In an era of shifting global economic alliances, few countries find themselves more strategically positioned than Colombia. Caught between the massive state-backed investment initiatives of China and the established political and economic influence of the United States, Bogotá’s policy decisions have never held higher stakes for investors, the region, or especially, the country’s own citizens.

At the 2025 Colombia Gold Summit, Finance Colombia Executive Editor Loren Moss spoke with Daniel Giraldo, a Managing Director at FTI Consulting (NYSE: FCN), a global business advisory firm specializing in cross-border investment and corporate finance. Giraldo offered his perspective on the geopolitical chessboard, examining what Colombia’s recent decision to join the Belt and Road Initiative means for its future relationship with its largest long-standing ally, the United States.

Finance Colombia: I’m here with Daniel Giraldo of FTI Consulting. So we’re here at the 2025 CGS, Colombia Gold Summit, where we also talk about other precious metals, we talk about silver, we also talk about metals like copper, molybdenum, things like that. You gave an interesting talk yesterday, I don’t want to steal your thunder. Why don’t you summarize your discussion?

Daniel Giraldo: Well, if I could summarize my lecture yesterday, I think there’s a chessboard, a giant global chessboard right now. And there are two main players: US and China. And Colombia is one key figure, a key part of this chessboard. Right now, Colombia is in a key position with lots of opportunities between Chinese investment and the US investment. However, which decisions Colombia takes right now will shift the entire game for the coming years.

Finance Colombia: So we are in the last few months of a government that has been relatively friendly or biased towards China. And hostile might be too strong of a word, but relatively cold towards the United States, talking about the Petro government. Colombia, under Petro, just signed up for the Belt and Road Initiative. What is the significance of that for Colombia, not just in its relationship with the United States, but what does that do or change for Colombia?

Daniel Giraldo: Well, what we are seeing right now is that Colombia signed formally the Belt and Road Initiative earlier this year. And there’s been a lot of tensions with the Trump government. At the same time, the US is the main investor in Colombia. And what we’re seeing is how China, through different initiatives, wants to have a bigger long-term influence in the region. And Colombia is, in a soft way, saying, “We want that for us.” However, that’s not a shift that can be made automatically. That’s not made in a single signature by one president. It takes years and years to forge a relationship. And although the government of Petro, President Petro is showing how they’re very interested in the Chinese investment, and to have a strong relationship with the Chinese government, it’s not the way, to just step out of their major alliances throughout years with the US

Finance Colombia: The way that investment is done in China is fundamentally different than the way investment is done from places like the US or Canada or many European countries. In the US, if you’re going to attract investment in Colombia, it’s going to be with some company. And that company is going to do what it wants to do within the law but not really giving a damn about what Washington says or what Washington wants or what Ottawa says or wants. Whereas in China, it’s very much a government-to-government thing. You have state-owned enterprises, and Xi Jinping or the Communist Party says, “we’re going to invest in this,” whether it’s profitable or not, for whatever kind of geopolitical reasons that they want to do things. So it’s a fundamentally different thing.

If you do a deal with a company in the US, you’re doing a deal with that company. Now, yes, you have to make sure that regulatory things go through. Trump is a little bit more of a patronage type of president where he wants to get involved with things so he can find benefit for himself or his administration. But generally speaking, even still, if we look at investors, if you’re going to bring in someone to invest in one of these mining companies here or exploration, it’s a company. In China, it’s going to be a state-backed company. Now, what does that imply, then, for the way business would be done going forward, number one? And number two, Petro’s on his way out, and maybe there will be another left-wing government to continue his project, it doesn’t look like it at this point. But do you see continuity in that affinity or that participation in the Belt and Road Initiative? Like you mentioned, it’s not a treaty, it’s more of like a memorandum of understanding, like the diplomats like to call it. But what do you foresee over the next two or three years?

Daniel Giraldo: Yeah, I believe every tactic has been launched in a very moderate way somehow. So, of course, Belt and Road is just a framework, and every project that could be contemplated by Chinese government, depending on the feasibility of each one of these projects. So they’re not basically getting married yet, they’re just dating.

