A simmering spat over candidates for government posts boiled up this week with revelations that a Bogotá university was faking professional titles for workers in Petro’s administration.

According to congress members revealing the scandal, 24 public servants got top contracts using dodgy titles from Universidad Fundación San José, a mold-breaking higher education institute once famed for accessible courses, but now under scrutiny for selling degrees.

They also accused Petro and his education chiefs of dragging their feet in investigating the university for the suspected fraud case.  

“Petro’s promises for education come to nothing,” said house representative Catherine Juvinao after she claimed to have identified 24 cases where officials and contractors in top government entities appeared to have been hired with diplomas from the Univerisity Foundation San José without all the tests.

One stand-out case was a government functionary who, according to university records, graduated in four quite different degrees – Business Administration, Industrial Engineering, Public Accounting and International Marketing – on the same day.

“This is one of the most serious cases. Who graduates with four degrees on the same day?,” the representative said in an interview with Semana magazine.

According to Juvinoa, the university handed out diplomas to students who had failed to complete the independent technical tests, known as PruebaPro, and in some cases had not studied at all.

Fake titles for plum jobs?

Although academic fraud has occured regularly in Colombia – and similar scandals have rocked previous governments – the investigations by Juvinao and her team are targeting an administration that promised to turn its back on corruption.

This week’s revelations followed last year’s political dogfight over the proposed appointment of 23-year-old Juliana Guerrero as vice-minister of youth. The candidate, who was close to both Petro and his education minister, was already embroiled in controversies over private use of police planes. Then in September she was found to have falsified her accounting qualifications at the university.

After public pressure the university rescinded the degree, and Guerrero herself told Caracol news that she intended to take the independent exams to regain her title in November.

Further investigations revealed a bigger suspicion: that the Petro government was routinely using the university – with which it had contracts – to fudge academic requirements for candidates favoured for plum jobs.

This week Juvinao accused  Petro government or running a “Cartel of Dodgy Diplomas” in cahoots with the San José university. “It’s bad news that our first left-wing government ended up being a monument to mediocrity, captured by an institution,” she said.

The state was “closing the door to those who studied hard by merit,” she said, while calling for a probe by the Attorney General’s office, adding that: “we have all the evidence to support any investigation”.

Political Attacks

For its part, the Ministry of Education announced this week it was investigating the University Foundation San José related to the case of Guerrero, Petro’s preferred candidate for the Ministry of Youth.

In the same communication, the ministry strongly denied it had any link to “illicit activities related to the expedition of academic titles”.

The Colombian president repeatedly defended Guerrero’s nomination for the post last year even after her degree was pulled by the university. Her only error was to claim her title before taking the final exam, he said, suggesting a storm in a teacup. The attacks were personal and political, he added.

“So, Juliana’s graduation exam, after completing her studies, was registered for in July and is scheduled for next November. Is that the summary of this scandal?” he wrote on X.

At first view Petro’s gesture seemed on target; young candidates, particularly female, get torrents of abuse in the rough-and-tumble of Colombian politics, often facing a public scrutiny less applied to old-school politicos.

But looking back that defence now seems misplaced: financial data revealed this month showed Guerrero had paid for her degree course long after receiving her diploma – almost unheard of in Colombia – while the university itself confirmed that she “never went to classes or presented exams nor complied with the accounting program”.

Doubling down

This week Petro doubled down on his defense of the University Foundation San José, claiming the accusations by the opposition unfairly focused on “poor single mothers” trying to get ahead.

“Private universities…allow these working women to study faster,” he said. “[Politicians] to gain votes shouldn’t destroy working women. I expect a public apology from these congresswomen to the working women of Colombia.”

To complicate the president’s narrative, referring to the Guerrero case, the university announced it had “detected and denounced a fraud” and had itself requested the attorney general’s office to investigate. It also promised to “stregthen internal audits” to prevent future cheating.

Representative Juvinao told Semana told Semana magazine that the Guerrero case suggested corruption in the form of cash for qualifications, and was likely “the tip off an iceberg”.

“There is a deliberate strategy to fabricate qualifications to fit the needs of Petro’s government departments,” she said.

In a country where people struggle for further education – and value highly their hard-earned academic qualifications – what started as an online spat over a youth representative is becoming a scandal with much more scope.

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Colombia and Ecuador have started exchanging trade retaliations after Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa announced a 30% “security” tariff on imports from Colombia, escalating tensions between Andean neighbours over border security cooperation.

Noboa said the measure would take effect on Feb. 1 and would remain in place until Colombia shows “real commitment” to jointly tackle drug trafficking and illegal mining along the shared frontier. He made the announcement from Davos, where he is attending the World Economic Forum.

“We have made real efforts of cooperation with Colombia… but while we have insisted on dialogue, our military continues facing criminal groups tied to drug trafficking on the border without any cooperation,” Noboa said in a post on X, citing an annual trade deficit of more than $1 billion.

Colombia’s foreign ministry rejected the tariff in a formal protest note, calling it a unilateral decision that violates Andean Community (CAN) rules, and proposed a ministerial meeting involving foreign affairs, defence, trade and energy officials on Jan. 25 in Ipiales, Colombia’s southern border city.

The government of President Gustavo Petro also announced a 30% tariff on 20 products imported from Ecuador in response, though it has not specified the items. Diana Marcela Morales, Colombia’s Minister of Commerce, Industry and Tourism (MinCIT) said Ecuador’s exports covered by the retaliatory measure total some $250 million, and described the policy as “temporary” and “revisable.”

Fedexpor, Ecuador’s exporters federation, said non-oil exports to Colombia rose 4% between January and November 2025, and that the Colombian market receives more than 1,130 Ecuadorian export products. The top exports include wood boards, vegetable oils and fats, canned tuna, minerals and metals, and processed food products.

The dispute has also spread into the energy sector. Colombia’s Ministry of Mines and Energy said on Thursday it had suspended international electricity transactions with Ecuador, citing climate-related pressure on domestic supply and the need to prioritise national demand amid concerns over a possible new El Niño weather cycle.

Ecuador has struggled with severe droughts in recent years, triggering long power cuts in 2024 and 2025 in a country where roughly 70% of electricity generation depends on hydropower, while Colombia has supplied electricity during periods of shortage.

President Petro noted that Colombia acted in solidarity during Ecuador’s worst drought in 60 years. “I hope Ecuador has appreciated that when we were needed, we responded with energy,” Petro said on Wednesday.

Following Colombia’s electricity suspension, Ecuador announced new tariffs on transporting Colombian crude through its heavy crude pipeline system. Environment and Energy Minister Inés Manzano said the oil transport fee through the OCP pipeline would reflect “reciprocity,” without giving details.

Colombia and Ecuador share a 600-kilometre border stretching from the Pacific coast to the Amazon, where Colombian armed groups and criminal networks operate, including organisations involved in drug trafficking, arms smuggling and illegal mining. Relations between Petro and Noboa, who sit on opposite ends of the political spectrum, have frequently been strained.

The Bogotá mayoralty has declared the tender process for the construction of the capital’s second metro line void after no bids were submitted by the deadline, Mayor Carlos Fernando Galán said on Tuesday, highlighting ongoing challenges facing Colombia’s most ambitious infrastructure project.

Galán said none of the prequalified consortia presented final offers before the cutoff time on Jan. 20, forcing the city to restart the process. He stressed, however, that the decision does not jeopardize the continuation of the project, which is expected to be re-tendered through a new international bidding process beginning in February. “We must inform the public that no proposals were received from the consortia that were prequalified to submit offers,” Galán told a press conference. “This does not mean that Metro Line 2 will not go ahead. Metro Line 2 continues.”

