International observers certify Colombia’s first-round vote as transparent and credible

Two major international electoral observation missions have rejected claims of fraud in Colombia’s May 31 presidential first round, as outgoing President Gustavo Petro continued to press unsubstantiated allegations of irregularities in the days following the vote. The country heads to a June 21 runoff between right-wing candidate Abelardo de la Espriella and leftist senator Iván Cepeda.

The European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) issued a preliminary statement Tuesday, June 2, describing the vote count as having been carried out in a “transparent, orderly and fluid” manner. Esteban González Pons, Vice President of the European Parliament and chief observer of the EU mission, told reporters in Bogotá that none of the 12 candidates who competed in the first round had brought claims of irregularities to his mission.

“We can discard any manipulation of data in the quick count and in the final count,” González Pons said. The mission selected a random sample of tally sheets from around the country and compared them to physical ballots cast, finding no inconsistencies.

“We can discard any manipulation of data in the quick count and in the final count.” — Esteban González Pons, Chief Observer, EU Election Observation Mission to Colombia

The EU EOM deployed 143 observers from 24 EU member states plus Norway, Switzerland, and Canada, covering 591 voting tables. The mission will also observe the June 21 runoff and issue a final report two months after the process concludes.

The Organization of American States (OAS) mission, headed by former Dominican Republic President Leonel Fernández, similarly described the May 31 election day as “civic, calm and participatory,” with high citizen turnout compared to previous electoral cycles. The OAS mission comprised 96 observers and specialists from 24 countries, covering 412 polling stations and 1,340 voting tables across 26 departments, the Capital District, and five cities abroad.

Official results from the National Civil Registry (Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil) showed de la Espriella receiving 43.74% of the vote, a margin of more than 673,000 votes over Cepeda, who received 40.90%. More than 23 million voters participated. By Monday night, the Registry said it had completed its review of 99.98% of voting tables and found a variation of only 0.06% from the quick count issued on election night.

Presento las bases comprobadas del posible fraude. Que puedo entregar a autoridad competente.

Dije que no reconocí los datos del preconteo del software de los hermanos Bautista es porque tengo datos.

Mi compromiso con mi pueblo y el amor a mi país por el que he luchado toda mi…

— Gustavo Petro (@petrogustavo) June 2, 2026

Petro, who is constitutionally barred from seeking re-election, alleged on Sunday that 800,000 voters had been illegally added to voter rolls. He doubled down Tuesday in a post on X, claiming without evidence that 885,000 voters had been registered after a March 31 deadline, and pointing to alleged irregularities in the software used for vote counting and tabulation. The president said he could present his evidence to the relevant authorities.

Cepeda, who represents Petro’s Pacto Histórico, initially declined to acknowledge the quick count results on Sunday, saying he would wait for the official tally overseen by judges and notaries. By Monday, however, he softened his position, stating that monitors deployed by his party had not found “irregularities of a sufficient dimension to speak of fraud.” Cepeda also challenged de la Espriella to a debate ahead of the runoff.

Under Colombian law, election results are certified by judges, not the executive branch, typically within two weeks of the vote. González Pons noted that Colombia “has very strong democratic institutions, rooted in the people,” adding that the country “will find in democracy its principal ally, because of all the things that fail Colombia, democracy is one that has never failed it.”

Political analysts and observers have cautioned that Petro’s fraud allegations, made without supporting evidence, risk inflaming political tensions and contributing to a polarized climate in the lead-up to the June 21 runoff.

Fitch: June 21 Runoff Will Shape Colombia’s Fiscal Path

Colombia’s June 21 presidential runoff will have a significant bearing on the country’s economic policies and prospects, Fitch Ratings said in a commentary published this week.

In the first round of voting on May 31, right-wing candidate Abelardo de la Espriella — running under the Defensores de la Patria movement — received 43.7% of votes, defeating leftist senator Iván Cepeda of the governing Pacto Histórico, who received 40.9%. Neither candidate reached the absolute majority required to win outright, sending the election to a runoff.

De la Espriella’s stronger-than-expected first-round performance prompted a positive reaction in financial markets, reflecting expectations that he may be better positioned to address Colombia’s macroeconomic challenges that have intensified under outgoing President Gustavo Petro.

