After being removed from the United States, a family tries to rebuild their life back in Colombia.

Confused about the upcoming Colombian presidential election? We’re here to help you with a set of cheat sheets on the top candidates so you can follow the local news. Today we’re looking at poll leader Iván Cepeda of the Pacto Histórico.

Who is Iván Cepeda?

Iván Cepeda Castro is a leftist politician who has served in the Colombian senate for the last 12 years. Before that, he was a Congressman for a term. Born in Bogotá to activist politician parents, the family was forced into exile in Soviet Czechia and Cuba in his youth. At 63 years of age, he’s notably older than his main rivals.

His father was assassinated for political reasons in 1994, something that has unsurprisingly contributed enormously to his sociopolitical views. He was a young communist, but long since moved away from that, preferring to concentrate on social analysis, activism and campaigning against rightist corruption.

He represents the Pacto Histórico ruling coalition, meaning that he benefits from the popularity of the current president Gustavo Petro. That’s no surprise, as they’ve been firm friends and comrades for years, with the president supporting his bid.

In comparison to his mentor, Cepeda is far more serious. Petro often plays the cuddly socialist grandpa, going off on tangents about free love and so forth. Cepeda is much more of a hardline Maoist academic who is well up for a long march through the institutions. He lacks the charisma of Petro, coming across more professorial and dry.

Is he polling well?

Very. He’s absolutely nailed on for the second round, with the only real question being how high his vote share is. There is some speculation that he may come second, but more likely he will be comfortably in front of the two rightest candidates.

The trickier part is the second round, when the right will be consolidated behind one person rather than split in two. He’s still often favourite against both Abelardo de la Espriella and Paloma Valencia, but likely prefers the former.

While he’s been out in front all through the campaigning process, he’s not really gone anywhere, simply sitting on 38-43% in every poll. While that’s admirable consistency, it also calls into question his ability to draw in the undecided voters.

He’s a marmite candidate, with very few informed voters neutral on him. Either you think he’s the saviour of the republic who can make Colombia more equal or you think he’s a dangerous revolutionary who will ruin the country. A lot of votes are for him under any circumstance and as many are against him under any circumstance.

What’s his campaign like?

Firmly leftist, unsurprisingly. He’s also leaning heavily into being the continuity candidate for the Petro government. That makes sense, with approval levels riding high after the giant minimum wage increase this year. While that might yet be a problem down the line, it’s electoral dynamite.

However, his campaigning has been rather lacklustre. He’s not a natural orator in the way that Petro is, and he lacks charisma, coming across as a dry theoretical academic. Perhaps aware of this, his team have arranged rallies where he can preach to the converted and otherwise keeping him out of the spotlight.

In reality, much of his campaigning is being done by others. Petro is the key figure here, with the president right up against the line of not technically campaigning. However, the head of state is taking a lot of actions that are clearly designed to help Cepeda, as well as constantly using his pulpit to call for the continuation of his ideas.

Complementing this is an incredibly powerful influencer/social push. Much of this is fairly organic, with Pacto supporters used to activism and intuitively good at promoting their candidate. It fits in well with his man of the people image. The biggest meme is ‘Solo pacto en esta mondá’. Notably, Cepeda himself isn’t the draw, with variations on the phrase namechecking Petro.

Combined with his very loose manifesto (see below), his campaign messaging is basically that only the Pacto will stand up for the people, especially those that have been treated poorly by the state. There’s little in the way of concrete offers, just a call for loyalty.

So what’s in his manifesto then?

You can read it for yourself online, but have a big pot of tea ready: it outdoes Marx and Engels at a whopping 433(!) pages long. A lot of that is AI images, while the actual propuestas are hidden away between rambling discourse, tangential essays, theoretical musings and diary entries. Notably, it is mostly in the past and present tenses.

A recurring theme is the involvement of civil society via what he calls the poder constituyente, especially youth and women’s groups. He claims he will call all political and social actors to the table in a mesa de diálogo nacional aimed at forming concrete proposals.

This will be implemented by a new Alianza Público-Popular which will allow civil groups to directly manage state funds. Both ethnic minority and campesino territories will be recognised and organised. There will be a Banco del Pueblo to improve access to financial instruments for poorer people as well as the unbanked.

Security is not a priority, but the key aim is to dismantle armed groups that are ‘successors of paramilitaries’. Iván Cepeda will continue the extant peace talks set up by Petro, but with a red line over assassinations of social leaders. Coca farmers will be encouraged to turn away from illegality via crop substitution.

Corruption will be dealt with by the Secretary for Transparency of the Presidency being given full independence and the Fiscalía receiving an Institute for Macrocorruption, as well as beefing up existing systems. Civil society will be encouraged to involve themselves in these processes.

A new Ley de Austeridad Republicana will be brought in to limit state spending via civil servants in an attempt to cut costs. He will reduce the salaries of the president’s office immediately and encourage his ministers to do the same. There will be greater scrutiny of public spending across all levels of the state. Again, no details.

More interesting is the promise to give victims of corruption resources, partially funded by seizure of illegal gains. All of this will be aimed at the parts of the country with the highest rates of corruption and impunity.

Victims of the conflict, meanwhile, will benefit from a new acuerdo nacional which will aim to deliver further reparations. He will also make sure that the 2016 peace agreement is carried out as originally planned, focusing on the Planes de Desarollo con Enfoque Territorial (PDET) for the areas most affected.

International relations will not revolve around the interests of Washington or Miami (?), but rather the national interest. The plan is for autonomy and integration, again involving civil society to work with foreign-based counterparts.

For rural areas, there will be 30,000km of minor roads built to improve connections to far-flung places, known as the vías para la paz. There will also be more rights to participate in politics, defend territory, improve connectivity and services, more land restitution and so on, none of which is clearly defined or detailed in numbers.

Rubbish is on the agenda, unlike any other candidate. He promises to strengthen and enforce recycling schemes and the basura cero initiative. Revitalisation and regrowth of urban areas is also under plan. On transport, he says he will rejuvenate trains as well as sort out the roads.

Who is he running with?

Aida Marina Quilcué Vivas is an Indigenous activist and current senator of the Republic. While she won’t bring any votes with her, this is a huge signal from the Pacto that they are serious about Indigenous representation.

Her selection shows Pacto confidence that they don’t need to reach out and form alliances with other groups. The advantage is that Quilcué and Cepeda will agree on virtually everything, in sharp contrast to Petro and Francia Márquez.

Quilcué has been an active part of the campaign, rallying supporters across the country, especially in rural and Indigneous areas. She’s chastised Abelardo for using the jaguar as a symbol. She’s also clashed with Paloma Valencia over indigenous rights in Cauca.

Is he a communist guerrilla that will expropriate my property?

No, he’s not. He was a young communist, but distanced himself from the party (against the wishes of his family) three and a half decades ago. He’s not a guerilla either and never has been, despite his closeness to M-19. He’s a leftist for sure, but that is not synonymous with communism either in act or desire.

The reason this gets so much traction is that he has certainly been close to guerilla groups, either working with them or in peace talks. He doesn’t help this by his actions, often going out of his way to avoid criticising groups that have a nominally leftist agenda, while specifying that he wants to go after ex-paras.

What’s all this about the Caso Uribe?

Iván Cepeda has been a fierce critic of Álvaro Uribe dating all the way back to when Uribe was in the Casa de Nariño. In many ways, the ex-president has defined Cepeda’s political career as much as Petro, though as sworn enemy rather than comrade. 

Cepeda accused the ex-president of links to paramilitarism, relating to the falsos positivos case and others. After repeated attacks in the Senate, Uribe filed a defamation writ against Cepeda, which was eventually annulled. In turn, Uribe found himself under investigation for allegedly attempting to influence witnesses in that case.

Vindication came last year with a Bogotá court ruling in favour of Cepeda after over a decade of deliberation. However, it was only a partial victory, with the ex-president only being declared guilty of fraude procesal y soborno en actuación judicial.

This means there is absolutely no love lost between the two, with Uribe’s preferred candidate Paloma Valencia and Iván Cepeda frequently clashing in the Senate and in the media. Abelardo de la Espriella also is close to Uribe, having represented him legally.

Any skeletons in his closet?

Yes. He has a habit of ignoring things that aren’t connected to paramilitarism or the peace process, ending up as one of the most absent senators in the last couple of years. He also has habitually evaded making clear statements on his health following his diagnosis of bowel cancer. He claims it is in remission, but rumours swirl that it is not. 

Then there’s the Operation Fénix affair. He was allegedly namechecked in emails found in a raid on a FARC base. It’s never been fully proved or denied, but has always hung over him. Added to the controversy over recent audioclips by guerrillas referring to him as a comrade, it fuels the fire for those who see him as too close to armed groups.

So, can he succeed?

Yes, he can and is probably the favourite at the moment. It would be absolutely shocking were he not to get to the second round and he matches up well with both of the two people he’s likely to face there.

Of the two rightists, he probably wants to see Abelardo against him. While he carries a threat as a markedly anti-establishment candidate in contrast to Cepeda’s life in politics, he will also turn off some of the anti-left candidates, especially those who want someone serious.

Voto en blanco could then become the decider. If we end up with a situation where a high number of voters decide they want neither option, Cepeda is likely in luck. It’s entirely possible that he could win without crossing 50% of the vote.

The popularity of Petro works in his favour, as does the minimum wage issue. Many will want further increases and see him as the best way to get that done. This may not be a vote for him so much as for the Pacto, but they all count.

However, there are no guarantees. He will get very few voters coming across from eliminated candidates. The key battle here will be turnout, which usually increases by 5-10 percentage points for the runoff.

The post Candidate guides for the 2026 Colombian elections: Iván Cepeda appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

Colombia’s 2026 vice-tourism inadmissions outpace all of 2025

Migración Colombia denied entry to an American known on social media as Casey Red Beard at Aeropuerto Internacional El Dorado in Bogotá on Saturday, May 23, returning him on an immediate flight to Miami after officials confirmed prior alerts linking him to the alleged promotion of sex tourism and private gatherings in Medellín. The traveler has been barred from entering Colombia for 10 years.

The decision drew on existing anotaciones registered by the agency’s Regional Antioquia-Chocó office, derived from public denouncements made in earlier years. According to Migración Colombia, the man had used social media to promote private gatherings in apartments in Medellín aimed at foreign visitors, marketed under the name Programa de Inmersión en Medellín. The agency described packages priced in US dollars that included private dinners, exclusive parties, excursions, and food and transport for women attending the events.

A message attributed by Migración Colombia to the organizers of the parties read: “Mis clientes son millonarios y me pagan muy bien para lanzar fiestas donde solo haya chicas educadas (…) ellos no quieren conocer las chicas que están en el Lleras a las 2 a.m.” (“My clients are millionaires and they pay me very well to throw parties where there are only educated girls (…) they don’t want to meet the girls who are at Lleras at 2 a.m.”)

“In several posts, he brags that his “white advantage” helps him attract Latin American women and urges men to get their passports.” – Jessica Van Meir in The Baffler #77, January 2025

Statements from Bogotá and Medellín

The Director General of Migración Colombia, Gloria Esperanza Arriero, said the agency “no solo tiene rigor en el control migratorio, sino también capacidad en las verificaciones y en la toma de decisiones para combatir la trata de personas y la explotación sexual de niños, niñas y adolescentes con todos los elementos posibles” (“not only enforces migration controls rigorously, but also has the verification and decision-making capacity to combat human trafficking and the sexual exploitation of children and adolescents with every available element”). Arriero added that the agency would continue strengthening control mechanisms to prevent the entry of persons it determines pose risks to communities.

The Mayor of Medellín, Federico Gutiérrez, addressed the case on his X account: “Otro más. Go Home Un estadounidense conocido en redes sociales como Casey Red Beard llegó a Bogotá en un vuelo desde Miami y fue devuelto a su país por Migración Colombia, luego de confirmarse que estaba en la lista Alertas Medellín, por promoción explícita de turismo con fines de explotación sexual, organizando fiestas en apartamentos de la ciudad.” (“Another one. Go Home An American known on social media as Casey Red Beard arrived in Bogotá on a flight from Miami and was returned to his country by Migración Colombia, after it was confirmed he was on the Alertas Medellín list for the explicit promotion of tourism for the purposes of sexual exploitation, organizing parties in apartments in the city.”)

