President Gustavo Petro accused Ecuador on Monday of carrying out bombing raids inside Colombian territory, sharply escalating a diplomatic and trade dispute that has been simmering since January.

Petro said “27 charred bodies” have been found near the border and suggested the attacks could not have been carried out by illegal armed groups, though he presented no evidence to support the claim.

“Ecuador is bombing us, and these are not illegal armed groups,” Petro said during a televised cabinet meeting, warning of a serious breach of sovereignty.

Ecuador’s President Daniel Noboa swiftly rejected the accusation.

“President Petro, your statements are false; we are acting within our own territory,” Noboa said, adding that Ecuadorian forces were targeting “narco-terrorist structures” operating near the border.

Petro said a bomb believed to have been dropped from an aircraft had been discovered near the frontier, reinforcing what he described as a pattern of cross-border strikes.

“A bomb has appeared, dropped from a plane… very close to the border with Ecuador,” Petro said. “We must investigate thoroughly, but this supports my suspicion that Ecuador is bombing us.”

He added that “many explosions” had been reported and said his government would soon release an audio recording allegedly originating from Ecuador.

In a post on social media platform X, Petro said the bombings did not appear to come from Colombian armed forces or illegal groups, which he argued lack the capability to carry out aerial attacks. “The explanation (from Ecuador) is not credible,” he wrote, without specifying when or where the deaths occurred.

Ecuador doubles down

Noboa, facing a surge in organized crime violence at home, has adopted an aggressive military strategy that includes aerial bombardments of suspected cartel camps near the Colombian border.

His government says the operations are conducted strictly within Ecuadorian territory and are often aimed at groups with Colombian origins, including FARC dissidents. “Together with international cooperation, we continue this fight, bombing locations used as hideouts by these groups, many of them Colombian,” Noboa said in a statement.

He also accused Colombia of failing to control its side of the border, allowing criminal organizations to spill into Ecuador.

The latest confrontation comes against the backdrop of a worsening trade dispute that began in January when Ecuador imposed a 30% “security tariff” on Colombian imports, citing Bogotá’s alleged inaction against narcotrafficking.

The tariff was later increased to 50%.

Colombia retaliated with tariffs on 73 products, suspended electricity exports to Ecuador, and imposed restrictions on bilateral trade, deepening tensions between the neighboring countries.

Ecuador responded by raising fees on the transport of Colombian crude through one of its main pipelines.

Despite early attempts to contain the fallout, relations have steadily deteriorated, culminating in the current exchange of accusations.

Risk of escalation

Petro’s latest claims mark the most serious rupture yet, raising the specter of a cross-border military incident between the two countries, which share a long and porous frontier plagued by drug trafficking and illegal mining.

The Colombian president said he had appealed to Donald Trump to intervene diplomatically.“I asked him to act and call the president of Ecuador because we do not want to go to war,” he said.

The involvement of the United States adds another layer of complexity. Ecuador recently deepened security cooperation with Washington, including the establishment of a new FBI office and joint operations targeting organized crime. Earlier this month, Ecuadorian and U.S. forces conducted strikes on a camp linked to the Comandos de la Frontera, a dissident faction of the FARC guerrilla.

The Colombia–Ecuador border has long been a strategic corridor for cocaine trafficking, with armed groups exploiting weak state presence on both sides. While the border itself is not disputed, diverging security strategies have increasingly brought Bogotá and Quito into conflict.

Petro’s government has prioritized negotiations with armed groups under its “Total Peace” policy, while Noboa has pursued a hardline military crackdown.

For now, the allegations from Casa de Nariño remain unverified, but the political damage is done – and one further miscalculation could carry deep consequences far beyond the shared border.

Colombia’s migration authority Migración Colombia denied entry last week to 10 foreign nationals suspected of seeking sex tourism, marking the largest single-day refusal of its kind at Medellín’s main international gateway, officials said.

The individuals — nine from the United States and one from Anguilla — were stopped at José María Córdova International Airport on March 11 after migration officers concluded their travel did not correspond to legitimate tourism.

Authorities said the group arrived on a flight from Miami with a stopover in Panama and voluntarily allowed inspections of their luggage. Officials reported finding sex toys and large quantities of condoms which, along with interview responses, raised suspicions about the purpose of their visit.

In a separate case the same day, the Anguillan national, arriving from the Dominican Republic, told officials he intended to “select women to have sexual relations” in his home country, prompting his immediate inadmission.

The measures form part of a broader government effort to curb human trafficking and sexual exploitation, following directives issued by President Gustavo Petro to strengthen migration controls.

“This is about protecting local communities and preventing Colombia from being used as a destination for illicit activities,” said Gloria Esperanza Arriero, director of Migración Colombia, praising officers in the Antioquia–Chocó regional unit for their rigorous enforcement.

The agency said the refusals were applied as a preventive measure under existing migration law, which grants authorities discretion to deny entry to foreigners who fail to meet requirements or pose risks to public safety or human rights.

The latest cases bring to 26 the number of foreign nationals denied entry in 2026 at the Rionegro airport for suspected links to sexual exploitation. In 2025, authorities recorded 110 such inadmissions nationwide, with roughly 80 occurring at the same terminal, the principal international gateway to Medellín.

Officials say the figures underscore the airport’s strategic importance in detecting early attempts to enter the country for illicit purposes, particularly in a city whose nightlife districts have drawn increasing international scrutiny in recent years.

Migration enforcement has also expanded beyond airports. Authorities reported recent operations in Medellín targeting suspected criminal networks linked to sexual exploitation, drug trafficking and theft in nightlife areas such as Parque Lleras.

In one case, two foreign nationals with criminal records in Venezuela were located in the El Poblado district. One of them, a Venezuelan woman known as “Kata,” had been sentenced to nine years in prison for human trafficking by a court in Caracas. She was expelled after officials confirmed the ruling through Venezuela’s consulate.

Investigators said she had operated in Colombia using falsified documents and was allegedly involved in prostitution networks and drug distribution in Medellín’s nightlife zones, highlighting the challenges authorities face in monitoring transnational criminal activity.

A second suspect, identified as “Gokú,” a dual Colombian-Venezuelan national, was wanted in Venezuela for charges including aggravated robbery, homicide and illegal possession of firearms. Authorities said he posed as a tourist while facilitating theft operations tied to criminal groups.

Separately, migration officials in Bogotá located a French national subject to an Interpol red notice in a hotel near the U.S. Embassy district. The individual was wanted for child abduction and document falsification and was handed over to the relevant authorities following verification of the international warrant.

Migración Colombia said the case was one of nearly 40 alerts recorded so far in 2026 across multiple regions, including Bogotá, Boyacá, Caquetá, Huila and Tolima, involving migration violations and international judicial requests.

The agency added that these operations have led to arrests and more than ten expulsions of foreign nationals this year, underscoring an intensification of enforcement efforts across the country.

In a separate incident underscoring authorities’ concerns, Colombian police arrested a 46-year-old U.S. citizen in Medellín after he was found with a 14-year-old girl in a short-term rental apartment in the El Poblado area, according to local media reports.

The case was triggered by an anonymous tip to the emergency line, prompting officers from the police child protection unit to respond. Authorities said the minor, still in her school uniform, told investigators the man had contacted her through social media to solicit sexual services.

The suspect was detained and faces charges related to the commercial sexual exploitation of a minor under 18, police said. Authorities did not immediately release further details on his identity or legal status.

