Right-wing presidential candidate Abelardo “El Tigre” de la Espriella emerged as the frontrunner in Colombia’s presidential election on Sunday, setting up a high-stakes runoff against left-wing senator Iván Cepeda in a contest that could reshape the political future of one of Latin America’s largest economies.

With more than 97% of ballots counted, National Registry Bulletin No. 15 showed De la Espriella leading with 43.77% of the vote, or approximately 10.1 million ballots, compared with Cepeda’s 40.88%, or slightly above 9.4 million votes. The margin of roughly 667,000 votes exceeded many pre-election forecasts and positioned the Barranquilla-based criminal defense lawyer as the favorite heading into the decisive June 21 runoff.

Election authorities reported that voting unfolded peacefully across the country, with preliminary results available just 90 minutes after polling stations closed at 4:00 p.m. More than 41 million Colombians had been eligible to participate in the election, including 1.4 million citizens residing abroad.

The result represents a significant rebuke to President Gustavo Petro’s political project and highlights growing voter concerns over security, economic performance and public confidence in state institutions.

Petro, who is constitutionally barred from seeking re-election, has thrown his support behind Cepeda, a leading figure within the governing coalition and one of the principal defenders of the government’s controversial “Total Peace” strategy. The policy sought negotiated settlements with FARC dissidents, criminal organizations and other armed groups operating throughout the country, but critics argue it failed to reduce violence in many regions.

While Cepeda entered election day as the favorite in most opinion polls, De la Espriella successfully capitalized on public frustration over extortion, insecurity, illegal armed groups and what many voters perceive as a deterioration of public order under Petro’s administration.

Known to supporters as “El Tigre,” De la Espriella built his campaign around a tough-on-crime platform inspired in part by the security policies of El Salvador’s President Nayib Bukele. He has promised to strengthen the military, restore state authority in conflict-affected regions and confront criminal organizations with what he describes as an uncompromising approach.

His message appears to have resonated particularly among middle-class voters, business sectors and residents of regions heavily impacted by drug trafficking and armed violence.

The election also exposed the weakness of Colombia’s political center, which for years attempted to position itself as an alternative to the country’s increasingly polarized political landscape.

Conservative candidate Paloma Valencia secured more than 1.5 million votes (or 6.9%) but remained well behind the two frontrunners. Although her campaign attracted traditional conservatives and followers of former president Álvaro Uribe Vélez, she struggled to expand beyond the party’s core support base.

Centrist Sergio Fajardo, the former mayor of Medellín and former governor of Antioquia, won just 4.6% of the vote, just shy of one million ballots. Once regarded as a politician capable of bridging Colombia’s ideological divides, Fajardo failed in his third attempt to reach the presidency as voters increasingly gravitated toward candidates offering sharply contrasting visions for the country’s future.

Former Bogotá mayor Claudia López suffered one of the day’s most dramatic defeats, capturing less than 1% of the national vote. The result marked a stunning collapse for a politician who only a few years ago was considered among Colombia’s most vocal leaders.

Analysts say the runoff campaign is now likely to become a referendum on Petro’s presidency and the future direction of the country.

For Cepeda’s supporters, the June 21 vote offers an opportunity to preserve and deepen many of the social and political reforms promoted by the current administration. For De la Espriella’s backers, it represents a chance to reverse those policies and return to a security-centered model associated with the administrations of former president Álvaro Uribe.

The key question over the coming weeks will be whether De la Espriella can consolidate support among conservative and independent voters while Cepeda seeks to unite the left and attract Colombians wary of a return to hardline security policies.

After a largely peaceful election day, Colombia now faces three weeks of intense campaigning before voters make what many observers consider one of the most consequential political decisions since the country’s historic shift to the left in 2022.

Much of Colombia woke up to temperate weather and clear skies over the capital, Bogotá. As lines began to form outside polling stations when they opened at 8:00 a.m. on Sunday, voters cast their ballots in one of the country’s most closely watched presidential elections in decades, a contest that could redefine the political direction of the South American nation at a time of mounting security concerns and economic uncertainty.

