Segunda Marquetalia ordered the attack last year according to trial testimony.

Revelations that former FARC leaders ordered the 2025 killing of Miguel Uribe have heightened political tensions in the run-up to the May presidential elections.

The 39-year-old Colombian senator and presidential hopeful was gunned down by a Bogotá gang hired by the Segunda Marquetalia, an armed group created by disgruntled guerrillas hiding in Venezuela, according to testimony revealed in court.

The senator was shot down by a 15-year-old assassin at an open-air political rally in the barrio of Modelia in June, 2025. Uribe died of head wounds two months later.

After months of investigations and multiple arrests, state prosecutors were last week finally able to link the local gang that carried out the hit with the armed group.  

See also: Who ordered the murder of presidential candidate Miguel Uribe?

The breakthrough came during the trial of Bogotá-based gang leader Simeón Pérez Marroquín, also known as ‘El Viejo’, who admitted he had hired the local Plata o Plomo (‘Silver or Lead’) gang to carry out the killing on behalf of the Segunda Marquetalia armed group.

“The deal was that they would pay one billion pesos [US$270,000] for the senator’s death,” said Marroquín in a statement reported by magazine Semana.

Right hand man

Confirmation of involvement by an armed group founded by former FARC leaders sparked a political spat between front-runners for the upcoming presidential election.

Right-wing candidate Paloma Valencia was quick to accuse the Petro government of negotiating peace with the Segunda Marquetalia – even while the armed group was plotting the murder of Uribe.

See also: Peace Plan has caused more conflict, says thinktank

Valencia referred to Marroquín’s statements that the hit was organized by veteran guerrilla Zarco Aldinever, the right-hand man of the group leader Iván Márquez, in early 2025.

At this time Aldinever was nominated a ‘peace manager’ by the Petro government, meaning any arrest warrants were suspended and the rebel was free to roam. This despite the collapse of peace talks with the Segunda Marquetalia at the end of 2024.

Valencia further pointed to the closeness between her main election rival Iván Cepeda and leaders of the armed group.

Old photo

“The killer of Miguel Uribe is photographed hugging Iván Cepeda,” she wrote on X, attaching  a photo of her rival with Segunda Marquetalia founder Iván Márquez.  

In fact, the photo of Cepeda dated from the 2016 FARC peace talks, explained President Petro in a strongly worded statement defending his friend and political ally.

“The photo shows Iván Cepeda’s attempt to help [the Santos government] achieve peace. At that time, the entire FARC was ready for peace,” said.

Iván Márquez was number two in the FARC at the time and widely respected for his role in the negotiations.

Petro went on to blame his predecessor, right-wing president Iván Duque, for undermining the FARC peace process that forced former guerrilla leaders like Márquez back to arms and the Segunda Marquetalia.

Following the 2016 deal, some former FARC leaders had been “entrapped by state prosecutors with fake drug charges”, he said, leading to extradition requests from the United States.

Faced with this legal pressure several top commanders, including Iván Márquez and Jesus Santrich, fled to Venezuela in 2018 before emerging on video a year later to announce their new incarnation as the Segunda Marquetalia, named after the village in the Tolima department where the original FARC first formed in 1964.

The armed group was active in drug trafficking and illegal mining along the Colombia-Venezuela border, in the departments such as Vichada and Guainía, according to a profile by InsightCrime. The leadership is suspected of hiding out in Venezuela.

Another study by Fundacion Ideas para La Paz estimated the group to have 530 armed combatants in 2025, an increase of 15% on 2024, and work mostly in the eastern plains of Colombia.

A hunt is on

In a press conference on Tuesday, Valencia accused Cepeda and other left-wing lawmakers of backing the former FARC commanders in their legal battles back in 2018, creating a chain of events leading to the creation of recycled armed group.

“Congressmen like Cepeda defended [Marquéz and Santrich] …and didn’t allow them to be extradited. If these thugs had been extradited, Miguel Uribe would be alive today,” she said.

In his own press statement Cepeda called Valencia’s comments “a dirty political game” and issued a challenge to the candidate, and her political mentor right-wing former president Álvaro Uribe, to back up the accusations in court.

“It’s infamy to accuse me or President Petro to have any type of involvement in such a deplorable deed as the assassination of senator and presidential pre-candidate Miguel Uribe,” he said.

Meanwhile this week the Colombian attorney general’s office launched a fresh hunt for the leaders of the Segunda Marquetalia, offering around million-dollar rewards for the capture of seven commanders including Iván Márquez and Zarco Aldinever.  

In fact, Aldinever was reported killed by rival armed group ELN in Venezuela during a squabble over a cocaine shipment in August last year – the same month that Miguel Uribe died – according to Colombian state forces at the time.    

This week Colombia’s Minister of Defense Pedro Sanchez walked back that claim saying no body had ever been found and that the initial report of Aldinever’s death – sent from the Segunda Marquetalia itself – could be disinformation.

“At this time, the position is clear: without a body there is no confirmation of death, and that is why all institutional resources remain active to locate him,” said Sanchez.

Underworld connections

Closer to home, the Segunda Marquetalia’s influence in Bogotá was under scrutiny after Simeón Marroquín’s testimony shed light on the murky connections with the city’s underworld.

Marroquín admitted that in previous decades he had acted as an urban operative for the FARC guerrillas, a hired gun ready to carry out orders in the city.

“I never wore camouflage, but while I was here in Bogotá, I was a miliciano. Guerrilla missions would come up, and I’d carry them out, but I was never in the ranks.”

His contacts with the FARC continued to the Segunda Marquetalia that tapped him for the Uribe killing.

Early in 2025, Marroquín was invited to a secret meeting in Cúcuta close to the Venezuelan border where, according to his testimony, Aldinever offered him one billion pesos for the crime (US$270,000) and another 600 million pesos (US$160,000) to “bribe the justice system” to deflect attention from the guerrilla group.

The motive for the killing was not clearly revealed by Marroquín, though a text message later found on his phone sent to his guerrilla paymasters talked of an “eye for an eye”, suggesting the former rebels were out for revenge.

Chilling revelation

Uribe was selected as an influential senator, scion of a right-wing political family, and popular candidate for this year’s presidential elections. He was also an easy target for assassins with his regular visits to communities where he had walkabouts to engage with local voters.

In the first few months of 2025, Marroquín worked his underworld connections to hire the Plata o Plomo gang which in turn lured the 15-year-old gunman who shot and wounded Miguel Uribe in a small park in the barrio of Modelia on June 7.

See also: Arrests made – but still questions in Uribe shooting.

Marroquín’s account paints a picture of a loose network of petty criminals lured by cash rather than political interests, ignorant of the details of both their intended target and the paymasters behind the plot.

The middleman saw the hit as a “good business opportunity” but also a chance to rekindle his role as urban operative for a guerrilla organization.

Marroquín’s plan unraveled after the 15-year-old gunman and various low-level gang members were detained in the hours and days following the June attack, creating a trail leading to his own capture in October.

“What’s done is done”

One chilling revelation was the order from above for Marroquín to kill low-level gang members to cut links to the guerrilla masterminds. This included murdering alias Gabriela, who transported the weapon and was present on the day of the shooting.

Marroquín refused to kill Gabriela, telling investigators “I didn’t have the heart for that because she was very young.” But he did send her by bus to the city of Florencia where the guerrillas were lying in wait.

#ATENCIÓN | "No hay palabras que justifiquen dicho acto, pero pues ya está hecho (…)", fueron las palabras con las que Simeón Pérez Marroquín, alias ‘El Viejo’, pidió perdón a la familia del senador y precandidato presidencial Miguel Uribe Turbay, tras reconocer que fue el… pic.twitter.com/btgnOsTEF7

— ÚltimaHoraCaracol (@UltimaHoraCR) March 20, 2026

The 19-year-old never made it; police investigators, already on Gabriela’s trail, organized for the bus to “break down” some miles before Florencia. Her arrest there and subsequent interrogation lead to Marroquín’s capture and eventual exposing of the links to the Segunda Marquetalia.

Last week, during the court process, Simeón Marroquín attempted to apologize for his role in the killing of Miguel Uribe.

“There are no words to justify my actions, but what’s done is done,” he said on camera from his cell, addressing his victim’s family – Uribe was married with four children – and asking forgiveness. He was then sentenced to 22 years in prison.

How quickly Colombian investigators can find Zarco Aldinever or other Segunda Marquetalia commanders, dead or alive, or hiding in Venezuela, remains to be seen.

The post Political tensions rise as guerrilla group revealed to be behind Miguel Uribe’s murder appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

Nine months after the shooting of presidential candidate Miguel Uribe Turbay in a leafy Bogotá park, the gang behind the killing have been rounded up and are facing justice.

The masterminds, though, are still at large. Circumstantial evidence points to a political assassination called in by an ex-FARC faction called the Segunda Marquetalia. But other theories exist.

And as the country prepares for the next rounds of elections, the youthful Uribe – seen by many as a presidential hopeful – is conspicuous by his absence.

We look back at killing that rocked Bogotá in 2025, and who might be behind it.

How did the shooting unfold?

Uribe was gunned down in Parque El Golfito, a green space in bustling Modelia on the western edge of Bogotá, on June 7, during a walkabout in the barrio where he met local business owners and climbed on a beer crate to deliver an impromptu address to a small crowd.

See also: Miguel Uribe hospitalized after assassination attempt

The senator was shot at close range twice in the head by a 15-year-old gunman wielding a Glock pistol in the crowd, who then fled but was himself shot in the leg by Uribe’s protection squad and captured in a nearby street.

Uribe was hospitalized and underwent several emergency surgeries before dying from his wounds on August 11, more than two months later.

Who was Miguel Uribe?

The 39-year-old senator was nationally recognized and scion of a political family. His grandfather Julio César Turbay was president from 1978 to 1982, and his mother the journalist Diana Turbay kidnapped by the Medellín cartel in 1991 who died in a botched rescue attempt, a tragedy immortalized by Gabriel García Márquez in his non-fiction book News of a Kidnapping.

Even though he was raised as a legacy politician, and a key candidate for the right-wing Centro Democratico, Uribe nevertheless garnered support across the political spectrum for his hard work and attention to detail, more technocrat than populist, and potentially a unifying figure.

It was perhaps typical of Uribe that the day he was shot he in an unsung corner of the city meeting everyday folks.

What was the impact of his assassination?

Many mourned the loss of the young senator, married with four children.  In reality, Uribe’s death was just one of many in Colombia during 2025 with 187 social leaders and human rights defenders murdered nationwide, according to data from conflict thinktank Indepaz.

The senator’s killing had an outsized impact for several reasons. First, Bogotá, unusually for a megacity, has almost half the homicide rate than many smaller cities and some rural areas with long-running conflicts between gangs and armed groups.

Secondly, the many feared Uribe’s attack signaled a return to the 1980s when a wave of political killings – usually by extreme right-wing forces against left wing targets in cahoots with drug cartels – plagued Bogotá and many other Colombian cities.

But united condemnation of the attack quickly degenerated to finger-pointing between political factions with Uribe’s lawyer filing a complaint against President Gustavo Petro for alleged “harassment” of the senator.

Was Petro to blame?

An early theory floated by the late senator’s lawyer was that the attack was a “hate crime”, which in Colombia covers persecution for ideological views. The argument went that Petro crossed the line with his itchy Twitter finger: in their complaint the lawyer presented a 20-page document with 42 presidential tweets disparaging Uribe. 