The next president will face the challenge of addressing Colombia’s wide fiscal imbalance. The central government deficit reached 6.4% of GDP in 2025, or 7.8% when net of a temporary reduction in interest costs from liability management operations. Fitch estimates that debt stabilization will require a fiscal adjustment equivalent to 4% of GDP. Higher global oil prices are expected to boost revenues via taxes and dividends in 2027, but Fitch cautioned that this support may not last.

“De la Espriella’s stronger-than-expected first-round performance prompted a positive reaction in financial markets, reflecting expectations that he may be better positioned to address Colombia’s macroeconomic challenges.” — Fitch Ratings

De la Espriella has pledged fiscal consolidation through a 40% reduction in the size of the state, while Cepeda has proposed restraining public-sector salaries and benefits. Budget rigidities and spending pressures tied to pensions, healthcare, and subnational transfers will make either adjustment difficult. Both candidates have also proposed higher spending — on defense and social welfare respectively. Capital spending could be trimmed as an adjustment variable, but only to a limited extent, with 2025 outlays of 2.7% of GDP.

The interest bill will be another source of pressure amid a higher local yield curve. Recent liability management operations have replaced lower-coupon bonds with higher-coupon ones, providing an up-front financial benefit while increasing future interest costs.

Given these spending constraints, durable fiscal consolidation is likely to require revenue-side measures. Colombia has a history of tax reforms, but new legislation is far from assured. De la Espriella has pledged to cut taxes, and while Cepeda supports revenue-raising measures, he could face obstacles in advancing reforms through Congress — as Petro’s administration found.

Uncertainties about Colombia’s trend growth persist. The economy expanded at an annual rate of 2.5% in 2019–2025, below the ‘BB’ median and below its own prior average of 3.5%–4%, supported by government transfers, a strong labor market, and minimum wage increases that kept private consumption buoyant at +4.2%. In contrast, investment contracted by an average of 1.6% annually, falling to 16% of GDP from 21%, affected in part by business concerns about the Petro administration’s more interventionist policy stance.

De la Espriella has pledged to boost growth through promotion of hydrocarbon development — including fracking — alongside tax cuts and steps to reduce administrative burdens on businesses. Cepeda has pledged continuity with Petro’s state-led development model, without concrete proposals to revive private investment.

Both agendas face implementation challenges. The next legislature will remain fragmented, requiring negotiation to pass any major legislation. As a political newcomer, de la Espriella could encounter difficulty advancing his program should he win. Social protests are a risk, particularly regarding his plans to cut spending and adopt a tougher security stance.

The election could also influence monetary policy, with implications for financial conditions and thus for public finances and growth. Despite rising inflation, the Banco de la República (Banrep) voted to hold its policy rate at 11.25% after swift prior increases of 200 basis points, amid explicit pressure from the executive branch for looser policy. The elections could influence Banrep’s next steps starting with its June 30 board meeting, and will also determine who fills two vacancies on its seven-member board in 2029.

Fitch’s downgrade of Colombia to ‘BB’/Stable in December 2025 reflected the agency’s view that the starting point for public finances had weakened considerably, and that improvement would take time regardless of the election outcome. Faster-than-expected fiscal adjustment, higher growth, and lower real rates that support debt stabilization could be positive for the rating. A worsening of these variables that steepens the debt trajectory could be negative.

Above image: Fitch Ratings

Colombia’s Runoff Could Reshape Investment, Energy, and Labor Policy

Colombia’s first-round presidential election, held Sunday, May 31, 2026, produced a result that crystallizes the country’s political exhaustion with both the governing left and the traditional right. Criminal defense attorney and political outsider Abelardo de la Espriella placed first with more than 10.3 million votes. Leftist Senator Iván Cepeda, a close ally of outgoing President Gustavo Petro and the lead architect of the administration’s Paz Total peace policy, finished second with just under 9.7 million votes. The two will face each other in a runoff election on June 21.

Senator Paloma Valencia, the candidate backed by former President Álvaro Uribe and the standard-bearer of his Uribismo movement, placed a distant third, receiving less than 7% of the vote — fewer than 1.7 million ballots. Former Medellín mayor and Antioquia governor Sergio Fajardo received just over one million votes, while former Bogotá mayor Claudia López finished below 1%, with approximately 225,000 votes. The remaining minor candidates combined for just over 1% of the total.

