of Colombia’s most established polling firms, surveyed 3,800 respondents across 152 municipalities between May 13 and May 20, registering Cepeda at 44.6%, De la Espriella at 31.6%, and Valencia at 14.0%. The Centro Nacional de Consultoría (CNC) published a survey conducted May 22 and 23 showing Cepeda at 33.4%, De la Espriella at 30.9%, and Valencia at 12.6%.

Comparing those figures to the Fundación Génesis Crea survey from May 4 through May 11 — which placed Cepeda at 35.1%, Valencia at 25.4%, and De la Espriella at 21.6% — indicates a multi-poll trend of De la Espriella gaining approximately nine to ten percentage points in three weeks while Valencia shed a comparable share. AS/COA’s poll tracker confirms the directional consistency across firms.

Atlas Intel, which published figures more favorable to De la Espriella, is currently under investigation by Colombia’s Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE) for potential methodology violations and could face suspension of its operations. Those figures are treated with caution in this analysis.

Runoff modeling diverges between firms. Fundación Génesis Crea showed Valencia defeating Cepeda 49.1% to 44.7% in a second-round matchup — meaning she was the stronger opposition candidate in that scenario. The Guarumo/Ecoanalítica survey found Cepeda losing all hypothetical runoff scenarios, including against De la Espriella. Two minor candidates — former senator Clara López and former Chocó governor Luis Gilberto Murillo — withdrew and endorsed Cepeda before the first round, a consolidation that appears to have had limited effect on his polling numbers.

Finance Colombia reported in May that the campaign has been marked by an unusual absence of traditional televised debates. Cepeda declined to participate in events organized by major media outlets, stating that proposed formats lacked neutrality. Former Bogotá Mayor Claudia López, herself a candidate, said publicly that Cepeda’s refusal was motivated by an unwillingness to defend his record as the architect of President Gustavo Petro‘s Paz Total security negotiation strategy.

Security Policy: The Three Approaches to Armed Groups

Public security is the top voter concern heading into the election. InSight Crime documented that the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) launched a major offensive against FARC dissident factions in Norte de Santander in early 2025, resulting in mass civilian casualties in the Catatumbo region. In Chocó and Antioquia, the ELN and the Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC), commonly known as the Clan del Golfo, are competing for control of illegal gold mining corridors and drug trafficking routes. In Cauca, FARC dissident factions have established territorial control in areas where state presence has collapsed.

Cepeda’s approach to security is defined by his role as the principal legislative architect of Paz Total. As chair of the Senate‘s peace commission, he designed the framework that extended negotiating status to the ELN, FARC dissident groups, and the Clan del Golfo. His stated rationale is that targeting the financial leadership of drug networks rather than foot soldiers produces more durable results — a position that has academic backing in narcotics policy literature. In practice, Paz Total produced ceasefires that were repeatedly violated, and security indicators in conflict-affected departments deteriorated during the Petro administration. A Cepeda presidency is expected to continue the negotiated settlement model, with the military operating under political constraints.

Valencia’s security platform is based on reinstating Seguridad Democrática, the doctrine associated with former president Álvaro Uribe’s administrations from 2002 to 2010. The core elements are expanded military presence in rural conflict zones, dismantling of rural criminal networks, and resumption of extradition agreements with the United States — which Petro suspended, effectively shielding cartel leadership from US federal prosecution. The Uribe-era approach resulted in measurable reductions in homicide rates, forced displacement, and ELN and FARC territorial control, though human rights organizations documented serious abuses by security forces during that period.

De la Espriella has stated explicitly that his government would have no peace process. He advocates for a model similar to El Salvador’s under President Nayib Bukele: mass incarceration, construction of high-security prison facilities, classification of guerrilla and cartel organizations as foreign terrorist organizations, and broad military offensives. He has not detailed how such operations would be financed or how the mass detention model would interact with Colombia’s Constitutional Court, which has repeatedly constrained executive security powers.

For the armed groups operating in Norte de Santander and Cauca, the historical record indicates that Colombia’s criminal organizations respond more acutely to sustained, institutionally grounded military pressure and functioning extradition pipelines than to political rhetoric. By that measure, Valencia’s platform — which rebuilds the institutional security apparatus incrementally — represents a more structurally credible threat to the ELN and the Estado Mayor Central (EMC) FARC dissidents. For the Clan del Golfo leadership, extradition to the United States has historically been the principal deterrent, and Valencia’s program explicitly restores it.

