Colombia is at risk of sliding back into one of the darkest chapters of its recent history, according to a stark new report by the United Nations, which warns that escalating violence, territorial control by illegal armed groups and political instability are eroding hard-won human rights gains.
The annual assessment by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights paints a troubling picture of 2025: a country where armed actors have deepened their grip over rural regions, civilians are increasingly trapped in conflict zones, and the implementation of the 2016 peace accord is under growing strain.
At the heart of the report lies a central warning — Colombia faces the “possibility of reverting” to pre-peace agreement levels of violence, particularly in territories where the state remains weak or absent.
Across large swathes of the country — from the Catatumbo in Norte de Santander to the Pacific coast — non-state armed groups and criminal organizations have consolidated control over vulnerable populations, imposing what the report describes as “illegal armed governance”.
The criminal groups mentioned- Clan del Golfo, ELN, FARC dissidents – are responsible for a wide range of abuses: forced displacement, confinement, selective killings, sexual violence and the recruitment of children. Entire communities, especially Indigenous and Afro-Colombian populations, are subjected to coercion and forced participation in illicit economies. “Afro-descendant communities, particularly in regions such as Chocó, continue to face severe human rights violations due to the presence and social control exercised by non-state armed groups,” claims the report.
Even in areas where a single armed group dominates and overt violence is less visible, the UN notes that civilians live under strict systems of control, with basic freedoms curtailed and fear pervasive.
The UN documented 53 verified massacres in 2025, leaving 174 victims, the vast majority attributed to armed groups fighting over control of illegal economies such as drug trafficking.
The report also highlights a disturbing increase in indiscriminate attacks, including the use of explosives and drones in populated areas. Cities such as Cali were directly affected, with civilian casualties mounting as conflict spills into urban spaces.
In one incident in the southern department of Huila, a motorcycle bomb targeting a police station killed civilians and injured dozens, underscoring the growing risks faced by ordinary Colombians.
One of the report’s most alarming findings is the worsening situation for children.
The UN verified 150 cases of child recruitment in 2025, though it warns this represents only a fraction of the true scale due to underreporting and fear of retaliation. Armed groups are increasingly using social media platforms to lure minors, glamorising violence and illegal economies.
In some cases, children recruited into armed groups were later killed during military operations, raising further concerns about protection mechanisms.
Schools have also become battlegrounds. Armed groups have occupied educational spaces, disrupted classes and used them as recruitment grounds, particularly among Indigenous communities at risk of cultural and physical extinction.
The report details systematic patterns of sexual violence, exploitation and coercion, particularly against women and girls in conflict zones.
Armed groups have imposed control over reproductive rights, restricted access to healthcare and, in some cases, forced pregnancies. Girls are often recruited through manipulation and emotional coercion, only to face abuse, forced labour and sexual violence once under the control of armed actors.
Indigenous, Afro-descendant and migrant women are disproportionately affected, facing layered vulnerabilities exacerbated by institutional absence.
As Colombia moves through a politically sensitive period, the report identifies a sharp rise in preelectoral violence.
The killing of the right-wing presidential candidate Miguel Uribe Turbay in August 2025 marked a dramatic escalation, while the UN recorded 18 assassinations and 126 attacks or threats against political leaders and candidates.
Nearly 650 municipalities were classified as high-risk zones by Colombia’s Ombudsman, raising concerns about the integrity of democratic participation.
The report also points to a surge in digital harassment. “Violence has also extended into the digital space, with an increase in hate speech and discriminatory discourse on social media platforms.”
Humanitarian conditions have deteriorated significantly. According to UN data, mass forced displacement rose by 85% compared with 2024, driven largely by clashes between armed groups. In Catatumbo alone, nearly 90,000 people were displaced, alongside a wave of killings, kidnappings and child recruitment.
Confinement — where communities are effectively trapped by armed actors — has also increased, restricting access to food, healthcare and livelihoods, particularly in departments such as Chocó and Cauca.
Despite these challenges, the report acknowledges partial progress in implementing the 2016 Final Accord with the ex-Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrilla.
While land reform initiatives have advanced, delays in formal land titling and uneven territorial implementation continue to limit impact of the 2016 agreement. The killing of 45 former FARC combatants in 2025 — a 36% increase from the previous year — highlights ongoing security gaps in reintegration efforts. “The United Nations Verification Mission documented the continued killing of former FARC, underscoring persistent security risks despite a peace agreement.”
A recurring theme throughout the United Nations report is the insufficient presence of the state in conflict-affected regions. It warns that weak institutional reach continues to limit protection for civilians and the effective implementation of security and development policies. The report also notes that “coca cultivation rose by 3% to 262,000 hectares in 2024,” although growth has slowed for a third consecutive year, cautioning that underfunded substitution programmes risk undermining efforts to transition to legal economies.
In many cases, responses by security forces have been too slow or insufficient to prevent abuses or protect communities.
The UN concludes that Colombia stands at a pivotal juncture.
Without stronger coordination, sustained investment and a renewed focus on protecting civilians, the country risks undermining nearly a decade of peacebuilding.
“The persistence of violence and the strengthening of armed groups continue to gravely affect the civilian population,” the United Nations warns — a stark signal that security conditions are deteriorating across Colombia. As the country enters a polarised election season, the report suggests the stakes are no longer confined to preserving the 2016 peace accord, but to preventing a broader erosion of state authority and civilian protections in territories most at risk.
The Colombian government temporarily closed last week PNN Tayrona National Natural Park following threats against park staff and escalating violence between rival armed groups fighting for control of drug trafficking corridors along the Caribbean coast.
The shutdown, announced on Feb. 17 by Parques Nacionales Naturales de Colombia, was described as a preventive measure to protect visitors, local communities and officials.
“The National Government announced the temporary closure of PNN Tayrona as a preventive measure to protect the lives and safety of visitors, communities, and officials, and to ensure their security,” the agency said in a statement.
Tayrona, located near the city of Santa Marta in the foothills of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, is one of Colombia’s most visited protected areas, drawing as many as 750,000 visitors annually. Known for its white-sand beaches and dense tropical forest, the park is a pillar of the tourism economy in the Magdalena department.
The closure comes amid an intensifying turf war between the Conquering Self-Defense Forces of the Sierra Nevada (ACSN) and the Gaitanist Army of Colombia (EGC), better known as the Clan del Golfo, a criminal organization designated as a terrorist group by the United States.
Authorities say the immediate trigger for the crisis was a Feb. 11 operation to dismantle unauthorized constructions within the protected area, including houses, bathrooms and hiking trails built without state permission.