While acknowledging that Petro was in no way linked to the physical attack, he had created a “favorable environment” for anyone with a serious grudge to take out the senator, said the lawyers, though this didn’t explain why a 15-year-old – not a likely candidate for political grievances – was coerced to pull the trigger.

And by the end of June new evidence emerged from the shooter himself. The youth didn’t even know who his target was the senator, or indeed who was Miguel Uribe.

And other pieces of the puzzle fell into place, clarifying that the shooter was hired for cash by an organized criminal gang that had planned the killing in detail.

If it was so well planned, why did they get caught?

Good question. The contract killers calling themselves Plata o Plomo (‘Silver or Lead’) left a trail of evidence starting with the wounded gunman captured with minutes of the shooting.

Next to fall was Carlos Mora, alias ‘El Veneco’, who drove the young assassin, followed a few days later by 19-year-old Katherine Martínez, alias ‘Gabriela’, who delivered the pistol.

Gabriela’s arrest gave the first clues to a wider conspiracy: the webcammer was tracked down to the regional capital of Florencia, Caquetá, a jungle department of Colombia with high presence of armed groups.

CCTV footage from Modelia placed her inside the car with the gunman, and she later confessed to transporting the gun itself.With CCTV footage, and information from Gabriela and El Veneco, other key members of the gang were soon rounded up including two other getaway drivers and a middleman for hiring the 15-year-old.

Seems like a very amateur operation…

Plata o Plomo was a loose group of criminals drawn from the Bogotá underworld, and many had worked together before. The leader was Elder José Arteaga, alias Chipi, who in a rather unlikely twist also ran a hair salon in Engativá.

When not trimming beards, Chipi was immersed in crime with a history of extortion, violence and armed robbery, and was  linked to the murder of a Mexican businessman in Medellín in 2024.

See also: Arrests made but still questions in Uribe shooting.

He was also quite ruthless: according to Gabriela, Chipi was planning to cover his tracks by killing both El Veneco and the 15-year-old hired assassin. Being captured early likely saved their lives.

Chipi himself became the subject of a national manhunt until his luck ran out on July 5. He was captured hiding in a house in Engativá by a special police unit a month after the shooting, just a few kilometers from where it took place.

So, case closed?

Not so fast. Chipi was just one link in a longer chain. According to Gabriela, now a key witness, the hairdresser  told her the murder contract was for 700 million pesos, around US$190,000.

This amount of cash pointed to a bigger player. 

In Colombia there are plenty of candidates to choose from, and no shortage of pundits to point the finger.

Examples please?

Sure. Journalist and presidential hopeful Vicky Dávila accused Iván Mordisco, commander of the Estado Mayor Central – EMC – a dissident FARC faction fighting the state in the southwest of the country. She claimed to have insider information from military intelligence that also pointed to the likelihood of more assassinations of right-wing figures.

Her theory was backed by interior minister Armando Benedetti, who also saw reason for the EMC to stir up trouble in Bogotá as revenge for the war being waged against the group in Cauca.

However, no direct evidence was presented, and that the EMC denied any involvement, calling the allegations “a media strategy”.

Petro claimed involvement by the mysterious “Board”, a mythical super-cartel fused from drug gangs, guerrillas and paramilitaries. Petro portrayed himself as another potential victim: The Board was also plotting his own assassination, he said.

Wow. Anyone and everyone could have done it.

Exactly. Pick the political flavor of your favorite conspiracy.  More fanciful pitches were that the extreme right had planned it themselves to stoke a coup against Petro – who would likely get the blame – and at the same time eliminate the popular Uribe from the candidate’s list.

Or that the extreme left wanted to take out an effective political opponent from the presidential race.

One problem for investigators was the complex networks between criminal gangs, drug cartels and guerrilla groups, partly worsened by Petro’s Total Peace plan which had split armed groups into smaller and more dangerous factions.

See also: Peace Plan has caused more conflict, says thinktank

The Plata o Plomo gang was clearly working for financial gain. But despite capturing eight members by the end of August, the important detail of who paid them – and why – was yet to be revealed.

Maybe the gang was scared to reveal the backers?

Quite likely. In the dog-eat-dog world of Colombian crime, and where people in jail are regularly murdered, spilling the beans is not recommended. But one more key suspect was emerging:  a mysterious character known as ‘El Viejo’.

His capture came at the end of October after months of police work. Clues emerged from messages from El Viejo on Gabriela’s phone. She also confessed to transporting guns and explosives for him on various occasions in Bogotá.

Soon police had a name, Simeón Pérez Marroquín, and a place, in a remote fortified farmstead on the vast plains of Meta. A helicopter team swooped in and took him back to Bogotá.

So where did El Viejo lead?

El Viejo, the ninth capture in the Uribe case, was the most significant. While Chipi coordinated the killing on the ground, it seems El Viejo was closer to the backers.

Another key detail suggests the plot was months in the making: El Viejo was stalking Uribe in March, three months before the shooting in Modelia, and making notes on the senators movements and bodyguards.

Moreover, El Viejo, while living partly in Usme in the south of Bogotá, and on the farm in Meta, also had links to an area of Caquetá known as a stronghold of Segunda Marquetalia.

Segunda Marquetalia? Sounds more like a Cuban singer…

In fact, a recycled FARC guerrilla group named after the original rebel hideout in Tolima. Its leaders were senior commanders who abandoned the peace process in 2019 after persecution by the right-wing Duque government and threats to extradite them to the U.S.

State prosecutors accused some of drug trafficking, charges the commanders claimed were invented. According to Insight Crime, the group lead by Iván Márquez – formerly number two in the FARC – reactivated rebel units in both Colombia and Venezuela, where the group had hidden camps.

But in 2021 Colombian special forces pursued the leaders in Venezuelan territory killing three of the top commander. Further fighting in 2022 wounded Márquez, in fact he was declared dead by Colombian authorities before reappearing in a video in 2024, though he is rumoured to have suffered severe injuries.

A reason to get angry?

Perhaps. A plausible theory is that the Segunda Marquetalia was seeking revenge and targeted Miguel Uribe as a visible – and vulnerable – figure of the Colombian right wing.

Colombian prosecutors claim to have found a digital trail linking El Viejo with the “criminal circle” of Iván Márquez’s armed group. And his stalking of Uribe months before the shooting suggests a long-term plot.

And if such a plot existed, it coincided with the breakdown of peace talks between Petro’s government and the Segunda Marquetalia at the start of 2025, perhaps another spur to action.

But this evidence is yet to be tested in court.  El Viejo is jailed while awaiting trial for aggravated homicide, even while prosecutors are offering him a legal deal for information leading to the ultimate masterminds.

So will El Viejo talk?

That’s what investigators are hoping for. Two of the gang so far sentenced, Gabriela and El Veneco, have collaborated for reduced sentences, both getting 20 years in jail.

With presidential elections in May, and candidates on the stump, Colombia needs clarity.

The post Who ordered the murder of presidential candidate Miguel Uribe? appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

We take a quick dive down Avenida Caracas where the raised railway is both a wonder and worry.

For citizens used to the snail’s pace of work on their city’s infrastructure, the rapid rising of the Bogota’s Metro over their heads is something to behold.

With 11 kilometers of concrete viaduct completed, and many more clicks of columns in place, not to mention stations and interchanges emerging from the rubble, the megaobra is officially at 73% completion.

For rolos who have waited three generations for a train – the first Metro plan was made in 1942 – this advance is nothing short of a miracle.

Not everyone is happy. Last week small business owners along Avenida Caracas, the last south-north sector of the construction, took to the streets to protest the “destruction and insecurity” of their neighborhoods.

“The Metro advances. The community recedes,” said the banners the protesters hung across the formerly busy throughfare now converted into a construction site.

As is typical in Bogotá protests, it was public transport in the form of Transmilenio buses that were blocked forcing thousands of commuters to walk sections of their journey home.

Hanging on by a thread

The protests ended, but the problems continued for Avenida Caracas.

This week the central section of the wide avenue was taken up by construction teams supporting the massive overhead beam launcher that dropped the pre-cast viaduct sections into place 15 meters above the street.

Meanwhile, car traffic was banned from the main artery while Transmilenio buses threaded their way past graffitied concrete columns. Pedestrians scurried out of the temporary bus stations and fast away from the apocalyptic scenes, more Blade Runner than Springtime in Paris.

Local shopkeepers told The Bogotá Post this week that business had never been bleaker.

“We’re hanging on by a thread,” said Carlos Torres of clothes store 80’s American World, on the corner of Calle 60. “We’ve had no financial help from the district, and takings are down by 80 per cent.”

He had been forced to suspend their health insurance payments for the last year and were struggling to pay the rent, he said.

Danger down below

Footfall had “fallen massively” said Angela Cruz on her way to a hair salon across the road, with people avoiding the dusty streets, partly from fear of robberies.

Avenida Caracas was “always a bid dodgy”, she said, but the attraction for thieves of the building works, with materials and machinery to pilfer, had increased insecurity.

“We’re worried when it’s finished the support columns and dark areas under the Metro will become full of attackers.”

That the Metro would shelter criminals was a recurring concern for residents. Concept drawings of the finished line depicted idyllic leafy walkways with pedestrians pushing prams.

But as every resident of the city already knows, any tunnel, underpass or covered area becomes a hotspot for crime.

And whereas the Metro planners had robust plans to control access to the overhead trains to ensure commuters travel in peace – in contrast to the Transmilenio where anyone can jump on or off – there were no clear plans to protect open spaces below.

“Walking home just got harder,” said Cruz.

Bogotá’s ‘Berlin Wall’

Similar concerns were raised recently in a speech by President Gustavo Petro when he railed against the elevated Metro plan – now near completion – as a boondoggle for property speculators and claimed that Avenida Caracas was being “destroyed by the oligarchy”.

He further suggested that the raised railway would become a “Berlin Wall, separating the rich from poor”.

Such rhetoric was not unexpected from the mandate who long championed an underground Metro, though failed to get it moving during his own term as Bogotá’s mayor (2012 to 2015). He might yet get his way; plans for Line 2, currently on the drawing board, are for an underground Metro running east west beneath the city’s wealthier northern barrios.

See also: Going Underground, Petro threatens to derail Metro.

The final plan to build Line 1 overhead, while controversial, was taken for economic reasons and speed of construction during the second mayorship of Enrique Penalosa – the founder of Bogotá Transmilenio bus system and implacable political opponent of Petro – in 2016.

The elevated Line 1 of the Metro will be 24 kilometers – one of the longest urban light rails on the continent – and have 16 stations including 10 interchanges with the Transmilenio bendy-bus network.   

Much of the line runs through poorer barrios in the south-west of the city where, even with the work unfinished, some economic benefits were being proclaimed.  

Just get it done

Thinktank ProBogotá, in a study with the Unversidad de los Andes, reported a rise in residential property values of 11 per cent in areas around Line 1. Such increases could generate investment in undeveloped pockets of the city.

In the long term, Avenida Caracas businesses were also predicting a boost from the Metro. Just not yet.

“Right now, times are hard,” said business owner Adenay Flores.  He had seen profits plunge in the 18 months since construction began, he said, while painting the entrance to his Moscu pawnbrokers.

But he also recognized that the Metro was vital to the mobility of the city and could transform lives of people living in less accessible areas.