“Let it be clear: there is no place here for foreigners who come to promote disorder and skirt the law.”— Federico Gutiérrez, Mayor of Medellín

The Alertas Medellín list cited by Gutiérrez is a municipal mechanism maintained by the Alcaldía de Medellín that flags foreign nationals associated with criminal activity, security risks, or conduct authorities consider incompatible with public coexistence. The list is shared with Migración Colombia for use at points of entry.

Identifying the Subject

Authorities publicly identified the man only by his social-media handle, Casey Red Beard, and the affiliated X account @RedBeardRants1. The individual operating under the handle is Casey Brown, an American previously identified by name in a January 2025 essay in The Baffler by journalist Jessica Van Meir, who described him as “a self-proclaimed red-pilled dating coach” who advertised “gringo parties” in Medellín “for American tourists to meet Colombian women.” Van Meir cited a 2023 report in the Colombian feminist outlet Manifiesta alleging that Red Beard and an accomplice had engaged in sex trafficking. A LinkedIn profile consistent with the same identification also presents him under the name Casey Brown. Migración Colombia has not commented on legal-name identification.

Self-Styled ‘Red-Pilled’ Dating Coach

The public profile cultivated by the subject sits squarely within the so-called “red pill” or “manosphere” online community — a network of self-styled male-dating influencers whose best-known international figure is the British-American social-media personality Andrew Tate, currently under indictment in Romania on charges including human trafficking and rape. On his YouTube channel, which operates under the handle @redbeardrants, and in his publicly indexed marketing materials, Red Beard describes his stated mission as one to “destroy loneliness in men” and promotes a method built around mass online-dating outreach, paid virtual assistants, and copy-paste messaging “funnels.” His published guidance to clients includes an explicit recommendation to “leave the west (USA, Canada, UK, etc.). Go to a more favorable dating market like Eastern Europe, South America, Asia, etc. where the women are more feminine, beautiful, cooperative, and easier to obtain.” His listed past collaborations include Myron Gaines and the Fresh and Fit Podcast, a manosphere-adjacent program in the same broader subculture.

Investigators reviewing his social-media output cited the same framing in their internal alerts. Beyond the “chicas educadas” message attributed to the organizers by Migración Colombia, the agency noted that Red Beard’s published content has historically marketed Medellín itself as the destination commodity, with the city’s Parque Lleras nightlife district and surrounding El Poblado sector positioned as the operational base for his promoted experiences.

Mayor’s Office Has Made Vice and Sex Tourism a Signature Enforcement Priority

Federico Gutiérrez has positioned the protection of women and children from sexual exploitation as a defining priority of his second, non-consecutive mayoral term, treating the suppression of vice tourism as both a public-safety obligation and a city-brand imperative. The May 23 Casey Red Beard inadmission fits a sustained two-year enforcement push that began in his first weeks back in office in early 2024. Within weeks of taking office, the administration imposed a curfew restricting unaccompanied minors from designated zones — including La 33, La Candelaria, and the Corredor de la 70 — to combat commercial sexual exploitation of children. In April 2024 the mayor used emergency powers to outlaw prostitution in the El Poblado sector, including the Parque Lleras zone, and authorities sealed a guesthouse called Gotham marketed through Airbnb on grounds related to alleged organized criminal activity, with extinción de dominio (asset forfeiture) proceedings sought against the property.

The enforcement push has been backed by explicit US support. In April 2024 the US Ambassador to Colombia, Francisco Palmieri, met with Gutiérrez in Bogotá and pledged the “total cooperation of the US government and its resources” to support Colombian law enforcement against sexual exploitation and human trafficking, including the extradition of US citizens to Colombia where applicable. A bilateral operational pattern was already visible in March 2024, when two US citizens were arrested for the sexual exploitation of minors in Colombia following coordinated raids. Subsequent arrests in August 2024 involved direct coordination with the US Department of Homeland Security’s Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) on a transnational case involving a Mexican operator and routes through El Poblado, Belén, Cancún, and Mérida.

Municipal prevention has run alongside enforcement and has been framed around the protection of minors and women in conditions of economic vulnerability. The Secretary of Security and Coexistence of Medellín, Manuel Villa Mejía, has overseen periodic mega-operativos involving more than 300 agents drawn from the Policía Nacional, the army, Migración Colombia, and municipal agencies, targeting establishments and accommodations linked to alleged exploitation. In October 2025 the Alcaldía launched training for owners and administrators of tourist accommodations in coordination with Fundación Renacer, a Colombian non-governmental organization specializing in the prevention of commercial sexual exploitation of children. City-government figures from October 2024 reported a 160% increase in arrests for sexual violence against minors and 22,000 calls to the city’s 123 emergency line for child and adolescent protection requests during that year, even as overall foreign tourist arrivals rose 26% — a data pairing the Alcaldía has used to argue that brand recovery and enforcement are complementary rather than competing objectives.

The broader foreigner-safety beat in Medellín has continued to draw international attention. In March 2026, the death of an American Airlines (NASDAQ: AAL) flight attendant in Antioquia following her disappearance focused renewed attention on escopolamina-related crime targeting foreigners and locals in the city.

Otro más. Go Home

Un estadounidense conocido en redes sociales como Casey Red Beard llegó a Bogotá en un vuelo desde Miami y fue devuelto a su país por Migración Colombia, luego de confirmarse que estaba en la lista Alertas Medellín, por promoción explícita de turismo con… https://t.co/EWBfr9qwdK

— Fico Gutiérrez (@FicoGutierrez) May 23, 2026

Enforcement Numbers for 2026

In what has elapsed of 2026, Migración Colombia has inadmitted approximately 90 foreign nationals nationwide for risks associated with sexual exploitation and conduct linked to trata de personas (human trafficking), a figure already approaching the 110 cases recorded for all of 2025. In Medellín alone, more than 60 inadmission procedures have been carried out so far this year, compared to 80 for all of 2025. The agency’s Regional Antioquia-Chocó office accounts for 63 of the 2026 cases.

Broader expulsion and deportation activity is running at a pace comparable to the previous year. Through May 23, the agency reported 310 expulsions or deportations of foreign citizens in 2026, comprising 157 deportations and 153 expulsions, compared to 1,652 cases recorded during all of 2025. Deportations were concentrated in the agency’s Nariño, Oriente, Atlántico, Eje Cafetero, Antioquia, and Andina regional offices, while expulsions were most frequent in Oriente, Andina, Antioquia, Nariño, and at the El Dorado station.

According to Arriero, expulsion and deportation decisions are taken in accordance with the Constitución Política de Colombia and applicable law, with due-process considerations, and respond to immigration violations, threats to public order or national security, judicial orders, and requirements from international organizations including the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL). Migración Colombia retains discretionary authority under Decreto 2136 de 2021 to deny entry to or order the return of foreign citizens it determines pose risks to national security or public order.

Pattern of Recent Cases

The Casey Red Beard inadmission follows several high-profile expulsions earlier in 2026. In April, Migración Colombia expelled Steve Newland, a US citizen and social media operator known as “Chill Capo,” accused of promoting party experiences with alleged ties to sexual exploitation and of publishing content advising visitors on how to evade migration controls. The same month, the agency expelled Samuel McVey, a former teacher from New Rochelle, New York, following incidents at schools in the eastern Antioquia municipality of Rionegro and in the Las Palmas sector of Medellín. Migración Colombia also detected and again removed Russian citizen George Laevsky after he attempted to re-enter the country following an April expulsion linked to repeated disturbances at an apartment in the El Poblado sector.

Colombian authorities have framed the escalating enforcement as targeting precisely the use of social media and digital platforms to market tourism packages that allegedly conceal sexual exploitation, with women in conditions of economic vulnerability described as the principal victims. The agency has previously stated that prevention of Explotación Sexual Comercial de Niños, Niñas y Adolescentes (ESCNNA) is a particular priority, citing cooperation with international intelligence agencies and the Angel Watch program, which has resulted in more than 470 entry denials since 2016 for reasons associated with sexual offenses.

Colombians face three sharply different futures in May 31 vote

Colombia votes on May 31 with its presidential race concentrated around three candidates whose platforms diverge on nearly every dimension of economic and security policy relevant to foreign investors. For corporate executives, institutional investors, and multinational operations with Colombian exposure, the choice between senator Iván Cepeda, senator Paloma Valencia, and defense attorney Abelardo de la Espriella carries direct, measurable implications for the regulatory environment, foreign direct investment (FDI) conditions, energy sector licensing, and geopolitical alignment through at least 2030.

No candidate is projected to clear the 50%-plus-one threshold required to win outright on May 31, making a runoff election on June 21 the expected outcome. The question that will determine the direction of that runoff — and by extension the next administration — is which of the two opposition candidates finishes second.

Click above to play the video!

A Race Reshaped by Late Polling

The final-week polling picture shifted substantially, and the trajectory matters as much as the snapshot. The CONDOR weighted aggregate — which incorporates surveys from six polling firms and applies greater weight to more recent data — placed the race as of May 23 at: Cepeda 36.3%, De la Espriella 29.1%, Valencia 16.7%.

Invamer, one of Colombia’s most established polling firms, surveyed 3,800 respondents across 152 municipalities between May 13 and May 20, registering Cepeda at 44.6%, De la Espriella at 31.6%, and Valencia at 14.0%. The Centro Nacional de Consultoría (CNC) published a survey conducted May 22 and 23 showing Cepeda at 33.4%, De la Espriella at 30.9%, and Valencia at 12.6%.

Comparing those figures to the Fundación Génesis Crea survey from May 4 through May 11 — which placed Cepeda at 35.1%, Valencia at 25.4%, and De la Espriella at 21.6% — indicates a multi-poll trend of De la Espriella gaining approximately nine to ten percentage points in three weeks while Valencia shed a comparable share. AS/COA’s poll tracker confirms the directional consistency across firms.

Atlas Intel, which published figures more favorable to De la Espriella, is currently under investigation by Colombia’s Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE) for potential methodology violations and could face suspension of its operations. Those figures are treated with caution in this analysis.

Runoff modeling diverges between firms. Fundación Génesis Crea showed Valencia defeating Cepeda 49.1% to 44.7% in a second-round matchup — meaning she was the stronger opposition candidate in that scenario. The Guarumo/Ecoanalítica survey found Cepeda losing all hypothetical runoff scenarios, including against De la Espriella. Two minor candidates — former senator Clara López and former Chocó governor Luis Gilberto Murillo — withdrew and endorsed Cepeda before the first round, a consolidation that appears to have had limited effect on his polling numbers.

Finance Colombia reported in May that the campaign has been marked by an unusual absence of traditional televised debates. Cepeda declined to participate in events organized by major media outlets, stating that proposed formats lacked neutrality. Former Bogotá Mayor Claudia López, herself a candidate, said publicly that Cepeda’s refusal was motivated by an unwillingness to defend his record as the architect of President Gustavo Petro‘s Paz Total security negotiation strategy.

Security Policy: The Three Approaches to Armed Groups

Public security is the top voter concern heading into the election. InSight Crime documented that the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) launched a major offensive against FARC dissident factions in Norte de Santander in early 2025, resulting in mass civilian casualties in the Catatumbo region. In Chocó and Antioquia, the ELN and the Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC), commonly known as the Clan del Golfo, are competing for control of illegal gold mining corridors and drug trafficking routes. In Cauca, FARC dissident factions have established territorial control in areas where state presence has collapsed.

Cepeda’s approach to security is defined by his role as the principal legislative architect of Paz Total. As chair of the Senate‘s peace commission, he designed the framework that extended negotiating status to the ELN, FARC dissident groups, and the Clan del Golfo. His stated rationale is that targeting the financial leadership of drug networks rather than foot soldiers produces more durable results — a position that has academic backing in narcotics policy literature. In practice, Paz Total produced ceasefires that were repeatedly violated, and security indicators in conflict-affected departments deteriorated during the Petro administration. A Cepeda presidency is expected to continue the negotiated settlement model, with the military operating under political constraints.

Valencia’s security platform is based on reinstating Seguridad Democrática, the doctrine associated with former president Álvaro Uribe’s administrations from 2002 to 2010. The core elements are expanded military presence in rural conflict zones, dismantling of rural criminal networks, and resumption of extradition agreements with the United States — which Petro suspended, effectively shielding cartel leadership from US federal prosecution. The Uribe-era approach resulted in measurable reductions in homicide rates, forced displacement, and ELN and FARC territorial control, though human rights organizations documented serious abuses by security forces during that period.

