Have you done your traspaso? If not, read on….

Colombia’s cancilleria (foreign affairs ministry) was reminding foreign residents this week of the 2026 deadline to transfer their old resident visas to the new 5-year electronic visa scheme.

“Anyone with these visas, granted under previous regulations, must complete the mandatory process before October 31, 2026, before the Visa Authority,” announced the government, referring to resident ‘R’ visas issued before October, 2022, when new visa regulations came into effect.

Failure to transfer your visa by October 31 could lead to sanctions or even losing your residency status.

And even though the October deadline seems far away, the Cancilleria are expecting a flood of last-minute applications. Our advice is: don’t leave it to the last minute. Government websites are clunky at the best of times and you will need at least one appointment with Migración, which will be harder to get as the deadline approaches.

To avoid last-minute panic, here’s a quick Q and A to get ahead of the game…

I have a permanent ‘R’ residents visa in my passport. Surely that’s OK?

No. Under new laws passed in 2022 (law 5477 to be precise), all R visas for long-term residents are now subject to a transfer every five years, which also coincides with the lifespan of the Cedula Extranjeria (Colombian-issued ID card). So even if the visa stamp in your passport says indefinida, you still need to do the transfer.

The traspaso applies to:

• All Resident (R) visas issued before October 21, 2022.
• Any new R e-visas after five years (the expiry date is written on the visa).
• If you change passports for any reason (expired, lost or stolen).

If you have a passport about to expire it makes sense to renew the passport before the visa transfer.

So, do I have to start the whole visa application process again?

No. The traspaso is relatively simple and can be done mostly online, directly with the Cancilleria website. Although touted as a ‘transfer’, in most cases you will be issued with a new visa number in an electronic format that will be sent to you by email. You can then print your own e-visa and carry it with your passport and store it in your phone.

Other steps require visiting your nearest Migración office.

What are the steps?

1. Obtain your Migration Movement Certificate from the nearest Migration Office.
2. Apply online for visa traspaso. Wait for the e-visa to be issued.
3. Register your new e-visa and apply for a new Cedula Extranjeria ID card online.
4. Make an appointment with Migration Office for your biometric data.
5. Collect your new Cedula Extranjeria ID card.

How much does it cost?

Around US$ 213 in total at current exchange rates. This breaks down to: US$25 for the Migration Movement Certificate, US$54 for the visa study, US$54 for the visa issuance, US$80 for a new replacement ID card (Cedula de Extranjeria).

What’s the Migration Movement Certificate?

Before applying for the traspaso, you need to obtain Certificado de Movimientos Migratorios, which is a printed certificate issued by Migración showing your entrances and exits from Colombia. The purpose of the certificate is to show your presence in Colombia. If you have been absent from the country for more than two years your residency status is automatically cancelled. You can apply and pay for the certificate online at the Migración website Formulario Único de Trámites page.

Be careful to select the centro facilitador (Migration office) that is closest to you because you must collect the printed certificate in person from the office. Also select the 10-year option for the certificate’s timeframe.

Does that mean hours of queuing?

Not usually. One you have applied online, Migración will send you an email within three days notifying that your certificate is ready. You can go to the office and skip the lines by showing the email to the door staff. The counter staff will then print off the certificate. There is usually no need to make an appointment.

Can I get the certificate from overseas?

At present, Migración is only giving the option to collect the certificate in person in Colombia. This is one way to ensure that the visa holder is resident in Colombia. The option to collect in an overseas – i.e. at Colombian consulates – could change in the future.  

OK, so what about the visa transfer?

Now you need to the visa website at  www.cancilleria.gov.co, and navigate to the visa page called the SITAC. Note there are English and Spanish pages (the Spanish version sometimes works better).

Fill in your details to enter the system, then select ‘Visa traspaso’ from the dropdown menus. You will also be asked to click on the timeframe when your original ‘R’ visa was issued. You will then be told what documents to present; these can be uploaded in PDF.

What documents are required?

This varies depending on your type of Resident visa and when it was issued, but generally:

• Scan of your original R visa.
• Scan of your passport main page.
• Scan of your current Cedula Extranjeria.
• Scan of your most recent migration entry stamp to Colombia.
• Scan of your Migratory Movements Certificate issued by Migración.
• Letter requesting the transfer, explaining the reason for the request (i.e. ‘para cumplir con Ley 5477 de 2022’).
• Passport-style digital photo meeting the specifications.

Holders of permanent resident visas do not need to provide any more information. Other types of R visas might require evidence that the conditions under which the visa was granted still applies.

How do I pay?

The fees are divided into a US$54 ‘study’ fee, which is paid on submission of the documents. When the visa transfer is approved you pay an additional ‘visa issuance fee’ of US$54. Payment is also online by Colombian PSE bank transfer scheme, or you can use Visa or Mastercard credit cards. 

Is that the traspaso done?

No. Once your e-visa is sent to you be email, you need to register your visa and apply for a new Cedula Extranjeria ID card within 15 days of receiving the new e-visa. The initial application and payment is done online, using the Formulario Único de Trámites page. Tick the Cedula Extranjeria box and select your nearest Migración office from the drop-down menu.

You’ll need to provide more information, scans, and an US$80 payment.

Surely that’s the end of it?

Nope. Now you need to make an appointment with the same Migración office to provide biometric data for your new CE. To make an appointment, first register with the website here.  Slots for the following week are allocated often at 5pm on Sunday, so try at this time.

If there are no slots available, take a screenshot of the appointment page as you can later use this as evidence to prove you were trying to comply with the 15-day plan (Migración sometimes sanction visa holders for not registering on time).

If you do not get an appointment within 15 days don’t worry; with your screenshots of the full agendas, Migracion are unlikely to complain. Everyone knows the system is overloaded.

What about my Cedula de Extranjeria?

Another delay: some people wait months for the plastic card, though lately the wait has been getting shorter. You can use your old CE or your passport in the meantime.

Should I hire a commercial visa company to do the paperwork?

The Cancilleria recommends applicants to apply directly for the traspaso directly via the website. However, commercial visa companies can assist with the paperwork but will charge a fee up to several hundred dollars. Try the process yourself before seeking professional help.

Just don’t leave it too late…

The post Long-term foreign residents reminded to transfer ‘R’ visas in 2026 appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

Segunda Marquetalia ordered the attack last year according to trial testimony.

Revelations that former FARC leaders ordered the 2025 killing of Miguel Uribe have heightened political tensions in the run-up to the May presidential elections.

The 39-year-old Colombian senator and presidential hopeful was gunned down by a Bogotá gang hired by the Segunda Marquetalia, an armed group created by disgruntled guerrillas hiding in Venezuela, according to testimony revealed in court.

The senator was shot down by a 15-year-old assassin at an open-air political rally in the barrio of Modelia in June, 2025. Uribe died of head wounds two months later.

After months of investigations and multiple arrests, state prosecutors were last week finally able to link the local gang that carried out the hit with the armed group.  

See also: Who ordered the murder of presidential candidate Miguel Uribe?

The breakthrough came during the trial of Bogotá-based gang leader Simeón Pérez Marroquín, also known as ‘El Viejo’, who admitted he had hired the local Plata o Plomo (‘Silver or Lead’) gang to carry out the killing on behalf of the Segunda Marquetalia armed group.

“The deal was that they would pay one billion pesos [US$270,000] for the senator’s death,” said Marroquín in a statement reported by magazine Semana.

Right hand man

Confirmation of involvement by an armed group founded by former FARC leaders sparked a political spat between front-runners for the upcoming presidential election.

Right-wing candidate Paloma Valencia was quick to accuse the Petro government of negotiating peace with the Segunda Marquetalia – even while the armed group was plotting the murder of Uribe.

See also: Peace Plan has caused more conflict, says thinktank

Valencia referred to Marroquín’s statements that the hit was organized by veteran guerrilla Zarco Aldinever, the right-hand man of the group leader Iván Márquez, in early 2025.

At this time Aldinever was nominated a ‘peace manager’ by the Petro government, meaning any arrest warrants were suspended and the rebel was free to roam. This despite the collapse of peace talks with the Segunda Marquetalia at the end of 2024.

Valencia further pointed to the closeness between her main election rival Iván Cepeda and leaders of the armed group.

Old photo

“The killer of Miguel Uribe is photographed hugging Iván Cepeda,” she wrote on X, attaching  a photo of her rival with Segunda Marquetalia founder Iván Márquez.  

In fact, the photo of Cepeda dated from the 2016 FARC peace talks, explained President Petro in a strongly worded statement defending his friend and political ally.

“The photo shows Iván Cepeda’s attempt to help [the Santos government] achieve peace. At that time, the entire FARC was ready for peace,” said.

Iván Márquez was number two in the FARC at the time and widely respected for his role in the negotiations.

Petro went on to blame his predecessor, right-wing president Iván Duque, for undermining the FARC peace process that forced former guerrilla leaders like Márquez back to arms and the Segunda Marquetalia.

Following the 2016 deal, some former FARC leaders had been “entrapped by state prosecutors with fake drug charges”, he said, leading to extradition requests from the United States.

Faced with this legal pressure several top commanders, including Iván Márquez and Jesus Santrich, fled to Venezuela in 2018 before emerging on video a year later to announce their new incarnation as the Segunda Marquetalia, named after the village in the Tolima department where the original FARC first formed in 1964.

The armed group was active in drug trafficking and illegal mining along the Colombia-Venezuela border, in the departments such as Vichada and Guainía, according to a profile by InsightCrime. The leadership is suspected of hiding out in Venezuela.

Another study by Fundacion Ideas para La Paz estimated the group to have 530 armed combatants in 2025, an increase of 15% on 2024, and work mostly in the eastern plains of Colombia.

A hunt is on

In a press conference on Tuesday, Valencia accused Cepeda and other left-wing lawmakers of backing the former FARC commanders in their legal battles back in 2018, creating a chain of events leading to the creation of recycled armed group.

“Congressmen like Cepeda defended [Marquéz and Santrich] …and didn’t allow them to be extradited. If these thugs had been extradited, Miguel Uribe would be alive today,” she said.

In his own press statement Cepeda called Valencia’s comments “a dirty political game” and issued a challenge to the candidate, and her political mentor right-wing former president Álvaro Uribe, to back up the accusations in court.

“It’s infamy to accuse me or President Petro to have any type of involvement in such a deplorable deed as the assassination of senator and presidential pre-candidate Miguel Uribe,” he said.

Meanwhile this week the Colombian attorney general’s office launched a fresh hunt for the leaders of the Segunda Marquetalia, offering around million-dollar rewards for the capture of seven commanders including Iván Márquez and Zarco Aldinever.  

In fact, Aldinever was reported killed by rival armed group ELN in Venezuela during a squabble over a cocaine shipment in August last year – the same month that Miguel Uribe died – according to Colombian state forces at the time.    

This week Colombia’s Minister of Defense Pedro Sanchez walked back that claim saying no body had ever been found and that the initial report of Aldinever’s death – sent from the Segunda Marquetalia itself – could be disinformation.

“At this time, the position is clear: without a body there is no confirmation of death, and that is why all institutional resources remain active to locate him,” said Sanchez.

Underworld connections

Closer to home, the Segunda Marquetalia’s influence in Bogotá was under scrutiny after Simeón Marroquín’s testimony shed light on the murky connections with the city’s underworld.

Marroquín admitted that in previous decades he had acted as an urban operative for the FARC guerrillas, a hired gun ready to carry out orders in the city.

“I never wore camouflage, but while I was here in Bogotá, I was a miliciano. Guerrilla missions would come up, and I’d carry them out, but I was never in the ranks.”

His contacts with the FARC continued to the Segunda Marquetalia that tapped him for the Uribe killing.

Early in 2025, Marroquín was invited to a secret meeting in Cúcuta close to the Venezuelan border where, according to his testimony, Aldinever offered him one billion pesos for the crime (US$270,000) and another 600 million pesos (US$160,000) to “bribe the justice system” to deflect attention from the guerrilla group.

The motive for the killing was not clearly revealed by Marroquín, though a text message later found on his phone sent to his guerrilla paymasters talked of an “eye for an eye”, suggesting the former rebels were out for revenge.

Chilling revelation

Uribe was selected as an influential senator, scion of a right-wing political family, and popular candidate for this year’s presidential elections. He was also an easy target for assassins with his regular visits to communities where he had walkabouts to engage with local voters.

In the first few months of 2025, Marroquín worked his underworld connections to hire the Plata o Plomo gang which in turn lured the 15-year-old gunman who shot and wounded Miguel Uribe in a small park in the barrio of Modelia on June 7.

See also: Arrests made – but still questions in Uribe shooting.

Marroquín’s account paints a picture of a loose network of petty criminals lured by cash rather than political interests, ignorant of the details of both their intended target and the paymasters behind the plot.

The middleman saw the hit as a “good business opportunity” but also a chance to rekindle his role as urban operative for a guerrilla organization.

Marroquín’s plan unraveled after the 15-year-old gunman and various low-level gang members were detained in the hours and days following the June attack, creating a trail leading to his own capture in October.

