Former Colombian Foreign Minister Álvaro Leyva Durán launched a blistering attack against President Gustavo Petro just days before Colombia heads to the polls on May 31, warning of what he described as looming threats to the country’s democratic institutions and accusing the government of preparing to reject an unfavorable electoral outcome.

In a lengthy manifesto published Tuesday on the social media platform X under the title “Propuesta de Álvaro Leyva Durán al País para las Elecciones,” the veteran Conservative politician claimed Petro fears both political defeat and possible legal consequences should right-wing presidential candidate Abelardo De la Espriella emerge victorious.

“Petro knows that his future depends on his successor protecting him from justice,” Leyva wrote, adding that De la Espriella “could win the elections in the first round.”

According to Leyva, the former member of the M-19 guerrilla and senator understands that with De la Espriella in office, “he himself could end up in prison. And that is why he has sought to derail the candidate and will refuse to recognize his victory.”

The explosive accusations mark the latest escalation in the increasingly bitter campaign season ahead of what analysts are calling one of Colombia’s most polarized elections in decades. Leyva, once one of Petro’s closest political allies and his first foreign minister, has in recent months become one of the president’s fiercest critics.

In the manifesto, Leyva intertwined personal memories of Colombia’s turbulent political history with warnings about what he believes is unfolding behind the scenes of the current administration.

“At my age, I know these kinds of stories well,” he wrote, before recalling his close relationship with slain Conservative leader Álvaro Gómez Hurtado.

“My father, Jorge Leyva, gave me at birth the name of his friend Álvaro Gómez Hurtado. When I was 12 years old, Álvaro would speak to me about politics and explain the world to me with a globe.”

Leyva recounted how Gómez and his own father were exiled after the 1953 military coup, and how decades later he worked alongside Gómez politically, even helping negotiate his release after he was kidnapped by the M-19 guerrilla movement in 1988.

“In 1995, after leaving a lecture at Sergio Arboleda University, Álvaro Gómez and I shook hands for the last time,” Leyva wrote. “Because minutes later, I watched in horror as he was assassinated in his car. It was a national tragedy.”

The former minister used Gómez’s legacy as a contrast to his eventual disillusionment with Petro.

“Because of that, I believed I could work with Gustavo Petro,” he said. “When he invited me to become his minister, I accepted because I believed him to be an honorable man. But I was wrong.”

Leyva then delivered some of his harshest remarks yet against the president.

“I came to know the monster from within: his vileness and degradation,” he wrote. “At enormous personal and family cost, I dared to denounce his baseness and his disrespect for the office.”

He added: “Because character demands that one not remain silent in the face of ignominy. And because of everything I witnessed, because of the rotten environment in which he (Petro) moves, I know what the government is plotting.”

Leyva also alleged that Petro’s radicalised supporters to intimidate opponents and manipulate the electoral process. “Today, while Abelardo wages a major democratic battle, Petro incites his followers to commit all kinds of outrages,” he wrote. “There has even been talk of snipers during the campaign.”

Without providing evidence, Leyva claimed that attempts had been made to invalidate De la Espriella’s candidacy, suppress favorable polling data and mobilize state-backed political machinery to influence the vote.

“On election day, rivers of money will flow in an attempt to stop De la Espriella,” he warned.

The former foreign minister also accused Petro of laying the groundwork to dispute the legitimacy of the election itself.

“The president has also spent months constructing a narrative of electoral manipulation,” Leyva wrote. In this way, according to the author, he is “weaving an argument to reject an adverse electoral outcome” that he already senses is inevitable. “That is the false ace up Petro’s sleeve,” he continued. “And like any gambler fueled by hatred, he will use it.”

Leyva also referenced U.S. Republican lawmakers from Florida, María Elvira Salazar and Rick Scott, claiming both were aware of the risks facing Colombia’s democratic process. “Scott is an ally of Colombian democracy and correctly sensed what the national government is planning,” he wrote.

In one of the most dramatic sections of the manifesto, Leyva proposed that Petro temporarily step aside if he alleges fraud after either the first or second round of voting.

“I make a proposal: if in the first or second round Petro claims there was fraud, he should step down from office under the terms of Article 193 of the Constitution,” Leyva wrote.

He suggested that the vice president temporarily assume office while an international commission made up of U.S. lawmakers, European parliamentarians, the Vatican and the United Nations review the vote count and oversee the transition of power before August 7.

“Think about it, Gustavo. Think about it carefully,” Leyva concluded. “Because the alternative will not end well for you. Abelardo De la Espriella will be the next president. And you will have to accept that reality, whether you like it or not.”

Confused about the upcoming Colombian presidential election? We’re here to help you with a set of cheat sheets on the top candidates so you can follow the local news. Today we’re looking at poll leader Iván Cepeda of the Pacto Histórico.

Who is Iván Cepeda?

Iván Cepeda Castro is a leftist politician who has served in the Colombian senate for the last 12 years. Before that, he was a Congressman for a term. Born in Bogotá to activist politician parents, the family was forced into exile in Soviet Czechia and Cuba in his youth. At 63 years of age, he’s notably older than his main rivals.

His father was assassinated for political reasons in 1994, something that has unsurprisingly contributed enormously to his sociopolitical views. He was a young communist, but long since moved away from that, preferring to concentrate on social analysis, activism and campaigning against rightist corruption.

He represents the Pacto Histórico ruling coalition, meaning that he benefits from the popularity of the current president Gustavo Petro. That’s no surprise, as they’ve been firm friends and comrades for years, with the president supporting his bid.

In comparison to his mentor, Cepeda is far more serious. Petro often plays the cuddly socialist grandpa, going off on tangents about free love and so forth. Cepeda is much more of a hardline Maoist academic who is well up for a long march through the institutions. He lacks the charisma of Petro, coming across more professorial and dry.

Is he polling well?

Very. He’s absolutely nailed on for the second round, with the only real question being how high his vote share is. There is some speculation that he may come second, but more likely he will be comfortably in front of the two rightest candidates.

The trickier part is the second round, when the right will be consolidated behind one person rather than split in two. He’s still often favourite against both Abelardo de la Espriella and Paloma Valencia, but likely prefers the former.

While he’s been out in front all through the campaigning process, he’s not really gone anywhere, simply sitting on 38-43% in every poll. While that’s admirable consistency, it also calls into question his ability to draw in the undecided voters.

He’s a marmite candidate, with very few informed voters neutral on him. Either you think he’s the saviour of the republic who can make Colombia more equal or you think he’s a dangerous revolutionary who will ruin the country. A lot of votes are for him under any circumstance and as many are against him under any circumstance.

What’s his campaign like?

Firmly leftist, unsurprisingly. He’s also leaning heavily into being the continuity candidate for the Petro government. That makes sense, with approval levels riding high after the giant minimum wage increase this year. While that might yet be a problem down the line, it’s electoral dynamite.

However, his campaigning has been rather lacklustre. He’s not a natural orator in the way that Petro is, and he lacks charisma, coming across as a dry theoretical academic. Perhaps aware of this, his team have arranged rallies where he can preach to the converted and otherwise keeping him out of the spotlight.

In reality, much of his campaigning is being done by others. Petro is the key figure here, with the president right up against the line of not technically campaigning. However, the head of state is taking a lot of actions that are clearly designed to help Cepeda, as well as constantly using his pulpit to call for the continuation of his ideas.

Complementing this is an incredibly powerful influencer/social push. Much of this is fairly organic, with Pacto supporters used to activism and intuitively good at promoting their candidate. It fits in well with his man of the people image. The biggest meme is ‘Solo pacto en esta mondá’. Notably, Cepeda himself isn’t the draw, with variations on the phrase namechecking Petro.

Combined with his very loose manifesto (see below), his campaign messaging is basically that only the Pacto will stand up for the people, especially those that have been treated poorly by the state. There’s little in the way of concrete offers, just a call for loyalty.

So what’s in his manifesto then?

You can read it for yourself online, but have a big pot of tea ready: it outdoes Marx and Engels at a whopping 433(!) pages long. A lot of that is AI images, while the actual propuestas are hidden away between rambling discourse, tangential essays, theoretical musings and diary entries. Notably, it is mostly in the past and present tenses.

A recurring theme is the involvement of civil society via what he calls the poder constituyente, especially youth and women’s groups. He claims he will call all political and social actors to the table in a mesa de diálogo nacional aimed at forming concrete proposals.

This will be implemented by a new Alianza Público-Popular which will allow civil groups to directly manage state funds. Both ethnic minority and campesino territories will be recognised and organised. There will be a Banco del Pueblo to improve access to financial instruments for poorer people as well as the unbanked.

Security is not a priority, but the key aim is to dismantle armed groups that are ‘successors of paramilitaries’. Iván Cepeda will continue the extant peace talks set up by Petro, but with a red line over assassinations of social leaders. Coca farmers will be encouraged to turn away from illegality via crop substitution.

Corruption will be dealt with by the Secretary for Transparency of the Presidency being given full independence and the Fiscalía receiving an Institute for Macrocorruption, as well as beefing up existing systems. Civil society will be encouraged to involve themselves in these processes.

A new Ley de Austeridad Republicana will be brought in to limit state spending via civil servants in an attempt to cut costs. He will reduce the salaries of the president’s office immediately and encourage his ministers to do the same. There will be greater scrutiny of public spending across all levels of the state. Again, no details.

More interesting is the promise to give victims of corruption resources, partially funded by seizure of illegal gains. All of this will be aimed at the parts of the country with the highest rates of corruption and impunity.

Victims of the conflict, meanwhile, will benefit from a new acuerdo nacional which will aim to deliver further reparations. He will also make sure that the 2016 peace agreement is carried out as originally planned, focusing on the Planes de Desarollo con Enfoque Territorial (PDET) for the areas most affected.

International relations will not revolve around the interests of Washington or Miami (?), but rather the national interest. The plan is for autonomy and integration, again involving civil society to work with foreign-based counterparts.

For rural areas, there will be 30,000km of minor roads built to improve connections to far-flung places, known as the vías para la paz. There will also be more rights to participate in politics, defend territory, improve connectivity and services, more land restitution and so on, none of which is clearly defined or detailed in numbers.

Rubbish is on the agenda, unlike any other candidate. He promises to strengthen and enforce recycling schemes and the basura cero initiative. Revitalisation and regrowth of urban areas is also under plan. On transport, he says he will rejuvenate trains as well as sort out the roads.

Who is he running with?

Aida Marina Quilcué Vivas is an Indigenous activist and current senator of the Republic. While she won’t bring any votes with her, this is a huge signal from the Pacto that they are serious about Indigenous representation.

Her selection shows Pacto confidence that they don’t need to reach out and form alliances with other groups. The advantage is that Quilcué and Cepeda will agree on virtually everything, in sharp contrast to Petro and Francia Márquez.

Quilcué has been an active part of the campaign, rallying supporters across the country, especially in rural and Indigneous areas. She’s chastised Abelardo for using the jaguar as a symbol. She’s also clashed with Paloma Valencia over indigenous rights in Cauca.

Is he a communist guerrilla that will expropriate my property?

No, he’s not. He was a young communist, but distanced himself from the party (against the wishes of his family) three and a half decades ago. He’s not a guerilla either and never has been, despite his closeness to M-19. He’s a leftist for sure, but that is not synonymous with communism either in act or desire.

The reason this gets so much traction is that he has certainly been close to guerilla groups, either working with them or in peace talks. He doesn’t help this by his actions, often going out of his way to avoid criticising groups that have a nominally leftist agenda, while specifying that he wants to go after ex-paras.

What’s all this about the Caso Uribe?