Business Climate and Employment Conditions

The Petro administration enacted a series of minimum wage increases totaling more than 60% over four years — including a 16% increase for 2023, the largest single-year hike in Colombian history, and a 23.78% increase for 2026 — restructured labor regulations to expand premium pay requirements for night, weekend, and holiday shifts, and raised corporate tax rates to fund social spending programs. The Asociación Nacional de Empresarios de Colombia (ANDI) characterized the regulatory environment as adverse to private investment. Finance Colombia tracked a material decline in FDI in the extractive sector over the same period.

Cepeda supported those labor and fiscal reforms throughout their legislative passage. His platform extends the Petro model: increased state social spending, continued land redistribution programs, and maintenance of the current wage and labor cost structure. For companies with established Colombian operations, the regulatory environment is manageable; for companies evaluating market entry or operational expansion, the cost structure adds friction.

Valencia’s economic program emphasizes corporate stability and private sector investment as the primary mechanisms of job creation. Her vice-presidential running mate, Juan Daniel Oviedo — former director of DANE, Colombia’s national statistics agency — represents a technocratic orientation focused on reducing structural market distortions, streamlining public procurement, and scaling back state administrative overhead. Oviedo’s appointment is a direct signal to the business community that economic management would be data-driven rather than ideologically directed. Oviedo also publicly identifies as a member of the LGBTQ+ community, a departure from the traditional social conservatism of Centro Democrático.

De la Espriella’s economic orientation is pro-business with protectionist elements. His vice-presidential candidate, José Manuel Restrepo — who served as Colombia’s Finance Minister and Commerce Minister — provides institutional credibility on fiscal and trade policy. Restrepo’s presence on the ticket signals commitment to fiscal discipline and regulatory reduction in the extractive and commercial sectors. De la Espriella’s personal style, however, introduces operational uncertainty; his campaign has generated multiple high-profile controversies, including a public altercation with Caracol Noticias journalist María Lucía Fernández during a live broadcast and a formal apology following misconduct allegations by journalist Laura Rodríguez of Piso 8 FM.

Foreign Investment, Oil, and Mining

The extractive sector is the most consequential economic policy dimension for international capital. Ecopetrol (NYSE: EC; BVC: ECOPETROL) — Colombia’s state-controlled energy company and the largest corporation in the country — has operated under exploration restrictions during the Petro administration, which has opposed new fossil fuel contracts on climate grounds.

Cepeda’s position extends the Petro framework: mandatory transition away from fossil fuels, heavy restrictions or outright prohibitions on new oil and gas exploration contracts, and stringent environmental licensing requirements for open-pit mining operations. Foreign investment would be directed by policy toward green hydrogen, ecotourism, and smallholder agriculture. For the multinational oil majors with Colombian operations and for institutional investors in the mining sector, a Cepeda presidency represents a continuation of the current constraints and, in some contract scenarios, an accelerated wind-down of Colombian portfolios.

In a related development, Finance Colombia reported in May that Ecopetrol’s president, Ricardo Roa, has been formally charged in connection with alleged campaign spending violations during Petro’s 2022 presidential campaign. The case will be inherited by whoever takes office in August.

Valencia’s position is that hydrocarbon revenues are essential to Colombia’s macroeconomic stability and that the country cannot exit the sector before alternative revenue structures exist. Her platform actively encourages FDI in petroleum exploration, is open to regulated fracking, and commits to clearing the environmental licensing backlog that has stalled multiple large-scale gold and copper mining projects. For energy and mining companies currently blocked by administrative delays, this represents the most direct path to project advancement.

De la Espriella’s position goes further: essentially deregulating the environmental licensing process for major extraction projects on the grounds that Colombia’s economic sovereignty takes precedence over environmental restrictions he characterizes as externally imposed. The practical constraint is whether a De la Espriella administration would have the institutional coherence and congressional support to deliver regulatory rollback, given that his movement has no established political party structure and entered the race through an independent signature campaign.

Foreign Policy: Washington Alignment vs. Multipolar Strategy

Colombia’s relationship with the United States deteriorated materially under Petro, who aligned Colombia with Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro, pursued closer ties with China and Russia, and suspended extradition agreements. US counternarcotics cooperation was strained throughout the period.

