Colombia and Ecuador have started exchanging trade retaliations after Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa announced a 30% “security” tariff on imports from Colombia, escalating tensions between Andean neighbours over border security cooperation.

Noboa said the measure would take effect on Feb. 1 and would remain in place until Colombia shows “real commitment” to jointly tackle drug trafficking and illegal mining along the shared frontier. He made the announcement from Davos, where he is attending the World Economic Forum.

“We have made real efforts of cooperation with Colombia… but while we have insisted on dialogue, our military continues facing criminal groups tied to drug trafficking on the border without any cooperation,” Noboa said in a post on X, citing an annual trade deficit of more than $1 billion.

Colombia’s foreign ministry rejected the tariff in a formal protest note, calling it a unilateral decision that violates Andean Community (CAN) rules, and proposed a ministerial meeting involving foreign affairs, defence, trade and energy officials on Jan. 25 in Ipiales, Colombia’s southern border city.

The government of President Gustavo Petro also announced a 30% tariff on 20 products imported from Ecuador in response, though it has not specified the items. Diana Marcela Morales, Colombia’s Minister of Commerce, Industry and Tourism (MinCIT) said Ecuador’s exports covered by the retaliatory measure total some $250 million, and described the policy as “temporary” and “revisable.”

Fedexpor, Ecuador’s exporters federation, said non-oil exports to Colombia rose 4% between January and November 2025, and that the Colombian market receives more than 1,130 Ecuadorian export products. The top exports include wood boards, vegetable oils and fats, canned tuna, minerals and metals, and processed food products.

The dispute has also spread into the energy sector. Colombia’s Ministry of Mines and Energy said on Thursday it had suspended international electricity transactions with Ecuador, citing climate-related pressure on domestic supply and the need to prioritise national demand amid concerns over a possible new El Niño weather cycle.

Ecuador has struggled with severe droughts in recent years, triggering long power cuts in 2024 and 2025 in a country where roughly 70% of electricity generation depends on hydropower, while Colombia has supplied electricity during periods of shortage.

President Petro noted that Colombia acted in solidarity during Ecuador’s worst drought in 60 years. “I hope Ecuador has appreciated that when we were needed, we responded with energy,” Petro said on Wednesday.

Following Colombia’s electricity suspension, Ecuador announced new tariffs on transporting Colombian crude through its heavy crude pipeline system. Environment and Energy Minister Inés Manzano said the oil transport fee through the OCP pipeline would reflect “reciprocity,” without giving details.

Colombia and Ecuador share a 600-kilometre border stretching from the Pacific coast to the Amazon, where Colombian armed groups and criminal networks operate, including organisations involved in drug trafficking, arms smuggling and illegal mining. Relations between Petro and Noboa, who sit on opposite ends of the political spectrum, have frequently been strained.

The Bogotá mayoralty has declared the tender process for the construction of the capital’s second metro line void after no bids were submitted by the deadline, Mayor Carlos Fernando Galán said on Tuesday, highlighting ongoing challenges facing Colombia’s most ambitious infrastructure project.

Galán said none of the prequalified consortia presented final offers before the cutoff time on Jan. 20, forcing the city to restart the process. He stressed, however, that the decision does not jeopardize the continuation of the project, which is expected to be re-tendered through a new international bidding process beginning in February. “We must inform the public that no proposals were received from the consortia that were prequalified to submit offers,” Galán told a press conference. “This does not mean that Metro Line 2 will not go ahead. Metro Line 2 continues.”

Bogotá’s second metro line, a 15.5-kilometre underground system designed to connect the city’s northern and western districts with the centre, is a key component of efforts to modernize public transport in a city of more than 8 million residents.

The project is expected to include 11 stations, most of them underground, and carry up to 50,000 passengers per hour in each direction.

The Mayor said the new tender would benefit from a more mature technical and financial structure, as well as continued backing from multilateral lenders and Colombia’s national government through existing co-financing agreements. Authorities aim to award the contract in the first quarter of 2027.

The failed bidding process follows a lengthy prequalification phase that began under the previous city administration led by former mayor Claudia López. Four consortia were initially prequalified in August 2023, after which the project moved into the public tender stage in September of that year.

According to Galán, two of those groups were excluded in October 2024 due to conflicts of interest raised by competing bidders. That reduced the field to two consortia, one Chinese and one Spanish.

In October 2025, the Chinese-led consortium withdrew from the process, citing concerns over Colombia’s exchange rate volatility and associated financial risks. This left the Spanish consortium as the sole remaining bidder. That group later requested an extension to the submission deadline, which city authorities declined to grant.

Galán said the Spanish consortium ultimately failed to submit a proposal after one of its key partners, infrastructure firm Acciona, withdrew from the group, rendering the bid unviable. The formal notification of withdrawal was filed on the same day the tender closed.

The City claims to have taken steps to encourage competition, including issuing addenda and extending deadlines, but were ultimately unable to secure a binding offer.

The announcement comes as construction of Bogotá’s first metro line – an elevated system being built by the Chinese consortium China Harbour Engineering Company Limited (CHEC) – has reached approximately 70% completion, according to the mayoralty. Line 1 is scheduled to begin operations in 2028 and is seen as a test case for future rail projects in the capital.

Metro Line 2 is expected to cost approximately 34.9 trillion Colombian pesos (USD$8.9 billion) and will be fully automated, according to the Bogotá Metro Company. The line will operate 25 trains, each measuring 140 metres in length, and is projected to add around 800,000 daily trips to the city’s public transport network once operational.

Leonidas Narváez, general manager of the Enpresa Metro de Bogotá (EMB) said the city would launch an expanded global outreach campaign to attract new bidders when the tender reopens. “We will carry out a broad international invitation to firms around the world so that they can once again participate,” Narváez said.

Political reactions to the failed tender were swift. Daniel Briceño, a former city councillor from the  Centro Democrático party, and Senatorial candidate, blamed the López administration for what he described as structural flaws in the project’s design. “This process was left poorly prepared and with serious errors,” Briceño said in a statement.

City councillor Juan David Quintero, meanwhile, attributed the lack of bids in part to global geopolitical tensions, pointing to the trade disputes between the United States and China as a factor influencing risk perceptions among major infrastructure firms.

Galán rejected claims that the project was at risk, saying the revised timeline preserves the city’s broader metro expansion plans. Under the new schedule, authorities expect to receive bids in September 2026, following additional technical and financial adjustments. “We have secured financing, multilateral support and a valid co-financing agreement,” he said. “The project remains on track.”

Bogotá officials said the restart of the tender process was intended to provide greater certainty to potential bidders while safeguarding public resources and long-term project viability.

U.S. President Donald Trump said on Tuesday there was “no going back” on his goal to bring Greenland under U.S. control, refusing to rule out the use of force and escalating tensions with European allies already bracing for a renewed transatlantic trade dispute.

Trump’s remarks followed a series of social media posts featuring AI-generated images, including one depicting the president standing in Greenland holding a U.S. flag and another showing a map of North America with Canada, Greenland and Venezuela covered by the stars and stripes.

The imagery, shared without official explanation, has fuelled alarm among allies and raised questions about the blurring of political messaging and artificial intelligence at a moment of heightened geopolitical strain.

“As I expressed to everyone, very plainly, Greenland is imperative for National and World Security. There can be no going back — on that, everyone agrees,” Trump said after speaking with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte.

Greenland, a vast Arctic island rich in minerals and strategically located between North America and Europe, is a self-governing territory of Denmark, a fellow NATO member. Trump’s renewed push to acquire it has revived a proposal he first floated during his previous term, but has now been accompanied by explicit warnings of tariffs and the possible use of force.

European leaders reacted with unease. Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen told parliament in Copenhagen that “the worst may still lie ahead.”

“We can negotiate about everything — security, investments, the economy — but we cannot negotiate our most fundamental values: sovereignty, our country’s identity, our borders and our democracy,” Frederiksen said.

At the World Economic Forum in Davos, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen urged the bloc to prepare for a more confrontational era.

“The seismic change we are going through today is an opportunity — in fact a necessity — to build a new form of European independence,” she said.

Trade war fears resurface

Trump has threatened steep tariffs on countries he says stand in the way of U.S. interests, including European allies involved in NATO exercises in Greenland. The European Union has warned it could retaliate with tariffs on up to €93 billion ($101 billion) of U.S. imports if trade measures are imposed.

One option under discussion is the EU’s Anti-Coercion Instrument, a powerful tool that could restrict access to public tenders, investment or services, including digital services where U.S. companies hold a surplus.

U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent sought to calm markets and dismissed fears of an escalating trade war.

“It’s been 48 hours. Sit back, relax,” Bessent told reporters in Davos. “Calm down the hysteria. Take a deep breath.”

Financial markets were less sanguine. U.S. stock index futures slid to one-month lows, global equities fell, and gold prices touched record highs as investors sought safety.

Canada and Venezuela react

The inclusion of Canada and Venezuela in the AI-generated map added to the controversy.

Canada, a close U.S. ally and NATO member, has previously been the subject of Trump’s rhetoric suggesting it could become the “51st state.” Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney said he was “concerned” by the escalation and warned of the implications for North American and transatlantic security.

Canadian officials said Ottawa has drawn up plans to send a small contingent of soldiers to Greenland to participate in NATO military exercises, pending final approval from Carney. Canada already has aircraft and personnel deployed there as part of a NORAD exercise involving the United States.

Venezuela’s government condemned Trump’s post and called on citizens to share the country’s official map online in what officials described as a symbolic defence of sovereignty.

Russia weighs in

Russia, which has closely watched the growing rift between Washington and Europe, questioned Denmark’s sovereignty over Greenland. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said the island was the result of “colonial conquest,” while denying Moscow had any designs on the territory.

Protesters also took to the streets in several European cities, including Zurich, where demonstrators carried banners opposing Trump’s appearance at Davos and denouncing what they called imperialist policies.

Despite pushback from allies and some members of Congress, Trump has shown no sign of softening his stance, leaving diplomats and markets braced for further escalation as NATO cohesion and global trade relations come under renewed strain.

A federal jury in the United States has awarded coal producer Drummond Company Inc. $256 million after finding that a prominent human-rights attorney and his associates orchestrated a campaign of false accusations linking the company to paramilitary violence in Colombia.

The verdict, delivered on January 15 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, marks one of the largest legal victories Drummond has secured in its long-running effort to counter claims alleging ties to illegal armed groups during Colombia’s internal conflict.

Jurors ruled unanimously that Washington-based attorney Terrence P. Collingsworth and his organization, International Rights Advocates (IRAdvocates), knowingly made false and defamatory statements accusing Drummond of financing paramilitary organizations operating in Colombia. The panel also found that Collingsworth and IRAdvocates violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), determining they engaged in a coordinated scheme involving extortion, bribery of witnesses, witness tampering, wire fraud, money laundering, obstruction of justice and conspiracy.