Iván Cepeda has been a fierce critic of Álvaro Uribe dating all the way back to when Uribe was in the Casa de Nariño. In many ways, the ex-president has defined Cepeda’s political career as much as Petro, though as sworn enemy rather than comrade. 

Cepeda accused the ex-president of links to paramilitarism, relating to the falsos positivos case and others. After repeated attacks in the Senate, Uribe filed a defamation writ against Cepeda, which was eventually annulled. In turn, Uribe found himself under investigation for allegedly attempting to influence witnesses in that case.

Vindication came last year with a Bogotá court ruling in favour of Cepeda after over a decade of deliberation. However, it was only a partial victory, with the ex-president only being declared guilty of fraude procesal y soborno en actuación judicial.

This means there is absolutely no love lost between the two, with Uribe’s preferred candidate Paloma Valencia and Iván Cepeda frequently clashing in the Senate and in the media. Abelardo de la Espriella also is close to Uribe, having represented him legally.

Any skeletons in his closet?

Yes. He has a habit of ignoring things that aren’t connected to paramilitarism or the peace process, ending up as one of the most absent senators in the last couple of years. He also has habitually evaded making clear statements on his health following his diagnosis of bowel cancer. He claims it is in remission, but rumours swirl that it is not. 

Then there’s the Operation Fénix affair. He was allegedly namechecked in emails found in a raid on a FARC base. It’s never been fully proved or denied, but has always hung over him. Added to the controversy over recent audioclips by guerrillas referring to him as a comrade, it fuels the fire for those who see him as too close to armed groups.

So, can he succeed?

Yes, he can and is probably the favourite at the moment. It would be absolutely shocking were he not to get to the second round and he matches up well with both of the two people he’s likely to face there.

Of the two rightists, he probably wants to see Abelardo against him. While he carries a threat as a markedly anti-establishment candidate in contrast to Cepeda’s life in politics, he will also turn off some of the anti-left candidates, especially those who want someone serious.

Voto en blanco could then become the decider. If we end up with a situation where a high number of voters decide they want neither option, Cepeda is likely in luck. It’s entirely possible that he could win without crossing 50% of the vote.

The popularity of Petro works in his favour, as does the minimum wage issue. Many will want further increases and see him as the best way to get that done. This may not be a vote for him so much as for the Pacto, but they all count.

However, there are no guarantees. He will get very few voters coming across from eliminated candidates. The key battle here will be turnout, which usually increases by 5-10 percentage points for the runoff.

The post Candidate guides for the 2026 Colombian elections: Iván Cepeda appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

Colombia entered the final week of campaigning on Monday ahead of a presidential election that has exposed deep political divisions, sharpened ideological tensions and raised concerns over the country’s security and economic future.

The three leading candidates in the 2026 race wrapped up major public appearances over the weekend with rallies across Bogotá, where supporters waving flags, chanting slogans and wearing campaign colors filled arenas, public plazas and avenues in a final push before Sunday’s first-round vote.

The election has increasingly become a referendum on the legacy of President Gustavo Petro and the future direction of the South American nation after four years marked by failed social reforms, diplomatic friction, fiscal pressures and a deteriorating security conditions ahead of the May 31 election.

Senator Iván Cepeda, the candidate aligned with Petro’s governing Historic Pact coalition, entered the final stretch of the campaign presenting himself as the defender of progressive reforms and social justice policies aimed at reducing inequality and expanding access to education, pensions and healthcare.

Speaking before supporters in Bogotá’s historic Plaza de Bolívar, Cepeda urged Colombians to “defend hope” and reject what he described as a return to the political establishment that governed Colombia before Petro’s historic 2022 victory.

“Our project is one of dignity, peace and social transformation,” the hard-left senator told supporters. “We cannot allow fear and hatred to reverse the changes that millions of Colombians demanded.”

Cepeda has pledged to continue the government’s controversial “Total Peace” strategy, which seeks negotiated settlements with armed guerrilla groups and criminal organizations. The policy, however, has failed to curb violence and has instead allowed illegal armed factions to strengthen territorial control in rural areas.

Security has emerged as one of the defining issues of the campaign following a rise in massacres, attacks against security forces and extortion in regions including Catatumbo, Cauca and parts of the Pacific coast. Several recent bomb attacks and clashes involving dissident rebel groups have intensified public anxiety and become central talking points for opposition candidates.

Conservative lawyer and political outsider Abelardo de la Espriella has capitalized on growing frustration over insecurity, presenting himself as the candidate of “authority and order.”

During rallies attended by thousands in Bogotá, Barranquilla and Medellín, de la Espriella has promised a sweeping security crackdown against illegal armed groups, tougher prison sentences and expanded support for the military and police.

“Colombia cannot continue surrendering territory to criminals and terrorists,” he told cheering supporters. “The state must recover authority in every corner of the country.”

De la Espriella has also sought to attract business leaders and middle-class voters concerned about inflation, unemployment and slowing investment. His campaign platform includes proposals for tax reductions, deregulation and incentives aimed at restoring investor confidence after several years of economic uncertainty.

Meanwhile, senator Paloma Valencia closed her campaign with a massive event at Bogotá’s Movistar Arena, in which she framed the election as a battle to prevent Colombia from drifting toward authoritarianism and economic collapse. Throughout the campaign, she has repeatedly warned voters against what she calls “the Venezuelanization of Colombia,” a message that has resonated strongly among conservative sectors and business elites.

“We are voting for democracy, liberty and the survival of our institutions,” Valencia said during her closing rally. “Colombia cannot continue down the path of division and improvisation.”

Political analysts say the election reflects a country increasingly polarized between those who support Petro’s promise of structural change and those who believe the administration’s policies have weakened institutions, damaged investor confidence and emboldened armed groups.

Recent polling suggests Cepeda maintains a narrow lead heading into Sunday’s vote, though few observers expect any candidate to secure the more than 50 percent needed to avoid a runoff election scheduled for June 21.

The latest surveys indicate a highly competitive contest for second place between Valencia and de la Espriella, setting the stage for what could become one of the most polarized second-round races in Colombia’s modern political history.

Beyond ideology, many voters say they remain concerned about rising living costs, access to employment, corruption and public safety.

In downtown Bogotá, where campaign caravans and political posters have become a daily feature of city life, voters have expressed exhaustion after months of aggressive rhetoric and constant political confrontation.

With just days remaining before Colombians head to the polls, authorities across the country have increased security measures amid concerns over possible unrest and isolated acts of political violence.

Sunday’s election is widely viewed as one of the most consequential in decades, with the outcome expected to shape Colombia’s political and economic direction long after the campaign slogans and rallies fade from the streets of Bogotá.

Confused about the upcoming Colombian presidential election? We’re here to help you with a set of cheat sheets on the top candidates so you can follow the local news. Today we’re looking at Paloma Valencia of the Centro Democrático.

Who is Paloma Valencia?

Paloma Susana Valencia Laserna is a conservative politician who has represented the Centro Democrático in the Senate for 12 years. She won her primary battle with three million votes in March, confirming her position as the establishment rightist candidate.

Anti-establishment types, look away now. Her paternal grandfather Guillermo León Valencia was President of the Republic from 1962-66, while her maternal grandfather Mario Laserna Pinzón founded the Universidad de los Andes.

Perhaps not coincidentally, that’s her alma mater, studying economics there before a Master’s in creative writing at New York University. She’s been heavily involved in politics for two decades now, originally as a candidate for Alas Equipo Colombia before jumping ship to the Centro Democrático.

Her faith is deeply important to her, as is tradition. Coming from the circle of the Popayán elite, she is a fairly standard conservative on most cultural and social issues. On the economy, she tacks more to a neoliberal line.

Is she polling well?

Not as well as she would like. While she won comfortably in the March primaries as part of the Gran Consulta por Colombia, she has since fluctuated around 15-25%, usually rising and falling in rhythm with rightist rival Abelardo de la Espriella.

Most recent polling has her in third place a week out from the election, which is a problem. She does outperform Abelardo in head-to-head matchups with Iván Cepeda in most polls, which her messaging will want to lean into over the coming week.

What’s her campaign like?

Centrism, slightly improbably. As one of two rightists in an election with a clearly dominant leftist candidate, two flailing centrists and a host of also-rans, she’s positioning herself as the closest to the centre of the viable options.

However, she’s firmly of the right, although tempered somewhat by her far more liberal vicepresidential candidate Juan Daniel Oviedo. This is best evidenced by the fact she is very much ‘la que dice Uribe’, clearly having the backing of the controversial yet still influential ex-president.

Her campaign logo features a cross, with religion playing a large role for her stance on many cultural and social issues. She leans heavily into those as a conservative. Colombia Más Grande is the slogan, but they don’t use it particularly well.

If elected, she would be Colombia’s first ever female head of state (with a first ever gay vicepresident too), although she’s not really leant into that much as you might think. As with much else, she’s not managing to cut through particularly well on socials or make a big splash in the national debate.

So what’s in her manifesto then?

You can read it for yourself online, under the name 111puntos. You even get an extra point for free. It’s fairly well presented, laid out and supported, but that’s not necessarily going to win any votes. Overall, other than a massive reliance on AI, there’s no big surprise or radical shakeup here, more a return to the old ways of doing things.

Paloma is certainly no dove when it comes to security and crime, promising a tough line. COP$20tn over four years for the armed forces in order to modernise and rebuild, finishing at 4% of annual GDP destined for the forces. That includes recruiting 30,000 more military personnel and the same number of police officers.

The rest of the money will go on increasing pay, conditions and so forth as well as a big push on tech. Drones are the centrepiece for investment, but cyberdefence is also highlighted as an area that needs urgent investment. 

Slightly more old-school is her plan to militarise key transportation routes immediately. More of the same with coca farms: more spraying that allegedly won’t affect ecosystems or people, combined with subsidies for substitution. The fact that neither of those things have worked for decades isn’t stopping her.

On the other side of the coin, Paloma Valencia promises zero impunity: “el que la hace, la paga”. That means more powers to seize illicit gains and more prison sentences for those found guilty of corruption, reducing the number of casa por carcel sentences. 22,000 more penitentiary places and 19,000 more prisoners.

There will be 50 new casas de justicia and mobile courts to tour the country visiting rural locations that are currently not served by the legal systems. All of this is working towards an aim to get congestion in the system from 48% down to 0. Ominously, there’s also a promise of a law to “regulate protest and punish vandalism”.

New laws on corruption are to be brought in, mostly focused around greater transparency using tech. That means blockchain to record transactions and deals as well as AI to analyse potential discrepancies. There will be greater enforcement of existing regulations and a guardian of public integrity to oversee processes.

On the economy, it’s all about recovering confidence from the international market. That will be done by getting infrastructure and mining production back up to pre-pandemic levels (6%+), USD$10mn more in exports and growth over five percent annually.

More FDI to the tune of USD$2bn annually, 25% of GDP to go into internal investment and reducing the deficit by COP$50tn. How is she going to pay for all this? With, err, tax cuts for homeowners and businesses, efficiency savings of 25% and debt refinancing. Good luck with all that.

She’s the only candidate to really take the healthcare crisis seriously. First up is a promise to resolve 10 million blocked prescriptions, appointments and so on in the first 100 days. She plans to send doctors to patients in rural areas, not the other way round.

This will be paid for by a COP$9tn investment. A third of that is destined for delivery of outstanding operations and prescriptions, the rest for paying accumulated state debt to healthcare operators. Many taxpayers won’t like the latter.

Energy faces a similar situation: paying off state debts to operators within the first three months. The goal here is to avoid blackouts and brownouts in the short term, while putting in place structures to avoid the same issues over the long term.