According to the parks agency, the demolitions prompted threats on social media directed at park personnel. Tensions escalated on Feb. 16 when local residents blocked employees from entering the park. Officials said individuals then began charging tourists for access and allowing entry without formal registration, effectively taking over certain administrative functions.
“This created a situation that prevents a minimum level of security from being ensured within the protected area,” authorities said.
While the government has not formally attributed responsibility for the threats, the timing of the closure has drawn attention to the deteriorating security environment in northern Colombia. Recent confrontations between the Clan del Golfo and the ACSN in nearby municipalities, including Aracataca, have led to forced displacements and heightened fears about the stability of the region.
Colombia’s Ombudsman’s Office has previously warned of the presence of both groups in and around Tayrona, citing risks ranging from extortion to sexual violence. The violence, analysts say, reflects a broader struggle for control over strategic drug trafficking corridors extending into the departments of Cesar and La Guajira.
Yet the official narrative has been complicated by contrasting statements from government negotiators engaged in talks with the ACSN.
Mauricio Silva, the government’s chief negotiator in a socio-legal dialogue with the ACSN, said the decision to close the park was driven largely by climatic and preventive considerations. While acknowledging the existence of security risks and territorial control by armed groups in parts of the Sierra Nevada, Silva said it would be inappropriate to assign criminal responsibility without completed judicial investigations.
“One thing is to recognize the delicate security situation in the territory, and another is to point to specific perpetrators without proof,” Silva said, underscoring the government’s cautious position amid ongoing negotiations.
Local tourism operators have also questioned the link between the closure and the armed conflict. Some community leaders argue that the dispute stems in part from longstanding grievances over how ticket revenues are managed. They contend that funds collected by the central government are not sufficiently reinvested in infrastructure and local development within the park and surrounding communities.
The crisis has exposed deeper tensions over who exercises effective authority in one of Colombia’s most emblematic tourist destinations. Indigenous communities, national authorities and armed groups all operate in the broader Sierra Nevada region, where state presence has historically been uneven.
Although tourists in Tayrona have generally been insulated from direct violence — with armed groups preferring to profit indirectly through extortion, drug trafficking and prostitution — the park’s closure has raised concerns that the conflict could increasingly disrupt legitimate economic activity.
For the department of Magdalena, where tourism depends on Tayrona as key source of revenue, the shutdown represents both a security and economic setback. Hotel operators and tour agencies in Santa Marta have reported cancellations since the announcement, though officials have not provided a timeline for reopening.
The government has said the closure will remain in effect until minimum security conditions can be guaranteed. Meanwhile, the dispute underscores the fragile balance between conservation, tourism and public saefty in a region where armed actors continue to expand their territorial control.
Nearly a week after Donald Trump hosted Colombia’s president, Gustavo Petro, at the White House, calm has returned to a bilateral relationship that only recently appeared headed for rupture. The insults have stopped. The social media theatrics have faded. Diplomacy, not spectacle, is back in charge.
This alone tells us that both governments have agreed to “disagree” and agree again.
The meeting itself produced no headline agreements. Instead, it marked something more consequential and less dramatic – a quiet end to illusions. In Washington, Petro’s flagship policy of “Total Peace” is now widely regarded as exhausted, if not outright discredited. What replaces it is a far more traditional, conditional partnership: security cooperation first, democracy under scrutiny, and patience in short supply.
The timing matters. Within days of the White House meeting, the U.S. State Department announced that John McNamara, Washington’s chargé d’affaires in Bogotá, will leave his post on February 13. McNamara arrived a year ago at a moment of open hostility between Trump and Petro, when the relationship was being tested not only by policy disagreements but by personal antagonism. His task was not to advance grand initiatives, but to prevent a collapse. That he succeeded says much about the value of professional diplomacy in an era of impulsive politics.
His departure now marks the end of a holding pattern. What comes next will be harder, more explicit, and less forgiving.
The Trump – Petro encounter was cordial, almost surprisingly so. Trump praised Petro as “terrific.” Petro shared a handwritten note from Trump declaring his affection for Colombia. The optics were deliberate. But the substance lay elsewhere.
According to officials and lawmakers briefed on the talks, Washington’s message was blunt: negotiations without consequences have failed. Petro’s Paz Total—a strategy built on ceasefires, open-ended negotiations, and the assumption that armed groups could be coaxed into disarmament—has not reduced violence. In many regions, it has coincided with territorial expansion by FARC dissidents, rising extortion, and a deepening humanitarian crisis. From Washington’s perspective, it has blurred the line between peace realpolitik and paralysis.
U.S. cooperation with Colombia is now explicitly conditioned on key demands. First, decisive military action against armed groups, especially the ELN along the Venezuelan border, where insurgents have long enjoyed sanctuary. Second, ironclad guarantees that Colombia’s upcoming electoral processes will be free, fair, and transparent ahead of a high-stakes 2026 presidential race.
This is not ideological hostility. It is strategic calculation – from Bogotá to Caracas, and ultimately, the Oval Office.
Colombia remains indispensable to U.S. interests: a capstone of regional security, a key counter-narcotics partner, and a democratic anchor in a hemisphere unsettled by authoritarian drift and Venezuelan instability. But indispensability does not mean indulgence. Washington’s conclusion is that leverage must now be used, not deferred.
The shift was visible almost immediately. Colombian forces bombed ELN encampments in the Catatumbo region near the Venezuelan border, killing several fighters and seizing weapons. The strikes signaled a return to military pressure after months of restraint under Paz Total.
Yet they also exposed the moral and political cost of the new course. According to Colombia’s forensic authorities and reporting by El Colombiano, one of those killed in Catatumbo was a child. Seven bodies were recovered after the operation, including that of a minor. The incident echoed last November’s bombing in Guaviare that killed seven minors, among them an 11-year-old girl.
Petro, in the aftermath of the Trump encounter, has responded with a stark argument: armed groups recruit children precisely to deter military action. Halting airstrikes, he said, would reward a “cowardly and criminal” strategy and accelerate forced recruitment. It is a grim logic, but not an implausible one—and it illustrates the impossible trade-offs now confronting the Colombian state.
Peace negotiations have not been spared. The Clan del Golfo, one of the country’s most powerful criminal organizations, suspended talks with the government after reports that Colombia and the United States discussed targeting “high-value” leaders. From Washington’s perspective, this reaction only reinforces its skepticism: armed groups talk peace when it buys time, not when it requires surrender.
None of this suggests enthusiasm in Washington for a militarized Colombia. It suggests resignation. The United States has seen this cycle before – in Colombia and throughout the hemisphere. Negotiations without enforcement are a contradiction. Ceasefires without verification entrench armed actors. Elections held amid coercion corrode democratic legitimacy from within.