According to court filings and testimony presented at trial, the defendants allegedly used fabricated narratives and paid testimony to pressure Drummond through lawsuits and media campaigns in the United States, Colombia and Europe. Jurors concluded there was “clear and convincing evidence” that Collingsworth either knew his claims were false or acted with reckless disregard for the truth.

Drummond had brought two lawsuits against Collingsworth and his network: one alleging defamation and another invoking the federal RICO statute. The jury awarded $52 million in damages for defamation and $68 million under the RICO claims. Under U.S. law, RICO damages are automatically tripled, bringing the total award to $256 million.

The case centered heavily on payments made to Colombian witnesses who had testified in earlier lawsuits accusing Drummond of supporting right-wing paramilitary groups. Evidence showed that more than $400,000 had been paid to individuals including Jaime Blanco Maya and Jairo de Jesús Charris, also known as “El Viejo Miguel,” without disclosure to courts.

The jury further found that other alleged co-conspirators were involved in the broader scheme, including Colombian attorney Iván Alfredo Otero Mendoza and Dutch businessman Albert van Bilderbeek, both of whom were also held liable under RICO.

Drummond’s lead trial counsel, Trey Wells of Starnes Davis Florie LLP, said the verdict vindicated the company after decades of reputational damage. “This verdict is further proof that Drummond has never had any ties whatsoever to illegal armed groups,” Wells said in a statement. “For years the company endured malicious accusations and false narratives that have now been categorically rejected by an American jury.”

Drummond has operated in Colombia since the late 1980s and is one of the largest exporters of Colombian coal. The company has faced multiple lawsuits over the past two decades in U.S. courts alleging it supported paramilitary groups blamed for killings near its mining operations — claims Drummond has consistently denied. The Company said the ruling exposesd a coordinated effort to damage Drummond’s reputation and extract financial settlements through legal pressure based on false testimony. “The case documents demonstrate a deliberate strategy to harm Drummond commercially and reputationally through fabricated allegations,” the company noted.

Drummond reiterated its commitment to ethical operations in Colombia, stressing that it has complied with national laws since beginning activities in the country and maintains strict corporate governance standards.

The verdict is expected to have far-reaching implications for ongoing and future transnational litigation involving corporate accountability claims, particularly cases reliant on testimony sourced in conflict zones.

Colombia’s presidential race has entered poll season with a revealing snapshot from Noticias RCN and Spanish firm GAD3 that points to an election defined less by early frontrunners than by who can consolidate votes after March’s inter-party consultations.

At first glance, Historic Pact senator Iván Cepeda appears comfortably ahead. The RCN poll places him at 30% voting intention — well above far-right independent Abelardo de la Espriella (22%) and miles ahead of the scattered field trailing behind in single digits.

But a deeper reading of the numbers suggests Cepeda’s lead may already be capped.

The 30% figure aligns almost perfectly with President Gustavo Petro’s loyal electoral base, which has consistently hovered between 28% and 32% since his rise to national prominence. In other words, Cepeda appears to have consolidated petrismo rather than expanded beyond it. The poll reinforces this ceiling: 5% of respondents favor a blank vote, 11% say they would vote for none of the candidates, and 14% remain undecided — a combined 30% still outside the Petro orbit and unlikely to gravitate toward Cepeda.

Further down the list, potential left-leaning or independent figures barely register: Sergio Fajardo, Aníbal Gaviria, Juan Daniel Oviedo, Roy Barreras and Camilo Romero each sit around 1%. Even Claudia López and Germán Vargas Lleras score negligible fractions. The fragmentation benefits Cepeda for now, but it also masks the absence of new voters entering his camp.

By contrast, the Right’s apparent weakness hides a powerful consolidation opportunity.

The Gran Consulta por Colombia, on March 8, shows Paloma Valencia leading the consultation vote with 23%. Yet the poll also reveals that the rest of the consultation slate collectively commands nearly 20%: Juan Manuel Galán (8%), Vicky Dávila (8%), Juan Carlos Pinzón (6%), Juan Daniel Oviedo (4%), Aníbal Gaviria (3%), Enrique Peñalosa (2%), David Luna (1%) and Mauricio Cárdenas (1%).

This bloc is electorally decisive because it represents Colombia’s ideological center — liberal technocrats, urban moderates and business-friendly reformists who reject Petro’s economic direction but resist extreme rhetoric. Valencia’s political résumé, Senate visibility and party machinery position her as the most viable leader to absorb that vote once the consultation narrows the field.

If she consolidates those nearly 20 points, her support would leap toward — or beyond — 40%, instantly surpassing Cepeda’s apparent plateau.

De la Espriella’s 22% underscores the volatility on the Right but also its fragility. His voters overlap heavily with Valencia’s base and are expected to migrate toward a unified conservative candidacy. Even Uribe has hinted that such unity is inevitable in a runoff; the RCN poll suggests it could happen much earlier under electoral pressure.

Yet the poll’s most intriguing subplot lies within the Left’s own consultation, where Roy Barreras emerges as a latent threat to Cepeda despite low headline numbers.

In the Frente Amplio consultation, Cepeda commands 34%, but the striking figure is the 44% who say they would vote for none. Barreras registers 4%, and Camilo Romero 3%, revealing a progressive electorate deeply unconvinced by the current slate.

Barreras’ political positioning explains why that matters. Though aligned with Petro’s government, his ideological lineage is closer to former President Juan Manuel Santos — pragmatic, transactional and coalition-oriented. Unlike Cepeda, Barreras is seen as someone capable of negotiating with centrists and conservatives alike. He represents continuity without ideological rigidity.

If Barreras manages to capture even part of that dissatisfied 44%, Cepeda’s narrow base could erode quickly. The RCN poll already shows Cepeda strong only where the Left is unified and stagnant where broader voters are involved.

Second-round simulations deepen the warning. Cepeda defeats De la Espriella 40% to 32%, but those numbers again reflect Petro’s core plus soft undecideds. Against Paloma Valencia he drops to 43% versus her 20% — a gap that would narrow dramatically once Valencia inherits the consultation bloc. More telling still, Cepeda’s numbers barely move across matchups, reinforcing the perception of a fixed ceiling.

Colombia’s presidential arithmetic is therefore shifting beneath the surface.

Cepeda leads because the field is divided. Valencia stands to surge because her side is about to unify. Barreras lurks as the only left-leaning figure capable of fracturing Cepeda’s ideological monopoly and attracting voters beyond Petro’s loyalists.

While headlines focus on Cepeda versus De la Espriella, the RCN poll suggests the real race may ultimately emerge after March 8 — between Paloma Valencia consolidating a broad anti-Petro coalition and Roy Barreras positioning himself as the Left’s only candidate with cross-spectrum appeal.

In Colombia’s elections, momentum follows math. And the math is just beginning to move.

Colombian President Gustavo Petro has made Gaza the moral centerpiece of his foreign policy. Since the October 7, 2023, Hamas terror attacks, he has devoted extraordinary political capital to denouncing Israel, questioning its right to self-defense, and framing the Gaza war as a singular global emergency.

He summoned “Free Palestine” marches, spent public funds hosting solidarity concerts in Bogotá’s Plaza de Bolívar, donned a keffiyeh near Times Square alongside Roger Waters, branded Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu a “war criminal,” labeled Gaza a “genocide,” and even urged U.S. military personnel to disobey orders from President Donald Trump over Middle East policy.

The performance was theatrical, relentless – and costly. Petro’s visa to the United States was revoked. Months later, he was placed on the U.S. Treasury’s OFAC sanctions list alongside his close political ally and interior minister Armando Benedetti, as well as his wife – or estranged wife – Verónica Alcocer, whose marital status, according to Petro himself, remains mysteriously unresolved.

Yet for all this moral fervor, Petro has remained conspicuously silent on one of the gravest human rights catastrophes unfolding today: Iran’s brutal suppression of nationwide protests.

His silence is deafening.

Since protests erupted across Iran in late December 2025, the regime has responded not with reform but with terror. Demonstrators demanding economic relief, dignity, and political change have been met with live ammunition. Militiamen aligned with the Revolutionary Guards have swept through cities on motorbikes, firing automatic weapons into crowds. Snipers reportedly aim at faces and genitals. Morgues are overflowing. Bodies are stacked in blood-soaked streets.  More than 12,000 are believed dead. Thousands more have been dragged from hospital beds into prisons, many never to be seen again.

This is not metaphorical violence. These are not contested narratives. These are crimes against humanity carried out by a theocracy against its own citizens.

And yet – nothing from Petro.

The Iranian regime insists the unrest is a foreign-engineered plot: psychological warfare orchestrated by hostile powers to destabilize the Islamic Republic. The opposition, by contrast, sees a nationwide rupture—an uprising rooted in decades of repression, economic collapse, and the severing of legitimacy between rulers and ruled.

Narrative control matters. In modern conflict, perception is a battlefield. As scholars Ihsan Yilmaz and Shahram Akbarzadeh have noted, authoritarian regimes increasingly rely on Strategic Digital Information Operations—psychological warfare designed not merely to suppress dissent, but to reshape reality itself. The objective is cognitive: to induce fear, discredit opponents, and convince societies that resistance is futile.

Petro’s brand of performative moralism has not been cost-free. His compulsive need to condemn Israel – and, by extension, the United States – was read in Washington not as symbolism but as direct provocation. It coincided with a marked deterioration in U.S.–Colombia relations, freezing high-level dialogue, undermining security cooperation, and contributing to the unprecedented decision to revoke his U.S. visa. For a country whose military, intelligence, and counter-narcotics apparatus remains deeply intertwined with American support, the damage was neither abstract nor symbolic – it was strategic.

The rupture with Israel was even more explicit. By publicly referring to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as a “Nazi,” Petro crossed a diplomatic red line that few world leaders have dared approach. The comparison – historically illiterate, morally inflammatory, and deeply offensive- effectively severed Colombia–Israel relations. Defense cooperation was halted, diplomatic channels collapsed, and decades of bilateral engagement in security, technology, and trade were sacrificed to rhetorical escalation. Whatever one’s view of Israel’s conduct in Gaza, equating the Jewish state with the architects of the Holocaust is not principled criticism; it is diplomatic arson.

In both cases, Petro appeared less concerned with consequences than with signaling ideological virtue to a global activist audience. The result has been the erosion of Colombia’s standing with two key partners—one its most important ally, the other a longstanding strategic collaborator—while yielding no tangible benefit to the civilians whose suffering he claims to champion.

What makes Petro’s silence on Iran so damning is not merely its contrast with his Gaza activism; it is the exposure of a deeper incoherence. For years, leftist politicians, celebrities, and fringe groups have flooded streets in capitals around the world denouncing Israel’s war as “genocide.” Now, when protesters are machine-gunned in Iran, hospitals are raided, and young people are summarily executed, this outrage dissipates.