Under Colombia’s electoral system, the top two finishers advance to a runoff if no candidate surpasses 50% in the first round. The June 21 vote will determine who assumes the presidency on August 7.

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The Candidates: Background and Context

Abelardo de la Espriella, 47, has never held elected office. He built a national profile over more than two decades as a high-profile defense attorney, founding De La Espriella Lawyers in 2002, with offices in Colombia and the United States. His client roster has included controversial figures: he represented Alex Saab, a Colombian-born businessman who became a close associate of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and was implicated in a scheme to launder proceeds from Venezuela’s food-assistance program, the Comité Local de Abastecimiento y Producción (CLAP). Saab was extradited to the United States, convicted, and later granted clemency before being re-arrested in Venezuela in early 2026. De la Espriella also represented members of the Nule family in connection with the Carrusel de Contratos — a major contracting scandal tied to infrastructure works at Bogotá’s El Dorado airport corridor. He has additionally been reported to have represented individuals linked to organized crime.

De la Espriella has drawn comparisons to figures such as US President Donald Trump and El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele. His campaign has centered on hard-line security policy, including proposals for large-scale incarceration, expanded military operations against armed groups, and the rejection of negotiations with guerrilla organizations. He is reported to hold Italian and US citizenship in addition to his Colombian nationality, and is said to own property in Florida.

In a notable departure from his defense work, de la Espriella took the side of a victim in a high-profile acid-attack case, acting as a private prosecutor to secure a stronger sentence for the perpetrator — an episode that raised his public profile beyond the defense bar.

Iván Cepeda, 63, enters the runoff as the consolidated candidate of the Colombian left and Petro’s Pacto Histórico coalition. He is the primary legislative architect of Paz Total, the Petro administration’s policy of negotiating simultaneously with multiple armed actors, including the ELN and FARC dissident factions. Cepeda’s family background includes deep ties to the Colombian left: his father was secretary general of the Communist Party, and was assassinated. Cepeda himself studied in communist Bulgaria during the soviet era. The two finalists have an established legal and political history: Uribe attempted to bring criminal charges against Cepeda while both served in the Senate, but the Supreme Court determined that Uribe had fabricated the accusations and attempted to bribe witnesses — a case that resulted in Uribe’s criminal conviction.

“If nothing changes, Abelardo wins.” — Loren Moss, Finance Colombia

The Electoral Map

The geographic distribution of the vote reflects deep regional divisions. Cepeda carried Bogotá, which has trended left for years, particularly in lower-income districts on the city’s south and west sides. Antioquia — historically the heartland of Uribismo and home to Medellín, the country’s second-largest city — voted more than two to one for de la Espriella, a result that signals the weakening grip of Uribe’s movement even in its traditional stronghold.

The heart of coffee-growing country — the departments of Caldas, Risaralda, and Quindío also went to de la Espriella. Caquetá, a sparsely populated department in southern Colombia that has suffered sustained guerrilla violence from both the ELN and FARC dissident groups, voted for de la Espriella as well, a result we may interpret as a direct rejection of Petro and Cepeda’s Paz Total.

Cepeda carried Colombia’s Pacific coast, including the chronically neglected department of Chocó, as well as the sparsely populated Amazonas and Putumayo departments bordering Peru and Brazil, and the northern Caribbean coast. The Caribbean coast result is notable, as the region has historically suffered from underdevelopment, infrastructure deficits, and significant income inequality. Norte de Santander with its Catatumbo region on the Venezuelan border and experiencing severe armed-group activity — voted for de la Espriella, a result consistent with public exhaustion over security policy.

The Political Context: From Uribe to Petro and Beyond

Colombia’s current political trajectory is rooted in decisions made across the past two decades. President Uribe served two terms in the early 2000s and, together with then-Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos, mounted a sustained military campaign against the FARC that significantly weakened the insurgency. Santos later broke from Uribe after assuming the presidency, governing independently and ultimately negotiating a peace agreement with the FARC — a deal that Uribe actively opposed. A plebiscite on the accord failed, but Santos used legislative maneuvering to implement it anyway.