De la Espriella has stated explicitly that his government would have no peace process. He advocates for a model similar to El Salvador’s under President Nayib Bukele: mass incarceration, construction of high-security prison facilities, classification of guerrilla and cartel organizations as foreign terrorist organizations, and broad military offensives. He has not detailed how such operations would be financed or how the mass detention model would interact with Colombia’s Constitutional Court, which has repeatedly constrained executive security powers.

For the armed groups operating in Norte de Santander and Cauca, the historical record indicates that Colombia’s criminal organizations respond more acutely to sustained, institutionally grounded military pressure and functioning extradition pipelines than to political rhetoric. By that measure, Valencia’s platform — which rebuilds the institutional security apparatus incrementally — represents a more structurally credible threat to the ELN and the Estado Mayor Central (EMC) FARC dissidents. For the Clan del Golfo leadership, extradition to the United States has historically been the principal deterrent, and Valencia’s program explicitly restores it.

Business Climate and Employment Conditions

The Petro administration enacted a series of minimum wage increases totaling more than 60% over four years — including a 16% increase for 2023, the largest single-year hike in Colombian history, and a 23.78% increase for 2026 — restructured labor regulations to expand premium pay requirements for night, weekend, and holiday shifts, and raised corporate tax rates to fund social spending programs. The Asociación Nacional de Empresarios de Colombia (ANDI) characterized the regulatory environment as adverse to private investment. Finance Colombia tracked a material decline in FDI in the extractive sector over the same period.

Cepeda supported those labor and fiscal reforms throughout their legislative passage. His platform extends the Petro model: increased state social spending, continued land redistribution programs, and maintenance of the current wage and labor cost structure. For companies with established Colombian operations, the regulatory environment is manageable; for companies evaluating market entry or operational expansion, the cost structure adds friction.

Valencia’s economic program emphasizes corporate stability and private sector investment as the primary mechanisms of job creation. Her vice-presidential running mate, Juan Daniel Oviedo — former director of DANE, Colombia’s national statistics agency — represents a technocratic orientation focused on reducing structural market distortions, streamlining public procurement, and scaling back state administrative overhead. Oviedo’s appointment is a direct signal to the business community that economic management would be data-driven rather than ideologically directed. Oviedo also publicly identifies as a member of the LGBTQ+ community, a departure from the traditional social conservatism of Centro Democrático.

De la Espriella’s economic orientation is pro-business with protectionist elements. His vice-presidential candidate, José Manuel Restrepo — who served as Colombia’s Finance Minister and Commerce Minister — provides institutional credibility on fiscal and trade policy. Restrepo’s presence on the ticket signals commitment to fiscal discipline and regulatory reduction in the extractive and commercial sectors. De la Espriella’s personal style, however, introduces operational uncertainty; his campaign has generated multiple high-profile controversies, including a public altercation with Caracol Noticias journalist María Lucía Fernández during a live broadcast and a formal apology following misconduct allegations by journalist Laura Rodríguez of Piso 8 FM.

Foreign Investment, Oil, and Mining

The extractive sector is the most consequential economic policy dimension for international capital. Ecopetrol (NYSE: EC; BVC: ECOPETROL) — Colombia’s state-controlled energy company and the largest corporation in the country — has operated under exploration restrictions during the Petro administration, which has opposed new fossil fuel contracts on climate grounds.

Cepeda’s position extends the Petro framework: mandatory transition away from fossil fuels, heavy restrictions or outright prohibitions on new oil and gas exploration contracts, and stringent environmental licensing requirements for open-pit mining operations. Foreign investment would be directed by policy toward green hydrogen, ecotourism, and smallholder agriculture. For the multinational oil majors with Colombian operations and for institutional investors in the mining sector, a Cepeda presidency represents a continuation of the current constraints and, in some contract scenarios, an accelerated wind-down of Colombian portfolios.

In a related development, Finance Colombia reported in May that Ecopetrol’s president, Ricardo Roa, has been formally charged in connection with alleged campaign spending violations during Petro’s 2022 presidential campaign. The case will be inherited by whoever takes office in August.

Valencia’s position is that hydrocarbon revenues are essential to Colombia’s macroeconomic stability and that the country cannot exit the sector before alternative revenue structures exist. Her platform actively encourages FDI in petroleum exploration, is open to regulated fracking, and commits to clearing the environmental licensing backlog that has stalled multiple large-scale gold and copper mining projects. For energy and mining companies currently blocked by administrative delays, this represents the most direct path to project advancement.

De la Espriella’s position goes further: essentially deregulating the environmental licensing process for major extraction projects on the grounds that Colombia’s economic sovereignty takes precedence over environmental restrictions he characterizes as externally imposed. The practical constraint is whether a De la Espriella administration would have the institutional coherence and congressional support to deliver regulatory rollback, given that his movement has no established political party structure and entered the race through an independent signature campaign.

Foreign Policy: Washington Alignment vs. Multipolar Strategy

Colombia’s relationship with the United States deteriorated materially under Petro, who aligned Colombia with Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro, pursued closer ties with China and Russia, and suspended extradition agreements. US counternarcotics cooperation was strained throughout the period.

Cepeda is committed to what he describes as a multipolar foreign policy — maintaining functional diplomatic channels with Washington and Brussels while deepening strategic and commercial relationships with China and Russia. His alignment with regional left-of-center governments in Mexico, Brazil, and Bolivia would position Colombia as part of a Latin American bloc that has grown increasingly skeptical of US regional leadership. For US companies operating in Colombia, this trajectory does not mean immediate operational disruption, but it reduces Colombia’s utility as a reliable counterpart on security cooperation, counter-narcotics intelligence sharing, and trade dispute resolution.

Valencia positions a return to the Western alignment as a core objective. She would prioritize restoring the US-Colombia relationship, reinforcing the bilateral Free Trade Agreement, and reestablishing intelligence-sharing mechanisms that were reduced under Petro. Her framing positions Colombia as a democratic anchor in a region experiencing authoritarian pressures.

De la Espriella takes the most explicit pro-US position in the race. La Silla Vacía reported that De la Espriella or entities linked to his campaign donated more than $90,000 USD to the US Republican Party, a fact that raises questions about the nature and expectations of those relationships. He has publicly aligned himself with the populist right in the United States, takes a hostile posture toward China, Russia, and Venezuela, and has characterized his security approach as consistent with a transactional alliance with Washington focused on counter-narcotics enforcement and cartel designation as foreign terrorist organizations.

“Ese pisco robó a 200 mil colombianos.” — Claudia López, former Mayor of Bogotá, referring to presidential candidate Abelardo de la Espriella’s legal representation of DMG pyramid scheme founder David Murcia Guzmán, during a presidential campaign event.

Corruption and Judicial Independence

All three candidates have stated commitments to fighting corruption, though their approaches and focal points differ in ways that are material to the institutional environment for business operations.

Cepeda’s legislative record includes serious, documented work investigating paramilitary infiltration of Colombia’s political institutions — the period known as parapolítica — and pursuing accountability for those cases. His blind spot, his critics argue, is corruption within the current administration. When Ecopetrol’s Ricardo Roa was formally charged in connection with Petro’s 2022 campaign, the response from the Pacto Histórico coalition was subdued. Cepeda has been Álvaro Uribe’s primary judicial antagonist in the Senate; a Cepeda administration would offer no institutional protection to Uribe and would be expected to support the full progress of judicial proceedings against him. For left-wing politicians facing legal exposure, including former Medellín mayor Daniel Quintero, a Cepeda administration would be expected to be more receptive to amnesty frameworks.

Valencia’s approach to anti-corruption is structural rather than prosecutorial: strengthening the independence of the Contraloría General de la República and the Fiscalía General de la Nación, implementing digital transparency in public procurement, and reducing informal executive influence over judicial processes. She would be expected to apply political and rhetorical pressure on behalf of Uribe — her political mentor and a close ally — though her legislative track record indicates a degree of institutional independence from Centro Democrático party orthodoxy.

De la Espriella’s anti-corruption rhetoric centers on severe criminal penalties for corrupt officials. The credibility of that position is complicated by his professional history, which is examined in detail below.

De la Espriella’s Legal Career: The Documented Record

De la Espriella’s campaign has faced sustained scrutiny over his client history as one of Colombia’s highest-profile criminal defense attorneys. The record is documented in reporting by El Colombiano, El Espectador, and the investigative outlet Corrupción al Día.

His documented client roster includes Salvatore Mancuso, the former supreme commander of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) paramilitary network; multiple legislators convicted in the parapolítica scandal, which established systematic infiltration of Colombia’s congress by paramilitary organizations; David Murcia Guzmán, the operator of the DMG pyramid scheme that defrauded an estimated 200,000 Colombian investors; the Nule Primos, convicted of large-scale public contract fraud; and Álex Saab, the Colombian businessman extradited to the United States on charges of acting as the primary money launderer for the Maduro government in Venezuela. According to Corrupción al Día, De la Espriella’s legal fees from Saab reportedly reached $12 million USD and included private aircraft travel.

De la Espriella’s response to this line of criticism rests on due process principles: that every accused person is entitled to vigorous legal defense regardless of the charges, and that his ability to navigate Colombia’s criminal code at its most complex levels demonstrates the expertise required to enforce the law from the executive branch. The argument has legal validity as a principle. The specific issue for foreign compliance officers and US government counterparts is the Saab representation: the same Nicolás Maduro whose regime De la Espriella’s campaign now characterizes as an ideological enemy received legal services from De la Espriella’s firm when the representation was commercially available.

The Fiscalía investigated De la Espriella in connection with alleged paramilitary links in 2009 and again in 2012; both investigations were dismissed for insufficient evidence, and he carries no convictions or active investigations on those matters.

Cepeda’s Family History and Ideological Background

Critics of Iván Cepeda, including Enrique Gómez of the Salvación Nacional party, have argued that his family background constitutes evidence of structural alignment with guerrilla movements. The record on this point merits examination.

Cepeda is the son of Manuel Cepeda Vargas, who served as Secretary-General of the Colombian Communist Party and as a senator for the Unión Patriótica (UP), a left-wing political movement that was systematically exterminated by a combination of state actors and paramilitary organizations during the 1980s and 1990s. Manuel Cepeda Vargas was assassinated on August 9, 1994. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights subsequently found the Colombian state responsible for his murder. The FARC-EP named its Frente Urbano Manuel Cepeda Vargas — an urban front operating within the Bloque Occidental — in the elder Cepeda’s honor.

The Fundación Paz y Reconciliación (PARES) has documented that Iván Cepeda’s relationship with his father’s political positions was more complex than the family lineage alone suggests. After studying in Bulgaria in 1981, Cepeda broke from his father’s Soviet-oriented communist framework and aligned with democratic leftists including Bernardo Jaramillo Ossa, who publicly rejected the FARC’s armed strategy. Cepeda has repeatedly stated his repudiation of the FARC’s use of his father’s name. No documented evidence connects him to operational coordination with current armed groups.

What the family history does establish is the ideological framework through which Cepeda processes security policy: a belief, grounded in personal and political experience, that the Colombian state’s institutional violence has been as destructive as guerrilla violence, and that negotiated settlements are structurally preferable to military solutions. That framework generates Paz Total. It also generates a posture toward ELN and FARC dissident negotiators that prioritizes process continuity over verified compliance — a disposition that armed groups have demonstrably exploited to maintain territorial and operational positions while negotiation frameworks provided legal cover.

Valencia and the Uribe Question

The comparison to former president Iván Duque (2018–2022) comes up regularly in discussions of Valencia’s political independence. Duque, who had limited independent political standing before Uribe selected him, was perceived throughout his term as governing within constraints set by his patron — a dynamic that Colombian political cartoonists characterized as ventriloquism.

Valencia’s profile differs materially. She is the granddaughter of former Colombian president Guillermo León Valencia, carries her own political lineage, and has served in the Senate for over a decade, building positions on agrarian reform, judicial modernization, and indigenous land rights that have placed her at variance with standard Centro Democrático positions on those issues. She won the Gran Consulta por Colombia primary on March 8 with more than 45% of the vote — over 3.2 million Colombians — establishing a democratic mandate distinct from any party endorsement.

She would be expected to use institutional and rhetorical channels to support Uribe in the ongoing judicial proceedings against him, and to apply pressure on the trajectory of those cases. Whether that constitutes political interference with judicial independence or normal advocacy within democratic norms is a question on which observers disagree. What the legislative record does not support is the characterization of Valencia as incapable of independent governance.