As Allister Heath wrote recently in The Telegraph, this is “pure, unadulterated evil… a stain on humanity.” And yet where are the chants? Where is the flotilla? Where are the luvvies? One might also ask: where is the Colombian president who claims human rights as his moral compass?

The answer is uncomfortable. Gaza became a performative ritual of sit-ins and campus “occupations.” The tragedy of Iran exposes the hollowness of that performance.

When Iran’s protests began in Tehran’s Grand Bazaar, authorities initially assumed they were manageable. Bazaar merchants—traditionally conservative and closely linked to the state—were seen as transactional actors seeking economic relief, not regime change. Even Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei acknowledged their grievances, a rare concession.

But the regime miscalculated. Protests spread to more than 25 provinces. Ethnic minorities—Kurds, Baluch, Arabs, and Azeris—joined despite deep skepticism about the opposition and fears of what might follow. The unrest evolved from economic protest into an existential challenge to the state, triggering a massacre reportedly claiming more than 6,000 lives.

Meanwhile, fears of chaos loom. Exiled figures such as Reza Pahlavi position themselves as transitional leaders, even as their proposed roadmaps concentrate power in ways eerily reminiscent of the current theocracy. The Syrian precedent—where Western intervention elevated jihadist actors rather than democratic forces—haunts the region.

None of this excuses silence.

President Petro has every right to condemn injustice – especially on his own soil, where human rights abuses by FARC dissidents and the ELN guerrilla continue to inflict immense suffering on Colombia’s most vulnerable. Yet here, too, the silence has been deafening: soldiers kidnapped, children cowering under desks amid gunfire in Cauca, an ongoing humanitarian catastrophe in Catatumbo that has displaced more than 60,000 people and quietly slipped from the government’s agenda.

For Petro, moral leadership is selective. If civilian lives matter, they matter everywhere. If state violence is intolerable, it is intolerable whether committed by an ally, an adversary, or a regime ideologically convenient to ignore.

Silence in the face of mass murder is not neutrality. It is complicity by omission.

Petro’s foreign policy has become a study in selective empathy – loud where ideology demands it, louder still on social media, but mute where principle requires courage. That is not moral clarity. It is hypocrisy incarnate.

Beatriz González, one of Latin America’s most influential contemporary artists, whose boldly colored, deliberately unrefined paintings and installations confronted Colombia’s long history of political violence, public mourning and social inequality – while also reshaping the country’s most important public art collection – died on Jan. 9, 2026, at her home in Bogotá. She was 93.

Her death was announced by the Banco de la República, Colombia’s central bank, where for more than four decades she played a decisive role in shaping the institution’s cultural mission and its vast art collections. In a statement, the bank described her as “an essential figure in Colombian art and culture” and “a masterful narrator of memory.”

González was not only a prolific artist but also a historian, curator, educator and critic — a rare figure who helped define how Colombia would see its art, its past and, ultimately, itself. “Artists exist so that memory is not thrown in the trash,” she once said, a line that came to stand as a quiet manifesto for a career devoted to preserving what official histories often erased.

Born in Bucaramanga in 1932, González came of age during La Violencia, the brutal civil conflict that engulfed Colombia between 1948 and 1958. That formative experience would leave an indelible mark on her work. After briefly studying architecture, she enrolled at the University of the Andes in Bogotá, graduating with a degree in fine arts in 1962. She later studied printmaking in Rotterdam and counted among her teachers the influential critic Marta Traba, who helped shape modern art discourse in Latin America.

González’s early work drew attention for its irreverent treatment of European art history and Colombian popular imagery. Her critical view of “good taste” led her to reject academic refinement in favor of what the art critic Germán Rubiano described as an approach that was consciously unpolished and deliberately opposed to sophistication.

She appropriated masterpieces by Manet, Leonardo da Vinci and Raphael, flattening their compositions and translating them into the visual language of curtains, furniture and household objects. Armoires, beds, trays and even wallpaper became supports for paintings marked by compressed figures and bold color palettes — a strategy that blurred the boundary between high art and domestic life.

One of her earliest and most discussed works, The Sisga Suicides (1965), reimagined a newspaper photograph of a young couple who drowned themselves in a dam outside Bogotá. Rendered in vivid, almost cheerful colors, the painting exposed the uneasy coexistence of tragedy and banality in Colombian public life — a theme that would recur throughout her career.

By the 1980s, González’s art took on an increasingly overt political tone. Press photographs of presidents, massacres and grieving families became central to her work. She painted them repeatedly, transforming news images into objects of repetition and contemplation, as if to ask how a society becomes accustomed to its own suffering. “It’s been a critique of power that has permeated my work,” she told ArtReview in 2016. “For that very reason, I don’t think of it as ‘political’; it has an ethical commitment.”

Her focus on mourning was particularly stark in works depicting mothers weeping after the 1996 Las Delicias massacre, in which dozens of Colombian soldiers were killed by the FARC guerrilla. These images, stripped of sentimentality, confronted viewers with grief as a collective, inescapable condition. The depth with which González addressed both individual and collective mourning stands among her most significant contributions to contemporary art.

That macabre clarity intensified in the 2000s. In Anonymous Auras (2023), one of her final major works, González installed more than 8,000 printed silhouettes of workers carrying corpses across the wall niches of Bogotá’s Central Cemetery. The figures – anonymous, repetitive and almost ritualistic – transformed the cemetery into a monumental archive of loss, honoring victims whose names were never recorded.

“Artists exist so that memory is not thrown in the trash”

Parallel to her artistic production, González exerted extraordinary influence as a curator and cultural policymaker. Beginning in the 1980s, she became a close collaborator of the Banco de la República’s cultural division, serving as a researcher, curator and longtime member of its advisory committee on visual arts. In that role, she helped guide the formation of a national art collection with a distinctly Colombian focus, while insisting on dialogue with international works of the highest quality.

Few individuals knew the Central Bank’s art collection as intimately as González. Over more than forty years, she worked alongside successive generations of curators, historians and collectors, helping to consolidate one of the most important public art collections in Latin America.

In 2020, she donated her personal archive and library — nearly 100,000 documents — to the Banco de la República to ensure free public access. The archive documents not only her artistic practice but also her work as an educator, curator and historian, and provides an unparalleled record of Colombian art, politics and visual culture.

Her institutional impact reached beyond the Central Bank. At the Museo de Arte Moderno de Bogotá (MAMBO), she founded the influential School of Guides, a pioneering program for museum education that trained figures who would later become leading artists and curators. From 1989 to 2004, she served as chief curator of the Museo Nacional de Colombia, where she reorganized the permanent collection and helped redefine the country’s historical narrative through art.

International recognition came steadily. Her work appeared in Documenta 14, the Berlin Biennale and the landmark exhibition “Radical Women: Latin American Art, 1960–1985.” Major retrospectives were held at the Pérez Art Museum Miami, the Museum of Fine Arts, Houston, and the CAPC in Bordeaux. In 2026, the Barbican Centre in London is set to host her first major retrospective in the United Kingdom.

González received numerous honors, including Colombia’s Premio Vida y Obra and honorary doctorates from the University of the Andes and the University of Antioquia. In 2025, the city of Bogotá awarded her the Civil Order of Merit, recognizing her invaluable legacy and profound influence on the nation’s cultural life.

Yet she remained skeptical of accolades. She preferred to speak of discipline, research and responsibility — and of the obligation, as she saw it, to bear witness. From a childhood habit of collecting film-star postcards to a lifetime spent gathering images of state violence, Beatriz González devoted herself to the stubborn preservation of memory and to an unapologetic voice in Colombian contemporary art.

Read the Banco de la República’s tribute (in Spanish) to Beatriz González, written by Claudia Cristancho Camacho of the Cultural Section and Art Collection. 

https://www.banrepcultural.org/noticias/despedimos-la-maestra-beatriz-gonzalez-figura-esencial-del-arte-y-la-cultura-en-colombia

For much of the past decade, Colombia built a reputation as one of travel’s great value destinations: culturally rich, visually stunning, and refreshingly affordable. A strong U.S. dollar, competitive hotel rates, and inexpensive food and transport helped turn cities like Medellín and Cartagena into global favorites, while smaller destinations thrived on a steady flow of backpackers and eco-tourists.

This equation is now changing. And faster than the industry expected.

The Colombian peso has strengthened sharply, trading this week near 3,630 to the U.S. dollar, its highest level since mid-2021. For foreign visitors, the effect is immediate and tangible: fewer pesos per dollar at the ATM, and higher costs across nearly every aspect of a trip – from meals and hotel stays to transportation and tours.

The shift is perhaps most visible at the table. Consider a classic Caribbean staple: deep-fried mojarra, served whole with coconut rice and patacones. At La Estrella, a popular local eatery in Cartagena, the dish costs about COP$40,000 per person. Order the same fish at a beachside stall and the price climbs to COP$60,000. In a high-end Old City restaurant, plated with foraged greens and linen service, it can reach COP$120,000 per person.

At today’s exchange rate, that translates to roughly $11, $16, and $33 — still accessible by international standards, but a noticeable jump from the Colombia many travelers remember.

Currency is only part of the story

While peso strength explains much of the increase, Colombia’s tourism sector is also grappling with sharply higher operating costs following a 23% increase in the national minimum wage, enacted by presidential decree under President Gustavo Petro.

From the government’s perspective, the measure was framed as a necessary response to inflation and cost-of-living pressures. For hotels, tour operators, and travel agencies, however, the speed and scale of the increase have posed significant challenges.

The Colombian Hotel and Tourism Association (Cotelco) has warned that the decision places particular strain on an industry where labor accounts for a large share of costs. According to Cotelco, roughly 70% of hotel workers are part of operational teams — including housekeeping, front desk staff, maintenance, kitchens, and security — leaving businesses highly exposed to wage adjustments.

Cotelco has also pointed to recent changes in labor rules, such as higher pay for Sunday and holiday shifts and the earlier start of night-shift premiums, which further increase payroll expenses. Looking ahead, the sector faces additional pressure in July 2026, when Colombia’s legally mandated reduction of the workweek to 42 hours takes effect, a complex adjustment for hotels that operate around the clock.

Rising costs beyond wages

Labor is not the only expense rising. Hotels and tourism businesses are also absorbing higher energy and gas tariffs, including a 20% energy surcharge introduced in 2025, which disproportionately affects establishments that operate continuously and rely heavily on air conditioning, refrigeration, and water systems.

Transportation costs are climbing as well. Higher toll fees and fuel prices have pushed up the cost of airport transfers, private drivers, and overland travel between destinations, quietly adding to tourists’ final bills. These increases are particularly noticeable for travelers moving between regions — for example, from Cartagena to Santa Marta, or through the Coffee Axis by road.

Price increases are not felt evenly across the country.

In large cities such as Bogotá and Medellín, intense competition has helped cushion the blow. These markets offer a wide range of accommodation, from budget hostels and short-term rentals to international five-star hotels, giving travelers flexibility and keeping price growth relatively contained.