Uribe’s next handpicked candidate, Iván Duque, won the 2018 election but finished his term with approximately 30% approval. Members of his own party publicly distanced themselves from him — Senator María Fernanda Cabal, a staunch Uribista, called Duque a “mamerto” (leftist idiot) while he was still in office. Under his administration, indicators on crime and guerrilla activity worsened, and armed groups including the ELN rebuilt operational capacity that had been degraded under Uribe and Santos.

Petro’s administration has not met initial fears of a Venezuelan-style democratic breakdown: Congress has largely blocked the most radical components of his agenda, including attempts to nationalize the private pension system and convert the healthcare system to a single-payer model. However, crime has increased, armed groups have expanded their operational footprints, and the security situation in several regions has worsened. Paz Total is widely seen as having produced few tangible results.

Uribe himself was convicted of witness tampering and attempted bribery in the case he had brought against Cepeda. Though released from house arrest after conviction, the judges who authorized his release are now reportedly under investigation for judicial corruption. Valencia’s poor performance in the first round — despite being Uribe’s chosen standard-bearer — suggests that Uribismo as a political force is waning, with its core constituency aging and new generations of voters disengaged from the Uribe legacy.

What to Expect Before June 21

Both campaigns will intensify mobilization efforts over the coming three weeks. Cepeda’s movement — Colombia Humana and the broader Pacto Histórico coalition — has historically relied on organized mobilizations, including indigenous community-led mingas, labor unions, and allied social movements. Cepeda’s running mate Senator Aida Quilcué is an indigenous activist, a choice expected to energize those constituencies. FECODE, the Federación Colombiana de Trabajadores de la Educación (Colombia’s main teachers’ federation), is expected to align officially with Cepeda, though individual teachers may not follow union leadership in their voting choices.

On the right, Paloma Valencia issued a public endorsement of de la Espriella immediately following the first-round results. Business community organizations, including ANDI (the Asociación Nacional de Empresarios de Colombia) and Fenalco (the Federación Nacional de Comerciantes), do not formally endorse candidates, but their members are widely understood to favor a government that supports private enterprise and market-oriented policy. De la Espriella holds no congressional constituency, meaning whichever candidate wins will face the same dynamic Petro encountered: a fragmented Congress that is likely to act as a check on executive authority.

The question of centrist voter alignment remains open. Fajardo and López are not expected to formally endorse either finalist, and the direction of their combined approximately 1.2 million votes is uncertain.

Winners and Losers by Sector

For international investors and executives operating in Colombia, the policy differences between the two candidates are substantive across several key sectors.

Petroleum and Natural Gas: De la Espriella has stated unequivocally that he will restart petroleum exploration and licensing, which the Petro administration blocked. Ecopetrol S.A. (NYSE: EC; BVC: ECOPETROL), Colombia’s state-controlled oil company, which also holds producing assets in the US Permian Basin and Gulf of Mexico, has operated under a government that halted new drilling permits. The consequences have included a decline in future production capacity at a time when global oil prices have risen due to Middle East tensions. Colombia has been forced to import natural gas at elevated prices to meet existing domestic demand — including from transportation fleets that were converted to natural gas under government incentive programs. Cepeda would be expected to continue or deepen current restrictions on fossil fuel expansion.

Healthcare: The Petro-Cepeda platform favors a government single-payer model. The administration has already taken over several Entidades Promotoras de Salud (EPS) — Colombia’s managed-care intermediaries — placing the healthcare system in legal and financial uncertainty. Private clinics, hospitals, and physicians who wish to operate outside a government-controlled framework would benefit from a de la Espriella administration. Cepeda’s healthcare agenda would accelerate the shift toward government-managed care.

BPO, Tech, and Call Centers: The BPO sector — which provides large volumes of formal employment, particularly in Medellín, Bogotá, Cali, and Barranquilla — was significantly affected by Petro-era minimum wage increases of 16% and 23% in successive years. These increases created contract renegotiation pressures with international clients, some of whom have shifted or considered shifting operations to competing jurisdictions including Honduras, Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, and Guatemala. At the CX Summit, the industry’s main annual event held in Cartagena, the son of Álvaro Uribe appeared as an invited keynote speaker — a gesture that could be interpreted within the industry as an implicit signal of political alignment. A de la Espriella government, with its orientation toward labor market deregulation and reduced regulatory burden, would be viewed more favorably by this sector. Current Colombian labor law prohibits part-time employment contracts and places significant restrictions on dual employment, making workforce flexibility difficult for businesses that operate outside traditional 40-hour weekly structures.