Bogotá’s second metro line, a 15.5-kilometre underground system designed to connect the city’s northern and western districts with the centre, is a key component of efforts to modernize public transport in a city of more than 8 million residents.

The project is expected to include 11 stations, most of them underground, and carry up to 50,000 passengers per hour in each direction.

The Mayor said the new tender would benefit from a more mature technical and financial structure, as well as continued backing from multilateral lenders and Colombia’s national government through existing co-financing agreements. Authorities aim to award the contract in the first quarter of 2027.

The failed bidding process follows a lengthy prequalification phase that began under the previous city administration led by former mayor Claudia López. Four consortia were initially prequalified in August 2023, after which the project moved into the public tender stage in September of that year.

According to Galán, two of those groups were excluded in October 2024 due to conflicts of interest raised by competing bidders. That reduced the field to two consortia, one Chinese and one Spanish.

In October 2025, the Chinese-led consortium withdrew from the process, citing concerns over Colombia’s exchange rate volatility and associated financial risks. This left the Spanish consortium as the sole remaining bidder. That group later requested an extension to the submission deadline, which city authorities declined to grant.

Galán said the Spanish consortium ultimately failed to submit a proposal after one of its key partners, infrastructure firm Acciona, withdrew from the group, rendering the bid unviable. The formal notification of withdrawal was filed on the same day the tender closed.

The City claims to have taken steps to encourage competition, including issuing addenda and extending deadlines, but were ultimately unable to secure a binding offer.

The announcement comes as construction of Bogotá’s first metro line – an elevated system being built by the Chinese consortium China Harbour Engineering Company Limited (CHEC) – has reached approximately 70% completion, according to the mayoralty. Line 1 is scheduled to begin operations in 2028 and is seen as a test case for future rail projects in the capital.

Metro Line 2 is expected to cost approximately 34.9 trillion Colombian pesos (USD$8.9 billion) and will be fully automated, according to the Bogotá Metro Company. The line will operate 25 trains, each measuring 140 metres in length, and is projected to add around 800,000 daily trips to the city’s public transport network once operational.

Leonidas Narváez, general manager of the Enpresa Metro de Bogotá (EMB) said the city would launch an expanded global outreach campaign to attract new bidders when the tender reopens. “We will carry out a broad international invitation to firms around the world so that they can once again participate,” Narváez said.

Political reactions to the failed tender were swift. Daniel Briceño, a former city councillor from the  Centro Democrático party, and Senatorial candidate, blamed the López administration for what he described as structural flaws in the project’s design. “This process was left poorly prepared and with serious errors,” Briceño said in a statement.

City councillor Juan David Quintero, meanwhile, attributed the lack of bids in part to global geopolitical tensions, pointing to the trade disputes between the United States and China as a factor influencing risk perceptions among major infrastructure firms.

Galán rejected claims that the project was at risk, saying the revised timeline preserves the city’s broader metro expansion plans. Under the new schedule, authorities expect to receive bids in September 2026, following additional technical and financial adjustments. “We have secured financing, multilateral support and a valid co-financing agreement,” he said. “The project remains on track.”

Bogotá officials said the restart of the tender process was intended to provide greater certainty to potential bidders while safeguarding public resources and long-term project viability.

U.S. President Donald Trump said on Tuesday there was “no going back” on his goal to bring Greenland under U.S. control, refusing to rule out the use of force and escalating tensions with European allies already bracing for a renewed transatlantic trade dispute.

Trump’s remarks followed a series of social media posts featuring AI-generated images, including one depicting the president standing in Greenland holding a U.S. flag and another showing a map of North America with Canada, Greenland and Venezuela covered by the stars and stripes.

The imagery, shared without official explanation, has fuelled alarm among allies and raised questions about the blurring of political messaging and artificial intelligence at a moment of heightened geopolitical strain.

“As I expressed to everyone, very plainly, Greenland is imperative for National and World Security. There can be no going back — on that, everyone agrees,” Trump said after speaking with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte.

Greenland, a vast Arctic island rich in minerals and strategically located between North America and Europe, is a self-governing territory of Denmark, a fellow NATO member. Trump’s renewed push to acquire it has revived a proposal he first floated during his previous term, but has now been accompanied by explicit warnings of tariffs and the possible use of force.

European leaders reacted with unease. Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen told parliament in Copenhagen that “the worst may still lie ahead.”

“We can negotiate about everything — security, investments, the economy — but we cannot negotiate our most fundamental values: sovereignty, our country’s identity, our borders and our democracy,” Frederiksen said.

At the World Economic Forum in Davos, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen urged the bloc to prepare for a more confrontational era.

“The seismic change we are going through today is an opportunity — in fact a necessity — to build a new form of European independence,” she said.

Trade war fears resurface

Trump has threatened steep tariffs on countries he says stand in the way of U.S. interests, including European allies involved in NATO exercises in Greenland. The European Union has warned it could retaliate with tariffs on up to €93 billion ($101 billion) of U.S. imports if trade measures are imposed.

One option under discussion is the EU’s Anti-Coercion Instrument, a powerful tool that could restrict access to public tenders, investment or services, including digital services where U.S. companies hold a surplus.

U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent sought to calm markets and dismissed fears of an escalating trade war.

“It’s been 48 hours. Sit back, relax,” Bessent told reporters in Davos. “Calm down the hysteria. Take a deep breath.”

Financial markets were less sanguine. U.S. stock index futures slid to one-month lows, global equities fell, and gold prices touched record highs as investors sought safety.

Canada and Venezuela react

The inclusion of Canada and Venezuela in the AI-generated map added to the controversy.

Canada, a close U.S. ally and NATO member, has previously been the subject of Trump’s rhetoric suggesting it could become the “51st state.” Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney said he was “concerned” by the escalation and warned of the implications for North American and transatlantic security.

Canadian officials said Ottawa has drawn up plans to send a small contingent of soldiers to Greenland to participate in NATO military exercises, pending final approval from Carney. Canada already has aircraft and personnel deployed there as part of a NORAD exercise involving the United States.

Venezuela’s government condemned Trump’s post and called on citizens to share the country’s official map online in what officials described as a symbolic defence of sovereignty.

Russia weighs in

Russia, which has closely watched the growing rift between Washington and Europe, questioned Denmark’s sovereignty over Greenland. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said the island was the result of “colonial conquest,” while denying Moscow had any designs on the territory.

Protesters also took to the streets in several European cities, including Zurich, where demonstrators carried banners opposing Trump’s appearance at Davos and denouncing what they called imperialist policies.

Despite pushback from allies and some members of Congress, Trump has shown no sign of softening his stance, leaving diplomats and markets braced for further escalation as NATO cohesion and global trade relations come under renewed strain.

A federal jury in the United States has awarded coal producer Drummond Company Inc. $256 million after finding that a prominent human-rights attorney and his associates orchestrated a campaign of false accusations linking the company to paramilitary violence in Colombia.

The verdict, delivered on January 15 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, marks one of the largest legal victories Drummond has secured in its long-running effort to counter claims alleging ties to illegal armed groups during Colombia’s internal conflict.