In contrast, smaller resort and nature destinations face sharper pressure. In places like Palomino, wedged between the Caribbean Sea and the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, or Salento in the Coffee Axis, accommodation options are limited. Boutique eco-lodges and family-run hotels dominate, and supply cannot easily expand.

In these destinations, rising labor and operating costs are passed on more quickly to guests, making price hikes more visible — and sometimes harder to justify.

According to Anato, Colombia’s association of travel agencies, the wage increase has also disrupted long-term planning. Many tourism businesses had projected annual cost increases of 8% to 12%, not nearly double that figure.

For inbound tourism, which operates on long booking cycles, the timing is especially problematic. Rates, packages, and contracts with international wholesalers for 2026 were often negotiated under different macroeconomic assumptions, limiting companies’ ability to adjust prices after the fact.

Anato has also warned of a double squeeze: rising costs at home combined with a stronger peso, which reduces the real value of revenues earned in foreign currency.

Pay more – Higher expectations

Most travelers are not inherently opposed to paying more for Colombia. What they increasingly expect, however, is visible improvement in exchange.

Higher prices bring sharper scrutiny of cleanliness, waste management, and environmental standards, particularly in coastal areas where beach pollution and informal tourism practices remain persistent concerns. As Colombia positions itself as a higher-value destination, arbitrary pricing, lack of regulation could erode sustainable tourism.

Internal security is another critical factor. As costs rise, long-standing security concerns, especially in rural areas and off-the-beaten path travel corridors, weigh heavily in  destination choice. Travelers paying mid-range or premium prices expect predictability and safety to match the cost.

Looking ahead, a further strengthening of the peso toward 3,500 per dollar would intensify pressure on Colombia’s tourism sector as competition and air connectivity across the region grows fiercer.

Colombia now finds itself competing directly with the all-inclusive efficiency of Mexico’s Riviera Maya and the Dominican Republic, the well-established eco-tourism model of Costa Rica, and the increasingly curated cultural and nature offerings of Guatemala. These destinations have spent years refining price with product, investing in infrastructure, security, and environmental enforcement.

Colombia’s transition from affordable standout to mid-range contender is still underway. Currency strength and wage growth can signal economic maturity, but without tangible improvements in security, the country risks losing travelers to emerging destinations across the Middle East and South East Asia. The message is clear: Colombia remains compelling – but no longer discounted. Whether higher prices translate into a better consumer experience will determine how well the country holds its place in an increasingly crowded travel market.

Far-right independent candidate Abelardo De la Espriella, widely known by the nickname “El Tigre” (The Tiger), has taken the lead in Colombia’s presidential race five months ahead of the election, according to a new poll by AtlasIntel published by Semana magazine.

The survey places De la Espriella, founder of the pro-democracy movement Defensores de la Patria, at 28% of voting intentions, narrowly ahead of left-wing senator Iván Cepeda at 26.5%. Former Antioquia governor Sergio Fajardo ranks third with 9.4%, once again failing to surpass the 10% benchmark that has long eluded his centrist candidacies.

A corporate lawyer by training, De la Espriella rose to prominence as a high-profile legal advocate for conservative causes and a vocal critic of President Gustavo Petro’s reform agenda. His political ascent has been driven by hardline law-and-order rhetoric, a confrontational style and an aggressive use of social media, allowing him to position himself as an outsider channeling anti-establishment sentiment and opposition to the left.

In a hypothetical second-round runoff, De la Espriella would defeat hard-leftist Cepeda by 9.3 percentage points, the poll found, consolidating his status as the best-positioned opposition figure at this early stage of the race.

AtlasIntel also projected a runoff between De la Espriella and Fajardo. In that scenario, De la Espriella would secure 37.9% of the vote, compared with 23.2% for Fajardo — a margin of 14.7 points.

Fajardo, a mathematician and former governor of Antioquia from 2012 to 2016, has struggled to expand his electoral base beyond a narrow segment of moderate voters. His current polling echoes his performance in the first round of the 2022 presidential election, when he placed fourth with just over 800,000 votes, equivalent to 4.2% of the total, despite entering that race as a well-known national figure.

Further down the field, Juan Carlos Pinzón and Paloma Valencia each registered 5.1% support, followed by Claudia López (2.6%), Enrique Peñalosa (2.3%), Juan Daniel Oviedo (1.8%) and Aníbal Gaviria (1.3%). Several other candidates polled below 1%.

The survey found that 7.2% of respondents would vote blank, 5.7% remain undecided, and 1.1% said they would not vote.

Valencia, a senator from the right-wing Centro Democrático party, could nonetheless emerge as a pivotal figure in the race. Former president Álvaro Uribe Vélez, Colombia’s most influential conservative leader, has named Valencia as the party’s official presidential candidate, formally placing the weight of his political machine behind her campaign.

Uribe, who governed Colombia from 2002 to 2010, retains significant influence, particularly in his home region of Antioquia and in the country’s second-largest city, Medellín, long considered a stronghold of uribismo. Analysts say Valencia’s numbers could rise sharply as party structures mobilise and undecided conservative voters coalesce around an officially endorsed candidate.

In other simulated second-round matchups, Valencia would narrowly defeat Cepeda by 2.4 points, while Cepeda would beat former defence minister Pinzón by 4.5 points, according to the poll.

AtlasIntel also measured voter intentions ahead of Colombia’s interparty primaries scheduled for March 8, to be held alongside congressional elections. About 18.7% of respondents said they plan to participate in the “Gran Consulta por Colombia,” while 29.8% expressed interest in voting in the leftist “Pacto Amplio”. Former Colombian Ambassador to the United Kingdom and insider of the Petro administration, Roy Barreras, is seen as a leading contender to the clinch the consultation.

Within the Gran Consulta, Valencia leads with 19.1% among likely participants, followed by Pinzón (13.1%), Aníbal Gaviria (11.1%), Juan Daniel Oviedo (10.6%) and former Semana director  Vicky Dávila (7%).

The poll results reinforce a broader pattern of fragmentation across the centre and right, even as opposition voters increasingly focus on preventing a left-wing victory. With five months to go before the May 31 election, an emerging landscape of “all against Cepeda” has appeared on the horizon, in which disparate conservative and centrist forces could eventually rally behind a single contender in a runoff scenario on June 19, 2026.

In this context, De la Espriella — himself a close ideological ally of Uribe — could seek to consolidate all right-wing factions by selecting Valencia as a potential vice-presidential running mate,  move that would unite his strong support on the Colombian coast, with the  strength of Centro Democrático and Uribe’s loyal political base in conservative departments.

According to AtlasIntel’s CEO Andrei Roman, the contest is being shaped by persistent ideological polarisation, internal divisions within the opposition, and the growing dominance of social media.

“The race is structured around the continuity of Petro-style progressivism versus a broad anti-Petro front,” Roman said. “At the same time, digital presence has become decisive, allowing outsider figures to gain traction quickly and redefine political mobilisation.”

It was a frustrating night for the roughly 6,000 supporters gathered in Bogotá’s Plaza de Bolívar to hear President Gustavo Petro deliver what many expected to be a fiery, anti-imperialist address.

After waiting for hours in cold, rainy conditions, demonstrators waved placards reading “Yankee Go Home,” “Out Trump,” and “Respect Colombia,” anticipating a confrontational speech aimed squarely at U.S. President Donald Trump following weeks of diplomatic tension.

Instead, when Petro finally took the stage, the tone of the rally shifted abruptly.

The Colombian president opened by announcing that he would not deliver his prepared speech. Rather than launching into the expected denunciation of Washington, Petro told the crowd that his delay was due to a lengthy phone call with Trump — a revelation that visibly stunned the audience.

As Petro spoke about the conversation, the plaza fell largely silent. Each mention of Trump appeared to drain the rally of its energy, replacing chants and applause with uneasy quiet. What had been billed as a mass show of resistance against U.S. pressure became an unexpected account of diplomatic rapprochement.

According to Petro, the call — conducted with simultaneous translation — lasted close to an hour and marked the first direct conversation between the two leaders since Trump’s return to office. “Today I came with one speech, and I have to give another,” Petro told supporters. “The first one was quite hard.”

A source at the presidential palace told El Colombiano that Petro appeared relaxed during the exchange, smiling several times as he spoke with Trump. A photograph of the moment, later shared by Petro, showed him seated at his desk mid-conversation.

Petro said the discussion focused primarily on drug trafficking, Venezuela and other bilateral disagreements. He acknowledged that significant differences remain but argued that dialogue was preferable to confrontation.

“I know that if anyone were to harm me — in any way — what would happen, given Colombia’s history and the level of support we have reached, is that the Colombian people would enter into conflict,” Petro said during the rally. “If they touch Petro, they touch Colombia.”

The remarks were a response to Trump’s recent comments suggesting that a military operation against Colombia, similar to the one carried out in Venezuela, “sounds good.” Petro, however, struck a notably more conciliatory tone on Wednesday, saying Trump “is not foolish,” even if he disagreed with him.

In a further surprise to supporters, Petro stated publicly that Nicolás Maduro was not his ally, claiming the Venezuelan leader had previously distanced him from Hugo Chávez by preventing him from attending Chávez’s funeral.

Shortly after the call, Trump issued a statement on his Truth Social platform confirming the conversation and signalling a thaw in relations.

“It was a Great Honor to speak with the President of Colombia, Gustavo Petro, who called to explain the situation of drugs and other disagreements that we have had,” Trump wrote. “I appreciated his call and tone, and look forward to meeting him in the near future.”

Trump added that Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Colombia’s foreign minister were already making arrangements for a meeting at the White House in Washington.

Petro confirmed that further discussions would be needed, particularly regarding drug trafficking figures, the role of the ELN guerrilla group along Colombia’s borders and Venezuela’s political future. “We cannot lower our guard,” Petro said. “There are still things to discuss at the White House.”

The president also revealed that he had spoken days earlier with Venezuela’s interim leader Delcy Rodríguez and had invited her to Colombia — a disclosure likely to further complicate regional diplomacy.

What was intended as a show of defiance against Washington ultimately became a public demonstration of Petro’s willingness to recalibrate his strategy, leaving his hardline supporters confused and critics questioning whether the president had overplayed the politics of mobilisation — only to pivot, unexpectedly, toward negotiation.

Colombian President Gustavo Petro has called on supporters to mobilise nationwide on Wednesday to defend “national sovereignty,” sharply escalating a diplomatic crisis with the United States after President Donald Trump said a U.S. military operation against Colombia “sounds good” to him.

The demonstrations are expected to take place in Bogotá’s Plaza de Bolívar, Parque Lourdes in the Chapinero locality, and outside the U.S. Embassy, with parallel protests planned in Medellín (Plaza Mayor), Cali (Plaza de Cayzedo), Bucaramanga (Plazoleta Cívica Luis Carlos Galán), Cartagena (Plaza de San Pedro Claver), Santa Marta (Parque de Bolívar).