Mining: The Petro administration has been less aggressive toward mining than toward petroleum, but sector participants expect a more permissive regulatory environment under de la Espriella, and continued constraints under Cepeda.

Security and Tourism: Both candidates have stated support for tourism promotion, but the sector’s trajectory is more directly linked to security conditions. Under current policies, several regions that were accessible to domestic and international travelers several years ago have experienced increased armed-group activity, effectively closing them to tourism. A de la Espriella administration is expected to pursue a more aggressive military posture toward the ELN and FARC dissident factions; a Cepeda government would likely continue dialogue-first approaches. The outcome will directly affect which parts of Colombia’s territory remain accessible to investment and tourism.

Foreign Relations: A de la Espriella government is expected to restore a broadly cooperative relationship with the United States, which deteriorated under Petro following several high-profile diplomatic incidents. De la Espriella has expressed admiration for US President Donald Trump, and reports indicate he holds US citizenship and owns property in Florida. Relations with Ecuador, which have been strained by mutual tariff escalations between Petro and Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa, would be expected to normalize. Relations with Venezuela under Cepeda would likely continue along the current allied trajectory, while a de la Espriella government would be expected to take a more critical posture toward Caracas. China and Russia would find a more receptive diplomatic environment under Cepeda, and a cooler one under de la Espriella.

The Poor and Informal Workers: Cepeda’s campaign argues that minimum wage increases and expanded state services benefit lower-income Colombians. Critics counter that elevated formal labor costs have pushed more employment into the informal sector — which currently accounts for approximately half the Colombian workforce — depriving those workers of pension contributions, health benefits, and job security. De la Espriella’s platform, which emphasizes business formation, security, and labor market deregulation, would be presented as generating more formal-sector job creation. The actual distributional effects of either approach remain contested.

The Outlook

Assuming current polling trends hold and Uribista voters consolidate behind de la Espriella as expected following Valencia’s endorsement, de la Espriella enters the runoff as the frontrunner. Cepeda’s path to victory depends on driving high turnout among his base, securing support from centrist voters who did not vote for either finalist in the first round, and potentially benefiting from any missteps by de la Espriella in the final three weeks of campaigning.

The first-round results produced no major electoral violence. The ELN announced a temporary halt to armed actions during the voting period. Authorities detained some individuals reportedly attempting to purchase votes in rural areas, but no large-scale incidents were recorded.

The incoming president will face a Congress with no natural majority aligned to the executive, a healthcare system in partial administrative disarray, a petroleum sector whose future production trajectory is in question, and regions where state presence remains contested by armed groups. The June 21 runoff will determine which vision — market-oriented restructuring or continuation of the Petro project — Colombia pursues for the next four years.

U.S. President Donald Trump has nominated Kentucky businessman and political ally Nathaniel “Nate” Morris to serve as the next U.S. ambassador to Colombia, placing a prominent supporter of the Republican president at the helm of one of Washington’s most important diplomatic posts in Latin America.

The nomination was formally submitted to lawmakers on Monday, one day after right-wing presidential candidate Abelardo “El Tigre” de la Espriella emerged as the frontrunner in Colombia’s first-round election, setting up a runoff that could reshape relations between Bogotá and Washington.

Morris, 45, is the founder of Rubicon Technologies, an environmental technology and waste-management company, and has become one of Trump’s most visible political allies in Kentucky. His nomination comes as Colombia enters a period of political transition and uncertainty over the future direction of bilateral cooperation on security, counternarcotics efforts, trade and migration.

The White House announced Morris’s nomination as part of a broader package of diplomatic appointments across Latin America. If confirmed by the Senate, he would become Washington’s top representative in Colombia at a pivotal moment for relations between the longtime allies.

Trump had previously urged Morris to abandon a potential bid for the U.S. Senate in Kentucky in order to join his administration.

“Nate is a fantastic businessman and a strong MAGA warrior,” Trump wrote on social media. “I have asked Nate to step aside from the Senate race to take a role in my Administration as Ambassador. Nate is Oxford-educated, tough as steel, loves our great nation, and will represent the United States very well.”