“Yes, we’ve had hardships. But this is the evolution of the city, I totally support the Metro. Once finished it will bring people back to Avenida Caracas,” he said. “But they need to get it done.”

It was a sentiment echoed by many business owners we talked to in the shadow of the concrete viaduct: torn between welcoming the future mass transit system while keeping their financial heads above water.

“We’re suffering, but we still want the Metro. It will bring better times,” Carlos Torres from the clothes shop told The Bogotá Post. “Until then, we just have to hang on.”

The post In the shadow of the Metro appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

… but Centro Democratico bounces back, while small parties lose out in March 8 voting.

Last Sunday’s elections brought mixed results to Colombia’s capital with the left-wing Pacto Historico party cementing its position as most popular party in the city even while its main opponent the Centro Democratico showed relatively bigger gains.

With 18 Bogotá seats up for grabs in the Chamber of Representatives, the Pacto Historico, backed by President Gustavo Petro, took a majority of eight, an increase of one seat from the previous period.

And by garnering 900,000 votes the incumbent party upped its count by more than 100,000 compared to 2022, when it was also the most popular party in the city.

But by some comparisons the right-wing Centro Democratico’s result was even more impressive, surging from two to four seats on March 8, totalling 700,000 votes, up from around 300,000 in 2022.

In Bogotá, as at national level, the losers were the smaller independent parties often citizen-led or based on niche issues. Also failing was the Nuevo Liberalismo party, founded by mayor Carlos Galán, which failed to pick up a single seat, a sign perhaps of citizen discontent with the capital’s current administration.

The demise of the small and independents reflected a national trend of voter gravitation towards the two bigger parties, Centro Democratico and Pacto Historico, whose top candidates – Paloma Valencia and Iván Cepeda – are likely contenders for the presidential slug-out in May. 

The remaining Bogotá seats went to smaller traditional parties the Green Alliance (2), and the Liberal Party (1), with one seat awarded to the upstart Salvacion Nacional formed by firebrand right-wing presidential candidate Abelardo De La Espriella.

Political phenomenon

The stand-out result in the Bogotá caucus was Centro Democratico’s first-time congressional candidate Daniel Briceño who captured 262,000 votes for his seat in the chamber.

Not only did Briceño get the highest congressional vote across Colombia, he also out-voted the entire list of senators – which get elected nationally – with one of the historically highest ever recorded in Colombia for a camara or senado representative.

The 34-year-old lawyer was being hailed this week as a political phenomenon. Briceño is currently serving on Bogotá city council where he campaigns against corruption, cronyism and waste through a clever combination of social media and forensic takedowns of his political targets.

The influencer made his name by digging into big data on government databases that has allowed him to uncover contracts and documents embarrassing to the administration of Gustavo Petro.

Since then, he has gained both an online following and voter base by scrutinizing and exposing mismanagement at all government levels.

Defend every vote

Briceño’s jump to congress was mirrored on the political left in Bogotá by the rise of influencers Laura Beltran, aka Lalis, and Daniel Monroy, who both won seats for Pacto Historico.

Despite their success at the urns on March 8, both Monroy and Beltran amplified claims of fraud in the days after the election.

Beltran, posting on X, issued a media alert begging for lawyers in the city to volunteer their time as scrutineers to check the recount after detecting “the winds of fraud”.

“We are defending each vote for the Pacto Historico. In Bogotá we have the chance to recover one more seat,” she said, suggesting the party could up its count to nine.

Monroy, for his part, made a widely echoed claim that  “votes for Pacto Historico are disappearing”.

So far there is no evidence of electoral fraud, though changes in the final vote could come about from errors corrected in the final scrutiny taking place in Bogotá this week.

Meanwhile preliminary declarations by European Union electoral observers  – 145  were deployed to Colombia – stated that the voting process had been “transparent, accurate and well-organized”.

Voter turnout for Bogotá was 48 per cent, similar to the level of participation across the country, with the capital providing 15 per cent of the national vote. A higher turnout is expected for the May presidential elections.

The post Election boost for Pacto Historico in Bogotá … appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

Amelia Makstutis, Lily O’Sullivan and Jonathan Hernández Nassif contributed to reporting.

Colombians went to the polls on Sunday to choose new representatives to Congress and the Senate, as well as presidential candidates for three main political blocs. Both the ruling leftist party and opposition right-wing party had good showings, setting up a potentially polarizing next legislative term. 

Despite warnings of possible political violence by the country’s illegal armed groups, elections took place “without any major security incidents” according to the United Nations mission in Colombia. Overall voter turnout was around 48%, about on par with previous legislative election years. 

With over 3,000 candidates competing for 102 Senate and 182 House seats, leftist President Gustavo Petro’s Historic Pact (Pacto Historico) party and the opposition Democratic Center (Centro Democratic) — founded by former right-wing President Álvaro Uribe — had the strongest showing Sunday. 

By 10:00 PM, with nearly 100% of preliminary votes tallied, Historic Pact secured 22.8% of Senate votes while the Democratic Center tallied 15.6%, according to the National Civil Registry. The Liberal Party (Partido Liberal), Green Alliance (Alianza Verde), and the Conservative Party (Partido Conservador de Colombia) trailed with 11.7%, 9.8% and 9.6% respectively. 

Official tallies for the lower house are still unclear, but analysts expect a divided Congress. 

The results could keep Colombia’s legislature polarized as no party was able to secure an absolute majority. Throughout his presidency, Petro has faced barriers in Congress to passing his progressive legislation and he even called for a constituent assembly to circumvent the body. 

His party’s presidential candidate, Senator Ivan Cepeda, who aims to carry the torch for Petro’s reforms, celebrated the party’s win in the senate race saying, “Today our second half begins, with a strong and committed caucus we will begin a new stage of transformations.” 

Political risk consultant Sergio Guzman told Reuters, “The left showed that it is here to stay, the ​right that it is divided, but it is not weak. We are going to have a fragmented Congress for the next legislature.”

Jeni Suarez, 41, who voted for the Historic Pact for the Senate and Congress, told The Bogotá Post in Medellin that the most important problem at the moment is the “political war from side to side.” 

Presidential primaries 

In addition to the House and Senate, Colombia also held three primary elections — known as inter-party consultations – to choose candidates for the three main political blocs: left, centrist, and right-wing. 

Two candidates currently leading in the polls — far-right lawyer Abelardo de la Espriella and left-wing Senator Ivan Cepeda — were not included in the primaries and the eventual nominees from the three consultations – “The Consultation for Solutions: Health, Security, and Education” (center); “Front for Life” (left), and “The Great Consultation for Colombia” (right) – will go on to compete against them in the first round of presidential elections on May 31. 

Sunday night’s big winner was Paloma Valencia, a protégé of former President Uribe’s Democratic Center party with a political pedigree that includes a former president grandfather and an aunt who was Colombia’s first female cabinet-level minister. 

Addressing her base at her victory party, Valencia lambasted President Petro, calling his administration “a time bomb that’s ticking down the seconds until it explodes.” 

In an interview ahead of the primaries, Valencia told Latin America Reports, “I am Uribista, and I will die Uribista,” and said she plans to follow in her mentor’s footsteps. 

Former Bogotá Mayor Claudia Lopez handily won her Consultation for Solutions primary, and former Medellín Mayor Daniel Quintero conceded to longtime politician and former Senator Roy Barreras in the Front for Life consultation. 

“I want to congratulate Roy on his victory. I will support him as required by law,” said Quintero on X. “I hope he leads us toward a process of unity.”

Election security 

In the days leading up to elections, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights warned that non-State armed groups were using violence to control civilian populations in Colombia and could undermine election security. 

Last year, the UN recorded 18 homicides and 126 cases of attacks and threats against political leaders, including the high-profile assassination of right-wing pre-presidential candidate Miguel Uribe Turbay, who was shot in the head at rally in Bogotá’s Modelia neighborhood in June and succumbed to his injuries in August. 

On Sunday, Minister of Defense Pedro Sánchez said over 240,000 security forces had been deployed to safeguard elections, which a delegate for the National Civil Registry called a “peaceful day at the polls, except for some isolated cases in the regions.”

Voting was temporarily suspended in the rural municipality of La Macarena, Meta following an alleged drone strike by a guerilla group near a polling station, according to the National Civil Registry. The agency also denounced “100 million cyberattacks” against its website.

Other election interference, including vote-buying was also reported. Colombia’s National Police said they captured 88 people related to elections and seized over $990,000 (COP 3,761,000,000) in cash meant to influence voting. 

In the hours leading up to the election, Víctor Hugo Moreno Bandeira, the Democratic Center congressional candidate in the southern Amazonas department, was arrested with $5,200 (COP $20 million) in cash allegedly meant for vote buying. His party later suspended his candidacy. 

And Fredy Camilo Gómez Castro, a senatorial candidate for The U Party (Partido de la U), was arrested and accused of being the right-hand to Colombia’s contraband king, Diego Marín, alias “Papá Pitufo.”

On Colombia’s eastern border with Venezuela, Defense Minister Sánchez denounced mass illegal border crossings, with an estimated 2,400 people crossing the Tachira river “presumably headed to vote.”

While his party had success, Álvaro Uribe fell flat 

For the first time in his storied political career, the History Channel’s “Greatest Colombian in History”, Álvaro Uribe, failed to win a seat in the Senate. 

Projections indicate that Uribe’s Democratic Center party will secure 17 seats in the Senate, and he was placed 25th on the list of his party’s candidates, effectively excluding him from a seat. 

Uribe, who won over much of Colombia’s electorate for beating back leftist guerrillas during his presidential terms between 2002 and 2010, has come under fire in recent years for his ties to drug traffickers and paramilitary death squads. 

Last August, the controversial president was convicted of procedural fraud and bribing a witness and was sentenced to 12 years house arrest before Bogotá’s Superior Court overturned the conviction two months later.

Amelia Makstutis, Lily O’Sullivan and Jonathan Hernández Nassif contributed to reporting.

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Former Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) commanders have for the first time in Colombian history freely admitted the armed group’s role in recruiting more than 18,677 children during five decades of their armed conflict with the state.

In a five-page document signed by Rodrigo Londoño, alias ‘Timochenko’, and five other demobilized senior leaders, the former fighters recognized their role in forcing minors into a life under arms.

Colombia’s peace court, known as the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP), had previously determined that the six defendants, all former members of the FARC secretariat, carried responsibility for the crimes of recruitment of minors under 15 years of age, mistreatment torture and murder of children, sexual and reproductive violence, and prejudice against minors with diverse sexual orientations or gender identities.

See also: Peace plan has caused more conflict, says thinktank.

In the letter to the court the six defendants admitted the acts and asked for forgiveness.

“There are no words to repair these deeds,” said Londoño in a televised address widely circulated this week. “Today with honesty and clarity we recognize our role.”

“We ask forgiveness from direct and indirect victims, and from society in general.”

Londoño, who was the FARC’s last field commander up until the peace signing, said he recognized that the rebel’s actions had “stolen childhoods” as young combatants faced constant fear and death.

Historical whitewashing

Londoño also acknowledged that “the homicides, forced abortions, acts of gender-based violence, and reproductive violence caused serious physical and psychological damage that still persists”.

The statement was a milestone in Case 07 of Colombia’s JEP, the special court charged with untangling crimes committed by all sides during the state conflict with the FARC.