Officials say the inadmissions at Rionegro reflect a broader trend seen in 2025, when most of the 110 foreigners denied entry over suspected sex tourism were U.S. nationals, reinforcing concerns about the international dimension of the issue.

Authorities say they will continue strengthening coordination with international bodies to prevent Colombia from being used as a destination for sexual exploitation or as a refuge for individuals attempting to evade justice.

Conservative presidential candidate Paloma Valencia has chosen economist and former statistics chief Juan Daniel Oviedo as her vice-presidential running mate, a move widely interpreted as an effort by the right-wing Centro Democrático to broaden its appeal beyond its traditional conservative base ahead of Colombia’s May 31 presidential election.

The alliance seeks to balance Valencia’s hard-line security message – closely associated with former president Álvaro Uribe Vélez – with Oviedo’s more technocratic and centrist profile, which resonates with younger, urban voters.

Announcing the ticket in the bustling commercial district of San Victorino in central Bogotá, Valencia said the decision followed consultations within the party and with Uribe himself.

“We have reached the conclusion that the best teammate is Juan Daniel Oviedo,” Valencia said. “He obtained a popular backing that excites all of us. He is connecting with many Colombians who did not feel represented.”

The announcement comes just days before the deadline to register presidential tickets with Colombia’s electoral authorities and follows Valencia’s decisive victory in the conservative primary coalition known as “La Gran Consulta,” where she secured more than three million votes. Oviedo finished second with more than one million, quickly emerging as one of the race’s unexpected political figures.

Balancinga new centre

Valencia, a staunch supporter of Uribe’s political project, has repeatedly signaled she will not distance herself from the former president’s ideological influence.

“I’m not going to distance myself from Uribe; I’m going to die a Uribe supporter,” she said in a recent interview with El País, reaffirming her commitment to the security agenda associated with the former two-term president.

Yet her choice of Oviedo indicates an attempt to broaden the coalition’s reach. The economist, who gained national prominence as director of Colombia’s national statistics agency – DANE – is widely viewed as a highly-skilled data-driven analyst with appeal among educated urban voters in their thirties and forties – many of whom supported the Colombian Peace Agreement.

That demographic has traditionally gravitated toward centrist figures such as former Bogotá mayor Claudia López or the moderate political movement associated with Sergio Fajardo.

Oviedo’s presence on the ticket could help the conservative bloc penetrate that electorate while also tempering some of the party’s more polarizing rhetoric.

Beyond Differences

The partnership did not come easily. According to campaign strategists involved in negotiations, several days of discussions were required to reconcile differences between the candidates – particularly regarding Colombia’s peace process.

The Centro Democrático has long been critical of the transitional justice system created by the 2016 accord, especially the Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz (JEP), which has been investigating war crimes committed by ex-FARC and Armed Forces during two decades of the internal conflict.

Oviedo, however, has publicly supported the peace agreement and defended the need for reconciliation. Speaking after accepting the nomination, Oviedo emphasized the importance of political dialogue despite ideological differences.

“This is about listening,” he said. “In this coalition we are capable of recognizing our differences but uniting around a fundamental purpose: looking toward the future and building a country where everyone fits.”

He also highlighted his intention to include diverse sectors of Colombian society, mentioning farmers, informal workers, women and the LGBT community.

Strategic Moves in Gran San

The announcement’s location – San Victorino’s Gran San commercial center, one of Bogotá’s busiest retail hubs- was also symbolic. The district is a bustling marketplace dominated by small traders and informal workers, a constituency both candidates say they want to court.

Valencia described the alliance as a forward-looking project for a country weary of political polarization.

“We have many pains as a nation,” she said during the event. “If we only look backward we will find wounds that still need healing. But we have another option: to look forward toward the future we deserve.”

She also praised Oviedo’s credentials, describing him as a policymaker who understands the deep structural and social challenges facing Colombia. “He likes numbers, he likes studying,” she said. “Government is not about talking nonsense about problems – it’s about understanding them deeply in order to solve them,” she said to waves of applause.

The announcement quickly triggered reactions from across Colombia’s political landscape.

Former Liberal president Ernesto Samper welcomed the decision, arguing that Oviedo’s acceptance of the vice-presidential role signaled an implicit recognition by the right-wing party of the peace process. “The acceptance of Juan Daniel Oviedo demonstrates that the Centro Democrático validates the Havana peace agreement and the continuation of the JEP,” he Samper.

With the campaign entering its decisive phase, the Valencia-Oviedo ticket represents a strategic attempt to unite two currents within Colombia’s conservative electorate: an older security-focused base loyal to Uribe and a younger urban sector seeking pragmatic solutions to the internal conflict.

Whether the combination can bridge Colombia’s ideological divide – or deepen it- will likely shape the tone of the presidential race in the weeks and moths leading to the decisive vote.

Colombia’s high-altitude Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta has become the latest flashpoint in the country’s worsening rural security crisis, after armed clashes between illegal groups left Indigenous communities trapped in the crossfire and triggered a humanitarian evacuation mission.

Authorities confirmed that at least nine wounded civilians, including two minors, were evacuated following heavy fighting between the Clan del Golfo (Gulf Clan) and paramilitary group Autodefensas Conquistadoras de la Sierra Nevada, which are battling for territorial control in the mountainous region.

The fighting first broke out in the foothills near Aracataca, department of Magdalena, and birthplace of Literature Nobel Laurate Gabriel García Márquez. According to local news sources, several indigenous Arhuaco communities reported being trapped by gunfire, and in some cases, used as human shields during the armed confrontations.

Colombia’s human rights ombudsman, the Defensoría del Pueblo, deployed a humanitarian mission to monitor the deteriorating situation and coordinate assistance with Indigenous authorities, regional officials and the armed forces.

The operation succeeded in evacuating nine injured people who had been confined in areas affected by the fighting. Among the wounded are two children, highlighting the vulnerability of civilian populations in the isolated highlands.

The mission was carried out in the Indigenous community of Gunmaku, where Arhuaco traditional authorities accompanied humanitarian teams in assessing the impact of the violence and assisting those affected.

Officials said both armed groups agreed to temporarily respect a humanitarian corridor, allowing rescue teams to reach the injured and transport them to safety.

Despite the evacuation, the Defensoría warned that the situation remains critical.

Preliminary humanitarian reports indicate the disappearance of two women, the killing of a man, and the injury of a child, while many residents remain confined in their communities due to the ongoing clashes.

“We are deeply concerned about the population in Serankua and nearby rural settlements,” stated the ombudsman’s office, referring to communities located high in the Sierra Nevada where access is extremely difficult.

The entity added that the confrontation had been anticipated in earlier early-warning alerts, but the national government failed to fully prevent the escalation.

Rescue operations have been complicated by the region’s extreme geography.

Much of the affected territory lies more than 2,800 metres above sea level, accessible only by footpaths and rugged mountain trails. Helicopter evacuations carried out by the Colombian Army involved considerable risk due to the altitude and lack of landing zones.

Magdalena governor Margarita Guerra Zúñiga confirmed that the military conducted what she described as a “humanitarian extraction” operation, transporting injured civilians to Santa Marta for treatment.

Several evacuees are receiving medical attention and are in stable condition, except for one child who required emergency surgery.

Indigenous leaders are now warning of forced displacement, similar to the humanitarian crisis last year in the mountainous Catatumbo region, Norte de Santander, close to the Venezuelan border.