Turning on the taps for both oil and gas lies at the heart of this plan, with a reboot of exploration and extraction projects. Partly, this is to attract AI database and server investment. There’s also support for renewables and alternatives, but it seems more of an afterthought.

Her plan on international relations is to ride two horses. Free competition with China and more co-operation on infrastructure and exports from Colombia. At the same time, leadership in Donald Trump’s Shield of the Americas project while guaranteeing that only the Colombian Armed Forces will operate in national territory.

There will be 187,000 free school places for talented children, 150,000 grants for vulnerable children and 10 public superschools. ICETEX loans, in line with other countries, will only be repayable when you have a salary. COLFUTURO will be rescued as well. The 16 biggest urban centres will have psycho-social units to look out for vulnerable children.

Businesses employing people under 28 will receive a subsidy of up to 30% of minimum wage for a year. Agricultural workers will receive better lines of credit, three million hectares of land formalised and a million new farming zones designated. Tourism is projected to double, with new routes opened for Asia and Europe.

There is a heavy focus on the grey economy. Informal workers will have access to seed capital, loans, a virtual wallet and a host of other possibilities. The goal is to offer help without persecution.

Pensioners will all be covered unconditionally, regardless of law or budget changes as well as three million vulnerable adults to receive subsidies. Each child born into poverty will have COP$500,000 put aside as seed capital to start saving.

Infrastructure starts off with 35,000km of new roads as well as increased satellite connectivity for marginalised communities. There will be 1 million new homes built, with a quarter of those directly subsidised. A million further homes will receive new or improved potable water access.

Finally, the environment. The brakes will go on for deforestation and the national parks will be protected from guerrilla activity. Local families will be given subsidies in order to protect areas of natural interest. Money generated from mining will be ploughed back into environmental protection.

Who is she running with?

Juan Daniel Oviedo, former head of DANE and candidate in the last race for Bogotá mayor. In that contest, he managed to force Gustavo Bolívar into third place in a two-horse race, showcasing his impressive campaigning ability. He came second in the Gran Consulta with over a million votes, reinforcing his reputation. 

He’s been more visible than Paloma Valencia for much of the campaign and is much more active than either of the other two undercards. That was the reason he was brought in – to appeal to more liberal voters and to provide an injection of energy on socials. He’s delivered in spades on both accounts.

However, there are a couple of issues here. Firstly, he runs the risk of overshadowing Paloma Valencia with his charisma and presence. Secondly, by joining her campaign he lost some of those centrist voters who saw it as a betrayal to join forces with the Centro Democrático.

They certainly aren’t natural bedfellows, with Oviedo a fair bit left of Valencia on a lot of economic issues. More profound splits are found on social issues. For example, Oviedo is out and proud while Valencia stands against gay adoption and marriage. Awkward at best. 

Why do people say she’s ‘la que dice Uribe’?

Pido respetuosamente votar por Paloma Valencia. pic.twitter.com/HpS5XjGdVw

— Álvaro Uribe Vélez (@AlvaroUribeVel) May 18, 2026

That’s a bit unfair on a candidate with a long and storied political career of her own. However, while she isn’t just Uribe’s candidate, she certainly makes a lot of having his passionate backing.

That’s been a mixed blessing for a while now, with Uribe’s influence waning as the years pass. While his candidate won in 2018, they failed to even make the second round in 2014 and 2022 and we could well be on for a repeat of that.

The ex-president certainly casts a long shadow and that’s not always positive, especially with Oviedo also shining bright. Support for Uribe has dwindled over the past two decades, as Colombian demographics change profoundly.

However, Uribe does retain a large swell of support and also commands the biggest party machine of the candidates in the race. The Centro Democrático will be able to make a huge campaigning push on and offline across the entire country, which may be underreported. 

Any skeletons in her closet?

A few, mainly over her combative social media use while in the Senate. Paloma Valencia has largely avoided serious controversy though, with most of her twitterstorms being differences of opinion rather than accusations of impropriety.

She accused now-president Gustavo Petro of corruption in 2018 following the Odebrecht affair. This amounted to grainy footage of him receiving cash at an unknown point. That was archived as being far too flimsy to be evidence of anything at all.

In 2022 she defended the Colombian state’s actions during the armed conflict, saying that while there may have been errors and atrocities, they were legitimate and in defence of the country. That unsurprisingly met with a huge backlash from various quarters.

Una narrativa mucho más constructiva (y verdadera) es: Los para y la guerrrilla fueron y son monstruosos. El Estado cometió errores y atrocidades, pero era legítimo y fundamentalmente estuvo en la defensa de los ciudadanos.

— Paloma Valencia L (@PalomaValenciaL) July 29, 2022

There is one case hanging over Paloma Valencia still. Her link to Uribe led to her questioning the legitimacy of a key witness in the case against him. In turn, the witnesses defence lawyers filed a defamation case against the senator, over which the Supreme Court has ordered a conciliatory process. That has not yet concluded.

She’s also clashed with Cepeda’s vicepresidential candidate Aida Quilcué over indigenous rights in Cauca. Indeed, she’s gone as far as to suggest splitting the entire department in two, one for Indigenous Colombians only, something many view as racially motivated.

So, can she succeed?

Yes, she can. Next weekend is arguably a harder test for her than a second round would be if she gets through. Similar concerns swirled around her in the Gran Consulta por Colombia, but she ended up sailing through comfortably. 

If she can repeat that trick, she matches up better than anyone else against Iván Cepeda. However, that’s very far from guaranteed, as they’re closely matched. It’s assumed that she’ll gain a lot of Abelardo voters, but that may not be true. The anti-left will flock to her, but the anti-establishment might not.

Her main draw is presenting herself as the only viable sensible candidate. In part that’s with Oviedo on board, in part that both Cepeda and de la Espriella are seen as populist. There’s a lot of centrist voters that will hold their noses and vote for her along those lines.

Having said all that, centrism isn’t in vogue in many places globally and Colombia is no exception. That may block her even getting to a final face-off and her chances of winning rest with anti-Cepeda votes. More than any other candidate, hers would be a loveless victory.

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Confused about the 2026 Colombian presidential elections? We’re here to help you with a set of cheat sheets on the top candidates so you can follow the local news. First we’re looking at Abelardo de la Espriella of Defensores de la Patria.

Who is Abelardo de la Espriella?

Abelardo de la Espriella hails from Montería, which he makes great play of. He was actually born in Bogotá, as well as studying in various universities here. He rose to fame as a defence lawyer, eventually setting up his own firm, De La Espriella Lawyers Enterprise. Their clients have been varied (more of that later).

He has a colourful background alongside his legal activity, releasing two albums of classical and traditional music as well as launching De La Espriella Style, his menswear line. He also has his fingers in other pies, including rum, wine and coffee, several books and a foundation to help impoverished kids.

A former atheist, he saw the light in the pandemic and came around to Catholicism, which is convenient for winning votes in a deeply religious country. He holds Italian and US passports. He takes pride in his appearance, often suited and tidily-bearded but switching to sombreros vueltiaos or guayaberas when appropriate.

While he has a varied and successful background in business, he has no experience at all in government, either at local or national level. He is leaning into that, taking the mantle of the outsider candidate and promising to do politics differently. Courting controversy is second nature for this bullish and outspoken candidate.

Is he polling well?

He started strongly towards the end of last year, then seemed to have dipped as we moved into springtime. Since the March elections though, he’s picked up the pace again and is peaking again at just the right time.

He’s now ahead of Paloma again with most pollsters and stands a good chance of making the second round, where he faces a strong challenge against Cepeda. His incredibly divisive rhetoric and persona mean that he doesn’t match up easily in a one-on-one.

Like many populists in the caudillo mould, he splits opinions – while he wins a lot of hearts and minds, so too does he turn a lot of people against him. Very few people are neutral on Abelardo, which means he could struggle to win the more centrist voters, even against Cepeda. Expect voto en blanco to do well if he’s in the second round.

What’s his campaign like?

Pick your adjective depending on how you view him generally: controversial, innovative, problematic, fierce, strong, crass, outspoken. What’s unarguable is that it is very much focused on him, features a lot of show and spin and is extremely light on detail.

Very much in the vein of a Trump or Bukele, two key influences he acknowledges himself, he positions himself as the outsider candidate compared to the professional politicians in the race. This has not only been successful elsewhere, but almost took Rodolfo Hernández to the presidency four years ago.

Interestingly, Abelardo de la Espriella is in one way openly following a very similar line to the leftists he claims to hate. He is courting “los que nunca” against “los que siempre”, fitting his position as the outsider candidate. His promises often revolve directly around shaking everything up.

So what’s in his manifesto then?

You can read it for yourself online, or what is there at least. It’s barely a manifesto and more a collection of ideas, positions and wishes. He focuses heavily on law and order with a generous side serving of efficiency savings. Quite how any of this will get done or whether it’s viable is often unclear.

First thing on the agenda is that he’s tough on crime. He’s proposed 10 megacarceles in the Bukele mould, a ‘primera linea’ of reservists and veterans and a new bloque de búsqueda for barrios. He targets a 30% reduction in gender-based violence and 40% cut in feminicides. That involves an accelerated 24/7 judicial process in 72 hours maximum. 

More widely, he wants to reform and better fund the armed forces in order to both establish state control of territory and enforce the state monopoly on arms. That carries over into his stance on armed groups. He wants to eliminate 330,000 hectares of coca farms using any and all tools available to him. That means spraying, manual elimination, express recuperation of proceeds of crime and so on.

Para cambiar a Colombia primero hay que sobrevivirle a quienes no quieren que cambie. pic.twitter.com/h6Tf8refWr

— De La Espriella Presidente (@AbelardoPTE) May 17, 2026

The mano dura is also set to come down on politicians. He’s fiercely anti-corruption, which he defines broadly. He plans to start with Ecopetrol and then clean out state organisations of their links to “narco-trafficking, corruption and bad management”.

Politicians and administrators that are not corrupt won’t be safe, either. He promises zero tolerance for ineptitude and inefficiency. He wants results within 100 days and those with empty hands will be told to sling their hook. Ambassadors have been told they need to promote the country, not just shoot whisky on the public purse.

Tax avoidance is also on the radar – Abelardo de la Espriella wants to use AI to radically improve DIAN’s processes and deal with widespread avoidance. Subsidies will also be revised to make sure they are going to the right places.

He wants to recover energy self-sufficiency and to restart drilling and exploration as well. Gas is his main focus, although rare earth mining is also highlighted, alongside reform of the costly ElectroCaribe. A main driver is drawing a clear line between legal and illegal mining.

The national budget will also benefit from the efficiency savings – merging or abolishing agencies he sees as redundant such as the Ministerio de Igualdad. That’s part of a shock plan to save around 3.1% of GDP.

With those savings, the aim is to get the deficit to -4.8%(!) within the first year, falling to under 3.5% or lower by 2030. Dovetailing with that is a promise to anchor the debt/GDP ratio at no higher than 55%. All this will require annual growth of at least 3% with 5%+ targeted.

On education, there is to be greater focus on technology, as well as a ‘virtual university’ and free computers in schools. Unsurprisingly, details are limited. A STEM program specifically aimed at girls will be set up to deal with the tech gender gap.

Rural communities are a key part of his voter base and he’s promising 600,000 new jobs outside cities as well as 100,000 young people to receive education on improved farming methods and use of tech. 2 million hectares are to be delivered to the people.

Rounding up, there will be COP$125bn aimed at co-investment or seed capital for creative projects; mass sterilisation of stray animals to reduce populations and 200,000 carers to be given subsidies.

Who is he running with?