“What’s done is done”

One chilling revelation was the order from above for Marroquín to kill low-level gang members to cut links to the guerrilla masterminds. This included murdering alias Gabriela, who transported the weapon and was present on the day of the shooting.

Marroquín refused to kill Gabriela, telling investigators “I didn’t have the heart for that because she was very young.” But he did send her by bus to the city of Florencia where the guerrillas were lying in wait.

#ATENCIÓN | "No hay palabras que justifiquen dicho acto, pero pues ya está hecho (…)", fueron las palabras con las que Simeón Pérez Marroquín, alias ‘El Viejo’, pidió perdón a la familia del senador y precandidato presidencial Miguel Uribe Turbay, tras reconocer que fue el… pic.twitter.com/btgnOsTEF7

— ÚltimaHoraCaracol (@UltimaHoraCR) March 20, 2026

The 19-year-old never made it; police investigators, already on Gabriela’s trail, organized for the bus to “break down” some miles before Florencia. Her arrest there and subsequent interrogation lead to Marroquín’s capture and eventual exposing of the links to the Segunda Marquetalia.

Last week, during the court process, Simeón Marroquín attempted to apologize for his role in the killing of Miguel Uribe.

“There are no words to justify my actions, but what’s done is done,” he said on camera from his cell, addressing his victim’s family – Uribe was married with four children – and asking forgiveness. He was then sentenced to 22 years in prison.

How quickly Colombian investigators can find Zarco Aldinever or other Segunda Marquetalia commanders, dead or alive, or hiding in Venezuela, remains to be seen.

The post Political tensions rise as guerrilla group revealed to be behind Miguel Uribe’s murder appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

Nine months after the shooting of presidential candidate Miguel Uribe Turbay in a leafy Bogotá park, the gang behind the killing have been rounded up and are facing justice.

The masterminds, though, are still at large. Circumstantial evidence points to a political assassination called in by an ex-FARC faction called the Segunda Marquetalia. But other theories exist.

And as the country prepares for the next rounds of elections, the youthful Uribe – seen by many as a presidential hopeful – is conspicuous by his absence.

We look back at killing that rocked Bogotá in 2025, and who might be behind it.

How did the shooting unfold?

Uribe was gunned down in Parque El Golfito, a green space in bustling Modelia on the western edge of Bogotá, on June 7, during a walkabout in the barrio where he met local business owners and climbed on a beer crate to deliver an impromptu address to a small crowd.

See also: Miguel Uribe hospitalized after assassination attempt

The senator was shot at close range twice in the head by a 15-year-old gunman wielding a Glock pistol in the crowd, who then fled but was himself shot in the leg by Uribe’s protection squad and captured in a nearby street.

Uribe was hospitalized and underwent several emergency surgeries before dying from his wounds on August 11, more than two months later.

Who was Miguel Uribe?

The 39-year-old senator was nationally recognized and scion of a political family. His grandfather Julio César Turbay was president from 1978 to 1982, and his mother the journalist Diana Turbay kidnapped by the Medellín cartel in 1991 who died in a botched rescue attempt, a tragedy immortalized by Gabriel García Márquez in his non-fiction book News of a Kidnapping.

Even though he was raised as a legacy politician, and a key candidate for the right-wing Centro Democratico, Uribe nevertheless garnered support across the political spectrum for his hard work and attention to detail, more technocrat than populist, and potentially a unifying figure.

It was perhaps typical of Uribe that the day he was shot he in an unsung corner of the city meeting everyday folks.

What was the impact of his assassination?

Many mourned the loss of the young senator, married with four children.  In reality, Uribe’s death was just one of many in Colombia during 2025 with 187 social leaders and human rights defenders murdered nationwide, according to data from conflict thinktank Indepaz.

The senator’s killing had an outsized impact for several reasons. First, Bogotá, unusually for a megacity, has almost half the homicide rate than many smaller cities and some rural areas with long-running conflicts between gangs and armed groups.

Secondly, the many feared Uribe’s attack signaled a return to the 1980s when a wave of political killings – usually by extreme right-wing forces against left wing targets in cahoots with drug cartels – plagued Bogotá and many other Colombian cities.

But united condemnation of the attack quickly degenerated to finger-pointing between political factions with Uribe’s lawyer filing a complaint against President Gustavo Petro for alleged “harassment” of the senator.

Was Petro to blame?

An early theory floated by the late senator’s lawyer was that the attack was a “hate crime”, which in Colombia covers persecution for ideological views. The argument went that Petro crossed the line with his itchy Twitter finger: in their complaint the lawyer presented a 20-page document with 42 presidential tweets disparaging Uribe. 

While acknowledging that Petro was in no way linked to the physical attack, he had created a “favorable environment” for anyone with a serious grudge to take out the senator, said the lawyers, though this didn’t explain why a 15-year-old – not a likely candidate for political grievances – was coerced to pull the trigger.

And by the end of June new evidence emerged from the shooter himself. The youth didn’t even know who his target was the senator, or indeed who was Miguel Uribe.

And other pieces of the puzzle fell into place, clarifying that the shooter was hired for cash by an organized criminal gang that had planned the killing in detail.

If it was so well planned, why did they get caught?

Good question. The contract killers calling themselves Plata o Plomo (‘Silver or Lead’) left a trail of evidence starting with the wounded gunman captured with minutes of the shooting.

Next to fall was Carlos Mora, alias ‘El Veneco’, who drove the young assassin, followed a few days later by 19-year-old Katherine Martínez, alias ‘Gabriela’, who delivered the pistol.

Gabriela’s arrest gave the first clues to a wider conspiracy: the webcammer was tracked down to the regional capital of Florencia, Caquetá, a jungle department of Colombia with high presence of armed groups.

CCTV footage from Modelia placed her inside the car with the gunman, and she later confessed to transporting the gun itself.With CCTV footage, and information from Gabriela and El Veneco, other key members of the gang were soon rounded up including two other getaway drivers and a middleman for hiring the 15-year-old.

Seems like a very amateur operation…

Plata o Plomo was a loose group of criminals drawn from the Bogotá underworld, and many had worked together before. The leader was Elder José Arteaga, alias Chipi, who in a rather unlikely twist also ran a hair salon in Engativá.

When not trimming beards, Chipi was immersed in crime with a history of extortion, violence and armed robbery, and was  linked to the murder of a Mexican businessman in Medellín in 2024.

See also: Arrests made but still questions in Uribe shooting.

He was also quite ruthless: according to Gabriela, Chipi was planning to cover his tracks by killing both El Veneco and the 15-year-old hired assassin. Being captured early likely saved their lives.

Chipi himself became the subject of a national manhunt until his luck ran out on July 5. He was captured hiding in a house in Engativá by a special police unit a month after the shooting, just a few kilometers from where it took place.

So, case closed?

Not so fast. Chipi was just one link in a longer chain. According to Gabriela, now a key witness, the hairdresser  told her the murder contract was for 700 million pesos, around US$190,000.

This amount of cash pointed to a bigger player. 

In Colombia there are plenty of candidates to choose from, and no shortage of pundits to point the finger.

Examples please?

Sure. Journalist and presidential hopeful Vicky Dávila accused Iván Mordisco, commander of the Estado Mayor Central – EMC – a dissident FARC faction fighting the state in the southwest of the country. She claimed to have insider information from military intelligence that also pointed to the likelihood of more assassinations of right-wing figures.

Her theory was backed by interior minister Armando Benedetti, who also saw reason for the EMC to stir up trouble in Bogotá as revenge for the war being waged against the group in Cauca.

However, no direct evidence was presented, and that the EMC denied any involvement, calling the allegations “a media strategy”.

Petro claimed involvement by the mysterious “Board”, a mythical super-cartel fused from drug gangs, guerrillas and paramilitaries. Petro portrayed himself as another potential victim: The Board was also plotting his own assassination, he said.

Wow. Anyone and everyone could have done it.

Exactly. Pick the political flavor of your favorite conspiracy.  More fanciful pitches were that the extreme right had planned it themselves to stoke a coup against Petro – who would likely get the blame – and at the same time eliminate the popular Uribe from the candidate’s list.

Or that the extreme left wanted to take out an effective political opponent from the presidential race.

One problem for investigators was the complex networks between criminal gangs, drug cartels and guerrilla groups, partly worsened by Petro’s Total Peace plan which had split armed groups into smaller and more dangerous factions.

See also: Peace Plan has caused more conflict, says thinktank

The Plata o Plomo gang was clearly working for financial gain. But despite capturing eight members by the end of August, the important detail of who paid them – and why – was yet to be revealed.

Maybe the gang was scared to reveal the backers?

Quite likely. In the dog-eat-dog world of Colombian crime, and where people in jail are regularly murdered, spilling the beans is not recommended. But one more key suspect was emerging:  a mysterious character known as ‘El Viejo’.

His capture came at the end of October after months of police work. Clues emerged from messages from El Viejo on Gabriela’s phone. She also confessed to transporting guns and explosives for him on various occasions in Bogotá.

Soon police had a name, Simeón Pérez Marroquín, and a place, in a remote fortified farmstead on the vast plains of Meta. A helicopter team swooped in and took him back to Bogotá.

So where did El Viejo lead?

El Viejo, the ninth capture in the Uribe case, was the most significant. While Chipi coordinated the killing on the ground, it seems El Viejo was closer to the backers.

Another key detail suggests the plot was months in the making: El Viejo was stalking Uribe in March, three months before the shooting in Modelia, and making notes on the senators movements and bodyguards.

Moreover, El Viejo, while living partly in Usme in the south of Bogotá, and on the farm in Meta, also had links to an area of Caquetá known as a stronghold of Segunda Marquetalia.

Segunda Marquetalia? Sounds more like a Cuban singer…

In fact, a recycled FARC guerrilla group named after the original rebel hideout in Tolima. Its leaders were senior commanders who abandoned the peace process in 2019 after persecution by the right-wing Duque government and threats to extradite them to the U.S.

State prosecutors accused some of drug trafficking, charges the commanders claimed were invented. According to Insight Crime, the group lead by Iván Márquez – formerly number two in the FARC – reactivated rebel units in both Colombia and Venezuela, where the group had hidden camps.

But in 2021 Colombian special forces pursued the leaders in Venezuelan territory killing three of the top commander. Further fighting in 2022 wounded Márquez, in fact he was declared dead by Colombian authorities before reappearing in a video in 2024, though he is rumoured to have suffered severe injuries.

A reason to get angry?

Perhaps. A plausible theory is that the Segunda Marquetalia was seeking revenge and targeted Miguel Uribe as a visible – and vulnerable – figure of the Colombian right wing.

Colombian prosecutors claim to have found a digital trail linking El Viejo with the “criminal circle” of Iván Márquez’s armed group. And his stalking of Uribe months before the shooting suggests a long-term plot.

And if such a plot existed, it coincided with the breakdown of peace talks between Petro’s government and the Segunda Marquetalia at the start of 2025, perhaps another spur to action.

But this evidence is yet to be tested in court.  El Viejo is jailed while awaiting trial for aggravated homicide, even while prosecutors are offering him a legal deal for information leading to the ultimate masterminds.

So will El Viejo talk?

That’s what investigators are hoping for. Two of the gang so far sentenced, Gabriela and El Veneco, have collaborated for reduced sentences, both getting 20 years in jail.

With presidential elections in May, and candidates on the stump, Colombia needs clarity.

The post Who ordered the murder of presidential candidate Miguel Uribe? appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

We take a quick dive down Avenida Caracas where the raised railway is both a wonder and worry.

For citizens used to the snail’s pace of work on their city’s infrastructure, the rapid rising of the Bogota’s Metro over their heads is something to behold.

With 11 kilometers of concrete viaduct completed, and many more clicks of columns in place, not to mention stations and interchanges emerging from the rubble, the megaobra is officially at 73% completion.

For rolos who have waited three generations for a train – the first Metro plan was made in 1942 – this advance is nothing short of a miracle.

Not everyone is happy. Last week small business owners along Avenida Caracas, the last south-north sector of the construction, took to the streets to protest the “destruction and insecurity” of their neighborhoods.

“The Metro advances. The community recedes,” said the banners the protesters hung across the formerly busy throughfare now converted into a construction site.

As is typical in Bogotá protests, it was public transport in the form of Transmilenio buses that were blocked forcing thousands of commuters to walk sections of their journey home.

Hanging on by a thread

The protests ended, but the problems continued for Avenida Caracas.

This week the central section of the wide avenue was taken up by construction teams supporting the massive overhead beam launcher that dropped the pre-cast viaduct sections into place 15 meters above the street.

Meanwhile, car traffic was banned from the main artery while Transmilenio buses threaded their way past graffitied concrete columns. Pedestrians scurried out of the temporary bus stations and fast away from the apocalyptic scenes, more Blade Runner than Springtime in Paris.

Local shopkeepers told The Bogotá Post this week that business had never been bleaker.

“We’re hanging on by a thread,” said Carlos Torres of clothes store 80’s American World, on the corner of Calle 60. “We’ve had no financial help from the district, and takings are down by 80 per cent.”

He had been forced to suspend their health insurance payments for the last year and were struggling to pay the rent, he said.