In Bogotá, outside Corferias, the country’s largest exhibition and convention center and one of Colombia’s busiest voting locations, queues of unregistered voters formed well before polling stations officially opened.

According to the National Registry Office, more than 41 million Colombians are eligible to vote in the election, including approximately 1.4 million citizens residing abroad. Polling stations are under tight security nationwide and will remain open until 4:00 p.m. local time.

The 2026 election has been overshadowed by a resurgence of political violence, recalling memories of some of the country’s darkest electoral periods. Authorities have heightened security measures following a tense campaign season marked by threats against candidates, concerns over public safety, and growing polarization between the political left and right.

President Gustavo Petro, who is constitutionally barred from seeking re-election, has thrown his support behind left-wing senator Iván Cepeda, 63, who is widely regarded as the architect of the government’s failed “Total Peace” strategy aimed at negotiating disarmament agreements with FARC dissidents and other illegal armed groups.

President Petro cast his vote at 9:10 am from the Plazoleta Mosquera inside the National Capitol.

Opinion polls have placed Cepeda in first place with support ranging between 33% and 40%, making him the clear favorite to advance to a second-round runoff scheduled for June 21 should no candidate secure an outright majority of 50% plus one vote on Sunday.

Cepeda, of the ruling Historic Pact coalition, is facing two formidable opponents to his Marxist agenda: right-wing senator Paloma Valencia, 48, of the Centro Democrático party, and criminal defense lawyer Abelardo de la Espriella, 47, considered the “outsider” in the race, whose rapid rise has become one of the defining stories of the campaign.

Valencia and De la Espriella both embrace the “democratic security” doctrine associated with former president Álvaro Uribe Vélez, whose two administrations between 2002 and 2010 were defined by an aggressive military campaign against the FARC and ELN guerrillas.

De la Espriella, known among supporters as “The Tiger,” has portrayed himself as a political outsider capable of restoring economic growth and defeating criminal organizations. His campaign has gained momentum through a pro-Bukele message, fueled by a strong social media presence and rhetoric that resonates with middle-class Colombians on the Caribbean coast who are frustrated by extortion, insecurity, and the traditional political establishment.

The political capital of  Sergio Fajardo and Claudia López appears to be spent, as the race has increasingly evolved into a contest between three candidates. The self-professed centrists and former mayors – one from Medellín (Fajardo) and other from Bogotá (López) — have consistently polled in the single digits, but on Sunday, their political relevance could evaporate a quickly with the final tally.

Sunday’s vote is unlikely to produce an outright winner, making a runoff between Cepeda and one of his conservative challengers the most probable outcome.

The key uncertainty is whether Valencia’s established party machinery and her effort to capture the undecided centre by naming Juan Daniel Oviedo as her running mate will push her beyond the six million votes she received in the March primaries.

Should Valencia outperform polling forecasts, De la Espriella will be forced on Monday to convince his supporters to back Uribe’s official candidate.

For many Colombians, this election represents more than a contest between three frontrunners. It has become a referendum on President Petro’s stalled reform agenda, the country’s deteriorating security situation, and the future direction of a democracy facing some of its most significant challenges at a time when the “pink tide” of left-wing governments across Latin America has largely receded. Or in the words of former FARC hostage and ex-presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt: “May ethics, hope, truth, and commitment to Colombia prevail today over the machismo, fear, violence, and misogyny of the extremes. I trust that we will have the first woman President.”

 

 

Just days away from Colombia’s first-round presidential election, incumbent President Gustavo Petro continues to sound the alarm about voter fraud. 

On Tuesday, he repeated claims that the National Registrar’s Office is allowing the vote to be manipulated against his party’s candidate, Senator Iván Cepeda.