Protection agencies, such as the Childrens Welfare Agency (ICBF) are calling on armed groups to respect international humanitarian law, particularly the principles of distinction and precaution, which prohibit attacks against civilians or the use of non-combatants as human shields.

Human rights monitors also called for stronger state presence in the Sierra Nevada, warning that ancestral communities remain highly vulnerable to violence and coercion from criminals.

Security analysts claim the clashes are part of a broader territorial struggle for control of drug trafficking routes that extend from La Guajira to the Uraba Gulf, as well as expanding extortion networks along Colombia’s Caribbean coast.

The Clan del Golfo, Colombia’s largest drugs cartel, has expanded operations across the Caribbean in recent years. The group is now competing for more territorial control with the Autodefensas Conquistadoras de la Sierra Nevada,  also known as “Los Pachenca”.

The Sierra Nevada — a vast mountainous ecosystem rising from the Caribbean coast to snow-capped peaks — is the spiritual and ancestral home for the Arhuaco, Kogui, Wiwa and Kankuamo peoples.

Community leaders warn that the expansion of armed groups threatens not only civilian lives but also the ecological and cultural balance of the mountain range, which Indigenous “elders” – mamos – regard as the “Heart of the World”.

Humanitarian agencies have urged Colombia’s government to convene the Intersectoral Commission for Rapid Response to Early Warnings (CIPRAT) and strengthen coordination between the Interior Ministry, regional authorities and the Victims’ Unit.

While more army units are being deployed to the area, Indigenous leaders warn that unless the government of President Petro establishes a permanent security and humanitarian presence, the remote communities inside the world’s highest coastal mountain range will find themselves trapped in a conflict that engulfs not only their ancient territories, but also, one of the country’s most recognized tourism destinations.

Colombia’s presidential race entered a decisive new phase this week after Sunday’s inter-party primaries propelled conservative senator Paloma Valencia into the national spotlight and triggered a scramble among political factions to forge alliances ahead of the May 31 election.

Valencia’s commanding performance in the right-wing “La Gran Consulta” primary – where she secured roughly six million votes – has reshaped the political landscape, opening a contest within the conservative bloc while forcing candidates across the spectrum to recalibrate their strategies.

The vote effectively marks the start of Colombia’s election season, in which presidential hopefuls must broaden their appeal beyond ideological bases while navigating a fragmented political field.

For the right, the central challenge is whether it can attract moderate and centrist voters without alienating the hardline supporters who form the backbone of a political base – and party – associated with former president Álvaro Uribe.

Valencia, a senior figure in Uribe’s Democratic Center, emerged from the primaries as one of the leading conservative contenders after her vote total surpassed the turnout achieved by President Gustavo Petro and Vice President Francia Márquez in their coalition primaries ahead of the 2022 election.

For Uribe’s movement, which appeared weakened after the presidency of Iván Duque and several electoral setbacks, the result represents an unexpected demonstration of political resilience.

Yet the surge of security-focused Senator has also intensified competition from the far right.

Barranquilla-based lawyer Abelardo de la Espriella, who had previously dominated opposition to Petro, now faces a rival capable of consolidating support among traditional party structures while courting voters beyond the hard-right.

De la Espriella announced Tuesday that Ivan Duque’s former finance minister José Manuel Restrepo will join his presidential ticket as vice-presidential candidate, a move widely interpreted as an attempt to add economic credibility to a campaign largely driven by security rhetoric.

Political observers on the night of the consulations emphasized that Uribe will play a decisive role in shaping the outcome of any hard-right and center-right alliance.

The former president remains the most influential figure within Colombia’s right-wing political establishment and will act as “kingmaker” when negotiations begin over a possible understanding between Valencia and De la Espriella aimed at consolidating the anti-Petro vote.

Whether such an agreement materializes remains uncertain, as both candidates seek to position themselves as the principal challenger to the left in the first round scheduled for May 31.

Sunday’s primaries also produced a surprise showing from economist Juan Daniel Oviedo, the former head of Colombia’s national statistics agency (DANE), who secured more than one million votes and finished second in La Gran Consulta.

Oviedo has cultivated support among urban and younger voters, particularly in Bogotá, where his technocratic style and socially liberal positions have resonated with diverse constituencies, including large segments of the LGBTQ community.

Yet his unexpectedly strong performance now places him at a political crossroads.

Oviedo is expected to meet Valencia on Thursday to discuss a possible alliance that could include joining her ticket as a vice-presidential candidate.

Such a partnership could help Valencia reach voters beyond the traditional conservative base. But it also carries risks for Oviedo, whose supporters may question a close association with the Uribe-aligned political establishment that has dominated Colombia’s right for more than two decades.

The two politicians differ sharply on several issues, including the 2016 peace agreement with FARC  and role of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP), the transitional justice tribunal created to prosecute war crimes committed during Colombia’s internal conflict.

While Oviedo has defended Juan Manuel Santos’ peace agreement and role of the tribunal, Valencia has long criticized JEP and promoted reforms aimed at limiting its legal authority.

Despite the shifting dynamics on the right, the left retains an important institutional foothold following Sunday’s legislative elections.

Petro’s governing coalition, the Historic Pact, emerged as the largest force in the Senate with 25 of the chamber’s 102 seats, according to official results, though it fell short of an outright majority and will need alliances with other parties in the fragmented legislature.

Within the progressive camp, however, the primaries exposed clear divisions.

Former Senate president and former Ambassador to London Roy Barreras secured just over 200,000 votes in the left-wing primary and publicly blamed Petro for the weak turnout, accusing the president of discouraging supporters from voting on Sunday to cement the official candidacy of hard-left candidate Iván Cepeda.

The primaries also underscored the continued weakness of Colombia’s political center.

Former Bogotá mayor Claudia López won her coalition’s primary but attracted fewer than half a million votes, a disappointing result that leaves her entering the first round of the presidential race with reduced political momentum.

With nearly three months remaining before the first round of voting, the campaign that begins this week bears little resemblance to the one that existed before Sunday’s primaries.

The conservative opposition remains divided but newly energized, the left retains institutional strength despite internal tensions, and the political center faces an uphill battle to remain relevant.

In a race now expected to be decided in two rounds, Colombia’s presidential contest is once again wide open as candidates maneuver to build alliances and capture the pivotal voters who will ultimately decide the country’s political direction.

President Gustavo Petro has announced the start of a consultation process with ethnic communities to draft a new decree protecting the sacred “Black Line” of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta after Colombia’s highest administrative court annulled the previous legal framework governing the ancestral territory.

The announcement came late on March 4 during an interethnic assembly in the Caribbean city of Santa Marta attended by Indigenous authorities, Afro-Colombian representatives and members of Petro’s government.

The process follows a February 12 ruling by the Council of State of Colombia that struck down Decree 1500 of 2018, a measure issued under former president Juan Manuel Santos that formally recognized the “Black Line” as the spiritual and cultural boundary of the ancestral territory of the Sierra Nevada’s Indigenous peoples.

The ruling removed the legal recognition of 348 sacred sites across the mountain range, an area spanning the Caribbean departments of La Guajira, Magdalena Department and Cesar Department.

The court concluded the decree had not complied fully with the constitutional requirement of prior consultation with all ethnic communities potentially affected by the territorial delimitation.

