In an era of shifting global economic alliances, few countries find themselves more strategically positioned than Colombia. Caught between the massive state-backed investment initiatives of China and the established political and economic influence of the United States, Bogotá’s policy decisions have never held higher stakes for investors, the region, or especially, the country’s own citizens.
At the 2025 Colombia Gold Summit,Finance Colombia Executive Editor Loren Moss spoke with Daniel Giraldo, a Managing Director at FTI Consulting (NYSE: FCN), a global business advisory firm specializing in cross-border investment and corporate finance. Giraldo offered his perspective on the geopolitical chessboard, examining what Colombia’s recent decision to join the Belt and Road Initiative means for its future relationship with its largest long-standing ally, the United States.
Finance Colombia: I’m here with Daniel Giraldo of FTI Consulting. So we’re here at the 2025 CGS, Colombia Gold Summit, where we also talk about other precious metals, we talk about silver, we also talk about metals like copper, molybdenum, things like that. You gave an interesting talk yesterday, I don’t want to steal your thunder. Why don’t you summarize your discussion?
Daniel Giraldo: Well, if I could summarize my lecture yesterday, I think there’s a chessboard, a giant global chessboard right now. And there are two main players: US and China. And Colombia is one key figure, a key part of this chessboard. Right now, Colombia is in a key position with lots of opportunities between Chinese investment and the US investment. However, which decisions Colombia takes right now will shift the entire game for the coming years.
Finance Colombia: So we are in the last few months of a government that has been relatively friendly or biased towards China. And hostile might be too strong of a word, but relatively cold towards the United States, talking about the Petro government. Colombia, under Petro, just signed up for the Belt and Road Initiative. What is the significance of that for Colombia, not just in its relationship with the United States, but what does that do or change for Colombia?
Daniel Giraldo: Well, what we are seeing right now is that Colombia signed formally the Belt and Road Initiative earlier this year. And there’s been a lot of tensions with the Trump government. At the same time, the US is the main investor in Colombia. And what we’re seeing is how China, through different initiatives, wants to have a bigger long-term influence in the region. And Colombia is, in a soft way, saying, “We want that for us.” However, that’s not a shift that can be made automatically. That’s not made in a single signature by one president. It takes years and years to forge a relationship. And although the government of Petro, President Petro is showing how they’re very interested in the Chinese investment, and to have a strong relationship with the Chinese government, it’s not the way, to just step out of their major alliances throughout years with the US
Finance Colombia: The way that investment is done in China is fundamentally different than the way investment is done from places like the US or Canada or many European countries. In the US, if you’re going to attract investment in Colombia, it’s going to be with some company. And that company is going to do what it wants to do within the law but not really giving a damn about what Washington says or what Washington wants or what Ottawa says or wants. Whereas in China, it’s very much a government-to-government thing. You have state-owned enterprises, and Xi Jinping or the Communist Party says, “we’re going to invest in this,” whether it’s profitable or not, for whatever kind of geopolitical reasons that they want to do things. So it’s a fundamentally different thing.
If you do a deal with a company in the US, you’re doing a deal with that company. Now, yes, you have to make sure that regulatory things go through. Trump is a little bit more of a patronage type of president where he wants to get involved with things so he can find benefit for himself or his administration. But generally speaking, even still, if we look at investors, if you’re going to bring in someone to invest in one of these mining companies here or exploration, it’s a company. In China, it’s going to be a state-backed company. Now, what does that imply, then, for the way business would be done going forward, number one? And number two, Petro’s on his way out, and maybe there will be another left-wing government to continue his project, it doesn’t look like it at this point. But do you see continuity in that affinity or that participation in the Belt and Road Initiative? Like you mentioned, it’s not a treaty, it’s more of like a memorandum of understanding, like the diplomats like to call it. But what do you foresee over the next two or three years?
Daniel Giraldo: Yeah, I believe every tactic has been launched in a very moderate way somehow. So, of course, Belt and Road is just a framework, and every project that could be contemplated by Chinese government, depending on the feasibility of each one of these projects. So they’re not basically getting married yet, they’re just dating.
They’re just on their first dates. However, we’re married to the US We’ve had a long-standing marriage, and what we are seeing right now is that how investment works for both countries is different. However, for both countries, there are more and more, basically, things they require to be approved.