Press Freedom and the Media Environment

Press freedom carries an indirect but measurable correlation with rule-of-law quality, which in turn affects operational risk for companies that rely on regulatory predictability and transparent legal processes.

Cepeda has maintained a posture toward critical media that mirrors President Petro’s practice of characterizing adversarial outlets as acting in the interests of economic elites. Under Petro, this produced a systematic exclusion of critical media from official information flows and persistent rhetorical delegitimization of independent journalism, though the press remained legally free to operate. A Cepeda administration would be expected to continue this pattern.

Valencia’s background in Colombia’s traditional political and intellectual establishment, combined with a decade in a party that has faced sustained critical coverage from Colombia’s major outlets, points toward a conventional institutional relationship with the press — adversarial at times, but within professional norms.

De la Espriella’s conduct during the campaign provides direct evidence of his approach. He publicly called Caracol Noticias journalist María Lucía Fernández “ignorant” in a live interview. He issued a formal apology after journalist Laura Rodríguez of Piso 8 FM made allegations of inappropriate conduct. His campaign strategy has drawn comparisons to the approach of Argentine president Javier Milei and US president Donald Trump in its use of direct digital channels to circumvent traditional media while publicly attacking outlets that publish critical coverage. The press would remain legally protected under a De la Espriella administration, but the operational environment for investigative journalism would be hostile.

The Ideological Spectrum: Market Liberalism to State Direction

The question of which candidate is most aligned with free-market principles requires a distinction that the international business press frequently elides: the difference between economic deregulation and political authoritarianism. These can, and in this election do, exist independently.

De la Espriella’s platform is often described in international coverage as the most pro-market. His deregulation proposals for the extractive sector and his corporate tax rhetoric support that reading in the economic domain. His security platform, however, involves a substantial expansion of state coercive power: mass detention operations, a mega-prison construction program, and the suspension of standard due process protections to facilitate rapid incarceration of criminal suspects. The Cato Institute‘s framework of economic freedom as inseparable from civil liberties would categorize a state powerful enough to detain people without standard procedural protections as a state that represents an institutional risk to property rights and contract enforcement as well.

Valencia’s platform, anchored by Oviedo’s technocratic program of structural market reform — reduced administrative barriers, streamlined procurement, smaller state overhead, maintained civil liberties — represents the closest approximation to coherent market liberalism available in this field. It does not carry the rhetorical force of De la Espriella’s deregulation proposals, but it has more institutional grounding.

Cepeda’s platform is the furthest from market liberalism by any standard measure: state-directed investment allocation, wealth redistribution through tax and transfer mechanisms, state expansion in healthcare and pension administration, and agrarian land redistribution. His program is continuous with the Petro administration’s economic framework.

Minor Candidates: The Rest of the Ballot

Several other candidates remain on the ballot and are drawing small but potentially consequential vote shares in a first round where the margin between second and third place could be narrow.

Claudia López, former mayor of Bogotá running under the Con Claudia Imparables coalition, positions herself as a progressive centrist with a documented anti-corruption record. Her polling has not broken 3.5% in major surveys, and her high polarization ratings from her mayoral term limit her growth ceiling. Her attacks on De la Espriella during the campaign — she publicly called him a “defender of the mafia” in reference to his client history — have been among the most pointed in the race, and factually grounded on the public record.

Sergio Fajardo, making his third consecutive presidential run under Dignidad y Compromiso, continues to represent a technocratic, education-focused centrism grounded in his work transforming Medellín in the early 2000s. He has not broken 3.5% in any major poll in this cycle.

Roy Barreras, running under La Fuerza de la Paz following his Frente por la Vida primary victory, is one of the most experienced political operatives in Colombia, having been part of multiple coalition governments across ideological lines over two decades. He polls below the threshold for meaningful first-round impact.

Miguel Uribe Londoño, running under Partido Demócrata, represents a younger-generation conservative platform emphasizing fiscal discipline and private sector growth, broadly consistent with Valencia’s program. He also polls below 3.5%.

Carlos Caicedo, running on a regionalist platform emphasizing decentralization away from Bogotá, draws support primarily from the Costa Caribe. His structural argument about Colombia’s administrative over-centralization is substantively grounded, though his national profile is insufficient to affect the first-round outcome.

Investment Implications

For international capital with Colombian exposure, the three-way race produces three materially different operational scenarios.

A Cepeda victory — which remains the single most likely first-round outcome based on available polling — would signal continuity of the Petro-era regulatory framework: sustained capital outflow pressure, high corporate tax rates, no new fossil fuel exploration contracts for Ecopetrol (NYSE: EC; BVC: ECOPETROL) or private operators, continued labor cost escalation, and a foreign policy trajectory away from Washington. Colombian equity valuations would be expected to remain under pressure. The mining licensing backlog would continue to accumulate. A Cepeda administration would not replicate Venezuela’s economic trajectory — Colombia’s independent central bank, Banco de la República, its functioning constitutional court, and its institutional depth provide meaningful buffers — but the investment headwinds would be structural rather than cyclical.

A Valencia victory would represent the sharpest regulatory reversal available in this field. Ecopetrol exploration contracts would be expected to advance. The mining licensing backlog would be addressed. US bilateral relations would be restored, reactivating security intelligence cooperation and trade facilitation mechanisms. The Colombian peso would be expected to strengthen as country risk premium declined. The path to that outcome now requires her to either close the gap significantly on De la Espriella in the first round or rely on runoff polling that showed her as the stronger second-round candidate — data that predates the most recent polling shift.

A De la Espriella victory introduces the widest distribution of possible outcomes. The upside scenario involves Restrepo managing fiscal and trade policy competently, genuine regulatory rollback in the extractive sector, aggressive extradition resumption, and security operations that reduce the physical risk premium in conflict-affected departments including Cauca, Norte de Santander, and Chocó. The downside scenario involves recurring crises generated by De la Espriella’s personal conduct, conflicts of interest arising from his former client relationships, and authoritarian security measures that attract international human rights attention and complicate bilateral relationships. Restrepo’s presence on the ticket reduces the probability of the downside scenario but does not eliminate it.

The current polling trend indicates that right-wing voters are consolidating around De la Espriella at Valencia’s expense. Whether that consolidation produces a runoff between De la Espriella and Cepeda — and whether the runoff produces a left or right-wing government — remains uncertain. What the polling data does not support is the scenario, widely assumed until recently, of a Cepeda-Valencia runoff in which Valencia was positioned as the structurally stronger opposition candidate.

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Energy and M&A specialist takes helm of 70-lawyer Bogotá practice

Holland & Knight has named José Vicente Zapata executive partner of its Bogotá office, the firm announced on May 4, 2026. Zapata will oversee day-to-day management of the office while continuing to lead his energy practice, which focuses on corporate, contractual, and commercial matters, with an emphasis on spin-offs and mergers and acquisitions. He succeeds Enrique Gómez Pinzón, who has served as executive partner since the office opened in 2012 and will now take the title of executive partner emeritus while continuing his corporate, M&A, finance, and international arbitration practice.

Zapata has been with Holland & Knight for nearly 12 years and co-chairs the firm’s Venezuela Focus Team, a group of partners who advise clients with interests in that country. His regulatory work covers environmental, energy, and natural resources matters, as well as corporate compliance, including the design of ethics programs and compliance with Colombia’s Sistema de Autocontrol y Gestión del Riesgo Integral de Lavado de Activos y Financiación del Terrorismo (SAGRILAFT) anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorism financing regime. He also handles liability cases involving contractual and non-contractual damages.

“I look forward to continuing to strengthen our team’s offerings in advising Colombian companies and guiding international clients to navigate entry into the Colombian market.” — José Vicente Zapata, Executive Partner, Holland & Knight Bogotá

Zapata earned his LL.M. in Sustainable Development and International Business Law from McGill University in Montreal and his J.D. from the Pontificia Universidad Javeriana in Bogotá. He has been ranked in Energy & Natural Resources: Environment by Chambers Global and Chambers Latin America since 2014, was named to The Legal 500 Latin America Hall of Fame in Environment in 2025 and 2026, and is regularly listed in The Best Lawyers in Colombia.

“I look forward to continuing to strengthen our team’s offerings in advising Colombian companies and guiding international clients to navigate entry into the Colombian market,” Zapata said in a written statement.

Bob Grammig, Holland & Knight’s chair and chief executive officer, said Zapata’s appointment was intended to focus the office on growth in Colombia and across Latin America. Gómez Pinzón said he would continue to support the office in his emeritus role.

The Bogotá office now houses nearly 70 lawyers. Its practice covers cross-border deals and international trade; mergers, acquisitions, and joint ventures; oil, gas, and mining projects; environmental assessments, liability, and compliance; taxation; labor law; intellectual property, trademark, and patent registration; antitrust and consumer law; capital markets, venture capital, and private equity; international licensing and franchising; project finance and foreign investment; corporate reorganizations and financial restructurings; litigation and international arbitration; and private wealth services.

Holland & Knight’s Latin America Practice Group includes more than 200 attorneys working on cross-border M&A, joint ventures, private equity and financing transactions, and disputes involving Latin America. The firm overall counts approximately 2,200 lawyers and other professionals across 35 offices. Founded in 1889, it provides representation in litigation, corporate and finance, real estate, healthcare, and government matters.

The leadership transition comes as international firms continue to deepen their footprint in Bogotá to serve foreign investors entering Colombian energy, infrastructure, and natural resources markets, and to advise Colombian corporates pursuing transactions abroad.

Infrastructure pivot frees up $1.3 billion USD for shareholders

Frontera Energy Corporation (TSX: FEC) (OTCQX: FECCF) reported first-quarter 2026 net income from continuing operations of $13.1 million USD and adjusted EBITDA of $28.5 million USD, as the Calgary-based company moves to close the sale of its Colombian exploration and production portfolio to Parex Resources Inc. (TSX: PXT) and reposition itself as a standalone Colombian infrastructure company anchored by its pipeline and port assets.

Total revenues from continuing operations were $26.8 million USD in the first quarter, compared with $26.9 million USD in the fourth quarter of 2025 and $25.1 million USD in the first quarter of 2025. Net loss for the period, including discontinued operations, was $15.4 million USD, reflecting a $28.5 million USD net loss from the Colombian E&P assets now classified as held for sale.

“In total, this strategy will have unlocked approximately $1.3 billion of capital for investors.” — Gabriel de Alba, Chairman of the Board, Frontera Energy Corporation

The Parex transaction

On April 30, 2026, Frontera shareholders approved a plan of arrangement under which Parex Resources, through a wholly-owned subsidiary, will acquire all of Frontera’s Colombian upstream business — including its oil and gas exploration and production assets, a reverse-osmosis water-treatment facility, and a palm-oil plantation. The transaction carries an enterprise value of $750 million USD. The cash purchase price consists of $500 million USD payable at closing, subject to customary adjustments, plus an additional $25 million USD contingent payment tied to specified development milestones to be achieved within 12 months of closing.

At the same shareholder meeting, investors approved a reduction of Frontera’s capital account of up to $647 million CAD (approximately $470 million USD) to fund a return of capital to shareholders from the net proceeds of the transaction. The Supreme Court of British Columbia issued its final order approving the arrangement on May 4, 2026. Closing remains subject to the satisfaction of remaining conditions and is expected in May 2026.

Chairman Gabriel de Alba said the company would retain roughly $50 million USD of cash to support growth opportunities at the remaining infrastructure business, including an LNG regasification project being developed in partnership with Ecopetrol (NYSE: EC) (BVC: ECOPETROL). “In total, this strategy will have unlocked approximately $1.3 billion of capital for investors,” de Alba said.

ODL pipeline drives cash flow

Frontera holds a 35 percent equity interest in the Oleoducto de los Llanos (ODL) crude oil pipeline, which connects the Rubiales, Quifa, Caño Sur, Llanos-34, and other production blocks to the Monterrey and Cusiana stations in the department of Casanare. ODL’s share of income contributed $14.2 million USD to Frontera in the first quarter, compared with $15.1 million USD a year earlier, with the year-over-year decline reflecting higher depreciation, amortization, and operating costs.

ODL transported 233,875 barrels per day in the first quarter of 2026 at an average tariff of $4.70 USD per barrel, compared with 236,387 barrels per day at $4.73 USD per barrel in the first quarter of 2025. The pipeline declared $185 million USD in total dividends, of which $64.7 million USD is net to Frontera. The company expects to receive those distributions during 2026 in installments of approximately 40 percent in the second quarter, 35 percent in the third quarter, and 25 percent in the fourth quarter.