Sacred geography

For the Indigenous peoples who inhabit the Sierra Nevada – Arhuaco, Kogi, Wiwa and Kankuamo p – the “Black Line” is far more than a geographic boundary.

It represents a cosmological network of sacred sites connecting coastal lagoons, rivers, glaciers and mountain peaks across what Indigenous leaders describe as the “Heart of the World.”

Through these sites, spiritual elders – known as mamos – maintain rituals they say preserve the balance between humans, nature and the spiritual realm.

“The Sierra is not only a mountain; it is a living being that breathes through its lagoons, its glaciers, its stones and its lines of energy,” Indigenous leaders said following the ruling, warning that removing the decree threatens decades of cooperation between the state and Indigenous authorities.

The now-annulled decree had been the product of years of negotiations between Indigenous authorities and the Colombian government following orders from the Constitutional Court of Colombia to formally recognize ancestral territories and sacred geography.

The mapping of the 348 sites was supported by technical studies conducted by the national mapping agency, the Instituto Geográfico Agustín Codazzi.

For Indigenous leaders, the decree served as the main legal instrument protecting the sacred network from outside interventions, including mining projects, infrastructure development, tourism ventures and energy exploration.

With its annulment, communities fear they are left without an effective legal mechanism to defend the territory and its ecosystems.

The Sierra Nevada is widely regarded by scientists as one of the most biodiverse mountain systems on Earth, rising from sea level to snow-covered peaks in less than 50 kilometres.

Speaking before Indigenous delegates in Santa Marta, Petro said the consultation process would now place communities at the centre of the decision-making process.

“Here a process begins in which you have the word, not the government,” Petro told the assembly. “Now corresponds a process of consultation. The consultation belongs to you. I hope it ends well and quickly so we can issue the decree again.”

The president urged participants to move forward without unnecessary delays while ensuring the key issues are discussed.

“Sometimes our own dialectic of discussion leads us to prolong processes or find contradictions where none exist,” he said.

Petro framed the protection of the Sierra Nevada not only as a territorial matter but also as a message to a world facing increasing geopolitical conflict.

“The Heart of the World must be at peace, because if the Heart of the World is not at peace, humanity will not be at peace,” Petro said. “Today humanity is not at peace – missiles fall everywhere.”

The government says the consultation will include not only the four Indigenous nations of the Sierra but also neighbouring groups such as the Ette Ennaka people and coastal communities including Afro-descendant groups and residents of Taganga.

According to Vice-Minister for Social Dialogue and Human Rights Gabriel Rondón, the current stage is an “intercultural dialogue” designed to define a roadmap toward a new decree that avoids the legal flaws identified by the Council of State.

“The purpose is to start from the beginning, clarify doubts and create a broad path that allows us to agree on a new administrative act without the failures of the previous one,” Rondón said.

PNN Tayrona reopens

Separately, the government confirmed that the nearby Tayrona National Natural Park will reopen to visitors on March 5 after a three-month closure over security concerns with illegal armed groups operating in the Sierra Nevada.

The Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism (MinCIT), said it has mobilised institutional support and technical funding to ensure the park resumes operations with security and sustainability guarantees.

Tourism authorities also announced plans for light infrastructure investments of about COP$2.7 billion to improve visitor facilities and promote Colombia’s network of national parks as leading ecotourism destinations.

Colombia’s transitional justice system has reached a morally charged milestone. The seven former commanders of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC-EP) guerrilla have formally accepted responsibility for the recruitment of 18,677 minors during the country’s decades-long internal conflict, acknowledging not only the scale of the practice but also the sexual and reproductive abuses that accompanied it.

The admission, submitted to the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP), marks a shift in tone from earlier, more defensive statements. It comes as the country approaches the tenth anniversary of the 2016 peace agreement, signed between President Juan Manuel Santos and Rodrigo Londoño, and at a moment that has opened a more complex struggle over truth and accountability.

The signatories of the letter are Rodrigo Londoño Echeverry, known by his wartime alias “Timochenko”, along with Pastor Alape Lascarro, Julián Gallo Cubillos, Milton de Jesús Toncel Redondo, Pablo Catatumbo Torres, Rodrigo Granda Escobar and Jaime Alberto Parra Rodríguez.

In a video delivered to the tribunal’s Chamber for Acknowledgment of Truth, the seven former members of the guerrilla’s last Secretariat “ask forgiveness from the victims and society for the recruitment and use of girls and boys,” as well as for “cruel treatment, homicides, sexual, reproductive and prejudice-based violence” inflicted within their ranks.

The language is unusually direct. The tribunal, in turn, has accepted these declarations as “a starting point for designing direct restorative encounters with victims,” emphasizing that the process remains ongoing and conditional. This is not, it insists, “a conclusion but the beginning of a more demanding phase” of recognition.

The figures involved are stark. The JEP has identified 18,677 victims of child recruitment between 1996 and 2016, number that exposes what it calls a “violence that was invisible, even to the state itself.” Prior to the tribunal’s investigation, official records had produced only 387 cases and 45 sentences, five of them acquittals – a gap that hints at the scale of impunity.

The crimes extend far beyond recruitment. The tribunal has organized its findings into five “macro-criminal patterns”: the enlistment of minors, including those under 15; mistreatment, torture and killings within the ranks; sexual violence; reproductive violence, including forced contraception and abortions; and persecution based on sexual orientation or gender identity.

Particularly striking is the acknowledgment of reproductive control. The former commanders concede that the imposition of contraceptive methods and the forced termination of pregnancies constituted forms of violence that “violated the dignity and integrity” of those affected – most of them girls and adolescents. Such practices, long alleged by victims, had previously been downplayed or denied.

The JEP’s statement underscores the scale and diversity of those harmed. More than 11,000 victims are formally accredited in Case 07, including some 2,000 individuals and over 9,000 members of Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities. For these groups, the consequences were not merely individual but collective. The recruitment of children, the tribunal notes, “aggravated the risk of physical and cultural extinction” for several communities.

The social geography of the crime is also revealing. Recruitment thrived in peripheral regions where state presence was weak and armed actors exercised de facto authority over vulnerable populations. Children were drawn in through coercion, deception or, in some cases, the promise of protection in violent environments. Once inside, many encountered a regime of discipline and control that blurred the line between indoctrination and abuse.

The tribunal is explicit about the enduring damage. Victims, it says, continue to live with “profound emotional, psychological and physical harm,” often compounded by stigma and exclusion. Many are still reconstructing “their life projects and identities,” a process that has stretched into adulthood.

Crucially, the JEP frames the former commanders’ admission not as an act of closure but as an invitation—to victims and to society. In its words, “this is not a point of arrival, but the beginning of an encounter” between those responsible and those who suffered. Whether that encounter leads to reconciliation or renewed grievance remains uncertain.

Under Colombia’s transitional justice model, such acknowledgments carry legal consequences. Full and truthful admissions can lead to alternative sentences for reparations and restorative measures rather than prison. The tribunal is now assessing whether the former commanders’ statements meet that threshold. Victims, for their part, are being asked to “read, listen and weigh” the declarations and decide what they mean for their own processes.

Early reactions have been met with skepticism and resignation. Some victims’ representatives have described the statements as a “first step toward dialogue,” while noting that they fall short of a complete account.

The broader political context complicates matters. Colombia’s security situation has deteriorated in large swathes of the country, with dissident factions and other armed groups recruiting minors even as the state grapples with the legacy of past conflicts. The JEP itself alludes to this continuity, calling on “society as a whole, including new structures of violence,” to ensure non-repetition.