Case 07 was opened in 2019 and has since officially recognized 18,677 victims, of which 54 per cent are children themselves recruited, and 46 per cent families who lost children to the conflict.

Other actors in Colombia’s armed conflict have used minors as well. According to Crisis Group, “right-wing paramilitary groups” counted some 2,800 children within their ranks when they demobilized in the mid-2000s.

Historically the FARC whitewashed their role in the recruitment of minors, and during the 2016 peace process vigorously denied accusations of abducting children or threatening families to hand over their children.

According to the FARC’s own narrative, many young recruits joining the Marxist guerrilla group were “volunteers escaping poverty”. The leadership traditionally downplayed reports of sexual abuse, forced abortions and the murders and disappearances of children as political propaganda.

As recently as 2015, FARC commanders were claiming that the armed group “under no circumstance recruited children, or anyone else, forcefully,” according to a Human Rights Watch report critical of the guerrilla’s position.

Never coming home

HRW’s own investigations had identified victims as young as 12 who were tied up by the guerrillas and threatened to be killed if they tried to resist. In other cases, kids were tricked with offers of presents or cash before being forced to fight under arms.

The report also cited cases of older commanders abusing girls as young as 12 in some incidents forcing them to use contraception or to have abortions.

According to JEP data presented under Case 07, child victims were present in the FARC ranks across 16 departments of Colombia, almost the whole territory controlled by the guerrilla group at its peak. Recruitment peaked between 1999 and 2013 but continued to 2016, the year of the peace accord between the rebels and the state.

Accredited to the case were 2,000 individual victims recruited as children but now adults, the JEP announced this week.

Also part of the group were families of 485 children recruited into the ranks who “never returned home”. The JEP had joined with the UPBD (Unidad de Búsqueda de Personas dadas por Desaparecidas) missing persons unit to try and locate the remains of those missing persons.

Details from Case 07 also highlighted the large numbers of minors taken from indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities, with 9,000 registered victims from six ethnic groups.

Restorative Justice

According to JEP proceedures, FARC leaders’ statements this week were an important step forward in the restorative justice process. The special peace court works with a system of dialogues between accused perpetrators and victims.

Information released by the court this week defined Case 07 as still in the dialogue phase with both private and public audiences were expected in the future where victims would given the opportunity to recount their experiences.

In line with previous cases, the former FARC leaders, could chose to respond to the crimes in front of the victims. Any punishment could come in the form of an eight-year sentence of restricted liberties for the former FARC leaders, though not jail time.

As part of the sentence the JEP might recommend restorative programs – a form of social work – in agreements made with the victims.   

For its part, the former FARC secretariat announced its full support for this process. In a taped statement former commander Julián Galló also accepted his role in the crimes.

“Our compromise is to work in the future so that hopefully these cases don’t keep on occurring,” he said.

Circular problem

Repetition was already happening, according to a report published last month by Crisis Group called Kids on the Front Lines: Stopping Child Recruitment in Colombia. According to the Brussels-based think tank, the practice had “boomed in the last decade” even since the FARC demobilized under the peace process in 2016.

A new generation of armed groups still relied on minors to maintain territorial control, said the report, with 620 cases reported in 2024: “Children carry out high-risk tasks, suffer abuse, and are punished with death if caught escaping.”

Ruthless gangs were using social media posts to reel vulnerable youngsters into the conflict with false promises of wealth, status and protection, said Crisis Group. Families faced reprisals if they spoke out, the report added.

And with increased competition between fractionated armed groups, minors were being pushed to the front lines: “Kids now fight in high-risk combat roles.”

Colombia’s circular problem of child recruitment was highlighted this week by JEP magistrate Lily Rueda, presiding over Case 07, in conversation with El Espectador. The message from the peace courts was “more relevant then ever” after data from UNICEF showed that the recruitment of children in Colombia had increased by 300% in the last five years.

“This is an opportunity to reiterate our commitment to investigating and prosecuting these acts of violence against children, which constitute war crimes and are not subject to amnesty, not even in the context of peace agreements,” she said

“Victims who survived recruitment in the past should not be victimized again by the recruitment of their own sons and daughters in the present day.”

The post Former FARC chiefs ask forgiveness for forcing children into the guerrilla ranks appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

Health authorities have activated over 200 free vaccination points across the city this week after two measles cases were reported.

The highly contagious virus, which is airborne and can cause serious health problems for young children, was detected in travelers from Mexico who had arrived in Bogotá and then fallen ill. Another imported case was found outside the capital.

In response the city’s District Health Secretariat said it had activated protocols to isolate the cases and had laboratories on hand to help with tracking any potential spread in the city.

Bogotá’s health secretary Gerson Bermont emphasized the need for a swift response: “Bogotá has all the infrastructure and human resources to provide technical support for diagnostic processes, he said. “The key is to act promptly to reduce local transmission.”

Measles was one of the most contagious viruses in existence and could be transmitted even by breathing, he warned. The best protection was with the MMR (measles, mumps, and rubella) vaccine, with two doses 97% effective at preventing the disease. The three people reported this week were unvaccinated.

In June last year U.S. embassies around the world took the unusual step of issuing a warning that measles was an “ongoing global risk” and advised citizens going abroad to get jabbed.

“Travelers can catch measles in many travel settings including travel hubs like airports and train stations, on public transportation like airplanes and trains, at tourist attractions, and at large, crowded events,” said the notice.

“Infected travelers can bring the disease back to their home communities where it can spread rapidly among people who are not immune.”

Good coverage

Recent data from the U.S. Centre for Disease Control (CDC) showed outbreaks in every region of the world with high caseloads in Mexico, Yemen, Indonesia, Pakistan, India, Angola and Laos.

 The World Health Organization (WHO)  declared Colombia free of measles in 2014, after intensive campaigns across the country by vaccination teams brought MMR to remote corners of the country.

Measles vaccine coverage in the country was 93 per cent for the first dose, according to data on the WHO immunization dashboard, a reasonable result for a country with access challenges for health teams

Bogotá last saw cases in 2019, when 11 persons were affected by the disease, according to data from the city’s Observatorio de Salud.  

To avoid local spread from the imported cases this week, more than 200 vaccination points were activated across the city, with details in this link of locations and opening times. Most of the sites are in existing health facilities though all are welcome and the measles vaccine is free.

The city health authorities were offering free immunization with the triple MMR vaccines (measles, mumps and rubella) known in Colombia as SRP (sarampión, rubéola y paperas) or a double vaccine of SR (just measles and rubella). Any unvaccinated or partially vaccinate person between six months old and 60 years old was encouraged to get jabbed.

The risk to Colombia “could not be underestimated” Bermont told Blu Radio this week.

“It’s bad news what’s happening in the Americas,” he said. “Last year there were 15,000 measles cases across the region. Just in Mexico there were 32 deaths”.

Bermont said mass immunization was the best method to avoid an outbreak, but region had become vulnerable from anti-vax messaging by pressure groups that gained influence during the Covid-19 pandemia.  

“We have to also recognize that today there are also health authorities in the world that throw doubt on the effectiveness of the vaccine.”

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Colombia will head to the polls this year to elect the country’s next president and members of Congress. A report released this week by the Ombudsman’s Office found that the government is failing to implement over half of the watchdog’s recommendations to ensure safe and fair elections. 

On Monday, the office released a follow-up report to its October 2025 Electoral Early Warning (ATE 013-25), saying that around 42% of recommendations for safeguarding elections were being implemented.

Last June, the country made international headlines when pre-presidential candidate Miguel Uribe Turbay was shot in the head while holding a rally in Bogotá’s Modelia neighborhood. He would succumb to his injuries two months later. 

Since then, Ombudsman Iris Marín Ortiz’s office has registered 457 cases of death threats against social leaders, human rights defenders, and political actors in the pre-election period, which officially began in January 2025 when President Gustavo Petro convened his cabinet to decide which members would step down to run for elected office in 2026.

The report noted that candidates face ongoing risks, from constraints on campaigning in armed group–controlled areas to stigmatization, threats, and even homicide.

“The risk is not that the elections will be canceled,” said Marín, but rather that un-safeguarded elections could ignore the “forced silence of communities in the face of the governance of armed groups in some regions of the country.”

The Ombudsman’s report categorized municipalities into five risk levels from lowest to highest intensity of identified violence, in order to guide authorities on security, protection, and the safeguarding of political rights.

Two hundred fifty-seven were classified at Ordinary Action Level, 216 at Permanent Monitoring Level, 425 at Priority Action Level, 162 at Urgent Action Level, and 62 at Immediate Action Level — the most critical stage. In the follow-up Report, although the number of municipalities at Permanent Monitoring Level decreased (195), there was an increase in municipalities that required Priority Action (433), Urgent Action (168), and Immediate Action (69).

Political violence has continued in the period since Uribe Turbay’s death. Earlier in February, Senator Jairo Castellanos’s armored vehicle was attacked at an ELN rebel checkpoint in the northeastern Arauca department, killing two of his bodyguards. A few days later, Indigenous Senator Aida Quilcué was temporarily kidnapped in an area of western Cauca where FARC dissidents are active.

Upon reviewing the Government’s response, the highest rate of implementation for the 11 recommendations is 65% and the lowest is 0%. Strengthening and support for political organizations was the least advanced recommendation, followed by inter-institutional coordination and joint action for rapid response.

According to the Report’s conclusions, insufficient implementation of ATE 013-25 led to weak institutional coordination, allowed illegal armed groups to maintain control, jeopardized victims’ political participation in Special Transitional Peace Electoral Districts (CITREP), and perpetuated impunity through ineffective justice mechanisms.

The Ombudsman issued six new recommendations and reinforced the previous ones, urging the Ministry of the Interior to lead the Intersectoral Commission for Rapid Response to Early Warnings (CIPRAT), align action plans, ensure measurable budgets, and eliminate overlapping measures that cause operational gaps.

On March 8, Colombians will head to the polls for legislative elections where they’ll vote for representatives to the national congress, senate as well as primary elections where political parties will choose presidential candidates to represent them in the first round of presidential voting on May 31.

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An express kidnapping highlights the risks of taking a taxi in Colombia’s capital. What happened, and how to avoid it happening to you.

Bogotá breathed a collective sigh of relief on Tuesday morning when news broke of the safe arrival home of Diana Ospina, a rola missing for almost 40 hours after being kidnapped by a taxi she had hailed in the street after a night out in Chapinero.

Ospina was the latest victim of El Paseo Millonario, the ‘millionaire ride’, where passengers riding in yellow public taxis are physically attacked and forced to hand over cash and valuables.

The technique varies, but victims are usually targeted late at night in busy streets in party zones outside restaurants or discotheques, then driven to a quiet spot where two accomplices of the driver climb in the back seat and threaten the passenger with knives, guns or syringes.

See also: Bogotá’s Murder Mosaic

The following ordeal can last minutes or hours or even days. Victims are intimidated with beatings or stab wounds, and hooded or blindfolded. Some are killed, as in the case of a university professor found dead on the outskirts of the city in January this year.

Foreigners are also targeted: in 2013, a DEA officer Terry Watson was stabbed to death in a Bogotá taxi after two assailants jumped in the back seat. Authorities later said the army veteran resisted the attack. Seven taxi drivers were later captured and extradited to the U.S. to face charges for his murder.

According to police data, during 2025 in Bogotá there were registered 37 cases of kidnapping for ransom or extortion, though these crimes are highly under-reported. This is because the same gangs threaten the victims to keep quiet, and in the case of taxi gangs, know where their targets live.

