Freight forwarders and logistics companies serving the Americas no longer think of the region’s air network as a peripheral add-on to ocean freight. Latin American airports now handle everything from export flowers and pharmaceuticals to e-commerce parcels on overnight schedules. With volumes showing a steady growth path—and with governments racing to upgrade runways, cold-chain rooms, and free-trade zones—these gateways are transforming how independent forwarders plan routings, price capacity, and promise lead-times to customers.

The Latin American air freight market, valued at $1.04 billion USD in 2025, is projected to experience sustained growth, driven by expanding e-commerce, increasing cross-border trade, including inter-Latin American trade. Key growth drivers include the rising demand for more reliable and quick turnaround delivery services, particularly for perishable goods and high-value products.

Global air cargo demand rose by 3.4% in 2025 compared with the previous year, according to data released by the International Air Transport Association (IATA).

At the same time, total capacity, measured in available cargo ton-kilometers (ACTK), increased by 3.7% year on year. For international operations, demand rose by 4.2%, while capacity increased by 5.1%.

Latin America Air Freight Industry Concentration & Characteristics

The Latin American air freight industry has been defined by a moderate level of concentration, with a few large global players dominating but now also including several significant regional carriers. While FedEx, UPS, and DHL hold substantial market share, particularly in international freight, regional players like LATAM Cargo, Avianca Cargo (Tampa Air), and Aeromexico maintain strong positions in domestic and regional routes.

Other leading players in the Latin American airfreight industry include IAG Cargo (UK), Copa Airlines (Panama), American Airlines, Delta Airlines, Azul Cargo Express (Brazil) and Emirates Skycargo.

Nicholas Sutherland’s opinions and claims are his own, and not necessarily those of Finance Colombia.

Regional Growth Drivers

• E-commerce explosion – Same-day and next-day service expectations are migrating south, driving express integrators to expand cargo terminals in Latin America and sign block-space agreements with regional carriers.
• Perishables dominance – Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Chile collectively ship more than 1.5 million tons of flowers, fruit, seafood, and pharma each year—commodities that depend on airport infrastructure for freight with reliable 2-8 °C corridors.
• Pharmaceuticals – Colombia, Mexico and Brazil stand out as not only having large national companies, but also some of the largest pharma companies in the world have factories in these countries.

Electronics, jewelry, auto parts, specialized machine parts, and high-value textiles are also driving increased traffic.

Latin America’s Hub Status

For years, Latin America has been spoken of primarily as a supplier, a hub for perishables, electronics, and auto parts feeding the U.S. and Europe. Fast forward to 2025 and something is unmistakably clear: the region is no longer merely sourcing for the world. It is becoming one of the most strategically viable air cargo growth engines, driven by nearshoring, rising consumer markets, and accelerated infrastructure investment.

Leading Locations

Mexico

 Since 2023 the Felipe Ángeles International Airport, also within the Greater Metropolitan Area of Mexico City, has now surpassed the Benito Juarez airport for air cargo with 2025 figures showing 413,224 metric tons in air cargo traffic.

The International Airport of Mexico City, known officially as Benito Juárez International Airport, stands out as the largest airport in the country and is now the second busiest air cargo hub in Mexico and number three in the LATAM region. The figures underline the importance of this hub. In January 2022, the air terminal managed a total of 41,650 tons. In 2023, this number rose to 47,206.8 tons, reflecting an important increase of 5,556.8 tons. It is important to mention that this airport also acts as a center of operations and connections (HUB) for the Mexican airline Aeroméxico, further strengthening its strategic position in the airport and logistics scenario in the region.

The International Airport of Cancun (CUN), located in the Mexican Caribbean, is a major hub in cargo handling in Latin America. With leading-edge facilities and advanced systems for the processing of goods, the airport handles a diversity of products, including consumer goods, textiles, electronic parts and pharmaceutical products. Its strategic location makes it crucial for trade routes between North America, Latin America and Europe and it has undergone constant growth in its volume of cargo.

Colombia

El Dorado International Airport is in Colombia’s capital city, Bogotá, and stands out as the third most important airport in Latin America in terms of freight volume. It registered a 2024 throughput of 809,00 tons, with flowers, perishables and pharma being the main categories.

Colombia has consolidated its position as a world leader in the export of a wide range of products, including products derived from agriculture, foodstuffs and chemical products. The airport has also been consolidated as the center of strategic operations (HUB) for international airline, Avianca.