Jurors ruled unanimously that Washington-based attorney Terrence P. Collingsworth and his organization, International Rights Advocates (IRAdvocates), knowingly made false and defamatory statements accusing Drummond of financing paramilitary organizations operating in Colombia. The panel also found that Collingsworth and IRAdvocates violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), determining they engaged in a coordinated scheme involving extortion, bribery of witnesses, witness tampering, wire fraud, money laundering, obstruction of justice and conspiracy.

According to court filings and testimony presented at trial, the defendants allegedly used fabricated narratives and paid testimony to pressure Drummond through lawsuits and media campaigns in the United States, Colombia and Europe. Jurors concluded there was “clear and convincing evidence” that Collingsworth either knew his claims were false or acted with reckless disregard for the truth.

Drummond had brought two lawsuits against Collingsworth and his network: one alleging defamation and another invoking the federal RICO statute. The jury awarded $52 million in damages for defamation and $68 million under the RICO claims. Under U.S. law, RICO damages are automatically tripled, bringing the total award to $256 million.

The case centered heavily on payments made to Colombian witnesses who had testified in earlier lawsuits accusing Drummond of supporting right-wing paramilitary groups. Evidence showed that more than $400,000 had been paid to individuals including Jaime Blanco Maya and Jairo de Jesús Charris, also known as “El Viejo Miguel,” without disclosure to courts.

The jury further found that other alleged co-conspirators were involved in the broader scheme, including Colombian attorney Iván Alfredo Otero Mendoza and Dutch businessman Albert van Bilderbeek, both of whom were also held liable under RICO.

Drummond’s lead trial counsel, Trey Wells of Starnes Davis Florie LLP, said the verdict vindicated the company after decades of reputational damage. “This verdict is further proof that Drummond has never had any ties whatsoever to illegal armed groups,” Wells said in a statement. “For years the company endured malicious accusations and false narratives that have now been categorically rejected by an American jury.”

Drummond has operated in Colombia since the late 1980s and is one of the largest exporters of Colombian coal. The company has faced multiple lawsuits over the past two decades in U.S. courts alleging it supported paramilitary groups blamed for killings near its mining operations — claims Drummond has consistently denied. The Company said the ruling exposesd a coordinated effort to damage Drummond’s reputation and extract financial settlements through legal pressure based on false testimony. “The case documents demonstrate a deliberate strategy to harm Drummond commercially and reputationally through fabricated allegations,” the company noted.

Drummond reiterated its commitment to ethical operations in Colombia, stressing that it has complied with national laws since beginning activities in the country and maintains strict corporate governance standards.

The verdict is expected to have far-reaching implications for ongoing and future transnational litigation involving corporate accountability claims, particularly cases reliant on testimony sourced in conflict zones.

Bogotá’s mayor and security chiefs celebrated some positive results last week with stats showing an overall reduction of high-impact crimes in the city during 2025, with the murder rate dropping in the city even as violent deaths increased across Colombia.

“In Bogotá in 2025, there were fewer homicides robberies, fewer vehicle thefts, fewer motorcycle thefts, fewer cases of extortion, more drug seizures, more weapons seizures, and more arrests,” said Bogotá´s mayor Carlos Galán, presenting a security scorecard showing security shifts in the first two years of his administration.

Some decreases were significant, such as extortion cases dropping by 20 per cent, stolen car cases by 22 per cent and commercial theft by 30 per cent. Others were less impressive: street robberies only reduced by 6 per cent, and cases of sexual violence by 8 per cent.

Homicides, perhaps the most significant metric, reduced last year by just 3.4%, with 1,165 killings recorded on the national police database compared to 1,214 in 2024. This gave Bogotá – with a population of around 8 million – a current homicide rate of 14.8 deaths per 100,000 of the population, according to the standard formula used to compare deaths across varying population sizes.

Limited success

This was way short of Mayor Galán’s stated goal of 8 deaths per 100,000 during his four-year tenure, but a better result than the national one. At 14.8, Bogotá’s homicide rate was considerably lower than Colombia’s national figure of 25.9 deaths per 100,000 of the population, based the alarming total of 12,484 violent deaths reported nationwide – a two per cent increase on the previous year.

City security secretary César Restrepo also pointed out that Bogotá had proportionally less murders than other major cities such as Bucaramanga, Cartagena, Barranquilla, Pereira and Cali (see table below). Medellín, however, bested the capital with a reduced rate of 11.7 per 100,000.

And in our own comparison with cities worldwide, Bogotá’s homicide rate was lower than Washington D.C. (17 per 100,000) Baltimore (23 per 100,000) or New Orleans (33 per 100,000) but much higher than most European cities such as London (currently at 1 per 100,000) or Berlin (3 per 100,000).

Backdrop of violence

The challenges facing Bogotá in reducing violence against a national backdrop of increasing insecurity were highlighted in a recent study by think tank Centro de Paz y Seguridad Externadista which compared homicides rates between recent national governments.

The current Petro government reported 40,633 violent deaths during its first three years, an increase of 11 per cent over the same period for the Juan Manuel Santos government (2014 to 18) and seven per cent higher than during Ivan Duque’s tenure from 2018 to 2022.

The data pointed to a failure of the Petro’s Paz Total (‘Total Peace’) process which reduced military pressure on illegal armed groups allowing them to expand their range and illegal activities in the last three years, concluded the report.

“Although the government insists that the national conflict is de-escalating, the figures point to another scenario: homicidal violence remains at high levels,” said study leader Andrés González in December presenting the findings on YouTube.

González also pointed out that while most territorial battles took place in rural areas, the effects reflected in urban hubs where local crime groups – often with links to larger armed groups – used lethal violence in conflicts linked to extortion and micro trafficking.

Catch and release

Another challenge for Bogotá’s security was the low conviction rate for captured criminals, according to city police chief Giovanni Cristancho in an interview with El Tiempo. Out of 33,000 criminals arrested in the city in 2025, less than 10 per cent ended up in jail, he said.

Criminals showed little fear of the justice system, and many caught by the police were multiple offenders, said Christancho, with the police having to “catch the same person 20 times”.

Recycling criminals back on the streets was “outside the control of the district government”, security chief Restrepoalso told  El Tiempo last week, but recognised it reflected badly on the city administration.

“Most citizens express their annoyance because criminals are either released or not convicted. As long as these other conditions remain unresolved, all the results we announce will continue to generate frustration among the public,” he said

This chimed with a common perception in Bogotá that even if the police are clamping down, the justice system as a whole is failing the city. Those concerns were echoed in a recent public survey by city watchdog Bogotá Como Vamos that found that a  62% of respondents perceived Bogotá as less secure, the highest figure recorded since 2008.

Catch and kill

Low conviction rates could explain the resurgence of vigilante justice being meted out by frustrated rolos in recent years, with groups of citizens organizing to capture and beat offenders, sometimes tying them to lampposts or parading them naked through neighborhood and posting videos on social media.

Barrio justice has long been a problem in Bogotá; a study from 2016, reported in The Bogotá Post, showed an average of one lynching death every three days over a 12 month period in the city.

A more recent phenomenon in the city is the rise of fleets of armed private security guards mounted on motorbikes chasing down stolen vehicles.

One company, Self Security GPS, uses satellite tracking and immobilizer devices to recover stolen vehicles, but also regularly posts alarming videos of their ‘commandos’ taking down car thieves, sometimes with dramatic shoot-outs on the street with passers-by diving for cover.

According to data from the mayor’s office, at the last count, there were 150,000 private security guards “supporting security in Bogotá” – far outnumbering the 17,500 uniformed police.