José Manuel Restrepo, the closest thing to an aristocrat that a two-century-old republic can have. He claims direct descendency from revolutionary hero Francisco de Paula Santander. In sharp contrast to Abelardo, he’s a classic buttoned-down conservative.

He served under Duque as Ministro de Hacienda following the botched intent at fiscal reform, having previously been at Comercio. Outside of politics he has been rector of three different universities, most notably the Rosario, his alma mater alongside Bath and the LSE. 

However, given that Abelardo de la Espriella loves the limelight, his undercard is not a key part of this campaign. While the other two real candidates have genuinely strong vice-presidential candidates, Abelardo is doing all the heavy lifting himself.

What’s all this El Tigre stuff?

Abelardo understands the importance of branding, and this is a key part of his appeal. He says that the big cat represents courage, ferocity and independence, all of which are qualities he identifies with. In a country where blankets featuring tigers are a staple of many homes, this is a good brand to have.

Tigre in Colombia can refer to tigers or jaguars, both of which he uses, though the former are more common. That means video screens with dancing tigers on them, tiger-print shoes up for sale and a whole lot more. He’s often to be seen wearing tiger-print clothes.

Cepeda’s running mate Aida Quilcué has publicly asked him to stop using jaguars as part of this, claiming they hold a special significance for Indigenous Colombians. Abelardo de la Espriella has predictably ignored that.

Any skeletons in his closet?

Sort of. There’s certainly a great deal of controversy, but a lot of it he simply leans into and doesn’t see as problematic at all. That’s true of personal attacks on Paloma Valencia,  as well as frequent homophobic and sexist outbursts.

It’s less true of his past as a criminal defence lawyer, an area that often makes him quite touchy. He has represented some pretty shady characters, including Álvaro Uribe himself. Jorge Pretelt and David Guzmán are just two high-profile clients accused of corruption that de la Espriella has defended.

In fairness, his firm has also taken on some genuinely important defences, most notably Natalia de la Ponce and Rosa Elvira Cely. However, even this is disputed, with family members taking to Instagram to dispute his take on that and suggest it was more about financial interest.

Then there’s the outstanding allegations that the firmas he collected in order to be able to run were improperly registered. He won 5 million, more than any other Colombian, of which 3 million were ruled invalid. That still leaves him comfortably over the threshold, but raises questions about his support. 

So, can he succeed?

Yes, he can. It’s nowhere near guaranteed that he’ll make the second round, of course, and he absolutely has the potential to do or say something that will torpedo his campaign. However, he’s a maverick and is campaigning well, which makes him unpredictable.

He is offering easy solutions to complex problems, but that’s often popular with the electorate. Get past the rhetoric and he identifies a lot of key problems and his proposals could be a good thing. He just doesn’t make it clear exactly how this is going to happen.

More to the point, Abelardo de la Espriella represents the outsider position compared to everyone else: he really is not a professional politician like them, for good or for bad. Again, that’s popular with many voters after decades of incompetence from technocrats.

Comparisons with Trump in the USA or Bukele in El Salvador are clichéd, but they stand up. He frequently flirts with sexism and homophobia while mocking opponents, but claims innocence, he promises a hard line on crime and he avoids clarity over his proposals. Both those candidates won comfortably with similar electorates to Colombia.

If he gets to the second round, he could win due to a dislike of the other candidate, as that will almost certainly be Cepeda. In that case, there could be a lot of voters holding their noses to vote either for or against him. At the moment, that’s a coin flip.

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Former Colombian President Álvaro Uribe Vélez confronted a group of protesters outside his residence in Rionegro, Antioquia, on Wednesday after activists began painting a mural referencing victims of Colombia’s “false positives” scandal.

Videos and images shared widely on social media showed Uribe surrounded by security personnel while holding a paint roller near the wall where the mural was being painted. Wearing a light field jacket and broad-brimmed hat, the former president appeared visibly upset as tensions rose between demonstrators, supporters and members of his security team.

The incident quickly became one of Colombia’s most discussed political flashpoints this week, exposing deep divisions surrounding the country’s internal armed conflict with ex-FARC, the transitional justice system, and the increasingly polarized 2026 presidential race. The official candidate of Uribe’s Centro Democrático party, Paloma Valencia, is considered Cepeda’s strongest rival in the event of a run-off election on June 21.

Uribe later said he had interrupted a political meeting in Medellín after receiving a call informing him that a large group had gathered near the entrance to his property while his wife was home alone.

“Cowardly Cepeda, stop sending people to my house where my lady was alone,” Uribe wrote on X Wednesday, referring his political foe and presidential frontrunner Iván Cepeda.

In a separate statement, Uribe accused the hard-leftist senator and Hernán Muriel, a congressman from the governing Historic Pact coalition, of promoting what he described as “acts of provocation and intimidation” against his family.

According to Uribe, the protesters arrived in three buses and gathered close to the entrance of the estate while artists painted the mural. He claimed one of his supporters was injured with a knife during the confrontation and said a member of his security detail was also hurt.

“I told them that I was going to erase the mural,” Uribe wrote. “Before provoking violence against my family and our home, they would have to kill me.”

Later footage showed Uribe personally covering the painted wall with a roller while supporters and security personnel stood guard nearby.

The mural referenced the latest figures released by Colombia’s Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP), the transitional tribunal created following the 2016 peace accord with FARC. The tribunal recently updated estimates tied to the “false positives” scandal, in which civilians were allegedly killed by members of the armed forces and falsely presented as combat casualties during more than four decades of Colombia’s internal conflict.

Muriel, who organized the demonstration, rejected accusations that the protest was intended to threaten Uribe or his family. He described the gathering “as a peaceful act” organized by victims’ organizations, social movements and human rights defenders seeking to highlight the revised JEP findings.

“We are carrying out an act of social mobilization and memory pedagogy,” Muriel said in remarks shared online. “We are here with social organizations, victims and human rights defenders following the new figure of 7,837 false positives announced by the JEP.”

According to Muriel, the mural was painted on public property near the residence and was intended to commemorate victims of the conflict.

The confrontation prompted swift reactions from political allies of the former president in Antioquia, one of Colombia’s most conservative regions and a longtime bastion of Uribe’s “democratic security” agenda.

Medellín Mayor Federico Gutiérrez criticized the protest and accused supporters of President Gustavo Petro of fostering political hostility toward opposition figures. “It’s the same method used during the last mayoral campaign in Medellín,” he wrote on social media, adding that political tensions in the country were continuing to escalate.

Antioquia Governor Andrés Julián Rendón also condemned the incident and called for respect toward Uribe and his family.

The episode underscores how historical revisionism spread on social media continues to discredit the legacy of the country’s two-term president (2002-2010), and leading opposition leaders. By Thursday morning, the images from Rionegro — showing Uribe beside the mural with a paint roller in hand — had spread across Colombian media and social networks, becoming the latest symbol of how the left justifies ideologically-fueled protests to vandalize public space and infrastructure.

A new national survey suggests Colombia’s 2026 presidential race is shaping into a high-stakes runoff between Iván Cepeda and conservative rival Paloma Valencia, with the first round on May 31 favoring the left-wing senator, but the second round  – on June 21 – projecting a narrow victory for the Centro Democratico candidate.

The latest poll by Fundación Génesis Crea places Cepeda at the top of voter intention for the first round with 35.1%, followed by Valencia with 25.4% and lawyer Abelardo de la Espriella with 21.6%, signaling an increasingly polarized contest just weeks before Colombians head to the polls.

The survey, conducted between May 4 and May 11 across 134 municipalities and 24 departmental capitals, interviewed 4,352 citizens and presents one of the most detailed snapshots yet of the country’s electoral mood ahead of what many analysts are calling the most decisive presidential vote in years.

Despite Cepeda’s strong lead in the opening round, the numbers suggest a dramatic reversal in a hypothetical runoff. In a second-round scenario against Valencia, the senator from the Democratic Center would secure 48.3% of the vote, compared to 45.6% for Cepeda, while blank votes would account for 6.1%.

The findings indicate that while Cepeda commands a consolidated progressive base, Valencia could benefit from a broader anti-government coalition in a runoff, uniting conservative, centrist and undecided voters wary of continuity with President Gustavo Petro’s political project.

Against other rivals, Cepeda performs more strongly. He would defeat De la Espriella with 46.5% to 41.4%, and also surpass former Bogotá mayor Claudia López with 47.2% to 40.2%, though blank voting would remain unusually high at around 12% in both matchups.

The poll also reflects the deep national divide over Petro’s presidency. Some 51.2% of respondents reported an unfavorable image of the president, while 44.6% viewed him positively. By contrast, former president Álvaro Uribe Vélez registered a 50.4% favorable rating, with 48.3% holding an unfavorable view.

These figures reinforce the enduring political influence of Uribe, whose legacy continues to shape right-wing mobilization, while Petro faces growing criticism over security concerns, economic uncertainty and the faltering progress of his “Total Peace” agenda.

Beyond the top three contenders, voter preference remains fragmented. López registers 3.6%, followed by Sergio Fajardo at 2.9%, while other names such as Roy Barreras, Mauricio Liscano and Carlos Caicedo remain below 1%.

Blank voting stands at 3.2%, while 5.4% of respondents said they remain undecided — a figure that could prove decisive in an increasingly volatile campaign season.

The study reports a margin of error of ±1.485% and a 95% confidence level, with data weighted according to official demographic indicators from the Dane and the National Civil Registry. The sample covered all major regions of Colombia, including the Caribbean, Pacific, Coffee Region, Llanos and Amazon basin.

With just two weeks before the first decisive round, the poll confirms that Colombia is heading toward an electoral confrontation defined less by ideological persuasion than by rejection: a battle between those seeking continuity with Petro’s leftist administration and those determined to stop it.

For now, Cepeda leads the first charge. But if the runoff materializes as projected, Paloma Valencia may be waiting at the finish line.

The departure of former Vice President Germán Vargas Lleras’s coffin from Bogotá’s Palacio de San Carlos on Monday morning blended state mourning with unmistakable political symbolism, as Colombia’s political elite gathered to bid farewell to one of the country’s most influential figures.

His daughter, Clemencia Vargas Umaña, attended the ceremony accompanied by her father’s two French bulldogs – Toño and Henry –  adding a deeply personal note to the solemn proceedings before the main funeral mass at 11:00 a.m. inside Bogotá’s Primatial Cathedral of Bogotá. The service marked the conclusion of three days in which the Foreign Ministry headquarters became the center of national political attention.

Vice President Francia Márquez represented the national government in the absence of President Gustavo Petro and delivered one of the most emotional moments of the day when she embraced Clemencia Vargas before the ceremony. Earlier, Márquez had publicly offered condolences to the family, praising Vargas Lleras’ democratic legacy and saying his “democratic work will be remembered.”

The wake drew figures from across Colombia’s political spectrum, reflecting Vargas Lleras’ decades-long influence. Former presidents Juan Manuel Santos, with whom Vargas Lleras served as vice president, Ernesto Samper, and Iván Duque were present, along with senator Paloma Valencia and former president Álvaro Uribe Vélez, whose attendance underscored the respect afforded to Vargas Lleras despite years of sharp public disputes between the two men.

Vargas Lleras died Friday in Bogotá after a prolonged battle with cancer. He was 64. His death ends a political career spanning more than three decades as senator, minister, vice president, and two-time presidential candidate.

Born in Bogotá on February 19, 1962, Vargas Lleras came from one of Colombia’s most prominent political dynasties. His grandfather, former President Carlos Lleras Restrepo, was a leading figure of the Liberal Party.

He built his own career as a city councilman, congressman, minister, and ultimately leader of the Cambio Radical party. His first presidential run came in 2010, where he finished third with nearly 1.5 million votes. Though unsuccessful, the campaign positioned him as a national force.