Cepeda is committed to what he describes as a multipolar foreign policy — maintaining functional diplomatic channels with Washington and Brussels while deepening strategic and commercial relationships with China and Russia. His alignment with regional left-of-center governments in Mexico, Brazil, and Bolivia would position Colombia as part of a Latin American bloc that has grown increasingly skeptical of US regional leadership. For US companies operating in Colombia, this trajectory does not mean immediate operational disruption, but it reduces Colombia’s utility as a reliable counterpart on security cooperation, counter-narcotics intelligence sharing, and trade dispute resolution.

Valencia positions a return to the Western alignment as a core objective. She would prioritize restoring the US-Colombia relationship, reinforcing the bilateral Free Trade Agreement, and reestablishing intelligence-sharing mechanisms that were reduced under Petro. Her framing positions Colombia as a democratic anchor in a region experiencing authoritarian pressures.

De la Espriella takes the most explicit pro-US position in the race. La Silla Vacía reported that De la Espriella or entities linked to his campaign donated more than $90,000 USD to the US Republican Party, a fact that raises questions about the nature and expectations of those relationships. He has publicly aligned himself with the populist right in the United States, takes a hostile posture toward China, Russia, and Venezuela, and has characterized his security approach as consistent with a transactional alliance with Washington focused on counter-narcotics enforcement and cartel designation as foreign terrorist organizations.

“Ese pisco robó a 200 mil colombianos.” — Claudia López, former Mayor of Bogotá, referring to presidential candidate Abelardo de la Espriella’s legal representation of DMG pyramid scheme founder David Murcia Guzmán, during a presidential campaign event.

Corruption and Judicial Independence

All three candidates have stated commitments to fighting corruption, though their approaches and focal points differ in ways that are material to the institutional environment for business operations.

Cepeda’s legislative record includes serious, documented work investigating paramilitary infiltration of Colombia’s political institutions — the period known as parapolítica — and pursuing accountability for those cases. His blind spot, his critics argue, is corruption within the current administration. When Ecopetrol’s Ricardo Roa was formally charged in connection with Petro’s 2022 campaign, the response from the Pacto Histórico coalition was subdued. Cepeda has been Álvaro Uribe’s primary judicial antagonist in the Senate; a Cepeda administration would offer no institutional protection to Uribe and would be expected to support the full progress of judicial proceedings against him. For left-wing politicians facing legal exposure, including former Medellín mayor Daniel Quintero, a Cepeda administration would be expected to be more receptive to amnesty frameworks.

Valencia’s approach to anti-corruption is structural rather than prosecutorial: strengthening the independence of the Contraloría General de la República and the Fiscalía General de la Nación, implementing digital transparency in public procurement, and reducing informal executive influence over judicial processes. She would be expected to apply political and rhetorical pressure on behalf of Uribe — her political mentor and a close ally — though her legislative track record indicates a degree of institutional independence from Centro Democrático party orthodoxy.

De la Espriella’s anti-corruption rhetoric centers on severe criminal penalties for corrupt officials. The credibility of that position is complicated by his professional history, which is examined in detail below.

De la Espriella’s Legal Career: The Documented Record

De la Espriella’s campaign has faced sustained scrutiny over his client history as one of Colombia’s highest-profile criminal defense attorneys. The record is documented in reporting by El Colombiano, El Espectador, and the investigative outlet Corrupción al Día.

His documented client roster includes Salvatore Mancuso, the former supreme commander of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) paramilitary network; multiple legislators convicted in the parapolítica scandal, which established systematic infiltration of Colombia’s congress by paramilitary organizations; David Murcia Guzmán, the operator of the DMG pyramid scheme that defrauded an estimated 200,000 Colombian investors; the Nule Primos, convicted of large-scale public contract fraud; and Álex Saab, the Colombian businessman extradited to the United States on charges of acting as the primary money launderer for the Maduro government in Venezuela. According to Corrupción al Día, De la Espriella’s legal fees from Saab reportedly reached $12 million USD and included private aircraft travel.

De la Espriella’s response to this line of criticism rests on due process principles: that every accused person is entitled to vigorous legal defense regardless of the charges, and that his ability to navigate Colombia’s criminal code at its most complex levels demonstrates the expertise required to enforce the law from the executive branch. The argument has legal validity as a principle. The specific issue for foreign compliance officers and US government counterparts is the Saab representation: the same Nicolás Maduro whose regime De la Espriella’s campaign now characterizes as an ideological enemy received legal services from De la Espriella’s firm when the representation was commercially available.