Increasingly though, frustration among everyday citizens has boiled over into drastic reactions to street crime. Such an attempt at instant justice ended in tragedy last week with three deaths after a Bogotá driver was robbed at gunpoint by two masked robbers on a motorbike; the victim gave chase and crushed the fleeing assailants with his pick-up truck. In the ensuing multi-vehicle crash one of the robbers was killed, along with two innocent travelers who also lost their lives.   

Statistically, not a good start to 2026.  

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Colombia’s presidential race has entered poll season with a revealing snapshot from Noticias RCN and Spanish firm GAD3 that points to an election defined less by early frontrunners than by who can consolidate votes after March’s inter-party consultations.

At first glance, Historic Pact senator Iván Cepeda appears comfortably ahead. The RCN poll places him at 30% voting intention — well above far-right independent Abelardo de la Espriella (22%) and miles ahead of the scattered field trailing behind in single digits.

But a deeper reading of the numbers suggests Cepeda’s lead may already be capped.

The 30% figure aligns almost perfectly with President Gustavo Petro’s loyal electoral base, which has consistently hovered between 28% and 32% since his rise to national prominence. In other words, Cepeda appears to have consolidated petrismo rather than expanded beyond it. The poll reinforces this ceiling: 5% of respondents favor a blank vote, 11% say they would vote for none of the candidates, and 14% remain undecided — a combined 30% still outside the Petro orbit and unlikely to gravitate toward Cepeda.

Further down the list, potential left-leaning or independent figures barely register: Sergio Fajardo, Aníbal Gaviria, Juan Daniel Oviedo, Roy Barreras and Camilo Romero each sit around 1%. Even Claudia López and Germán Vargas Lleras score negligible fractions. The fragmentation benefits Cepeda for now, but it also masks the absence of new voters entering his camp.

By contrast, the Right’s apparent weakness hides a powerful consolidation opportunity.

The Gran Consulta por Colombia, on March 8, shows Paloma Valencia leading the consultation vote with 23%. Yet the poll also reveals that the rest of the consultation slate collectively commands nearly 20%: Juan Manuel Galán (8%), Vicky Dávila (8%), Juan Carlos Pinzón (6%), Juan Daniel Oviedo (4%), Aníbal Gaviria (3%), Enrique Peñalosa (2%), David Luna (1%) and Mauricio Cárdenas (1%).

This bloc is electorally decisive because it represents Colombia’s ideological center — liberal technocrats, urban moderates and business-friendly reformists who reject Petro’s economic direction but resist extreme rhetoric. Valencia’s political résumé, Senate visibility and party machinery position her as the most viable leader to absorb that vote once the consultation narrows the field.

If she consolidates those nearly 20 points, her support would leap toward — or beyond — 40%, instantly surpassing Cepeda’s apparent plateau.

De la Espriella’s 22% underscores the volatility on the Right but also its fragility. His voters overlap heavily with Valencia’s base and are expected to migrate toward a unified conservative candidacy. Even Uribe has hinted that such unity is inevitable in a runoff; the RCN poll suggests it could happen much earlier under electoral pressure.

Yet the poll’s most intriguing subplot lies within the Left’s own consultation, where Roy Barreras emerges as a latent threat to Cepeda despite low headline numbers.

In the Frente Amplio consultation, Cepeda commands 34%, but the striking figure is the 44% who say they would vote for none. Barreras registers 4%, and Camilo Romero 3%, revealing a progressive electorate deeply unconvinced by the current slate.

Barreras’ political positioning explains why that matters. Though aligned with Petro’s government, his ideological lineage is closer to former President Juan Manuel Santos — pragmatic, transactional and coalition-oriented. Unlike Cepeda, Barreras is seen as someone capable of negotiating with centrists and conservatives alike. He represents continuity without ideological rigidity.

If Barreras manages to capture even part of that dissatisfied 44%, Cepeda’s narrow base could erode quickly. The RCN poll already shows Cepeda strong only where the Left is unified and stagnant where broader voters are involved.

Second-round simulations deepen the warning. Cepeda defeats De la Espriella 40% to 32%, but those numbers again reflect Petro’s core plus soft undecideds. Against Paloma Valencia he drops to 43% versus her 20% — a gap that would narrow dramatically once Valencia inherits the consultation bloc. More telling still, Cepeda’s numbers barely move across matchups, reinforcing the perception of a fixed ceiling.

Colombia’s presidential arithmetic is therefore shifting beneath the surface.

Cepeda leads because the field is divided. Valencia stands to surge because her side is about to unify. Barreras lurks as the only left-leaning figure capable of fracturing Cepeda’s ideological monopoly and attracting voters beyond Petro’s loyalists.

While headlines focus on Cepeda versus De la Espriella, the RCN poll suggests the real race may ultimately emerge after March 8 — between Paloma Valencia consolidating a broad anti-Petro coalition and Roy Barreras positioning himself as the Left’s only candidate with cross-spectrum appeal.

In Colombia’s elections, momentum follows math. And the math is just beginning to move.

Colombian President Gustavo Petro has made Gaza the moral centerpiece of his foreign policy. Since the October 7, 2023, Hamas terror attacks, he has devoted extraordinary political capital to denouncing Israel, questioning its right to self-defense, and framing the Gaza war as a singular global emergency.

He summoned “Free Palestine” marches, spent public funds hosting solidarity concerts in Bogotá’s Plaza de Bolívar, donned a keffiyeh near Times Square alongside Roger Waters, branded Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu a “war criminal,” labeled Gaza a “genocide,” and even urged U.S. military personnel to disobey orders from President Donald Trump over Middle East policy.

The performance was theatrical, relentless – and costly. Petro’s visa to the United States was revoked. Months later, he was placed on the U.S. Treasury’s OFAC sanctions list alongside his close political ally and interior minister Armando Benedetti, as well as his wife – or estranged wife – Verónica Alcocer, whose marital status, according to Petro himself, remains mysteriously unresolved.

Yet for all this moral fervor, Petro has remained conspicuously silent on one of the gravest human rights catastrophes unfolding today: Iran’s brutal suppression of nationwide protests.

His silence is deafening.

Since protests erupted across Iran in late December 2025, the regime has responded not with reform but with terror. Demonstrators demanding economic relief, dignity, and political change have been met with live ammunition. Militiamen aligned with the Revolutionary Guards have swept through cities on motorbikes, firing automatic weapons into crowds. Snipers reportedly aim at faces and genitals. Morgues are overflowing. Bodies are stacked in blood-soaked streets.  More than 12,000 are believed dead. Thousands more have been dragged from hospital beds into prisons, many never to be seen again.

This is not metaphorical violence. These are not contested narratives. These are crimes against humanity carried out by a theocracy against its own citizens.

And yet – nothing from Petro.

The Iranian regime insists the unrest is a foreign-engineered plot: psychological warfare orchestrated by hostile powers to destabilize the Islamic Republic. The opposition, by contrast, sees a nationwide rupture—an uprising rooted in decades of repression, economic collapse, and the severing of legitimacy between rulers and ruled.

Narrative control matters. In modern conflict, perception is a battlefield. As scholars Ihsan Yilmaz and Shahram Akbarzadeh have noted, authoritarian regimes increasingly rely on Strategic Digital Information Operations—psychological warfare designed not merely to suppress dissent, but to reshape reality itself. The objective is cognitive: to induce fear, discredit opponents, and convince societies that resistance is futile.