Which brings us to the second pillar of the new relationship: electoral transparency.
U.S. officials have made clear that Colombia’s democratic processes will now be watched closely – not as a moral abstraction, but as a strategic necessity. A Colombia that cannot guarantee free elections is not a reliable ally, no matter how aligned its security policies may be.
This is the bargain now on offer. Not a reset. No rupture. Conditional coexistence.
John McNamara’s departure symbolizes the transition. His tenure was about keeping the peace between governments. The next phase will be about enforcing terms.
For Petro, the challenge is severe. He must deliver security results demanded by Washington without losing legitimacy at home, where skepticism of militarization runs deep. He must demonstrate democratic integrity while navigating a polarized political landscape. And he must do so knowing that Total Peace, once his signature promise, no longer commands confidence abroad.
The calm in U.S.–Colombia relations is real- but it is not comfort. It is the quiet before accountability.
Ecuador has sharply increased tariffs on Colombian crude oil transported through its pipeline system, deepening a trade and energy dispute between the two Andean neighbours that has already disrupted electricity exports and bilateral commerce.
Ecuador said on Tuesday it had raised the tariff paid by Colombia for each barrel of oil transported through the state-owned Trans-Ecuadorian Oil Pipeline System (SOTE) by 900%, lifting the fee from $3 to $30 per barrel. The move came in response to Colombia’s decision to suspend electricity exports to Ecuador from Feb. 1, 2026.
Bogotá has yet to issue an official response to the tariff increase.
The dispute has widened beyond trade into energy cooperation and crude transportation, straining relations between the two countries amid longstanding tensions over border security and cooperation against drug trafficking.
Without explicitly referring to the trade conflict, Colombia’s Ministry of Mines and Energy last week issued a resolution suspending international electricity transactions (TIE) with Ecuador, describing the measure as a preventive step aimed at protecting Colombia’s energy sovereignty and security amid climate-related pressures on domestic supply.
Colombia is a key electricity supplier to Ecuador, particularly during periods of drought. Ecuador has faced prolonged power cuts in recent years, including in 2024 and 2025, in a country where roughly 70% of electricity generation depends on hydropower.
Colombia’s leftist President Gustavo Petro said his country had previously acted in solidarity during Ecuador’s worst drought in decades. “I hope Ecuador appreciated that when it needed us, we responded with energy,” Petro said last week.
Ecuador’s Environment and Energy Minister Inés Manzano said the crude transport tariff increase applied to Colombia’s state oil company Ecopetrol and private firms exporting oil through the SOTE. “We made a change in the tariff value,” Manzano said. “Instead of three dollars, it is now 30 dollars per barrel.”
According to Ecuadorian news outlets, the SOTE transported nearly 10,300 barrels per day of Colombian crude in November, shipped by Ecopetrol and private companies.
Manzano has also said Ecuador will impose new fees on Colombian crude transported through the Oleoducto de Crudos Pesados (OCP) pipeline, citing reciprocity following Colombia’s suspension of electricity exports.
The trade conflict began last week when Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa, a close political ally of U.S. President Donald Trump, announced a 30% tariff on imports from Colombia, effective from February. Speaking from the World Economic Forum in Davos, Noboa said the measure was justified by what he described as insufficient cooperation from Bogotá in combating drug trafficking and organised crime along the shared border.
“We have made real efforts of cooperation with Colombia,” Noboa said in a post on social media, adding that Ecuador faces a trade deficit of more than $1 billion with its neighbour. “But while we insist on dialogue, our military continues confronting criminal groups tied to narcotrafficking on the border without cooperation.”
Colombia’s foreign ministry rejected the move as unilateral and contrary to Andean Community (CAN) trade rules, sending a formal protest note to Quito. Bogotá has proposed a high-level ministerial meeting involving foreign affairs, defence, trade and energy officials to de-escalate the dispute, though no date has been confirmed.
Colombia’s Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism (MinCIT) responded by announcing a 30% tariff on 23 Ecuadorian products, which have not yet been specified, with the option to extend the measure to additional goods. Trade Minister Diana Marcela Morales Rojas said the tariff was proportional, temporary and intended to restore balance to bilateral trade.
“This levy does not constitute a sanction or a confrontational measure,” the ministry said in a statement. “It is a corrective action aimed at protecting the national productive apparatus.”
Business groups say Colombia exports mainly electricity, medicines, vehicles, cosmetics and plastics to Ecuador, while importing vegetable oils and fats, canned tuna, minerals and metals. Ecuador’s exporters federation, Fedexpor, said non-oil exports to Colombia rose 4% between January and November last year, with more than 1,130 products entering the Colombian market.
Colombia and Ecuador share a 600-kilometre border stretching from the Pacific coast to the Amazon rainforest, a region where Colombian guerrilla groups and binational criminal organisations operate, including networks involved in drug trafficking, arms smuggling and illegal mining.
Although Quito and Bogotá have both signalled willingness to engage in dialogue, the rapid escalation of tariffs and energy measures has raised concerns among exporters, energy producers and regional analysts about the risk of prolonged disruption to trade and cooperation between two of the Andean region’s closest economic partners.
Colombia and Ecuador have started exchanging trade retaliations after Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa announced a 30% “security” tariff on imports from Colombia, escalating tensions between Andean neighbours over border security cooperation.
Noboa said the measure would take effect on Feb. 1 and would remain in place until Colombia shows “real commitment” to jointly tackle drug trafficking and illegal mining along the shared frontier. He made the announcement from Davos, where he is attending the World Economic Forum.
“We have made real efforts of cooperation with Colombia… but while we have insisted on dialogue, our military continues facing criminal groups tied to drug trafficking on the border without any cooperation,” Noboa said in a post on X, citing an annual trade deficit of more than $1 billion.
Colombia’s foreign ministry rejected the tariff in a formal protest note, calling it a unilateral decision that violates Andean Community (CAN) rules, and proposed a ministerial meeting involving foreign affairs, defence, trade and energy officials on Jan. 25 in Ipiales, Colombia’s southern border city.
The government of President Gustavo Petro also announced a 30% tariff on 20 products imported from Ecuador in response, though it has not specified the items. Diana Marcela Morales, Colombia’s Minister of Commerce, Industry and Tourism (MinCIT) said Ecuador’s exports covered by the retaliatory measure total some $250 million, and described the policy as “temporary” and “revisable.”
Fedexpor, Ecuador’s exporters federation, said non-oil exports to Colombia rose 4% between January and November 2025, and that the Colombian market receives more than 1,130 Ecuadorian export products. The top exports include wood boards, vegetable oils and fats, canned tuna, minerals and metals, and processed food products.