They’re just on their first dates. However, we’re married to the US We’ve had a long-standing marriage, and what we are seeing right now is that how investment works for both countries is different. However, for both countries, there are more and more, basically, things they require to be approved.

So in order to achieve this, the US is not being indirect about it. They require trusted partners. They require trusted allies, which get what’s at stake right now. So, Petro’s government has one year left. We are expecting a shift. However, even if Colombia gets a left-wing government or a right-wing government, it doesn’t change the fact that investment in the latest years has been in a rough place.

So Colombia requires this investment, and the country requires a very stable policy framework, regulatory framework, legal framework, in order to get investors feeling safer, with more appeal. And, yes, of course, it’s not the same as an SOE (State Owned Enterprise) Chinese company that wants to invest, that needs the approval of Beijing and all this. In contrast, we have the US. Of course, Washington can say whatever they want. They can say Petro is now on the Clinton list, and they can sanction him personally. But a company, a US company, can still invest here; it changes how they see Colombia in the long run.

Finance Colombia: I think one of the things that is very notable is that the Trump government sanctioned Petro, his son, his wife, and his interior minister personally, rather than imposing sanctions on the country or doing, like, I don’t know, tariff things. Actually, by the time we publish the video, we might know what happens, but right before the Supreme Court right now, actually as we speak, there is a challenge to Trump’s ability to circumvent congressional law. And so if we have a trade pact, like free trade agreement or something like that, a lot of businesses in the US have challenged Trump’s ability to just… you can’t just cancel a law. Congress passed a law, and it’s in effect, and you can’t just cancel it. Well, that’s what they’re arguing. And all of these kind of unilateral, discretionary tariff moves that affect entire economies and entire industries, there’s some uncertainty that is going to be settled there.

“However, we’re married to the US We’ve had a long-standing marriage, and what we are seeing right now is that how investment works for both countries is different.” – Daniel Giraldo

But it’s interesting because it seems that with them sanctioning Petro and Benedetti directly as individuals, they’re saying that they want to maintain some predictability and constancy in the bilateral economic relationship with Colombia. And I think that there have been a lot of missions. Fico, the mayor here in Medellin, some of the other mayors and Colombian congressional people have visited Washington and met with senators and met with people in the State Department and said, “Look, you know, we disagree with what the president’s doing. Wait a few months.” And it seems like Washington has heard that and is not acting too rashly towards Colombia as a country but rather decided to take their ire out directly on the president and his consigliere Armando Benedetti.

Daniel Giraldo: What I believe of this is that Trump’s government can say like, “We’re not afraid. We are not afraid of imposing sanctions. We’re not afraid of not conducting business in the way we used to do it anymore.” And it’s been shown, for example, in the relationship with China, for example, with the Chinese government, with Xi Jinping. And there’s been like an escalation of tariffs, for example, I think up to 130%. I can’t remember the exact number. And then last week they say, “let’s stop this. Let’s trade the sequels.” And it’s also their way of showing the carrot and then showing the mace or bat, this metaphor.

Finance Colombia: Yeah, the stick.

Daniel Giraldo: And with Colombia, I believe it is the same. It’s like we could, if we wanted, to give some sanctions and they will have great consequences in terms of our bilateral trade. However, they’re aware of their position. They’re our main investor. We have a very good relationship in bilateral trade. There’s been years and there’s been decades of both countries benefiting from each other. We have a great position in one of the closest countries to enter South America. And they know this government is just ending. So why would they give us, like give the left-wing parties an opportunity to just bash them and say, “Oh, Trump’s government can’t be trusted.” Whereas if you take another position and say, “Look, this is personal, this is just these individuals, not the whole country.” You still have ground to negotiate, to renegotiate, to benefit. So I believe it is quite tactical.

Finance Colombia: Another thing that you mentioned is the difference on the ground. When you look at, for example, if we talk about the mining sector, not just on the ground, but literally in the ground, the US right now, the Trump administration, and really just the US more broadly, is very concerned about rare earths. And Colombia, even though there’s not yet a lot of mining activity, Colombia does have rare earth potential. There’s already been illegal coltan, cobalt ore mining taking place down in the Amazon, things like that. But it would seem that further damaging relationships with Colombia right now would contravene the political strategy in the US to strengthen its rare earth mineral supply chain.