Petro’s brand of performative moralism has not been cost-free. His compulsive need to condemn Israel – and, by extension, the United States – was read in Washington not as symbolism but as direct provocation. It coincided with a marked deterioration in U.S.–Colombia relations, freezing high-level dialogue, undermining security cooperation, and contributing to the unprecedented decision to revoke his U.S. visa. For a country whose military, intelligence, and counter-narcotics apparatus remains deeply intertwined with American support, the damage was neither abstract nor symbolic – it was strategic.

The rupture with Israel was even more explicit. By publicly referring to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as a “Nazi,” Petro crossed a diplomatic red line that few world leaders have dared approach. The comparison – historically illiterate, morally inflammatory, and deeply offensive- effectively severed Colombia–Israel relations. Defense cooperation was halted, diplomatic channels collapsed, and decades of bilateral engagement in security, technology, and trade were sacrificed to rhetorical escalation. Whatever one’s view of Israel’s conduct in Gaza, equating the Jewish state with the architects of the Holocaust is not principled criticism; it is diplomatic arson.

In both cases, Petro appeared less concerned with consequences than with signaling ideological virtue to a global activist audience. The result has been the erosion of Colombia’s standing with two key partners—one its most important ally, the other a longstanding strategic collaborator—while yielding no tangible benefit to the civilians whose suffering he claims to champion.

What makes Petro’s silence on Iran so damning is not merely its contrast with his Gaza activism; it is the exposure of a deeper incoherence. For years, leftist politicians, celebrities, and fringe groups have flooded streets in capitals around the world denouncing Israel’s war as “genocide.” Now, when protesters are machine-gunned in Iran, hospitals are raided, and young people are summarily executed, this outrage dissipates.

As Allister Heath wrote recently in The Telegraph, this is “pure, unadulterated evil… a stain on humanity.” And yet where are the chants? Where is the flotilla? Where are the luvvies? One might also ask: where is the Colombian president who claims human rights as his moral compass?

The answer is uncomfortable. Gaza became a performative ritual of sit-ins and campus “occupations.” The tragedy of Iran exposes the hollowness of that performance.

When Iran’s protests began in Tehran’s Grand Bazaar, authorities initially assumed they were manageable. Bazaar merchants—traditionally conservative and closely linked to the state—were seen as transactional actors seeking economic relief, not regime change. Even Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei acknowledged their grievances, a rare concession.

But the regime miscalculated. Protests spread to more than 25 provinces. Ethnic minorities—Kurds, Baluch, Arabs, and Azeris—joined despite deep skepticism about the opposition and fears of what might follow. The unrest evolved from economic protest into an existential challenge to the state, triggering a massacre reportedly claiming more than 6,000 lives.

Meanwhile, fears of chaos loom. Exiled figures such as Reza Pahlavi position themselves as transitional leaders, even as their proposed roadmaps concentrate power in ways eerily reminiscent of the current theocracy. The Syrian precedent—where Western intervention elevated jihadist actors rather than democratic forces—haunts the region.

None of this excuses silence.

President Petro has every right to condemn injustice – especially on his own soil, where human rights abuses by FARC dissidents and the ELN guerrilla continue to inflict immense suffering on Colombia’s most vulnerable. Yet here, too, the silence has been deafening: soldiers kidnapped, children cowering under desks amid gunfire in Cauca, an ongoing humanitarian catastrophe in Catatumbo that has displaced more than 60,000 people and quietly slipped from the government’s agenda.

For Petro, moral leadership is selective. If civilian lives matter, they matter everywhere. If state violence is intolerable, it is intolerable whether committed by an ally, an adversary, or a regime ideologically convenient to ignore.

Silence in the face of mass murder is not neutrality. It is complicity by omission.

Petro’s foreign policy has become a study in selective empathy – loud where ideology demands it, louder still on social media, but mute where principle requires courage. That is not moral clarity. It is hypocrisy incarnate.

Beatriz González, one of Latin America’s most influential contemporary artists, whose boldly colored, deliberately unrefined paintings and installations confronted Colombia’s long history of political violence, public mourning and social inequality – while also reshaping the country’s most important public art collection – died on Jan. 9, 2026, at her home in Bogotá. She was 93.

Her death was announced by the Banco de la República, Colombia’s central bank, where for more than four decades she played a decisive role in shaping the institution’s cultural mission and its vast art collections. In a statement, the bank described her as “an essential figure in Colombian art and culture” and “a masterful narrator of memory.”

González was not only a prolific artist but also a historian, curator, educator and critic — a rare figure who helped define how Colombia would see its art, its past and, ultimately, itself. “Artists exist so that memory is not thrown in the trash,” she once said, a line that came to stand as a quiet manifesto for a career devoted to preserving what official histories often erased.

Born in Bucaramanga in 1932, González came of age during La Violencia, the brutal civil conflict that engulfed Colombia between 1948 and 1958. That formative experience would leave an indelible mark on her work. After briefly studying architecture, she enrolled at the University of the Andes in Bogotá, graduating with a degree in fine arts in 1962. She later studied printmaking in Rotterdam and counted among her teachers the influential critic Marta Traba, who helped shape modern art discourse in Latin America.

González’s early work drew attention for its irreverent treatment of European art history and Colombian popular imagery. Her critical view of “good taste” led her to reject academic refinement in favor of what the art critic Germán Rubiano described as an approach that was consciously unpolished and deliberately opposed to sophistication.

She appropriated masterpieces by Manet, Leonardo da Vinci and Raphael, flattening their compositions and translating them into the visual language of curtains, furniture and household objects. Armoires, beds, trays and even wallpaper became supports for paintings marked by compressed figures and bold color palettes — a strategy that blurred the boundary between high art and domestic life.

One of her earliest and most discussed works, The Sisga Suicides (1965), reimagined a newspaper photograph of a young couple who drowned themselves in a dam outside Bogotá. Rendered in vivid, almost cheerful colors, the painting exposed the uneasy coexistence of tragedy and banality in Colombian public life — a theme that would recur throughout her career.

By the 1980s, González’s art took on an increasingly overt political tone. Press photographs of presidents, massacres and grieving families became central to her work. She painted them repeatedly, transforming news images into objects of repetition and contemplation, as if to ask how a society becomes accustomed to its own suffering. “It’s been a critique of power that has permeated my work,” she told ArtReview in 2016. “For that very reason, I don’t think of it as ‘political’; it has an ethical commitment.”

Her focus on mourning was particularly stark in works depicting mothers weeping after the 1996 Las Delicias massacre, in which dozens of Colombian soldiers were killed by the FARC guerrilla. These images, stripped of sentimentality, confronted viewers with grief as a collective, inescapable condition. The depth with which González addressed both individual and collective mourning stands among her most significant contributions to contemporary art.

That macabre clarity intensified in the 2000s. In Anonymous Auras (2023), one of her final major works, González installed more than 8,000 printed silhouettes of workers carrying corpses across the wall niches of Bogotá’s Central Cemetery. The figures – anonymous, repetitive and almost ritualistic – transformed the cemetery into a monumental archive of loss, honoring victims whose names were never recorded.

“Artists exist so that memory is not thrown in the trash”

Parallel to her artistic production, González exerted extraordinary influence as a curator and cultural policymaker. Beginning in the 1980s, she became a close collaborator of the Banco de la República’s cultural division, serving as a researcher, curator and longtime member of its advisory committee on visual arts. In that role, she helped guide the formation of a national art collection with a distinctly Colombian focus, while insisting on dialogue with international works of the highest quality.