Danger down below

Footfall had “fallen massively” said Angela Cruz on her way to a hair salon across the road, with people avoiding the dusty streets, partly from fear of robberies.

Avenida Caracas was “always a bid dodgy”, she said, but the attraction for thieves of the building works, with materials and machinery to pilfer, had increased insecurity.

“We’re worried when it’s finished the support columns and dark areas under the Metro will become full of attackers.”

That the Metro would shelter criminals was a recurring concern for residents. Concept drawings of the finished line depicted idyllic leafy walkways with pedestrians pushing prams.

But as every resident of the city already knows, any tunnel, underpass or covered area becomes a hotspot for crime.

And whereas the Metro planners had robust plans to control access to the overhead trains to ensure commuters travel in peace – in contrast to the Transmilenio where anyone can jump on or off – there were no clear plans to protect open spaces below.

“Walking home just got harder,” said Cruz.

Bogotá’s ‘Berlin Wall’

Similar concerns were raised recently in a speech by President Gustavo Petro when he railed against the elevated Metro plan – now near completion – as a boondoggle for property speculators and claimed that Avenida Caracas was being “destroyed by the oligarchy”.

He further suggested that the raised railway would become a “Berlin Wall, separating the rich from poor”.

Such rhetoric was not unexpected from the mandate who long championed an underground Metro, though failed to get it moving during his own term as Bogotá’s mayor (2012 to 2015). He might yet get his way; plans for Line 2, currently on the drawing board, are for an underground Metro running east west beneath the city’s wealthier northern barrios.

See also: Going Underground, Petro threatens to derail Metro.

The final plan to build Line 1 overhead, while controversial, was taken for economic reasons and speed of construction during the second mayorship of Enrique Penalosa – the founder of Bogotá Transmilenio bus system and implacable political opponent of Petro – in 2016.

The elevated Line 1 of the Metro will be 24 kilometers – one of the longest urban light rails on the continent – and have 16 stations including 10 interchanges with the Transmilenio bendy-bus network.   

Much of the line runs through poorer barrios in the south-west of the city where, even with the work unfinished, some economic benefits were being proclaimed.  

Just get it done

Thinktank ProBogotá, in a study with the Unversidad de los Andes, reported a rise in residential property values of 11 per cent in areas around Line 1. Such increases could generate investment in undeveloped pockets of the city.

In the long term, Avenida Caracas businesses were also predicting a boost from the Metro. Just not yet.

“Right now, times are hard,” said business owner Adenay Flores.  He had seen profits plunge in the 18 months since construction began, he said, while painting the entrance to his Moscu pawnbrokers.

But he also recognized that the Metro was vital to the mobility of the city and could transform lives of people living in less accessible areas.

“Yes, we’ve had hardships. But this is the evolution of the city, I totally support the Metro. Once finished it will bring people back to Avenida Caracas,” he said. “But they need to get it done.”

It was a sentiment echoed by many business owners we talked to in the shadow of the concrete viaduct: torn between welcoming the future mass transit system while keeping their financial heads above water.

“We’re suffering, but we still want the Metro. It will bring better times,” Carlos Torres from the clothes shop told The Bogotá Post. “Until then, we just have to hang on.”

The post In the shadow of the Metro appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

… but Centro Democratico bounces back, while small parties lose out in March 8 voting.

Last Sunday’s elections brought mixed results to Colombia’s capital with the left-wing Pacto Historico party cementing its position as most popular party in the city even while its main opponent the Centro Democratico showed relatively bigger gains.

With 18 Bogotá seats up for grabs in the Chamber of Representatives, the Pacto Historico, backed by President Gustavo Petro, took a majority of eight, an increase of one seat from the previous period.

And by garnering 900,000 votes the incumbent party upped its count by more than 100,000 compared to 2022, when it was also the most popular party in the city.

But by some comparisons the right-wing Centro Democratico’s result was even more impressive, surging from two to four seats on March 8, totalling 700,000 votes, up from around 300,000 in 2022.

In Bogotá, as at national level, the losers were the smaller independent parties often citizen-led or based on niche issues. Also failing was the Nuevo Liberalismo party, founded by mayor Carlos Galán, which failed to pick up a single seat, a sign perhaps of citizen discontent with the capital’s current administration.

The demise of the small and independents reflected a national trend of voter gravitation towards the two bigger parties, Centro Democratico and Pacto Historico, whose top candidates – Paloma Valencia and Iván Cepeda – are likely contenders for the presidential slug-out in May. 

The remaining Bogotá seats went to smaller traditional parties the Green Alliance (2), and the Liberal Party (1), with one seat awarded to the upstart Salvacion Nacional formed by firebrand right-wing presidential candidate Abelardo De La Espriella.

Political phenomenon

The stand-out result in the Bogotá caucus was Centro Democratico’s first-time congressional candidate Daniel Briceño who captured 262,000 votes for his seat in the chamber.

Not only did Briceño get the highest congressional vote across Colombia, he also out-voted the entire list of senators – which get elected nationally – with one of the historically highest ever recorded in Colombia for a camara or senado representative.

The 34-year-old lawyer was being hailed this week as a political phenomenon. Briceño is currently serving on Bogotá city council where he campaigns against corruption, cronyism and waste through a clever combination of social media and forensic takedowns of his political targets.

The influencer made his name by digging into big data on government databases that has allowed him to uncover contracts and documents embarrassing to the administration of Gustavo Petro.

Since then, he has gained both an online following and voter base by scrutinizing and exposing mismanagement at all government levels.

Defend every vote

Briceño’s jump to congress was mirrored on the political left in Bogotá by the rise of influencers Laura Beltran, aka Lalis, and Daniel Monroy, who both won seats for Pacto Historico.

Despite their success at the urns on March 8, both Monroy and Beltran amplified claims of fraud in the days after the election.

Beltran, posting on X, issued a media alert begging for lawyers in the city to volunteer their time as scrutineers to check the recount after detecting “the winds of fraud”.

“We are defending each vote for the Pacto Historico. In Bogotá we have the chance to recover one more seat,” she said, suggesting the party could up its count to nine.

Monroy, for his part, made a widely echoed claim that  “votes for Pacto Historico are disappearing”.

So far there is no evidence of electoral fraud, though changes in the final vote could come about from errors corrected in the final scrutiny taking place in Bogotá this week.

Meanwhile preliminary declarations by European Union electoral observers  – 145  were deployed to Colombia – stated that the voting process had been “transparent, accurate and well-organized”.

Voter turnout for Bogotá was 48 per cent, similar to the level of participation across the country, with the capital providing 15 per cent of the national vote. A higher turnout is expected for the May presidential elections.

The post Election boost for Pacto Historico in Bogotá … appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

Former Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) commanders have for the first time in Colombian history freely admitted the armed group’s role in recruiting more than 18,677 children during five decades of their armed conflict with the state.

In a five-page document signed by Rodrigo Londoño, alias ‘Timochenko’, and five other demobilized senior leaders, the former fighters recognized their role in forcing minors into a life under arms.

Colombia’s peace court, known as the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP), had previously determined that the six defendants, all former members of the FARC secretariat, carried responsibility for the crimes of recruitment of minors under 15 years of age, mistreatment torture and murder of children, sexual and reproductive violence, and prejudice against minors with diverse sexual orientations or gender identities.

See also: Peace plan has caused more conflict, says thinktank.

In the letter to the court the six defendants admitted the acts and asked for forgiveness.

“There are no words to repair these deeds,” said Londoño in a televised address widely circulated this week. “Today with honesty and clarity we recognize our role.”

“We ask forgiveness from direct and indirect victims, and from society in general.”

Londoño, who was the FARC’s last field commander up until the peace signing, said he recognized that the rebel’s actions had “stolen childhoods” as young combatants faced constant fear and death.

Historical whitewashing

Londoño also acknowledged that “the homicides, forced abortions, acts of gender-based violence, and reproductive violence caused serious physical and psychological damage that still persists”.

The statement was a milestone in Case 07 of Colombia’s JEP, the special court charged with untangling crimes committed by all sides during the state conflict with the FARC.

Case 07 was opened in 2019 and has since officially recognized 18,677 victims, of which 54 per cent are children themselves recruited, and 46 per cent families who lost children to the conflict.

Other actors in Colombia’s armed conflict have used minors as well. According to Crisis Group, “right-wing paramilitary groups” counted some 2,800 children within their ranks when they demobilized in the mid-2000s.

Historically the FARC whitewashed their role in the recruitment of minors, and during the 2016 peace process vigorously denied accusations of abducting children or threatening families to hand over their children.

According to the FARC’s own narrative, many young recruits joining the Marxist guerrilla group were “volunteers escaping poverty”. The leadership traditionally downplayed reports of sexual abuse, forced abortions and the murders and disappearances of children as political propaganda.

As recently as 2015, FARC commanders were claiming that the armed group “under no circumstance recruited children, or anyone else, forcefully,” according to a Human Rights Watch report critical of the guerrilla’s position.

Never coming home

HRW’s own investigations had identified victims as young as 12 who were tied up by the guerrillas and threatened to be killed if they tried to resist. In other cases, kids were tricked with offers of presents or cash before being forced to fight under arms.

The report also cited cases of older commanders abusing girls as young as 12 in some incidents forcing them to use contraception or to have abortions.

According to JEP data presented under Case 07, child victims were present in the FARC ranks across 16 departments of Colombia, almost the whole territory controlled by the guerrilla group at its peak. Recruitment peaked between 1999 and 2013 but continued to 2016, the year of the peace accord between the rebels and the state.

Accredited to the case were 2,000 individual victims recruited as children but now adults, the JEP announced this week.

Also part of the group were families of 485 children recruited into the ranks who “never returned home”. The JEP had joined with the UPBD (Unidad de Búsqueda de Personas dadas por Desaparecidas) missing persons unit to try and locate the remains of those missing persons.

Details from Case 07 also highlighted the large numbers of minors taken from indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities, with 9,000 registered victims from six ethnic groups.

Restorative Justice

According to JEP proceedures, FARC leaders’ statements this week were an important step forward in the restorative justice process. The special peace court works with a system of dialogues between accused perpetrators and victims.

Information released by the court this week defined Case 07 as still in the dialogue phase with both private and public audiences were expected in the future where victims would given the opportunity to recount their experiences.

In line with previous cases, the former FARC leaders, could chose to respond to the crimes in front of the victims. Any punishment could come in the form of an eight-year sentence of restricted liberties for the former FARC leaders, though not jail time.

As part of the sentence the JEP might recommend restorative programs – a form of social work – in agreements made with the victims.   

For its part, the former FARC secretariat announced its full support for this process. In a taped statement former commander Julián Galló also accepted his role in the crimes.

“Our compromise is to work in the future so that hopefully these cases don’t keep on occurring,” he said.

Circular problem

Repetition was already happening, according to a report published last month by Crisis Group called Kids on the Front Lines: Stopping Child Recruitment in Colombia. According to the Brussels-based think tank, the practice had “boomed in the last decade” even since the FARC demobilized under the peace process in 2016.

A new generation of armed groups still relied on minors to maintain territorial control, said the report, with 620 cases reported in 2024: “Children carry out high-risk tasks, suffer abuse, and are punished with death if caught escaping.”

Ruthless gangs were using social media posts to reel vulnerable youngsters into the conflict with false promises of wealth, status and protection, said Crisis Group. Families faced reprisals if they spoke out, the report added.

And with increased competition between fractionated armed groups, minors were being pushed to the front lines: “Kids now fight in high-risk combat roles.”

Colombia’s circular problem of child recruitment was highlighted this week by JEP magistrate Lily Rueda, presiding over Case 07, in conversation with El Espectador. The message from the peace courts was “more relevant then ever” after data from UNICEF showed that the recruitment of children in Colombia had increased by 300% in the last five years.

“This is an opportunity to reiterate our commitment to investigating and prosecuting these acts of violence against children, which constitute war crimes and are not subject to amnesty, not even in the context of peace agreements,” she said

“Victims who survived recruitment in the past should not be victimized again by the recruitment of their own sons and daughters in the present day.”

The post Former FARC chiefs ask forgiveness for forcing children into the guerrilla ranks appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

Health authorities have activated over 200 free vaccination points across the city this week after two measles cases were reported.

The highly contagious virus, which is airborne and can cause serious health problems for young children, was detected in travelers from Mexico who had arrived in Bogotá and then fallen ill. Another imported case was found outside the capital.

In response the city’s District Health Secretariat said it had activated protocols to isolate the cases and had laboratories on hand to help with tracking any potential spread in the city.

Bogotá’s health secretary Gerson Bermont emphasized the need for a swift response: “Bogotá has all the infrastructure and human resources to provide technical support for diagnostic processes, he said. “The key is to act promptly to reduce local transmission.”

Measles was one of the most contagious viruses in existence and could be transmitted even by breathing, he warned. The best protection was with the MMR (measles, mumps, and rubella) vaccine, with two doses 97% effective at preventing the disease. The three people reported this week were unvaccinated.

In June last year U.S. embassies around the world took the unusual step of issuing a warning that measles was an “ongoing global risk” and advised citizens going abroad to get jabbed.