Petro renewed calls for citizens to supervise the vote count, describing it as the only way to avoid fraud: “Only the physical vigilance of millions of people can overcome the algorithm manipulations that the Registrar’s Office refused to prevent.”

But are the president’s claims of vulnerabilities in the voting system valid?

A decade-long dispute

Petro’s claims stem from a long-running grudge with Thomas Greg & Sons, a multinational security and printing company tasked with issuing Colombian passports and overseeing electoral logistics.

According to Petro, the firm cannot be trusted with the sensitive task of printing, delivering, and processing vote counting forms.

While the president’s claims have widely been dismissed by electoral institutions as reckless, there is some foundation for them.

Following the 2014 legislative elections, the evangelical political party, MIRA, filed a legal petition against the Registrar’s Office, claiming a discrepancy between the ballot pre-count (filled out by citizen juries in a form known as E-14) and the digitized tally of the vote (filled out by officials in the E-24 form).

MIRA claimed to have evidence of manipulation of the software used for “voting, information, transmission, or tabulation of election results,” which was managed by a subsidiary of Thomas Greg & Sons. 

After a lengthy four-year legal case, the Council of State (Consejo de Estado), the highest court overseeing the government, issued a ruling in favor of MIRA. It found evidence of destruction of electoral material and inconsistencies between the E-14 and E-24 forms. 

Crucially, the Council of State said that it could not confirm that voting software had been sabotaged because it did not have access to the source code of the software during the elections.

Without the original code, it was impossible to know if the system had been tampered with.

The body issued a clear recommendation to prevent repetitions of the dispute in future elections: “Direct the Electoral Organization to acquire the necessary vote-counting software for use within the state—that is, software owned by the organization itself—which allows for full traceability of the vote-counting process from the polling stations through to the official declaration of the election results.”

In other words, it recommended that electoral authorities roll out their own software, rather than relying on third party providers.

But 12 years later, Thomas Greg & Sons remains in charge of the electoral software; according to the Registrar’s Office, purchasing proprietary software and operating the corresponding data centers is not feasible.

While Petro continues to lobby for a fully state-owned system, he has concentrated his efforts on mitigating the risks of a repeat of the 2014 source code issue.

The president has repeatedly demanded that the Registrar’s Office share the source code with the government and the public, which he says would allow them to prevent a repeat of the situation in 2014.

But the Registrar’s Office maintains that there is no need, suggesting that publicizing the code would leave the software more vulnerable to attacks and defending internal audit processes.

Petro rebutted, calling the claim “an immense lie”.

Other types of fraud

As well as warning about software manipulation, the president has also raised the alarm about differences between the pre-count and the official, scrutinized count. Ahead of the March elections, he warned that the pre-count may not accurately reflect the results.

Petro’s concerns stem from the 2022 legislative elections in which over half a million votes for his Historic Pact coalition were excluded in the pre-count and later revealed in the scrutiny. 

Rather than software, the culprit for the discrepancy, which in total represented a 5.49% difference, was human error; the Electoral Observation Mission (MOE) had warned the ballot sheets were designed in a way that could lead to Historic Pact votes being neglected. 

But the 2022 vote appears to be an outlier, with the MOE reporting just a 0.28% discrepancy between the pre-count and the scrutinized votes in March’s legislative elections.

Petro’s mistrust in the pre-count may be valid in the case of a tight race with razor-thin margins but not so much if there is a clear winner. And, in any case, the scrutiny process should clear up any doubts. 

“In Colombian elections, it is judges who determine electoral disputes and not a logistical operator such as Thomas Greg & Sons,” explained Sergio Guzmán, director at Colombia Risk Analysis, a political risk think tank.

Bigger fish to fry

While Petro aims his crusade against Thomas Greg & Sons, a firm which he has clashed with on a range of issues, there are other, more prescient threats to electoral integrity.

“I think that concerns about voters being coerced to vote are legitimate… but I think concerns that somebody will steal the election are overblown,” said Guzmán.