So in order to achieve this, the US is not being indirect about it. They require trusted partners. They require trusted allies, which get what’s at stake right now. So, Petro’s government has one year left. We are expecting a shift. However, even if Colombia gets a left-wing government or a right-wing government, it doesn’t change the fact that investment in the latest years has been in a rough place.
So Colombia requires this investment, and the country requires a very stable policy framework, regulatory framework, legal framework, in order to get investors feeling safer, with more appeal. And, yes, of course, it’s not the same as an SOE (State Owned Enterprise) Chinese company that wants to invest, that needs the approval of Beijing and all this. In contrast, we have the US. Of course, Washington can say whatever they want. They can say Petro is now on the Clinton list, and they can sanction him personally. But a company, a US company, can still invest here; it changes how they see Colombia in the long run.
Finance Colombia: I think one of the things that is very notable is that the Trump government sanctioned Petro, his son, his wife, and his interior minister personally, rather than imposing sanctions on the country or doing, like, I don’t know, tariff things. Actually, by the time we publish the video, we might know what happens, but right before the Supreme Court right now, actually as we speak, there is a challenge to Trump’s ability to circumvent congressional law. And so if we have a trade pact, like free trade agreement or something like that, a lot of businesses in the US have challenged Trump’s ability to just… you can’t just cancel a law. Congress passed a law, and it’s in effect, and you can’t just cancel it. Well, that’s what they’re arguing. And all of these kind of unilateral, discretionary tariff moves that affect entire economies and entire industries, there’s some uncertainty that is going to be settled there.
“However, we’re married to the US We’ve had a long-standing marriage, and what we are seeing right now is that how investment works for both countries is different.” – Daniel Giraldo
But it’s interesting because it seems that with them sanctioning Petro and Benedetti directly as individuals, they’re saying that they want to maintain some predictability and constancy in the bilateral economic relationship with Colombia. And I think that there have been a lot of missions. Fico, the mayor here in Medellin, some of the other mayors and Colombian congressional people have visited Washington and met with senators and met with people in the State Department and said, “Look, you know, we disagree with what the president’s doing. Wait a few months.” And it seems like Washington has heard that and is not acting too rashly towards Colombia as a country but rather decided to take their ire out directly on the president and his consigliere Armando Benedetti.
Daniel Giraldo: What I believe of this is that Trump’s government can say like, “We’re not afraid. We are not afraid of imposing sanctions. We’re not afraid of not conducting business in the way we used to do it anymore.” And it’s been shown, for example, in the relationship with China, for example, with the Chinese government, with Xi Jinping. And there’s been like an escalation of tariffs, for example, I think up to 130%. I can’t remember the exact number. And then last week they say, “let’s stop this. Let’s trade the sequels.” And it’s also their way of showing the carrot and then showing the mace or bat, this metaphor.
Finance Colombia: Yeah, the stick.
Daniel Giraldo: And with Colombia, I believe it is the same. It’s like we could, if we wanted, to give some sanctions and they will have great consequences in terms of our bilateral trade. However, they’re aware of their position. They’re our main investor. We have a very good relationship in bilateral trade. There’s been years and there’s been decades of both countries benefiting from each other. We have a great position in one of the closest countries to enter South America. And they know this government is just ending. So why would they give us, like give the left-wing parties an opportunity to just bash them and say, “Oh, Trump’s government can’t be trusted.” Whereas if you take another position and say, “Look, this is personal, this is just these individuals, not the whole country.” You still have ground to negotiate, to renegotiate, to benefit. So I believe it is quite tactical.
Finance Colombia: Another thing that you mentioned is the difference on the ground. When you look at, for example, if we talk about the mining sector, not just on the ground, but literally in the ground, the US right now, the Trump administration, and really just the US more broadly, is very concerned about rare earths. And Colombia, even though there’s not yet a lot of mining activity, Colombia does have rare earth potential. There’s already been illegal coltan, cobalt ore mining taking place down in the Amazon, things like that. But it would seem that further damaging relationships with Colombia right now would contravene the political strategy in the US to strengthen its rare earth mineral supply chain.