Long-term debt at Frontera totaled $167.8 million USD at the end of the first quarter and is expected to decline to approximately $131 million USD by year-end 2026, primarily through scheduled amortizations and cash-sweep mechanisms tied to ODL cash flows. From May 2025 through December 2026, long-term debt is expected to fall by more than $100 million USD.

Puerto Bahía expands cargo mix

Puerto Bahía, the multipurpose maritime terminal located in Cartagena adjacent to the Bocachica access channel and near the Reficar refinery, generated $12.7 million USD in revenue in the first quarter of 2026, compared with $10.0 million USD in the same period a year earlier. The 150-hectare facility comprises a hydrocarbons terminal with nominal capacity of 2,672,000 barrels and a general cargo terminal. Frontera holds a 99.97 percent equity interest in the port.

General cargo growth offset weaker liquids volumes. The general cargo terminal handled 38,067 roll-on/roll-off (RORO) units in the first quarter, more than double the 18,223 units handled a year earlier, alongside 3,851 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs) of containerized cargo, up from 1,256 TEUs in the first quarter of 2025. Break-bulk volumes declined to 25,216 tons/m³ from 41,198 tons/m³. RORO dwell times shortened from 40 days to 31 days year over year.

The liquids terminal handled 36,937 barrels per day in the first quarter of 2026, down from 51,579 barrels per day a year earlier. Ecopetrol volumes accounted for 26,273 barrels per day, Frontera-related volumes for 7,389 barrels per day, and other third-party volumes for 3,275 barrels per day. The company attributed the decline mainly to lower third-party throughput and the absence of certain trading flows.

Operating costs at the port rose to $7.6 million USD in the first quarter from $5.0 million USD a year earlier, driven by increased infrastructure maintenance in the liquids terminal and higher cargo volumes in the general cargo facility.

LPG and LNG projects advance

Puerto Bahía’s liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) project began initial operations in March 2026, providing capacity to handle up to 10,000 tons per month. The terminal is targeted to become fully operational during the first quarter of 2028. Capital expenditures during the first quarter totaled $1.0 million USD, including $0.4 million USD for major tank maintenance and $0.3 million USD for the LPG project.

The company is also advancing an LNG regasification project at Puerto Bahía in partnership with Ecopetrol, intended to support Colombia’s domestic gas supply as domestic production declines. Frontera is also pursuing expansion of containerized cargo operations.

Discontinued operations

Following the execution of the arrangement agreement, the Colombian E&P assets are now classified as discontinued operations under IFRS 5. Colombian production averaged 36,700 barrels of oil equivalent per day in the first quarter of 2026, comprising 25,394 barrels per day of heavy crude, 8,653 barrels per day of light and medium crude combined, 5,706 thousand cubic feet per day of conventional natural gas, and 1,652 barrels of oil equivalent per day of natural gas liquids. That compares with 39,010 barrels of oil equivalent per day a year earlier.

The operating netback from the discontinued Colombian operations was $41.79 USD per barrel of oil equivalent in the first quarter of 2026, compared with $34.22 USD per barrel of oil equivalent in the first quarter of 2025, supported by a higher Brent reference price of $78.38 USD per barrel against $74.98 USD per barrel a year earlier.

Frontera retains exploration and development interests in Guyana through subsidiaries that include CGX Energy Inc. (TSXV: OYL), which is not part of the Parex transaction. The company’s go-forward portfolio will be anchored by the ODL pipeline stake and Puerto Bahía, with the infrastructure business generating approximately $77 million USD of distributable cash flow in 2025, according to the management information circular dated March 30, 2026.

Above photo courtesy Frontera Energy Corporation.

Proposal would reset how banks weigh social and climate costs

The Superintendencia Financiera de Colombia (SFC) has presented a proposal to create a national system of socio-environmental prices that supervised financial institutions would apply when evaluating and analyzing private and public development projects in Colombia. The regulator argues that the country’s financial system faces the challenge of financing projects that generate long-term social returns, not only private profitability.

The proposal was unveiled in Bogotá on May 14, 2026, during the forum Precios socioambientales: una herramienta para la inversión sostenible en Colombia, hosted at the regulator’s headquarters. Participants included Superintendent of Finance César Ferrari; Daniel Schydlowsky, professor at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Raúl Castro, professor at the Universidad de los Andes; Andrés Vera, technical vice president of Asobancaria; Ricardo Lara Manzano, director of infrastructure and energy for the Andean region at IDB Invest; and Andrés Trejos, economic studies coordinator at the SFC.

Ferrari noted that the methodology, also known as “shadow pricing,” gained prominence during the second half of the twentieth century before falling out of favor, and is now resurfacing globally as social and environmental dynamics increasingly affect business and the financial system. “The concept of ‘shadow prices’ is regaining importance because we are seeing the effects of climate change on the economy and on competition in business across all sectors,” Ferrari said.

“The concept of ‘shadow prices’ is regaining importance because we are seeing the effects of climate change on the economy and on competition in business across all sectors.” — César Ferrari, Colombian Superintendent of Finance

Schydlowsky explained that shadow prices measure the value of goods and services when market failures distort interest rates, exchange rates, or fiscal balances. The approach is designed to correct for the gap between observed market prices and the true economic and social cost of resources.

What the SFC is proposing

Trejos argued that social project evaluation provides a technical basis for discussing the relevance of investment initiatives in the context of public policy and the financial system, and helps select projects that raise social welfare with economic efficiency and environmental sustainability. “It is possible to prioritize projects beyond private profitability, incorporating general social welfare and, in particular, environmental sustainability,” he said.

The SFC’s proposal to build a socio-environmental pricing system for Colombia includes estimates of the social valuation of six productive factors and fundamental variables: labor, public revenue, investment, foreign exchange, carbon, and the social discount rate.

Under the proposed framework, projects would receive more favorable evaluation if they are labor-intensive — especially when they absorb idle or underemployed workers — if they generate or save foreign exchange through expanded exports or efficient import substitution, if they strengthen public revenue and the state’s capacity to provide public goods and regulation, or if they reduce carbon footprint or deliver net benefits in climate mitigation and adaptation.

The proposal does not yet carry the force of regulation. The SFC presented the framework as a methodology for supervised entities — including banks, insurers, and pension fund managers — to incorporate into their internal project evaluation processes alongside conventional financial analysis.

Headline photo: The installation of more than 886 solar systems benefiting 4,000 users. Photo credit: One Inversión Social.

Q1 visitor count tops 1.58 million as Mexico push targets World Cup

Non-resident visitor arrivals to Colombia grew 6.7% in March 2026 compared to the same month of the previous year, and the country received 1,584,378 non-resident visitors during the first quarter, according to figures from Migración Colombia processed by the Ministerio de Comercio, Industria y Turismo.

In March alone, 541,720 non-resident visitors entered the country. Of that total, 419,150 were foreign non-resident visitors, representing 5.3% year-over-year growth, while the cruise segment recorded 58,186 passengers, a 41.2% increase over the same month in 2025.

For executives and investors evaluating Colombia’s tourism, hospitality, and aviation sectors, the data indicate continued recovery in international arrivals and a measurable expansion of cruise traffic, two segments that directly affect hotel occupancy, retail spending in coastal cities such as Cartagena and Santa Marta, and the pipeline of inbound foreign exchange.

“Colombian tourism is going through a significant period of international expansion. Colombia is recording sustained growth in visitor arrivals while strengthening its connectivity and expanding its presence in strategic markets,” said Diana Marcela Morales Rojas, Minister of Commerce, Industry and Tourism.

Air connectivity figures

According to the Aeronáutica Civil de Colombia (Aerocivil), 4,483,077 passengers were transported on scheduled flights in February 2026, a 9.4% increase compared to the same month of the prior year. International arrivals grew 11.9% while domestic traffic increased 7.3%.

Between January and February 2026, scheduled flights moved 9,906,749 passengers, an 8.2% increase over the same period in 2025. The figures reflect ongoing expansion in commercial aviation capacity into Colombian airports, including the principal international gateways in Bogotá, Medellín, Cartagena, and Cali.

Mexico airport campaign tied to World Cup

Following Colombia’s participation as guest of honor at the Tianguis Turístico de México, the Ministerio de Comercio, Industria y Turismo signed an agreement with more than 20 Mexican airports to display the country’s “Descubre la Diversidad de Colombia, El País de la Belleza” campaign during the FIFA World Cup season.

The campaign will run in terminals operated by the Mexican federal government, including airports in Mexico City, Toluca, Tulum, and Cancún. The Mexican market represents one of the larger sources of regional intra-Latin American travel and is expected to see elevated transit volumes during the World Cup, which Mexico will co-host with the United States and Canada in summer 2026.

“Colombia is positioning itself as an increasingly visible and competitive destination in international markets. These alliances allow us to expand the country’s presence in strategic global venues, increase visitor arrivals, and continue positioning tourism as an engine of economic development for the regions,” Morales Rojas said.

The ministry indicated that Colombia’s presence at the Tianguis Turístico also produced bilateral conversations on expanding air connectivity and promotional cooperation with Mexican tourism operators, though specific route announcements or carrier commitments tied to the agreement were not disclosed.

Above photo: Mexico pavilion at the 2015 ANATO Vitrina Turistica trade show in Bogotá (photo: Loren Moss)

Tenth US conviction under joint US-Colombia child exploitation offensive

A federal jury in the Southern District of Florida convicted Ramon Arellano Sandoval, 65, of Antioch, Tennessee, on charges of attempted sex trafficking of a minor and attempted production of child sexual abuse material involving a 14-year-old victim residing in Medellín, Colombia. A US federal district judge subsequently sentenced Arellano Sandoval to 30 years in federal prison, according to Alcaldía de Medellín Mayor Federico “Fico” Gutiérrez, who confirmed the sentence on May 21, 2026.

The case, prosecuted by the US Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida under case number 24-cr-20519, represents the tenth conviction obtained under a joint US-Colombia enforcement initiative targeting foreign nationals who travel to Medellín to sexually exploit minors. Three other US citizens previously sentenced in connection with the program include Stefan Correa and Manuel Poceiro, who each received life sentences, and Mohamed Anaswed, who received 21 years in federal prison.

According to court records and evidence presented at the February 24 trial, Arellano Sandoval exchanged thousands of text and video messages with the victim, who was 14 years old at the time, and who lived in a rural area near Medellín. Prosecutors presented evidence that the defendant knew the victim’s age, repeatedly solicited sexually explicit videos from her, directed her to produce illicit material in exchange for electronic payments, and traveled to Colombia to engage in commercial sex with her.

“The evidence showed that this defendant pressured a child to create sexually explicit videos and even traveled overseas to abuse her. That conduct is predatory, criminal, and intolerable.” — Jason A. Reding Quiñones, US Attorney, Southern District of Florida

The jury found Arellano Sandoval guilty of attempted sex trafficking of a minor, which carries a maximum sentence of life in federal prison, and attempted production of visual depictions of the sexual exploitation of a minor, which carries a maximum sentence of 30 years.

“The jury’s verdict delivered justice for a 14-year-old victim who was targeted and exploited by a 65-year-old man who knew exactly what he was doing,” said US Attorney Jason A. Reding Quiñones for the Southern District of Florida. “The evidence showed that this defendant pressured a child to create sexually explicit videos and even traveled overseas to abuse her.”

The investigation was conducted by Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) Miami under Special Agent in Charge José R. Figueroa, with operational support from HSI Colombia. Assistant US Attorneys Tim Farina and Camille Smith handled the prosecution. On the Colombian side, the arrest and evidence collection involved the Alcaldía de Medellín, the Policía Nacional through its Dirección de Protección y Servicios Especiales (DIPRO), the Fiscalía General de la Nación, and Migración Colombia.

“La justicia no tiene fronteras cuando se trata de proteger a nuestros niños, niñas y adolescentes,” Gutiérrez wrote on his X account, referring to cross-border judicial cooperation in cases involving the exploitation of minors. The mayor indicated the administration would continue pursuing similar prosecutions, stating that any foreign national traveling to Medellín to exploit minors would be pursued until obtaining a conviction, including in their country of origin.

La justicia no tiene fronteras cuando se trata de proteger a nuestros niños, niñas y adolescentes.Otro condenado más.