Publicity blitz

In the case of Ospina, her kidnap started early Sunday morning when she hailed a yellow taxi that took her to within one block of her home in Engativá, where two men from a following taxi climbed in the back, threatened her and took her blindfolded for a three-hour driver around the city while using her phone and bank cards.

The ordeal did not end there. Ospina was then passed on to another kidnap group operating in the south of the city and held in a house there while more extortion demands were made. Late on Monday night, after being captive for nearly 40 hours, Ospina was dropped off in the hills above Bogotá where she eventually walked to a police station for assistance.

According to information on FM radio, from contacts close to the family, the kidnap gang released her after the “feeling pressure from the media blitz” with social media platforms widely publicising her disappearance. Other news reports stated they released her only after draining 50 million pesos (US$15,000) from her bank accounts.

This week the authorities were still hunting the perpetrators, expecting arrests imminently.

Your world in your phone

The Ospina case highlights how smartphones have upped the risks for kidnap victims in Colombia.

Whereas in the past a paseo millonario was usually a short-term event – passengers held for an hour while the gang used their bankcards at an ATM – criminals nowadays are eyeing much bigger profits from emptying bank accounts held on smartphones.

The insistence by banks and other financial platforms to use biometric approvals such as face recognition or fingerprint scanning has created the need for gangs to keep their targets captive for many days, in some cases drugging them into compliance or subduing them through threats of violence.

See also: Bogotá Police take down gang drugging victims in Teusaquillo and Chapinero

The rise of the digital nomads in Colombia often with juicy crypto accounts accessed through their phones has also created opportunities for tech savvy criminals. After such attacks, platforms are reluctant to reimburse funds arguing that they were transferred with the biometric approval of the victim.

One thing is clear: apart from increased financial losses, the longer victims are held captive the worse their outcome, both in terms of physical and psychological damage, the risk of sexual violence, or death from an overdose of the powerful drugs such as burundanga administered by the gangs.

The Canaries

Bogotá has more than 55,000 public taxis circulating on any given day sometimes referred to as ‘Los Canarios’ (the canaries) after their yellow cars and a popular telenovela depicting taxi drivers. It is worth noting that taxi drivers are themselves frequently the victims of robbery, extortions and murder.

Yellow taxi companies in Bogotá are registered and controlled by the Secretería de Movilidad with each driver given a Tarjeta de Control, the plasticized card hanging down the seat back that – in theory – displays the name, details and photo of the driver as well as the fare scale, and is revalidated every month.

In Bogotá, passengers can independently check the status of registered drivers by entering the numberplate into the menu at SIMUR at  www.simur.gov.co/conductores-de-taxi.

But in a random test by The Bogotá Post, out of 10 taxis entered by number plate, only six had a registered driver. Four were reported “without an active registration”.

That lack of control is further weakened by the fact that registered taxistas often allow other drivers to take the wheel, said transport companies this week.

“We work on good faith, but we can’t guarantee that drivers don’t hand over their cars to other persons to commit crimes,” Maria  Botero, manager of Radiotaxis told Noticias Caracol.

In the case of Ospina, the taxis that abducted her were quickly identified along with their owners, but not the actual attackers. One car was not currently registered on SIMUR.

No dar papaya

How to avoid becoming a victim? A good tip is to use a ride platforms like Didi, Cabify, Uber or Indrive. Some like Didi are also linked to the yellow public taxis, but safer because the ride is traced. At times hailing a street taxi is the only option because app cars are far off, and you weigh the risks of standing on the street, or (as in the case of Diana Ospina) the app ride is suddenly cancelled.

Attacks are usually at night, on weekends, on persons leaving bars or restaurants. But passengers can be targeted in daytime, particularly in financial districts or leaving a bank. If you are riding the yellow taxis, here are some ways to no dar papaya, as they say in Bogotá (‘don’t be a sucker’).

Before going out:

• Carry a clean phone with no banking apps and limited personal data. Many people in Bogotá are now leaving their financial transactions on a second phone or tablet stored safely at home.
• Carry a wad of cash. Perhaps counterintuitively, in the digital world cash makes you less of a target. And it is easy to hand over.
• If you do carry a bank card, take just one linked to a low-balance account.

Getting the taxi:

• Travel in a group. Criminals generally target solo passengers.
• Check the taxi numberplate in SIMUR, see above. This takes seconds and confirms if there is a registered driver. If not, walk away.
• Take a photo of the taxi numberplate, send to friends or family. Ensure the driver sees you doing this.
• Before entering a taxi, look carefully to ensure there is no-one hidden inside.
• Check the Tarjeta de Control photo with the actual driver. Do this before setting off.
• Check doors can be locked and unlocked from the passenger seat.

During the trip:

• Lock doors on both sides.
• Share your real-time location with a family member or friend.

Signs of danger:

• The driver changes the route without explanation.
• The taxi turns onto dark or deserted streets.
• The driver suddenly stops to pick up other persons.
• Motorcycles or other cars or taxis closely follow the vehicle.

During an attack:

• Prioritize your physical safety.
• Give up any valuables without resistance.

If you suspect someone you know has been abducted by a taxi gang, call the GAULA special police unit (Grupos de Acción Unificada por la Libertad Personal) that deals with extortion and kidnapping, on Line 165.

“Safe taxi” zones

Even with these precautions, street taxis are still a risk, and a growing one according to Bogotá security authorities who during 2025 arrested at least 20 persons from several different Paseo Millonario gangs such as La 57 and La Zona T.

A recent advance by the city has been the recognition of the crime as “kidnap with extortion”, with up to 40 years in jail for perpetrators.

Another nitiative announced by the Secretaría de Seguridad this week was taxi seguro zones where uniformed teams patrol outside nightspots and assist revellers to take only registered taxis.

But while mediatic, such initiatives are likely to have only limited impact. Taxi gangs are generally compact, with three people, and mobile so they can cruise new zones. And new gangs seem to pop up as quickly as old ones are taken down.

So while the city can celebrate the safe return of Diana Ospina, and hopefully soon see her attackers rounded up, there will be plenty more candidates for the Millionaire Ride.  

The post Paseo Millionario: don’t be taken for a ride appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

Student leaders declare ‘indefinite strike’ at Bogotá’s sprawling Universidad Nacional as controversial rector reappointed.  

In another twist in the saga of who runs the ‘Nacho’, Colombia’s largest public university, controversial candidate Ismael Peña was formally inducted as rector last week ending a two-year legal wrangle.

Peña was sworn in during a small private ceremony on Thursday just days after a Bogotá tribunal ordered his reinstatement in the job. This followed the resignation last November of another rector whose possession was ruled illegitimate by Colombia’s state council.

Read more: Court Ruling Expected to Spark Trouble at the National University.

The initial controversy was sparked in 2024 in the highly politicized campus when a popular candidate, Leopoldo Múnera, lost out to Peña in the last voting round by the university council.

#BOGOTÁ | Este es el panorama a esta hora (6:53 p.m.) en la calle 26 a la altura de la Universidad Nacional.

Los servicios troncales que transitan realizan retornos en Corferias y Concejo de Bogotá.

Los vehículos particulares no pueden circular en sentido Oriente-Occidente.… pic.twitter.com/WWfyIrqwXi

— ÚltimaHoraCaracol (@UltimaHoraCR) February 19, 2026

The ensuing strikes and protests galvanized the university for four months setting back the academic agenda and creating an exhausting three-term year in 2025, from which students and professors are only just recovering.

Protests and vandalism spilled over onto major nearby transport routes around the Bogotá campus. In Bogotá, the Nacho sits in the corner of the busy Avenida NQS and Avenida El Dorado, two of the most vital throughfares for both public and private transport.

Return of Torres

Even as news of Peña’s legal victory and imminent reinstatement was announced last week, students and supporters quickly blocked the Avenida El Dorado forcing Transmilenio buses to suspend operations and thousands of commuters to make their way on foot.

Student assemblies at the university’s two main campuses, Bogotá and Medellin, called for “indefinite strikes” to protest Peña reinstatement.

To add to the confusion, the Bogotá campus was also invaded by a large group of campesinos from Cauca whose later protests detained workers in government buildings, part of a plan to draw attention to conflict-related problems in their department.

On Friday, when The Bogotá Post visited the university, most of the faculties were closed but the campus was filled with students busy painting fresh murals to celebrate the return of the remains to the campus of Camilo Torres, a revolutionary priest and founder of the university Sociology Department, who joined the ELN guerrillas and was killed in action against the army in 1966.

See also: Remains of Rebel Priest Set to Return to Bogotá.

Many students gave their views on the return of Peña but  declined to be fully identified.

Roberto, a sociology student selling food in the campus, said he supported the strike to “preserve the autonomy of the university”. Peña was seen as an unpopular candidate “linked to private interests that will privatize the curriculum and syphon off profits”, he said.

Corporate spinoffs

Similar sentiments were expressed across the campus: that Peña was being parachuted in with the backing of the Centro Democratic party to advance both a right-wing agenda and disburse lucrative contracts to a select group of private companies.

According to an investigation by magazine La Raya last year, Peña was the continuity candidate for “a parallel administration system” embedded in a company called Rotorr that dished out deals on behalf of the university, but bypassed internal auditing procedures leaving an opaque tangle of beneficiaries.

During his rectorship Múnera described these corporate spinoffs as engaging in “crimes against the university” and flagged them to the judicial authorities, but so far with no clear resolution.

Despite these controversies, Peña’s return was boosted by support from the Consejo Superior Universitario, the highest decision-making body of public universities in Colombia, that unanimously agreed to respect the tribunal ruling, clearing any final legal hurdles.

Strike Down

In another unexpected outcome, an online poll of students revealed that a majority were against the suspension of classes.

 The initial strike call came after a hastily convened student assembly on the Bogotá campus where some student representatives later complained that their voices were not heard.

“There was one classmate, he raised his hand and they wouldn’t let him speak. So, the next day we decided to conduct a survey to ask the students if they agreed with the strike,” student representative Kevin Arriguí told City TV.

The results, based on a total of 5,438 respondents, showed that 56 per cent (3,060 students) disagreed with the strike, while only 36 per cent (2,141 students) supported it. There were 237 undecideds.

Tellingly, the online strike survey had a higher participation among students than last year’s vote to install a Constituyente Universitaria – a people’s body – that is now in place.

Some students consulted on the campus by The Bogotá Post last week were mindful of the outcome of the 2024 strike which lasted several months and created hardships, particularly for poor students from rural areas who had spent money to travel to the capital to study, only to face severe interruptions to their curriculums and the risk of having to study another year to gain their degrees.

“We don’t want Peña. People are angry. But we don’t want to stop the term either,” said Carla, a student outside the newly constructed 70,000-million-peso arts faculty building.

Fragile mobility

Finding a compromise could be problematic. Activists on the campus were pressuring undergraduates to not attend classes and most lessons were abandoned. Some professors offered their classes on-line.

The student assembly planned this week at the Bogotá site could reverse the strike plans, though this seems unlikely. The general mood among students on the campus was that they would “block Peña, whatever it takes”.

Such talk is common at a university that is a petri dish for the national condition and at times – literally – a battleground for political divisions, particularly in a city nominated as the country’s “protest capital”.