Two 3,800 m runways at 8,360 ft elevation make BOG a purpose-built wide-body freighter hub. Cargo airlines position here to bridge east-west schedules across the Caribbean, giving forwarders same-night connections into MIA, AMS, and DOH.

Panama

Tocumen International Airport (PTY), Panamá City handled 216,653 tons in 2024 (a 4% increase over 2023). PTY sits astride the Colón Free Zone and the Panamá Canal rail link; a third runway is budgeted for development in 2027 to future-proof capacity.

A new development project called “Tocumen Cargo City”, with an area of 124 hectares, which includes the concession for the development of the cargo terminal and logistics zone, was announced in 2024. This project will take advantage of Tocumen’s competitive advantages as the region’s main air hub that connects daily more than 80 commercial destinations, and more than 50 air cargo destinations integrating a multimodal axis with the country’s maritime and land transport operations,

 Peru

Jorge Chávez International Airport is in the region of Callao, outside of the metropolitan area of Lima (Peru). It stands out as the center of operations and connections for LATAM Airlines.

In 2023 the airport handled 230,993 tons of air freight. The largest quantities of air export products were fresh asparagus, blueberries, salmon and other seafood. In 2024, the airport also added another runway and a new passenger terminal with an adjoining logistics park.

Brazil

São Paulo-Guarulhos International Airport (GRU) had a throughput of 235,600 tons in 2024. Air-sea multimodality is boosted by a 90-minute drive to the Port of Santos. Automotive, machinery, pharma cold-chain (largest airport cool-store in Brazil) are the highest categories of products.

Campinas Viracopos (VCP) airport, in Sao Paulo state (not the city) handles roughly one-third of Brazil’s imported air freight and was voted 2024 Cargo Airport of the Year by routesonline.com . It boasts a 90,000 m² cargo terminal with 11 dedicated cold rooms and a live-animal zone.

 Looking Forward

Governments are aware that there is now fierce rivalry to attract air cargo logistics operations and several have identified the sector as a key segment which would improve the competitiveness of their economies and stimulate economic growth and create skilled employment opportunities. Integration of air cargo, ports, incentives and free zones have become a cornerstone for attracting logistics and manufacturing companies.

Cargo airports in Latin America are writing the next chapter in hemispheric logistics. For independent freight forwarders, and other investors, these hubs are not just transit points, they are strategic pivot points to shorten lead times, diversify modal risk, and command premium margins in niche verticals. Airports are emerging as focal points in this new logistics landscape. Policy support, geography, and international partnerships are essential to attracting international operators and service providers.

Several countries have made successful initiatives to increase investment in the multimodal logistics space including the Dominican Republic, El Salvador (with a focus on increasing Maintenance Repair and Overhaul operations) Ecuador and La Aurora International Airport in Guatemala becoming a major hub, with LAATS, a Guatemalan logistics and freight company, managing all regular cargo flights there.

Attracting Investment in the Caribbean

For countries in the Caribbean to consider becoming air cargo logistics locations, they require international operators to view them as viable long-term locations, therefore several factors need to be considered.

Cold-Chain certification is a cornerstone for diversified airfreight operations. Pharma shippers demand IATA CEIV or WHO GDP accreditation. GRU, VCP, and LIM all hold multiple certifications, allowing forwarders to move temperature-controlled cargo without auxiliary containers significant cost saving.

Customs & Free-Zone Synergy have been the defining characteristics of a country’s success. Many airports interface directly with bonded zones or inland ports. Panama’s Tocumen International Airport’s on-airport logistics park and Panama Pacifico free zone cut transfer times by 24 hours compared with off-site warehousing.

Customs Harmonization and Focused Incentives

Caribbean countries must consider integration of the electronic DUCA-F, a fundamental document for the export of products originating in a Central American country to other countries in the region, within the framework of current trade agreements. It integrates and connects the customs systems of the six countries that make up the Central American region. This interconnection significantly improves customs controls, allowing for the automatic validation of declared data and real-time verification of approvals issued by the single windows and customs authorities of each country.

Airports may waive or discount landing fees for 1–2 years to attract new carriers or new routes. Sao Paulo’s Viracopos International Airport in Brazil runs an incentive program for cargo carriers as it looks to strengthen international hub’s cargo activities. The program aims to develop Viracopos as an international cargo hub, and the gateway’s operator – Aeroportos Brasil Viracopos – wants to increase the number of international flight routes and cargo frequencies. Some of these incentives include 100% exemption of landing fees for operations at the airport’s cargo terminal for the first 24 months of a carrier’s cargo operation.