The dispute has also spread into the energy sector. Colombia’s Ministry of Mines and Energy said on Thursday it had suspended international electricity transactions with Ecuador, citing climate-related pressure on domestic supply and the need to prioritise national demand amid concerns over a possible new El Niño weather cycle.
Ecuador has struggled with severe droughts in recent years, triggering long power cuts in 2024 and 2025 in a country where roughly 70% of electricity generation depends on hydropower, while Colombia has supplied electricity during periods of shortage.
President Petro noted that Colombia acted in solidarity during Ecuador’s worst drought in 60 years. “I hope Ecuador has appreciated that when we were needed, we responded with energy,” Petro said on Wednesday.
Following Colombia’s electricity suspension, Ecuador announced new tariffs on transporting Colombian crude through its heavy crude pipeline system. Environment and Energy Minister Inés Manzano said the oil transport fee through the OCP pipeline would reflect “reciprocity,” without giving details.
Colombia and Ecuador share a 600-kilometre border stretching from the Pacific coast to the Amazon, where Colombian armed groups and criminal networks operate, including organisations involved in drug trafficking, arms smuggling and illegal mining. Relations between Petro and Noboa, who sit on opposite ends of the political spectrum, have frequently been strained.
U.S. President Donald Trump said on Tuesday there was “no going back” on his goal to bring Greenland under U.S. control, refusing to rule out the use of force and escalating tensions with European allies already bracing for a renewed transatlantic trade dispute.
Trump’s remarks followed a series of social media posts featuring AI-generated images, including one depicting the president standing in Greenland holding a U.S. flag and another showing a map of North America with Canada, Greenland and Venezuela covered by the stars and stripes.
The imagery, shared without official explanation, has fuelled alarm among allies and raised questions about the blurring of political messaging and artificial intelligence at a moment of heightened geopolitical strain.
“As I expressed to everyone, very plainly, Greenland is imperative for National and World Security. There can be no going back — on that, everyone agrees,” Trump said after speaking with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte.
Greenland, a vast Arctic island rich in minerals and strategically located between North America and Europe, is a self-governing territory of Denmark, a fellow NATO member. Trump’s renewed push to acquire it has revived a proposal he first floated during his previous term, but has now been accompanied by explicit warnings of tariffs and the possible use of force.
European leaders reacted with unease. Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen told parliament in Copenhagen that “the worst may still lie ahead.”
“We can negotiate about everything — security, investments, the economy — but we cannot negotiate our most fundamental values: sovereignty, our country’s identity, our borders and our democracy,” Frederiksen said.
At the World Economic Forum in Davos, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen urged the bloc to prepare for a more confrontational era.
“The seismic change we are going through today is an opportunity — in fact a necessity — to build a new form of European independence,” she said.
Trump has threatened steep tariffs on countries he says stand in the way of U.S. interests, including European allies involved in NATO exercises in Greenland. The European Union has warned it could retaliate with tariffs on up to €93 billion ($101 billion) of U.S. imports if trade measures are imposed.
One option under discussion is the EU’s Anti-Coercion Instrument, a powerful tool that could restrict access to public tenders, investment or services, including digital services where U.S. companies hold a surplus.
U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent sought to calm markets and dismissed fears of an escalating trade war.
“It’s been 48 hours. Sit back, relax,” Bessent told reporters in Davos. “Calm down the hysteria. Take a deep breath.”
Financial markets were less sanguine. U.S. stock index futures slid to one-month lows, global equities fell, and gold prices touched record highs as investors sought safety.
The inclusion of Canada and Venezuela in the AI-generated map added to the controversy.
Canada, a close U.S. ally and NATO member, has previously been the subject of Trump’s rhetoric suggesting it could become the “51st state.” Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney said he was “concerned” by the escalation and warned of the implications for North American and transatlantic security.
Canadian officials said Ottawa has drawn up plans to send a small contingent of soldiers to Greenland to participate in NATO military exercises, pending final approval from Carney. Canada already has aircraft and personnel deployed there as part of a NORAD exercise involving the United States.
Venezuela’s government condemned Trump’s post and called on citizens to share the country’s official map online in what officials described as a symbolic defence of sovereignty.
Russia, which has closely watched the growing rift between Washington and Europe, questioned Denmark’s sovereignty over Greenland. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said the island was the result of “colonial conquest,” while denying Moscow had any designs on the territory.
Protesters also took to the streets in several European cities, including Zurich, where demonstrators carried banners opposing Trump’s appearance at Davos and denouncing what they called imperialist policies.
Despite pushback from allies and some members of Congress, Trump has shown no sign of softening his stance, leaving diplomats and markets braced for further escalation as NATO cohesion and global trade relations come under renewed strain.
Bogotá’s mayor and security chiefs celebrated some positive results last week with stats showing an overall reduction of high-impact crimes in the city during 2025, with the murder rate dropping in the city even as violent deaths increased across Colombia.
“In Bogotá in 2025, there were fewer homicides robberies, fewer vehicle thefts, fewer motorcycle thefts, fewer cases of extortion, more drug seizures, more weapons seizures, and more arrests,” said Bogotá´s mayor Carlos Galán, presenting a security scorecard showing security shifts in the first two years of his administration.
Some decreases were significant, such as extortion cases dropping by 20 per cent, stolen car cases by 22 per cent and commercial theft by 30 per cent. Others were less impressive: street robberies only reduced by 6 per cent, and cases of sexual violence by 8 per cent.
Homicides, perhaps the most significant metric, reduced last year by just 3.4%, with 1,165 killings recorded on the national police database compared to 1,214 in 2024. This gave Bogotá – with a population of around 8 million – a current homicide rate of 14.8 deaths per 100,000 of the population, according to the standard formula used to compare deaths across varying population sizes.
This was way short of Mayor Galán’s stated goal of 8 deaths per 100,000 during his four-year tenure, but a better result than the national one. At 14.8, Bogotá’s homicide rate was considerably lower than Colombia’s national figure of 25.9 deaths per 100,000 of the population, based the alarming total of 12,484 violent deaths reported nationwide – a two per cent increase on the previous year.
City security secretary César Restrepo also pointed out that Bogotá had proportionally less murders than other major cities such as Bucaramanga, Cartagena, Barranquilla, Pereira and Cali (see table below). Medellín, however, bested the capital with a reduced rate of 11.7 per 100,000.
And in our own comparison with cities worldwide, Bogotá’s homicide rate was lower than Washington D.C. (17 per 100,000) Baltimore (23 per 100,000) or New Orleans (33 per 100,000) but much higher than most European cities such as London (currently at 1 per 100,000) or Berlin (3 per 100,000).