“Travelers can catch measles in many travel settings including travel hubs like airports and train stations, on public transportation like airplanes and trains, at tourist attractions, and at large, crowded events,” said the notice.

“Infected travelers can bring the disease back to their home communities where it can spread rapidly among people who are not immune.”

Good coverage

Recent data from the U.S. Centre for Disease Control (CDC) showed outbreaks in every region of the world with high caseloads in Mexico, Yemen, Indonesia, Pakistan, India, Angola and Laos.

 The World Health Organization (WHO)  declared Colombia free of measles in 2014, after intensive campaigns across the country by vaccination teams brought MMR to remote corners of the country.

Measles vaccine coverage in the country was 93 per cent for the first dose, according to data on the WHO immunization dashboard, a reasonable result for a country with access challenges for health teams

Bogotá last saw cases in 2019, when 11 persons were affected by the disease, according to data from the city’s Observatorio de Salud.  

To avoid local spread from the imported cases this week, more than 200 vaccination points were activated across the city, with details in this link of locations and opening times. Most of the sites are in existing health facilities though all are welcome and the measles vaccine is free.

The city health authorities were offering free immunization with the triple MMR vaccines (measles, mumps and rubella) known in Colombia as SRP (sarampión, rubéola y paperas) or a double vaccine of SR (just measles and rubella). Any unvaccinated or partially vaccinate person between six months old and 60 years old was encouraged to get jabbed.

The risk to Colombia “could not be underestimated” Bermont told Blu Radio this week.

“It’s bad news what’s happening in the Americas,” he said. “Last year there were 15,000 measles cases across the region. Just in Mexico there were 32 deaths”.

Bermont said mass immunization was the best method to avoid an outbreak, but region had become vulnerable from anti-vax messaging by pressure groups that gained influence during the Covid-19 pandemia.  

“We have to also recognize that today there are also health authorities in the world that throw doubt on the effectiveness of the vaccine.”

The post Vaccination drive after measles cases detected in Bogotá appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

An express kidnapping highlights the risks of taking a taxi in Colombia’s capital. What happened, and how to avoid it happening to you.

Bogotá breathed a collective sigh of relief on Tuesday morning when news broke of the safe arrival home of Diana Ospina, a rola missing for almost 40 hours after being kidnapped by a taxi she had hailed in the street after a night out in Chapinero.

Ospina was the latest victim of El Paseo Millonario, the ‘millionaire ride’, where passengers riding in yellow public taxis are physically attacked and forced to hand over cash and valuables.

The technique varies, but victims are usually targeted late at night in busy streets in party zones outside restaurants or discotheques, then driven to a quiet spot where two accomplices of the driver climb in the back seat and threaten the passenger with knives, guns or syringes.

See also: Bogotá’s Murder Mosaic

The following ordeal can last minutes or hours or even days. Victims are intimidated with beatings or stab wounds, and hooded or blindfolded. Some are killed, as in the case of a university professor found dead on the outskirts of the city in January this year.

Foreigners are also targeted: in 2013, a DEA officer Terry Watson was stabbed to death in a Bogotá taxi after two assailants jumped in the back seat. Authorities later said the army veteran resisted the attack. Seven taxi drivers were later captured and extradited to the U.S. to face charges for his murder.

According to police data, during 2025 in Bogotá there were registered 37 cases of kidnapping for ransom or extortion, though these crimes are highly under-reported. This is because the same gangs threaten the victims to keep quiet, and in the case of taxi gangs, know where their targets live.

Publicity blitz

In the case of Ospina, her kidnap started early Sunday morning when she hailed a yellow taxi that took her to within one block of her home in Engativá, where two men from a following taxi climbed in the back, threatened her and took her blindfolded for a three-hour driver around the city while using her phone and bank cards.

The ordeal did not end there. Ospina was then passed on to another kidnap group operating in the south of the city and held in a house there while more extortion demands were made. Late on Monday night, after being captive for nearly 40 hours, Ospina was dropped off in the hills above Bogotá where she eventually walked to a police station for assistance.

According to information on FM radio, from contacts close to the family, the kidnap gang released her after the “feeling pressure from the media blitz” with social media platforms widely publicising her disappearance. Other news reports stated they released her only after draining 50 million pesos (US$15,000) from her bank accounts.

This week the authorities were still hunting the perpetrators, expecting arrests imminently.

Your world in your phone

The Ospina case highlights how smartphones have upped the risks for kidnap victims in Colombia.

Whereas in the past a paseo millonario was usually a short-term event – passengers held for an hour while the gang used their bankcards at an ATM – criminals nowadays are eyeing much bigger profits from emptying bank accounts held on smartphones.

The insistence by banks and other financial platforms to use biometric approvals such as face recognition or fingerprint scanning has created the need for gangs to keep their targets captive for many days, in some cases drugging them into compliance or subduing them through threats of violence.

See also: Bogotá Police take down gang drugging victims in Teusaquillo and Chapinero

The rise of the digital nomads in Colombia often with juicy crypto accounts accessed through their phones has also created opportunities for tech savvy criminals. After such attacks, platforms are reluctant to reimburse funds arguing that they were transferred with the biometric approval of the victim.

One thing is clear: apart from increased financial losses, the longer victims are held captive the worse their outcome, both in terms of physical and psychological damage, the risk of sexual violence, or death from an overdose of the powerful drugs such as burundanga administered by the gangs.

The Canaries

Bogotá has more than 55,000 public taxis circulating on any given day sometimes referred to as ‘Los Canarios’ (the canaries) after their yellow cars and a popular telenovela depicting taxi drivers. It is worth noting that taxi drivers are themselves frequently the victims of robbery, extortions and murder.

Yellow taxi companies in Bogotá are registered and controlled by the Secretería de Movilidad with each driver given a Tarjeta de Control, the plasticized card hanging down the seat back that – in theory – displays the name, details and photo of the driver as well as the fare scale, and is revalidated every month.

In Bogotá, passengers can independently check the status of registered drivers by entering the numberplate into the menu at SIMUR at  www.simur.gov.co/conductores-de-taxi.

But in a random test by The Bogotá Post, out of 10 taxis entered by number plate, only six had a registered driver. Four were reported “without an active registration”.

That lack of control is further weakened by the fact that registered taxistas often allow other drivers to take the wheel, said transport companies this week.

“We work on good faith, but we can’t guarantee that drivers don’t hand over their cars to other persons to commit crimes,” Maria  Botero, manager of Radiotaxis told Noticias Caracol.

In the case of Ospina, the taxis that abducted her were quickly identified along with their owners, but not the actual attackers. One car was not currently registered on SIMUR.

No dar papaya

How to avoid becoming a victim? A good tip is to use a ride platforms like Didi, Cabify, Uber or Indrive. Some like Didi are also linked to the yellow public taxis, but safer because the ride is traced. At times hailing a street taxi is the only option because app cars are far off, and you weigh the risks of standing on the street, or (as in the case of Diana Ospina) the app ride is suddenly cancelled.

Attacks are usually at night, on weekends, on persons leaving bars or restaurants. But passengers can be targeted in daytime, particularly in financial districts or leaving a bank. If you are riding the yellow taxis, here are some ways to no dar papaya, as they say in Bogotá (‘don’t be a sucker’).

Before going out:

• Carry a clean phone with no banking apps and limited personal data. Many people in Bogotá are now leaving their financial transactions on a second phone or tablet stored safely at home.
• Carry a wad of cash. Perhaps counterintuitively, in the digital world cash makes you less of a target. And it is easy to hand over.
• If you do carry a bank card, take just one linked to a low-balance account.

Getting the taxi:

• Travel in a group. Criminals generally target solo passengers.
• Check the taxi numberplate in SIMUR, see above. This takes seconds and confirms if there is a registered driver. If not, walk away.
• Take a photo of the taxi numberplate, send to friends or family. Ensure the driver sees you doing this.
• Before entering a taxi, look carefully to ensure there is no-one hidden inside.
• Check the Tarjeta de Control photo with the actual driver. Do this before setting off.
• Check doors can be locked and unlocked from the passenger seat.

During the trip:

• Lock doors on both sides.
• Share your real-time location with a family member or friend.

Signs of danger:

• The driver changes the route without explanation.
• The taxi turns onto dark or deserted streets.
• The driver suddenly stops to pick up other persons.
• Motorcycles or other cars or taxis closely follow the vehicle.

During an attack:

• Prioritize your physical safety.
• Give up any valuables without resistance.

If you suspect someone you know has been abducted by a taxi gang, call the GAULA special police unit (Grupos de Acción Unificada por la Libertad Personal) that deals with extortion and kidnapping, on Line 165.

“Safe taxi” zones

Even with these precautions, street taxis are still a risk, and a growing one according to Bogotá security authorities who during 2025 arrested at least 20 persons from several different Paseo Millonario gangs such as La 57 and La Zona T.

A recent advance by the city has been the recognition of the crime as “kidnap with extortion”, with up to 40 years in jail for perpetrators.

Another nitiative announced by the Secretaría de Seguridad this week was taxi seguro zones where uniformed teams patrol outside nightspots and assist revellers to take only registered taxis.

But while mediatic, such initiatives are likely to have only limited impact. Taxi gangs are generally compact, with three people, and mobile so they can cruise new zones. And new gangs seem to pop up as quickly as old ones are taken down.

So while the city can celebrate the safe return of Diana Ospina, and hopefully soon see her attackers rounded up, there will be plenty more candidates for the Millionaire Ride.  

The post Paseo Millionario: don’t be taken for a ride appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

Student leaders declare ‘indefinite strike’ at Bogotá’s sprawling Universidad Nacional as controversial rector reappointed.  

In another twist in the saga of who runs the ‘Nacho’, Colombia’s largest public university, controversial candidate Ismael Peña was formally inducted as rector last week ending a two-year legal wrangle.

Peña was sworn in during a small private ceremony on Thursday just days after a Bogotá tribunal ordered his reinstatement in the job. This followed the resignation last November of another rector whose possession was ruled illegitimate by Colombia’s state council.

Read more: Court Ruling Expected to Spark Trouble at the National University.

The initial controversy was sparked in 2024 in the highly politicized campus when a popular candidate, Leopoldo Múnera, lost out to Peña in the last voting round by the university council.

#BOGOTÁ | Este es el panorama a esta hora (6:53 p.m.) en la calle 26 a la altura de la Universidad Nacional.

Los servicios troncales que transitan realizan retornos en Corferias y Concejo de Bogotá.

Los vehículos particulares no pueden circular en sentido Oriente-Occidente.… pic.twitter.com/WWfyIrqwXi

— ÚltimaHoraCaracol (@UltimaHoraCR) February 19, 2026

The ensuing strikes and protests galvanized the university for four months setting back the academic agenda and creating an exhausting three-term year in 2025, from which students and professors are only just recovering.

Protests and vandalism spilled over onto major nearby transport routes around the Bogotá campus. In Bogotá, the Nacho sits in the corner of the busy Avenida NQS and Avenida El Dorado, two of the most vital throughfares for both public and private transport.

Return of Torres

Even as news of Peña’s legal victory and imminent reinstatement was announced last week, students and supporters quickly blocked the Avenida El Dorado forcing Transmilenio buses to suspend operations and thousands of commuters to make their way on foot.

Student assemblies at the university’s two main campuses, Bogotá and Medellin, called for “indefinite strikes” to protest Peña reinstatement.

To add to the confusion, the Bogotá campus was also invaded by a large group of campesinos from Cauca whose later protests detained workers in government buildings, part of a plan to draw attention to conflict-related problems in their department.

On Friday, when The Bogotá Post visited the university, most of the faculties were closed but the campus was filled with students busy painting fresh murals to celebrate the return of the remains to the campus of Camilo Torres, a revolutionary priest and founder of the university Sociology Department, who joined the ELN guerrillas and was killed in action against the army in 1966.

See also: Remains of Rebel Priest Set to Return to Bogotá.

Many students gave their views on the return of Peña but  declined to be fully identified.

Roberto, a sociology student selling food in the campus, said he supported the strike to “preserve the autonomy of the university”. Peña was seen as an unpopular candidate “linked to private interests that will privatize the curriculum and syphon off profits”, he said.

Corporate spinoffs

Similar sentiments were expressed across the campus: that Peña was being parachuted in with the backing of the Centro Democratic party to advance both a right-wing agenda and disburse lucrative contracts to a select group of private companies.

According to an investigation by magazine La Raya last year, Peña was the continuity candidate for “a parallel administration system” embedded in a company called Rotorr that dished out deals on behalf of the university, but bypassed internal auditing procedures leaving an opaque tangle of beneficiaries.

During his rectorship Múnera described these corporate spinoffs as engaging in “crimes against the university” and flagged them to the judicial authorities, but so far with no clear resolution.

Despite these controversies, Peña’s return was boosted by support from the Consejo Superior Universitario, the highest decision-making body of public universities in Colombia, that unanimously agreed to respect the tribunal ruling, clearing any final legal hurdles.

Strike Down

In another unexpected outcome, an online poll of students revealed that a majority were against the suspension of classes.

