Colombia and Ecuador have started exchanging trade retaliations after Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa announced a 30% “security” tariff on imports from Colombia, escalating tensions between Andean neighbours over border security cooperation.

Noboa said the measure would take effect on Feb. 1 and would remain in place until Colombia shows “real commitment” to jointly tackle drug trafficking and illegal mining along the shared frontier. He made the announcement from Davos, where he is attending the World Economic Forum.

“We have made real efforts of cooperation with Colombia… but while we have insisted on dialogue, our military continues facing criminal groups tied to drug trafficking on the border without any cooperation,” Noboa said in a post on X, citing an annual trade deficit of more than $1 billion.

Colombia’s foreign ministry rejected the tariff in a formal protest note, calling it a unilateral decision that violates Andean Community (CAN) rules, and proposed a ministerial meeting involving foreign affairs, defence, trade and energy officials on Jan. 25 in Ipiales, Colombia’s southern border city.

The government of President Gustavo Petro also announced a 30% tariff on 20 products imported from Ecuador in response, though it has not specified the items. Diana Marcela Morales, Colombia’s Minister of Commerce, Industry and Tourism (MinCIT) said Ecuador’s exports covered by the retaliatory measure total some $250 million, and described the policy as “temporary” and “revisable.”

Fedexpor, Ecuador’s exporters federation, said non-oil exports to Colombia rose 4% between January and November 2025, and that the Colombian market receives more than 1,130 Ecuadorian export products. The top exports include wood boards, vegetable oils and fats, canned tuna, minerals and metals, and processed food products.

The dispute has also spread into the energy sector. Colombia’s Ministry of Mines and Energy said on Thursday it had suspended international electricity transactions with Ecuador, citing climate-related pressure on domestic supply and the need to prioritise national demand amid concerns over a possible new El Niño weather cycle.

Ecuador has struggled with severe droughts in recent years, triggering long power cuts in 2024 and 2025 in a country where roughly 70% of electricity generation depends on hydropower, while Colombia has supplied electricity during periods of shortage.

President Petro noted that Colombia acted in solidarity during Ecuador’s worst drought in 60 years. “I hope Ecuador has appreciated that when we were needed, we responded with energy,” Petro said on Wednesday.

Following Colombia’s electricity suspension, Ecuador announced new tariffs on transporting Colombian crude through its heavy crude pipeline system. Environment and Energy Minister Inés Manzano said the oil transport fee through the OCP pipeline would reflect “reciprocity,” without giving details.

Colombia and Ecuador share a 600-kilometre border stretching from the Pacific coast to the Amazon, where Colombian armed groups and criminal networks operate, including organisations involved in drug trafficking, arms smuggling and illegal mining. Relations between Petro and Noboa, who sit on opposite ends of the political spectrum, have frequently been strained.

The extraction of Nicolás Maduro on Saturday was meant to signal the end of an era. Instead, it has exposed an uncomfortable truth that may loom over Washington weeks and months after the “shock-and-awe” attacks in central Caracas have waned from headlines: was Venezuela’s democratic opposition sidelined at the very moment it appeared closest to victory?

Just weeks earlier, María Corina Machado, the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize laureate and the symbolic leader of Venezuela’s opposition, had laid out her Freedom Manifesto — a sweeping blueprint for a Venezuelan-led democratic transition rooted in dignity, elections, free markets and the return of millions of exiles. She framed the coming moment not as an American intervention, but as a national rebirth steered by Venezuelans themselves.

That vision now appears to be colliding with a far more transactional reality.

Following Maduro’s capture in a U.S.-led operation, President Donald Trump declined to elevate Machado or her movement into any formal role. Instead, senior U.S. officials have coalesced around Delcy Rodríguez – Maduro’s longtime lieutenant and overseer of the oil sector — as Washington’s primary interlocutor in Caracas. Trump publicly praised Rodríguez’s cooperation while dismissing Machado as a “very nice woman” who “lacks the support” to lead the country.