Few individuals knew the Central Bank’s art collection as intimately as González. Over more than forty years, she worked alongside successive generations of curators, historians and collectors, helping to consolidate one of the most important public art collections in Latin America.

In 2020, she donated her personal archive and library — nearly 100,000 documents — to the Banco de la República to ensure free public access. The archive documents not only her artistic practice but also her work as an educator, curator and historian, and provides an unparalleled record of Colombian art, politics and visual culture.

Her institutional impact reached beyond the Central Bank. At the Museo de Arte Moderno de Bogotá (MAMBO), she founded the influential School of Guides, a pioneering program for museum education that trained figures who would later become leading artists and curators. From 1989 to 2004, she served as chief curator of the Museo Nacional de Colombia, where she reorganized the permanent collection and helped redefine the country’s historical narrative through art.

International recognition came steadily. Her work appeared in Documenta 14, the Berlin Biennale and the landmark exhibition “Radical Women: Latin American Art, 1960–1985.” Major retrospectives were held at the Pérez Art Museum Miami, the Museum of Fine Arts, Houston, and the CAPC in Bordeaux. In 2026, the Barbican Centre in London is set to host her first major retrospective in the United Kingdom.

González received numerous honors, including Colombia’s Premio Vida y Obra and honorary doctorates from the University of the Andes and the University of Antioquia. In 2025, the city of Bogotá awarded her the Civil Order of Merit, recognizing her invaluable legacy and profound influence on the nation’s cultural life.

Yet she remained skeptical of accolades. She preferred to speak of discipline, research and responsibility — and of the obligation, as she saw it, to bear witness. From a childhood habit of collecting film-star postcards to a lifetime spent gathering images of state violence, Beatriz González devoted herself to the stubborn preservation of memory and to an unapologetic voice in Colombian contemporary art.

Read the Banco de la República’s tribute (in Spanish) to Beatriz González, written by Claudia Cristancho Camacho of the Cultural Section and Art Collection. 

https://www.banrepcultural.org/noticias/despedimos-la-maestra-beatriz-gonzalez-figura-esencial-del-arte-y-la-cultura-en-colombia

For much of the past decade, Colombia built a reputation as one of travel’s great value destinations: culturally rich, visually stunning, and refreshingly affordable. A strong U.S. dollar, competitive hotel rates, and inexpensive food and transport helped turn cities like Medellín and Cartagena into global favorites, while smaller destinations thrived on a steady flow of backpackers and eco-tourists.

This equation is now changing. And faster than the industry expected.

The Colombian peso has strengthened sharply, trading this week near 3,630 to the U.S. dollar, its highest level since mid-2021. For foreign visitors, the effect is immediate and tangible: fewer pesos per dollar at the ATM, and higher costs across nearly every aspect of a trip – from meals and hotel stays to transportation and tours.

The shift is perhaps most visible at the table. Consider a classic Caribbean staple: deep-fried mojarra, served whole with coconut rice and patacones. At La Estrella, a popular local eatery in Cartagena, the dish costs about COP$40,000 per person. Order the same fish at a beachside stall and the price climbs to COP$60,000. In a high-end Old City restaurant, plated with foraged greens and linen service, it can reach COP$120,000 per person.

At today’s exchange rate, that translates to roughly $11, $16, and $33 — still accessible by international standards, but a noticeable jump from the Colombia many travelers remember.

Currency is only part of the story

While peso strength explains much of the increase, Colombia’s tourism sector is also grappling with sharply higher operating costs following a 23% increase in the national minimum wage, enacted by presidential decree under President Gustavo Petro.

From the government’s perspective, the measure was framed as a necessary response to inflation and cost-of-living pressures. For hotels, tour operators, and travel agencies, however, the speed and scale of the increase have posed significant challenges.

The Colombian Hotel and Tourism Association (Cotelco) has warned that the decision places particular strain on an industry where labor accounts for a large share of costs. According to Cotelco, roughly 70% of hotel workers are part of operational teams — including housekeeping, front desk staff, maintenance, kitchens, and security — leaving businesses highly exposed to wage adjustments.

Cotelco has also pointed to recent changes in labor rules, such as higher pay for Sunday and holiday shifts and the earlier start of night-shift premiums, which further increase payroll expenses. Looking ahead, the sector faces additional pressure in July 2026, when Colombia’s legally mandated reduction of the workweek to 42 hours takes effect, a complex adjustment for hotels that operate around the clock.

Rising costs beyond wages

Labor is not the only expense rising. Hotels and tourism businesses are also absorbing higher energy and gas tariffs, including a 20% energy surcharge introduced in 2025, which disproportionately affects establishments that operate continuously and rely heavily on air conditioning, refrigeration, and water systems.

Transportation costs are climbing as well. Higher toll fees and fuel prices have pushed up the cost of airport transfers, private drivers, and overland travel between destinations, quietly adding to tourists’ final bills. These increases are particularly noticeable for travelers moving between regions — for example, from Cartagena to Santa Marta, or through the Coffee Axis by road.

Price increases are not felt evenly across the country.

In large cities such as Bogotá and Medellín, intense competition has helped cushion the blow. These markets offer a wide range of accommodation, from budget hostels and short-term rentals to international five-star hotels, giving travelers flexibility and keeping price growth relatively contained.

In contrast, smaller resort and nature destinations face sharper pressure. In places like Palomino, wedged between the Caribbean Sea and the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, or Salento in the Coffee Axis, accommodation options are limited. Boutique eco-lodges and family-run hotels dominate, and supply cannot easily expand.

In these destinations, rising labor and operating costs are passed on more quickly to guests, making price hikes more visible — and sometimes harder to justify.

According to Anato, Colombia’s association of travel agencies, the wage increase has also disrupted long-term planning. Many tourism businesses had projected annual cost increases of 8% to 12%, not nearly double that figure.

For inbound tourism, which operates on long booking cycles, the timing is especially problematic. Rates, packages, and contracts with international wholesalers for 2026 were often negotiated under different macroeconomic assumptions, limiting companies’ ability to adjust prices after the fact.

Anato has also warned of a double squeeze: rising costs at home combined with a stronger peso, which reduces the real value of revenues earned in foreign currency.

Pay more – Higher expectations

Most travelers are not inherently opposed to paying more for Colombia. What they increasingly expect, however, is visible improvement in exchange.

Higher prices bring sharper scrutiny of cleanliness, waste management, and environmental standards, particularly in coastal areas where beach pollution and informal tourism practices remain persistent concerns. As Colombia positions itself as a higher-value destination, arbitrary pricing, lack of regulation could erode sustainable tourism.

Internal security is another critical factor. As costs rise, long-standing security concerns, especially in rural areas and off-the-beaten path travel corridors, weigh heavily in  destination choice. Travelers paying mid-range or premium prices expect predictability and safety to match the cost.

Looking ahead, a further strengthening of the peso toward 3,500 per dollar would intensify pressure on Colombia’s tourism sector as competition and air connectivity across the region grows fiercer.

Colombia now finds itself competing directly with the all-inclusive efficiency of Mexico’s Riviera Maya and the Dominican Republic, the well-established eco-tourism model of Costa Rica, and the increasingly curated cultural and nature offerings of Guatemala. These destinations have spent years refining price with product, investing in infrastructure, security, and environmental enforcement.

Colombia’s transition from affordable standout to mid-range contender is still underway. Currency strength and wage growth can signal economic maturity, but without tangible improvements in security, the country risks losing travelers to emerging destinations across the Middle East and South East Asia. The message is clear: Colombia remains compelling – but no longer discounted. Whether higher prices translate into a better consumer experience will determine how well the country holds its place in an increasingly crowded travel market.