President Santos later appointed him to his cabinet, and in 2014 selected him as his running mate for reelection. The pair won in the runoff, and Vargas Lleras assumed office as vice president on August 7 that year.

He ran again for president in 2018 under the “Mejor Vargas Lleras” coalition, focusing on infrastructure, housing and administrative reform. He finished fourth in the first round and did not advance to the runoff.

Throughout his career, Vargas Lleras survived two assassination attempts and weathered political scandals, including accusations linked to parapolitics investigations, though he was never formally charged.

In later years, his health increasingly limited his public life. He was diagnosed with a benign meningioma in 2016 after a fainting episode, and in recent years battled cancer while largely stepping back from frontline politics.

Even as his public appearances became rare, his influence endured. Monday’s funeral made clear that, in death as in life, Germán Vargas Lleras remained a central figure in Colombia’s political history.

Colombian politician Germán Vargas Lleras died Friday in the capital Bogotá, according to Semana magazine. His death brings an end to a political career spanning more than 30 years, including as a senator, minister, vice president, and two-time presidential candidate. 

On Monday, Vargas Lleras was admitted to the Intensive Care Unit at the Luis Carlos Sarmiento Angulo Cancer Treatment and Research Center in Bogotá. He was later transferred to another hospital where he lost a battle with cancer he had been fighting for years. He was 64 years old. 

Political career

Born in Bogotá on February 19, 1962, Vargas Lleras grew up in a political family. His grandfather, former President Carlos Lleras Restrepo, was a pillar of the country’s Liberal Party. 

He would go on to make a name for himself on his own, serving as a city councilman, congressman, minister, and ultimately leader of the Cambio Radical political party.

Vargas Lleras first ran for president 2009. He traveled the country, participated in debates, and garnered nearly 1.5 million votes. It wasn’t enough to win, but he finished third. 

The winner of the election, Juan Manuel Santos, would later call on him to serve as a minister in his cabinet. 

In 2014, Santos chose him as his running mate for reelection. Together they won in the runoff, and Vargas Lleras took office as vice president on August 7 of that year. 

Once his term as vice president ended, Vargas Lleras did not sit idle. In 2018, he ran again for president, this time with the “Mejor Vargas Lleras” coalition backed by Cambio Radical. 

His policy proposals included  infrastructure, housing, and a more efficient public administration.

In the first round, he received over 1.4 million votes but finished fourth, knocking him out of the runoff race. His campaign stated that he would not officially endorse either of the remaining candidates, Iván Duque and Gustavo Petro. 

Over time, he kept a lower profile, though he never completely stepped away from politics.

During his career, Vargas Lleras would survive two assassination attempts and a “parapolitics” scandal in which he was accused, but never charged, with benefitting politically from his connections to warlord “Martin Llanos”.

Health issues

In his later years, his health gradually got in the way of politics; reportedly, he suffered from a benign meningioma, a tumor in the membranes surrounding the brain and spinal cord, which was detected in 2016 after a fainting spell. 

On March 11, former President Álvaro Uribe commented on his condition, saying, “My best wishes for the health of Dr. Germán Vargas Lleras, a distinguished patriot whom I respect despite our occasional disagreements.”

During his final months, the former vice president stayed out of the public eye, though he briefly reappeared on March 3  in a video concerning the March 8 parliamentary elections. 

Upon learning of his death, former President Santos wrote on X that he is “deeply saddened” and described Vargas Lleras as “an exceptional colleague.”

Current President Gustavo Petro also mourned the political leader’s death: “Both in the Senate and on the campaign trail, he behaved like a gladiator. As someone who often disagreed with him, I regret that his seriousness in debate will be lost,” he said on his X account.

Featured image: Germán Vargas Lleras

Image credit: Germán Vargas Lleras via Facebook.

This article originally appeared on Latin America Reports and was republished with permission.

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A landmark ruling by the Superior Tribunal of Bogotá has delivered one of the strongest judicial rebukes yet of the narrative surrounding Colombia’s 2021 National Strike, concluding that some of the most destructive episodes of violence during the protests were not spontaneous acts of social unrest but part of a coordinated criminal strategy involving illegal armed groups.

The decision, issued by the Criminal Chamber of the tribunal under magistrate Jaime Andrés Velasco Velasco Muñoz, found that several of those prosecuted for violent acts in the capital maintained operational ties with cells linked to the Second Manuel Marulanda Vélez, a dissident faction of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia –  FARC.

For years, much of the public debate framed the violence of the so-called Paro Nacional as the uncontrolled overflow of legitimate citizen protests sparked by social inequality, police abuse, unemployment and widespread anger over the government of then-President Iván Duque.

But after reviewing wiretaps, surveillance records, testimonies and digital communications, the court concluded that several of the attacks that paralyzed Bogotá followed a clear operational structure, with leadership roles, territorial coordination and instructions issued in advance.

According to the ruling, some defendants acted in coordination with illegal armed actors to organize attacks on police command posts, TransMilenio stations, commercial establishments and strategic road corridors across the capital.

“For the magistrates, these were not isolated or improvised actions,” the ruling stated. “There existed an organized structure with assigned functions, defined leadership and a chain of command.”

The 2021 protests initially erupted after Duque introduced a controversial tax reform proposal during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. The measure, widely criticized for placing additional burdens on the middle and working classes during an economic crisis, quickly ignited nationwide demonstrations.

Although the government later withdrew the reform, the protests escalated into weeks of nationwide unrest, marked by deadly confrontations between demonstrators and security forces, the burning of police stations, attacks on public transport infrastructure and prolonged road blockades that crippled supply chains across Colombia.

In Bogotá alone, dozens of TransMilenio stations were vandalized or destroyed, CAI neighborhood police posts were torched, and mobility across major avenues such as Las Américas, Carrera Séptima and Autonorte was severely disrupted.

Elsewhere, especially in southwestern Colombia, blockades led to shortages of fuel, medical oxygen and basic food supplies, with business leaders warning of millions of dollars in economic losses and humanitarian consequences for vulnerable communities.

The tribunal’s ruling argues that at least part of that violence was not the natural escalation of protest, but the result of deliberate planning.

Investigators identified several WhatsApp groups allegedly used to coordinate simultaneous actions across the city. Among the names cited in the judicial file were groups linked to strategic corridors such as “Américas,” “Carrera Séptima,” “Autonorte,” “Autosur” and “Caracas.”

According to prosecutors, these digital channels were used to organize blockades, assign responsibilities and plan attacks against public infrastructure.

The court also found that some young defendants had been tasked with recruiting new members and expanding influence within university environments, both public and private, strengthening support networks and facilitating operational logistics.

One of the most significant findings involved intercepted communications that allegedly referenced support from higher-ranking commanders connected to FARC dissidents.

For the magistrates, this reinforced the conclusion that there was external coordination behind the violence, rather than a purely spontaneous citizen uprising.

The ruling now sharply challenges the long-promoted narrative of the unrest as exclusively peaceful social protest and instead reframes part of the National Strike as coordinated urban sabotage carried out under the cover of legitimate public discontent.

It also revives scrutiny of the national strike committee and senior left-wing political leaders, including current President Gustavo Petro, who strongly supported the demonstrations and positioned himself as one of the loudest critics of Duque’s handling of both the protests and the pandemic.

Critics argue that political backing from opposition leaders helped legitimize actions that moved far beyond peaceful protest, allowing criminal actors to operate behind the shield of social mobilization while deepening institutional instability.

The protests also unfolded at one of the most fragile moments of the COVID-19 emergency, when Colombia was still facing high ICU occupancy, strict mobility restrictions and biosecurity measures intended to limit mass contagion.

Large demonstrations and road blockades directly violated those restrictions, and critics maintain that the protests contributed to additional infections and unnecessary strain on an already overwhelmed public health system.

For opponents of Petro and sectors of the business community, the ruling is less a revelation than a delayed institutional acknowledgment of what many citizens experienced firsthand: burned police stations, destroyed public transport, food shortages and entire cities brought to a standstill.

After evaluating the full body of evidence, the court sentenced three of the principal defendants to 19 years in prison for terrorism and criminal conspiracy. A fourth defendant received a 10-year prison sentence.

The tribunal also imposed fines exceeding 1 billion pesos, reflecting the severe damage caused to both public and private infrastructure.

Far from closing the chapter on the National Strike, the ruling reopens one of Colombia’s deepest political wounds: whether the country witnessed a legitimate social uprising, or whether parts of it were, from the beginning, a calculated strategy of destabilization supported by organized criminal networks.

For many Colombians, the answer may shape how the country remembers 2021—and who must ultimately be held responsible.

With just over a month to go before Colombia’s May 31 presidential election, a new Invamer poll suggests the race has narrowed to three viable contenders, as left-wing senator Iván Cepeda strengthens his lead and two right-wing rivals battle for a place in the runoff.

The survey, conducted for Noticias Caracol and Blu Radio, shows Cepeda commanding 44.3% of voting intention, a significant jump from 37.1% in February. The Pacto Histórico candidate has not only consolidated support among core voters but expanded his appeal across all regions, with particularly strong gains among younger voters aged 20 to 30.

Trailing behind, but still within striking distance of a second-round berth, are Abelardo de la Espriella with 21.5% and Paloma Valencia with 19.8%. While De la Espriella has posted modest gains since February, Valencia has emerged as the fastest-rising candidate, nearly doubling her support from 10% in the previous poll.

The data underscores a central dynamic shaping the race: a fragmented right competing for a single runoff slot, even as the left coalesces behind a dominant frontrunner. According to the data, as long as the right remains divided, any division among the pro-Uribe camps will continue to benefit Cepeda. Unless there is a clear consolidation after May 31, the numbers suggest the second round will be a contest over who faces the hard-leftist and not whether he gets to the final run-off.

The collapse of Colombia’s political center has been equally striking. Former Bogotá mayor Claudia López has seen her support plunge from 11.7% to 3.6%, while former Medellín mayor Sergio Fajardo has dropped from 6.6% to just 2.5%. Both candidates have lost more than half of their previous backing and now poll well below the 4% threshold required for state reimbursement of campaign expenses.

López’s decline appears particularly acute in urban constituencies, where she previously drew strong support, including among progressive and LGBTQ voters, pointing to a broader erosion of her core base. Fajardo, meanwhile, continues to struggle to regain traction, reflecting persistent voter dissatisfaction with centrist alternatives.

Analysts are also seeing how centrist voters are shifting toward Valencia, whose ticket includes former DANE statistics chief Juan Daniel Oviedo as the vice-presidential option. Oviedo appears to be decisive in broadening Valencia’s appeal beyond the Centro Democrático base.

Despite Cepeda’s commanding first-round lead, runoff scenarios suggest a more competitive contest – particularly if Valencia secures the second spot. In a hypothetical second round between Cepeda and De la Espriella, the left-wing candidate would win with 54.6% against 42.6%. However, against Valencia, the margin narrows significantly to 51.2% versus 46.6%.

That tightening gap reflects Valencia’s growing ability to attract support beyond her base, including voters from the political center and segments of the undecided electorate. According to the poll, she outperforms De la Espriella in capturing second-choice preferences, positioning her as the more competitive challenger in a potential runoff.

When respondents were asked who they would support if their first-choice candidate failed to advance, Cepeda led with 26.7%, followed closely by Valencia at 25.7%, with De la Espriella trailing at 19.8%. López and Fajardo lagged further behind, reinforcing their diminished relevance in the race.

Cepeda’s dominance, however, is not without warning signs. While he continues to lead comfortably, his projected runoff margins have narrowed compared to earlier surveys, particularly against Valencia. The erosion suggests that while his base remains solid, opposition voters may be coalescing more effectively than before.