This was revealed by data published in an El Espectador op-ed this week which showed Bogotá had 1,678 mass mobilization recorded during 2025, roughly 32 per week, and an increase of 17 per cent on the previous year.

While celebrating this increase as a “symptom of democracy”, it also pointed out that these protests “affected public order and the fragile mobility of millions of Bogotanos”.  

 That included two million people using the Transmilenio each day, with a majority of these on lines passing close to the Universidad Nacional. Easy targets for agitators based on the campus.

Which is why trouble at the Nacho generally means headaches for the whole city.

The post More trouble at Bogotá’s Universidad Nacional? appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

We analyse recent homicide figures in Colombia’s capital.

Last month we looked at the latest homicide data for the city: in 2025 violent deaths went down 3.4% on the previous year. These 1,165 killings gave Bogotá – with a population of around 8 million – a homicide rate of 14.8 deaths per 100,000 of the population.

This month we look deeper into this statistic.  Why homicides? Though an imperfect indicator, murder rates do give an insight into insecurity in a zone as they are often the extreme outcome of robberies gone wrong, gang feuds, political violence, domestic violence, fights, targeted killings, drugging of victims and bungled kidnappings. Put simply, the number of bodies means the amount of crime.  

Crime patchwork

Where are homicides happening? In our own analysis of Bogotá’s 20 districts (see map below) the gritty downtown area of Sant Fe has the highest rate of 54 killings per 100,000 inhabitants, followed by nearby Los Martíres with 47, and Ciudad Bolívar with 33.

Sant Fe, like many Bogotá districts, is a patchwork of agreeable barrios, such as the touristy Las Aguas for example, and historic La Candelaria (with just three homicides last year) juxtaposed with crime-ridden neighborhoods.

But in the southwest corner of Santa Fe lies San Bernardo, or ‘Samber’ as it is known locally, generally recognized as the most dangerous barrio in Bogotá, a hub for gangs selling drugs to street people and the scene of several fatal grenade attacks in 2025.

Santa Fe is a reminder that in Bogotá safer streets are often just a block away from no-go zones. Rolos and long-term residentslearn to navigate these invisible barriers.

To emphasize this point, Santa Fe, statistically the most dangerous district in the city, lies adjacent to the leafy district of Teusaquillo with a homicide rate of 5 per 100,000 in 2025 (amounting to nine deaths), which according to this metric makes it the safest district in Bogotá.

Less grim up north

Other districts registering less than 10 killings per 100,000 in 2025 are the more upmarket northern districts of the city: Chapinero, Usaquén, Suba, Fontibón and Engativá. And as in most years, there is a gradient towards safer barrios in the north, with the dividing line running roughly along the Avenida El Dorado (Av Calle 26).

But in terms of reducing crime, there are success stories in the south. While still the most dangerous district, Santa Fe has reduced its homicide rate by 28 per cent in 2025 alongside Bosa, Usme and Antonio Nariño, all with reductions in double digits.

These results are hard to assess; organized criminal gangs are present in all these areas, so the peace could be transitory and a result of rival gangs declaring a truce, or one gang leveraging control, rather than societal shifts or better policing.

In some cases, large-scale operations have had an impact, combing security and social services in a carrot and stick approach called megatomas. In Santa Fe, for example, following the grenade attacks, the Bogotá administration both militarized the barrio and flooded it with development programs to support the huge homeless population there. This approach seems to have worked, at least temporarily.

On the negative side, three central districts (Puente Aranda, San Cristóbal and Rafael Uribe Uribe) have seen a spike in killings, a reminder of the balloon effect; pushing down on crime in one zone just forces it to pop up somewhere else.

Sicario scenarios

What’s behind the killings? Police databases do not reveal motives, but media coverage and occasional analyses by Bogotá’s Secretaría de Seguridad give insights into the city’s mean streets. 

Targeted killings, usually carried out by paid hitmen (sicarios), are for the city the visible tip of an underworld iceberg of organized crime. Hits are carried out often on the street or public spaces against identified victims by professional gunslingers sometimes recruited specifically for the job with promises of cash.

Clear-up rates are low: in June last year city councilors complained that in the first half of 2025 out of 521 homicides, 156 were targeted hits, for which only 16 people had been arrested. “In other words, 90 per cent of assassinations on Bogotá go unpunished,” pointed out councilor Julián Espinosa in one debate.

This was despite the city police’s vaunted Plan Candado – Padlock Strategy – of mobile rapid response teams and drones to quickly catch perpetrators by locking down zones within minutes of a major crime.

The most high-profile killing was the gunning down of senator and presidential candidate Miguel Uribe, shot in the head during a walkabout in a Bogotá park. The police quickly apprehended the small-time gangsters behind the shooting in June 2025, including the 15-year-old shooter, but today despite nine arrests are no closer to revealing the paymasters behind the hit.

Another unsolved assassination was the targeted killing of emerald czar Hernando Sánchez, shot dead while walking with his family in a leafy northern suburb of Usaquén in April last year. The military-style killing, by a sniper hiding in nearby woodlands, was identical to the mysterious murder nine months before of a fellow emerald baron, known as Pedro Pechuga, also unresolved.

Weapons of choice

Despite Colombia having restrictions for private ownership of firearms, the majority of 2025 killings were with guns, at 703, according to the police database. Other weapons recorded were knives (304), blunt objects (84) and grenades (6).

This pattern has persisted for decades; Colombia, and its capital, are flooded with illegal firearms, many of them from the estimated 600,000 guns smuggled south across the border from the U.S. each year.  Just in the first four months of 2025, police confiscated 8,466 illegal weapons across the country

According to Carolina Ortega, a political scientist at the National University, and quoted by  UPI, illegal guns were used in 78 per cent of killings in Colombia.

Easy access to guns also raised the risk of spontaneous killings, according to data from the Secretaria de Seguridad which showed that40 per cent of Bogotá homicides followed a dispute, argument or scuffle.

Most of these happened outside on the street, late in the evening, and “amidst scenes of revelry and excessive alcohol consumption”, said the report, released as part of a media campaign called “Take a second before you shoot…”.

Violent machismo

Femicides went down on 2025, both in Bogotá and at national level, according to data released this week by the Observatorio de Mujeres y Equidad de Género de Bogotá.

In Bogotá during 2025 there were 97 females killed, around 8% of total violent deaths. Of these, 20 were classified as femicides. This was slightly less than in 2024 (22 deaths) and mirrored a similar reduction (7%) nationally. Nationally, approximately one killing in five of a female was later classified as a femicide, the “violent expression of machismo”, said the study.  

A study by Bogotá’s Secretaria de la Mujer found that in 49 per cent of cases in the capital, the women had suffered physical violence in the weeks before the murder, and 40 per cent had previously sought help from the police.

According to observatory data, last year Secretaria staff supported 142,688 women, of which 48% were facing violence, a slight reduction on the previous years. The 2025 figures were a reminder that although more warning signs were being detected, timely intervention was not always possible, said the report.

“Femicide does not arise from nothing: it is foreshadowed, repeated, and often normalized before reaching its most tragic outcome,” it concluded.

Pay up – or pay the price

In 2025 many Bogotá murders were linked to extortion demands, with gangs ruthlessly gunning down small business owners if they failed to pay protection money. Sometimes shop staff or a passerby were also killed or injured, in some case with grenades or explosives.

Protection rackets are nothing new in the city, but cases and killings skyrocketed post-pandemic partly because of turf wars between gangs diversifying from the drug trade and Venezuelan gangs linked to the transnational group Tren de Aragua with names like Las Satanás and Los Coyotes.

Extortion reached epidemic proportions in 2024, with an average of 200 cases a month, and continued into 2025 with a rash of crimes such as the killings of informal minibus drivers in the south of Bogotá.

Overall, Bogotá in 2025 saw extortion go down by 20 per cent compared to 2024, though it was still higher than any year during the previous decade. And already in the first month of 2026 there have been several murders linked to extortion demands including a grenade attack on a nightclub in Los Mártires last week which killed one and injured a dozen more.

Millionaire’s ride

Another death last week, that of a university professor found dead and incinerated on the outskirts of the city, highlighted increased cases of Bogotá’s infamous Paseo Millonario, where armed gangs working with taxi drivers attack and extort passengers, often torturing them to reveal bank details while they empty their accounts.

Victims are often targeted late at night leaving bars or restaurants. In a chilling twist, recent cases pointed to victims being subdued with ketamine, with the drug either killing or severely incapacitating the victim.

According to data from the GAULA (Anti-Kidnapping and Extortion Group), 40 Paseo Millonario cases were reported in 2025, a rise of 207 per cent on the previous year. Even that figure was thought to be a huge underestimate since many victims were too scared to come forward. Hotspots were in Chapinero, Kennedy, Bosa, Ciudad Bolívar, and Fontibón.

In one case a taxi gang held a victim for 19 hours, prompting the Attorney General’s Office to reclassify such crimes as “kidnapping” with a potential 42-year prison sentence. In theory this prompted the police to start responding more robustly to a crime that has plagued Bogotá for decades.

Perpetrators of these high-impact crimes were also more likely now to get locked up, with 47 imprisoned last year out of the 52 captured, which was way above average jailing rate of 6 percent of criminals arrested, according to Bogotá police chief Giovanni Cristancho, talking to RCN News last week.

But he also admitted that the understaffed police force was struggling to keep up with constantly emerging kidnap gangs, usually small teams of four or five people which could easily move around the city.

“As soon as we reinforce one area, such as around Calle 85, the modus operandi shifts to other zones,” he told RCN.

It’s that randomness, and the risk of being drugged – or worse – that makes the Paseo Millonario one of the most feared crimes in Bogotá. And for 2026, the one to watch.

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Bogotá, Colombia – 15 people were killed in a place crash in eastern Colombia on Wednesday morning, including a lower house lawmaker and a political candidate.

The aircraft, operated by government airline Satena, was flying from Cúcuta to Ocaña, two cities in the North Santander department in eastern Colombia, when it disappeared from radar roughly eleven minutes before landing.

After an initial search and rescue effort, authorities were alerted to the wreckage site by local farmers.

“The national government, through the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation Authority, confirm with deep pain the deaths of the people who were on board the HK-4709 plane from Cúcuta to Ocaña,” read a government statement on Wednesday afternoon.

The confirmation came some five hours after the plane left radar coverage; it was due to land at 12:05PM but last made contact with air traffic control at 11:54AM.

On board the plane was Diogenes Quintero, who holds a “peace seat” in the Congress, reserved for victims of the armed conflict. Also on the flight was ​​Carlos Salcedo Salazar, a candidate for the same seat in upcoming elections.

The cause of the plane’s disappearance is unclear, but local authorities have pointed to adverse weather conditions. However, investigations remain ongoing.

The route from Cúcuta to Ocaña was inaugurated last year and welcomed as a symbolic step forward in conflict-struck Catatumbo, long disconnected by air from major cities.

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ELN guerrillas have announced the recovery of iconic revolutionary Camilo Torres. They now want his body returned to Bogotá’s National University.

Colombia’s largest rebel army, the ELN – at war with the state since 1964 – have alerted the world to the likely discovery of the long-lost remains of Camilo Torres.

The fighting priest, killed in combat with the army 60 years ago, has been found by government forensic teams in the department of Santander, the ELN said in a press statement this week.

The ELN leaked the news before the Unidad de Búsqueda de Personas Dadas por Desaparecidas (UBPD) could finalize technical tests, but it was widely expected that the search is now ended for the respected cura and university professor who became a revolutionary martyr.