Like landing fees, building rents can be discounted for air cargo carriers. For example, St. Louis International Airport offers 18 months of waived terminal building rents and landing fees for new transoceanic service and related logistics. Income tax exemptions for the first four (4) years of operation and reduced tax rates (sub 10%) for air cargo-related logistics operations are other ways to compete with nearshore rival locations. Income tax exemptions on rental for developers are essential for infrastructure development. These exemptions can be for twenty years, combined with a reduced tax rate for the following years.

Several Caribbean countries have declared intentions to compete for investment in air logistics, however very few (except for the Dominican Republic) have made it a priority with an accompanying tactical and focused execution plan. Caribbean countries who wish to position themselves as an air cargo hub need to have feasibility studies done by internationally recognized logistics companies along with a well-defined plan for what reasonable short-term and long-term success looks like. It’s also essential to have a realistic outlook of what each country can offer, rival strengths and incentives and a clear understanding of any deficiencies which may pose headwinds to their stated goals.

Stark figures show expansion of fighting groups under ‘Paz Total’.

Colombia’s illegal armed groups have grown by 84 per cent during the three years of the Petro government’s Paz Total plan, thinktank Fundacion Ideas para la Paz (FIP) announced last week.

The alarming data showed the country’s main guerrilla factions and organised crime gangs totalled 27,000 active members at the end of 2025, adding 5,000 new recruits in just 12 months.

And humanitarian crises associated with the expansion of illicit economies, such as combats, displacements or confinement of communities, attacks on social leaders and extortion were also on the rise.

According to Gerson Arias, co-author of FIP’s El Deterioro de la Seguridad Marca el Inicio de 2026 (Deteriorating Security Marks the Start of 2026), the endless peace talks played out under President Petro’s expansive Paz Total policy had only incentivised armed groups to grow in terms of fighters, weapons and territory.

“Paz Total was based on a state ceasefire – but without any conditions put on the groups, such as ceasing recruitment, including child recruitment, or ending expansion,” he told The Bogotá Post.

“As such, the policy gave a gigantic strategic advantage to the armed groups to strengthen their fighting forces.”

Big surge

The biggest surge was in the organised crime group Clan de Golfo, up by 30 per cent to 9,840 active agents, reported FIP (see chart below).

Next in terms of size was the ELN, the guerrilla group dominating the eastern borderlands of Colombia, with 6,810 members, an increase of 9 per cent.

Dissident FARC groups also grew, some by almost a quarter, such as CNEB (Coordinadora Nacional Ejercito Bolivariano) which despite drawn-out peace talks with the Petro government – and numerous plans for a disarmament – ended the year 25 per cent bigger than started, now numbering 2,089.

And these were probably underestimates, said Arias. The FIP figures were based on military and intelligence data collected annually since 2002,and generally considered to be lower than the actual numbers.

“We tend to undermeasure illegal activity. It’s impossible to say with precision, but we would say the real data could be 20% or 30% higher,” he concluded.

Unlucky 13

These numbers included both armed fighters – often uniformed and carrying heavy weaponry – and support members tasked with infiltrating civilian communities to “ensure compliance”, often carrying pistols. Armed groups were increasingly deploying explosives by drones.

According to the FIP report, none of the negotiation processes had managed to curb their recruitment capacity.

Territorial expansion had also triggered disputes over illegal gold mining, coca, and trafficking routes. The FIP report identified 13 zones where two or more groups were facing off, more than twice the number of disputed territories that Petro inherited from the Duque government in 2022.

Top in terms of combat last year were Catatumbo in Norte de Santander, and areas of Guaviare, Cauca, Nariño, Valle and Arauca (see map).

But even departments considered peaceful in recent years, such as Tolima and Huila, were being drawn back into the fray, said Arias.

This rise in conflict brought a host of humanitarian impacts. Armed groups strictly controlled their zones, at times displacing or confining populations, but also imposing daily controls such as travel permissions and ID cards.

Last year, according to UN figures quoted by FIP, one million mostly rural Colombians were affected by armed group controls, tripling the number recorded in 2024.