For now, the trajectory is clear. Cepeda has gained ground nationally despite a worsening security situation and poll conducted before the terrorist bomb on Saturday, April 25 by FARC dissidents along the Pan-American highway in which 20 persons were killed.

With less than a month until Colombians head to the polls, the race appears increasingly defined not by a crowded field, but by a three-way struggle – one frontrunner and two challengers vying for the chance to stop him.

Colombian President Gustavo Petro will meet Venezuela’s interim leader Delcy Rodríguez in Caracas on Friday to address security challenges along the shared border, marking their first official encounter since Nicolás Maduro was captured by U.S special forces on January 3, 2026.

The meeting, to be held at the Miraflores presidential palace, is expected to center on coordination between the two countries to tackle armed groups, drug trafficking and other cross-border threats that have long destabilized frontier regions.

Colombia’s presidency said the talks aim to “strengthen bilateral cooperation, territorial control and coordination on security matters,” following the cancellation of a previous meeting scheduled for March 13 at the border due to security concerns cited by Caracas.

Friday’s talks come after Rodríguez assumed power earlier this year following the capture of former Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro during Operation Absolute Resolve.

Petro is expected to travel to Caracas after holding meetings earlier in Bogotá. The leaders will first hold a private discussion to outline joint actions addressing border instability, followed by a broader metting between their respective delegations aimed at formalizing institutional commitments.

Officials from both countries are also expected to sign the final act of the III Commission on Neighborhood and Integration, with foreign ministers participating, before delivering statements to the media.

The Colombia–Venezuela border stretches more than 2,200 kilometers (1,367 miles) from the Caribbean coast to the Amazon basin and has long been a hotspot for illegal activity, including the presence of the National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrilla, as well as drug trafficking and smuggling networks.

Petro said earlier this week that the talks would place particular emphasis on the Catatumbo region, one of the most volatile areas along the frontier, where violence linked to armed groups and illicit economies has intensified.

“If we go, Catatumbo is a key issue to discuss with President Delcy,” Petro said during a cabinet meeting on April 21, adding that his delegation would include military and police officials to coordinate security strategies.

He said the goal is to develop a joint security plan, improve coordination between the two countries’ armed forces and police, and deepen intelligence-sharing, warning that a lack of cooperation could lead to operations that harm civilian populations.

The meeting also comes against the backdrop of a rebound in bilateral trade between the two countries following years of strained relations.

Trade flows have increased significantly in recent years, rising from around US$200 million three years ago to more than $1 billion, representing an increase of roughly 600%, according to official figures.

Colombia recorded a trade surplus of US$1 billion with Venezuela in 2025, underscoring the economic incentives for both governments to maintain stable ties despite ongoing political uncertainties.

Petro first announced the trip last week during an interview in Spain, referencing the earlier failed meeting and signaling his willingness to travel to Caracas to advance talks.

The visit marks a key test of Colombia’s role in engaging with Venezuela’s transitional leadership, as both countries seek to stabilize their shared border while cautiously rebuilding diplomatic and economic relations in the post-Maduro era.

Bogotá, Colombia – Leftist presidential candidate Iván Cepeda challenged his opponents to a debate on Saturday after turning down previous proposals to face-off with his rivals.

“I challenge the far right, its two candidates – Senator Paloma Valencia and lawyer Abelardo de la Espriella – to a debate,” Cepeda told a crowd at a rally in Fusagasugá, a city near Bogotá. 

His opponents responded by accepting the proposal, while also highlighting that they had been calling for a debate for months.

The possibility of a live face-off between candidates has been a recurring theme ahead of first-round presidential elections on May 31.

Shortly after beginning his candidacy last year, Cepeda dismissed the idea of participating in a debate: “I’m not going to take part in debates—let me make this clear from the outset—to exchange insults with other candidates, or to threaten one another, or to denigrate one another.”

Cepeda’s rivals have repeatedly criticized him for refusing to spar with them on the public stage, something they highlighted following the leftist candidate’s U-turn on Saturday.

“Allow me to correct you: you’re not issuing a challenge; you’re accepting the challenge you were invited to take up months ago,” said criminal defense attorney de la Espriella.

Valencia, the candidate for the Centro Democrático (Democratic Center) party, also seized the opportunity to pounce on Cepeda: “A few weeks ago, it was I who challenged Iván Cepeda several times to a face-to-face debate, yet you chose to hide away in the Senate with a controlled microphone.”

She suggested that Cepeda’s U-turn owes to a worsening performance in recent polls: “Now that the polls are tightening, you’re coming out of Fusagasugá with this challenge.”

Analysts agreed with Valencia’s suggestion, saying that Cepeda’s debate proposal is an attempt to inject life into a stagnating campaign. 

“Cepeda has offered to debate because of his campaign’s inherent lack of momentum and general weakness. He is not captivating any new voters or finding a tangible way of changing the narrative in his favor,” Sergio Guzmán, Director at Colombia Risk Analysis, a political risk consultancy, told Latin America Reports. 

Internal party polls reportedly show sluggish growth in Cepeda’s polling numbers since he became the official candidate for the Pacto Histórico (Historic Pact) in October. 

Meanwhile, Valencia has been soaring in the polls following her victory in presidential primaries in March; Cepeda and de la Espriella did not partake.

But the debate is not without risk for Cepeda, according to Guzmán: “Cepeda runs the risk of having to go on the defensive of Petro and his administration.”

Others believe that Cepeda’s oratory style does not lend itself to the televised debate format.

“He has a much more academic tendency, which is not so typical in politics, let alone in modern politics,” noted Miguel Jaramillo Luján, a Colombian political strategist. In contrast, he noted that de la Espriella and Valencia have a more media-savvy communication style.

Nevertheless, the analyst told Latin America Reports that Cepeda’s debate style could give him the chance to woo crucial centrist voters: “I believe he can inspire confidence and credibility among his target audience and even among the centre, particularly when it comes to dispelling certain myths and lies that have been spread by the centre and the right.”

With the leading candidates agreeing to debate, the battle over the specifics – including moderators, questions, and location – begins. 

The post Colombia elections: candidates set for debate after Cepeda backtracks appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

Fresh audio revelations broadcast by Noticias Caracol have triggered a political storm in Colombia, implicating senior government-linked figures in alleged secret contacts with one of the country’s most notorious smugglers, Diego Marín Buitrago.

The recordings, aired late on April 5, appear to document meetings between intermediaries connected to President Gustavo Petro and the legal representative of Marín, widely known by the alias “Papá Pitufo.” The revelations come with just over four months remaining in Petro’s presidential term, intensifying scrutiny over his administration.

According to the report, the audios – lasting more than 90 minutes – capture conversations from early 2025 involving at least four individuals allegedly acting as emissaries of the government. Among them is Jorge Lemus, the former head of the National Intelligence Directorate (DNI), as well as other figures with links to the administration.

In the recordings, Lemus is heard holding closed-door meetings with Marín’s lawyer, Luis Felipe Ramírez, in which possible judicial benefits and guarantees are discussed in exchange for cooperation. Such proposals, if confirmed, would fall outside the remit of intelligence officials and raise questions about potential overreach and irregular negotiations.

The audios also suggest that these contacts occurred before any formal intervention by judicial authorities, with intermediaries allegedly presenting themselves as acting on behalf of the executive branch. Additional names mentioned include Catalan political figures Xavier Vendrell and Ramón Devesa, as well as former financial intelligence adviser Isaac Beltrán.

The revelations have revived a long-running controversy over alleged links between Marín and Petro’s 2022 presidential campaign. Previous reports indicated that the smuggler may have contributed 500 million pesos (approximately $130,000) to the campaign—funds Petro has said were returned upon discovery of their origin. However, opposition figures argue that no conclusive proof of that վերադարձ has ever been presented.

Opposition leaders, including senator and presidential hopeful Paloma Valencia, seized on the latest disclosures to demand an independent investigation. “This is an extremely serious institutional matter,” Valencia said in a video response, questioning the absence of evidence regarding the alleged վերադարձ of the funds and warning of a pattern of clandestine contacts.

Critics argue that the recordings point to “under-the-table” dealings with criminal actors, potentially undermining the government’s legitimacy at a critical political juncture.

President Petro responded by acknowledging that intelligence contacts with Marín’s circle had taken place but insisted they were authorized and aimed solely at securing the smuggler’s cooperation with Colombian justice.

“The purpose was to bring Marín to Colombia,” Petro said, framing the outreach as part of a broader strategy to dismantle criminal networks. However, the president went further, alleging that some intelligence agents may have exploited the situation by attempting to solicit money during the interactions.

According to Petro, these alleged irregularities led to dismissals within state agencies, suggesting internal misconduct rather than a coordinated government effort to negotiate with the smuggler.

The president also criticized the Fiscalía General de la Nación, accusing prosecutors of limiting the scope of investigations and pursuing what he described as a politically motivated campaign against his administration.

Marín, long considered one of Colombia’s most significant contraband operators, has been linked for decades to networks involved in smuggling and bribery. His arrest in Europe in 2024 triggered an ongoing extradition process, though legal challenges in countries including Spain and Portugal have complicated proceedings.

Prosecutors in Colombia have charged him with criminal conspiracy and bribery, alleging he led a sophisticated structure that penetrated state institutions.

The latest revelations add to mounting political pressure on Petro, whose administration has already faced a series of scandals and internal fractures. With the presidential term nearing its end, the emergence of recorded evidence – rather than testimony or second-hand accounts—marks a potentially decisive moment in a controversy that has shadowed his government for years.

Whether the audios lead to formal investigations or judicial consequences remains unclear. But politically, the damage appears immediate, reopening questions about the boundaries between state actors and criminal networks—and the extent to which those lines may have been blurred behind closed doors.

Colombia is on the verge of banning female genital mutilation (FGM), as lawmakers advance legislation that would outlaw a practice still reported in parts of the country, making it the only nation in Latin America where cases have been documented.

In a unanimous decision, the First Commission of the Senate approved the bill in its third debate, leaving just one final vote in the full chamber before it can become law — a significant step in addressing a practice widely condemned as a violation of human rights.

The initiative, known as Bill 440 of 2025 (accumulated with 239 of 2024), seeks not only to prohibit FGM but to eradicate the conditions that allow it to persist, particularly in indigenous communities.

“This is about settling a historic debt with Indigenous women and girls,” Representative Jennifer Pedraza said after the vote. “Eradicating this violent and limiting practice is essential to guaranteeing their health and dignity.”

Globally, more than 230 million girls and women alive today have undergone FGM, according to the World Health Organization. The practice, defined as the partial or total removal of external female genitalia for non-medical reasons, is most often carried out on minors and can lead to severe bleeding, infections, complications in childbirth and long-term psychological trauma.

While FGM is most prevalent in parts of Africa, the Middle East and Asia, Colombia’s case has drawn particular concern due to its singular status in the Americas. Lawmakers noted that the practice disproportionately affects very young girls, often under the age of one, with cases concentrated in the departments of La Guajira, Chocó and Risaralda.

Official data show a gradual decline in reported cases: 91 in 2023, 54 in 2024 and 39 so far in 2025. Authorities caution, however, that underreporting, is pervasive.

The bill marks a strategic shift away from punitive approaches toward prevention, education and intercultural dialogue. Senator Clara López, who led the initiative in the Senate, argued that criminalization alone has failed to eliminate the practice elsewhere.

“In countries where FGM has been banned for decades, prevalence remains high,” López said during the debate, pointing to cases such as Mali and Egypt, where rates have remained above 80% despite legal prohibitions.