Daniel Giraldo: Yes, it is completely true. The US has shown how important it is for them to be less dependent on the supply chains of the Chinese government, specifically in terms of their rare earths and critical minerals refining processes. So the US has been in recent weeks signing lots of memorandums of understanding and bilateral agreements with Australia, with Japan, with Malaysia, with Thailand. And they already have very good deals with Argentina, with the Mineral Security Partnership, for example, Mexico, Peru, Argentina. And the Dominican Republic. And Colombia could be in the radar as well. And what Colombia requires to be here and to benefit with the US as well is just to be patient, to get the best and the highest standards of ESG, and to reassure the different governments that it is safe to trade minerals with Colombia. That if they purchase Colombian minerals, they explore the region and they trade with us, they will find quality, they will find high standards of minerals, without assuming lots of risks that these markets don’t want to assess anymore.
Finance Colombia: So longer term, looking out three to five years, are you optimistic or pessimistic about the bilateral relationship between the US and Colombia?
Daniel Giraldo: I feel optimistic, not only because it’s the most comfortable answer, but I do feel optimistic because I believe there is a lot of potential. And right now, the sector is not in its best place. But I believe that sometimes you just have to grit your teeth, take the punch, and then stand up again and do everything that’s in your power to just become better. And Colombia has a history of learning, and the sector will learn as well how to be more competent, how to attract investors, and how to get to the highest standard and quality of their bilateral trade with different countries.
Finance Colombia: Great. Well, Daniel Giraldo from FTI Consulting, you guys are one of the leading strategic consulting firms globally, especially when you look at things like cross-border investment. That seems to be your strong suit, even though you guys are a large firm and you guys do a lot of different things. Always great to see your presence here at CGS, at Colombia Gold Summit. And thanks for your insights.
Daniel Giraldo: It’s a pleasure, thanks for having me.
The Board of Directors of Empresas Públicas de Medellín (EPM) approved a budget of $29.8 trillion COP for the 2026 fiscal year during its session on December 2, 2025. The budget is intended to guarantee the continued provision of public utility services—including energy, water, and natural gas—while addressing challenges related to regulatory demands, climate variability, the energy transition, and increasing consumer demand.
The budget allocates resources across all of EPM’s business segments, which include Power Generation, Transmission and Distribution, Gas, Water Provision, and Wastewater. The overall spending plan prioritizes projects focused on modernizing infrastructure, expanding service coverage, and optimizing operational efficiency.
Budget Distribution and Key Investments
The 29.8 trillion COP total budget is divided across four main areas, with investments receiving the largest allocation:
Investment Expenses (48%): 14.1 trillion COP
Infrastructure investments: 4 trillion COP.
Long-term contracts for commercial operation and maintenance (registered as investment under current budgetary rules): 6 trillion COP.
Assets and inventory related to service provision and investments, provisions, and others: 3.2 trillion COP.
Capitalizations and other items: 907 billion COP.
Functioning Expenses (28%): 8.5 trillion COP
This includes transfers to the District of Medellín totaling 2.4 trillion COP, taxes and contributions to the national and territorial governments totaling 1.2 trillion COP, and personnel expenses amounting to 1.6 trillion COP.
This covers the purchase of energy, natural gas, and other inputs required to guarantee public service delivery.
Debt Service (11%): 3.3 trillion COP
Final Cash Availability (3%): 800 billion COP
Of the 4 trillion COP earmarked for infrastructure investments, 1.3 trillion COP is designated for the second phase of the Hidroituango Hydroelectric Project, a significant infrastructure development for the nation’s energy stability.
Financing and Operational Focus
The 2026 budget is projected to be financed primarily through 18.3 trillion COP (62%) in current revenues from services provided (energy, gas, water, and wastewater). This will be supplemented by 3.5 trillion COP (12%) from loans, with the remaining 26% sourced from dividends received from subsidiaries, accounts receivable recovery, and the initial cash balance.
The budget focuses on specific initiatives across EPM’s segments:
Power Generation: Includes the expansion of generation infrastructure and the implementation of a master plan for fire protection at generation plants. Resources are also allocated for the modernization of the Guadalupe-Troneras power stations.
Energy Transmission and Distribution: Focuses on infrastructure expansion and maintenance, replacement of cables and transformers across all voltage levels, and the control of non-technical energy losses.
Water and Wastewater: Key projects include the Orfelinato – Villa Hermosa Pumping System, the expansion of the Yulimar circuit, and the modernization of the Ayurá water treatment plant. The budget also funds the construction, intervention, and repair of water and sewer networks.
Gas: Initiatives include optimizing operations through the utilization of biogas from the La Pradera facility.