On Monday, Delsy Rodríguez took the oath of office in the presence of the Ambassadors to China, Iran and Russia. The scene from the National Assembly recalls the sham investiture of Maduro on January 10, 2025,  and sends a dire signal to the internationl community:  Does oil security matter more than a secure democracy?

White House insiders told U.S. media that Trump had never warmed to Machado, “because his feelings got hurt”, reads the Daily Beast. According to an article on Monday in The Washington Post, the president declined to pick Machado because she committed the “ultimate sin” of offending his pride, after receiving the Nobel Peace Prize. “If she had turned it down and said, ‘I can’t accept it because it’s Donald Trump’s,’ she’d be the president of Venezuela today,” cites the newspaper’s sources.

Having lost the Oslo podium as the world’s “peace president,” personal grievance and strategic calculation have marked the White House’s decision to annoint a “moderate” in Miraflores. But Rodríguez is no moderate, and her penchant for state repression remains intact. A  recent article in the Wall Street Journal affirms that Washington is willing to tolerate a Maduro 2.0 — a Chavista continuity government — so long as it cooperates on oil, narcotics enforcement and geopolitical alignment.

On the ground in Caracas, the mood reflects that ambiguity. There have been no mass celebrations, no release of political prisoners, and no clear roadmap. Power remains concentrated within the same military-backed elites that have pillaged Venezuela for over three decades, even as Maduro himself awaits trial in New York on charges expected to exceed those once brought against Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán.

U.S. officials insist this is realism, not betrayal. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has argued that squeezing the regime economically and forcing compliance on security and oil will eventually produce leverage. But he has stopped short of demanding immediate elections — a notable omission given that the opposition already won one.

Machado’s Freedom Manifesto now reads less like a transition plan and more like a rebuke. It imagined a Venezuela where sovereignty flowed from the ballot box, not from foreign capitals; where dignity, not expediency, guided reconstruction; and where Venezuelans — not external powers — chose their leaders.

Instead, Trump has suggested that the United States will “run” Venezuela, even as it leaves the same repressive security apparatus intact. The contradiction is stark: maximum news coverage abroad, minimal transformation on the ground.

The question, then, is not only whether Trump sidetracked María Corina Machado, but whether the United States has traded a rare democratic opening for short-term gains. If Chavismo survives without Maduro — its prisons full, its generals untouched, its oil flowing under U.S management — the Nobel laureate’s blueprint may yet stand as the document of a revolution deferred.

And history may judge that Venezuela was not lost for lack of courage at home, but for lack of conviction abroad. In the words of Mexican historian Enrique Krauze, the end-game is inevitable: “If geopolitics seeks to turn Venezuela into a pawn on its chessboard, the people will take to the streets. They have chosen a legitimate president: Edmundo González. And they have a moral leader: María Corina Machado. Obstacles may arise, but Venezuela’s liberation is irreversible.”

The Board of Directors of Empresas Públicas de Medellín (EPM) approved a budget of $29.8 trillion COP for the 2026 fiscal year during its session on December 2, 2025. The budget is intended to guarantee the continued provision of public utility services—including energy, water, and natural gas—while addressing challenges related to regulatory demands, climate variability, the energy transition, and increasing consumer demand.

The budget allocates resources across all of EPM’s business segments, which include Power Generation, Transmission and Distribution, Gas, Water Provision, and Wastewater. The overall spending plan prioritizes projects focused on modernizing infrastructure, expanding service coverage, and optimizing operational efficiency.

Budget Distribution and Key Investments

The 29.8 trillion COP total budget is divided across four main areas, with investments receiving the largest allocation:

• Investment Expenses (48%): 14.1 trillion COP
  • Infrastructure investments: 4 trillion COP.
  • Long-term contracts for commercial operation and maintenance (registered as investment under current budgetary rules): 6 trillion COP.
  • Assets and inventory related to service provision and investments, provisions, and others: 3.2 trillion COP.
  • Capitalizations and other items: 907 billion COP.
• Functioning Expenses (28%): 8.5 trillion COP
  • This includes transfers to the District of Medellín totaling 2.4 trillion COP, taxes and contributions to the national and territorial governments totaling 1.2 trillion COP, and personnel expenses amounting to 1.6 trillion COP.
• Commercial Operation Expenses (10%): 3.1 trillion COP
  • This covers the purchase of energy, natural gas, and other inputs required to guarantee public service delivery.
• Debt Service (11%): 3.3 trillion COP
• Final Cash Availability (3%): 800 billion COP

Of the 4 trillion COP earmarked for infrastructure investments, 1.3 trillion COP is designated for the second phase of the Hidroituango Hydroelectric Project, a significant infrastructure development for the nation’s energy stability.