The legislation was developed through consultations with Indigenous leaders, including representatives of the Emberá community, where cases have been recorded. Juliana Dominico, a spokesperson for the Emberá, backed the bill while stressing that FGM is not an essential cultural or spiritual practice.

Supporters argue that framing FGM solely as a criminal issue risks driving it underground and alienating communities. Instead, the proposed law emphasizes public health strategies, education campaigns and culturally sensitive engagement to encourage abandonment of the practice.

International bodies have long called for a coordinated response. In 2008, the World Health Assembly adopted Resolution WHA61.16, urging governments to act across sectors including health, education, justice and social services.

Beyond its immediate health risks, FGM is widely recognized as a violation of fundamental rights, including bodily integrity and freedom from cruel or degrading treatment. In some cases, the procedure can be fatal.

The economic burden is also significant. The WHO estimates that treating complications related to FGM costs health systems around $1.4 billion annually, a figure expected to rise without stronger efforts to end the practice.

If approved in its final debate, Colombia’s ban would mark a turning point for the hemisphere, aligning the country with global efforts to eliminate FGM while testing a prevention-focused model that lawmakers hope will succeed where criminalization alone has fallen short.

The investigation into Colombia’s President comes on the heels of Petro’s visit to Washington & meeting with Trump.

The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has designated Colombian President Gustavo Petro as a priority target as federal prosecutors in New York investigate potential connections to narcotics trafficking organizations. Records indicate that the US Department of Justice is reviewing multiple inquiries dating back to 2022, primarily supported by information from confidential informants.

The investigations involve allegations regarding interactions with the Sinaloa cartel and the possible use of the Paz Total policy to benefit specific traffickers who reportedly contributed to the 2022 presidential campaign. Documents also mention the potential use of law enforcement assets to facilitate the transport of cocaine and fentanyl through maritime terminals. The priority target designation is applied to individuals whom the DEA identifies as having a significant influence on international narcotics distribution.

President Petro has denied any involvement with criminal organizations or the acceptance of illicit funds for his political activities. In a statement released on social media, he suggested that legal proceedings in the US would eventually disprove allegations originating from political opponents. The Embassy of Colombia in Washington stated that the reports are based on unverified and anonymous sources.

“The reported insinuations have no legal or factual basis,” stated the Embassy of Colombia in Washington.

The inquiry has expanded in recent months, with prosecutors in the Eastern and Southern Districts of New York questioning detained individuals about allegations that representatives of the administration solicited bribes in exchange for preventing extradition to the US. It has not been confirmed whether formal charges will be filed against the president, and the White House has stated it has played no role in the independent judicial process.

Portions of the DEA records cite a 2024 interview regarding allegations that former aides and officials from Ecopetrol (NYSE: EC) (BVC: ECOPETROL) were used to launder funds. Ricardo Roa, the president of Ecopetrol, has denied these claims. Simultaneously, the US Department of the Treasury previously sanctioned Petro in late 2025, citing concerns over cocaine production levels, though specific evidence was not made public at that time.

While Petro denies connections to criminal groups, it is important to note that he was a member of the homicidal M-19 guerilla group in Colombia from his teenage years until the group laid down its arms in 1987. Petro served prison time for illegal arms possession due to his activities with the M-19.

Domestic investigations in Colombia are also ongoing regarding the president’s relatives. His son, Nicolas Petro, faced charges in 2023 related to the alleged receipt of funds from a convicted trafficker. Furthermore, the president’s brother, Juan Fernando Petro, has been linked to investigations involving unauthorized negotiations with inmates at the La Picota prison regarding the Paz total framework and extradition protections.

Witnesses currently in US custody who may be relevant to the ongoing probes include former members of the Venezuelan Cartel de Los Soles and various Colombian nationals recently extradited, such as individuals associated with the La Inmaculada organization and the Clan del Golfo (Gulf Clan). Some reports suggest that sums near $500 million COP were discussed in exchange for gestores de paz (“Peace Manager”) status, though these allegations remain under judicial review.

Headline photo: Colombian President Gustavo Petro (photo César Carrión, Presidencia de Colombia)

Though surprises are possible, polling says the front runners are Iván Cepeda, Abelardo de la Espriella, and Paloma Valencia.

The Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil of Colombia (RNEC), the entity responsible for organizing elections in the country, reported that a total of 14 candidates have officially registered to run in the country’s presidential elections, scheduled for May 31, 2026. In this vote, citizens will elect the President and Vice President of the Republic for the 2026–2030 term.

According to the electoral authority, the candidates represent a wide range of political perspectives, from left to right, including independent candidacies running through political movements. Here the list and brief profile of the candidates:

1. Clara Eugenia López Obregón, currently a senator for the Esperanza Democrática She has served as Minister of Labor (2016–2017), acting mayor of Bogotá (2011–2012), and Bogotá’s secretary of government (2008–2010). She has been affiliated with left-wing parties and was Gustavo Petro’s vice presidential running mate in the 2010 election.
2. Óscar Mauricio Lizcano, from the FAMILIA coalition. He served as Minister of Information Technologies (2023–2025), was a senator (2010–2018), and a member of the House of Representatives (2006–2010).
3. Raúl Santiago Botero, candidate of the “Romper el Sistema” movement (Break the Establishment). An agronomist engineer and businessman from Medellín, he presents himself as an independent candidate with no prior political experience.
4. Miguel Uribe Londoño, father of the slain presidential candidate Miguel Uribe Turbay. He is running under the Colombian Democratic Party and previously served as president of the Centro Democrático party founded by Álvaro Uribe Vélez.
5. Sondra Macollins Garvin, from the movement “La Abogada de Hierro” (The Iron Lawyer) A criminal lawyer and psychologist, she presents herself as an independent candidate without political affiliations. She ran for the House of Representatives in 2022 and is known for her work in narcotrafficking and corruption cases.
6. Iván Cepeda Castro, a senator since 2014 and the official candidate of the Pacto Histórico, the same party as President Gustavo Petro. Polls project he will receive the highest vote share in the first election round. He is aligned with left-wing political ideas.
7. Abelardo de la Espriella, a lawyer with far-right positions, running for the first time under the Defensores de la Patria movement. Recent polls place him as a likely second or third contender in voter preference.
8. Claudia López Hernández, former mayor of Bogotá (2020–2023) and former senator (2014–2018), running under the centrist movement “Imparables con Claudia.” She is known for her anti-corruption agenda and secured her candidacy with more than 570,000 votes (about 9%) in recent interparty primaries.
9. Paloma Valencia Laserna, current senator and candidate of the Centro Democrático party led by Álvaro Uribe Vélez. She won the right-wing interparty primary on March 8 with more than 3 million votes. Polls place her among the top three contenders, and if she reaches a runoff, she would become the first woman in Colombia’s history to do so.

• Sergio Fajardo Valderrama, an academic and mathematician running for the Dignidad y Compromiso He served as mayor of Medellín and governor of Antioquia and is running for president for the third time.
• Roy Barreras, from the political party La Fuerza (The Force). He won the left-wing coalition primary on March 8 with the lowest vote total (257,000 votes, about 3.6%). Although currently aligned with left-wing movements and part of the Petro administration, he has previously been affiliated with right- and center-leaning parties.
• Gustavo Matamoros Camacho, of the Colombian Ecologist Party. He served in the Colombian Army for 43 years. With no prior political experience, his campaign focuses on public security.
• Luis Gilberto Murillo, who served as Minister of Foreign Affairs (2024–2025) and Colombia’s ambassador to the United States (2022–2024). A human rights advocate and Afro-Colombian leader from Chocó, he presents himself as an independent, moderate, centrist candidate.
• Carlos Eduardo Caicedo, running under the independent movement “Con Caicedo.” He was mayor of Santa Marta (2012–2015) and governor of Magdalena (2020–2023), where he built a strong base as a left-wing political leader.

The RNEC also reported that “the draw to determine the position of presidential candidates on the ballot will take place on March 25 at the Ágora Bogotá Convention Center.”

This process marks the formal start of the final phase of the presidential campaign, during which candidates will seek to consolidate support ahead of the first round on May 31. If no candidate secures an absolute majority, a runoff between the two leading candidates will be held on June 21.

Headline photo: Polling station in Colombia during last Congress elections in March 8, 2026. Photo courtesy of the Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil.

U.S. federal prosecutors have opened preliminary criminal investigations into Colombian President Gustavo Petro over alleged links to drug traffickers and possible illicit financing of his 2022 campaign, according to a report by The New York Times.

The previously undisclosed probes are being conducted by federal prosecutors in Manhattan and Brooklyn and involve specialists in international narcotics trafficking, as well as agents from the Drug Enforcement Administration and Homeland Security Investigations, the newspaper said, citing people familiar with the matter.

Investigators are examining, among other issues, whether Petro held meetings with individuals connected to drug trafficking networks and whether his presidential campaign solicited or received donations from such actors. The two investigations are being carried out independently and remain in their early stages, with no certainty that they will lead to formal criminal charges.

There is no indication that the White House played any role in launching the investigations, according to the report. However, the inquiries emerge in a broader context of heightened tensions and fluctuating diplomacy between Bogotá and Washington.

Relations between Petro and U.S. President Donald Trump have been volatile, marked by sharp public exchanges, threats of tariffs that were never implemented, and the temporary revocation of Petro’s U.S. visa. Trump has repeatedly accused Petro of failing to curb narcotics production and has described him in highly critical terms, while Petro has denounced what he characterises as political pressure and interference.

The U.S. Treasury Department last year imposed sanctions on Petro, members of his family and senior officials, including Interior Minister Armando Benedetti, alleging links to narcotics activity. The measures, which included asset freezes and travel restrictions, were justified by Washington on the grounds that cocaine production in Colombia had reached record levels and that the government had offered concessions to armed groups involved in trafficking.

Petro has rejected those claims, insisting that his administration has strengthened seizures of cocaine and slowed the rate of expansion of coca cultivation. He has also denied any knowledge of illicit funds entering his campaign, dismissing the allegations as politically motivated attacks.

Colombia’s Attorney General  is examining charges that Petro’s son – Nicolás Petro – received money from individuals linked to illicit activities during the 2022 campaign. While his son acknowledged receiving funds that were not reported, no criminal charges have been filed against the president himself, and Petro has maintained he was unaware of the campaign “donations”.

According to the NYT, the U.S. investigations are taking place amid a broader strategy in which Washington has increasingly used legal and judicial tools to advance foreign policy objectives. Analysts say such actions could serve as leverage in bilateral relations or influence political dynamics in allied countries.

The timing of the probes is particularly sensitive, as Colombia prepares for presidential elections on May 31, with a potential runoff in June. Petro, the country’s first leftist president, is constitutionally barred from seeking re-election but has actively backed his political successor with hardleftist Iván Cepeda.

The allegations could reverberate through the electoral campaign, where relations with the United States remain a central issue. Candidates on the right have emphasised the importance of maintaining close ties with Washington, while figures on the left have framed U.S. actions as a challenge to Colombia’s sovereignty.

Despite months of tensions, diplomatic relations between the two countries have shown signs of stabilisation in recent weeks. Petro and Trump held a bilateral meeting at the White House earlier this year, which both sides described as constructive, and officials have since sought to rebuild communication channels.

Even so, uncertainty persists over the trajectory of the relationship, particularly as Washington continues to prioritise counternarcotics cooperation with Colombia, historically one of its closest partners in the region.

Petro has consistently denied any links to drug trafficking and has pointed to his government’s security strategy, which includes negotiations with armed groups and efforts to reduce violence, as evidence of a broader approach to the drug trade.

The start of U.S. investigations add a new layer of complexity to an already fraught political and diplomatic landscape, with potential implications not only for Petro’s post-presidential future but for Colombia’s ties with its most important security ally.