Daniel Giraldo: Yes, it is completely true. The US has shown how important it is for them to be less dependent on the supply chains of the Chinese government, specifically in terms of their rare earths and critical minerals refining processes. So the US has been in recent weeks signing lots of memorandums of understanding and bilateral agreements with Australia, with Japan, with Malaysia, with Thailand. And they already have very good deals with Argentina, with the Mineral Security Partnership, for example, Mexico, Peru, Argentina. And the Dominican Republic. And Colombia could be in the radar as well. And what Colombia requires to be here and to benefit with the US as well is just to be patient, to get the best and the highest standards of ESG, and to reassure the different governments that it is safe to trade minerals with Colombia. That if they purchase Colombian minerals, they explore the region and they trade with us, they will find quality, they will find high standards of minerals, without assuming lots of risks that these markets don’t want to assess anymore.

Finance Colombia: So longer term, looking out three to five years, are you optimistic or pessimistic about the bilateral relationship between the US and Colombia?

Daniel Giraldo: I feel optimistic, not only because it’s the most comfortable answer, but I do feel optimistic because I believe there is a lot of potential. And right now, the sector is not in its best place. But I believe that sometimes you just have to grit your teeth, take the punch, and then stand up again and do everything that’s in your power to just become better. And Colombia has a history of learning, and the sector will learn as well how to be more competent, how to attract investors, and how to get to the highest standard and quality of their bilateral trade with different countries.

Finance Colombia: Great. Well, Daniel Giraldo from FTI Consulting, you guys are one of the leading strategic consulting firms globally, especially when you look at things like cross-border investment. That seems to be your strong suit, even though you guys are a large firm and you guys do a lot of different things. Always great to see your presence here at CGS, at Colombia Gold Summit. And thanks for your insights.

Daniel Giraldo: It’s a pleasure, thanks for having me.

For a literary festival, silence can be more revealing than speech. The decision by three writers to withdraw from the 2026 Hay Festival in Cartagena over the presence of María Corina Machado, this year’s Nobel Peace Prize laureate and the most prominent figure in Venezuela’s democratic opposition, has exposed a paradox at the heart of contemporary literary culture: a professed devotion to free expression that falters when confronted with an inconvenient voice.

Hay Festival Cartagena, now in its 21st edition, is scheduled to take place from 29 January to 1 February 2026, with parallel events in Barranquilla, Medellín and a special edition in Jericó, Antioquia. Founded three decades ago in Wales and once described by Bill Clinton as “the Woodstock of the mind,” Hay has built its global reputation on the premise that literature flourishes in the presence of disagreement. Its stages have hosted figures as diverse – and divisive – as Salman Rushdie, Jonathan Safran Foer and David Goodhart, writers whose ideas have unsettled orthodoxies across continents.

Yet in Cartagena, dialogue has been recast as contamination.

The Colombian novelist Laura Restrepo, the Barranquilla-born writer Giuseppe Caputo and the Dominican activist Mikaelah Drullard announced they would not attend in protest at Machado’s invitation. Restrepo, winner of the 2004 Alfaguara Prize, had been scheduled to participate in several events, including a conversation with Indian novelist Pankaj Mishra and a session devoted to her most recent book, I Am the Dagger and I Am the Wound. In a public letter addressed to festival director Cristina de la Fuente, Restrepo described Machado’s presence as “a line” crossed.

“I must cancel my attendance at Hay Festival Cartagena 2026,” Restrepo wrote. “The reason is the participation of María Corina Machado, an active supporter of United States military intervention in Latin America.” Granting her a platform, Restrepo argued, amounted to facilitating positions hostile to regional autonomy.

Caputo echoed his reasoning on social media, announcing that “in the current context of escalating imperial violence, it is better to withdraw from a festival taking place opposite the bombarded waters of the Caribbean Sea.” Drullard, five days earlier, said she could not attend an event that “supports pro-genocide and interventionist positions through the mobilisation of those who promote them,” citing Machado’s proximity to the administration of US President Donald Trump.