The challenges facing Bogotá in reducing violence against a national backdrop of increasing insecurity were highlighted in a recent study by think tank Centro de Paz y Seguridad Externadista which compared homicides rates between recent national governments.
The current Petro government reported 40,633 violent deaths during its first three years, an increase of 11 per cent over the same period for the Juan Manuel Santos government (2014 to 18) and seven per cent higher than during Ivan Duque’s tenure from 2018 to 2022.
The data pointed to a failure of the Petro’s Paz Total (‘Total Peace’) process which reduced military pressure on illegal armed groups allowing them to expand their range and illegal activities in the last three years, concluded the report.
“Although the government insists that the national conflict is de-escalating, the figures point to another scenario: homicidal violence remains at high levels,” said study leader Andrés González in December presenting the findings on YouTube.
González also pointed out that while most territorial battles took place in rural areas, the effects reflected in urban hubs where local crime groups – often with links to larger armed groups – used lethal violence in conflicts linked to extortion and micro trafficking.
Another challenge for Bogotá’s security was the low conviction rate for captured criminals, according to city police chief Giovanni Cristancho in an interview with El Tiempo. Out of 33,000 criminals arrested in the city in 2025, less than 10 per cent ended up in jail, he said.
Criminals showed little fear of the justice system, and many caught by the police were multiple offenders, said Christancho, with the police having to “catch the same person 20 times”.
Recycling criminals back on the streets was “outside the control of the district government”, security chief Restrepoalso told El Tiempo last week, but recognised it reflected badly on the city administration.
“Most citizens express their annoyance because criminals are either released or not convicted. As long as these other conditions remain unresolved, all the results we announce will continue to generate frustration among the public,” he said
This chimed with a common perception in Bogotá that even if the police are clamping down, the justice system as a whole is failing the city. Those concerns were echoed in a recent public survey by city watchdog Bogotá Como Vamos that found that a 62% of respondents perceived Bogotá as less secure, the highest figure recorded since 2008.
Low conviction rates could explain the resurgence of vigilante justice being meted out by frustrated rolos in recent years, with groups of citizens organizing to capture and beat offenders, sometimes tying them to lampposts or parading them naked through neighborhood and posting videos on social media.
Barrio justice has long been a problem in Bogotá; a study from 2016, reported in The Bogotá Post, showed an average of one lynching death every three days over a 12 month period in the city.
A more recent phenomenon in the city is the rise of fleets of armed private security guards mounted on motorbikes chasing down stolen vehicles.
One company, Self Security GPS, uses satellite tracking and immobilizer devices to recover stolen vehicles, but also regularly posts alarming videos of their ‘commandos’ taking down car thieves, sometimes with dramatic shoot-outs on the street with passers-by diving for cover.
According to data from the mayor’s office, at the last count, there were 150,000 private security guards “supporting security in Bogotá” – far outnumbering the 17,500 uniformed police.
Increasingly though, frustration among everyday citizens has boiled over into drastic reactions to street crime. Such an attempt at instant justice ended in tragedy last week with three deaths after a Bogotá driver was robbed at gunpoint by two masked robbers on a motorbike; the victim gave chase and crushed the fleeing assailants with his pick-up truck. In the ensuing multi-vehicle crash one of the robbers was killed, along with two innocent travelers who also lost their lives.
Statistically, not a good start to 2026.
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Colombian President Gustavo Petro has called on supporters to mobilise nationwide on Wednesday to defend “national sovereignty,” sharply escalating a diplomatic crisis with the United States after President Donald Trump said a U.S. military operation against Colombia “sounds good” to him.
The demonstrations are expected to take place in Bogotá’s Plaza de Bolívar, Parque Lourdes in the Chapinero locality, and outside the U.S. Embassy, with parallel protests planned in Medellín (Plaza Mayor), Cali (Plaza de Cayzedo), Bucaramanga (Plazoleta Cívica Luis Carlos Galán), Cartagena (Plaza de San Pedro Claver), Santa Marta (Parque de Bolívar).
The mobilisation follows Trump’s remarks aboard Air Force One on Sunday, when he described Petro as “a sick man” and appeared to endorse the idea of a U.S. military operation in Colombia — dubbed “Operation Colombia” by a journalist — comparable in scope to the operation that led to the arrest of Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro and wife, Cilia Flores.
When pressed on whether he meant direct military action, Trump replied: “Sounds good to me,” before adding that Petro should “watch his ass.” The White House has not clarified whether the comments reflect official U.S. policy.
A Return to Arms?
Petro responded with a torrent of social media posts and public statements that have alarmed political opponents and business leaders . In some of his strongest language since taking office, the leftist president warned that U.S. military action would plunge Colombia back into armed conflict.
“If you bomb peasants, thousands of guerrillas will return to the mountains,” Petro said. “And if you arrest the president whom a good part of my people want and respect, you will unleash the popular jaguar.”
Petro, Colombia’s first leftist leader and a former militant of the M-19 guerrilla, said he had sworn under the 1989 peace pact never to take up arms again, but suggested that commitment could be reversed if Colombia’s sovereignty were threatened.
“Although I have not been a military man, I know war and clandestinity,” Petro wrote. “I swore not to touch a weapon again since the 1989 Peace Pact, but for the homeland I will take up arms again — even though I do not want to.”
He also warned Colombia’s armed forces against showing loyalty to Washington, saying any commander who prioritised U.S. interests over Colombia’s would be dismissed. The constitution, he said, required the military to defend “popular sovereignty.”
Diplomatic protest lodged in Washington
Colombia’s Foreign Ministry formally raised the dispute on January 4, issuing a diplomatic note of protest to the U.S. government through Ambassador Daniel García-Peña in Washington.
In the letter, the ministry said Trump’s remarks violated basic principles governing relations between sovereign states and amounted to “undue interference” in Colombia’s internal affairs.
“The President of the Republic of Colombia has been legitimately elected by the sovereign will of the Colombian people,” the statement said, adding that any attempt to discredit him was incompatible with international law and the United Nations Charter.
The Cancillería also cited principles of sovereign equality, non-intervention and mutual respect, saying threats or the use of force between states were “unacceptable.”
“Colombia is a democratic, sovereign state that conducts its foreign policy autonomously,” it said. “Its sovereignty, institutional legitimacy and political independence are not subject to external conditioning.”
The crisis has further polarised Colombia’s already fractured political landscape. Former president Álvaro Uribe, a vocal critic of Petro, said Colombia was drifting toward a Venezuela-style confrontation with the United States, though he stopped short of endorsing military intervention.
“What Colombia needs is a change of government,” Uribe told El Tiempo, adding that he trusted Washington’s strategy was “well conceived.”