 The initial strike call came after a hastily convened student assembly on the Bogotá campus where some student representatives later complained that their voices were not heard.

“There was one classmate, he raised his hand and they wouldn’t let him speak. So, the next day we decided to conduct a survey to ask the students if they agreed with the strike,” student representative Kevin Arriguí told City TV.

The results, based on a total of 5,438 respondents, showed that 56 per cent (3,060 students) disagreed with the strike, while only 36 per cent (2,141 students) supported it. There were 237 undecideds.

Tellingly, the online strike survey had a higher participation among students than last year’s vote to install a Constituyente Universitaria – a people’s body – that is now in place.

Some students consulted on the campus by The Bogotá Post last week were mindful of the outcome of the 2024 strike which lasted several months and created hardships, particularly for poor students from rural areas who had spent money to travel to the capital to study, only to face severe interruptions to their curriculums and the risk of having to study another year to gain their degrees.

“We don’t want Peña. People are angry. But we don’t want to stop the term either,” said Carla, a student outside the newly constructed 70,000-million-peso arts faculty building.

Fragile mobility

Finding a compromise could be problematic. Activists on the campus were pressuring undergraduates to not attend classes and most lessons were abandoned. Some professors offered their classes on-line.

The student assembly planned this week at the Bogotá site could reverse the strike plans, though this seems unlikely. The general mood among students on the campus was that they would “block Peña, whatever it takes”.

Such talk is common at a university that is a petri dish for the national condition and at times – literally – a battleground for political divisions, particularly in a city nominated as the country’s “protest capital”.

This was revealed by data published in an El Espectador op-ed this week which showed Bogotá had 1,678 mass mobilization recorded during 2025, roughly 32 per week, and an increase of 17 per cent on the previous year.

While celebrating this increase as a “symptom of democracy”, it also pointed out that these protests “affected public order and the fragile mobility of millions of Bogotanos”.  

 That included two million people using the Transmilenio each day, with a majority of these on lines passing close to the Universidad Nacional. Easy targets for agitators based on the campus.

Which is why trouble at the Nacho generally means headaches for the whole city.

The post More trouble at Bogotá’s Universidad Nacional? appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

Failures in Colombia’s health system were highlighted this week after a young boy died from “completely preventable” complications from blood condition after going off treatment for two months.

Seven-year-old Kevin Acosta was rushed to hospital in Pitalito, Huila, on February 8 after falling off his bike and hitting his head, a situation complicated by his hemophilia.

According to his mother Katherine Pico, the boy required regular injections of clotting factors to prevent the genetic condition that can cause fatal bleeding if untreated.

But due to failings by his health insurer, Nueva EPS, Kevin had missed his regular injections for two months, and on the day of his accident he was denied emergency doses even while bleeding from his head in the hospital in Pitalito.

When the health insurer finally agreed to evacuate Kevin by air ambulance 24 hours later to Bogotá, where clotting factors were available, the blood loss was severe. Kevin died four day later in the Intensive Care Unit of the Hospital de la Misericordia in Bogotá.

Since then, Kevin’s death has caused huge indignation in Colombia both among medical experts who claim the death was preventable and critics of the current government’s political intervention in the health system which has left many users worse off.

Get off your bike

Adding to the furor, President Gustavo Petro waded into the debate blaming the mother for allowing Kevin to ride a bicycle.

“A hemophiliac child shouldn’t ride a bike; it’s a matter of prevention. We need to know if the doctor or the health system isn’t providing education, because mothers don’t learn about it, especially given the low educational levels in Colombia,” he said.

His own health minister, Guillermo Jaramillo, added: “Children with hemophilia should be restricted from activities that can generate violent trauma,” he said.

These comments were challenged by patient’s rights groups, who pointed out that cyclists with hemophilia have competed in the Tour de France, and medical experts who emphasized that in recent decades in Colombia prevention has been based on weekly or monthly injections of “clotting factors” which allowed hemophiliacs to lead normal lives.

Many medical experts concurred that children with regular prophylaxis to prevent excess bleeding could, and should, integrate in physical activities.  

“The child died from the accident, but the reason he died was because he didn’t have the medication,” Dr Sergio Robledo, president of the Colombian League of Hemophiliacs, told Blu Radio.  “Prevention in hemophilia means having the drugs, not locking the child up at home.”

“For more than 20 years in Colombia we have not had any [hemophilia] deaths specifically due to a lack of medicine,” Robledo continued.

Chaotic plan

Kevin’s case was symptomatic of problems in Colombia’s health system which had worsened under the Petro government, Denis Silva told the Bogotá Post this week.

Silva, spokesperson for Paciente Colombia, a coalition of 202 patients’ rights groups, said Kevin’s death was “100 per cent avoidable”.

“If Kevin had been given the prophylaxis or given the treatment when he went to the clinic to coagulate his blood, the situation would have been different”.

Kevin’s mother had been asking Nueva EPS for the life-saving medicines since December, he said, but they were never delivered because the EPS had “failed to pay the clinic” that administered the drug in Pitalito.

Blame for these errors should bounce back to the Petro government, said Silva. State entities had forcibly intervened in Nueva EPS in 2024, claiming fraud in the huge health insurer, and were thereafter legally responsible for managing the entity that covered 11 million Colombians.

Interventions in EPS insurers was not unusual in Colombia, he said. Previous governments had done the same to avoid a crisis for patients.

But were timely actions to “administrate, improve and, where necessary, rescue” the health insurers, though in some cases they were shuttered and patients moved to other companies. Petro’s current takeovers were more chaotic and linked to political overhaul of the health system, he said.

Health system in crisis

This agenda was heavily criticized in an opinion article ‘How Politics Destroyed Colombia’s Model Healthcare System’, by Colombian-based journalist Luke Taylor and published in the prestigious British Medical Journal in January.

Referring to President Petro’s “bungled reforms”, the story claimed that maternity wards and neonatal units were shutting their doors, emergency departments becoming overwhelmed, and training programs for specialist doctors being shut down.

It also quoted the Colombian president as stating that health companies were being “run by crooks”, even as the his government’s interventions triggered a slew of complaints by patients suddenly finding their health care a lot worse.

For patients with chronic ailments reliant on monthly checkups and regular medical supply, the decline was becoming an existential threat, said Colombia’s ombudsman, Iris Marín, this week.

Kevin Acosta was “yet another victim of the failures in the availability and access to medicines that thousands of Colombians face today, in order to access timely treatments that are crucial for their health”.

According to documents released by Nueva EPS, Pico had tried to transfer her son’s care from Huila to Santander department, then switched back to Huila, suggesting a paperwork logjam had delayed the treatment. In another statement, it denied suspending the prophylaxis.

Need for treatment

This was “a big lie” said Pico, talking to Semana, since even before the administrative switch the local clinic treating Kevin had told her in early January that Nueva EPS had ended its contract. Without payments from the EPS, the clinic was forced to suspend treatment.

“By January we had no medication, no appointments, nothing,” said Pico.

Her position was supported by the fact that, across the country, other chronic or rare disease sufferers – including hemophiliac suffers in Pico’s same family – were reporting the same shortages, in many cases linked to contractual or payment problems with health suppliers. 

ACHOP, the Colombian Association of Pediatric Hematology and Oncology, warned in a public communication that children and adolescents “were not receiving in a timely and continuous manner the essential medicines to preserve their lives in conditions of dignity”.

These shortages fell mostly on patients with the state-intervened Nueva EPS, confirmed hemophilia specialist Dr Jorge Peña, who said he regularly treated dozens of children with the condition.

Talking to Caracol Radio, Dr Peña said that children with other insurers were receiving their prophylaxis on time and were “happy, free from bleeding, and going to school as usual”.

“In comparison Nueva EPS patients are not getting the medicines, and I see them every day with bleeding. They can’t go to school.”

Leaked records

Meanwhile attempts by the government and President Petro to push back on Pico even while grieving her son’s death caused condemnation across the political spectrum, particularly since the state had taken over Nueva EPS.

“The responsibility is clear: when the state intervenes and controls, it is held accountable,” said Senator Jorge Robledo on X.

“The healthcare system already had problems, but under this government it’s worse. And meanwhile, more and more Colombians are suffering from illnesses that medicine knows how to treat.”

More criticism piled on President Petro after he leaked details from the Kevin Acosta’s medical records during a speech in La Guajira. Patient spokesperson Denis Silva called on the government to respect patient confidentiality

“These are confidential in Colombia,” said Silva. “By law the EPS insurer should guard the medical records, and no-one should access them without permission from the family”.

The leaks came even as the state agency overseeing the system, the Superintendency of Health (also known as Supersalud), announced an investigation into the Kevin’s care, including looking at “administrative barriers and the delivery of medication by Nueva EPS and the service provider”. This audit should clarify differences in accounts from the family and Nueva EPS.

But even with results pending, President Petro again doubled down in a speech claiming the family was primarily responsible for Kevin’s health outcomes.

“It’s the family that first of all cares for its children,” he said, “Not everything is the responsibility of the state, because the state can’t respond to everything, otherwise we lose our liberty”.  

Colombians living with hemophilia might want those liberties to include the right to life-saving drugs – and to ride a bike.

The post Young hemophilia patient dies after delay in life-saving medicines appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

Judges ordered the recapture this week of a Violeta Arango Ramírez, a prime suspect in the 2017 bombing of Bogotá’s Andino shopping mall, after she lost her legal protections as an ELN peace manager.

The Colombian attorney general’s office requested that Arango, thought to be active in the ranks of the ELN guerrillas, “be found immediately to comply with an order for prison detention” based on accusations she was a key participant in the attack that left three dead and 10 more injured.

Arango, a sociologist, was previously arrested in 2022, but then released from prison to assume the role of a gestora de paz (‘peace manager’) during peace talks between the ELN and the the Petro government.

The controversial release was criticised at the time by survivors and families of victims of the Andino attack as Arango remained a key suspect. By being nominated as a gestora de paz, Arango was allowed both her freedom and temporary avoidance of homicide and terrorism charges while whe was “collaborating with the peace process”.  

This week’s recapture order followed breakdowns in government talks with the ELN with the Justice Department officially removing many combatants’ designations as peace managers. The news gave a glimmer of hope for justice after nine years of uncertainty as to who was behind the attack.

Arango herself has always denied any involvement in the attack, pointing to a plot from within the state prosecutors’ office to frame left-wing activists during the political fallout from the 2016 FARC peace deal.

Pamphlet bombs

The Andino attack unfolded during the evening of Saturday, June 17, 2017, inside the crowded women’s restroom of the busy shopping mall at a peak hour. It was the eve of Father’s Day.

A bomb placed in a toilet cubicle exploded killing one French and two Colombian citizens and maimed at least eight more women in or around the restroom.

Police investigators quickly blamed the Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo or MRP, a left-wing group that had evolved in Bogotá’s public universities and was dedicated to mediatic events such as dangling flags from buildings and letting off weak explosives that launched political leaflets into the air.

Over the space of two years the MRP had targeted public spaces outside tax offices, health insurers and banks with messages such as: “Today in Colombia the peace process is a business plan”, and “Health in Colombia is a problem of democracy”.

In the months following the attack, a dozen suspects accused of being linked to the MRP were rounded up, detained over many months, then tried and released after none of the evidence against them could be proven in court.

Meanwhile an alternative theory emerged: that the Andino bombing was part of a right-wing plot carried out to destabilise the then-Santos government’s closeness to left-wing guerrilla groups in the wake of the historic 2016 peace process with the FARC, previously Colombia’s most powerful armed group.

False positives

In this narrative, the MRP, with its history of small-scale attacks and rumoured links to the larger ELN guerrilla group, made a convenient scape-goat.

Investigators claimed to have found similarities between the Andino bomb and the pamphlet explosives, but an analysis by news website Las2Orillas at the time pointed out that the attorney general’s office at the time “had a long history of fabricating evidence” to bring down left-wing political targets, partly as a distraction from their own implications in high profile corruption cases.

Violeta Arango, an activist with links to left-wing causes, found herself officially accused of being an MRP leader and coordinator with the much larger ELN guerrilla group.

She avoided capture and publicy declared herself the victim of a “falso positivo”, or false positive, referring to the practice by the Colombian military of murdering civilians and disguising their bodies as guerrilla combatants.

“This legal persecution I am suffering, along with my family who are being harassed and abused, is nothing more than a setup by the police and the attorney general’s office,” she wrote in an open letter, before fleeing Bogotá.

What happened next is subject to speculation. According to Arango herself, she escaped into the arms of the ELN (literally, as she became the romantic partner of a senior commander) fearing for her life in the face of “political persecution”.  

But her smooth transition into the ELN guerrilla’s Darío Ramírez Castro Front – active in the conflict zone of Sur de Bolívar – also seemed to vindicate the prosecution’s narrative of her links to urban terrorism.

Alias ‘Talibán’

Meanwhile in Bogotá, 10 other people were detained as suspected MRP members linked to the attack.

After searches of their homes, some were accused of carrying false IDs, carrying weapons, and, in some cases, having printed plans of the Andino shopping centre showing entrances and exits, and notes which appeared to show preparations for the bombing, and USB sticks with messages from the MRP.