The Fiscalía investigated De la Espriella in connection with alleged paramilitary links in 2009 and again in 2012; both investigations were dismissed for insufficient evidence, and he carries no convictions or active investigations on those matters.

Cepeda’s Family History and Ideological Background

Critics of Iván Cepeda, including Enrique Gómez of the Salvación Nacional party, have argued that his family background constitutes evidence of structural alignment with guerrilla movements. The record on this point merits examination.

Cepeda is the son of Manuel Cepeda Vargas, who served as Secretary-General of the Colombian Communist Party and as a senator for the Unión Patriótica (UP), a left-wing political movement that was systematically exterminated by a combination of state actors and paramilitary organizations during the 1980s and 1990s. Manuel Cepeda Vargas was assassinated on August 9, 1994. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights subsequently found the Colombian state responsible for his murder. The FARC-EP named its Frente Urbano Manuel Cepeda Vargas — an urban front operating within the Bloque Occidental — in the elder Cepeda’s honor.

The Fundación Paz y Reconciliación (PARES) has documented that Iván Cepeda’s relationship with his father’s political positions was more complex than the family lineage alone suggests. After studying in Bulgaria in 1981, Cepeda broke from his father’s Soviet-oriented communist framework and aligned with democratic leftists including Bernardo Jaramillo Ossa, who publicly rejected the FARC’s armed strategy. Cepeda has repeatedly stated his repudiation of the FARC’s use of his father’s name. No documented evidence connects him to operational coordination with current armed groups.

What the family history does establish is the ideological framework through which Cepeda processes security policy: a belief, grounded in personal and political experience, that the Colombian state’s institutional violence has been as destructive as guerrilla violence, and that negotiated settlements are structurally preferable to military solutions. That framework generates Paz Total. It also generates a posture toward ELN and FARC dissident negotiators that prioritizes process continuity over verified compliance — a disposition that armed groups have demonstrably exploited to maintain territorial and operational positions while negotiation frameworks provided legal cover.

Valencia and the Uribe Question

The comparison to former president Iván Duque (2018–2022) comes up regularly in discussions of Valencia’s political independence. Duque, who had limited independent political standing before Uribe selected him, was perceived throughout his term as governing within constraints set by his patron — a dynamic that Colombian political cartoonists characterized as ventriloquism.

Valencia’s profile differs materially. She is the granddaughter of former Colombian president Guillermo León Valencia, carries her own political lineage, and has served in the Senate for over a decade, building positions on agrarian reform, judicial modernization, and indigenous land rights that have placed her at variance with standard Centro Democrático positions on those issues. She won the Gran Consulta por Colombia primary on March 8 with more than 45% of the vote — over 3.2 million Colombians — establishing a democratic mandate distinct from any party endorsement.

She would be expected to use institutional and rhetorical channels to support Uribe in the ongoing judicial proceedings against him, and to apply pressure on the trajectory of those cases. Whether that constitutes political interference with judicial independence or normal advocacy within democratic norms is a question on which observers disagree. What the legislative record does not support is the characterization of Valencia as incapable of independent governance.

Press Freedom and the Media Environment

Press freedom carries an indirect but measurable correlation with rule-of-law quality, which in turn affects operational risk for companies that rely on regulatory predictability and transparent legal processes.

Cepeda has maintained a posture toward critical media that mirrors President Petro’s practice of characterizing adversarial outlets as acting in the interests of economic elites. Under Petro, this produced a systematic exclusion of critical media from official information flows and persistent rhetorical delegitimization of independent journalism, though the press remained legally free to operate. A Cepeda administration would be expected to continue this pattern.

Valencia’s background in Colombia’s traditional political and intellectual establishment, combined with a decade in a party that has faced sustained critical coverage from Colombia’s major outlets, points toward a conventional institutional relationship with the press — adversarial at times, but within professional norms.

De la Espriella’s conduct during the campaign provides direct evidence of his approach. He publicly called Caracol Noticias journalist María Lucía Fernández “ignorant” in a live interview. He issued a formal apology after journalist Laura Rodríguez of Piso 8 FM made allegations of inappropriate conduct. His campaign strategy has drawn comparisons to the approach of Argentine president Javier Milei and US president Donald Trump in its use of direct digital channels to circumvent traditional media while publicly attacking outlets that publish critical coverage. The press would remain legally protected under a De la Espriella administration, but the operational environment for investigative journalism would be hostile.