That appeal highlights the paradox at the heart of Colombia’s peace process. The country has made significant strides in uncovering the truth about past atrocities, yet struggles to prevent their recurrence. Transitional justice, in this sense, is both retrospective and urgently contemporary.

The former FARC leaders, for their part, have pledged to remain on the “dialogical and restorative path” and to participate in encounters with victims. They speak of the “deep and lasting damage” caused by their actions and express willingness to contribute to guarantees of non-repetition. Whether these commitments translate into tangible repair will depend on what follows.

For now, the significance of the moment lies less in what has been resolved than in what has been acknowledged. The recruitment of children – once a peripheral issue in public debates – has been placed at the center of Colombia’s reckoning with its violent past.

As the JEP puts it, recognizing these crimes “enables a broader reflection” on how to ensure that childhood is never again sacrificed to war. It is a sober ambition. Colombia has, at last, begun to confront one of the conflict’s darkest truths. Whether it can fully reckon with it remains an open question.

Colombians head to the polls on March 8 for what is, formally, a legislative election. In practice, it is something more consequential: a stress test of the country’s political coalitions ahead of the May 31 presidential race already defined by fragmentation – and by mounting security concerns for right-wing candidates.

The vote for Congress matters. But the country will be watching the consultas presidenciales—three parallel primaries that function as a de facto first round. In them, Colombians vote less for programs than for trajectories: continuity, rupture, or something in between.

On the right, Paloma Valencia is poised to dominate La Gran Consulta, a coalition spanning moderate conservatives, independent liberals, and slate of well-known political leaders. Polling places her far ahead of her rivals, with margins large enough not merely to win, but to define the bloc itself. In a pre-Petro era, such a coalition might have fractured under its contradictions, but today, it coheres around one single objective: opposition to the government of Gustavo Petro and the restoration of order- political, fiscal, and territorial.

Valencia’s strength is not only electoral; it is structural. She inherits the Centro Democrático machinery and the disciplined base loyal to former two-term president Álvaro Uribe, whose legacy continues to shape Colombia’s right. But her challenge begins the moment she wins. The right is not unified—it is merely aligned. To convert alignment into victory, she will need to reach out to Abelardo de la Espriella, a pro-Bukele, pro-Milei, lawyer whose mass appeal is rooted in a more visceral, anti-left electorate. If Valencia succeeds in clinching La Gran Consulta, the right could reach May 31 not only united, but energized. If she fails, she risks replaying a familiar Colombian pattern: ideological proximity undone by personal rivalries.

With “El Tigre” de la Espriella lurking in the shadows, the right looks ascendant. Uribe Vélez now faces the daunting challenge of fusing his CD base with Espriella’s fervent Defensores de la Patria.

A Spectral Center

Claudia López is expected to win her consultation comfortably, aided as much by the absence of strong rivals as by the presence of loyal supporters. Her likely vote total- perhaps around one million—will be spun as a comeback. In reality, it reflects the residual strength of her partisan mayoralty and Bogotá-based electorate.

The absence of Sergio Fajardo from the Consulta de las Soluciones underscores the fragmentation of Colombia’s center. A strong showing by López will force a choice: seek alliances quickly or face marginalization after March 8. Even a López–Fajardo ticket would face sharp criticism from within their respective bases, and risk a repeat of the 2022 election season in which Sergio Fajardo’s campaign imploded under the weight of Petrismo or Uribismo.

On the left, the situation is more fluid – and more revealing.

The exclusion of Iván Cepeda has transformed the Frente por la Vida into a contest between two practitioners of political adaptation: Roy Barreras and Daniel Quintero. Neither represents the ideological hardline of Petrismo. Both instead offer variations of what might be called continuity without commitment – a “Petrismo 2.0” calibrated for chaise-lounge socialists.

Barreras relies on organization, his tenure as a loyal Petro “insider”, and the quiet efficiencies of Colombia’s territorial elites. Quintero counters with a direct, anti-Uribe narrative amplified through social media. Each seeks not to replace Petro, but to reinterpret him. Yet the Barreras-versus-Quintero contest feels less like a continuation of an embattled political project than an attempt for both candidates to repackage their political futures.

The most important actor on the left may be Petro himself – precisely because of his absence. By declining to endorse the consultation, he has deprived it of coherence. The result is a referendum on his government without his direct participation, and turnout that may struggle to reach even one million voters. In political terms, that is not a mobilization. It is a warning.

What emerges from these three contests is not a country coalescing, but one sorting itself into sharper, more disciplined minorities. The right is concentrated and motivated. The left is divided and improvisational. The center is present, but peripheral.

Then there is the largest bloc of all: those who will not participate. Polling suggests that a majority of Colombians will abstain from the primaries altogether. This is not apathy in the conventional sense. It reflects something more structural –  a growing distance between citizens and political mechanisms that no longer seem to mediate power so much as ratify it.

In that respect, March 8 clarifies less about who will win than about how Colombia now conducts politics. Elections no longer aggregate a national will; they stage competitions between organized intensities. Victory belongs not to the broadest coalition, but to the most cohesive one.

By Sunday night, the candidates will claim momentum. Some will have earned it. Others will have inherited it. But all will confront the same reality: the path to the presidency no longer runs through the mythical Colombian center. It runs through blocs – disciplined, polarized, and increasingly unwilling to transcend partisan loyalties for the greater good.

In Bogotá, the mountains are never out of sight. They rise abruptly along the city’s eastern edge, forming a green wall that shapes the capital’s light, weather and sense of place. For Colombian artist Marina Sánchez, the ridges that surround the Colombian capital’s cardinal points are also more intimate: a constant presence, a point of orientation and, increasingly, a subject of quiet urgency.

Her latest exhibition, Panorámicas de la Sabana, runs from 5 to 29 March inside the colonial  Museo del Chicó, where 26 acrylic-on-canvas works reinterpret the high-altitude plateau of the Sabana through a distinctly chromatic lens. Installed in the museum’s Salón Colonial, the show brings together landscape, memory and abstraction in a series that feels both personal and outward-looking.

Sánchez has long been recognized for her expressive use of colour but this body of work marks a measured shift. While her earlier practice leaned towards abstraction, here the forms are more legible—ridgelines, shifting skies, traces of vegetation – yet never fixed. Instead, they dissolve through layered pigments and gestural brushwork that privilege sensation over strict representation.

What distinguishes Sánchez’s approach becomes clear in the work itself. The Cerros are not rendered as stable topography but as shifting, atmospheric forms. Bands of diffusec green rise and fold into one another, interrupted by flashes of cobalt, ochre and lilac, while a dense, unsettled sky presses down with quiet intensity. The composition resists stillness. It moves – closer to inclement weather than landscape.

Rather than mapping terrain, Sánchez constructs it through colour. The mountains appear to breathe, their contours dissolving at the edges as if seen through mist or memory. There is no single vantage point; the eye travels across the canvas, tracing lines that feel at once familiar and unstable.

“I want to show the relevance of these giants that often go unnoticed,” Sánchez says. For Bogotá’s residents, the hills are omnipresent yet rarely examined beyond their silhouette. In her telling, they become active participants in the city’s identity – “guardians” that accompany an urban landscape marked by rapid, and at times impersonal, expansion.