The mobilisation follows Trump’s remarks aboard Air Force One on Sunday, when he described Petro as “a sick man” and appeared to endorse the idea of a U.S. military operation in Colombia — dubbed “Operation Colombia” by a journalist — comparable in scope to the operation that led to the arrest of Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro and wife, Cilia Flores.

When pressed on whether he meant direct military action, Trump replied: “Sounds good to me,” before adding that Petro should “watch his ass.” The White House has not clarified whether the comments reflect official U.S. policy.

A Return to Arms?

Petro responded with a torrent of social media posts and public statements that have alarmed political opponents and business leaders . In some of his strongest language since taking office, the leftist president warned that U.S. military action would plunge Colombia back into armed conflict.

“If you bomb peasants, thousands of guerrillas will return to the mountains,” Petro said. “And if you arrest the president whom a good part of my people want and respect, you will unleash the popular jaguar.”

Petro, Colombia’s first leftist leader and a former militant of the M-19 guerrilla, said he had sworn under the 1989 peace pact never to take up arms again, but suggested that commitment could be reversed if Colombia’s sovereignty were threatened.

“Although I have not been a military man, I know war and clandestinity,” Petro wrote. “I swore not to touch a weapon again since the 1989 Peace Pact, but for the homeland I will take up arms again — even though I do not want to.”

He also warned Colombia’s armed forces against showing loyalty to Washington, saying any commander who prioritised U.S. interests over Colombia’s would be dismissed. The constitution, he said, required the military to defend “popular sovereignty.”

Diplomatic protest lodged in Washington

Colombia’s Foreign Ministry formally raised the dispute on January 4, issuing a diplomatic note of protest to the U.S. government through Ambassador Daniel García-Peña in Washington.

In the letter, the ministry said Trump’s remarks violated basic principles governing relations between sovereign states and amounted to “undue interference” in Colombia’s internal affairs.

“The President of the Republic of Colombia has been legitimately elected by the sovereign will of the Colombian people,” the statement said, adding that any attempt to discredit him was incompatible with international law and the United Nations Charter.

The Cancillería also cited principles of sovereign equality, non-intervention and mutual respect, saying threats or the use of force between states were “unacceptable.”

“Colombia is a democratic, sovereign state that conducts its foreign policy autonomously,” it said. “Its sovereignty, institutional legitimacy and political independence are not subject to external conditioning.”

The crisis has further polarised Colombia’s already fractured political landscape. Former president Álvaro Uribe, a vocal critic of Petro, said Colombia was drifting toward a Venezuela-style confrontation with the United States, though he stopped short of endorsing military intervention.

“What Colombia needs is a change of government,” Uribe told El Tiempo, adding that he trusted Washington’s strategy was “well conceived.”

Petro has cast Wednesday’s demonstrations as a defining moment for his presidency, portraying himself as the defender of national dignity against foreign aggression. He also reiterated the Colombian goverment’s position to cooperate fully with Washington on counter-narcotics and security issues. “You (Trump) took it upon yourself, in an act of arrogance, to punish my opinion — my words against the Palestinian genocide. Your punishment has been to falsely label me a drug trafficker and accuse me of running cocaine factories,” stated Petro hours after the Air Force One declations. “I don’t know whether Maduro is good or bad, or even whether he is a drug trafficker (…) so, stop the slander against me,” he said.

Petro’s critics accuse the president of instrumentalising public rallies to divert attention from Colombia’s deep internal security crisis, and to position himself politically alongside Venezuela’s ousted strongman. They argue that his language of “sovereignty” closely mirrors chavista narratives, warning that the protests risk morphing into an implicit show of solidarity with Nicolás Maduro rather than a defence of Colombia’s territorial integrity.

The White House has not walked back Trump’s remarks, and U.S. officials have so far declined to offer reassurances. On Wednesday morning, Secretary of State Marco Rubio and U.S. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth held a classified briefing with senators on Capitol Hill in which, according to Democratic leaders, their Republican counterparts refused to rule out sending U.S. troops to Venezuela or other countries.

Democratic Senate leader Chuck Schumer said he had asked for assurances that Washington was not planning operations elsewhere. “I mentioned some cases — including Colombia and Cuba — and I was very disappointed with their response,” Schumer said, adding that the meeting “left more questions than answers” and that the plan for the United States to govern Venezuela was “vague and based on illusions.”

As governments across Latin America closely watch the incoming chavista regime under interim president Delcy Rodríguez, the confrontation between Trump and Petro marks the most serious rupture in U.S.–Colombia relations in over two centuries. For Bogotá — long one of Washington’s closest allies in the region — the escalation has raised fears that incendiary rhetoric and mass mobilisation could push an already volatile situation into dangerous territory.

Editor’s Note: The U.S Embassy in Bogotá has issued a security alert, warning U.S. citizens to avoid large protests “as they have the potential to turn violent”.

The extraction of Nicolás Maduro on Saturday was meant to signal the end of an era. Instead, it has exposed an uncomfortable truth that may loom over Washington weeks and months after the “shock-and-awe” attacks in central Caracas have waned from headlines: was Venezuela’s democratic opposition sidelined at the very moment it appeared closest to victory?

Just weeks earlier, María Corina Machado, the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize laureate and the symbolic leader of Venezuela’s opposition, had laid out her Freedom Manifesto — a sweeping blueprint for a Venezuelan-led democratic transition rooted in dignity, elections, free markets and the return of millions of exiles. She framed the coming moment not as an American intervention, but as a national rebirth steered by Venezuelans themselves.

That vision now appears to be colliding with a far more transactional reality.

Following Maduro’s capture in a U.S.-led operation, President Donald Trump declined to elevate Machado or her movement into any formal role. Instead, senior U.S. officials have coalesced around Delcy Rodríguez – Maduro’s longtime lieutenant and overseer of the oil sector — as Washington’s primary interlocutor in Caracas. Trump publicly praised Rodríguez’s cooperation while dismissing Machado as a “very nice woman” who “lacks the support” to lead the country.

On Monday, Delsy Rodríguez took the oath of office in the presence of the Ambassadors to China, Iran and Russia. The scene from the National Assembly recalls the sham investiture of Maduro on January 10, 2025,  and sends a dire signal to the internationl community:  Does oil security matter more than a secure democracy?

White House insiders told U.S. media that Trump had never warmed to Machado, “because his feelings got hurt”, reads the Daily Beast. According to an article on Monday in The Washington Post, the president declined to pick Machado because she committed the “ultimate sin” of offending his pride, after receiving the Nobel Peace Prize. “If she had turned it down and said, ‘I can’t accept it because it’s Donald Trump’s,’ she’d be the president of Venezuela today,” cites the newspaper’s sources.

Having lost the Oslo podium as the world’s “peace president,” personal grievance and strategic calculation have marked the White House’s decision to annoint a “moderate” in Miraflores. But Rodríguez is no moderate, and her penchant for state repression remains intact. A  recent article in the Wall Street Journal affirms that Washington is willing to tolerate a Maduro 2.0 — a Chavista continuity government — so long as it cooperates on oil, narcotics enforcement and geopolitical alignment.

On the ground in Caracas, the mood reflects that ambiguity. There have been no mass celebrations, no release of political prisoners, and no clear roadmap. Power remains concentrated within the same military-backed elites that have pillaged Venezuela for over three decades, even as Maduro himself awaits trial in New York on charges expected to exceed those once brought against Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán.

U.S. officials insist this is realism, not betrayal. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has argued that squeezing the regime economically and forcing compliance on security and oil will eventually produce leverage. But he has stopped short of demanding immediate elections — a notable omission given that the opposition already won one.

Machado’s Freedom Manifesto now reads less like a transition plan and more like a rebuke. It imagined a Venezuela where sovereignty flowed from the ballot box, not from foreign capitals; where dignity, not expediency, guided reconstruction; and where Venezuelans — not external powers — chose their leaders.

Instead, Trump has suggested that the United States will “run” Venezuela, even as it leaves the same repressive security apparatus intact. The contradiction is stark: maximum news coverage abroad, minimal transformation on the ground.

The question, then, is not only whether Trump sidetracked María Corina Machado, but whether the United States has traded a rare democratic opening for short-term gains. If Chavismo survives without Maduro — its prisons full, its generals untouched, its oil flowing under U.S management — the Nobel laureate’s blueprint may yet stand as the document of a revolution deferred.

And history may judge that Venezuela was not lost for lack of courage at home, but for lack of conviction abroad. In the words of Mexican historian Enrique Krauze, the end-game is inevitable: “If geopolitics seeks to turn Venezuela into a pawn on its chessboard, the people will take to the streets. They have chosen a legitimate president: Edmundo González. And they have a moral leader: María Corina Machado. Obstacles may arise, but Venezuela’s liberation is irreversible.”

U.S. President Donald Trump escalated rhetoric toward Colombia on Sunday, suggesting that a U.S. military operation against the country — which he said could be dubbed “Operation Colombia” — was a possibility following Washington’s capture of Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro.

Speaking to reporters aboard Air Force One, Trump described Colombian President Gustavo Petro as “a sick man” and accused him of overseeing cocaine production destined for the United States.

“Colombia is run by a sick man who likes making cocaine and selling it to the United States,” Trump said. “And he’s not going to be doing it very long. Let me tell you.”

When asked directly whether he meant a U.S. military operation against Colombia, Trump replied: “Sounds good to me.”

Trump’s remarks came a day after the United States announced it had captured Maduro in a military operation in Caracas, an unprecedented move that has sent shockwaves across Latin America and raised fears of further U.S. interventions in the region.

Trump said the United States could also consider military action against Mexico if it failed to curb the flow of illicit drugs into the country. He added that Venezuelan migrants in the United States were among the factors considered in the raid against Maduro.

Trump also warned that Cuba, a close ally of Venezuela, was “a failing nation” and said its political future was “something we’ll end up talking about.”

Maduro is currently being held in a New York detention center and is expected to appear in court on Monday on drug trafficking charges. Trump said his administration would seek to work with remaining members of the Venezuelan government to crack down on drug trafficking and overhaul the country’s oil sector, rather than push immediately for elections.

Despite Maduro’s capture, Venezuela’s Vice President and oil minister, Delcy Rodríguez, has assumed interim leadership with the backing of the country’s top court. Rodríguez has insisted that Maduro remains Venezuela’s legitimate president and has denied Trump’s claim that she is willing to cooperate with Washington.

In an interview published by The Atlantic on Sunday, Trump warned that Rodríguez could “pay a bigger price than Maduro” if she failed to cooperate with the United States. Venezuela’s communications ministry did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

Petro denounces U.S. threats

Trump’s comments prompted an immediate and forceful response from Petro, who accused the U.S. president of slander and warned that Latin America risked being treated as “servants and slaves” unless it united.