Petro has cast Wednesday’s demonstrations as a defining moment for his presidency, portraying himself as the defender of national dignity against foreign aggression. He also reiterated the Colombian goverment’s position to cooperate fully with Washington on counter-narcotics and security issues. “You (Trump) took it upon yourself, in an act of arrogance, to punish my opinion — my words against the Palestinian genocide. Your punishment has been to falsely label me a drug trafficker and accuse me of running cocaine factories,” stated Petro hours after the Air Force One declations. “I don’t know whether Maduro is good or bad, or even whether he is a drug trafficker (…) so, stop the slander against me,” he said.
Petro’s critics accuse the president of instrumentalising public rallies to divert attention from Colombia’s deep internal security crisis, and to position himself politically alongside Venezuela’s ousted strongman. They argue that his language of “sovereignty” closely mirrors chavista narratives, warning that the protests risk morphing into an implicit show of solidarity with Nicolás Maduro rather than a defence of Colombia’s territorial integrity.
The White House has not walked back Trump’s remarks, and U.S. officials have so far declined to offer reassurances. On Wednesday morning, Secretary of State Marco Rubio and U.S. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth held a classified briefing with senators on Capitol Hill in which, according to Democratic leaders, their Republican counterparts refused to rule out sending U.S. troops to Venezuela or other countries.
Democratic Senate leader Chuck Schumer said he had asked for assurances that Washington was not planning operations elsewhere. “I mentioned some cases — including Colombia and Cuba — and I was very disappointed with their response,” Schumer said, adding that the meeting “left more questions than answers” and that the plan for the United States to govern Venezuela was “vague and based on illusions.”
As governments across Latin America closely watch the incoming chavista regime under interim president Delcy Rodríguez, the confrontation between Trump and Petro marks the most serious rupture in U.S.–Colombia relations in over two centuries. For Bogotá — long one of Washington’s closest allies in the region — the escalation has raised fears that incendiary rhetoric and mass mobilisation could push an already volatile situation into dangerous territory.
Editor’s Note: The U.S Embassy in Bogotá has issued a security alert, warning U.S. citizens to avoid large protests “as they have the potential to turn violent”.
Colombia has recorded 40,663 homicides during the first three years of President Gustavo Petro’s government, surpassing the totals reported under the administrations of Iván Duque and Juan Manuel Santos, according to a report published Tuesday by the Centro de Paz y Seguridad of Universidad Externado. The report documents killings between August 2022 and August 2025, a period that encompasses Petro’s “Total Peace” agenda with illegal armed groups. According to the data, Colombia registered a 7.59% increase in homicides compared with the same timeframe under Duque, who reported 37,795 cases, while Santos’ second term saw 36,646.
“During the first three years of Gustavo Petro’s administration, violence did not decrease under the banner of ‘Paz Total’. On the contrary, homicides continued to rise,” the study states. Petro’s annual average now stands at 13,554 murders per year, compared with 12,598 under Duque and 12,215 under Santos. Nationally, investigators estimate one person is killed every 39 minutes, a faster rate than during the two previous governments.
The findings, compiled by researchers Andrés González Díaz, Diego Rodríguez Pinzón and Carolina Saldaña, present a wide set of indicators showing the acceleration of lethal violence. Monthly murders during Petro’s term average 1,130 cases — compared with 1,050 under Duque — while daily homicides rose from 34.5 to 37 per day.
The authors also document a territorial reconfiguration of violence. Their analysis identifies rapidly shifting hotspots driven by disputes among armed groups, expanding drug economies and the weakening of state authority in several regions.
The study found the Caribbean region registered the steepest increases, displacing historically violent departments in the southwest. Six departments account for the largest share of the national rise when compared with Duque’s tenure, including Bolívar with 870 homicides, Magdalena: (811), Atlántico: (803) and Santander (530).
Researchers said these spikes coincide with the emergence of new criminal alliances, intensified disputes over drug-trafficking corridors and the collapse of informal ceasefires amid the government’s stalled negotiations with armed groups.
In Catatumbo, one of Colombia’s most unstable border regions, killings rose sharply due to clashes between the National Liberation Army (ELN) and FARC dissidents. “The increase in violence in Norte de Santander — 141 additional homicides — reflects escalating confrontations, particularly in Tibú, Ocaña, El Tarra and Cúcuta,” the report said. Rising attacks on social leaders and former FARC peace signatories further contributed to what analysts describe as an “acute humanitarian risk.”
Despite being the country’s most heavily policed territory, Bogotá recorded one of the most significant increases in homicide volume. Murders rose from 3,198 to 3,427, an increase of 229 cases (7.16%), making the capital the single largest contributor to the regional rise in central Colombia.
The department of Cundinamarca added 139 cases, rising from 1,111 to 1,250 homicides (+12.51%), while Boyacá registered the steepest proportional jump in the region — +17%, from 247 to 289 cases — despite being one of the country’s historically safest departments.
The report concludes that identifying and intervening in these “critical territorial nodes” is essential to reversing the national upward trend. It also adds that the shifting geography of violence reflects a broader proliferation of armed groups and illicit economies fueled by kidnapping, drug trafficking and illegal mining, during Petro’s final months in office.
Hugo Carvajal Barrios, the former Venezuelan intelligence chief known as “El Pollo,” has issued an explosive letter from a U.S. federal prison alleging that Nicolás Maduro’s government systematically used drug trafficking, criminal gangs, espionage networks, and even electoral technology as tools to undermine the United States. The 10-page statement, addressed to “President Trump and the People of the United States,” asserts that Venezuela’s ruling elite operates as a “narco-terrorist organization” with global reach and explicit anti-American intent.
Carvajal, a three-star general who served as Director of Military Intelligence under both Hugo Chávez and Maduro, writes that he is now “sitting in an American prison because I voluntarily plead guilty to the crimes charged against me: a narco-terrorism conspiracy.” He frames the letter not as a political intervention but as an act of accountability: a decision, he says, to reveal “the full truth so that the United States can protect itself from the dangers witnessed for so many years.”
Having broken publicly with the Maduro government in 2017, Carvajal fled Venezuela and was later extradited to the United States. He insists that even as he knew he faced prosecution, he acted “with the strongest conviction to dismantle Maduro’s criminal regime and bring freedom to my country.” Today, he writes, he believes it is essential to warn Americans about “the reality of what the Venezuelan regime truly is and why President Trump’s policies are not only correct, but absolutely necessary to the United States’ national security.”
Carvajal accuses Maduro and ruling party strongman Diosdado Cabello of transforming the Venezuelan state into a criminal consortium dedicated to drug trafficking. “I personally witnessed how Hugo Chávez’s government became a criminal organization that is now run by Nicolás Maduro, Diosdado Cabello, and other senior regime officials,” he states. The purpose of this network—known internationally as the Cartel de los Soles—was, he claims, “to weaponize drugs against the United States.”