The project began during the pandemic, when isolation altered both her routine and perspective. Working from home, Sánchez found herself drawn to the view outside her window: the slow fade of light across the mountains, the subtle shifts in colour at dusk.

“Being away from people – family, friends – I was left with the sky and the light of sunsets,” she says. “I wanted to replicate something I hadn’t fully appreciated and, in doing so, feel part of nature.”

Her visual language, however, is not shaped by Bogotá alone. Sánchez has exhibited in New York City and Milan – cities where she has also lived, and whose pace and structure have informed her approach to rhythm and composition. If Bogotá provides the grounding geography, New York and Milan introduce a contrasting sensibility: verticality, movement and a heightened awareness of structure.

These contrasting narratives – from urban to rural, isolation and engagement, are visible throughout Panorámicas de la Sabana. Linear gestures – suggestive of passing headlights or urban flow – cut across certain canvases, briefly suspending the stillness of the mountains. It is a restrained intervention but an effective one, hinting at the tension between expansion and preservation.

Colour, in Sánchez’s palette, is not decorative but foundational. Greens shift from luminous to dense; blues dissolve into shadow; entire forms recede into haze. The landscape is reassembled through pigment, hovering between recognition and abstraction.

She describes her work as “chromatic poetry”, a phrase that aligns with her broader intention: to create space for reflection. “I want to offer a moment of calm beyond the difficulties that surround us,” she says, “despite the inevitable conflicts, wars and inequalities.”

In Bogotá, that impulse carries particular weight. The Eastern Hills and peaks to the West are not only a visual constant but a fragile ecological system—central to water sources and biodiversity, yet increasingly under pressure from urban growth. Sánchez’s paintings do not argue this point directly; instead, they suggest it, allowing atmosphere and colour to carry meaning.

For the artist, colour remains essential. “It would be difficult for me to imagine the world in black and white,” she says. “Colour is vitality. It gives strength and solidity. It is pure magic.”

That conviction runs through the exhibition. The hills emerge not as backdrop but as presence—shifting, watchful and quietly insistent. In Sánchez’s hands, they ask to be seen again, and more carefully this time.

Panorámicas de la Sabana runs from 5 to 29 March at the Museo del Chicó (Carrera 9 No. 93-38, Bogotá). Admission is free.

Colombia’s security forces alerted late Sunday Medellín Mayor Federico Gutiérrez and Antioquia Governor Andrés Julián Rendón to cancel a planned visit to the Hidroituango hydroelectric complex for Monday, March 2, after intelligence warnings of a possible drone attack and credible terrorist threat.

The visit, which included a press conference expected to draw around 100 journalists, was intended to showcase progress at the country’s largest hydroelectric project, now reported to be 95% complete. Instead, regional officials said army security recommendations prompted an abrupt suspension after the detection of unauthorized drone activity over the area.

“The recommendation of the National Army is that the trip be postponed given the detected presence of large, unauthorized drone overflights,” the Antioquia governor’s office said in a statement, adding that the devices were believed to be operated by the 36th Front of dissident Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrilla.

Officials said the threat was not speculative. Security teams warned that an attack could materialise during the public event, raising concerns not only for the two high-profile politicians but also for members of the press corps and technical staff.

Rendón told Caracol Radio that the drones had been observed manoeuvring persistently over the precise location where the press conference was scheduled to take place. The activity coincided with a recent military operation in the nearby municipality of San Andrés de Cuerquia, where troops seized a drone, explosives, detonators, radios and military-style clothing from the same dissident group.

“All of this is highly coincidental,” Rendón said, adding that authorities were analyzing whether the overflights formed part of reconnaissance ahead of a planned attack.

Gutiérrez said armed groups were seeking to destabilize the country and disrupt key infrastructure. “These terrorist groups want to shut down the country, to generate damage,” he said, pointing to ongoing threats against Empresas Públicas de Medellín (EPM), the state-owned utility responsible for the project.

The cancelled visit had both symbolic and operational significance. In addition to reviewing construction progress and the installation of four turbines, officials were expected to outline new revenue flows generated by the project for Medellín and the wider Antioquia department.

Hidroituango has long been a flagship infrastructure initiative, though it has also faced years of engineering setbacks, financial strain and political scrutiny.

The press event has been rescheduled to take place in Medellín’s La Alpujarra administrative complex under heightened security.

The incident underscores growing concern over the rapid adoption of drones by illegal armed groups. Once limited to reconnaissance, commercially available drones modified to carry explosives are now being used in targeted attacks across conflict-prone regions of the country, including the southwest departments of Nariño, Cauca and Valle del Cauca.

According to military data, more than 400 drone-related attacks have been recorded in Colombia over the past two years, reflecting a sharp escalation in both frequency and sophistication. Analysts say such devices offer armed groups a low-cost, high-impact means of striking military, civilian and infrastructure targets while reducing direct exposure.

Recent attacks in Antioquia highlight the trend. In rural Segovia, a drone-delivered explosive killed three members of a family and displaced more than 100 households amid clashes between FARC dissidents and the Gulf Clan criminal group last week. In Ituango, the nearrest municiplity to the power-generating damn, another drone attack targeted a fuel station using improvised explosives.

On Saturday, in southern Bolívar, a military helicopter was struck in a drone attack attributed to the National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrilla, leaving 14 soldiers injured. Colombian military officials say some armed groups may have received external training in the use of drones for covert operations.

Colombia’s armed forces are moving to adapt to the emerging threat, announcing last October the creation of a specialized “Drone Battalion” aimed at strengthening aerial surveillance and counter-drone capabilities. However, security experts warn that defending against small, low-flying devices — some costing as little as US$600 — remains a significant challenge, particularly in mountainous terrain like that surrounding Hidroituango.

The alleged plot has also raised concerns about a possible shift in targeting strategy by armed groups, from rural security forces to high-profile political figures and critical infrastructure ahead of the May 31 presidential elections.

While no attack ultimately took place, authorities say the decision to cancel the visit reflects the seriousness of the threat.

For now, officials are treating the incident as a direct warning of how Colombia’s long-running conflict is evolving – increasingly shaped by technology, and capable of reaching beyond traditional conflict zones into strategic economic and political targets.

Colombia is at risk of sliding back into one of the darkest chapters of its recent history, according to a stark new report by the United Nations, which warns that escalating violence, territorial control by illegal armed groups and political instability are eroding hard-won human rights gains.

The annual assessment by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights paints a troubling picture of 2025: a country where armed actors have deepened their grip over rural regions, civilians are increasingly trapped in conflict zones, and the implementation of the 2016 peace accord is under growing strain.

At the heart of the report lies a central warning — Colombia faces the “possibility of reverting” to pre-peace agreement levels of violence, particularly in territories where the state remains weak or absent.

Armed groups expand control

Across large swathes of the country — from the Catatumbo in Norte de Santander to the Pacific coast — non-state armed groups and criminal organizations have consolidated control over vulnerable populations, imposing what the report describes as “illegal armed governance”.

The criminal groups mentioned- Clan del Golfo, ELN, FARC dissidents – are responsible for a wide range of abuses: forced displacement, confinement, selective killings, sexual violence and the recruitment of children. Entire communities, especially Indigenous and Afro-Colombian populations, are subjected to coercion and forced participation in illicit economies. “Afro-descendant communities, particularly in regions such as Chocó, continue to face severe human rights violations due to the presence and social control exercised by non-state armed groups,” claims the report.