Although Morris has limited public diplomatic experience, his appointment reflects the Trump administration’s preference for politically connected allies and business leaders in several ambassadorial posts.

A native of Kentucky, Morris studied at George Washington University before pursuing further studies at the University of Oxford. He founded Rubicon Technologies, a company focused on waste management and environmental services, and later established Morris Industries, a private investment holding company based in Lexington with interests in sustainability, technology, industrial operations and financial services.

The nomination comes amid expectations that Colombia’s foreign policy could shift following Sunday’s election result. De la Espriella’s strong showing has fueled speculation that a future administration could seek closer alignment with Washington after years of tensions between the governments of President Donald Trump and Colombian President Gustavo Petro.

Before taking up the post in Bogotá, Morris must undergo Senate hearings and secure confirmation by a majority vote, a process that could take several weeks or months.

The hard-right presidential candidate Abelardo “El Tigre” de la Espriella emerged as the frontrunner in Colombia’s presidential election on Sunday, setting up a June 21 runoff against left-wing senator Iván Cepeda after a closely contested first round that was quickly overshadowed by President Gustavo Petro’s allegations of electoral irregularities.

According to the final bulletin (No.67) released by the National Registry Office, De la Espriella secured 43.74% of the vote, finishing ahead of Cepeda, who obtained 40.91%. Conservative senator Paloma Valencia followed with 6.92%, while centrist candidate Sergio Fajardo received 4.26%.

The outcome sets the stage for a high-stakes second round that could determine whether Colombia continues along the political path established by Petro’s administration or pivots sharply toward a more conservative agenda centered on security, economic growth and closer relations with the United States.

Within hours of the results being announced, Petro cast doubt on the preliminary count, stating on social media that he would not recognize the pre-count figures and would only accept the results produced through the official electoral scrutiny process conducted by judicial commissions.

The president argued that the election-day count “has no binding force” and raised concerns about alleged modifications to electoral software and inconsistencies in the voter registry. Petro further suggested that some 800,000 voter identification records may have been improperly added to the electoral census before the vote.

Petro’s allegations quickly became the dominant political controversy of election night. While the president suggested that software modifications and irregularities in the voter registry may have affected the process, he presented no public evidence to substantiate the claims. Electoral authorities, judicial officials and international observers subsequently defended the integrity of the vote, creating a sharp contrast between the president’s warnings and the assessments of institutions directly responsible for overseeing the election.

National Registrar Hernán Penagos responded forcefully to the allegations, rejecting claims that the software used in the electoral process handled voter identification records. Penagos emphasized that the electoral census had been closed since April 30, that all voting records were publicly available for review and that party witnesses had monitored voting and counting procedures throughout the country.

Attorney General Gregorio Eljach also challenged Petro’s assertions, publicly demanding evidence to support accusations that risked undermining confidence in the electoral process.

The controversy intensified briefly when Cepeda questioned apparent discrepancies in electoral databases and echoed concerns regarding the voter registry. However, the left-wing candidate later moderated his position after internal reviews by his campaign.

“We have found no evidence of facts that merit a statement regarding eventual irregularities,” Cepeda said, effectively distancing himself from Petro’s original claims.

The president’s fake narrative appeared to lose momentum after Cepeda’s own campaign acknowledged that it had uncovered no evidence of fraud or irregularities sufficient to challenge the outcome. The concession strengthened the position of election officials, who maintained throughout the day that Colombia’s voting system functioned normally and transparently.

Former Justice Minister Wilson Ruiz Orejuela was among those who condemned Petro’s statements, accusing the president of attempting to cast doubt on a legitimate electoral process. “Petro did not recognize last night’s results,” Ruiz said. “But he has been a complicit driver of the rigged elections that took place in Venezuela.”

International observers, meanwhile, offered a markedly different assessment of the electoral process. Scott Campbell, Colombia representative for the United Nations Human Rights Office, congratulated Colombians for what he described as a peaceful election day and praised the country’s institutions for overseeing the vote. “Today we have not documented significant violations or infringements of human rights,” Campbell said following the election.

Support for the integrity of the process also came from the United States.

Republican Senator Bernie Moreno, who participated as an international observer, described Colombia’s voting system as one of the most effective he had encountered.