International observers including the United Nations have warned that violence may undermine the elections, particularly in areas under armed group control. 

Vote buying is also a well-documented phenomenon in many regions of the country.

While Petro has some basis for his allegations of voter fraud, there is no evidence of software manipulation determining presidential election results in Colombia.

In a razor-thin race, observers would be wise to wait for the scrutinized vote count to declare a winner. But for now, Petro’s warnings about election-rigging appear to be largely overblown.

The post The truth behind Petro’s claims of Colombia voting fraud appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

Colombia is preparing for one of the largest international election observation missions in its history as the country heads toward Sunday’s presidential election amid heightened security measures, dry laws and nationwide institutional alerts aimed at safeguarding the democratic process.

Polling stations across Colombia will open on Sunday, May 31, from 8:00 a.m. until 4:00 p.m. as voters head to the ballot box to elect a new president for the 2026–2030 term. If no candidate secures an outright majority, a runoff election will be held on June 21.

More than 1,200 international observers from 22 countries are expected to monitor the elections under a mission coordinated by Colombia’s National Electoral Council (CNE), in what officials describe as one of the most extensive observation deployments ever organized in the country.

The official installation of the International Observation Mission took place Friday morning at Bogotá’s Grand Hyatt Hotel, where electoral authorities, diplomats and representatives of multilateral organizations gathered ahead of the vote.

According to the CNE, a total of 1,207 accredited observers will participate in territorial inspections, technical briefings and electoral monitoring operations across various regions of Colombia.

Authorities say the mission seeks to strengthen public confidence, transparency and legitimacy in a country where concerns over disinformation campaigns, fake news and political polarization have increasingly shaped the electoral climate.

Official figures show Colombia will install 118,346 voting tables distributed across 13,489 polling stations nationwide.

Among the international observers already arriving in Colombia is U.S. Republican Senator from Ohio, Bernie Moreno, who landed in Cartagena to participate in election monitoring activities.

Moreno, who was born in Colombia before emigrating to the United States, is part of the delegation accredited by the National Electoral Council to observe the presidential elections and verify the conditions under which the democratic process unfolds.

In Bogotá, authorities have implemented extraordinary measures aimed at maintaining public order during election weekend.

Mayor Carlos Fernando Galán’s administration announced that the capital’s “Ley Seca,” or dry law, will begin at 6:00 p.m. on Friday, May 29, and remain in effect until midday on Monday, June 1.

The restrictions prohibit the sale and consumption of alcoholic beverages in public spaces and establishments open to the public throughout Bogotá.

The measure begins 24 hours earlier than the nationwide presidential decree regulating election weekend restrictions and has sparked criticism from nightlife businesses, bars and restaurant owners who warn the extended dry law could significantly impact weekend revenues.

Business owners have also pointed to the timing of the UEFA Champions League final scheduled for Saturday evening between Paris Saint-Germain and Arsenal F.C. at Budapest’s Puskás Aréna, an event expected to draw large crowds to bars and public viewing venues across the Colombian capital.

“The decree seeks to guarantee coexistence and the proper development of the electoral process,” Bogotá authorities said in the official order announcing the restrictions.

At the same time, Bogotá’s Health Secretariat declared a yellow hospital alert across the entire capital beginning Friday evening and lasting through Monday evening.

The alert places the city’s public and private hospital network under a state of heightened operational readiness in anticipation of any emergencies or disturbances related to the elections.

“We call on all hospital directors and healthcare providers to strictly comply with the directives established under this alert,” José Vicente Guzmán, Bogotá’s deputy director for Emergency and Disaster Risk Management, said in a statement.

“It is essential to streamline patient admissions in emergency rooms, optimize ambulance response times and maintain direct and real-time communication channels with the city’s Emergency and Urgency Coordination Center,” he added.

Under the emergency protocols, hospitals have been ordered to activate disaster risk contingency plans, guarantee staffing availability, ensure sufficient medical supplies and maintain full operational readiness of ambulance services and patient transfer systems.