What remains striking, however, is not merely the severity of these accusations but their selectivity. None of the boycott statements devotes comparable moral energy to denouncing the documented human rights abuses of Nicolás Maduro’s regime: arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances, torture of political prisoners, or the systematic dismantling of democratic institutions. One is left to ask whether the authors’ moral outrage extends to the lived realities of Venezuelans themselves, or whether it finds expression only when filtered through the optics of geopolitics.

The irony is sharpened by the fact that the same US administration helped secure Machado’s escape from Venezuela on December 8, enabling her to arrive in Oslo hours after her daughter Ana Corina Sosa received the Nobel Peace Prize on her behalf. “When the history of our time is written, it won’t be the names of the authoritarian rulers that stand out – but the names of those who dared resist,” noted the Nobel Foundation. 

The arguments from Machado’s detractors  warrant scrutiny – and above all, debate. What they do not justify is refusal from Latin America’s self-entitled literati. A boycott replaces argument with absence, moral reasoning with pantomime. It is a gesture that confers ethical purity upon the boycotter while foreclosing the very exchange that literature has traditionally claimed to defend. This is the “line” that cannot be crossed.

The Hay Festival’s response has been characteristically diplomatic In a statement following the cancellations, organisers reaffirmed their commitment to pluralism: “We reaffirm our conviction that open, plural and constructive dialogue remains an essential tool for addressing complex realities and for defending the free exchange of ideas and freedom of expression.” They stressed that Hay “does not align itself with or endorse the opinions, positions or statements of those who participate in its activities,” while respecting the decisions of those who chose not to attend.

That insistence on neutrality, however, also reveals a deeper unease. If a literary festival must repeatedly assert its impartiality, it may be because neutrality itself has become suspect. Increasingly, festivals are asked to function as courts of moral arbitration, conferring legitimacy on some voices while quietly disqualifying others. The result is not a more just cultural sphere, but a narrower one—policed less by argument than by consensus.

The controversy has unfolded at a particularly volatile moment for Venezuela’s eight-million diaspora. Machado’s invitation coincides with a renewed escalation in US pressure in the Caribbean Sea. On Tuesday, President Trump ordered a “total and complete blockade” of all sanctioned oil tankers entering or leaving the country, targeting Caracas’s principal source of revenue. His administration also designated Maduro’s government a Foreign Terrorist Organization, accusing it of using “stolen US assets” to finance terrorism, drug trafficking and organised crime.

“Venezuela is completely surrounded by the largest armada ever assembled in the history of South America,” Trump wrote on Truth Social. “It will only get bigger, and the shock to them will be like nothing they have ever seen before – until such time as they return to the United States all of the oil, land and other assets they previously stole from us.”

Against this backdrop, Machado’s high-profile presence at Hay has acquired a symbolic weight that far exceeds literary stages. Yet it is precisely at such moments that intellectual forums are tested. Fiction, after all, teaches empathy, complexity and the capacity to hold contradiction without retreat. To boycott rather than engage is to abandon that lesson – and, with it, democratical ideals.

The reputational cost to Hay Festival Cartagena may prove lasting – not because Machado was invited, but because the limits of reason and tolerance have been publicly exposed. A gathering that once prided itself on hosting difficult conversations now finds itself unsettled by the very principle on which it was founded.

And there is a final inflection. If Hay’s commitment to dialogue is grounded in a leftist agenda – if certain voices render discussion impossible – then Machado herself should reasonably question the value of her remote participation at the festival on January 30, for a scheduled conversation with Venezuelan journalist and former minister Moisés Naím.

In Cartagena, it is not Machado’s words that should concern audiences, but the intellectual impoverishment by those who chose not to speak to her at all.

The U.S. seizure of an oil tanker off the Venezuelan coast appears designed to further squeeze the economy of President Nicolás Maduro’s government. The Dec. 10, 2025 operation — in which American forces descended from helicopters onto the vessel — followed months of U.S. military buildup in the Caribbean and was immediately condemned by Venezuela as “barefaced robbery and an act of international piracy.”