The Ideological Spectrum: Market Liberalism to State Direction

The question of which candidate is most aligned with free-market principles requires a distinction that the international business press frequently elides: the difference between economic deregulation and political authoritarianism. These can, and in this election do, exist independently.

De la Espriella’s platform is often described in international coverage as the most pro-market. His deregulation proposals for the extractive sector and his corporate tax rhetoric support that reading in the economic domain. His security platform, however, involves a substantial expansion of state coercive power: mass detention operations, a mega-prison construction program, and the suspension of standard due process protections to facilitate rapid incarceration of criminal suspects. The Cato Institute‘s framework of economic freedom as inseparable from civil liberties would categorize a state powerful enough to detain people without standard procedural protections as a state that represents an institutional risk to property rights and contract enforcement as well.

Valencia’s platform, anchored by Oviedo’s technocratic program of structural market reform — reduced administrative barriers, streamlined procurement, smaller state overhead, maintained civil liberties — represents the closest approximation to coherent market liberalism available in this field. It does not carry the rhetorical force of De la Espriella’s deregulation proposals, but it has more institutional grounding.

Cepeda’s platform is the furthest from market liberalism by any standard measure: state-directed investment allocation, wealth redistribution through tax and transfer mechanisms, state expansion in healthcare and pension administration, and agrarian land redistribution. His program is continuous with the Petro administration’s economic framework.

Minor Candidates: The Rest of the Ballot

Several other candidates remain on the ballot and are drawing small but potentially consequential vote shares in a first round where the margin between second and third place could be narrow.

Claudia López, former mayor of Bogotá running under the Con Claudia Imparables coalition, positions herself as a progressive centrist with a documented anti-corruption record. Her polling has not broken 3.5% in major surveys, and her high polarization ratings from her mayoral term limit her growth ceiling. Her attacks on De la Espriella during the campaign — she publicly called him a “defender of the mafia” in reference to his client history — have been among the most pointed in the race, and factually grounded on the public record.

Sergio Fajardo, making his third consecutive presidential run under Dignidad y Compromiso, continues to represent a technocratic, education-focused centrism grounded in his work transforming Medellín in the early 2000s. He has not broken 3.5% in any major poll in this cycle.

Roy Barreras, running under La Fuerza de la Paz following his Frente por la Vida primary victory, is one of the most experienced political operatives in Colombia, having been part of multiple coalition governments across ideological lines over two decades. He polls below the threshold for meaningful first-round impact.

Miguel Uribe Londoño, running under Partido Demócrata, represents a younger-generation conservative platform emphasizing fiscal discipline and private sector growth, broadly consistent with Valencia’s program. He also polls below 3.5%.

Carlos Caicedo, running on a regionalist platform emphasizing decentralization away from Bogotá, draws support primarily from the Costa Caribe. His structural argument about Colombia’s administrative over-centralization is substantively grounded, though his national profile is insufficient to affect the first-round outcome.

Investment Implications

For international capital with Colombian exposure, the three-way race produces three materially different operational scenarios.

A Cepeda victory — which remains the single most likely first-round outcome based on available polling — would signal continuity of the Petro-era regulatory framework: sustained capital outflow pressure, high corporate tax rates, no new fossil fuel exploration contracts for Ecopetrol (NYSE: EC; BVC: ECOPETROL) or private operators, continued labor cost escalation, and a foreign policy trajectory away from Washington. Colombian equity valuations would be expected to remain under pressure. The mining licensing backlog would continue to accumulate. A Cepeda administration would not replicate Venezuela’s economic trajectory — Colombia’s independent central bank, Banco de la República, its functioning constitutional court, and its institutional depth provide meaningful buffers — but the investment headwinds would be structural rather than cyclical.

A Valencia victory would represent the sharpest regulatory reversal available in this field. Ecopetrol exploration contracts would be expected to advance. The mining licensing backlog would be addressed. US bilateral relations would be restored, reactivating security intelligence cooperation and trade facilitation mechanisms. The Colombian peso would be expected to strengthen as country risk premium declined. The path to that outcome now requires her to either close the gap significantly on De la Espriella in the first round or rely on runoff polling that showed her as the stronger second-round candidate — data that predates the most recent polling shift.