Far-right independent candidate Abelardo De la Espriella, widely known by the nickname “El Tigre” (The Tiger), has taken the lead in Colombia’s presidential race five months ahead of the election, according to a new poll by AtlasIntel published by Semana magazine.

The survey places De la Espriella, founder of the pro-democracy movement Defensores de la Patria, at 28% of voting intentions, narrowly ahead of left-wing senator Iván Cepeda at 26.5%. Former Antioquia governor Sergio Fajardo ranks third with 9.4%, once again failing to surpass the 10% benchmark that has long eluded his centrist candidacies.

A corporate lawyer by training, De la Espriella rose to prominence as a high-profile legal advocate for conservative causes and a vocal critic of President Gustavo Petro’s reform agenda. His political ascent has been driven by hardline law-and-order rhetoric, a confrontational style and an aggressive use of social media, allowing him to position himself as an outsider channeling anti-establishment sentiment and opposition to the left.

In a hypothetical second-round runoff, De la Espriella would defeat hard-leftist Cepeda by 9.3 percentage points, the poll found, consolidating his status as the best-positioned opposition figure at this early stage of the race.

AtlasIntel also projected a runoff between De la Espriella and Fajardo. In that scenario, De la Espriella would secure 37.9% of the vote, compared with 23.2% for Fajardo — a margin of 14.7 points.

Fajardo, a mathematician and former governor of Antioquia from 2012 to 2016, has struggled to expand his electoral base beyond a narrow segment of moderate voters. His current polling echoes his performance in the first round of the 2022 presidential election, when he placed fourth with just over 800,000 votes, equivalent to 4.2% of the total, despite entering that race as a well-known national figure.

Further down the field, Juan Carlos Pinzón and Paloma Valencia each registered 5.1% support, followed by Claudia López (2.6%), Enrique Peñalosa (2.3%), Juan Daniel Oviedo (1.8%) and Aníbal Gaviria (1.3%). Several other candidates polled below 1%.

The survey found that 7.2% of respondents would vote blank, 5.7% remain undecided, and 1.1% said they would not vote.

Valencia, a senator from the right-wing Centro Democrático party, could nonetheless emerge as a pivotal figure in the race. Former president Álvaro Uribe Vélez, Colombia’s most influential conservative leader, has named Valencia as the party’s official presidential candidate, formally placing the weight of his political machine behind her campaign.

Uribe, who governed Colombia from 2002 to 2010, retains significant influence, particularly in his home region of Antioquia and in the country’s second-largest city, Medellín, long considered a stronghold of uribismo. Analysts say Valencia’s numbers could rise sharply as party structures mobilise and undecided conservative voters coalesce around an officially endorsed candidate.

In other simulated second-round matchups, Valencia would narrowly defeat Cepeda by 2.4 points, while Cepeda would beat former defence minister Pinzón by 4.5 points, according to the poll.

AtlasIntel also measured voter intentions ahead of Colombia’s interparty primaries scheduled for March 8, to be held alongside congressional elections. About 18.7% of respondents said they plan to participate in the “Gran Consulta por Colombia,” while 29.8% expressed interest in voting in the leftist “Pacto Amplio”. Former Colombian Ambassador to the United Kingdom and insider of the Petro administration, Roy Barreras, is seen as a leading contender to the clinch the consultation.

Within the Gran Consulta, Valencia leads with 19.1% among likely participants, followed by Pinzón (13.1%), Aníbal Gaviria (11.1%), Juan Daniel Oviedo (10.6%) and former Semana director  Vicky Dávila (7%).

The poll results reinforce a broader pattern of fragmentation across the centre and right, even as opposition voters increasingly focus on preventing a left-wing victory. With five months to go before the May 31 election, an emerging landscape of “all against Cepeda” has appeared on the horizon, in which disparate conservative and centrist forces could eventually rally behind a single contender in a runoff scenario on June 19, 2026.

In this context, De la Espriella — himself a close ideological ally of Uribe — could seek to consolidate all right-wing factions by selecting Valencia as a potential vice-presidential running mate,  move that would unite his strong support on the Colombian coast, with the  strength of Centro Democrático and Uribe’s loyal political base in conservative departments.

According to AtlasIntel’s CEO Andrei Roman, the contest is being shaped by persistent ideological polarisation, internal divisions within the opposition, and the growing dominance of social media.

“The race is structured around the continuity of Petro-style progressivism versus a broad anti-Petro front,” Roman said. “At the same time, digital presence has become decisive, allowing outsider figures to gain traction quickly and redefine political mobilisation.”

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A week on from the extraordinary events of the third of January, where does Colombia stand, what happens next and what do people think?

Despite aggressive rhetoric, Colombian president Gustavo Petro and US president Donald Trump have ended up on relatively good terms over the last week after Maduro’s capture, and for now there appears to be a wary calm between the Palacio Nariño and the White House. It’s too early to talk of a bromance, but there’s certainly been a rapid de-escalation.

The US president pointedly praised Petro’s tone in his tweet after they spoke over the phone on Wednesday, indicating that the Colombian president had been rather less bullish one on one compared to his public speeches and tweets.

Petro also seems happy with the conversation, saying that he had cleared the air and underlining that he is not connected to the illegal drug trade. He pointed out that he has stepped up seizures of drugs and has in fact been threatened various times over his life by drug cartels.

Esto es Histórico.

Hablaremos con Trump, de la Paz del Continente, de la soberanía , de un Pacto por la Vida basado en las energías limpias. Se puede descarbonizar la matriz de EEUU si se vuelve real el potencial de energías limpias de Suramérica pic.twitter.com/0bqPP2lAYe

— Gustavo Petro (@petrogustavo) January 8, 2026

Petro had criticised his counterpart in the White House all week, convened protests against the US military’s actions in Venezuela and called an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council, of which Colombia is a temporary member.

However, Petro appears to have struck a far more conciliatory note when actually talking to the US president on Wednesday. For his part, Donald Trump also turned down the heat, saying it was a great honour to speak with the Colombian president and that they would talk further in person at the White House.

Petro has confirmed that this will take place in the first week of February. He’s also invited interim Venezuelan president Delcy Rodríguez to visit the Palacio Nariño for talks.

Alongside his usual flurry of tweets, Petro had been setting this in motion, with his Interior Minister (and former ambassador to Venezuela) Armando Benedetti sending a memo to the US underlining their commitment to fighting drug production.

Antagonism serves both sides

Petro has been highly critical of Trump’s actions in the Caribbean from the outset. He has warned Trump “not to wake the jaguar” and denounced his strikes on boats over the last few months.

Bad blood between the pair goes back a long way, but has really ramped up in recent weeks. Even before the extraordinary events of last weekend, Petro’s fierce criticism of the military build up in the Caribbean had led to him and his estranged wife Veronica Alcócer being stuck on the Clinton List.

The truth is that antagonistic public rhetoric plays well for both Petro and Trump, regardless of how much damage it may do to the reputation of either country. They both get to play the big man and impress their base, which both need right now in the face of domestic woes.

Presidente Donald J. Trump sobre la llamada con el Presidente Gustavo Petro: https://t.co/1lTgSYF8hb

— US Embassy Bogota (@USEmbassyBogota) January 8, 2026

Trump doesn’t seem to mind Petro’s words, as long as he gets his way. That fits with his previous actions, including his fallout when running against current Secretary of State Marco Rubio. He says Petro’s been very hostile, but that’s all in the past.