The seized tanker, according to reports, is a 20-year-old supertanker called Skipper, capable of carrying around 2 million barrels of oil.

According to the Trump administration, the vessel was heading to Cuba. Given its size, however, it is far more likely that the final destination was China. Tankers of this scale are rarely used for short Caribbean routes; much smaller vessels typically serve Cuba.

The tanker had been sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury in 2022 for carrying prohibited Iranian oil. At the time, it was alleged that the ship — then known as Adisa — was controlled by Russian oil magnate Viktor Artemov and linked to an oil smuggling network.

On the surface, the seizure was unrelated to U.S. sanctions imposed on Venezuela in 2019 and expanded in 2020 to include secondary sanctions on third parties doing business with Caracas.

Venezuelan officials have therefore described the move as unprecedented, and they are largely correct. While Iranian tankers have been seized in the past for sanctions violations, this marks the first time a vessel departing Venezuela with a Venezuelan crew has been taken.

The Trump administration has signaled it intends to seize not only the cargo but the ship itself — a significant loss for the owning company. Because the shipment was sold under a “Free on Board” contract, the buyer assumed responsibility once the vessel left Venezuelan waters.

Nonetheless, the seizure represents a clear escalation in pressure on Venezuela. Reports indicate that around 30 other tankers operating near the country face some form of sanction. These vessels are part of a shadow fleet designed to evade restrictions while transporting oil from Venezuela, Russia, and Iran.

The message from Washington is unambiguous: more seizures may follow as the U.S. seeks to further squeeze Venezuelan oil revenues.

Venezuela’s economy remains overwhelmingly dependent on oil. Although official figures have not been published for seven years, most analysts estimate that oil accounts for more than 80% of exports, with some placing the figure above 90%.

Most Venezuelan oil is sold on the black market, largely to independent refiners in China. Chinese state-owned firms avoid these purchases to limit sanctions exposure, while authorities in Beijing tend to overlook shipments to non-state entities — particularly when tankers conceal their true origin.

An estimated 80% of Venezuelan oil ultimately goes to China through this channel. About 17% is exported to the United States under a Treasury license granted to Chevron, while roughly 3% goes to Cuba, often on subsidized terms.

Oil also accounts for around 20% of Venezuela’s GDP and more than half of government revenue, making the sector indispensable to Maduro’s survival.

Crucially, Venezuela’s oil industry was already in steep decline before U.S. sanctions began. Production peaked at 3.4 million barrels per day in 1998, fell to 2.7 million by the time Maduro took office in 2013, and dropped to 1.3 million barrels per day by 2019.

The 2019 oil sanctions shut Venezuela out of the U.S. market, forcing it to rely more heavily on China and India. When secondary sanctions followed in 2020, Europe and India halted purchases altogether. Combined with the pandemic-driven oil slump, production collapsed to just 400,000 barrels per day.

Output has since recovered to about 1 million barrels per day, aided largely by Chevron’s continued operations.

To sustain exports, Venezuela relies on a shadow fleet that uses false flags, renamed vessels, and manipulated transponders. Cargoes are sometimes transferred at sea — posing major environmental risks — before being relabeled in transit hubs such as Malaysia and shipped on to China.

The tanker seizure had little immediate impact on global oil prices due to ample supply and Venezuela’s limited market share. However, a more aggressive U.S. campaign could change that calculus.

For Venezuelan oil prices, the consequences may be sharper. Already heavily discounted due to sanctions risk, Venezuelan crude is now likely to be sold at even steeper reductions. Buyers will demand higher discounts and fewer prepayments, while export volumes may fall, forcing production cuts that are costly to reverse.

The result will be further pressure on the limited revenues Maduro depends on to keep the Venezuelan state afloat.

About the author:
Francisco J. Monaldi, Ph.D., is the Wallace S. Wilson Fellow in Latin American Energy Policy and director of the Latin America Energy Program at the Center for Energy Studies at Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy.

This article is reproduced from The Conversation under a Creative Commons licence