A De la Espriella victory introduces the widest distribution of possible outcomes. The upside scenario involves Restrepo managing fiscal and trade policy competently, genuine regulatory rollback in the extractive sector, aggressive extradition resumption, and security operations that reduce the physical risk premium in conflict-affected departments including Cauca, Norte de Santander, and Chocó. The downside scenario involves recurring crises generated by De la Espriella’s personal conduct, conflicts of interest arising from his former client relationships, and authoritarian security measures that attract international human rights attention and complicate bilateral relationships. Restrepo’s presence on the ticket reduces the probability of the downside scenario but does not eliminate it.

The current polling trend indicates that right-wing voters are consolidating around De la Espriella at Valencia’s expense. Whether that consolidation produces a runoff between De la Espriella and Cepeda — and whether the runoff produces a left or right-wing government — remains uncertain. What the polling data does not support is the scenario, widely assumed until recently, of a Cepeda-Valencia runoff in which Valencia was positioned as the structurally stronger opposition candidate.

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More than 400 combatants would be concentrated in the new zones as negotiations continue in Doha, Qatar

President Gustavo Petro is moving forward with the creation of temporary concentration zones, known as Zonas de Ubicación Temporal (ZUT), for members of the Estado Mayor Conjunto del Ejército Gaitanista de Colombia (EGC), also known as the Clan del Golfo, the country’s largest drug trafficking armed group, in a renewed effort to advance his Total Peace (Paz Total) policy just days before Colombia’s presidential elections on May 31, 2026.

According to an official statement from Colombia’s presidency, the ZUTs would initially allow the concentration of more than 400 combatants while parallel negotiations continue over a possible peace agreement with the Colombian government, although no preliminary agreements have yet been reached.

The temporary concentration zones would function as designated areas where combatants suspend armed activities while participating in talks with the government and preparing for a potential reintegration into civilian life.

According to the government, the zones would remain in effect until December 31, 2026, meaning their future would ultimately depend on Colombia’s next president, who will take office on August 7, as well as on the broader future of the Total Peace policy.

Colombia’s most powerful criminal organization

The Clan del Golfo is considered by specialized organizations, including the Fundación Ideas para la Paz (FIP), to be Colombia’s most powerful criminal structure.

According to the organization, the group has nearly 10,000 armed members and operates in multiple strategic regions linked to drug trafficking, illegal mining and territorial control.

The US government has designated the group a transnational terrorist organization, while President Donald Trump previously warned of possible US military actions in Colombian territory over security and narcotics concerns, comments that sparked diplomatic tensions with Petro’s administration.

Institutional clash over arrest warrants and extradition requests

The ZUT proposal comes amid tensions between Colombia’s executive branch and the Attorney General’s Office over the legal conditions required to move the process forward.

The Office of the High Commissioner for Peace requested the suspension of arrest warrants against 29 Clan del Golfo members, including 13 individuals subject to extradition requests, among them Jobanis de Jesús Ávila Villadiego, alias “Chiquito Malo,” the group’s top leader.

Attorney General Luz Adriana Camargo rejected the request, citing legal limitations regarding individuals sought by foreign authorities.

Following the refusal, Petro publicly defended the process in a message on X. “I have been clear that, in the early stages of the process, individuals facing extradition do not participate,” the president wrote, denying any intention to suspend extradition orders unless there is “an advanced peace process, as established by law.”

Amid the controversy, the Clan del Golfo itself issued a statement accepting that individuals facing extradition requests would not initially participate in the temporary concentration zones.

“As an unequivocal demonstration of political will and coherence, the Joint High Command of the Gaitanista Army of Colombia accepts, in good faith, that access to the Temporary Concentration Zones will be limited to combatants who are not subject to extradition requests by any foreign government,” the group said.

The group added that the decision seeks to “remove any shadow of doubt” over the process and prevent extradition disputes from obstructing negotiations.

The presidency later highlighted that the EGC accepted the government’s conditions for concentrating fighters in Tierralta, Córdoba, and in the municipalities of Belén de Bajirá and Unguía, Chocó. According to the government, combatants and commanders are expected to begin entering the zones on June 25.