Ramón Arellano Sandoval, de 65 años de Estados Unidos, fue sentenciado a 30 años en prisión federal de ese país, por los delitos de intento de explotación… pic.twitter.com/mepkNuOURX

— Fico Gutiérrez (@FicoGutierrez) May 21, 2026

The Arellano Sandoval case follows a similar prosecution earlier in 2026 against Michael Jaime Inofuentes, also a US citizen, who was sentenced by the US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia to 18 years in federal prison. Court evidence in that case established that Inofuentes sexually abused a 15-year-old in Medellín and paid for encounters in hotels, resulting in a pregnancy in early 2024. The investigation, triggered by a complaint from the victim’s mother to Colombian authorities, led to Inofuentes’s arrest in Miami. Prosecutors introduced WhatsApp conversations, financial transfers, and the defendant’s own admissions, which included statements that he had fathered other children in Colombia under similar circumstances. Related court documents and additional case information are available through the US District Court for the Southern District of Florida at www.flsd.uscourts.gov and through the PACER system at pacer.flsd.uscourts.gov under case number 24-cr-20519.

More than 400 combatants would be concentrated in the new zones as negotiations continue in Doha, Qatar

President Gustavo Petro is moving forward with the creation of temporary concentration zones, known as Zonas de Ubicación Temporal (ZUT), for members of the Estado Mayor Conjunto del Ejército Gaitanista de Colombia (EGC), also known as the Clan del Golfo, the country’s largest drug trafficking armed group, in a renewed effort to advance his Total Peace (Paz Total) policy just days before Colombia’s presidential elections on May 31, 2026.

According to an official statement from Colombia’s presidency, the ZUTs would initially allow the concentration of more than 400 combatants while parallel negotiations continue over a possible peace agreement with the Colombian government, although no preliminary agreements have yet been reached.

The temporary concentration zones would function as designated areas where combatants suspend armed activities while participating in talks with the government and preparing for a potential reintegration into civilian life.

According to the government, the zones would remain in effect until December 31, 2026, meaning their future would ultimately depend on Colombia’s next president, who will take office on August 7, as well as on the broader future of the Total Peace policy.

Colombia’s most powerful criminal organization

The Clan del Golfo is considered by specialized organizations, including the Fundación Ideas para la Paz (FIP), to be Colombia’s most powerful criminal structure.

According to the organization, the group has nearly 10,000 armed members and operates in multiple strategic regions linked to drug trafficking, illegal mining and territorial control.

The US government has designated the group a transnational terrorist organization, while President Donald Trump previously warned of possible US military actions in Colombian territory over security and narcotics concerns, comments that sparked diplomatic tensions with Petro’s administration.

Institutional clash over arrest warrants and extradition requests

The ZUT proposal comes amid tensions between Colombia’s executive branch and the Attorney General’s Office over the legal conditions required to move the process forward.

The Office of the High Commissioner for Peace requested the suspension of arrest warrants against 29 Clan del Golfo members, including 13 individuals subject to extradition requests, among them Jobanis de Jesús Ávila Villadiego, alias “Chiquito Malo,” the group’s top leader.

Attorney General Luz Adriana Camargo rejected the request, citing legal limitations regarding individuals sought by foreign authorities.

Following the refusal, Petro publicly defended the process in a message on X. “I have been clear that, in the early stages of the process, individuals facing extradition do not participate,” the president wrote, denying any intention to suspend extradition orders unless there is “an advanced peace process, as established by law.”

Amid the controversy, the Clan del Golfo itself issued a statement accepting that individuals facing extradition requests would not initially participate in the temporary concentration zones.

“As an unequivocal demonstration of political will and coherence, the Joint High Command of the Gaitanista Army of Colombia accepts, in good faith, that access to the Temporary Concentration Zones will be limited to combatants who are not subject to extradition requests by any foreign government,” the group said.

The group added that the decision seeks to “remove any shadow of doubt” over the process and prevent extradition disputes from obstructing negotiations.

The presidency later highlighted that the EGC accepted the government’s conditions for concentrating fighters in Tierralta, Córdoba, and in the municipalities of Belén de Bajirá and Unguía, Chocó. According to the government, combatants and commanders are expected to begin entering the zones on June 25.

Criticism over timing

The initiative has sparked criticism because of its timing, arriving just days before presidential elections and during a government transition period.

Ombudswoman Iris Marín warned that the process creates uncertainty over how armed groups might interpret the political transition.

“The move toward those zones creates expectations among armed groups in the middle of an electoral context and government transition. It is impossible for disarmament to happen before August 7, 2026, so how do armed groups interpret that in an electoral context?” Marín said in a video shared on social media.

Marín clarified, however, that Colombia’s Constitution grants the president authority to pursue peace negotiations, meaning concerns center not on the legality of the initiative itself but on its political timing.

Negotiations between the Colombian government and the Clan del Golfo have been underway since 2025 in Doha, Qatar, which has quietly hosted talks between both parties. According to official sources, the ZUTs are intended as confidence-building measures and humanitarian relief for communities affected by the group’s violence.

*

Photo: Colombian government representative Álvaro Jiménez shakes hands with Clan del Golfo spokesperson Luis Armando Pérez in the presence of Qatar’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mohammed bin Abdulaziz bin Saleh Al-Khulaifi, in Doha on September 18, 2025, at the start of peace talks. Photo shared by Colombia’s Office of the High Commissioner for Peace.

Colombia entered the final week of campaigning on Monday ahead of a presidential election that has exposed deep political divisions, sharpened ideological tensions and raised concerns over the country’s security and economic future.

The three leading candidates in the 2026 race wrapped up major public appearances over the weekend with rallies across Bogotá, where supporters waving flags, chanting slogans and wearing campaign colors filled arenas, public plazas and avenues in a final push before Sunday’s first-round vote.

The election has increasingly become a referendum on the legacy of President Gustavo Petro and the future direction of the South American nation after four years marked by failed social reforms, diplomatic friction, fiscal pressures and a deteriorating security conditions ahead of the May 31 election.

Senator Iván Cepeda, the candidate aligned with Petro’s governing Historic Pact coalition, entered the final stretch of the campaign presenting himself as the defender of progressive reforms and social justice policies aimed at reducing inequality and expanding access to education, pensions and healthcare.

Speaking before supporters in Bogotá’s historic Plaza de Bolívar, Cepeda urged Colombians to “defend hope” and reject what he described as a return to the political establishment that governed Colombia before Petro’s historic 2022 victory.

“Our project is one of dignity, peace and social transformation,” the hard-left senator told supporters. “We cannot allow fear and hatred to reverse the changes that millions of Colombians demanded.”

Cepeda has pledged to continue the government’s controversial “Total Peace” strategy, which seeks negotiated settlements with armed guerrilla groups and criminal organizations. The policy, however, has failed to curb violence and has instead allowed illegal armed factions to strengthen territorial control in rural areas.

Security has emerged as one of the defining issues of the campaign following a rise in massacres, attacks against security forces and extortion in regions including Catatumbo, Cauca and parts of the Pacific coast. Several recent bomb attacks and clashes involving dissident rebel groups have intensified public anxiety and become central talking points for opposition candidates.

Conservative lawyer and political outsider Abelardo de la Espriella has capitalized on growing frustration over insecurity, presenting himself as the candidate of “authority and order.”

During rallies attended by thousands in Bogotá, Barranquilla and Medellín, de la Espriella has promised a sweeping security crackdown against illegal armed groups, tougher prison sentences and expanded support for the military and police.

“Colombia cannot continue surrendering territory to criminals and terrorists,” he told cheering supporters. “The state must recover authority in every corner of the country.”

De la Espriella has also sought to attract business leaders and middle-class voters concerned about inflation, unemployment and slowing investment. His campaign platform includes proposals for tax reductions, deregulation and incentives aimed at restoring investor confidence after several years of economic uncertainty.

Meanwhile, senator Paloma Valencia closed her campaign with a massive event at Bogotá’s Movistar Arena, in which she framed the election as a battle to prevent Colombia from drifting toward authoritarianism and economic collapse. Throughout the campaign, she has repeatedly warned voters against what she calls “the Venezuelanization of Colombia,” a message that has resonated strongly among conservative sectors and business elites.

“We are voting for democracy, liberty and the survival of our institutions,” Valencia said during her closing rally. “Colombia cannot continue down the path of division and improvisation.”

Political analysts say the election reflects a country increasingly polarized between those who support Petro’s promise of structural change and those who believe the administration’s policies have weakened institutions, damaged investor confidence and emboldened armed groups.

Recent polling suggests Cepeda maintains a narrow lead heading into Sunday’s vote, though few observers expect any candidate to secure the more than 50 percent needed to avoid a runoff election scheduled for June 21.

The latest surveys indicate a highly competitive contest for second place between Valencia and de la Espriella, setting the stage for what could become one of the most polarized second-round races in Colombia’s modern political history.

Beyond ideology, many voters say they remain concerned about rising living costs, access to employment, corruption and public safety.

In downtown Bogotá, where campaign caravans and political posters have become a daily feature of city life, voters have expressed exhaustion after months of aggressive rhetoric and constant political confrontation.

With just days remaining before Colombians head to the polls, authorities across the country have increased security measures amid concerns over possible unrest and isolated acts of political violence.

Sunday’s election is widely viewed as one of the most consequential in decades, with the outcome expected to shape Colombia’s political and economic direction long after the campaign slogans and rallies fade from the streets of Bogotá.

Confused about the upcoming Colombian presidential election? We’re here to help you with a set of cheat sheets on the top candidates so you can follow the local news. Today we’re looking at Paloma Valencia of the Centro Democrático.

Who is Paloma Valencia?

Paloma Susana Valencia Laserna is a conservative politician who has represented the Centro Democrático in the Senate for 12 years. She won her primary battle with three million votes in March, confirming her position as the establishment rightist candidate.

Anti-establishment types, look away now. Her paternal grandfather Guillermo León Valencia was President of the Republic from 1962-66, while her maternal grandfather Mario Laserna Pinzón founded the Universidad de los Andes.

Perhaps not coincidentally, that’s her alma mater, studying economics there before a Master’s in creative writing at New York University. She’s been heavily involved in politics for two decades now, originally as a candidate for Alas Equipo Colombia before jumping ship to the Centro Democrático.

Her faith is deeply important to her, as is tradition. Coming from the circle of the Popayán elite, she is a fairly standard conservative on most cultural and social issues. On the economy, she tacks more to a neoliberal line.

Is she polling well?

Not as well as she would like. While she won comfortably in the March primaries as part of the Gran Consulta por Colombia, she has since fluctuated around 15-25%, usually rising and falling in rhythm with rightist rival Abelardo de la Espriella.

Most recent polling has her in third place a week out from the election, which is a problem. She does outperform Abelardo in head-to-head matchups with Iván Cepeda in most polls, which her messaging will want to lean into over the coming week.

What’s her campaign like?

Centrism, slightly improbably. As one of two rightists in an election with a clearly dominant leftist candidate, two flailing centrists and a host of also-rans, she’s positioning herself as the closest to the centre of the viable options.

However, she’s firmly of the right, although tempered somewhat by her far more liberal vicepresidential candidate Juan Daniel Oviedo. This is best evidenced by the fact she is very much ‘la que dice Uribe’, clearly having the backing of the controversial yet still influential ex-president.

Her campaign logo features a cross, with religion playing a large role for her stance on many cultural and social issues. She leans heavily into those as a conservative. Colombia Más Grande is the slogan, but they don’t use it particularly well.

If elected, she would be Colombia’s first ever female head of state (with a first ever gay vicepresident too), although she’s not really leant into that much as you might think. As with much else, she’s not managing to cut through particularly well on socials or make a big splash in the national debate.

So what’s in her manifesto then?

You can read it for yourself online, under the name 111puntos. You even get an extra point for free. It’s fairly well presented, laid out and supported, but that’s not necessarily going to win any votes. Overall, other than a massive reliance on AI, there’s no big surprise or radical shakeup here, more a return to the old ways of doing things.

Paloma is certainly no dove when it comes to security and crime, promising a tough line. COP$20tn over four years for the armed forces in order to modernise and rebuild, finishing at 4% of annual GDP destined for the forces. That includes recruiting 30,000 more military personnel and the same number of police officers.

The rest of the money will go on increasing pay, conditions and so forth as well as a big push on tech. Drones are the centrepiece for investment, but cyberdefence is also highlighted as an area that needs urgent investment. 