Civilians in the crosshairs

And according to Arias, the government had itself increased the risks to civilians by involving them as third parties in the peace talks while failing in any robust plan to pacify the zone.

“Petro reached partial agreements with the groups – even while they were still armed, still controlling, extorting, confining and pressuring civilian communities. There was no cost to the armed groups,” said the researcher.

Part of the problem was that Paz Total had initially failed to link to any coherent military strategy that could had protected civilian communities. This had put civic leaders “in the crosshairs of armed groups” as one side accused them of siding with the other.  

The statement is backed by a graph showing a year-on increase since 2022 in attacks both between armed groups, and against civilians and state forces. Last year there were 150 attacks on civilian targets.

In fact, by Arias’s estimate Colombia had gone back to 2011 in terms of the numbers of non-state armed actors – 27,000 – potentially in conflict.

That compared to a recent low of 12,800 combatants in 2018, two years after former president Santos signed the 2016 peace deal with the FARC guerrillas.

From bad to worse

In fact, to explain the current situation, Arias pointed to failures in the both the current administration and the previous right-wing government under Ivan Duque.

Taking over in 2018, Duque rolled back many of the agreements made with the FARC sending many ex-combatants back to the bush along with a wave of new combatants.

But then left-leaning Gustavo Petro, taking over in 2022, surprised even his own military advisers by declaring a unilateral ceasefire. This was the opening salvo of the Paz Total policy which announced negotiations with armed groups and criminal gangs on multiple fronts – in some cases even without informing them.

Petro’s plan was conceived “with good intentions”, said Arias, but had put misplaced trust in armed groups busy enriching themselves by illegal activities and with little incentive to demobilize.

By comparison, during the 2013-16 process with the FARC, the military forces under Santos had continued operations against the guerrilla up until the final signing: “This pressure incentivised the FARC to take serious decisions in terms of the peace process,” he said.

Too little, too late

The failings of Paz Total were apparent on the ground in the first few months of inception in 2022, with community organisations raising the alarm over the increased fighting between groups.

It took until late 2024 for the state military to step up offensive actions in areas such as Cauca, with battles against the dissident FARC factions of Ivan Mordisco. Then, in early 2025, the Catatumbo region of Norte de Santander caught fire with fierce combat between the ELN and FARC 33, leading to the largest humanitarian crisis in Colombia’s recent history.

But it took until August last year for President Petro himself to acknowledge that the policy had “not achieved peace”.

During 2025 military actions increased by 30 per cent, but with reduced state forces – many experienced soldiers and commanders had left – facing stronger armed groups, said Arias.

“The offensive came slowly and without an analysis of what was required to combat the strengthened armed groups.”

“Years of intelligence capacity was lost, along with military presence and air deployment. This explains why – despite the offensives – there are few concrete improvements for many communities.”

For soldiers on the ground, the job got harder under Paz Total with a strengthened enemy and less military intelligence to rely on. According to President Petro’s own presentation to the Trump Whitehouse early this month, 360 state forces have been killed “in the fight against drug trafficking” in the last three years, with 1,680 wounded.

But even away from the front line, Paz Total was not up to the monumental task of negotiating peace with multiple armed groups given that most governments had failed to pacify even one.

At whatever cost

“Paz Total never evaluated the institutional capacity required. It’s good to say: ‘we have to negotiate with everyone’. But that requires a method,” said Arias.

The government often pushed talks ahead even without any legal framework that would allow, constitutionally, the state to make peace with certain criminal gangs, or groups of recycled combatants that had previously demobilised. This created a credibility gap which continued to undermine the peace initiative.

“Even today, no group has taken a serious position on disarming or demobilisation or reducing violence,” said Arias.

FIP also questioned the government’s own seriousness in finalizing any negotiations, terming Paz Total an “electoral peace”; endless rounds of talks through the upcoming election period.  

It’s a strategy Arias condemned: “This government seems intent on continuing the process at whatever costs and put the burden of resolution on the next government. This is politically irresponsible.”

Lack of concrete results could also taint future processes, he said.

“The poor results have thrown doubt on the idea that political solutions to conflict is the best route, which is very worrying, and eventually exposes communities to more risk.”

His main message – and the key finding of the FIP report – was that ending conflict in Colombia required more than goodwill, he told The Bogotá Post.

“It’s incoherent to talk of ‘peace or security’. We need to talk of ‘peace and security’. Without that, we’ve gone backwards.”

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