Even in areas where a single armed group dominates and overt violence is less visible, the UN notes that civilians live under strict systems of control, with basic freedoms curtailed and fear pervasive.

The UN documented 53 verified massacres in 2025, leaving 174 victims, the vast majority attributed to armed groups fighting over control of illegal economies such as drug trafficking.

The report also highlights a disturbing increase in indiscriminate attacks, including the use of explosives and drones in populated areas. Cities such as Cali were directly affected, with civilian casualties mounting as conflict spills into urban spaces.

In one incident in the southern department of Huila, a motorcycle bomb targeting a police station killed civilians and injured dozens, underscoring the growing risks faced by ordinary Colombians.

Child Recruitment

One of the report’s most alarming findings is the worsening situation for children.

The UN verified 150 cases of child recruitment in 2025, though it warns this represents only a fraction of the true scale due to underreporting and fear of retaliation. Armed groups are increasingly using social media platforms to lure minors, glamorising violence and illegal economies.

In some cases, children recruited into armed groups were later killed during military operations, raising further concerns about protection mechanisms.

Schools have also become battlegrounds. Armed groups have occupied educational spaces, disrupted classes and used them as recruitment grounds, particularly among Indigenous communities at risk of cultural and physical extinction.

Gender-based violence

The report details systematic patterns of sexual violence, exploitation and coercion, particularly against women and girls in conflict zones.

Armed groups have imposed control over reproductive rights, restricted access to healthcare and, in some cases, forced pregnancies. Girls are often recruited through manipulation and emotional coercion, only to face abuse, forced labour and sexual violence once under the control of armed actors.

Indigenous, Afro-descendant and migrant women are disproportionately affected, facing layered vulnerabilities exacerbated by institutional absence.

Pre-Election violence

As Colombia moves through a politically sensitive period, the report identifies a sharp rise in preelectoral violence.

The killing of the right-wing presidential candidate Miguel Uribe Turbay in August 2025 marked a dramatic escalation, while the UN recorded 18 assassinations and 126 attacks or threats against political leaders and candidates.

Nearly 650 municipalities were classified as high-risk zones by Colombia’s Ombudsman, raising concerns about the integrity of democratic participation.

The report also points to a surge in digital harassment. “Violence has also extended into the digital space, with an increase in hate speech and discriminatory discourse on social media platforms.”

Humanitarian conditions have deteriorated significantly. According to UN data, mass forced displacement rose by 85% compared with 2024, driven largely by clashes between armed groups. In Catatumbo alone, nearly 90,000 people were displaced, alongside a wave of killings, kidnappings and child recruitment.

Confinement — where communities are effectively trapped by armed actors — has also increased, restricting access to food, healthcare and livelihoods, particularly in departments such as Chocó and Cauca.

Despite these challenges, the report acknowledges partial progress in implementing the 2016 Final Accord with the ex-Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrilla.

While land reform initiatives have advanced, delays in formal land titling and uneven territorial implementation continue to limit impact of the 2016 agreement. The killing of 45 former FARC combatants in 2025 — a 36% increase from the previous year — highlights ongoing security gaps in reintegration efforts. “The United Nations Verification Mission documented the continued killing of former FARC, underscoring persistent security risks despite a peace agreement.”

A recurring theme throughout the United Nations report is the insufficient presence of the state in conflict-affected regions. It warns that weak institutional reach continues to limit protection for civilians and the effective implementation of security and development policies. The report also notes that “coca cultivation rose by 3% to 262,000 hectares in 2024,” although growth has slowed for a third consecutive year, cautioning that underfunded substitution programmes risk undermining efforts to transition to legal economies.

In many cases, responses by security forces have been too slow or insufficient to prevent abuses or protect communities.

A critical moment for Colombia

The UN concludes that Colombia stands at a pivotal juncture.

Without stronger coordination, sustained investment and a renewed focus on protecting civilians, the country risks undermining nearly a decade of peacebuilding.

“The persistence of violence and the strengthening of armed groups continue to gravely affect the civilian population,” the United Nations warns — a stark signal that security conditions are deteriorating across Colombia. As the country enters a polarised election season, the report suggests the stakes are no longer confined to preserving the 2016 peace accord, but to preventing a broader erosion of state authority and civilian protections in territories most at risk.

Bogotá and the department of Cundinamarca are preparing to receive up to half a million visitors during Semana Santa 2026, as the Mayoralty unveiled an ambitious tourism campaign aimed at positioning the Colombian capital as a leading Easter destination in Latin America.

Branded “Paso a Paso, Caminando hacia la Pascua con María” (Step by Step, Walking Towards Easter with Mary), the initiative brings together the Alcaldía, departmental administration, tourism authorities and Archdiocese of Bogotá in a coordinated push to blend faith, heritage and culture into a single visitor experience.

The programme was formally launched inside the historic Catedral Primada de Bogotá with a concert of sacred music performed by the Heralds of the Gospel – Knights of the Virgin, a Catholic association known for its Latin Marian chants and global presence in more than 70 countries.

City officials say the strategy is designed not only to attract pilgrims but also to broaden Bogotá’s appeal as a cultural capital during one of the most important periods in the Christian calendar.

Ángela Garzón, Bogotá’s head of tourism, said the city expects around 500,000 visitors over the Easter season, drawn to a destination that embraces religious tolerance and offers a programme including gastronomy, concerts and free cultural events.

“Guatemala joins Bogotá and Cundinamarca in this second edition with its centuries-old tradition of floral carpets,” Garzón said, referring to one of the launch’s most striking features: a vibrant, handcrafted sawdust and flower carpet laid at the cathedral’s entrance by Guatemalan artisans.

Regional pilgrimage circuit

At the heart of the campaign are newly promoted routes designed to guide visitors through Bogotá’s historic churches and neighbourhoods.

Two principal walking circuits will anchor the experience. The first winds through La Candelaria and the colonial centre, linking some of the city’s most emblematic churches, including San Francisco, Las Nieves and San Ignacio, before culminating at the cathedral.

The second explores Chapinero, where 20th-century urban expansion meets ecclesiastical architecture, with stops at Lourdes Basilica and other parish churches that reflect Bogotá’s more modern religious identity.

The city’s tourism promotion institute, IDT, will also promote themed circuits, including a historic centre route focused on Marian devotion—particularly the Virgin of Sorrows—and pilgrimages to iconic sanctuaries such as Monserrate, which draws thousands of pilgrims each year.

Further south, visitors are encouraged to explore the Basilica of the Divine Child in Bogotá’s 20 de Julio district, reflecting the diversity of popular religious practices across the city.

The presence of Guatemalan artisans at the launch underscored the campaign’s international dimension. Their intricate carpet – crafted using Colombian flowers – symbolizes shared religious traditions and cultural exchange across Latin America.

Guatemala’s Ambassador to Colombia, Óscar Villagrán, described the installation as an expression of “community construction” and noted that the tradition was recognised by the United Nations in 2022 as part of humanity’s intangible cultural heritage.

The campaign also places strong emphasis on the figure of the Virgin Mary, particularly the Virgin of Sorrows, whose symbolism of suffering, resilience and hope resonates deeply with Catholics across the hemisphere.

Brother Gabriel Escobar of the Heralds of the Gospel framed Semana Santa as a moment of unity. “It is a time for reflection and sharing… a message of fraternity, charity and hope with faith,” he said during the launch event.