President Gustavo Petro accused Ecuador on Monday of carrying out bombing raids inside Colombian territory, sharply escalating a diplomatic and trade dispute that has been simmering since January.

Petro said “27 charred bodies” have been found near the border and suggested the attacks could not have been carried out by illegal armed groups, though he presented no evidence to support the claim.

“Ecuador is bombing us, and these are not illegal armed groups,” Petro said during a televised cabinet meeting, warning of a serious breach of sovereignty.

Ecuador’s President Daniel Noboa swiftly rejected the accusation.

“President Petro, your statements are false; we are acting within our own territory,” Noboa said, adding that Ecuadorian forces were targeting “narco-terrorist structures” operating near the border.

Petro said a bomb believed to have been dropped from an aircraft had been discovered near the frontier, reinforcing what he described as a pattern of cross-border strikes.

“A bomb has appeared, dropped from a plane… very close to the border with Ecuador,” Petro said. “We must investigate thoroughly, but this supports my suspicion that Ecuador is bombing us.”

He added that “many explosions” had been reported and said his government would soon release an audio recording allegedly originating from Ecuador.

In a post on social media platform X, Petro said the bombings did not appear to come from Colombian armed forces or illegal groups, which he argued lack the capability to carry out aerial attacks. “The explanation (from Ecuador) is not credible,” he wrote, without specifying when or where the deaths occurred.

Ecuador doubles down

Noboa, facing a surge in organized crime violence at home, has adopted an aggressive military strategy that includes aerial bombardments of suspected cartel camps near the Colombian border.

His government says the operations are conducted strictly within Ecuadorian territory and are often aimed at groups with Colombian origins, including FARC dissidents. “Together with international cooperation, we continue this fight, bombing locations used as hideouts by these groups, many of them Colombian,” Noboa said in a statement.

He also accused Colombia of failing to control its side of the border, allowing criminal organizations to spill into Ecuador.

The latest confrontation comes against the backdrop of a worsening trade dispute that began in January when Ecuador imposed a 30% “security tariff” on Colombian imports, citing Bogotá’s alleged inaction against narcotrafficking.

The tariff was later increased to 50%.

Colombia retaliated with tariffs on 73 products, suspended electricity exports to Ecuador, and imposed restrictions on bilateral trade, deepening tensions between the neighboring countries.

Ecuador responded by raising fees on the transport of Colombian crude through one of its main pipelines.

Despite early attempts to contain the fallout, relations have steadily deteriorated, culminating in the current exchange of accusations.

Risk of escalation

Petro’s latest claims mark the most serious rupture yet, raising the specter of a cross-border military incident between the two countries, which share a long and porous frontier plagued by drug trafficking and illegal mining.

The Colombian president said he had appealed to Donald Trump to intervene diplomatically.“I asked him to act and call the president of Ecuador because we do not want to go to war,” he said.

The involvement of the United States adds another layer of complexity. Ecuador recently deepened security cooperation with Washington, including the establishment of a new FBI office and joint operations targeting organized crime. Earlier this month, Ecuadorian and U.S. forces conducted strikes on a camp linked to the Comandos de la Frontera, a dissident faction of the FARC guerrilla.

The Colombia–Ecuador border has long been a strategic corridor for cocaine trafficking, with armed groups exploiting weak state presence on both sides. While the border itself is not disputed, diverging security strategies have increasingly brought Bogotá and Quito into conflict.

Petro’s government has prioritized negotiations with armed groups under its “Total Peace” policy, while Noboa has pursued a hardline military crackdown.

For now, the allegations from Casa de Nariño remain unverified, but the political damage is done – and one further miscalculation could carry deep consequences far beyond the shared border.

Colombia kicked off its electoral year with the Senate and House elections last weekend, alongside consultas for presidential runs. Who’s come out ahead?

The Colombian elections of 2026 started last week, with the Senate and Cámara finalising their seats for the next parliament. The presidential elections will take place at the end of May, with a second round in June if necessary.

The presidential elections also had a hand in last week’s results, with consultas to decide on who would represent groups of candidates with similar politics. That saw Claudia López, Roy Barreras and Paloma Valencia take the honours in their respective consultas.

When all was said and done, the results showed that traditional parties and candidates had generally performed poorly, with new candidates doing well and a difference in the traditional balance of power.

So, a week on and with the dust having settled as final results come in from all over the country, who’s up and who’s down after the first Colombian elections of 2026?  

Winners

It was a good day for the government, with the Pacto Histórico gaining seats and a low turnout for the leftist consulta. The Centro Democrático, too, had a good afternoon. Paloma won her consulta handily and the party overall also gained seats in borth houses.

Pacto Historico

The governing party had a spectacular Sunday, simply said. They increased their presence in both chambers and became the largest single party to boot. The Senate remains without a clear majority, but they are in a very strong position indeed, even without the former FARC combatientes’ curules.

On top of that, other results largely went their way. The leftist consulta that Cepeda was blocked from running in was a washout as the Pacto told their supporters to stay away. Prominent critics of the party from other parties such as Robledo, Miranda, Betancourt and Juvinao all crashed out as well.

While an overall majority in either house is far from within their grasp, the Senate now leans slightly more left than right, with left and centre-left senators adding up to 53. On top of that, after an often rocky government, it’s clear that they haven’t lost their base, indeed even expanding.

Paloma Valencia

A fortnight ago, Paloma Valencia’s campaign seemed to be stuttering. She was polling in single figures for first round intentions for the presidency and making few public appearances other than the mass debates for the Gran Consulta por Colombia. There was even a worry that she might suffer an upset in that consulta.

Fast forward to today and it’s a very different picture indeed. The latest polling shows her rocketing in popularity, now standing at around 20%. That’s because she picked up over three million votes in that consulta.

Then she picked the runner up in that race as her VP ticket, a smart move on her side to try and attract voters more in the centre as well as boost her in the capital. It’s not a landslide move, but it’s canny and the presidential race will likely come down to small margins. 

Juan Daniel Oviedo

Technically a loser, in the sense that he was a clear second to Valencia in the Gran Consulta. However, he picked up over a million votes, paying off his mortgage and significantly outperforming expectations. He also opened the door for some new paths in his political adventure. 

It had looked like his next step was to concentrate on a tilt for Bogotá mayor, having come in second last time around after another strong campaign. He then pulled a remarkable volte-face, accepting Valencia’s offer to run on her ticket.

That’s a move that puts him potentially in a different league than before, very much on the national stage now. It’s come at an enormous reputational price though, with many that voted for him feeling betrayed as he runs on a rightist ticket. He can claim that it’s centrist as much as he likes, but few see it that way.

Influencers

Electorates worldwide are losing patience with technocrats and politics as usual. That’s as true in Colombia as anywhere else, with a number of influencers running and doing fairly well. This is a trend that has been open for a while and shows no sign of slowing down.

Former adult actress Amaranta Hank won a spot for the Pacto Historico, while the White Elephant took a seat for the Partido Verde, having started out as a content creator looking to expose corruption and poor spending practices.

Safety

Despite fears of electoral violence and a turbulent run-up to election day, it was a relatively calm Sunday in the end. There was an attack on a voting centre in Meta, plus another couple of issues elsewhere, but overall it was a good sign for the upcoming presidential elections.

Losers

There were plenty of losers last week, with several high-profile candidates for the presidential race crashing out in their consultas. That saw Vicky Dávila unconvincingly claiming she wasn’t a loser and Enrique Peñalosa falling at the first hurdle again among others.

Farewell, too, for some familiar faces. Ingrid Betancourt failed to make the cut for Senate, losing her seat alongside her party. Jorge Robledo, the leftmost critic of Petro did likewise. Miguel Polo Polo unsurprisingly lost his seat as an Afro-Colombian representative, replaced by a principled lawyer, which delighted many.

In general, old parties and old faces fared poorly, with incumbency working against many. A striking exception to that was the party for ex-FARC combatants, Comunes. To their surprise, but no one else’s, they failed to meet the threshold for representation.

Roy Barreras

Standing in the leftwing consulta, Roy won in the sense that he saw off the threat from controversial former Medellín mayor Daniel Quintero. However, the Pacto campaign to not vote in consultas laid his lack of support bare.

Viejos Verdes

The Partido Verde managed to limit their losses in terms of seats, remaining at a similar level as before. However, there has been a significant change in who takes those curules. They had an open list, meaning that no-one was assured of a place.

Voters made it clear that they wanted to see new blood, with government critics Katherine Miranda and Cathy Juvinao voted out, along with Inti Asprilla and Angelica Lozano. 

The old Frente Nacional

For much of the last century, the Liberales and Conservadores absolutely dominated Colombian politics. For most of this century they’ve avoided running viable presidential candidates, preferring to hold their power in the Senate, Cámara and local politics. 

This time out they have taken a big hit in both houses, losing five seats between them and no longer being in the top level of voting blocs. Due to the fragmented nature of the parliament, they retain some kingmaking powers, but are a shadow of what they once were.

A big question now looms for both parties ahead of next year’s local elections. Just as the Pacto will feel they can make some big gains there, so too will the Liberales and Conservadores worry they might take more damage.

Claudia López

The former Bogotá mayor faced no real opposition in her consulta, sailing through with over 90% of the vote. However, that was 90% of not very much and she failed to get voters out to show support in the way that Valencia and Oviedo did. She faces an uphill slog from here.

Sergio Fajardo and Abelardo de la Espriella

Neither of this pair were in consultas, instead going to the second round. That’s meant they’ve been kept out of the headlines and lost momentum as well as having some unfortunate results.

The scale of the turnout for Valencia shows she’s a viable contender to Aspriella on the right and her leap in polling is matched by a significant downturn for el tigre. For Fajardo, it’s even worse: voters are largely abandoning the centre and technocratic politicians.

Trust in the system

 With the governing party repeatedly questioning the openness and fairness of the elections, this was rough. There have been a number of reports coming out questioning the practices of various voting centres and plenty of allegations, particularly from the left.

On top of that, a couple of candidates were arrested on voting day with big bags of cash that were allegedly to be used in vote-buying. While corruption in electoral processes is likely nowhere near as widespread as many claim, it’s clearly still an issue, especially in rural zones.

Centrist politics

Other than Juan Daniel Oviedo, centrists had a bad day at the polls, especially the centre-right. While the Centro Democrático and Pacto Historico gained votes on the flanks of both right and left, parties close to the centre lost out. 

Cambio Radical took a big hit, as did the conservatives, with Abelardo de la Espriella’s new Salvación Nacional party gaining three seats from literally nowhere. The partido de la U also lost a seat while Ahora! won another two seats. Poor turnout for the centrist consulta also means there seems to be little support on the presidential level.

What happens next?

The presidential election on May 31 is now very much the focus of attention. Iván Cepeda still leads the polls comfortably, with Paloma Valencia and Abelardo de la Aspriella splitting the rightwing vote at the moment. However, with over two months of campaigning time ahead, there is plenty of time for everything to change.

Gustavo Petro has shown little sign of intending to follow the guidelines on not campaigning, making references to Oviedo and Valencia as well as thinly-disguised references to Cepeda and so on. Expect this to continue and ever more strongly worded warnings from the registraduría to be ignored.

It’s also likely that there will be ever more rhetoric over electoral fraud, with the Pacto campaign leaning heavily into that already and working on raising awareness of the issue ahead of the voting for the first round.

There’s currently a very good chance that the presidential campaigns will get pretty ugly, with lots of negative campaigning and attack ads. There is no love lost between the candidates and plenty of bad blood on all sides. We’ll keep you up to date with things as the campaigns develop.

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