“Stop slandering me,” Petro said, calling on regional leaders to close ranks in the face of what he described as renewed U.S. imperial aggression.

In a series of lengthy posts on X, Petro said the United States had crossed a historic line by bombing Caracas during the operation to capture Maduro.

“The United States is the first country in the world to bomb a South American capital in all of human history,” Petro wrote. “Neither Netanyahu, nor Hitler, nor Franco, nor Salazar did it. That is a terrible medal, one that South Americans will not forget for generations.”

Petro said revenge was not the answer but warned that the damage would be long-lasting.

“Friends do not bomb each other,” he said, likening the attack on Caracas to the Nazi bombing of Guernica during the Spanish Civil War.

Instead, Petro urged deeper regional integration, arguing that Latin America must look beyond alignment with global powers.

“We do not look only to the north, but in all directions,” he said. “Latin America must unite or it will be treated as a servant and not as the vital center of the world.”

In a separate post, Petro issued a stark message to Colombia’s armed forces, ordering commanders to immediately remove any officer who showed loyalty to the United States over Colombia.

“Every Colombian soldier has an order from now on,” Petro wrote. “Any commander of the public forces who prefers the U.S. flag over the Colombian flag must immediately leave the institution.”

Petro said the armed forces were under orders not to fire on civilians but to defend Colombia’s sovereignty against any foreign invasion.

“I am not illegitimate. I am not a narco,” Petro wrote, rejecting Trump’s accusations. “I trust my people and the history of Colombia.”

Colombia’s first leftist president and a former member of the M-19 guerrilla movement also raised the spectre of a return to armed struggle, saying that while he had sworn under the 1989 peace pact never to take up weapons again, he would do so if Colombia’s sovereignty were threatened.

“I am not a military man, but I know war and clandestinity,” Petro wrote. “I swore never to touch a weapon again, but for the homeland I would take up arms once more, even though I do not want to.”

Rising fears of wider intervention

Trump’s warnings to Colombia were not his first. In the immediate aftermath of Maduro’s capture, he said Petro needed to “watch his ass” and suggested that Cuba’s political collapse was imminent.

The comments have heightened anxiety across the region, where governments are closely watching Washington’s next moves following the Caracas operation.

In Venezuela, a state of emergency has been in force since Saturday. A decree published on Monday ordered police to “immediately begin the national search and capture of everyone involved in the promotion or support for the armed attack by the United States,” according to the text.

Caracas remained largely quiet on Sunday, though residents reported a tense atmosphere as uncertainty mounted over the country’s political future and the possibility of further U.S. action.

For Colombia – a key U.S. ally that shares a 2,000-kilometre border with Venezuela, a country the Trump administration has said it will “run” in the aftermath of Saturday’s seizure of Maduro – the remarks mark the most explicit threat of U.S. military action in more than two centuries of diplomatic relations, and an ominous deterioration in already strained ties between Washington and Bogotá.

U.S. President Donald Trump said on Saturday that the United States would “run” Venezuela until a “safe, proper and judicious transition” of power is completed, following a U.S. military operation that resulted in the capture of Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores.

Speaking at a press conference at his Mar-a-Lago residence in Florida, Trump described the operation as a “spectacular assault” and “one of the most stunning, effective and powerful displays of American military might and competence in American history.”

“This was overwhelming military power,” Trump said, praising U.S. forces for what he called their “breathtaking speed, power, precision and competence.” He said the operation involved close coordination between the U.S. military, intelligence agencies and law enforcement.

Trump said Venezuelan forces had been “waiting for us” and were in a “ready position,” but were “completely overwhelmed and very quickly incapacitated.” He said no U.S. servicemembers were killed and no equipment was lost.

According to Trump, U.S. forces struck what he described as a “heavily fortified military fortress” in the heart of Caracas, disabling Venezuelan military capabilities and temporarily cutting power to the capital. “The lights went out due to a certain expertise that America has,” he said.

U.S. military officials said the operation, dubbed “Operation Absolute Resolve,” relied on months of intelligence gathering and the deployment of more than 150 aircraft. General Dan Caine said the mission maintained “total surprise,” dismantling Venezuelan air defense systems before U.S. helicopters arrived at Maduro’s compound shortly after 1:00 a.m. Eastern Time.

The helicopters came under fire, Caine said, prompting a response with “overwhelming force.” One aircraft was hit, but all returned safely. Maduro and his wife “gave up” and were taken into custody by the U.S. Department of Justice, boarding the USS Iwo Jima at 3:29 a.m., he added.

Trump said Maduro and Flores are being taken to New York to face drug trafficking-related charges. Maduro has repeatedly denied U.S. accusations that he leads a drug cartel.

Trump said the United States was prepared to carry out a second wave of attacks if necessary, adding that Washington was “not afraid of boots on the ground” and that U.S. forces had operated “at a very high level” inside Venezuela.

Asked how the United States would govern Venezuela during the transition, Trump offered few specifics, saying only that officials were “designating people right now.” He gestured toward himself and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, saying that for a period of time “it’s largely going to be the people standing right behind me.”

Rubio described Maduro as a “fugitive of American justice” with a US$50 million reward on his head. “I guess we saved ourselves $50 million,” Rubio said, prompting Trump to add: “We should make sure nobody claims it.”

Rubio said Maduro had been given “multiple opportunities” to avoid confrontation but instead chose to “act like a wild man,” accusing him of inviting Iran into Venezuela and allowing criminal gangs to send migrants into the United States. “President Trump is not a game player,” Rubio said.

Trump also said U.S. companies would be allowed to enter Venezuela to repair its oil infrastructure and “start making money for the country,” framing the intervention as the beginning of a “partnership” that would make Venezuelans “rich, independent and safe.” He referred to Maduro as an “illegitimate dictator.”

Trump confirmed that Rubio had been in contact with Delcy Rodríguez, Venezuela’s vice president and one of Maduro’s closest allies. Rodríguez issued an audio statement after the strikes urging the United States to provide proof of life for Maduro and Flores, sparking speculation that she may no longer be in Venezuela.

Trump said Rodríguez had expressed a willingness to do “whatever the U.S. asks,” though analysts say she would struggle to gain credibility as an agent of political change after years of defending the Maduro’s regime.

Opposition leader and Nobel Peace Prize laureate María Corina Machado has hailed the operation as a turning point for the country.

“The hour of freedom has arrived,” Machado said in a statement, declaring that Maduro is now facing international justice for “atrocious crimes” committed against Venezuelans and foreign citizens. She said the time had come for “popular sovereignty and national sovereignty” to prevail.

Machado called for the immediate recognition of opposition-backed Edmundo González Urrutia as Venezuela’s legitimate president and commander-in-chief of the armed forces, urging military officers to recognize his authority.

“We are prepared to enforce our mandate and take power,” she said, calling on Venezuelans inside the country to remain organized and on those abroad to mobilize international support for rebuilding Venezuela.

“Venezuela will be free,” Machado said. “Hand in hand with God, until the very end.”

U.S. President Donald Trump has hailed as “brilliant” the U.S. military operation that resulted in the capture of Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro, as explosions were reported in Caracas early Saturday. Governments across the Americas and Europe are reacting to the arrest of the Maduro and his wife Cilia Flores.

In a brief telephone interview with The New York Times hours after the strikes, Trump praised the planning and execution of the operation. “A lot of good planning and a lot of great, great troops and people,” Trump said. “It was a brilliant operation, actually.”

Trump said U.S. forces carried out a large-scale strike against military targets in Venezuela and captured Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, who were flown out of the country. He has not disclosed where they are being held. The U.S. administration claims there were no American casualties in the operation but declined to comment on Venezuelan casualties.

Venezuelan authorities have yet to confirm Maduro’s capture. Vice President Delcy Rodríguez said on state television that the whereabouts of Maduro and Flores were unknown and demanded “proof of life” from Washington.

Interior Minister and the regime’s henchman Diosdado Cabello urged calm, telling Venezuelans not to “make things easier for the invading enemy,” and alleged without evidence that civilian buildings had been hit.

In a separate statement broadcast on state television VTV, Venezuela’s Attorney General Tarek William Saab formally requested proof of life for Maduro and Flores. Saab condemned the U.S. action as a shift “from rhetoric to direct violence” and described the strikes as a premeditated act of terrorism. He said the operation left an unspecified number of people injured and killed, without providing figures or evidence.

Explosions were reported across Caracas in the early hours of Saturday, with power outages affecting several districts, according to witnesses and local media. Venezuelan state outlets reported strikes on major military and government sites, including Fuerte Tiuna, the country’s largest military base, and the La Carlota air base in heart of the capital.

According to sources inside Venezuela, pro-opposition supporters aligned with Venezuela’s legitimate president-elect Edmundo González and Nobel Peace Prize laureate María Corina Machado have begun mobilizing to secure government buildings and institutions and are preparing steps toward a political transition. Sources claim to be preparing the groundwork for what they describe as a interim administration, though no formal announcement has been made.

The U.S. embassy in Bogotá issued a security alert urging American citizens in Venezuela to shelter in place, citing “reports of explosions in and around” Caracas. The United States suspended operations at its embassy in Caracas in 2019.

Bogotá Mayor Carlos Fernando Galán called for calm and announced increased security measures near the U.S. and Venezuelan diplomatic missions in the Colombian capital.  “It is clear that a new stage is opening today for Venezuela, which should be oriented toward the return of democracy. That process must be peaceful and with full respect for the civilian population and international law. At this moment, the protection of Venezuelan citizens, both within their country and abroad, is a priority. Bogotá is home to hundreds of thousands of Venezuelan citizens, and our responsibility is to ensure their safety, their rights, and coexistence in the city,” he said.

Maduro was indicted in the United States in 2020 on corruption and drug trafficking charges, which he has repeatedly denied. The U.S. State Department has offered a $50 million reward for information leading to his arrest or conviction.

U.S. Attorney General Pamela Bondi said Maduro and Flores had been indicted in the Southern District of New York on charges including narco-terrorism conspiracy and cocaine importation conspiracy, adding that both would face U.S. justice.

Republicans react to Venezuela strikes

U.S House Representative María Elvira Salazar, a Florida Republican and outspoken critic of the Maduro government, said the strikes represented “the fall of a criminal structure masquerading as a government.” She said Maduro’s removal opened the door for “a real democratic transition led by Venezuelans who have resisted tyranny for years.”

Republican Senator Carlos Gimenez affirmed that “President Trump has changed the course of history in our hemisphere. Our country and the world are safer for it. Today’s decisive action is this hemisphere’s equivalent to the Fall of the Berlin Wall.”

Senator Rick Scott announced “A new day for Venezuela and Latin America. The United States and our hemisphere are safer because of President Trump’s leadership!”

U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau said in a social media post that Maduro had been removed from power and would be put on trial or punished, without providing further details.