Slightly more old-school is her plan to militarise key transportation routes immediately. More of the same with coca farms: more spraying that allegedly won’t affect ecosystems or people, combined with subsidies for substitution. The fact that neither of those things have worked for decades isn’t stopping her.

On the other side of the coin, Paloma Valencia promises zero impunity: “el que la hace, la paga”. That means more powers to seize illicit gains and more prison sentences for those found guilty of corruption, reducing the number of casa por carcel sentences. 22,000 more penitentiary places and 19,000 more prisoners.

There will be 50 new casas de justicia and mobile courts to tour the country visiting rural locations that are currently not served by the legal systems. All of this is working towards an aim to get congestion in the system from 48% down to 0. Ominously, there’s also a promise of a law to “regulate protest and punish vandalism”.

New laws on corruption are to be brought in, mostly focused around greater transparency using tech. That means blockchain to record transactions and deals as well as AI to analyse potential discrepancies. There will be greater enforcement of existing regulations and a guardian of public integrity to oversee processes.

On the economy, it’s all about recovering confidence from the international market. That will be done by getting infrastructure and mining production back up to pre-pandemic levels (6%+), USD$10mn more in exports and growth over five percent annually.

More FDI to the tune of USD$2bn annually, 25% of GDP to go into internal investment and reducing the deficit by COP$50tn. How is she going to pay for all this? With, err, tax cuts for homeowners and businesses, efficiency savings of 25% and debt refinancing. Good luck with all that.

She’s the only candidate to really take the healthcare crisis seriously. First up is a promise to resolve 10 million blocked prescriptions, appointments and so on in the first 100 days. She plans to send doctors to patients in rural areas, not the other way round.

This will be paid for by a COP$9tn investment. A third of that is destined for delivery of outstanding operations and prescriptions, the rest for paying accumulated state debt to healthcare operators. Many taxpayers won’t like the latter.

Energy faces a similar situation: paying off state debts to operators within the first three months. The goal here is to avoid blackouts and brownouts in the short term, while putting in place structures to avoid the same issues over the long term.

Turning on the taps for both oil and gas lies at the heart of this plan, with a reboot of exploration and extraction projects. Partly, this is to attract AI database and server investment. There’s also support for renewables and alternatives, but it seems more of an afterthought.

Her plan on international relations is to ride two horses. Free competition with China and more co-operation on infrastructure and exports from Colombia. At the same time, leadership in Donald Trump’s Shield of the Americas project while guaranteeing that only the Colombian Armed Forces will operate in national territory.

There will be 187,000 free school places for talented children, 150,000 grants for vulnerable children and 10 public superschools. ICETEX loans, in line with other countries, will only be repayable when you have a salary. COLFUTURO will be rescued as well. The 16 biggest urban centres will have psycho-social units to look out for vulnerable children.

Businesses employing people under 28 will receive a subsidy of up to 30% of minimum wage for a year. Agricultural workers will receive better lines of credit, three million hectares of land formalised and a million new farming zones designated. Tourism is projected to double, with new routes opened for Asia and Europe.

There is a heavy focus on the grey economy. Informal workers will have access to seed capital, loans, a virtual wallet and a host of other possibilities. The goal is to offer help without persecution.

Pensioners will all be covered unconditionally, regardless of law or budget changes as well as three million vulnerable adults to receive subsidies. Each child born into poverty will have COP$500,000 put aside as seed capital to start saving.

Infrastructure starts off with 35,000km of new roads as well as increased satellite connectivity for marginalised communities. There will be 1 million new homes built, with a quarter of those directly subsidised. A million further homes will receive new or improved potable water access.

Finally, the environment. The brakes will go on for deforestation and the national parks will be protected from guerrilla activity. Local families will be given subsidies in order to protect areas of natural interest. Money generated from mining will be ploughed back into environmental protection.

Who is she running with?

Juan Daniel Oviedo, former head of DANE and candidate in the last race for Bogotá mayor. In that contest, he managed to force Gustavo Bolívar into third place in a two-horse race, showcasing his impressive campaigning ability. He came second in the Gran Consulta with over a million votes, reinforcing his reputation. 

He’s been more visible than Paloma Valencia for much of the campaign and is much more active than either of the other two undercards. That was the reason he was brought in – to appeal to more liberal voters and to provide an injection of energy on socials. He’s delivered in spades on both accounts.

However, there are a couple of issues here. Firstly, he runs the risk of overshadowing Paloma Valencia with his charisma and presence. Secondly, by joining her campaign he lost some of those centrist voters who saw it as a betrayal to join forces with the Centro Democrático.

They certainly aren’t natural bedfellows, with Oviedo a fair bit left of Valencia on a lot of economic issues. More profound splits are found on social issues. For example, Oviedo is out and proud while Valencia stands against gay adoption and marriage. Awkward at best. 

Why do people say she’s ‘la que dice Uribe’?

Pido respetuosamente votar por Paloma Valencia. pic.twitter.com/HpS5XjGdVw

— Álvaro Uribe Vélez (@AlvaroUribeVel) May 18, 2026

That’s a bit unfair on a candidate with a long and storied political career of her own. However, while she isn’t just Uribe’s candidate, she certainly makes a lot of having his passionate backing.

That’s been a mixed blessing for a while now, with Uribe’s influence waning as the years pass. While his candidate won in 2018, they failed to even make the second round in 2014 and 2022 and we could well be on for a repeat of that.

The ex-president certainly casts a long shadow and that’s not always positive, especially with Oviedo also shining bright. Support for Uribe has dwindled over the past two decades, as Colombian demographics change profoundly.

However, Uribe does retain a large swell of support and also commands the biggest party machine of the candidates in the race. The Centro Democrático will be able to make a huge campaigning push on and offline across the entire country, which may be underreported. 

Any skeletons in her closet?

A few, mainly over her combative social media use while in the Senate. Paloma Valencia has largely avoided serious controversy though, with most of her twitterstorms being differences of opinion rather than accusations of impropriety.

She accused now-president Gustavo Petro of corruption in 2018 following the Odebrecht affair. This amounted to grainy footage of him receiving cash at an unknown point. That was archived as being far too flimsy to be evidence of anything at all.

In 2022 she defended the Colombian state’s actions during the armed conflict, saying that while there may have been errors and atrocities, they were legitimate and in defence of the country. That unsurprisingly met with a huge backlash from various quarters.

Una narrativa mucho más constructiva (y verdadera) es: Los para y la guerrrilla fueron y son monstruosos. El Estado cometió errores y atrocidades, pero era legítimo y fundamentalmente estuvo en la defensa de los ciudadanos.

— Paloma Valencia L (@PalomaValenciaL) July 29, 2022

There is one case hanging over Paloma Valencia still. Her link to Uribe led to her questioning the legitimacy of a key witness in the case against him. In turn, the witnesses defence lawyers filed a defamation case against the senator, over which the Supreme Court has ordered a conciliatory process. That has not yet concluded.

She’s also clashed with Cepeda’s vicepresidential candidate Aida Quilcué over indigenous rights in Cauca. Indeed, she’s gone as far as to suggest splitting the entire department in two, one for Indigenous Colombians only, something many view as racially motivated.

So, can she succeed?

Yes, she can. Next weekend is arguably a harder test for her than a second round would be if she gets through. Similar concerns swirled around her in the Gran Consulta por Colombia, but she ended up sailing through comfortably. 

If she can repeat that trick, she matches up better than anyone else against Iván Cepeda. However, that’s very far from guaranteed, as they’re closely matched. It’s assumed that she’ll gain a lot of Abelardo voters, but that may not be true. The anti-left will flock to her, but the anti-establishment might not.

Her main draw is presenting herself as the only viable sensible candidate. In part that’s with Oviedo on board, in part that both Cepeda and de la Espriella are seen as populist. There’s a lot of centrist voters that will hold their noses and vote for her along those lines.

Having said all that, centrism isn’t in vogue in many places globally and Colombia is no exception. That may block her even getting to a final face-off and her chances of winning rest with anti-Cepeda votes. More than any other candidate, hers would be a loveless victory.

The post Candidate guides for the 2026 Colombian elections: Paloma Valencia appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

Confused about the 2026 Colombian presidential elections? We’re here to help you with a set of cheat sheets on the top candidates so you can follow the local news. First we’re looking at Abelardo de la Espriella of Defensores de la Patria.

Who is Abelardo de la Espriella?

Abelardo de la Espriella hails from Montería, which he makes great play of. He was actually born in Bogotá, as well as studying in various universities here. He rose to fame as a defence lawyer, eventually setting up his own firm, De La Espriella Lawyers Enterprise. Their clients have been varied (more of that later).

He has a colourful background alongside his legal activity, releasing two albums of classical and traditional music as well as launching De La Espriella Style, his menswear line. He also has his fingers in other pies, including rum, wine and coffee, several books and a foundation to help impoverished kids.

A former atheist, he saw the light in the pandemic and came around to Catholicism, which is convenient for winning votes in a deeply religious country. He holds Italian and US passports. He takes pride in his appearance, often suited and tidily-bearded but switching to sombreros vueltiaos or guayaberas when appropriate.

While he has a varied and successful background in business, he has no experience at all in government, either at local or national level. He is leaning into that, taking the mantle of the outsider candidate and promising to do politics differently. Courting controversy is second nature for this bullish and outspoken candidate.

Is he polling well?

He started strongly towards the end of last year, then seemed to have dipped as we moved into springtime. Since the March elections though, he’s picked up the pace again and is peaking again at just the right time.

He’s now ahead of Paloma again with most pollsters and stands a good chance of making the second round, where he faces a strong challenge against Cepeda. His incredibly divisive rhetoric and persona mean that he doesn’t match up easily in a one-on-one.

Like many populists in the caudillo mould, he splits opinions – while he wins a lot of hearts and minds, so too does he turn a lot of people against him. Very few people are neutral on Abelardo, which means he could struggle to win the more centrist voters, even against Cepeda. Expect voto en blanco to do well if he’s in the second round.

What’s his campaign like?

Pick your adjective depending on how you view him generally: controversial, innovative, problematic, fierce, strong, crass, outspoken. What’s unarguable is that it is very much focused on him, features a lot of show and spin and is extremely light on detail.

Very much in the vein of a Trump or Bukele, two key influences he acknowledges himself, he positions himself as the outsider candidate compared to the professional politicians in the race. This has not only been successful elsewhere, but almost took Rodolfo Hernández to the presidency four years ago.

Interestingly, Abelardo de la Espriella is in one way openly following a very similar line to the leftists he claims to hate. He is courting “los que nunca” against “los que siempre”, fitting his position as the outsider candidate. His promises often revolve directly around shaking everything up.

So what’s in his manifesto then?

You can read it for yourself online, or what is there at least. It’s barely a manifesto and more a collection of ideas, positions and wishes. He focuses heavily on law and order with a generous side serving of efficiency savings. Quite how any of this will get done or whether it’s viable is often unclear.

First thing on the agenda is that he’s tough on crime. He’s proposed 10 megacarceles in the Bukele mould, a ‘primera linea’ of reservists and veterans and a new bloque de búsqueda for barrios. He targets a 30% reduction in gender-based violence and 40% cut in feminicides. That involves an accelerated 24/7 judicial process in 72 hours maximum. 

More widely, he wants to reform and better fund the armed forces in order to both establish state control of territory and enforce the state monopoly on arms. That carries over into his stance on armed groups. He wants to eliminate 330,000 hectares of coca farms using any and all tools available to him. That means spraying, manual elimination, express recuperation of proceeds of crime and so on.

Para cambiar a Colombia primero hay que sobrevivirle a quienes no quieren que cambie. pic.twitter.com/h6Tf8refWr

— De La Espriella Presidente (@AbelardoPTE) May 17, 2026

The mano dura is also set to come down on politicians. He’s fiercely anti-corruption, which he defines broadly. He plans to start with Ecopetrol and then clean out state organisations of their links to “narco-trafficking, corruption and bad management”.

Politicians and administrators that are not corrupt won’t be safe, either. He promises zero tolerance for ineptitude and inefficiency. He wants results within 100 days and those with empty hands will be told to sling their hook. Ambassadors have been told they need to promote the country, not just shoot whisky on the public purse.

Tax avoidance is also on the radar – Abelardo de la Espriella wants to use AI to radically improve DIAN’s processes and deal with widespread avoidance. Subsidies will also be revised to make sure they are going to the right places.