John Maya Salazar, General Manager of EPM, stated that the budget is aimed at enhancing operational efficiency, strengthening resource management, and ensuring service quality within a context of regulatory, climatic, and market challenges.
The USTOA Annual Conference is considered a significant platform within the US travel industry. The organization, founded in 1972, promotes responsible tourism and the development of experiences that contribute to cultural and environmental preservation. Medellín, operating as an associate member, utilized the event to engage with leading tour operators, international destinations, and specialized suppliers, aiming to secure high-value business agreements and build strategic alliances.
Medellín is seeking to encourage conscious and family-oriented tourism, and discourage those with more lascivious motives.
According to a statement from the Secretariat, the city’s delegation secured 10 business-to-business (B2B) meetings with US operators focused on expanding their travel portfolios into emerging Latin American markets. Medellín also contributed to the conference’s academic section, presenting its tourism assets. The city’s presentation emphasized its focus on the entertainment and social tourism segments, positioning itself for travelers seeking cultural and leisure activities with a defined responsible approach.
The Medellín Mayor’s Office, through its tourism agency and the Greater Medellín Convention & Visitors Bureau, highlighted several elements intended to appeal to international operators. These assets include the city’s calendar of international events, its gastronomic and musical offerings, and its active nightlife. Furthermore, city officials pointed to the modern hotel infrastructure, venues suitable for large-scale events, increased flight connectivity, and the range of cultural programs as factors allowing international operators to design programs that meet traveler expectations.
The city’s participation in the conference represents a push to cultivate long-term partnerships with operators who are committed to what the local administration defines as a more conscious form of travel, aligning with shifting industry trends.
Avianca Group International Limited (AGIL) yesterday reported its consolidated financial results for the third quarter of 2025. The company achieved $411 million USD in Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation, Amortization, and Rent (EBITDAR), resulting in a 27.2% margin for the period.
The third-quarter EBITDAR represents a 15.5% year-over-year increase from the $356 million USD reported in Q3 2024. Total operating revenues reached $1,509 million USD, marking a 12.8% increase compared to the $1,338 million USD recorded in the same period of the prior year. Total operating costs increased by 13.3% year-over-year, settling at $1,290 million USD. Net income for the quarter was $101 million USD, an improvement from $72 million USD in Q3 2024.
Operational and Capacity Metrics
Capacity, measured in Available Seat Kilometers (ASKs), reached 18,284 million, denoting a 6.8% increase compared to Q3 2024. This growth was attributed primarily to a 6.2% year-over-year increase in Stage Length. Passenger departures increased 1.0% year-over-year. The company transported 9.7 million passengers, consistent with the volume in the comparable period of 2024. The network encompassed 169 routes serving 83 destinations across 28 countries. Subsequent to the quarter’s close, Avianca introduced three new international routes, which included Belém (Brazil) and Monterrey (Mexico).
Cost performance for the quarter indicated a reduction in overall per-unit costs. Total Passenger CASK (Cost per Available Seat Kilometer) was 5.7 cents, a 1.9% decrease relative to Q3 2024. This decline was largely driven by Passenger Fuel CASK, which decreased 9.9% to 1.7 cents, resulting from lower fuel prices and increased fuel efficiency. Passenger CASK excluding fuel increased 2.1% year-over-year to 3.9 cents.
Balance Sheet and Credit Rating Actions
As of September 30, 2025, Avianca reported liquidity totaling $1,361 million USD, which represented 24.2% of last-twelve-month revenue. This total includes a cash balance of $1,161 million USD and $200 million USD available through an undrawn Revolving Credit Facility. The Net Debt to last-twelve-month EBITDAR ratio improved sequentially to 2.8x from 2.9x reported on June 30, 2025.
Rating agencies Moody’s and Fitch upgraded Avianca’s credit ratings to B1 and B+ respectively. Both rating actions were assigned a stable outlook.
Business Unit Performance and Network Development
The cargo division, Avianca Cargo, recorded $157 million USD in revenue during Q3 2025, representing a 14.1% year-over-year increase. The operating freighter fleet currently consists of nine Airbus A330s, following the integration of two additional P2F aircraft during the quarter.
The loyalty program, LifeMiles, reported a 72% year-over-year increase in Q3 2025 Third-Party Cash EBITDA, reaching $77 million USD.