But in many cases the police arrests and searches were themselves found to be illegal and without due process which, added to the flimsy evidence presented in court, lead to the the cases falling apart under legal scrutiny.

Some of these investigations were later examined in a documentary called Andino File: A Judicial Set-up? produced by journalism collective La Liga Contra el Silencio. One of the main accused, Iván Ramírez, described how the police produced CCTV used to identify him “scoping out the Andino”. This “evidence” later turned out to be video of a regular mall worker with a similar look.

In another twist, Ramírez described how the police themselves invented the aliases to which the suspects were presented as a “terrorist cell” to the media; for example, ‘El Calvo’, ‘Japo’, ‘Aleja’ and, in the case of the bearded sociologist, ‘Talibán’. The scary name stuck and Ramírez was thereafter referred to by Colombia media as ‘alias Talíban’.

He was also constantly described by prosecutors as the “explosives expert” of the MRP cell, a charge he consistently denied.

Ramírez was released from custody in 2021 after spending four years in pre-trial detention, during which time every case against him collapsed. But even after his release he continued to be “linked to the investigation”.

Peace managing

Then in June 2022, Violeta Arango, now in the ELN, was captured in the Sur de Bolívar in the same military operation that killed her partner, known as Pirry.

According to a post on X by the then minister of defence, Diego Molano, alias Pirry was “one of the top ELN commanders responsible for attacks on the civilian population, forced recruitment, and terrorism”.  

Arango was jailed for her guerrilla links even while the process continued against her for the Andino bombing.

That panorama changed when Petro Gustavo took the presidency in August 2022; with peace talks in the air, and after a visit from a Cuban and Norwegian delegation to her jail, Arango was released to her gestora de paz role in November that year. She resurfaced a month later in Caracas, Venezuela, as part of the ELN talks with the Petro government.

This appearance caused anger among the Andino victims. Pilar Molano, who lost a leg in the explosion, told Vorágine magazine that “it’s insane that they let her out and put her in the peace negotiations with the ELN”.

Six years after the Andino attack, in April 2023, the prosecutor’s office again filed charges against Arango based on evidence that prior to the bombing she had downloaded plans of the shopping mall from the Internet.

Cell structures

The indictment formally accused Arango of the “detailed planning” of the bomb attack. It further alleged that Arango was a senior member of the MRP “responible for attracting new members to the criminal organization in Bogotá and apparently participated in at least 21 terrorist attacks against EPS headquarters, public transport and infrastructure”.

With this week’s recapture order the case can move ahead – assuming she can be found.

Any trial could shed light on the who and why of the Andino bombing, and also the complex backstory of ‘Violeta’. But, given the shambolic history of the judicial process, it could also put the investigation back to square one.

In interviews in the intervening years leaders of MRP have repeatedly denied their groups involvement, as well as denying any links to the ELN, or any connections to the original suspects.

But the truth might be hard to find even within the two armed groups; both the ELN and the MRP are known to work in cell structures which plan autonomous actions often without the co-members or leaders aware.

Such was the case with the devastating car bomb that killed 20 young police recruits in Bogotá in 2019, initially denied by the ELN – their leadership claimed not to know of the plot – but eventually taking responsibility.

An unusual element of the Andino bombing is that no armed group or political movement has ever taken responsibility. And so far the prosecutors have not only failed to pin the attack on the MRP, but also ignored alternative lines of investigations such as a false flag operation by paramilitary or right-wing groups.

Lawyer for the Andino victims and survivors Franciso Bernate, said this week that “on behalf of the 11 female victims we hope Violeta is found so she can respond to these grave accusations”.

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Stark figures show expansion of fighting groups under ‘Paz Total’.

Colombia’s illegal armed groups have grown by 84 per cent during the three years of the Petro government’s Paz Total plan, thinktank Fundacion Ideas para la Paz (FIP) announced last week.

The alarming data showed the country’s main guerrilla factions and organised crime gangs totalled 27,000 active members at the end of 2025, adding 5,000 new recruits in just 12 months.

And humanitarian crises associated with the expansion of illicit economies, such as combats, displacements or confinement of communities, attacks on social leaders and extortion were also on the rise.

According to Gerson Arias, co-author of FIP’s El Deterioro de la Seguridad Marca el Inicio de 2026 (Deteriorating Security Marks the Start of 2026), the endless peace talks played out under President Petro’s expansive Paz Total policy had only incentivised armed groups to grow in terms of fighters, weapons and territory.

“Paz Total was based on a state ceasefire – but without any conditions put on the groups, such as ceasing recruitment, including child recruitment, or ending expansion,” he told The Bogotá Post.

“As such, the policy gave a gigantic strategic advantage to the armed groups to strengthen their fighting forces.”

Big surge

The biggest surge was in the organised crime group Clan de Golfo, up by 30 per cent to 9,840 active agents, reported FIP (see chart below).

Next in terms of size was the ELN, the guerrilla group dominating the eastern borderlands of Colombia, with 6,810 members, an increase of 9 per cent.

Dissident FARC groups also grew, some by almost a quarter, such as CNEB (Coordinadora Nacional Ejercito Bolivariano) which despite drawn-out peace talks with the Petro government – and numerous plans for a disarmament – ended the year 25 per cent bigger than started, now numbering 2,089.

And these were probably underestimates, said Arias. The FIP figures were based on military and intelligence data collected annually since 2002,and generally considered to be lower than the actual numbers.

“We tend to undermeasure illegal activity. It’s impossible to say with precision, but we would say the real data could be 20% or 30% higher,” he concluded.

Unlucky 13

These numbers included both armed fighters – often uniformed and carrying heavy weaponry – and support members tasked with infiltrating civilian communities to “ensure compliance”, often carrying pistols. Armed groups were increasingly deploying explosives by drones.

According to the FIP report, none of the negotiation processes had managed to curb their recruitment capacity.

Territorial expansion had also triggered disputes over illegal gold mining, coca, and trafficking routes. The FIP report identified 13 zones where two or more groups were facing off, more than twice the number of disputed territories that Petro inherited from the Duque government in 2022.

Top in terms of combat last year were Catatumbo in Norte de Santander, and areas of Guaviare, Cauca, Nariño, Valle and Arauca (see map).

But even departments considered peaceful in recent years, such as Tolima and Huila, were being drawn back into the fray, said Arias.

This rise in conflict brought a host of humanitarian impacts. Armed groups strictly controlled their zones, at times displacing or confining populations, but also imposing daily controls such as travel permissions and ID cards.

Last year, according to UN figures quoted by FIP, one million mostly rural Colombians were affected by armed group controls, tripling the number recorded in 2024.

Civilians in the crosshairs

And according to Arias, the government had itself increased the risks to civilians by involving them as third parties in the peace talks while failing in any robust plan to pacify the zone.

“Petro reached partial agreements with the groups – even while they were still armed, still controlling, extorting, confining and pressuring civilian communities. There was no cost to the armed groups,” said the researcher.

Part of the problem was that Paz Total had initially failed to link to any coherent military strategy that could had protected civilian communities. This had put civic leaders “in the crosshairs of armed groups” as one side accused them of siding with the other.  

The statement is backed by a graph showing a year-on increase since 2022 in attacks both between armed groups, and against civilians and state forces. Last year there were 150 attacks on civilian targets.

In fact, by Arias’s estimate Colombia had gone back to 2011 in terms of the numbers of non-state armed actors – 27,000 – potentially in conflict.

That compared to a recent low of 12,800 combatants in 2018, two years after former president Santos signed the 2016 peace deal with the FARC guerrillas.

From bad to worse

In fact, to explain the current situation, Arias pointed to failures in the both the current administration and the previous right-wing government under Ivan Duque.

Taking over in 2018, Duque rolled back many of the agreements made with the FARC sending many ex-combatants back to the bush along with a wave of new combatants.

But then left-leaning Gustavo Petro, taking over in 2022, surprised even his own military advisers by declaring a unilateral ceasefire. This was the opening salvo of the Paz Total policy which announced negotiations with armed groups and criminal gangs on multiple fronts – in some cases even without informing them.

Petro’s plan was conceived “with good intentions”, said Arias, but had put misplaced trust in armed groups busy enriching themselves by illegal activities and with little incentive to demobilize.

By comparison, during the 2013-16 process with the FARC, the military forces under Santos had continued operations against the guerrilla up until the final signing: “This pressure incentivised the FARC to take serious decisions in terms of the peace process,” he said.

Too little, too late

The failings of Paz Total were apparent on the ground in the first few months of inception in 2022, with community organisations raising the alarm over the increased fighting between groups.

It took until late 2024 for the state military to step up offensive actions in areas such as Cauca, with battles against the dissident FARC factions of Ivan Mordisco. Then, in early 2025, the Catatumbo region of Norte de Santander caught fire with fierce combat between the ELN and FARC 33, leading to the largest humanitarian crisis in Colombia’s recent history.

But it took until August last year for President Petro himself to acknowledge that the policy had “not achieved peace”.

During 2025 military actions increased by 30 per cent, but with reduced state forces – many experienced soldiers and commanders had left – facing stronger armed groups, said Arias.

“The offensive came slowly and without an analysis of what was required to combat the strengthened armed groups.”

“Years of intelligence capacity was lost, along with military presence and air deployment. This explains why – despite the offensives – there are few concrete improvements for many communities.”

For soldiers on the ground, the job got harder under Paz Total with a strengthened enemy and less military intelligence to rely on. According to President Petro’s own presentation to the Trump Whitehouse early this month, 360 state forces have been killed “in the fight against drug trafficking” in the last three years, with 1,680 wounded.

But even away from the front line, Paz Total was not up to the monumental task of negotiating peace with multiple armed groups given that most governments had failed to pacify even one.

At whatever cost

“Paz Total never evaluated the institutional capacity required. It’s good to say: ‘we have to negotiate with everyone’. But that requires a method,” said Arias.

The government often pushed talks ahead even without any legal framework that would allow, constitutionally, the state to make peace with certain criminal gangs, or groups of recycled combatants that had previously demobilised. This created a credibility gap which continued to undermine the peace initiative.

“Even today, no group has taken a serious position on disarming or demobilisation or reducing violence,” said Arias.

FIP also questioned the government’s own seriousness in finalizing any negotiations, terming Paz Total an “electoral peace”; endless rounds of talks through the upcoming election period.  

It’s a strategy Arias condemned: “This government seems intent on continuing the process at whatever costs and put the burden of resolution on the next government. This is politically irresponsible.”

Lack of concrete results could also taint future processes, he said.

“The poor results have thrown doubt on the idea that political solutions to conflict is the best route, which is very worrying, and eventually exposes communities to more risk.”

His main message – and the key finding of the FIP report – was that ending conflict in Colombia required more than goodwill, he told The Bogotá Post.

“It’s incoherent to talk of ‘peace or security’. We need to talk of ‘peace and security’. Without that, we’ve gone backwards.”

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We analyse recent homicide figures in Colombia’s capital.

Last month we looked at the latest homicide data for the city: in 2025 violent deaths went down 3.4% on the previous year. These 1,165 killings gave Bogotá – with a population of around 8 million – a homicide rate of 14.8 deaths per 100,000 of the population.

This month we look deeper into this statistic.  Why homicides? Though an imperfect indicator, murder rates do give an insight into insecurity in a zone as they are often the extreme outcome of robberies gone wrong, gang feuds, political violence, domestic violence, fights, targeted killings, drugging of victims and bungled kidnappings. Put simply, the number of bodies means the amount of crime.  

Crime patchwork

Where are homicides happening? In our own analysis of Bogotá’s 20 districts (see map below) the gritty downtown area of Sant Fe has the highest rate of 54 killings per 100,000 inhabitants, followed by nearby Los Martíres with 47, and Ciudad Bolívar with 33.

Sant Fe, like many Bogotá districts, is a patchwork of agreeable barrios, such as the touristy Las Aguas for example, and historic La Candelaria (with just three homicides last year) juxtaposed with crime-ridden neighborhoods.

But in the southwest corner of Santa Fe lies San Bernardo, or ‘Samber’ as it is known locally, generally recognized as the most dangerous barrio in Bogotá, a hub for gangs selling drugs to street people and the scene of several fatal grenade attacks in 2025.

Santa Fe is a reminder that in Bogotá safer streets are often just a block away from no-go zones. Rolos and long-term residentslearn to navigate these invisible barriers.

To emphasize this point, Santa Fe, statistically the most dangerous district in the city, lies adjacent to the leafy district of Teusaquillo with a homicide rate of 5 per 100,000 in 2025 (amounting to nine deaths), which according to this metric makes it the safest district in Bogotá.

Less grim up north

Other districts registering less than 10 killings per 100,000 in 2025 are the more upmarket northern districts of the city: Chapinero, Usaquén, Suba, Fontibón and Engativá. And as in most years, there is a gradient towards safer barrios in the north, with the dividing line running roughly along the Avenida El Dorado (Av Calle 26).

But in terms of reducing crime, there are success stories in the south. While still the most dangerous district, Santa Fe has reduced its homicide rate by 28 per cent in 2025 alongside Bosa, Usme and Antonio Nariño, all with reductions in double digits.