He maintains that narcotrafficking operations facilitated by Venezuela were not the result of corruption or rogue actors. “The drugs that reached your cities through new routes were not accidents… they were deliberate policies coordinated by the Venezuelan regime against the United States,” he writes. According to Carvajal, the strategy “was suggested by the Cuban regime to Chávez in the mid-2000s” and relied on cooperation from the FARC, ELN, Cuban intelligence agencies, and “Hezbollah.” The regime, he adds, supplied “weapons, passports, and impunity” to these groups.
Carvajal devotes a significant portion of the letter to the evolution of the Venezuelan criminal super-gang Tren de Aragua, now considered one of Latin America’s most rapidly expanding transnational crime networks. He claims he personally witnessed its origins inside Venezuelan prisons.
“I was present when decisions were made to organize and weaponize criminal gangs across Venezuela to protect the regime—among them the group known as Tren de Aragua,” he writes. Chávez, he claims, ordered the recruitment of gang leaders “to defend the revolution in exchange for impunity,” while Maduro later expanded the strategy by “exporting criminality and chaos abroad.”
Carvajal alleges that “thousands of members” of the gang were sent out of Venezuela through coordination among the Ministries of Interior and Prisons, the National Guard, and national police forces. He claims the outflow accelerated when “the Biden-Harris open-border policy became widely known,” asserting that Tren de Aragua “seized the opportunity to send these operatives into the United States.”
“They now have obedient, armed personnel on American soil,” he writes, alleging that the gang was ordered to continue “kidnapping, extorting, and killing” as a means of financing itself abroad.
Carvajal goes on to detail alleged espionage operations linked to both Russian and Cuban intelligence services. He claims Russian operatives approached Chávez with a plan to tap submarine internet cables linking South America and the Caribbean to the United States – purportedly to intercept U.S. government communications.
He also recounts warning Maduro in 2015 that allowing Russia to build a listening post on La Orchila Island “would one day invite American bombs,” a warning he says was ignored.
According to Carvajal, Venezuela and Cuba also sent operatives into the United States. “For twenty years, the Venezuelan regime sent spies into your country – many are still there, some disguised as members of the Venezuelan opposition,” he writes. Cuban intelligence, he claims, “bragged about having sent thousands of spies over decades, some now career politicians.” Most sensationally, he asserts: “U.S. diplomats and CIA officers were paid to assist Chávez and Maduro… and some remain active to this day.”
Carvajal also revives allegations about the voting-technology company Smartmatic. “The Smartmatic system can be altered—this is a fact,” he writes, claiming he oversaw the placement of the official responsible for information systems at Venezuela’s electoral authority. While he stops short of alleging that U.S. elections were stolen, he asserts that “elections can be rigged with the software and has been used to do so.”
Carvajal concludes with a sweeping warning to the United States. “Make no mistake about the threat posed by allowing a narco-terrorist organization to roam freely in the Caribbean,” he writes. “The regime I served is not merely hostile—it is at war with you.” He reiterates his support for Trump’s stance on Venezuela, writing: “I absolutely support President Trump’s policy… because it is in self-defense and he is acting based on the truth.”
Senator Iván Cepeda of the ruling Historic Pact coalition has emerged as the early front-runner in Colombia’s 2026 presidential race, according to a nationwide Invamer poll released Sunday by Caracol TV and Blu Radio. The survey – the first major measurement since the lifting of Colombia’s recent polling restrictions – places the left-wing candidate at 31.9% of voting intention, six months ahead of the first round.
The results position Cepeda well ahead of candidate Abelardo de la Espriella of Defensores de la Patria, who received 18.2%, and independent centrist Sergio Fajardo, who registered 8.5%. Miguel Uribe Londoño, running for the leadership of President Álvaro Uribe Vélez’s Centro Democrático party, follows with 4.2%. Uribe Londoño is the father of Senator Miguel Uribe Turbay, victim of an assassination attempt on June 7, and who died two months later at the Santa Fe Hospital in Bogotá.
The findings come amid broad public dissatisfaction with the country’s direction and with the administration of President Gustavo Petro, who leaves office on August 7, 2026. According to the poll, 56% of respondents disapprove of Petro’s administration, while 37% approve. Although disapproval has dipped slightly from previous months, nearly six in ten Colombians remain critical of the government. National sentiment is similarly pessimistic: 59.8% believe Colombia is “on the wrong track,” compared with 34.4% who feel otherwise.
Internal security stands out as the leading concern. Asked whether Petro’s “Total Peace” policy had made them feel safer, 66.2% claim it made them feel more insecure. Nearly 65% believe the initiative is moving in the “wrong direction”, and 73% say the government has lost territorial control to illegal armed groups. Only 20% expressed confidence in the government’s peace and security approach.
The Invamer survey, conducted between November 15 and 27 among 3,800 respondents in 148 municipalities, does not include public reaction to the latest scandal involving alleged infiltration of state institutions by FARC dissidents. The poll has a 1.81% margin of error and a 95% confidence level.
Cepeda’s lead reflects firm support among left-leaning voters and measurable gains among independents and left-leaning centrists. Though only 24% of those polled identified themselves as “left-wing”, the senator’s 31.9% support suggests he is drawing backing among younger voters. He also carries a relatively high rejection rate: 23.9% said they would “never” vote for him.
The survey challenges the perception that Cepeda lacks room to grow beyond the left, even as 50% expressed that they would prefer to vote for a candidate opposed to Petro. Analysts believe the Historic Pact’s decision to hold its internal consultation last month helped consolidate support within the coalition and gave Cepeda a strategic advantage.
Despite his lead, Cepeda could face voter rejection should Petro’s disapproval ratings continue to climb. The candidate’s current negative rating is among the highest of any public figure, and his pro-Petro agenda on security, economy, and U.S relations could push the center closer to the moderate right. Still, the poll indicates Cepeda would win a runoff against De la Espriella with a wide margin, but face a “technical tie” with the mathematician and former Governor of Antioquia.
De la Espriella, meanwhile, has quickly consolidated the anti-Petro vote, emerging as a “dark horse” at the extreme right of the spectrum. Once absent from early electoral projections, the lawyer now surpasses established Centro Democrático politicians – including senators María Fernanda Cabal, Paola Holguín, and Paloma Valencia.
Former defense minister under President Juan Manuel Santos and ex-Ambassador to Washinton, Juan Carlos Pinzón, is in seventh place (2,9%), but these early numbers are likely to increase, given that he maintains a close relationship with three ideological camps (Centro Democrático, La U, Cambio Radical) represented in Presidents Uribe and Juan Manuel Santos, and German Vargás Lleras.