The ELN said they hoped his remains “would be respected and returned to the Bogotá campus of the National University”.

In the early 1960s, the young Torres was a chaplain, professor and founder of the faculty of sociology at the tempestuous Universidad Nacional. Today, the charismatic priest still figures strongly in campus iconography with his image and quotes decorating many walls.

From priest to combatant

An exponent of liberation theology – a strand of Catholicism calling for social justice in an era of extreme poverty in Latin American – Torres took to the hills in 1965 with the ELN, then a fledgling guerrilla group aligning itself with Marxist ideology.

Calling himself Argemiro, the priest quickly became an influential link between the rebels and the church, respected across the political spectrum, and a spiritual influence on socialist movements across the continent.

His most famous quote, still echoing through liberation theology, was: “If Jesus were alive today, he would be a guerrillero”.

A photo of Torres appeared in a flyer printed by the ELN in January 1966, with the academic pictured in uniform clutching a rifle alongside the words: “From the mountains of Colombia, I intend to continue the fight, weapons in hand, until I achieve power for the people. Not one step back! Liberation or death!”.

Friends divided

The latter came quicker than expected. Torres was killed in combat aged 37 on February 15, 1966, in his first action against state forces. The firefight took place in the rugged terrain around El Carmen de Chucurí, Santander.

Ironically, the army operation that killed Torres was led by General Álvaro Valencia Tovar, a childhood friend of the rebel priest. In an old article on Las 2 Orillas, the general described the pair’s friendship over many years, even while taking separate political paths; a potent reminder of personal ties tested by Colombia’s civil conflict.

According to Valencia Tovar, the ELN had prepared a deadly ambush in a jungle gorge with 35 fighters – including Torres – lying in wait for an army patrol. But the soldiers, even while taking heavy fire, outflanked the guerrillas and killed five of the ELN fighters. Torres was among the dead.

Thereafter the story was muddled: according to Valencia Tovar, the general himself took Torres’ remains to a military pantheon close to Bucaramanga, the regional capital of Santander, perhaps a form of honour for his former friend. But the exact location was never disclosed, a bone of contention with the guerrilla group who wanted to mourn their martyr.

In another historical twist, years later a video emerged of a young Juan Manual Santos – the future centre-right president of Colombia – declaring he was an “acolyte” of Torres, who was in fact his uncle.

In 2016, the then president Santos, perhaps as a gesture towards his own deceased uncle, but also as a signg of good faith during a peace process with the ELN, promised a state search for the remains of his fallen uncle. That peace process failed, like many others.

Playing for time

Over 70 years of conflict the Ejército de Liberación Nacional has proved hard to pin down: the on-off negotiations with the current Petro government mark the seventh cycle of peace talks spanning seven presidential terms since 1992, with the guerrillas still fighting.

Today, many observers see these negotiation cycles as cynical ploys by the Marxist-Leninist rebels to hold off military pressure while expanding their own territory and illicit activities, which today extends to cocaine production, illegal gold mining, extortion, kidnapping and human trafficking.

According to a profile by thinktank InsightCrime, in the last 20 years the ELN have become increasingly active in neighbouring Venezuela where they act as a mercenary army for the Chavista regime with a strong role on controlling the borders.

That dynamic shifted after the U.S. military operation in early January in Venezuela to detain autocratic leader Nicólas Maduro.

Now less welcome in Venezuela, and facing an increasingly hostile Petro government, even while entangled in a turf war with dissident FARC groups in northeast Colombia, the ELN fighters are feeling the pressure.

Blood and fire

On January 12 this year, the ELN proposed another bite at the peace apple with a new ‘national accord’. This though was quickly rejected by President Petro, who wrote on X that the guerrillas had to renounce their illicit activities – primarily gold and cocaine – before coming to the table.

During the first three years of his term, Petro suffered several perfidies by the ELN such as their surprise attacks on rival groups in the coca enclave of Catatumbo last year that left hundreds dead and thousands displaced.

Responding to the ELN offer Petro, said he had “already offered an agreement, but they destroyed it with blood and fire, and by killing humble peasants”.

It is likely the Colombian president is now holding off until after his meeting with the Trump administration in Washington scheduled for February 3.  Any reconciliation between Petro and the U.S. president – their relationship has been rocky – could open the door for increased military support to combat the ELN, designated as a terrorist organization by the U.S. State Department since 1997.

Colombia’s ‘Che‘

Such a deal, combined with changes in Venezuela, could tilt the conflict in favour of Colombian state forces. And while still a potent fighting force, the ELN could prefer an escape route via the negotiation table in 2026 if talks open up with Petro or his successor.

With that in mind, it is probable that finding of Camilo Torres – miraculously close to the 60th anniversary of his death – is no coincidence, but rather a strategy in the poker game between state and guerrillas.

The wait now is for final confirmation of the remains by the UBPD.  Meanwhile the search unit is keeping mum on how, where, and when the body was found.

And if the ELN are claiming Torres as their own, then so is Petro: “The body of Father Camilo Torres Restrepo will be respected and laid to rest with honours,” he said on X this week, painting the priest as a national hero.

Perhaps putting him in the spotlight is a nod to Petro’s own rebel credentials as a former member of M-19 guerrilla group. And Torres is a timely reminder of how the ELN rebels – recently accused of human slavery in illicit mining camps  – are far removed from their ideological roots.

Where both sides agree is that his final resting place should be the National University campus in Bogotá. That´s a start. Sixty years after his death the fighting priest, seen by some as Colombia’s Che Guevara, could have a new role in bringing peace.

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The US carried out limited airstrikes in Venezuela this morning and claim to have captured Nicolás Maduro. Colombia has reacted with strong condemnation.

Colombia this morning woke to the news that US forces had attacked the neighbouring capital Caracas. President Donald Trump claimed via Truth Social that Maduro had been captured and extricated from the country, with the airstrikes necessary for that operation to take place.

It later emerged that the attack and capture was an arrest. The US has confirmed Maduro’s indictment in New York and that he will stand trial for narcotrafficking and potentially other offences. This dates back to 2020, although it was not widely known that Maduro’s wife Cilia, captured with him, had also been part of that case.

What is Colombia’s position?

Unsurprisingly, President Gustavo Petro is firmly against US action in general and particularly in the neighbouring country. In the short term he has sent troops to the border in preparation for a possible surge in refugees. Interestingly, it seems that the Colombian government may have had advance warning, as his security meeting started at 3AM.

Acabamos de terminar consejo de seguridad nacional desde las 3 am.

Se despliega la fuerza pública en la frontera, se despliega toda la fuerza asistencial que dispongamos en caso de entrada masiva de refugiados.

La embajada de Colombia en Venezuela está activa a llamadas de…

— Gustavo Petro (@petrogustavo) January 3, 2026

Petro rejects all US actions that violates the sovereignty of Venezuela and Latin America. He has said already that he will use his position on the UN security council to discuss this matter and search for a solution. In this, he will find support domestically and internationally.

For many in Colombia, and indeed Latin America in general, this brings memories of US interventionism during the Cold War. From helping to topple Allende in Chile, supporting dictatorships across the Southern Cone and the Sandinista affair, there is a long history of meddling in regional politics.

Equally, there is no love for Nicolás Maduro in Colombia. That is shared across the political spectrum for different reasons and comes through solidarity with the Venezuelan people, a dislike of the immigration wave he caused or a fierce disagreement with leftwing politicians in general.

However little sympathy there is for Maduro, that does not equate to support for direct military action from the US in foreign territory. Many Colombians have fears that similar might happen to their country. While that seems unlikely, Donald Trump is at best unpredictable and few would have seen today’s actions coming a year ago.

Colombia is also likely to have strained relations with the incoming administration in Caracas. Petro and many on his side are no fans of Machado, who they see as a classic representative of the Latin rightwing oligarchy.

Petro will be wary of supporting the notion that presidents can be toppled in this manner and regime change forced upon a nation by foreign forces. At the least, he will call for free and fair elections to be held sooner rather than later.

Relations with the USA have significantly deteriorated, for obvious reasons, but Colombia is very much with international feeling on this one, with Trump the pariah. A number of world leaders have issued statements decrying and condemning the US actions. Only Machado, Netanyahu and Argentina’s Milei have departed from the consensus, unsurpisingly.

ELN held a short-lived paro armado in December warning against foreign interference in the region, so it’s entirely likely that they might announce similar measures in the next few weeks. It’s unclear how or if groups such as the gaitanistas may react, given that they were recently declared terrorist organisations by the US State department.

What happens next?

For Colombia, the three biggest fears for the future are the probability of refugees fleeing across the border; the possibility that similar will happen here; the effects on this year’s election. This might have been a relatively quick operation, but its effects will linger for months at bare minimum and likely years.

Venezuela itself will have to work out who is going to replace Maduro in the presidential Palacio Miraflores. That could well be recent Nobel Peace Prize winner María Corina Machado, or could be a general stepping up to lead an interim government while elections are organised.

It could even be a continuation government, refusing to give in after the loss of Maduro and daring further strikes. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has ruled out further actions for the time being now that Maduro has been captured.

The likelihood of large scale US actions within Colombian territory is very low, despite Trump’s rhetoric that Petro might be next in line. The country has just assumed a position on the UN security council and is a member of NATO. Having said all that, focused operations targeting terrorists are certainly possible and Trump is often hard to predict.

Even smaller, focused operations would be incredibly controversial within Colombia and Petro would be pushed to respond strongly, not only by his own supporters. However, his options are relatively limited. He does not have the firepower to make serious counterattacks and is unlikely to want to do so outside of Colombian territory, for example against carriers in international waters.

Any operation involving boots on the ground within Colombia would be a very different story and the military would be more or less forced to intervene. That would push tensions to boiling point with the White House.

Venezuelan immigrants to Colombia already number around two million or more and this action is likely to see increased travel across the borders. Colombia has sent troops to the border in order to attempt to maintain order. Cities such as Cúcuta in Norte de Santander and Riohacha in La Guajira are already under strain and will struggle to absorb further numbers.

It is entirely possible that serious criminal elements and/or government or armed fores members will try to cross within the chaos, putting added pressure on the Colombian government. They may be destabilising elements and there may be pressure from the US not to harbour who they see as essentially international criminals.

For the upcoming election, candidates are already in a difficult position on this topic and things are likely to get harder. Rightwingers have spent years railing against the Venezuelan regime, but will be aware that most Colombians oppose this action.

The added complication is the possibility of Trump supporting one side or another, even making remarks like he did before the Guatemalan election or even offering financial support as he did in the Argentinian elections.

That will be tricky – being on Trump’s side will alienate enough voters to make victory unachievable, yet coming into office in conflict with the leader of the USA will make governing difficult. Candidates have a fine line to walk in terms of balancing electoral rhetoric with diplomacy.

Then there’s the question of who is in the Palacio Miraflores in Caracas. Hard leftwingers will start off on a bad footing with a Machado government or similar, whereas rightwingers will chime with her politically. If there is a sort of continuity, expect the opposite.

Given the surprise, if not shock, of this morning’s actions, it is hard to predict exactly what will happen next, other than there will be short term chaos at least. Trump, of course, thrives on chaos and has a gift for navigating uncertain times. He described this as a “brilliant operation” but few in the region will be in agreement. After all, he is not the one who has to live with the consequences.