“The beauty of democracy was fully displayed as the people of Colombia exercised their power to chart their future in their own hands and with their own voices,” Moreno wrote on social media.

Speaking later to Colombian media, Moreno said he had informed Secretary of State Marco Rubio and President Donald Trump that “the elections in Colombia were completely free and well done.”

Moreno went further, suggesting aspects of Colombia’s voting system compared favorably with those used in the United States. “They do it better here in Colombia than in the United States,” he said. U.S President Donald Trump directly endorsed De La Espriella ahead of Sunday’s vote, stating: “He has all my support.”

The controversy surrounding Petro’s claims also drew attention from Venezuela’s democratic opposition. President-elect Edmundo González praised Colombia’s institutions and warned of the fragility of democratic systems. “I look at Colombia with hope and with memory,” González wrote. “I know the value of what our Colombian brothers possess because we lost it. The right to choose, and the institutions that make it possible, are not easily recovered. Yours are still standing. Protect them.”

While election authorities sought to contain the controversy, De la Espriella’s victory triggered an immediate wave of support from conservative political leaders across Latin America and beyond.

Argentine President Javier Milei was among the first foreign leaders to congratulate the Barranquilla criminal defense lawyer. “This result reflects the desire for freedom and progress of the Colombian people, and an explicit willingness to say enough to the failed socialist model that has caused so much damage to our region and to Colombia in particular over the last four years,” Milei wrote on X.

The Argentine leader added that if the result is repeated in the runoff, “Colombia will once again join the community of free nations” before concluding with his trademark slogan: “Long live liberty, damn it.”

Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa also congratulated De la Espriella and suggested Colombians were demanding political change after four years of left-wing government. “Being a bad loser is contagious,” Noboa wrote in an apparent reference to former president Rafael Correa, and his criticism of the 2025 election results, adding that Colombia needs “real change.”

Venezuelan opposition leader María Corina Machado likewise celebrated the outcome, saying the result would strengthen democratic institutions and regional security. “The Venezuelan people need a strong and united Colombia,” Machado said, arguing that democratic nations must work together against organized crime and authoritarianism.

In Washington, Republican Congresswoman María Elvira Salazar welcomed De la Espriella’s performance and interpreted the result as a repudiation of Petro’s administration. “The results send a powerful message,” Salazar wrote. “Millions of Colombians reject Gustavo Petro’s direction and want to recover security, prosperity and freedom.”

The Conservative Party formally endorsed De la Espriella following the first-round results, describing him as the candidate who best “represents Colombians demanding a firm direction” for the country.

The runoff campaign now enters a critical three-week stretch as De la Espriella and Cepeda compete for support from voters whose preferred candidates were eliminated in the first round.

For firebrand De la Espriella, victory on June 21 would represent a dramatic ideological shift following four years of Petro’s left-wing presidency and could usher in closer ties with Washington and key allied governments, among them, Israel.

For Cepeda, the challenge will be persuading voters to embrace continuity with Petro’s political project despite deep public dissatisfaction over security, economic mismanagement, corruption scandals and an increasingly polarized political climate.

 

A June 21 presidential runoff will decide Colombia’s next president

Far-right candidate Abelardo de la Espriella and leftist Iván Cepeda advanced to the runoff round of Colombia’s presidential election after emerging as the top vote-getters in the May 31, 2026, first-round vote, in a result that reflects the deep political polarization shaping the country.

With 99.99% of polling stations counted, the Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil reported that De la Espriella won more than 10.3 million votes (43.7%), while Cepeda secured 9.6 million votes (40.9%). The two candidates will face each other in a runoff election scheduled for June 21, 2026.

Voter turnout reached 23.7 million people, equivalent to 57.8% of eligible voters. Together, the two candidates captured nearly 85% of valid ballots, leaving the remaining contenders far behind and setting up a contest between two sharply contrasting political visions.

De la Espriella’s unexpected rise

De la Espriella’s first-round victory represents one of the biggest surprises of the election and marks the first time in Colombia’s modern political history that a far-right party has emerged with a realistic chance of winning the presidency.

A lawyer by profession with no previous elected office experience, De la Espriella built his campaign around a populist message focused on political confrontation, public security, a hard-liner approach to crime and opposition to negotiations with illegal armed groups. His political style has drawn comparisons to Argentine President Javier Milei, Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele and US President Donald Trump.