In network strategy, AGIL expanded its Business Class service to 54 additional routes from key operational centers including Bogotá (Colombia), Medellín (Colombia), San Salvador (El Salvador), Quito, and Guayaquil (Ecuador). The company’s passenger operating fleet totaled 161 aircraft as of September 2025, including 134 Airbus A320 family aircraft, 15 Boeing 787s, and 12 Airbus A330s.
Avianca is a member of Star Alliance and is part of the Abra Group. The Abra Group also controls Gol Linhas Aéreas Inteligentes S.A. and holds a strategic investment in Wamos Air .
Colombian authorities have rescued 17 minors belonging to Lev Tahor, an ultra-Orthodox Jewish sect widely accused across several countries of child abuse, forced marriage, kidnapping and extreme coercive control. The operation — carried out by Migración Colombia in coordination with the Army’s Gaula Militar — was triggered by international alerts and concerns that the group may have been attempting to establish a new enclave inside Colombia.
Officials intervened in a hotel in the northern municipality of Yarumal after receiving intelligence reports about the presence of foreign minors linked to Lev Tahor. The hotel operation allowed officers to verify the identity and migration status of 26 people, including 17 children from the United States, Guatemala, Canada and other countries. Five of the minors had active Interpol “yellow notices,” issued when a child is reported missing or potentially at risk of crimes such as trafficking or kidnapping.
Authorities said that seven families associated with the sect had arrived in Colombia on October 22 and 23 on flights from New York City. Sister agencies abroad had previously warned Colombian counterparts about possible movements of Lev Tahor members due to ongoing investigations in other jurisdictions. Some members of the group’s leadership have prior convictions in the United States for kidnapping and the sexual exploitation of minors. There are also long-standing allegations from Guatemala of enforced pregnancies, mistreatment of minors and rape inside the community.
According to Colombian investigators, one working hypothesis is that the families may have been seeking to establish a new settlement in rural Colombia. The group has a history of sudden, secretive migrations to avoid scrutiny from foreign governments. Lev Tahor communities, estimated at around 50 families worldwide, have lived in the United States, Canada, Guatemala and Mexico, often leaving abruptly when law-enforcement pressure escalates.
Authorities emphasized that the primary goal of the operation was to protect the children and clarify their situation. The minors were transported to Migración Colombia’s Service Center in Medellín, where they spent the night under continuous supervision. Officials from the Colombian Family Welfare Institute (ICBF), child-protection attorneys and multidisciplinary teams of psychologists, social workers and medical professionals were deployed to guarantee a comprehensive assessment of the children’s well-being.
“All of our actions were guided by an absolute commitment to safeguard the rights of these boys, girls and adolescents,” said Gloria Esperanza Arriero, Director General of Migración Colombia. “This was a preventative and coordinated intervention. Our priority is to determine whether these minors were victims of abuse, coercion, or human trafficking under the guise of religious activity.”
Local and international investigators are now examining evidence to determine whether any of the minors were taken from their home countries illegally. Some preliminary findings suggest that at least a few of the children may have been transported across borders without full parental consent or in violation of court orders, raising the possibility of a trafficking scheme.
The Lev Tahor sect – founded in the 1980s – is known for its rigid, isolationist doctrine and its strict dress codes for women, who are required to wear black, head-to-toe garments. Members live in tightly controlled communities overseen by male leaders and bound by strict obedience norms. Over the past decade, authorities in Canada, the United States, Guatemala and Mexico have repeatedly intervened amid accusations of forced underage marriages, psychological abuse and extreme discipline practices.
In December 2024, Guatemalan authorities rescued 160 minors from a Lev Tahor-occupied farm after receiving reports of forced pregnancies and sexual violence. A year earlier, Mexican police dismantled a compound near the Guatemalan border, removing women and children and arresting at least one leader. And in 2021, two senior members of the group were convicted in New York for kidnapping children and attempting to force a 14-year-old girl back into an illegal sexual relationship with an adult man.
Colombian authorities say they are now collaborating with Interpol, foreign embassies, child-protection agencies, the Attorney General’s Office and the Gaula Militar to fully determine the legal status of the rescued minors, ensure they are not returned to dangerous environments and rule out any signs of human trafficking.
“Protection comes first,” Migración Colombia said in a statement. “We will use every institutional mechanism available to guarantee the safety of these children.”
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