Even though the poll found that 63% of eligible voters know who De la Espriella is, there is room for continued growth for the five candidates who marked above 2% in the poll, among them, Vargas Lleras in fifth place (2.1%).
The centrist bloc, historically influential in Colombian politics, appears fragmented. Fajardo, once considered a reliable alternative to both left and right, no longer polls in double digits. While he maintains a lower rejection rate than most rivals and doubles the numbers of former Bogotá mayor Claudia López (4.1%), analysts say the proliferation of centrist candidates could dilute Fajardo’s base. Combined, these candidates would outpace De la Espriella’s support, but the numbers suggest this does not translate into a cohesive electoral force.
Foreign policy is also shaping voter priorities. A large majority – 78% – said maintaining strong relations with the United States is essential for the next administration. Respondents widely rejected Petro’s decision to use a megaphone in New York to urge U.S. soldiers not to follow orders from former President Donald Trump; 78% disapproved of the act, even though half of respondents hold an unfavorable view of Trump.
President Petro reacted to the poll on social media, framing the electoral landscape as a struggle between entrenched elites and what he described as a “powerful people” seeking to reclaim the state. Referring implicitly to Uribe and Fajardo, the president said Colombia must reject “mafioso elites” and work toward a “free and educated” society.
The Centro Democrático announced it will conduct an internal vote among more than 4,000 active party members to select two candidates for a March 2026 primary. The contenders are senators Cabal, Holguín, and Valencia, and Miguel Uribe Londoño.
With six months until the first round on May 31, 2026, the Invamer poll highlights a polarized electorate, deep concerns over security and corruption, and an early advantage for the ruling coalition’s candidate — with substantial uncertainty and new political alignments spearheaded by former presidents, especially Álvaro Uribe.
President Gustavo Petro is confronting explosive accusations of treason and complicity after a Noticias Caracol investigative report revealed alleged channels of communication and the transfer of highly classified military intelligence from the Armed Forces to FARC dissidents led by alias Calarcá. The report broadcast on Sunday has plunged the leftist administration into political turmoil and prompted immediate demands for congressional and judicial action.
Caracol’s year-long investigation is grounded in over 100 digital files from seized computers, cellphones, and encrypted chats, as well as damning testimony from Calarcá himself. According to the news outlet, the documents contain references to sensitive military information, including operational details and warnings about troop movements, that dissident commanders allegedly received from contacts inside state institutions. Noticias Caracol also included the video testimony from Calarcá who described President Petro as an “ally.”
The broadcast identified two senior figures repeatedly named in the seized material: General Juan Miguel Huertas, head of the Army’s personnel command, and Wilmar Mejía, a senior official of the National Intelligence Directorate (DNI). General Huertas was reinstated by President Petro in July this year, and Mejía, is a former member of the M-19 guerrilla. According to Caracol, the dissident files portray those officials as conduits through which intelligence moved from the state to the armed group. The report further alleges that, on multiple occasions, official vehicles were used to transport members of the dissident organization away from military pressure.
Caracol reported that the Fiscalía General de la Nación has had custody of the seized technical evidence since July 2024, after a convoy carrying seven dissident members, including Calarcá himself, was detained at a military check-point near Medellín, Antioquia. The convoy was being escorted by personnel from the National Protection Unit (UNP) and was carrying a chache of weapons, cash as well as an under-age combatant. Days after the incident, President Petro named Calarcá a “peace envoy” and secured his release. Despite the material that became part of an investigation by the Attorney General’s Office into collusion between the UNP and FARC dissidents, Caracol claims, the Fiscalía has not initiatated any judicial actions prior to Sunday’s broadcast.
Noticias Caracol also tied Calarcá’s structure to high-impact attacks against the Colombian state. The dissident commander is identified by investigators as the mastermind behind the downing of a U.S-manufactured ‘Black Hawk’ helicopter in Amalfi, Antioquia, on October 21. The attack with an improvised drone resulted in 13 members of the National Police killed, and marked one of the most serious blows against counter-narcotics operations in the department. According to Caracol, the internal files seized from the guerrilla include references to preparations and communications surrounding the assault.
The dissident FARC commander is also considered one of the intellectual authors behind the June 7 assassination of presidential candidate Miguel Uribe Turbay, attack that shook the national political landscape and remains under investigation.
The investigation further highlights that communications between Calarcá and goverment officials referenced plans to create front companies modeled after the Convivir self-defense groups, and document the visit of a Chinese businessman to guerrilla camps in Catatumbo to discuss weapons fabrication and illegal gold-mining ventures. Caracol presented these elements as part of the dissidents’ own internal operational planning.
The revelations have been widely framed as proof of a deep institutional failures and evidence of a political strategy that has benefited the expansion of illegal armed groups. Opposition leaders claim that the files show deep state-level penetration by dissidents and security breaches that have put the lives of Colombia’s soldiers and police at extreme risk.
Within hours of the report, public condemnations were immediate and forceful. Former FARC hostage and presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt issued a statement demanding urgent action: “Congress must prosecute Petro now. Treason against the homeland is the greatest crime of a president. The congressmen are prevaricating by not doing so. The Supreme Court of Justice must act now. Our democracy is in maximum danger. Our army must refrain from obeying the criminals who have taken over the presidency and the Attorney General’s Office. Petro must leave now.”
Senator María Fernanda Cabal of the Centro Democrático party announced she would file a formal complaint with the House Accusations Committee. “Gustavo Petro must be held accountable before the justice system. I will file a formal complaint with the House Accusations Committee so that it investigates the alleged support from the FARC for his presidential campaign, revealed by Noticias Caracol, as well as the infiltration by alias ‘Calarcá’ into the Military Forces and the DNI,” she said.
President Petro — along with other senior government officials implicated in the scandal, including Vice President Francia Márquez — has not issued an official statement responding to Caracol’s core claims: that dissident commanders received classified military intelligence; that state resources and official vehicles were used to assist dissident mobility; and that high-level officials were named in internal dissident files as intermediaries.
As judicial authorities face growing pressure to respond, and Congress confronts calls to open formal proceedings against President Petro, the nation is entering what analysts describe as one of the most serious confrontations between civilian authority and the military-intelligence establishment in decades. The fallout from Caracol’s disclosures is widening rapidly, and for now, Petro’s silence can only cement the government’s complicity with illegal armed groups financed by drug trafficking. And proof that the U.S administration of President Donald Trump claims to have by adding Petro and close family members to the so-called ‘Clinton List’.
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