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The United States has captured Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro, along with his wife Cilia Flores, after a series of targeted military strikes on Caracas at 1:30 am on Saturday, January 3, 2026.

In a statement posted on his Truth Social platform, U.S President Donald J. Trump said U.S. forces, working with U.S. law enforcement, conducted a “large scale strike” that resulted in the capture of Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores. Trump said both were flown out of Venezuela, without providing details on where they were taken or the legal basis for their detention.

“The United States of America has successfully carried out a large scale strike against Venezuela and its leader, President Nicolas Maduro,” Trump said, adding that more information would be released at a news conference scheduled for 11 a.m. ET at his Mar-a-Lago residence in Florida.

Explosions were reported across parts of Caracas in the early hours of Saturday, according to witnesses and videos posted on social media, which showed flashes in the sky, fires and power outages in several areas of the capital. One of the main targets appeared to be Fuerte Tiuna, the country’s largest military base and a key command center for Venezuela’s Bolivarian Armed Forces.

The extent of damage and possible casualties could not be independently verified. Venezuelan authorities did not immediately confirm whether senior military officials, including Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino, were injured or killed in the strikes.

In Washington, Republican lawmakers were quick to praise President Trump’s decisive action. Representative Mario Díaz-Balart praised the operation, saying it demonstrated decisive leadership against what he described as an illegitimate regime that posed a threat to U.S. and regional security. Other lawmakers raised questions about the legality of the strikes and whether Congress had authorized the use of force.

In Colombia, Medellín Mayor Federico Gutiérrez expressed support for Venezuelans living abroad, saying millions had fled repression and economic collapse under Maduro’s rule. Venezuelan migrants make up a significant share of Medellín’s population, local authorities say.

It remains unclear how Venezuela’s armed forces will respond or whether Maduro’s removal will lead to a peaceful transition of power with the return of President-elect Edmundo González and opposition leader Maria Corina Machado, both currently out of the country.

Developing News Story….

An extraordinary leap of 23.78% in the Colombian minimum salary per month brings it to a symbolic COP$2,000,000

An unprecedented hike in the Colombian minimum salary for 2026 was announced on Monday 29 December, bringing the rate to two million pesos per month. That represents an increase of 23.78% on the 2025 number. That’s the biggest jump ever – only 1997 comes close in recent years with 21.02%.

The minimum salary itself (SMMLV or Salario Mínimo Mensual Legal Vigente) has gone up to COP$1,750,905. There is also a transport subsidy (COP$249,095) which brings the effective minimum salary in Colombia for 2026 to two million on the nose.

Business leaders had suggested a rise of around 7.21%, keeping it above annual inflation (5.3% as of November), while trade unions and syndicates had called for an optimistic 16%. Both were left in the dust by Petro’s extraordinary decision.

The extraordinary rise is not due directly to inflation, nor to the rising cost of living, but represents a fundamental change in the rationale behind the number. Colombian president Gustavo Petro explained that the minimum salary should be considered a household income, not individual. He calls this salario vital, or salario digno.

Whether the household basis for the minimum salary holds up to scrutiny is hard to say. It certainly was the case, but like most other middle-income countries Colombia is rapidly changing. The idea of a single income supporting a family is less true every year, with Colombian households under 3.5 people on average and with 1.5 workers. That means a true dependency ratio of nearly one to one.

It was calculated by working around the price of a basket of goods for the average family (canasta básica), logged at nearly 3 million pesos for four people. Using that number of 1.5 workers gave the convenient round number of two million.

The minimum salary (not including the transport subsidy) is the baseline number that in turn influences a whole lot of other values in Colombia, such as fines and public salaries which are counted as multiples of the SMMLV. That includes, happily for Congress, politicians’ pay.

What does the increase in the Colombian minimum salary mean for the economy?

Far harder to work out is the long term impact of this rise in the Colombian minimum salary. Petro claims it will further stoke private spending in the country as the increased wages percolate throughout the economy and allow continued growth.

https://twitter.com/MintrabajoCol/status/2005795577548923288

It will increase labour costs for a number of businesses, especially small companies, some of which will struggle to keep their heads above water with such a sudden rise in payroll. For medium and larger size businesses, this includes mandatory SENA apprentices.

Note that payroll costs for employers will increase by more than the 23.78% headline figure, as they have to make social security payments based on an employee’s wage as well as the wage itself.

Massive firms who are liquid enough to be able to absorb costs will likely be absolutely fine, even if there are a couple of high-profile exceptions. Companies that are dodging the system, either through informal working or false self-employment, will also likely thrive.

Of course, the new reforma laboral promises to regularise and/or eliminate such practices. On paper, that is. In reality, these are the potential counterintuitive effects that could be the legacy of this increase in the Colombian minimum salary.

Colombia saw a sharp downtick in the number of employees on minimum salary this year, while informal work and self-employment has risen to around 55% of the workforce. This trend could continue much more rapidly with companies unwilling to pay the high new Colombian minimum salary.

A further issue is how close the minimum salary is now to the average. This will particularly affect smaller businesses and recent graduates. The former will find it hard to offer salaries that are significantly above minimum to attract quality employees, while the latter will find themselves often close to minimum salary and waiting longer for a return on their studies.

It is worth remembering that both minimum salaries themselves and increases to them are often bitterly opposed the world over and predictions of chaos are frequently sown. In most cases there is short term turbulence followed by long term stability. 

Is this a political power play?

Despite Petro’s official line about household incomes, many will see this as a nakedly political move ahead of next year’s elections. It certainly will play well among the Colombia Humana base and potential voters as a reason to keep faith with the left and cast their vote accordingly next year. 

A more charitable view would be to say that it’s one of the last significant acts that Petro can take before leaving office, so he’s gone big to deliver an achievement. Those have been in short supply over his time in the Palacio Nariño.

What’s undoubtable is that this creates a massive headache for next year. Regardless of who takes power, they won’t be expected to deliver quite such a large rise. However, they will have to be careful how far they go below it.

Any successor to Petro will at least be able to say their allies prepared the ground and maybe get away with a modest increase. An incoming fiscal conservative will be under pressure to deliver another big increase against their natural instincts and take heat for not doing so, while actually cutting the rate would be close to political suicide.

While a lot of candidates in the 2026 election might say that this was a fiscally imprudent move, they will have to be careful how far they push it. Many in Colombia will agree with them, but those same people are also likely benefiting from the increase. 

There are also the optics of a rich politician arguing against the very many voters who are on minimum wage or even those who aspire to earn minimum wage. It’s not a good look to argue against giving stuff to the people whose vote you want.

Short term gains, but long term problems?

So in the end this is a huge play from Petro, which has won him a useful political victory for today. It backs up his rhetoric, as he can easily claim he’s acting on behalf of the workers. There’s plenty of truth in that, as many Colombians work on minimum wage.

It may be a bribe to the electorate, but many will claim that no one else has at least offered them anything like this ever before, so good on him. Going into the 2026 election candidates on Petro’s side will be able to point to this achievement, while opposition candidates face pressure to offer at least something similar or be painted as rich folk denying the poor.

It’s hard to see a short term in which we won’t see a lot of businesses go bankrupt. The longer term is harder to read, as most companies will be unhappy but able to keep going. The effect on public salaries is potentially alarming with the state already running a deficit, unable to achieve fiscal reform and still expanding.

Ironically, it’s entirely possible that the increase in the Colombian minimum salary for 2026 might lead to more informality and less dynamism in the economy. However, it’s also completely believable that the economy is resilient enough to handle it with ease. This may be Petro’s biggest gamble yet and even he doesn’t know how it’ll play out. 

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Electronic jamming and missiles are two of the risks identified by US regulators.

Major airlines cancelled flights from Bogotá to Caracas this week after US regulators warned of “heightened military activity” around Venezuela.

Avianca and LATAM suspended flights through Venezuelan airspace, along with at least five other airlines, as a response to a Federal Aviation Authority NOTAM (Notice to Airmen) that reported “Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) interference” around Maiquetía “Simón Bolívar” International Airport, which serves nearby Caracas.

The warnings were linked to military exercises under way in Venezuela, a response to threats from US forces massing in the Caribbean and aerial attacks on suspect drug boats, some originating from Venezuelan waters.

Colombia’s own airline regulator, Aeronáutica Civil de Colombia, repeated the FAA’s warning but said that air operators in Colombia could take “autonomous decisions” over flights to Venezuela.

On Monday several airlines were continuing direct flights from Bogotá, such as Wingo, Avior (a Venezuelan airline) and Satena (a commercial airline linked to the Colombian Ministry of Defense). Copa offered connections via Panama.

Mobile missiles

The list of airlines suspending flights continued to grow on Monday night with TAP, Turkish Airlines, Iberia and GOL being joined by Air Europa and Plus Ultra.

This came despite pushback from Venezuela’s Instituto Nacional de Aeronáutica Civil (INAC) which threatened to punish airlines for following the FAA’s recommendations.  According to a report in Aviation Online, airlines avoiding Caracas could in the long term lose access to the country’s airspace.

INAC also issued an ultimatum for airlines suspending flights “to resume services within a 48-hour period” or risk losing their landing permits.

Meanwhile the US FAA issued a more detailed FAA backgrounder clarifying that Venezuela had “at no point expressed an intent to target civil aviation”.

It did, however, seem concerned that the current context could trigger an air accident.

Venezuela, it said, had mobilized “thousands of military and reserve forces” with access to shoulder-mounted anti-aircraft missiles, or MANPADs (man-portable air defense systems), capable of downing low-altitude aircraft.

This followed comments by Maduro last month that his military were in possession of Russian-made Igla-S missiles “with no fewer than 5,000 of them in key anti-aircraft defense positions to guarantee peace, stability, and tranquility”.

Jammers and spoofers

The more immediate risk was to electronic systems, said the FAA documents, with several civil aircraft recently reporting interference while transiting Venezuela, in some cases causing “lingering effects throughout the night”.

“GNSS jammers and spoofers can affect aircraft out to 250 nautical miles [450 kilometres] and can impact a wide variety of critical communication, navigation, surveillance, and safety equipment on aircraft.”

The FAA said it would “continue to monitor the risk environment for US civil aviation operating in the region and make adjustments, as appropriate, to safeguard U.S. civil aviation”.

In fact, the US airlines stopped all direct commercial and cargo flights into Venezuela as part of an order issued in 2019, related to sanctions against the Maduro regime, widely seen as illegitimate, with the US State Department offering a bounty of US$50 million “for information leading to the arrest and / or conviction” .

Open to talks

Commentators on US – Venezuelan relations this week said that FAA announcement was not necessarily a sign of imminent US military action. Former Associated Press analyst Dan Perry told News Nation that the FAA warning was “a message that they [the FAA] expected the country to become unstable”, but did not point to a ground invasion.

For most observers, the NOTAM was a continuation of the maximum pressure strategy pursued by Washington against the Maduro regime, including a recent decision to declare the Cártel de los Soles — a disconnected group of corrupt military officers who facilitate drug shipments — as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.

Last week Maduro said he was open to talks with Washington, according to AP News, though US President Trump underscored that military action was “still on the table”.

In recent months the US has sent eight navy ships, a submarine, an aircraft carrier and 10,000 service members to the Caribbean. And since August, US firepower has killed at least 83 people in aerial attacks on speedboats suspected of running drugs; for anyone arriving in Venezuela, air is still safer than sea.

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