Criticism over timing

The initiative has sparked criticism because of its timing, arriving just days before presidential elections and during a government transition period.

Ombudswoman Iris Marín warned that the process creates uncertainty over how armed groups might interpret the political transition.

“The move toward those zones creates expectations among armed groups in the middle of an electoral context and government transition. It is impossible for disarmament to happen before August 7, 2026, so how do armed groups interpret that in an electoral context?” Marín said in a video shared on social media.

Marín clarified, however, that Colombia’s Constitution grants the president authority to pursue peace negotiations, meaning concerns center not on the legality of the initiative itself but on its political timing.

Negotiations between the Colombian government and the Clan del Golfo have been underway since 2025 in Doha, Qatar, which has quietly hosted talks between both parties. According to official sources, the ZUTs are intended as confidence-building measures and humanitarian relief for communities affected by the group’s violence.

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Photo: Colombian government representative Álvaro Jiménez shakes hands with Clan del Golfo spokesperson Luis Armando Pérez in the presence of Qatar’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mohammed bin Abdulaziz bin Saleh Al-Khulaifi, in Doha on September 18, 2025, at the start of peace talks. Photo shared by Colombia’s Office of the High Commissioner for Peace.

Colombia and Bolivia intensified a diplomatic crisis this week after mutually expelling representatives from their respective embassies, amid growing political tensions between Colombian President Gustavo Petro and Bolivian President Rodrigo Paz Pereira.

The tensions began May 20, 2026, when Bolivia’s Foreign Ministry announced the expulsion of Colombia’s ambassador to La Paz, Elizabeth García Carrillo, after describing remarks made by Petro regarding Bolivia’s political crisis as interference in the country’s internal affairs.

“The decision responds to the need to preserve the principles of sovereignty, noninterference in internal affairs and mutual respect among states, fundamental pillars of international coexistence and diplomatic relations between sovereign nations,” Bolivia’s Foreign Ministry said in an official statement.

One day later, Colombia’s Foreign Ministry, headed by Rosa Yolanda Villavicencio, responded by expelling Bolivia’s chargé d’affaires in Bogotá, Ariel Percy Molina Pimentel, under the principle of diplomatic reciprocity.

“The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Colombia, considering the recent decision adopted by the Government of the Plurinational State of Bolivia regarding the permanence of Colombia’s ambassador (…) was compelled, on the basis of reciprocity, to declare the termination of the functions of Mr. Ariel Percy Molina Pimentel,” Colombia’s Foreign Ministry said, citing Article 9 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

The Colombian government clarified that the measure does not imply a formal break in diplomatic relations between the two countries, adding that “Colombia remains willing to support, always at the request of the Bolivian government, initiatives in favor of peace, political dialogue, institutional channels, citizen participation and the observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms.”

Origin of the dispute

Bolivia’s decision followed a message posted by Petro on X on May 18, in which he said that “Bolivia is experiencing a popular uprising,” referring to the political and social crisis affecting the Andean country.

For the past three weeks, Bolivia has faced protests and road blockades led by supporters of former President Evo Morales, who oppose the current administration and are demanding the resignation of President Rodrigo Paz Pereira.

The protests have also unfolded as Morales faces judicial proceedings over alleged crimes related to human trafficking and child sexual abuse, while also refusing to appear before judicial authorities.

The Bolivian government interpreted Petro’s remarks as a violation of the principle of nonintervention in domestic affairs.

Bogotá, however, rejected that interpretation and said its officials had not sought to interfere in Bolivia’s internal politics.

Colombia “categorically rejects any interpretation attributing to its authorities an interest or intention to interfere in Bolivia’s internal affairs,” the Colombian Foreign Ministry said, while reiterating its commitment to sovereign equality, nonintervention, self-determination of peoples, peaceful settlement of disputes and respect for territorial integrity.

A politically sensitive moment for both governments

The diplomatic tensions come as Rodrigo Paz Pereira, who took office in November, faces social unrest, road blockades and domestic criticism over his administration.

Meanwhile, Petro is approaching the end of his term in Colombia amid a highly polarized electoral climate. The Colombian president is seeking to preserve the continuity of his political project through the election of a successor in presidential elections whose first round will take place May 31, with the next president set to take office on August 7, 2026.

Although neither government has announced additional measures, the exchange of expulsions marks the highest level of diplomatic tension between Colombia and Bolivia in recent years.