These results are hard to assess; organized criminal gangs are present in all these areas, so the peace could be transitory and a result of rival gangs declaring a truce, or one gang leveraging control, rather than societal shifts or better policing.

In some cases, large-scale operations have had an impact, combing security and social services in a carrot and stick approach called megatomas. In Santa Fe, for example, following the grenade attacks, the Bogotá administration both militarized the barrio and flooded it with development programs to support the huge homeless population there. This approach seems to have worked, at least temporarily.

On the negative side, three central districts (Puente Aranda, San Cristóbal and Rafael Uribe Uribe) have seen a spike in killings, a reminder of the balloon effect; pushing down on crime in one zone just forces it to pop up somewhere else.

Sicario scenarios

What’s behind the killings? Police databases do not reveal motives, but media coverage and occasional analyses by Bogotá’s Secretaría de Seguridad give insights into the city’s mean streets. 

Targeted killings, usually carried out by paid hitmen (sicarios), are for the city the visible tip of an underworld iceberg of organized crime. Hits are carried out often on the street or public spaces against identified victims by professional gunslingers sometimes recruited specifically for the job with promises of cash.

Clear-up rates are low: in June last year city councilors complained that in the first half of 2025 out of 521 homicides, 156 were targeted hits, for which only 16 people had been arrested. “In other words, 90 per cent of assassinations on Bogotá go unpunished,” pointed out councilor Julián Espinosa in one debate.

This was despite the city police’s vaunted Plan Candado – Padlock Strategy – of mobile rapid response teams and drones to quickly catch perpetrators by locking down zones within minutes of a major crime.

The most high-profile killing was the gunning down of senator and presidential candidate Miguel Uribe, shot in the head during a walkabout in a Bogotá park. The police quickly apprehended the small-time gangsters behind the shooting in June 2025, including the 15-year-old shooter, but today despite nine arrests are no closer to revealing the paymasters behind the hit.

Another unsolved assassination was the targeted killing of emerald czar Hernando Sánchez, shot dead while walking with his family in a leafy northern suburb of Usaquén in April last year. The military-style killing, by a sniper hiding in nearby woodlands, was identical to the mysterious murder nine months before of a fellow emerald baron, known as Pedro Pechuga, also unresolved.

Weapons of choice

Despite Colombia having restrictions for private ownership of firearms, the majority of 2025 killings were with guns, at 703, according to the police database. Other weapons recorded were knives (304), blunt objects (84) and grenades (6).

This pattern has persisted for decades; Colombia, and its capital, are flooded with illegal firearms, many of them from the estimated 600,000 guns smuggled south across the border from the U.S. each year.  Just in the first four months of 2025, police confiscated 8,466 illegal weapons across the country

According to Carolina Ortega, a political scientist at the National University, and quoted by  UPI, illegal guns were used in 78 per cent of killings in Colombia.

Easy access to guns also raised the risk of spontaneous killings, according to data from the Secretaria de Seguridad which showed that40 per cent of Bogotá homicides followed a dispute, argument or scuffle.

Most of these happened outside on the street, late in the evening, and “amidst scenes of revelry and excessive alcohol consumption”, said the report, released as part of a media campaign called “Take a second before you shoot…”.

Violent machismo

Femicides went down on 2025, both in Bogotá and at national level, according to data released this week by the Observatorio de Mujeres y Equidad de Género de Bogotá.

In Bogotá during 2025 there were 97 females killed, around 8% of total violent deaths. Of these, 20 were classified as femicides. This was slightly less than in 2024 (22 deaths) and mirrored a similar reduction (7%) nationally. Nationally, approximately one killing in five of a female was later classified as a femicide, the “violent expression of machismo”, said the study.  

A study by Bogotá’s Secretaria de la Mujer found that in 49 per cent of cases in the capital, the women had suffered physical violence in the weeks before the murder, and 40 per cent had previously sought help from the police.

According to observatory data, last year Secretaria staff supported 142,688 women, of which 48% were facing violence, a slight reduction on the previous years. The 2025 figures were a reminder that although more warning signs were being detected, timely intervention was not always possible, said the report.

“Femicide does not arise from nothing: it is foreshadowed, repeated, and often normalized before reaching its most tragic outcome,” it concluded.

Pay up – or pay the price

In 2025 many Bogotá murders were linked to extortion demands, with gangs ruthlessly gunning down small business owners if they failed to pay protection money. Sometimes shop staff or a passerby were also killed or injured, in some case with grenades or explosives.

Protection rackets are nothing new in the city, but cases and killings skyrocketed post-pandemic partly because of turf wars between gangs diversifying from the drug trade and Venezuelan gangs linked to the transnational group Tren de Aragua with names like Las Satanás and Los Coyotes.

Extortion reached epidemic proportions in 2024, with an average of 200 cases a month, and continued into 2025 with a rash of crimes such as the killings of informal minibus drivers in the south of Bogotá.

Overall, Bogotá in 2025 saw extortion go down by 20 per cent compared to 2024, though it was still higher than any year during the previous decade. And already in the first month of 2026 there have been several murders linked to extortion demands including a grenade attack on a nightclub in Los Mártires last week which killed one and injured a dozen more.

Millionaire’s ride

Another death last week, that of a university professor found dead and incinerated on the outskirts of the city, highlighted increased cases of Bogotá’s infamous Paseo Millonario, where armed gangs working with taxi drivers attack and extort passengers, often torturing them to reveal bank details while they empty their accounts.

Victims are often targeted late at night leaving bars or restaurants. In a chilling twist, recent cases pointed to victims being subdued with ketamine, with the drug either killing or severely incapacitating the victim.

According to data from the GAULA (Anti-Kidnapping and Extortion Group), 40 Paseo Millonario cases were reported in 2025, a rise of 207 per cent on the previous year. Even that figure was thought to be a huge underestimate since many victims were too scared to come forward. Hotspots were in Chapinero, Kennedy, Bosa, Ciudad Bolívar, and Fontibón.

In one case a taxi gang held a victim for 19 hours, prompting the Attorney General’s Office to reclassify such crimes as “kidnapping” with a potential 42-year prison sentence. In theory this prompted the police to start responding more robustly to a crime that has plagued Bogotá for decades.

Perpetrators of these high-impact crimes were also more likely now to get locked up, with 47 imprisoned last year out of the 52 captured, which was way above average jailing rate of 6 percent of criminals arrested, according to Bogotá police chief Giovanni Cristancho, talking to RCN News last week.

But he also admitted that the understaffed police force was struggling to keep up with constantly emerging kidnap gangs, usually small teams of four or five people which could easily move around the city.

“As soon as we reinforce one area, such as around Calle 85, the modus operandi shifts to other zones,” he told RCN.

It’s that randomness, and the risk of being drugged – or worse – that makes the Paseo Millonario one of the most feared crimes in Bogotá. And for 2026, the one to watch.

The post Bogotá’s murder mosaic appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

ELN guerrillas have announced the recovery of iconic revolutionary Camilo Torres. They now want his body returned to Bogotá’s National University.

Colombia’s largest rebel army, the ELN – at war with the state since 1964 – have alerted the world to the likely discovery of the long-lost remains of Camilo Torres.

The fighting priest, killed in combat with the army 60 years ago, has been found by government forensic teams in the department of Santander, the ELN said in a press statement this week.

The ELN leaked the news before the Unidad de Búsqueda de Personas Dadas por Desaparecidas (UBPD) could finalize technical tests, but it was widely expected that the search is now ended for the respected cura and university professor who became a revolutionary martyr.

The ELN said they hoped his remains “would be respected and returned to the Bogotá campus of the National University”.

In the early 1960s, the young Torres was a chaplain, professor and founder of the faculty of sociology at the tempestuous Universidad Nacional. Today, the charismatic priest still figures strongly in campus iconography with his image and quotes decorating many walls.

From priest to combatant

An exponent of liberation theology – a strand of Catholicism calling for social justice in an era of extreme poverty in Latin American – Torres took to the hills in 1965 with the ELN, then a fledgling guerrilla group aligning itself with Marxist ideology.

Calling himself Argemiro, the priest quickly became an influential link between the rebels and the church, respected across the political spectrum, and a spiritual influence on socialist movements across the continent.

His most famous quote, still echoing through liberation theology, was: “If Jesus were alive today, he would be a guerrillero”.

A photo of Torres appeared in a flyer printed by the ELN in January 1966, with the academic pictured in uniform clutching a rifle alongside the words: “From the mountains of Colombia, I intend to continue the fight, weapons in hand, until I achieve power for the people. Not one step back! Liberation or death!”.

Friends divided

The latter came quicker than expected. Torres was killed in combat aged 37 on February 15, 1966, in his first action against state forces. The firefight took place in the rugged terrain around El Carmen de Chucurí, Santander.

Ironically, the army operation that killed Torres was led by General Álvaro Valencia Tovar, a childhood friend of the rebel priest. In an old article on Las 2 Orillas, the general described the pair’s friendship over many years, even while taking separate political paths; a potent reminder of personal ties tested by Colombia’s civil conflict.

According to Valencia Tovar, the ELN had prepared a deadly ambush in a jungle gorge with 35 fighters – including Torres – lying in wait for an army patrol. But the soldiers, even while taking heavy fire, outflanked the guerrillas and killed five of the ELN fighters. Torres was among the dead.

Thereafter the story was muddled: according to Valencia Tovar, the general himself took Torres’ remains to a military pantheon close to Bucaramanga, the regional capital of Santander, perhaps a form of honour for his former friend. But the exact location was never disclosed, a bone of contention with the guerrilla group who wanted to mourn their martyr.

In another historical twist, years later a video emerged of a young Juan Manual Santos – the future centre-right president of Colombia – declaring he was an “acolyte” of Torres, who was in fact his uncle.

In 2016, the then president Santos, perhaps as a gesture towards his own deceased uncle, but also as a signg of good faith during a peace process with the ELN, promised a state search for the remains of his fallen uncle. That peace process failed, like many others.

Playing for time

Over 70 years of conflict the Ejército de Liberación Nacional has proved hard to pin down: the on-off negotiations with the current Petro government mark the seventh cycle of peace talks spanning seven presidential terms since 1992, with the guerrillas still fighting.

Today, many observers see these negotiation cycles as cynical ploys by the Marxist-Leninist rebels to hold off military pressure while expanding their own territory and illicit activities, which today extends to cocaine production, illegal gold mining, extortion, kidnapping and human trafficking.

According to a profile by thinktank InsightCrime, in the last 20 years the ELN have become increasingly active in neighbouring Venezuela where they act as a mercenary army for the Chavista regime with a strong role on controlling the borders.

That dynamic shifted after the U.S. military operation in early January in Venezuela to detain autocratic leader Nicólas Maduro.

Now less welcome in Venezuela, and facing an increasingly hostile Petro government, even while entangled in a turf war with dissident FARC groups in northeast Colombia, the ELN fighters are feeling the pressure.

Blood and fire

On January 12 this year, the ELN proposed another bite at the peace apple with a new ‘national accord’. This though was quickly rejected by President Petro, who wrote on X that the guerrillas had to renounce their illicit activities – primarily gold and cocaine – before coming to the table.

During the first three years of his term, Petro suffered several perfidies by the ELN such as their surprise attacks on rival groups in the coca enclave of Catatumbo last year that left hundreds dead and thousands displaced.

Responding to the ELN offer Petro, said he had “already offered an agreement, but they destroyed it with blood and fire, and by killing humble peasants”.

It is likely the Colombian president is now holding off until after his meeting with the Trump administration in Washington scheduled for February 3.  Any reconciliation between Petro and the U.S. president – their relationship has been rocky – could open the door for increased military support to combat the ELN, designated as a terrorist organization by the U.S. State Department since 1997.

Colombia’s ‘Che‘

Such a deal, combined with changes in Venezuela, could tilt the conflict in favour of Colombian state forces. And while still a potent fighting force, the ELN could prefer an escape route via the negotiation table in 2026 if talks open up with Petro or his successor.

With that in mind, it is probable that finding of Camilo Torres – miraculously close to the 60th anniversary of his death – is no coincidence, but rather a strategy in the poker game between state and guerrillas.

The wait now is for final confirmation of the remains by the UBPD.  Meanwhile the search unit is keeping mum on how, where, and when the body was found.

And if the ELN are claiming Torres as their own, then so is Petro: “The body of Father Camilo Torres Restrepo will be respected and laid to rest with honours,” he said on X this week, painting the priest as a national hero.

Perhaps putting him in the spotlight is a nod to Petro’s own rebel credentials as a former member of M-19 guerrilla group. And Torres is a timely reminder of how the ELN rebels – recently accused of human slavery in illicit mining camps  – are far removed from their ideological roots.

Where both sides agree is that his final resting place should be the National University campus in Bogotá. That´s a start. Sixty years after his death the fighting priest, seen by some as Colombia’s Che Guevara, could have a new role in bringing peace.

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A simmering spat over candidates for government posts boiled up this week with revelations that a Bogotá university was faking professional titles for workers in Petro’s administration.