Most pre-election polls placed him in second or third position, with support ranging between 15% and 25%, well below his final result.

His platform emphasizes stronger security policies, tougher penalties for criminal and narcotraffic organizations, and the construction of large-scale prisons similar to those in El Salvador. He has also rejected peace negotiations with armed groups.

His opposition to diversity and inclusion policies, as well as controversies involving remarks toward female journalists for which he later apologized, also became defining features of his campaign.

Cepeda achieves the strongest result ever for Colombia’s left party

Although he finished second, Cepeda achieved the highest vote total ever received by a left-wing presidential candidate in Colombia, surpassing the 8.5 million votes won by President Gustavo Petro in a previous presidential election.

The candidate of the ruling Pacto Histórico party based his campaign on grassroots mobilization, public rallies and the consolidation of a unified left-wing movement. His message focused on expanding social programs, inclusion and reducing inequality.

However, his candidacy has also been weighed down by criticism of the current administration, particularly regarding security concerns, problems within Colombia’s healthcare system and the limited results of the government’s “Total Peace” policy, which Petro promoted and Cepeda supported during his years in Congress.

Cepeda’s political career has been built in Congress, where he became known for defending the rights of victims of paramilitary violence and for his role in legal cases involving former President Álvaro Uribe.

After preliminary results were released, both Cepeda and Petro publicly questioned the preliminary vote count while stating they would recognize the official results certified by electoral commissions, judges and notaries.

“As president, I do not accept the preliminary count results,” Petro wrote on X, arguing that Colombia’s pre-count system has no legal validity and that only the official scrutiny process produces binding results. He later added that “the binding results the president will recognize are those issued by the electoral scrutiny commissions.”

Cepeda has also sought to distance himself from some of Petro’s proposals, including the idea of convening a constituent assembly to revise Colombia’s constitutional framework.

Historic defeat for Uribe’s political movement

Another major statement of the election was the poor performance of Paloma Valencia, candidate of the Centro Democrático party and backed by former President Uribe, who campaigned alongside her throughout the country despite defections by several prominent supporters.

Valencia finished third with 1.6 million votes (6.9%), far below polling projections that had placed her above 20%.

The result is widely attributed to voter fatigue with Uribe’s political movement and the migration of conservative voters toward De la Espriella, who was endorsed during the campaign by several prominent right-wing figures, including senators Paola Holguín and María Fernanda Cabal, as well as leader and businessman José Félix Lafaurie.

Strategic decisions within Valencia’s campaign may also have contributed to the result, including the selection of former Bogotá councilman Juan Daniel Oviedo as her vice-presidential running mate and her reluctance to directly confront De la Espriella during the campaign.

This marks the second consecutive presidential election in which Uribe reaches the runoff without a candidate from his own party. Nevertheless, he quickly endorsed De la Espriella after the results became known.

That endorsement could prove crucial. If elected, De la Espriella would face a Congress in which his movement holds only limited representation, making support from Centro Democrático, the second-largest congressional bloc, essential for advancing legislation and reforms.

Centrist voters may decide the runoff

Former Medellín Mayor Sergio Fajardo, who campaigned as a centrist alternative, finished fourth with more than 1 million votes (4.2%), while none of the remaining candidates surpassed 1% of the vote.

As the runoff approaches, the votes won by both Valencia and Fajardo are expected to be closely watched by the two campaigns, as they could prove decisive in an election that is shaping up to be highly competitive, deeply polarized and politically fragmented.

While Valencia has already endorsed De la Espriella, Fajardo has yet to take a public position. In previous elections, the former Medellín mayor has preferred to leave his supporters free to decide rather than formally endorse either finalist.

In Valencia’s case, despite her endorsement of De la Espriella, it remains unclear whether her support came primarily from voters aligned with former President Álvaro Uribe or whether a significant share was driven by the candidacy of Juan Daniel Oviedo, who won more than 1.2 million votes in the coalition primaries held in March.

The June 21 presidential runoff will therefore pit two sharply different visions for Colombia’s future against one another, in a political environment marked by polarization, social tensions, and persistent challenges related to security and governance that the next administration will have to address.