Financing and Operational Focus

The 2026 budget is projected to be financed primarily through 18.3 trillion COP (62%) in current revenues from services provided (energy, gas, water, and wastewater). This will be supplemented by 3.5 trillion COP (12%) from loans, with the remaining 26% sourced from dividends received from subsidiaries, accounts receivable recovery, and the initial cash balance.

The budget focuses on specific initiatives across EPM’s segments:

• Power Generation: Includes the expansion of generation infrastructure and the implementation of a master plan for fire protection at generation plants. Resources are also allocated for the modernization of the Guadalupe-Troneras power stations.
• Energy Transmission and Distribution: Focuses on infrastructure expansion and maintenance, replacement of cables and transformers across all voltage levels, and the control of non-technical energy losses.
• Water and Wastewater: Key projects include the Orfelinato – Villa Hermosa Pumping System, the expansion of the Yulimar circuit, and the modernization of the Ayurá water treatment plant. The budget also funds the construction, intervention, and repair of water and sewer networks.
• Gas: Initiatives include optimizing operations through the utilization of biogas from the La Pradera facility.

John Maya Salazar, General Manager of EPM, stated that the budget is aimed at enhancing operational efficiency, strengthening resource management, and ensuring service quality within a context of regulatory, climatic, and market challenges.

Headline photo courtesy EPM

Colombian propane gas distributor Colgas was recognized at the 2025 edition of Xposible Colsubsidio with the “Companies that Transform Society” award, a distinction granted to organizations with business models that integrate sustainability and social development. The recognition specifically highlighted the company’s corporate purpose and the execution of its “Empowering the Entrepreneurial Spirit” (Potenciar el Espíritu Emprendedor) project, an initiative designed to strengthen entrepreneurs and strategic allies within its value chain.

The 2025 iteration of Xposible Colsubsidio, a program led by Colsubsidio, received a total of over 500 submissions from business initiatives nationwide. The Colgas initiative was selected for its demonstrated capacity to generate value, promote business practices that meet social responsibility criteria, and contribute to the nation’s productivity.

Unusual for companies in Latin America, Colgas pledges to pay small business suppliers within 7 days of invoicing.

Didier Builes, General Manager of Colgas, indicated that the recognition validates the company’s corporate strategy. “At Colgas, we work to boost the entrepreneurs in our country, offering them concrete tools to grow and transform their businesses. This award motivates us to continue building opportunities that positively impact thousands of Colombian families,” Builes stated.

The “Empowering the Entrepreneurial Spirit” project by Colgas incorporates several strategic actions aimed at the formalization and growth of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs). Measures implemented include a program that guarantees payment to SME suppliers within 7 days, as well as financial inclusion initiatives designed to facilitate the sustainability of the small businesses associated with the company.

Furthermore, the program includes the Colgas Corporate University for Entrepreneurs (Universidad Corporativa de Emprendedores Colgas), a training platform that has provided instruction to collaborators and allies in areas such as sales, digital marketing, financial management, safety, and the secure use of Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG).

Colgas noted that this award reinforces its strategic positioning as an entity that supports productivity and entrepreneurship in Colombia. The company reaffirmed its focus on developing an ecosystem aimed at generating opportunities for the growth of small and medium businesses in the territories where it operates.

The U.S. seizure of an oil tanker off the Venezuelan coast appears designed to further squeeze the economy of President Nicolás Maduro’s government. The Dec. 10, 2025 operation — in which American forces descended from helicopters onto the vessel — followed months of U.S. military buildup in the Caribbean and was immediately condemned by Venezuela as “barefaced robbery and an act of international piracy.”