He wants to recover energy self-sufficiency and to restart drilling and exploration as well. Gas is his main focus, although rare earth mining is also highlighted, alongside reform of the costly ElectroCaribe. A main driver is drawing a clear line between legal and illegal mining.

The national budget will also benefit from the efficiency savings – merging or abolishing agencies he sees as redundant such as the Ministerio de Igualdad. That’s part of a shock plan to save around 3.1% of GDP.

With those savings, the aim is to get the deficit to -4.8%(!) within the first year, falling to under 3.5% or lower by 2030. Dovetailing with that is a promise to anchor the debt/GDP ratio at no higher than 55%. All this will require annual growth of at least 3% with 5%+ targeted.

On education, there is to be greater focus on technology, as well as a ‘virtual university’ and free computers in schools. Unsurprisingly, details are limited. A STEM program specifically aimed at girls will be set up to deal with the tech gender gap.

Rural communities are a key part of his voter base and he’s promising 600,000 new jobs outside cities as well as 100,000 young people to receive education on improved farming methods and use of tech. 2 million hectares are to be delivered to the people.

Rounding up, there will be COP$125bn aimed at co-investment or seed capital for creative projects; mass sterilisation of stray animals to reduce populations and 200,000 carers to be given subsidies.

Who is he running with?

José Manuel Restrepo, the closest thing to an aristocrat that a two-century-old republic can have. He claims direct descendency from revolutionary hero Francisco de Paula Santander. In sharp contrast to Abelardo, he’s a classic buttoned-down conservative.

He served under Duque as Ministro de Hacienda following the botched intent at fiscal reform, having previously been at Comercio. Outside of politics he has been rector of three different universities, most notably the Rosario, his alma mater alongside Bath and the LSE. 

However, given that Abelardo de la Espriella loves the limelight, his undercard is not a key part of this campaign. While the other two real candidates have genuinely strong vice-presidential candidates, Abelardo is doing all the heavy lifting himself.

What’s all this El Tigre stuff?

Abelardo understands the importance of branding, and this is a key part of his appeal. He says that the big cat represents courage, ferocity and independence, all of which are qualities he identifies with. In a country where blankets featuring tigers are a staple of many homes, this is a good brand to have.

Tigre in Colombia can refer to tigers or jaguars, both of which he uses, though the former are more common. That means video screens with dancing tigers on them, tiger-print shoes up for sale and a whole lot more. He’s often to be seen wearing tiger-print clothes.

Cepeda’s running mate Aida Quilcué has publicly asked him to stop using jaguars as part of this, claiming they hold a special significance for Indigenous Colombians. Abelardo de la Espriella has predictably ignored that.

Any skeletons in his closet?

Sort of. There’s certainly a great deal of controversy, but a lot of it he simply leans into and doesn’t see as problematic at all. That’s true of personal attacks on Paloma Valencia,  as well as frequent homophobic and sexist outbursts.

It’s less true of his past as a criminal defence lawyer, an area that often makes him quite touchy. He has represented some pretty shady characters, including Álvaro Uribe himself. Jorge Pretelt and David Guzmán are just two high-profile clients accused of corruption that de la Espriella has defended.

In fairness, his firm has also taken on some genuinely important defences, most notably Natalia de la Ponce and Rosa Elvira Cely. However, even this is disputed, with family members taking to Instagram to dispute his take on that and suggest it was more about financial interest.

Then there’s the outstanding allegations that the firmas he collected in order to be able to run were improperly registered. He won 5 million, more than any other Colombian, of which 3 million were ruled invalid. That still leaves him comfortably over the threshold, but raises questions about his support. 

So, can he succeed?

Yes, he can. It’s nowhere near guaranteed that he’ll make the second round, of course, and he absolutely has the potential to do or say something that will torpedo his campaign. However, he’s a maverick and is campaigning well, which makes him unpredictable.

He is offering easy solutions to complex problems, but that’s often popular with the electorate. Get past the rhetoric and he identifies a lot of key problems and his proposals could be a good thing. He just doesn’t make it clear exactly how this is going to happen.

More to the point, Abelardo de la Espriella represents the outsider position compared to everyone else: he really is not a professional politician like them, for good or for bad. Again, that’s popular with many voters after decades of incompetence from technocrats.

Comparisons with Trump in the USA or Bukele in El Salvador are clichéd, but they stand up. He frequently flirts with sexism and homophobia while mocking opponents, but claims innocence, he promises a hard line on crime and he avoids clarity over his proposals. Both those candidates won comfortably with similar electorates to Colombia.

If he gets to the second round, he could win due to a dislike of the other candidate, as that will almost certainly be Cepeda. In that case, there could be a lot of voters holding their noses to vote either for or against him. At the moment, that’s a coin flip.

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Colombia and Bolivia intensified a diplomatic crisis this week after mutually expelling representatives from their respective embassies, amid growing political tensions between Colombian President Gustavo Petro and Bolivian President Rodrigo Paz Pereira.

The tensions began May 20, 2026, when Bolivia’s Foreign Ministry announced the expulsion of Colombia’s ambassador to La Paz, Elizabeth García Carrillo, after describing remarks made by Petro regarding Bolivia’s political crisis as interference in the country’s internal affairs.

“The decision responds to the need to preserve the principles of sovereignty, noninterference in internal affairs and mutual respect among states, fundamental pillars of international coexistence and diplomatic relations between sovereign nations,” Bolivia’s Foreign Ministry said in an official statement.

One day later, Colombia’s Foreign Ministry, headed by Rosa Yolanda Villavicencio, responded by expelling Bolivia’s chargé d’affaires in Bogotá, Ariel Percy Molina Pimentel, under the principle of diplomatic reciprocity.

“The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Colombia, considering the recent decision adopted by the Government of the Plurinational State of Bolivia regarding the permanence of Colombia’s ambassador (…) was compelled, on the basis of reciprocity, to declare the termination of the functions of Mr. Ariel Percy Molina Pimentel,” Colombia’s Foreign Ministry said, citing Article 9 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

The Colombian government clarified that the measure does not imply a formal break in diplomatic relations between the two countries, adding that “Colombia remains willing to support, always at the request of the Bolivian government, initiatives in favor of peace, political dialogue, institutional channels, citizen participation and the observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms.”

Origin of the dispute

Bolivia’s decision followed a message posted by Petro on X on May 18, in which he said that “Bolivia is experiencing a popular uprising,” referring to the political and social crisis affecting the Andean country.

For the past three weeks, Bolivia has faced protests and road blockades led by supporters of former President Evo Morales, who oppose the current administration and are demanding the resignation of President Rodrigo Paz Pereira.

The protests have also unfolded as Morales faces judicial proceedings over alleged crimes related to human trafficking and child sexual abuse, while also refusing to appear before judicial authorities.

The Bolivian government interpreted Petro’s remarks as a violation of the principle of nonintervention in domestic affairs.

Bogotá, however, rejected that interpretation and said its officials had not sought to interfere in Bolivia’s internal politics.

Colombia “categorically rejects any interpretation attributing to its authorities an interest or intention to interfere in Bolivia’s internal affairs,” the Colombian Foreign Ministry said, while reiterating its commitment to sovereign equality, nonintervention, self-determination of peoples, peaceful settlement of disputes and respect for territorial integrity.

A politically sensitive moment for both governments

The diplomatic tensions come as Rodrigo Paz Pereira, who took office in November, faces social unrest, road blockades and domestic criticism over his administration.

Meanwhile, Petro is approaching the end of his term in Colombia amid a highly polarized electoral climate. The Colombian president is seeking to preserve the continuity of his political project through the election of a successor in presidential elections whose first round will take place May 31, with the next president set to take office on August 7, 2026.

Although neither government has announced additional measures, the exchange of expulsions marks the highest level of diplomatic tension between Colombia and Bolivia in recent years.

On April 20, the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) – Colombia’s transitional justice mechanism – released a report on the impacts suffered by animals in the context of the armed conflict. 

The JEP’s report, conducted in partnership with the University of Essex, found that an animal is killed or injured every 30 minutes due to the armed conflict.

Animal rights activists say the release represents a step forward in publicizing the often invisibilized violence inflicted upon animals in war.

The report was developed through the construction of a database using 237 national, regional, and local media outlets, and 600 X accounts belonging to social and environmental organizations, as well as State entities and multilateral organizations.

Based on the information collected, they made an individual categorization referring to domestic animals, and a collective one referring to species, that is, wild animals. In this context, 100,252 domestic animals faced violence and 44 species are at imminent risk of extinction as a result of the armed conflict.

Thirty-two percent of the recorded cases involving animals were directly linked to military actions, including armed confrontations, ambushes, and attacks. The impacts were not distributed evenly across the territory; there are regions where armed conflict, illegal economies, and environmental richness converge, intensifying the harm. For example, Antioquia is the department with the highest concentration of species threatened by the conflict.

“We realized that most cases involved incidents such as accidents with landmines, anti-personnel mines, ambushes against the public security forces, harassment of the public security forces, and armed confrontations. These were some of the situations in which animals were killed or injured. They were also affected by forced displacement,” Laura Ojeda, a researcher on the JEP’s Investigation and Prosecution Unit who contributed to the report, explained. 

Forced abandonment was one of the most documented forms of harm identified in the report, largely because it was closely tied to the victimization of caregivers within the dynamics of the conflict. 27% of the recorded cases — corresponding to approximately 900,000 animals — involved forced abandonment.

The report also identified nine ways in which animals were used throughout the armed conflict: as means of transportation; as devices to detonate explosive artifacts; as instruments to inflict pain and suffering – torture –; as sentinels for rapid alerts; as surveillance tools; in practices of bioterrorism involving zoonotic diseases; as propaganda tools; as amulets or part of esoteric rituals; and as a means to intimidate communities and extort payments from business owners and farmers.

Visibilizing animal suffering

The report comes as part of the JEP’s efforts to recognize the environment within its processes of justice, truth, and reparation. This release, the third in a series of three, is the first to focus on the specific forms of violence suffered by animals. 

“It is part of a strategy to recognize all forms of life that have been victims of the armed conflict in Colombia,” Ojeda told The Bogotá Post.

For Senator Andrea Padilla of the Green Alliance (Alianza Verde) party, the report represents a major step forward for animal rights. 

She notes that harm to animals is usually addressed as a collateral issue, as damage to property under a framework of harm to human assets.

“Animals have always been excluded from any moral consideration, from any legal consideration, even from news coverage,” the senator told The Bogotá Post.

The team behind the report faced the challenge of shifting the narrative away from the legal framework which refers to animals only as part of the natural environment.

Instead, it adopted a “differential” approach from natural sciences, in collaboration with La Enredadera & co, a scientific outreach collective.

For Luis Carlos Posso, anthropologist and member of the collective, the report represents an exception to the “unavoidable anthropocentrism permeating the law.”

Senator Padilla highlighted the animal rights implications:  “I believe it is only fair that sentient beings capable of emotions, affection, and social, moral, and emotional lives are also considered as affected by the conflict.”

Padilla added that understanding the impact of the conflict on animals deepens the appreciation of the human toll of violence.

“When we understand that there are bonds of affection there, family bonds that are abruptly broken by war, we can also see the conflict in a deeper way — that is, we can understand the deepest forms of harm being caused,” said the senator.

Animals as victims of the armed conflict

In addition to detailing the harms inflicted upon animals, the report proposes various reparative measures. These include habitat restoration, veterinary care in conflict zones, public veterinary care networks, the inclusion of animals in memory and truth processes, protection measures for at-risk species, and conservation initiatives.

However, there is still a long way to go before animals can be fully recognized as victims.

“Legally they are not things, but they are also not rights-holders. If they are not rights-holders, they cannot be recognized as victims,” explains Ojeda.

Colombian law recognizes animals as sentient beings, and laws such as the Ángel Law reflect significant progress in their rights. Currently, there is a bill advancing in congress that seeks to historically and legally recognize animals and ecosystems as victims of the internal armed conflict, prohibiting their use as instruments of war and ordering their essential reparation. This is Bill No. 012 of 2025, led by Senator Esmeralda Hernández of the Pacto Histórico party.

Senator Padilla explained that the success of the legal changes will depend on whoever is elected as the next president. 

“Undoubtedly, this report holds great value. It not only offers another perspective on the armed conflict, but also explicitly incorporates animals into the analysis of war, harm, and peace,” said Senator Padilla. She added that animals must be involved in reparations processes, insisting, “peace must include animals, or it will not be complete.”

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