Reactions from Latin America

Former Colombian President Álvaro Uribe Vélez defended the U.S. action as legitimate self-defense, arguing that Venezuela had for years harbored armed groups and facilitated drug trafficking. Uribe said that when a country becomes “a sanctuary for narco-terrorism,” it inevitably triggers consequences. He accused Venezuela’s leadership of destroying democratic institutions and fueling an exodus of millions across the region, urging Venezuelans to pursue freedom and institutional reconstruction.

Former Colombian President Iván Duque also welcomed the development, calling Maduro’s capture “the beginning of the end of the narco-dictatorship in Venezuela.” Duque said the moment opened a path toward democratic reconstruction with international support, while emphasizing the need to protect regional security.

Colombia’s current President Gustavo Petro took a sharply different view, rejecting what he called aggression against Venezuela’s sovereignty. Petro said Colombia had deployed security forces to its border and activated contingency plans in case of a mass influx of refugees, while seeking to convene the United Nations Security Council. “Internal conflicts between peoples are resolved by those same peoples in peace,” Petro said.

Argentina’s President Javier Milei struck a celebratory tone, posting on “X”: “Long live freedom, carajo!”

Ecuador’s President Daniel Noboa voiced support for Venezuela and the opposition. “To María Corina Machado, Edmundo González and the Venezuelan people, it is time to recover your country,” Noboa wrote, adding that what he called “narco-Chavista criminal structures” would continue to fall across the continent.

Colombian presidential candidate Paloma Valencia of the Centro Democrático party was among the first to react to the breaking news, stating: “Free Venezuela. The illegitimate dictator who usurped power, and subjugated Venezuela and the Venezuelans, has fallen. Democrats yearned for an opportunity for the return of democracy and freedom.”

Medellin Mayor Federico Gutiérrez also celebrated the arrest of the regime leader, saying: “Dictator Nicolás Maduro has been captured. Every tyrant’s time comes. Venezuela Free.”

Spain’s Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez has urged restraint and respect for international law, while Cuba’s President Miguel Díaz-Canel condemned the  “criminal attack” by the United States.

As of Saturday morning, no senior Venezuelan military official, including Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino, had appeared publicly, and it remained unclear who controlled key state institutions or how Venezuela’s armed forces would respond as the crisis continued to unfold.

The United States has captured Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro, along with his wife Cilia Flores, after a series of targeted military strikes on Caracas at 1:30 am on Saturday, January 3, 2026.

In a statement posted on his Truth Social platform, U.S President Donald J. Trump said U.S. forces, working with U.S. law enforcement, conducted a “large scale strike” that resulted in the capture of Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores. Trump said both were flown out of Venezuela, without providing details on where they were taken or the legal basis for their detention.

“The United States of America has successfully carried out a large scale strike against Venezuela and its leader, President Nicolas Maduro,” Trump said, adding that more information would be released at a news conference scheduled for 11 a.m. ET at his Mar-a-Lago residence in Florida.

Explosions were reported across parts of Caracas in the early hours of Saturday, according to witnesses and videos posted on social media, which showed flashes in the sky, fires and power outages in several areas of the capital. One of the main targets appeared to be Fuerte Tiuna, the country’s largest military base and a key command center for Venezuela’s Bolivarian Armed Forces.

The extent of damage and possible casualties could not be independently verified. Venezuelan authorities did not immediately confirm whether senior military officials, including Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino, were injured or killed in the strikes.

In Washington, Republican lawmakers were quick to praise President Trump’s decisive action. Representative Mario Díaz-Balart praised the operation, saying it demonstrated decisive leadership against what he described as an illegitimate regime that posed a threat to U.S. and regional security. Other lawmakers raised questions about the legality of the strikes and whether Congress had authorized the use of force.

In Colombia, Medellín Mayor Federico Gutiérrez expressed support for Venezuelans living abroad, saying millions had fled repression and economic collapse under Maduro’s rule. Venezuelan migrants make up a significant share of Medellín’s population, local authorities say.

It remains unclear how Venezuela’s armed forces will respond or whether Maduro’s removal will lead to a peaceful transition of power with the return of President-elect Edmundo González and opposition leader Maria Corina Machado, both currently out of the country.

Developing News Story….

Colombian President Gustavo Petro on Monday decreed a 23.7% increase in the country’s minimum wage for 2026, the largest real rise in at least two decades, bypassing negotiations with unions and business groups and sparking warnings from economists, bankers and employers over inflation, job losses and rising informality.

The decree lifts the monthly minimum wage to 1.75 million pesos (U.S$470), or close to 2 million pesos including transport subsidies, and will apply to roughly 2.5 million workers when it takes effect next year. Petro said the measure aims to reduce inequality and move Colombia toward a “living minimum wage” that allows workers to “live better.”

But business associations, financial analysts and opposition lawmakers said the scale of the increase — far above inflation and productivity trends — risks destabilising the labour market and the broader economy.

According to calculations based on official data, with inflation expected to close 2025 at around 5.3% and labour productivity growth estimated at 0.9%, a technically grounded adjustment would have been close to 6.2%. The gap between that benchmark and the decreed hike exceeds 17 percentage points, the largest deviation on record.

Informality and job losses

Colombia’s minimum wage plays an outsized role in the economy, serving not only as the legal wage floor but also as a reference for pensions, social security contributions and public-sector pay.

Banking association Asobancaria warned that increases far above productivity can generate unintended effects. Citing data from the national statistics agency DANE, the group noted that 49% of employed Colombians — about 11.4 million people — earn less than the minimum wage, mostly in the informal economy, while only 10% earn exactly the minimum wage. Former director of DANE and economist Juan Daniel Oviedo believes that an increase that only benefits one-out-of-ten workers will stump job creation. “A minimum wage of 2 million pesos will make us move like turtles when it comes to creating formal jobs  — something we need to structurally address poverty in Colombia.”

Retail association FENALCO described the decision as “populist” and said the talks had been a “charade.” Its president, Jaime Alberto Cabal, said the process ignored technical, economic and productivity variables and would hit small businesses hardest.

Lawmakers also raised concerns about the impact on independent workers and contractors in the agricultural sectors, especially hired-help on coffee planations. Carlos Fernando Motoa, a senator from the opposition Cambio Radical party, said the decision would push vulnerable workers out of the formal system.

“The unintended effects of this improvised handling of the minimum wage will end up hitting independent workers’ pockets,” Motoa said. “Many will be forced to choose between eating or paying for health and pension contributions.”

Economists warned that micro, small and medium-sized enterprises — which account for the majority of employment — may respond by cutting staff, reducing hours or shifting workers into informal arrangements to cope with higher payroll and social security costs.

Inflation and rates at risk

Analysts also cautioned that the wage hike could reignite inflation, complicating the central bank’s easing cycle. Central bank economists have forecast 2026 inflation at 3.6%, down from 5.1% expected in 2025, but several analysts said those projections may now need revising.

In an interview with Reuters, David Cubides, chief economist at Banco de Occidente, called the increase “absolutely unsustainable,” warning it would affect government payrolls, pension liabilities and the informal labour market.

“Inflation forecasts will have to be revised,” Cubides said, adding that interest rates could rise again in the medium term as a result.

The impact is amplified by Colombia’s ongoing reduction in the legal workweek. From July 2026, the standard workweek will fall to 42 hours, meaning the hourly minimum wage will rise by roughly 28.5%, further increasing labour costs.

The decree comes six months before the presidential election on May 31, 2026, and is viewed by critics of Colombia’s first leftist administration as an electoral gamble aimed at shoring up support for the ruling coalition’s candidate, Senator Iván Cepeda.

Opposition senator Esteban Quintero, from the Democratic Center party, warned that Colombia risked repeating the mistakes of other Latin American countries that pursued aggressive wage policies.

“Careful, Colombia. We cannot repeat the history of our neighbours,” Quintero said. “Populism is celebrated at first — and later the costs become unbearable.”

Former finance minister and presidential hopeful Mauricio Cárdenas said the decision would inevitably lead to layoffs, particularly in small businesses already operating on thin margins, and described the policy as “economic populism” whose costs would materialise after the election cycle.

“The employer ends up saying, ‘I can’t sustain this payroll,’” Cárdenas said. “People are laid off, and many end up working for less than the minimum wage. In the end, nothing is achieved.”

Liberal Party senator Mauricio Gómez Amín said the increase risked becoming a political banner rather than a technical policy tool.

“Without technical backing, a 23% increase translates into inflation, bankruptcies and fewer job opportunities,” Gómez Amín said. “Economic populism always sends the bill later.”

While supporters argue the measure will boost purchasing power at the start of 2026, analysts cautioned that the short-term gains could be offset by higher prices, job losses and a further expansion of Colombia’s informal economy — already one of the largest in Latin America.

Boyacá is a department best understood at walking pace. Here, the Colombian Andes rise into cold, luminous páramos, colonial towns cling to mountainsides, and trails once traced by the Muisca people now lead modern hikers through landscapes where history and geography feel inseparable. For those who hike not only to conquer summits but to understand place, Boyacá offers one of Colombia’s richest outdoor experiences.

Landmarks on the Trail

Many hikes in Boyacá double as cultural journeys. The Iguaque Sanctuary of Flora and Fauna, near Villa de Leyva, is among the most emblematic. Its winding ascent leads to the Laguna de Iguaque, a glacial lake revered by the Muisca as the birthplace of humanity. The trail passes cloud forest and páramo, with frailejones standing like silent sentinels, before opening onto a stark, spiritual landscape at nearly 3,800 meters.

Further east, the Sierra Nevada del Cocuy (Güicán) dominates the horizon with snowcapped peaks that feel almost Patagonian in scale. Hiking here is more demanding and tightly regulated to protect fragile ecosystems, but routes toward Ritacuba Blanco, Pan de Azúcar, and the Laguna Grande de la Sierra reward experienced trekkers with glaciers, alpine lakes and some of the most dramatic scenery in Colombia.

For gentler walks, the trails around Monguí, one of Colombia’s most beautiful heritage towns, weave together cobblestone paths, pine forests and views of the high plains. Nearby, the Puente Real de Calicanto, built in the 18th century, connects hikers directly to the colonial past.

Boyacá is defined by altitude. Much of the department sits above 2,500 meters, and hiking here is an exercise in patience and acclimatization. The páramo ecosystems – vast, windswept highlands unique to the northern Andes – are both austere and alive, capturing mist and feeding rivers that sustain millions downstream.

Beyond El Cocuy, lesser-known summits and ridgelines around Soatá, Tenza Valley, and Pisba Páramo offer solitude and long-distance views across folds of green and gold. Pisba, in particular, combines natural beauty with historical weight: these were the cold, punishing routes crossed by Simón Bolívar’s troops during the independence campaign of 1819.

Walking Through History

Boyacá is Colombia’s historic heartland. Trails often pass near sites central to the nation’s founding story, from the Puente de Boyacá, where independence was sealed, to rural paths that once carried armies, traders and pilgrims. Hiking here feels layered with memory: pre-Hispanic sacred sites, colonial estates, and republican battlefields coexist within a single day’s walk.