Authorities warned the alert level could be raised to orange or red depending on events during the weekend.

Residents requiring emergency medical attention have been advised to contact Bogotá’s 137 emergency hotline, which will remain operational around the clock throughout the election period.

Elsewhere in Colombia, local governments are also implementing measures to facilitate voting and public mobility.

In Medellín and the surrounding Aburrá Valley metropolitan region, authorities announced free rides on the city’s metro and cable car systems on election day until 6:00 p.m., while bus services will continue operating normally.

The presidential election arrives at a politically charged moment for Colombia after months of polarized campaigning, growing security concerns in several regions and intense national debate over the future direction of the country following the first leftist administration of President Gustavo Petro.

International observers, electoral authorities and security forces are expected to remain deployed throughout the weekend as Colombia prepares for one of the most consequential elections in recent years.

Medical leave, vacation time and unpaid leave will keep Ricardo Roa away from Ecopetrol through late July

The board of directors of Ecopetrol, Colombia’s largest oil and energy company, announced the postponement of unpaid leave previously granted to its president, Ricardo Roa Barragán, due to a 30-day medical leave taken by the executive. The decision was disclosed by the state-controlled company in an official statement issued May 27, 2026.

According to the company, the unpaid leave, initially scheduled to begin May 26 for a 30-day period, will take effect once both Roa’s medical leave and his remaining vacation period have concluded, meaning it is now expected to begin June 27.

If the schedule remains unchanged, Roa Barragán would return to Ecopetrol in late July, just one week before Colombia’s next president is sworn in on August 7, 2026, and gains the authority to appoint new leadership at the state-owned oil company.

Read Ecopetrol Announces Temporary Leave for President Ricardo Roa Amid Investigations by Colombia’s Attorney General’s Office by Finance Colombia.

The rescheduling extends Roa Barragán’s temporary absence during a sensitive period for Colombia’s largest state-controlled company, amid a government transition and growing scrutiny over its corporate stability.

The vacations and unpaid leave had previously been approved by Ecopetrol’s board as an institutional response to tensions surrounding Roa Barragán’s continued tenure. While labor unions, minority shareholders and various public voices had called for his removal, President Gustavo Petro publicly maintained his support.

Read The petroleum workers called for Ricardo Roa’s head following formal influence-peddling charges filed by Colombia’s Attorney General’s Office.

The board also decided to keep Juan Carlos Hurtado as acting president of Ecopetrol. Hurtado has served as executive vice president of hydrocarbons since November 2025.

So far in 2026, Colombia’s Attorney General’s Office has formally charged Roa Barragán in two separate cases: one involving alleged influence peddling by a public official, linked to purported benefits obtained in the purchase of an apartment in Bogotá, and another involving alleged violations of campaign spending limits in the 2022 “Petro Presidente” presidential campaign, for which he served as campaign manager.

Read Ecopetrol President Ricardo Roa Charged Over Alleged Campaign Spending Violations in Petro’s Presidential Campaign.

So far, no judicial conviction has been issued in either case, and the executive retains the presumption of innocence.

Under the revised schedule, Roa Barragán is expected to remain away from Ecopetrol’s presidency during part of the electoral period and presidential transition, ahead of the eventual handover to the administration elected in Colombia’s May 31 elections.

Twenty-Year Debt Arc Resets Colombia’s Sovereign Risk Outlook

Two decades of fiscal data show that Colombia’s gross general government debt has moved through four distinct macroeconomic phases, ending the current cycle at a level that is materially higher than its pre-pandemic baseline. Persistent annual fiscal deficits, currency volatility, an emergency spending shock and weaker-than-projected tax revenues have combined to push the ratio of public debt to gross domestic product from the mid-30s percent range in the mid-2000s to a band of roughly 60 to 62 percent at the start of 2026, according to figures published by the Ministerio de Hacienda y Crédito Público and the Banco de la República.