For Petro, this also sets him up nicely for his post-presidential life. In an interview this week he expressed a desire to tour the world speaking at conferences and the international exposure this week has been good for that. On top of that, Trump will likely lift the restrictions on him and his family as a reward for toeing the US line.

What’s the feeling in the calles?

One could have been forgiven for not noticing the midweek protests. Despite the best efforts of hyperbolic foreign journos, Bogotá has been far from a seething cauldron of dissent. In reality, a few hundred Petro diehards trooped out as expected.

Most Colombians are well aware of the reality of Maduro’s rule and the abuses carried out in its name. Apart from a very few outliers, there is no love lost for Nicolás Maduro and an overwhelming satisfaction that he’s no longer Venezuelan president.

That’s not to say, though, that Colombians are wildly happy about the current situation. Colombia is a very different country to her neighbour, but there remains a relatively well-founded concern among many that there may be attacks on Colombian territory.

Anti-American sentiment is not exactly thriving, but graffiti and the like is already going up in certain parts of the city. There’s little to no appetite in the country for any US military activity in Colombia, even against cartels or guerrillas.

Worries still linger over the possibility of other repercussions. The waits for American visas have only just started to come down, with new appointments a year hence. Many worry that will increase again and that extant visas for expat Colombians may be affected too.

Tariffs, too, are never far from people’s minds, although Trump’s current position towards Colombia seems to be benign. Tourism will possibly be affected, both in the short and medium term.

Of course, Bogotá has a thriving Venezuelan expat community as well. While there is general delight at Maduro being arrested, there remain justifiable fears over what comes next. Delcy Rodríguez is seemingly no-one’s first choice and most hope for the promise of free and fair elections.

The Plaza de Bolívar and many others around both Bogotá and Colombia have seen large groups of Venezuelans gathering both to celebrate Maduro’s fall and to call for a transition towards a proper democracy. Most, however, are just getting on with life and wary of reading too much into things at present.

A particular trend has been for exiled Venezuelans to take to social media in order to decry what they often see as ‘Venezuelasplaining’. Many accounts are keen to point out that while the US might only be interested in oil, neither were China, Russia and Iran after arepa recipes.

Venezuelan man:

“Those who say that the U.S. is only interested in our oil, I ask you: What do you think the Russians and the Chinese wanted here?

The recipe for arepas?" pic.twitter.com/BWpCmCxFGI

— Visegrád 24 (@visegrad24) January 4, 2026

As for other Colombian politicians, there’s been a mixed reaction. The Centro Democrático has had a well-coordinated and fierce response, aggressively trying to connect Petro and his allies to Maduro, with some success.

Others are resisting the temptation to use Venezuela as a political football, preferring to cautiously celebrate Maduro’s capture while expressing concern both about the manner it was done and the current political inclarity in the country.

What happens next?

For now, Delcy Rodríguez appears to be in control of Venezuela. She’s been sworn in as president and Trump says she’s committed to working with Washington. That means allowing US oil companies in, buying American goods and stopping shadow fleet sales.

While Trump had initially been dismissive of Maria Corina Machado, saying she had little support or respect in Venezuela, he’s changed his position a little and has a meeting lined up with her soon. This may be connected to her apparent offer to share her Nobel Peace Prize with him.

Regime enforcers have been on maneuvers throughout the past week to quieten internal dissent and quell momentum towards thoughts of a full democratic transition. The ELN has stepped up operations near to the Venezuelan border and Iván Mordisco has suggested a coalition of guerrillas to fight interventionism.

Plenty remains unclear about the whole situation. Trump has expressed a lot of opinions and thoughts but hasn’t elaborated on what the details behind any of it might be. There’s also a worrying lack of corroboration from other players. 

Rodríguez and Petro haven’t really confirmed his takes on their talks, nor have oil companies definitively committed to full investment. At the moment, it seems like all parties are reasonably happy with the state of play but keeping options open. 

Petro gets to play the plucky leader standing up to US imperialism, shoring up his party’s base at home ahead of coming elections while burnishing his reputation overseas. Trump gets to be the decisive commander in chief that took out a rival, while Rodríguez has received a promotion.

For now, it really could go in a number of different directions and small actions might be the things that push the country in certain directions. There are lots of cards on the table and plenty of big decisions to be taken.

Worryingly, the most likely scenario at the moment seems to be that the regime continues in power, just with a new leader and a new-found willingness, however reluctant, to work with the USA. For the ordinary Venezuelan, tragically, little much has changed as things stand.

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Bogotá, Colombia — Thousands gathered in Plaza de Bolívar after answering Colombian President Gustavo Petro’s call to mobilize against threats to Colombia’s national sovereignty from the United States.

Petro called for people to take to the streets in every public square across the country after Trump said military action in Colombia “sounds good” on Sunday, January 4,, just a day after removing Nicolás Maduro from power in neighboring Venezuela.

While Petro was expected to deliver a rousing speech against U.S. intervention, he told the crowd that he had to make his remarks less “harsh” after a conciliatory call with Trump just minutes before addressing demonstrators.

Plaza de Bolívar, located in central Bogotá near Congress and the Casa de Nariño presidential residence and office, hosted over 20,000 demonstrators and was adorned with flags and protest signs from the afternoon into the night of January 7.

“And no, no, I do not feel like being a North American colony. And yes, yes, I do feel like being a free and sovereign Colombia,” protesters chanted.

Many participants also used the demonstration to voice opposition to related issues, such as the exploitation of natural resources and the presence of foreign military bases.

“If we don’t defend our country, who will do it for us?” said one demonstrator. Other attendees stressed that the mobilization was not only about Colombia, but about Latin America as a whole.

Throughout the day, the rally featured musical performances and included the presence of labor and union representatives, public institutions, and a large portion of the presidential cabinet. The president and several ministers delivered speeches from the main stage.

President Petro presented some official data and concrete results from three years of his administration — including his fight against drug trafficking — many of them in comparison with the previous government. Among the achievements cited was the seizure of 2,800 tons of illegal substances by December 31, 2025. 

“My goal was zero blows against Colombia’s peasantry, voluntary crop substitution; we are now at 30,000 hectares registered,” he explained.

Petro publicly accused the U.S. far right and Colombian politicians of having convinced Trump that he “ran cocaine factories” and was a “front man for Maduro.” “We are not enemies of any people in the world,” he stated during his speech. Petro also said he spoke with Delcy Rodríguez, Interim President of Venezuela.

The phone call was later confirmed by Trump through his Truth Social account: “It was a great Honor to speak with the President of Colombia, Gustavo Petro, who called to explain the situation of drugs and other disagreements that we had. I appreciated his call and tone, and look forward to meeting him in the near future. Arrangements are being made between Secretary of State Marco Rubio and the Foreign Minister of Colombia. This meeting will take place in the White House in Washington, D.C..” 

In closing, the Colombian leader reaffirmed his stance on national sovereignty, as well as his differences with Trump over events in Venezuela — which he described as “illegal” — and other issues.

“To the mothers of Colombia, I say that the country clearly stands up for the defense of national sovereignty, because [Álvaro] Uribe is wrong. If they touch Petro, they touch Colombia. And if they touch Colombia, Colombia responds as its history has taught it—plain and simple.”

Featured image: Demonstrators at Plaza de Bolívar in central Bogotá
Author: Cristina Dorado Suaza

This article originally appeared on Latin America Reports and was re-published with permission.

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