The seized tanker, according to reports, is a 20-year-old supertanker called Skipper, capable of carrying around 2 million barrels of oil.

According to the Trump administration, the vessel was heading to Cuba. Given its size, however, it is far more likely that the final destination was China. Tankers of this scale are rarely used for short Caribbean routes; much smaller vessels typically serve Cuba.

The tanker had been sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury in 2022 for carrying prohibited Iranian oil. At the time, it was alleged that the ship — then known as Adisa — was controlled by Russian oil magnate Viktor Artemov and linked to an oil smuggling network.

On the surface, the seizure was unrelated to U.S. sanctions imposed on Venezuela in 2019 and expanded in 2020 to include secondary sanctions on third parties doing business with Caracas.

Venezuelan officials have therefore described the move as unprecedented, and they are largely correct. While Iranian tankers have been seized in the past for sanctions violations, this marks the first time a vessel departing Venezuela with a Venezuelan crew has been taken.

The Trump administration has signaled it intends to seize not only the cargo but the ship itself — a significant loss for the owning company. Because the shipment was sold under a “Free on Board” contract, the buyer assumed responsibility once the vessel left Venezuelan waters.

Nonetheless, the seizure represents a clear escalation in pressure on Venezuela. Reports indicate that around 30 other tankers operating near the country face some form of sanction. These vessels are part of a shadow fleet designed to evade restrictions while transporting oil from Venezuela, Russia, and Iran.

The message from Washington is unambiguous: more seizures may follow as the U.S. seeks to further squeeze Venezuelan oil revenues.

Venezuela’s economy remains overwhelmingly dependent on oil. Although official figures have not been published for seven years, most analysts estimate that oil accounts for more than 80% of exports, with some placing the figure above 90%.

Most Venezuelan oil is sold on the black market, largely to independent refiners in China. Chinese state-owned firms avoid these purchases to limit sanctions exposure, while authorities in Beijing tend to overlook shipments to non-state entities — particularly when tankers conceal their true origin.

An estimated 80% of Venezuelan oil ultimately goes to China through this channel. About 17% is exported to the United States under a Treasury license granted to Chevron, while roughly 3% goes to Cuba, often on subsidized terms.

Oil also accounts for around 20% of Venezuela’s GDP and more than half of government revenue, making the sector indispensable to Maduro’s survival.

Crucially, Venezuela’s oil industry was already in steep decline before U.S. sanctions began. Production peaked at 3.4 million barrels per day in 1998, fell to 2.7 million by the time Maduro took office in 2013, and dropped to 1.3 million barrels per day by 2019.

The 2019 oil sanctions shut Venezuela out of the U.S. market, forcing it to rely more heavily on China and India. When secondary sanctions followed in 2020, Europe and India halted purchases altogether. Combined with the pandemic-driven oil slump, production collapsed to just 400,000 barrels per day.

Output has since recovered to about 1 million barrels per day, aided largely by Chevron’s continued operations.

To sustain exports, Venezuela relies on a shadow fleet that uses false flags, renamed vessels, and manipulated transponders. Cargoes are sometimes transferred at sea — posing major environmental risks — before being relabeled in transit hubs such as Malaysia and shipped on to China.

The tanker seizure had little immediate impact on global oil prices due to ample supply and Venezuela’s limited market share. However, a more aggressive U.S. campaign could change that calculus.

For Venezuelan oil prices, the consequences may be sharper. Already heavily discounted due to sanctions risk, Venezuelan crude is now likely to be sold at even steeper reductions. Buyers will demand higher discounts and fewer prepayments, while export volumes may fall, forcing production cuts that are costly to reverse.

The result will be further pressure on the limited revenues Maduro depends on to keep the Venezuelan state afloat.

About the author:
Francisco J. Monaldi, Ph.D., is the Wallace S. Wilson Fellow in Latin American Energy Policy and director of the Latin America Energy Program at the Center for Energy Studies at Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy.

This article is reproduced from The Conversation under a Creative Commons licence