The shift carries direct implications for sovereign bondholders, multinationals operating in Colombia and any investor pricing country risk in the Andean region. All three major rating agencies — S&P Global Ratings, Moody’s Ratings and Fitch Ratings — now place Colombia in speculative-grade, or junk, territory, with consecutive downgrades through 2025 and into early 2026.

“The activation of the escape clause confirms that the deterioration observed in 2024 will not be corrected in 2025.” — Renzo Merino, sovereign analyst, Moody’s Ratings

The commodity cushion: 2006 to 2014

During the global commodity supercycle, Colombia benefited from sustained gross domestic product growth and steady government revenue. Hydrocarbon and mining receipts — channeled through Ecopetrol (NYSE: EC; BVC: ECOPETROL) and the broader extractive sector — supplied a substantial share of national tax intake. The debt-to-GDP ratio remained relatively stable during this period, generally hovering between 34 and 38 percent. Even with chronic primary deficits, nominal growth in the denominator absorbed new borrowing, masking the underlying structural imbalance that the Comité Autónomo de la Regla Fiscal (CARF) would later flag as the persistent driver of fiscal stress.

The currency and revenue shock: 2014 to 2019

The mechanics of the ratio changed sharply when Brent crude prices collapsed in late 2014. Reduced hydrocarbon royalties widened the fiscal gap just as the Colombian peso depreciated against the US dollar. Because a significant share of Colombia’s sovereign liabilities is denominated in foreign currency, the peso’s slide automatically inflated the local-currency value of outstanding external debt when measured against domestic GDP. The combined effect — wider deficits funded by new borrowing, plus a valuation effect on existing dollar-denominated obligations — pushed the ratio steadily higher through the late 2010s.

The structural revenue weakness that surfaced during this period has remained a recurring theme in subsequent fiscal assessments from Fedesarrollo and the Pontificia Universidad Javeriana Observatorio Fiscal, both of which have noted that successive tax reforms failed to fully close the gap between commitments and ordinary income.

The pandemic ceiling: 2020

The combination of emergency social spending under the Ingreso Solidario program, expanded health outlays and a sharp contraction in nominal GDP drove the ratio to a historic peak above 65 percent in 2020. The Ministerio de Hacienda reports the all-time high at 65.3 percent of GDP that year. The government activated the escape clause of the regla fiscal — Colombia’s fiscal rule, codified in Law 1473 of 2011 and modified by Law 2155 of 2021 — to accommodate the spending response, suspending the rule for 2020 and 2021.

That episode also triggered the first sovereign downgrade cycle: S&P Global Ratings cut Colombia’s long-term foreign currency rating to BB+ from BBB- in May 2021 after the administration of then-president Iván Duque withdrew a tax reform bill following street protests, costing the country its investment-grade status with that agency.

The new baseline: 2023 to 2026

Strong post-pandemic nominal growth briefly pulled the debt ratio down toward 57 percent in 2023. The decline did not hold. Structural spending pressures, elevated international interest rates and tax collections below budgeted projections pushed the ratio back up, establishing a new operating band around 60 to 62 percent of GDP. The Ministerio de Hacienda reported government debt to GDP at 61.3 percent for 2024.

The administration of President Gustavo Petro and Finance Minister Germán Ávila Plazas activated the regla fiscal escape clause for a second time in June 2025, with the Consejo Superior de Política Fiscal (Confis) approving a three-year suspension covering 2025 through 2027. The decision came despite an unfavorable technical opinion from the Comité Autónomo de la Regla Fiscal, which concluded that legal conditions for activating the clause were not met outside of a national emergency. The clause had previously been invoked only during the COVID-19 pandemic.

According to the Marco Fiscal de Mediano Plazo (MFMP) presented by the Ministerio de Hacienda, net public debt to GDP is projected to rise from 53 percent in 2023 to 61.3 percent in 2025 and approximately 63 percent in 2026. The fiscal deficit for 2025 was initially projected at 7.1 percent of GDP and later revised to roughly 6.2 percent of GDP, with the administration targeting a deficit below 6 percent of GDP for 2026.