According to congress members revealing the scandal, 24 public servants got top contracts using dodgy titles from Universidad Fundación San José, a mold-breaking higher education institute once famed for accessible courses, but now under scrutiny for selling degrees.

They also accused Petro and his education chiefs of dragging their feet in investigating the university for the suspected fraud case.  

“Petro’s promises for education come to nothing,” said house representative Catherine Juvinao after she claimed to have identified 24 cases where officials and contractors in top government entities appeared to have been hired with diplomas from the Univerisity Foundation San José without all the tests.

One stand-out case was a government functionary who, according to university records, graduated in four quite different degrees – Business Administration, Industrial Engineering, Public Accounting and International Marketing – on the same day.

“This is one of the most serious cases. Who graduates with four degrees on the same day?,” the representative said in an interview with Semana magazine.

According to Juvinoa, the university handed out diplomas to students who had failed to complete the independent technical tests, known as PruebaPro, and in some cases had not studied at all.

Fake titles for plum jobs?

Although academic fraud has occured regularly in Colombia – and similar scandals have rocked previous governments – the investigations by Juvinao and her team are targeting an administration that promised to turn its back on corruption.

This week’s revelations followed last year’s political dogfight over the proposed appointment of 23-year-old Juliana Guerrero as vice-minister of youth. The candidate, who was close to both Petro and his education minister, was already embroiled in controversies over private use of police planes. Then in September she was found to have falsified her accounting qualifications at the university.

After public pressure the university rescinded the degree, and Guerrero herself told Caracol news that she intended to take the independent exams to regain her title in November.

Further investigations revealed a bigger suspicion: that the Petro government was routinely using the university – with which it had contracts – to fudge academic requirements for candidates favoured for plum jobs.

This week Juvinao accused  Petro government or running a “Cartel of Dodgy Diplomas” in cahoots with the San José university. “It’s bad news that our first left-wing government ended up being a monument to mediocrity, captured by an institution,” she said.

The state was “closing the door to those who studied hard by merit,” she said, while calling for a probe by the Attorney General’s office, adding that: “we have all the evidence to support any investigation”.

Political Attacks

For its part, the Ministry of Education announced this week it was investigating the University Foundation San José related to the case of Guerrero, Petro’s preferred candidate for the Ministry of Youth.

In the same communication, the ministry strongly denied it had any link to “illicit activities related to the expedition of academic titles”.

The Colombian president repeatedly defended Guerrero’s nomination for the post last year even after her degree was pulled by the university. Her only error was to claim her title before taking the final exam, he said, suggesting a storm in a teacup. The attacks were personal and political, he added.

“So, Juliana’s graduation exam, after completing her studies, was registered for in July and is scheduled for next November. Is that the summary of this scandal?” he wrote on X.

At first view Petro’s gesture seemed on target; young candidates, particularly female, get torrents of abuse in the rough-and-tumble of Colombian politics, often facing a public scrutiny less applied to old-school politicos.

But looking back that defence now seems misplaced: financial data revealed this month showed Guerrero had paid for her degree course long after receiving her diploma – almost unheard of in Colombia – while the university itself confirmed that she “never went to classes or presented exams nor complied with the accounting program”.

Doubling down

This week Petro doubled down on his defense of the University Foundation San José, claiming the accusations by the opposition unfairly focused on “poor single mothers” trying to get ahead.

“Private universities…allow these working women to study faster,” he said. “[Politicians] to gain votes shouldn’t destroy working women. I expect a public apology from these congresswomen to the working women of Colombia.”

To complicate the president’s narrative, referring to the Guerrero case, the university announced it had “detected and denounced a fraud” and had itself requested the attorney general’s office to investigate. It also promised to “stregthen internal audits” to prevent future cheating.

Representative Juvinao told Semana told Semana magazine that the Guerrero case suggested corruption in the form of cash for qualifications, and was likely “the tip off an iceberg”.

“There is a deliberate strategy to fabricate qualifications to fit the needs of Petro’s government departments,” she said.

In a country where people struggle for further education – and value highly their hard-earned academic qualifications – what started as an online spat over a youth representative is becoming a scandal with much more scope.

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Bogotá’s mayor and security chiefs celebrated some positive results last week with stats showing an overall reduction of high-impact crimes in the city during 2025, with the murder rate dropping in the city even as violent deaths increased across Colombia.

“In Bogotá in 2025, there were fewer homicides robberies, fewer vehicle thefts, fewer motorcycle thefts, fewer cases of extortion, more drug seizures, more weapons seizures, and more arrests,” said Bogotá´s mayor Carlos Galán, presenting a security scorecard showing security shifts in the first two years of his administration.

Some decreases were significant, such as extortion cases dropping by 20 per cent, stolen car cases by 22 per cent and commercial theft by 30 per cent. Others were less impressive: street robberies only reduced by 6 per cent, and cases of sexual violence by 8 per cent.

Homicides, perhaps the most significant metric, reduced last year by just 3.4%, with 1,165 killings recorded on the national police database compared to 1,214 in 2024. This gave Bogotá – with a population of around 8 million – a current homicide rate of 14.8 deaths per 100,000 of the population, according to the standard formula used to compare deaths across varying population sizes.

Limited success

This was way short of Mayor Galán’s stated goal of 8 deaths per 100,000 during his four-year tenure, but a better result than the national one. At 14.8, Bogotá’s homicide rate was considerably lower than Colombia’s national figure of 25.9 deaths per 100,000 of the population, based the alarming total of 12,484 violent deaths reported nationwide – a two per cent increase on the previous year.

City security secretary César Restrepo also pointed out that Bogotá had proportionally less murders than other major cities such as Bucaramanga, Cartagena, Barranquilla, Pereira and Cali (see table below). Medellín, however, bested the capital with a reduced rate of 11.7 per 100,000.

And in our own comparison with cities worldwide, Bogotá’s homicide rate was lower than Washington D.C. (17 per 100,000) Baltimore (23 per 100,000) or New Orleans (33 per 100,000) but much higher than most European cities such as London (currently at 1 per 100,000) or Berlin (3 per 100,000).

Backdrop of violence

The challenges facing Bogotá in reducing violence against a national backdrop of increasing insecurity were highlighted in a recent study by think tank Centro de Paz y Seguridad Externadista which compared homicides rates between recent national governments.

The current Petro government reported 40,633 violent deaths during its first three years, an increase of 11 per cent over the same period for the Juan Manuel Santos government (2014 to 18) and seven per cent higher than during Ivan Duque’s tenure from 2018 to 2022.

The data pointed to a failure of the Petro’s Paz Total (‘Total Peace’) process which reduced military pressure on illegal armed groups allowing them to expand their range and illegal activities in the last three years, concluded the report.

“Although the government insists that the national conflict is de-escalating, the figures point to another scenario: homicidal violence remains at high levels,” said study leader Andrés González in December presenting the findings on YouTube.

González also pointed out that while most territorial battles took place in rural areas, the effects reflected in urban hubs where local crime groups – often with links to larger armed groups – used lethal violence in conflicts linked to extortion and micro trafficking.

Catch and release

Another challenge for Bogotá’s security was the low conviction rate for captured criminals, according to city police chief Giovanni Cristancho in an interview with El Tiempo. Out of 33,000 criminals arrested in the city in 2025, less than 10 per cent ended up in jail, he said.

Criminals showed little fear of the justice system, and many caught by the police were multiple offenders, said Christancho, with the police having to “catch the same person 20 times”.

Recycling criminals back on the streets was “outside the control of the district government”, security chief Restrepoalso told  El Tiempo last week, but recognised it reflected badly on the city administration.

“Most citizens express their annoyance because criminals are either released or not convicted. As long as these other conditions remain unresolved, all the results we announce will continue to generate frustration among the public,” he said

This chimed with a common perception in Bogotá that even if the police are clamping down, the justice system as a whole is failing the city. Those concerns were echoed in a recent public survey by city watchdog Bogotá Como Vamos that found that a  62% of respondents perceived Bogotá as less secure, the highest figure recorded since 2008.

Catch and kill

Low conviction rates could explain the resurgence of vigilante justice being meted out by frustrated rolos in recent years, with groups of citizens organizing to capture and beat offenders, sometimes tying them to lampposts or parading them naked through neighborhood and posting videos on social media.

Barrio justice has long been a problem in Bogotá; a study from 2016, reported in The Bogotá Post, showed an average of one lynching death every three days over a 12 month period in the city.

A more recent phenomenon in the city is the rise of fleets of armed private security guards mounted on motorbikes chasing down stolen vehicles.

One company, Self Security GPS, uses satellite tracking and immobilizer devices to recover stolen vehicles, but also regularly posts alarming videos of their ‘commandos’ taking down car thieves, sometimes with dramatic shoot-outs on the street with passers-by diving for cover.

According to data from the mayor’s office, at the last count, there were 150,000 private security guards “supporting security in Bogotá” – far outnumbering the 17,500 uniformed police.

Increasingly though, frustration among everyday citizens has boiled over into drastic reactions to street crime. Such an attempt at instant justice ended in tragedy last week with three deaths after a Bogotá driver was robbed at gunpoint by two masked robbers on a motorbike; the victim gave chase and crushed the fleeing assailants with his pick-up truck. In the ensuing multi-vehicle crash one of the robbers was killed, along with two innocent travelers who also lost their lives.   

Statistically, not a good start to 2026.  

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Electronic jamming and missiles are two of the risks identified by US regulators.

Major airlines cancelled flights from Bogotá to Caracas this week after US regulators warned of “heightened military activity” around Venezuela.

Avianca and LATAM suspended flights through Venezuelan airspace, along with at least five other airlines, as a response to a Federal Aviation Authority NOTAM (Notice to Airmen) that reported “Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) interference” around Maiquetía “Simón Bolívar” International Airport, which serves nearby Caracas.

The warnings were linked to military exercises under way in Venezuela, a response to threats from US forces massing in the Caribbean and aerial attacks on suspect drug boats, some originating from Venezuelan waters.

Colombia’s own airline regulator, Aeronáutica Civil de Colombia, repeated the FAA’s warning but said that air operators in Colombia could take “autonomous decisions” over flights to Venezuela.

On Monday several airlines were continuing direct flights from Bogotá, such as Wingo, Avior (a Venezuelan airline) and Satena (a commercial airline linked to the Colombian Ministry of Defense). Copa offered connections via Panama.

Mobile missiles

The list of airlines suspending flights continued to grow on Monday night with TAP, Turkish Airlines, Iberia and GOL being joined by Air Europa and Plus Ultra.

This came despite pushback from Venezuela’s Instituto Nacional de Aeronáutica Civil (INAC) which threatened to punish airlines for following the FAA’s recommendations.  According to a report in Aviation Online, airlines avoiding Caracas could in the long term lose access to the country’s airspace.

INAC also issued an ultimatum for airlines suspending flights “to resume services within a 48-hour period” or risk losing their landing permits.

Meanwhile the US FAA issued a more detailed FAA backgrounder clarifying that Venezuela had “at no point expressed an intent to target civil aviation”.

It did, however, seem concerned that the current context could trigger an air accident.

Venezuela, it said, had mobilized “thousands of military and reserve forces” with access to shoulder-mounted anti-aircraft missiles, or MANPADs (man-portable air defense systems), capable of downing low-altitude aircraft.

This followed comments by Maduro last month that his military were in possession of Russian-made Igla-S missiles “with no fewer than 5,000 of them in key anti-aircraft defense positions to guarantee peace, stability, and tranquility”.

Jammers and spoofers

The more immediate risk was to electronic systems, said the FAA documents, with several civil aircraft recently reporting interference while transiting Venezuela, in some cases causing “lingering effects throughout the night”.

“GNSS jammers and spoofers can affect aircraft out to 250 nautical miles [450 kilometres] and can impact a wide variety of critical communication, navigation, surveillance, and safety equipment on aircraft.”

The FAA said it would “continue to monitor the risk environment for US civil aviation operating in the region and make adjustments, as appropriate, to safeguard U.S. civil aviation”.

In fact, the US airlines stopped all direct commercial and cargo flights into Venezuela as part of an order issued in 2019, related to sanctions against the Maduro regime, widely seen as illegitimate, with the US State Department offering a bounty of US$50 million “for information leading to the arrest and / or conviction” .

Open to talks

Commentators on US – Venezuelan relations this week said that FAA announcement was not necessarily a sign of imminent US military action. Former Associated Press analyst Dan Perry told News Nation that the FAA warning was “a message that they [the FAA] expected the country to become unstable”, but did not point to a ground invasion.

For most observers, the NOTAM was a continuation of the maximum pressure strategy pursued by Washington against the Maduro regime, including a recent decision to declare the Cártel de los Soles — a disconnected group of corrupt military officers who facilitate drug shipments — as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.

Last week Maduro said he was open to talks with Washington, according to AP News, though US President Trump underscored that military action was “still on the table”.

In recent months the US has sent eight navy ships, a submarine, an aircraft carrier and 10,000 service members to the Caribbean. And since August, US firepower has killed at least 83 people in aerial attacks on speedboats suspected of running drugs; for anyone arriving in Venezuela, air is still safer than sea.

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