In Villa de Leyva, hikes extend naturally from stone plazas, monasteries and fossil fields, where ancient marine remains remind visitors that these mountains were once under the sea.

Gastronomy After the Climb

Hiking in Boyacá builds an appetite, and the region’s cuisine is designed to restore. The undisputed classic is cocido boyacense, a hearty stew of tubers, grains and meats – perfect after a cold day on the trail. Arepas boyacenses, thick and slightly sweet with curd cheese, are trail food in themselves, often eaten warm with coffee or hot chocolate.

Highland dairy culture shines in fresh cheeses and cuajada con melao, while trout from cold rivers and lakes – especially near Laguna de Tota – offers a lighter reward after long walks. The local market in Aquitania brims with potatoes, garlic, onions and corn, underscoring how closely food – and plenty of cold beer – is tied to altitude and soil.

Boyacá is not about speed or spectacle alone. It is about immersion – into thin air, deep history and a landscape that demands respect. Hiking here is as much a cultural act as a physical one, a way to understand how mountains have shaped ancient rituals and modern-day life.

Why such a massive U.S. military deployment off the coast of Venezuela, supposedly to combat the “Cartel of the Suns” and stop drug trafficking from Venezuela to the United States? After more than four months, the results amount to little more than a handful of small vessels destroyed – an extremely modest impact given the scale of the force deployed.

The reality is that the volume of drug trafficking transiting through Venezuela to the United States is relatively small. Venezuela is not a producer of cocaine, much less of fentanyl, most of which enters the United States via Mexico. If the real interest is not to halt drug trafficking, what then is the motivation for placing the Fourth Fleet on a war footing in the Caribbean Sea? Logic might lead one to think the U.S. interest is oil, since Venezuela holds the largest reserves in the world—but that is not it either. Today the United States is the world’s leading oil producer, at 13.4 million barrels per day, and it has proven reserves sufficient for approximately ten years, assuming no new discoveries and no improvements in recovery or technological advances—an impossible assumption.

So what, then, is the underlying issue if it is neither drugs, nor oil, nor other minerals in which Venezuela might have potential and that would be attractive to the United States?

The answer lies in a little-publicized document formally released by the White House on December 4, titled National Security Strategy 2025. While the document introduces substantial changes in relations with Europe and traditional adversaries, the most striking element is the new emphasis placed on Latin America. Of the document’s “roadmap to ensure that America remains the greatest and most successful nation in human history”, five sections are devoted exclusively to our region, positioning Latin America as a fundamental component of U.S. security – a very significant shift from earlier versions, which historically prioritized the Middle East or Asia. There is a new strategy, or if you will, a “New Monroe Doctrine,” a continuation of the 1823 Monroe Doctrine, reaffirming U.S. preeminence in the region.

“After years of neglect, the United States will once again apply and enforce the Monroe Doctrine to reestablish U.S. preeminence in the Western Hemisphere, and to protect our homeland and our access to key geographies throughout the region. We will deny non-Hemispheric competitors the ability to position forces or other threatening capabilities, or to own or control strategically vital assets, in our Hemisphere,” states the 29-page document.

Key elements of this new doctrine include: countering external influence by requiring Latin American governments to dismantle foreign military installations and divest strategic assets in exchange for aid or alliances; stopping illegal migration, including naval patrols in the Caribbean and the eastern Pacific, selective border deployments, and the use of incentives for governments to curb migratory flows; combating narco-terrorists and cartels; and sealing economic and political commitments with aligned governments in a win-win framework that would include procurement preferences and greater cooperation, among other measures, with a view to turning Latin America into a stable market for U.S. exports and a buffer against global rivals.

In recent years, China has achieved significant penetration in Latin America through its diplomacy and long-term strategy (the Belt and Road Initiative, or New Silk Road). For nearly all countries in the region, China has become the leading trading partner, displacing the United States; it is also an investor in major infrastructure projects and a lender of funds (in Venezuela’s case, a very large lender that negotiated debt repayment in oil at very low prices). In addition, China has become a major supplier of weapons and information technology.

In this context, what Washington appears to be seeking is indeed a regime change in Venezuela to counter the influence of China and Russia, but without openly announcing it in order to avoid a direct diplomatic confrontation. Trump has segmented the region into friendly regimes (Argentina, El Salvador, Ecuador, Honduras, and Guatemala), enemy regimes (Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua), and regimes in limbo (Colombia and Brazil).

For Venezuela, regime change appears imminent, which would profoundly benefit Colombia, because, as Miguel Uribe Turbay said before he was assassinated, “as long as there is no freedom in Venezuela, there will be no peace in Colombia.” On the other hand, a change of government in Colombia is also approaching, and the country will have to decide which of these groups it wants to belong to—whether it repairs its relations with its traditional partner and ally, or definitively joins the group of pariah states in the region. Let us hope it is the former.

About the author: Luis Guillermo Plata served as Minister of Trade, Industry of Commerce during the government of President Álvaro Uribe Vélez, and in 2021, appointed by President Iván Duque, Ambassador of Colombia to Spain.

For a literary festival, silence can be more revealing than speech. The decision by three writers to withdraw from the 2026 Hay Festival in Cartagena over the presence of María Corina Machado, this year’s Nobel Peace Prize laureate and the most prominent figure in Venezuela’s democratic opposition, has exposed a paradox at the heart of contemporary literary culture: a professed devotion to free expression that falters when confronted with an inconvenient voice.

Hay Festival Cartagena, now in its 21st edition, is scheduled to take place from 29 January to 1 February 2026, with parallel events in Barranquilla, Medellín and a special edition in Jericó, Antioquia. Founded three decades ago in Wales and once described by Bill Clinton as “the Woodstock of the mind,” Hay has built its global reputation on the premise that literature flourishes in the presence of disagreement. Its stages have hosted figures as diverse – and divisive – as Salman Rushdie, Jonathan Safran Foer and David Goodhart, writers whose ideas have unsettled orthodoxies across continents.

Yet in Cartagena, dialogue has been recast as contamination.

The Colombian novelist Laura Restrepo, the Barranquilla-born writer Giuseppe Caputo and the Dominican activist Mikaelah Drullard announced they would not attend in protest at Machado’s invitation. Restrepo, winner of the 2004 Alfaguara Prize, had been scheduled to participate in several events, including a conversation with Indian novelist Pankaj Mishra and a session devoted to her most recent book, I Am the Dagger and I Am the Wound. In a public letter addressed to festival director Cristina de la Fuente, Restrepo described Machado’s presence as “a line” crossed.

“I must cancel my attendance at Hay Festival Cartagena 2026,” Restrepo wrote. “The reason is the participation of María Corina Machado, an active supporter of United States military intervention in Latin America.” Granting her a platform, Restrepo argued, amounted to facilitating positions hostile to regional autonomy.

Caputo echoed his reasoning on social media, announcing that “in the current context of escalating imperial violence, it is better to withdraw from a festival taking place opposite the bombarded waters of the Caribbean Sea.” Drullard, five days earlier, said she could not attend an event that “supports pro-genocide and interventionist positions through the mobilisation of those who promote them,” citing Machado’s proximity to the administration of US President Donald Trump.

What remains striking, however, is not merely the severity of these accusations but their selectivity. None of the boycott statements devotes comparable moral energy to denouncing the documented human rights abuses of Nicolás Maduro’s regime: arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances, torture of political prisoners, or the systematic dismantling of democratic institutions. One is left to ask whether the authors’ moral outrage extends to the lived realities of Venezuelans themselves, or whether it finds expression only when filtered through the optics of geopolitics.

The irony is sharpened by the fact that the same US administration helped secure Machado’s escape from Venezuela on December 8, enabling her to arrive in Oslo hours after her daughter Ana Corina Sosa received the Nobel Peace Prize on her behalf. “When the history of our time is written, it won’t be the names of the authoritarian rulers that stand out – but the names of those who dared resist,” noted the Nobel Foundation. 

The arguments from Machado’s detractors  warrant scrutiny – and above all, debate. What they do not justify is refusal from Latin America’s self-entitled literati. A boycott replaces argument with absence, moral reasoning with pantomime. It is a gesture that confers ethical purity upon the boycotter while foreclosing the very exchange that literature has traditionally claimed to defend. This is the “line” that cannot be crossed.

The Hay Festival’s response has been characteristically diplomatic In a statement following the cancellations, organisers reaffirmed their commitment to pluralism: “We reaffirm our conviction that open, plural and constructive dialogue remains an essential tool for addressing complex realities and for defending the free exchange of ideas and freedom of expression.” They stressed that Hay “does not align itself with or endorse the opinions, positions or statements of those who participate in its activities,” while respecting the decisions of those who chose not to attend.

That insistence on neutrality, however, also reveals a deeper unease. If a literary festival must repeatedly assert its impartiality, it may be because neutrality itself has become suspect. Increasingly, festivals are asked to function as courts of moral arbitration, conferring legitimacy on some voices while quietly disqualifying others. The result is not a more just cultural sphere, but a narrower one—policed less by argument than by consensus.

The controversy has unfolded at a particularly volatile moment for Venezuela’s eight-million diaspora. Machado’s invitation coincides with a renewed escalation in US pressure in the Caribbean Sea. On Tuesday, President Trump ordered a “total and complete blockade” of all sanctioned oil tankers entering or leaving the country, targeting Caracas’s principal source of revenue. His administration also designated Maduro’s government a Foreign Terrorist Organization, accusing it of using “stolen US assets” to finance terrorism, drug trafficking and organised crime.

“Venezuela is completely surrounded by the largest armada ever assembled in the history of South America,” Trump wrote on Truth Social. “It will only get bigger, and the shock to them will be like nothing they have ever seen before – until such time as they return to the United States all of the oil, land and other assets they previously stole from us.”

Against this backdrop, Machado’s high-profile presence at Hay has acquired a symbolic weight that far exceeds literary stages. Yet it is precisely at such moments that intellectual forums are tested. Fiction, after all, teaches empathy, complexity and the capacity to hold contradiction without retreat. To boycott rather than engage is to abandon that lesson – and, with it, democratical ideals.

The reputational cost to Hay Festival Cartagena may prove lasting – not because Machado was invited, but because the limits of reason and tolerance have been publicly exposed. A gathering that once prided itself on hosting difficult conversations now finds itself unsettled by the very principle on which it was founded.

And there is a final inflection. If Hay’s commitment to dialogue is grounded in a leftist agenda – if certain voices render discussion impossible – then Machado herself should reasonably question the value of her remote participation at the festival on January 30, for a scheduled conversation with Venezuelan journalist and former minister Moisés Naím.

In Cartagena, it is not Machado’s words that should concern audiences, but the intellectual impoverishment by those who chose not to speak to her at all.