Debt service consumes a larger share of the budget

The cost of servicing this debt has reshaped the structure of the national budget. The 2026 draft budget presented by Minister Ávila totals $557 trillion COP, equivalent to roughly $134.7 billion USD, and represents 28.9 percent of GDP. Of that, debt servicing costs are projected at $102.5 trillion COP, or 5.3 percent of GDP, down from 6.2 percent of GDP in 2025.

The figures published by the Ministerio de Hacienda for domestic debt service in 2026 are higher when measured against tax intake alone: of an estimated $130 trillion COP in domestic debt service, $79 trillion COP corresponds to principal that can be rolled over through new issuances, while $51 trillion COP represents interest payments funded directly from the budget. Against projected tax revenue of approximately $300 trillion COP, that implies roughly one in every three pesos collected by the central government is allocated to interest on existing debt.

Rating agencies reprice the sovereign

The rating cycle has accelerated alongside the fiscal trajectory. Moody’s Ratings downgraded Colombia to Baa3 and subsequently into junk territory in 2025, citing the suspension of the fiscal rule. S&P Global Ratings issued a further downgrade in April 2026, its second cut in less than a year, on the same persistent deficit and debt concerns. Fitch Ratings also moved Colombia deeper into speculative grade in December 2025.

The Banco de la República reported external debt — combining public and private liabilities — at $238.7 billion USD at the close of November 2025, equivalent to 54.8 percent of GDP, an increase of $15.8 billion USD from January of the same year. The Colombian economy is currently valued at approximately $435 billion USD.

What investors are watching next

The Comité Autónomo de la Regla Fiscal has stated in its most recent reports to Congress that the 2025 primary balance target was missed by a wide margin even after the escape clause was activated, and that incoming projections for 2026 raise the bar for any return to the original fiscal rule by 2028. Business groups including Fenalco and the Consejo Gremial Nacional have publicly opposed the suspension and signaled potential legal challenges.

The 2026 financing plan disclosed by the Ministerio de Hacienda includes approximately $4.6 billion USD in global bond issuances, primarily to refinance a one-year Swiss-franc Total Return Swap operation valued at roughly $9.3 billion USD. The ministry has stated that the issuance does not constitute net new external debt. Updated debt and deficit targets are scheduled for release in the next iteration of the Plan Financiero.

For executives operating in Colombia or evaluating new investment, the baseline shift from a mid-30s to a low-60s debt-to-GDP environment alters several variables simultaneously: peso volatility tied to refinancing cycles, the trajectory of corporate tax policy as Congress weighs successive reform proposals, and the path of domestic interest rates set by the Banco de la República as it manages inflation alongside elevated sovereign funding costs. Detailed historical and forward-looking debt data is published by the Investor Relations Colombia office of the Ministerio de Hacienda.

Colombia’s Armed Forces and regional authorities are struggling to verify the full scale of a bloody confrontation between rival FARC dissident factions in the remote southeastern department of Guaviare after clashes reportedly left more than 50 combatants dead.

The fighting, described by officials as one of the deadliest episodes this year involving former Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) splinter groups, erupted in rural areas near the departmental capital San José del Guaviare between forces loyal to two dissident commanders known by their war aliases “Calarcá” and “Iván Mordisco.”

According to a communiqué released by the faction aligned with Calarcá, the confrontation began when approximately 250 fighters allegedly under the command of Néstor Gregorio Vera Fernández, alias Iván Mordisco, launched a surprise assault on a dissident encampment in the hamlet of La Siberia.

The clashes were reported in the rural sectors of Barranco Colorado, Charras and Trocha Ganadera, cattle farming regions with limited state presence.

The Calarcá faction claimed that a combat column belonging to the Isaías Carvajal Front had been resting overnight when it was attacked before dawn.

“In an act of legitimate self-defense, our units broke the siege, inflicting the first enemy casualties,” the group said in the statement, which was circulated through clandestine channels on Thursday.

“After three hours of combat, the enemy withdrew leaving fifty dead on the battlefield and carrying away a large number of wounded,” the communiqué added.

Colombia’s Army confirmed that troops from Brigade 22 remain deployed in the rural outskirts of San José del Guaviare, the epicenter of the fighting, but authorities acknowledged that they have been unable to fully enter the conflict zone due to difficult terrain and the continued presence of heavily armed illegal groups.

Defense Minister Pedro Sánchez confirmed the clashes took place in the Barranco Colorado sector, more than 100 kilometers east of San José del Guaviare, but refrained from confirming casualty figures. Minister Sánchez did, however, claim that the official statement amounted to a “confession and public admission” of an “atrocious crime”. Sánchez also warned that the reported deaths of underage combatants would constitute a grave violation of international humanitarian law and Colombian criminal legislation, further intensifying scrutiny over forced recruitment of children by FARC dissidents.

Officials said access to the region is severely restricted, with many areas reachable only through jungle tracks and river routes. Colombia’s forensic authorities, including Medicina Legal, have yet to recover or identify bodies from the battlefield.

Regional authorities convened an extraordinary security council meeting on Wednesday amid fears that the violence could intensify ahead of Colombia’s presidential election scheduled for May 31.

San José del Guaviare Mayor Willy Rodríguez told Caracol Radio that preliminary reports suggested “dozens” may have died, though he cautioned that authorities had not yet independently verified the numbers.

“We are receiving alarming information from residents in the rural areas, but the Armed Forces still have not been able to fully enter and confirm the situation,” Rodríguez said.

Governor Yeison Rojas joined police and military commanders in emergency deliberations as intelligence agencies attempted to establish the true scale of the confrontation.

The dissident faction loyal to Calarcá accused Iván Mordisco of provoking the conflict and described the elusive guerrilla commander as “a mentally disturbed individual with ideological shortcomings and psychopathic tendencies.”

The statement also claimed the group seized a significant cache of weapons during the battle, including four machine guns, 49 assault rifles, two Dragunov sniper rifles and more than 10,000 rounds of ammunition.

The faction further stated that two of its own fighters were killed and three wounded, while also claiming to have captured “a female prisoner of war.”

“We inform the Colombian people that this tragic event, occurring four days before an electoral contest, was not initiated by us,” the communiqué concluded. “It was an act of legitimate self-defense.”

The confrontation underscores the growing fragmentation and territorial disputes among Colombia’s remaining armed groups following the 2016 peace accord between the Colombian government and the FARC guerrillas.

Iván Mordisco, once considered one of the most powerful dissident commanders operating outside the peace agreement, has become a central figure in the collapse of President Gustavo Petro’s “Total Peace” negotiations with illegal armed groups.

Security analysts warn that Guaviare, a historic stronghold for the former FARC insurgency and a major coca-producing region, has increasingly become the scene of violent turf wars involving rival dissident fronts competing for narcotics routes, extortion rackets and territorial control.

The latest bloodshed also raises concerns over the deteriorating security situation in Colombia’s southeastern departments  just days before Colombians vote in a presidential election, May 31.

San José del Guaviare, long considered a strategic stronghold in Colombia’s anti-narcotics campaign, hosts one of the country’s largest counterinsurgency and anti-drug military bases, including a fleet of Black Hawk helicopter gunships used in jungle operations against armed groups and cocaine trafficking networks. The region has also historically maintained the presence of U.S. military personnel and advisers supporting intelligence, surveillance and counternarcotics missions in southeastern Colombia.

As of Thursday, Colombia’s Attorney General’s Office, National Forensic Institute – Medicina Legal – and Armed Forces had yet to issue a definitive death toll.