Beyond religion: gastronomy and nature trails

While religious observance remains central to the agenda, the IDT is keen to present Bogotá as a multi-layered destination, with a programme that includes Easter-themed food circuits, sacred music concerts and art exhibitions.

Outdoor activities also feature prominently, with hiking and cycling routes linking religious landmarks, alongside ecotourism excursions to the high-altitude wetlands of Chingaza and Sumapaz.

Authorities are also highlighting the city’s religious diversity, from well-known Catholic sites to other places of worship, such as the Bogotá Temple of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and local mosques.

This broader framing aligns with Bogotá’s evolving image as a destination where spirituality intersects with architecture, history and intercultural dialogue.

The joint Bogotá–Cundinamarca strategy is also an economic play, aimed at boosting local businesses during a peak tourism window while reinforcing regional identity.

Constanza Solórzano, head of Cundinamarca’s tourism institute, said the initiative strengthens ties between the city and its surrounding region through shared traditions and gastronomic alternatives.

By packaging Semana Santa as both a devotional journey and a cultural experience, Bogotá has positioned itself as a well-connected regional hub, inviting visitors to experience not only a place of celebration, but also a landscape of memory, faith and encounter—where centuries-old rituals unfold against the backdrop of a modern, diverse capital.

As Garzón put it, Bogotá during Semana Santa offers “a meaningful experience for residents and visitors alike”—one that moves, step by step, between the sacred and everyday rituals.

As Latin American companies confront slowing growth, talent churn and the demands of hybrid work, leadership effectiveness is being redefined. Strategy and charisma are no longer enough. Increasingly, performance hinges on something less visible: the assumptions leaders and employees hold about one another.

New doctoral research by Dr. Candice Fast suggests those hidden beliefs – often unconscious – can measurably shape engagement, productivity and service outcomes. Her study, Exploring Implicit Belief Alignment in Leaders and Followers, argues that leadership success depends not only on decision-making and execution, but on the mental models quietly governing workplace interactions.

The findings are particularly relevant for Colombia’s corporate sector, where hierarchical traditions often coexist with modern performance management systems.

After surveying 203 participants across North America, Dr.Fast applied validated psychological instruments and statistical modelling to examine how implicit beliefs influence workplace structures. The results indicate that misaligned assumptions between leaders and employees can account for up to 5% of passive behaviour within organizations. In financial terms, this margin is significant.

Why the 5% effect matters

In large corporations, even a 5% increase in engagement can translate into millions of dollars in productivity gains, improved customer satisfaction and lower operational friction. Applied studies cited alongside the research show that teams fostering collaborative belief structures recorded 5% to 10% higher engagement levels and measurable reductions in turnover costs.

For Latin American enterprises – where employee disengagement and retention are endemic challenges – such increments can determine whether performance targets are met or missed.

One of Dr.Fast’s more striking findings is that positive perceptions alone do not guarantee proactive performance. Companies must move beyond the catch phrasing of “positive thinking.” Leaders who unconsciously associate teams with traits such as conformity or passivity may inadvertently reinforce those behaviours, regardless of stated values.

In other words, culture is not shaped solely by policies or incentive systems, but by cognitive framing.

This has implications for multinational corporations operating across the region. Cultural and national variables were shown to influence how expectations are formed and interpreted within teams. In cross-border environments – from Bogotá to São Paulo to Mexico City – misalignment can quietly erode efficiency and collaboration.

As Latin American firms expand internationally and global groups deepen their regional footprint, leadership models that account for cognitive alignment may become a differentiating factor.

Unlike much academic work, Fast’s framework is designed for operational use. It emphasises structured self-assessment to surface subconscious assumptions, the use of 360-degree feedback to identify perception gaps, and the comparison of belief patterns with engagement data. It also encourages organisations to reframe limiting narratives through facilitated dialogue and to embed cognitive flexibility into leadership development programmes.

These tools align with a broader professionalisation of management practices across Latin America, where firms are increasingly adopting analytics-driven approaches to human capital strategy.

Fast’s corporate experience includes more than a decade at The Walt Disney Company, a global operator known for embedding service standards and behavioural alignment into its operational model. The relevance of belief alignment is evident in complex organizations where consistency, collaboration and innovation must scale across thousands of employees.

As an industry insider, Ursafe has publicly endorsed the groundbreaking research, describing it as a practical roadmap for measurable performance improvement. But the broader significance lies more in timing than endorsement. “The clarity it brings to the dynamics between leaders and employees makes it a benchmark for modern organizational development.”

Latin American businesses are navigating inflationary pressures, digital transformation and generational shifts in workplace expectations. In this environment, marginal gains in engagement and trust can compound quickly.

The study’s conclusion is clear: leadership success is not determined solely by strategic vision or authority, but by the invisible assumptions shaping daily interactions between managers and teams.

For companies willing to measure and recalibrate those assumptions, belief alignment may prove to be more than a theoretical construct. It may become a competitive lever – one capable of turning subtle cognitive shifts into tangible financial results.

In a hemisphere where growth increasingly depends on talent retention, innovation and cross-cultural agility, Dr.Candice Fast’s vision of leadership is grounded less on what organizations do — and more on how they think. “Beliefs, though invisible, are among the most powerful tools leaders possess,”  highlighted the data researcher.

Thousands of miles from Bogotá, in the frozen trench lines of eastern Ukraine, Colombian accents have become a familiar sound of war.

Between 1,000 and 2,000 Colombian nationals are currently serving in the ranks of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, according to recent investigations, while as many as 7,000 have passed through the country’s defence forces since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022. Their presence has turned Colombia into the single largest source of foreign fighters in Ukraine’s war effort – and estimated 25% – and an unexpected human bridge between two distant conflicts.

What might once have been dismissed as a story of mercenaries and combat-tested veterans has evolved into something far more complex: a shadowy window into the globalization of military labor.

Many of those arriving in Ukraine have witnessed close-hand Colombia’s internal conflict, which for more than six decades has forged one of Latin America’s most experienced armed orces. Trained in counterinsurgency, reconnaissance and irregular warfare, Colombian fighters bring a skillset that has proven adaptable to the grinding, attritional combat of the Donbas.

Ukrainian commanders have taken notice. In some units, Colombians have made up a majority of infantry personnel, valued for their endurance and battlefield discipline. Their roles range from trench warfare to fortification building and increasingly to drone operations, a defining feature of the war.

Yet their journey to the frontlines is rarely driven by ideology.

A steady stream of Colombian soldiers leaves active service each year, often in their late 30s or early 40s. While formal reintegration programmes exist, many veterans struggle to transition into civilian life. Salaries drop sharply after retirement, and the domestic private security sector is saturated. For some, Ukraine offers an economic lifeline.

Combat pay of between US$3,000 and US$5,000 a month – several times the average Colombian wage – is supplemented by signing bonuses and compensation packages for families in the event of death. The contrast is stark enough to turn war into a viable, if perilous, form of employment.

“Colombians understand the risks … yet they still come,” one Ukrainian officer involved in recruitment told local media.

The legal and political framing of these fighters remains contested. In December 2025, the Colombian Congress ratified the United Nations convention against mercenaries, a move backed by the leftist government of President Gustavo Petro.

Under the Convention’s definition, however, most Colombians serving in Ukraine are not considered mercenaries. They are formally integrated into Ukraine’s military structures, receive equal pay to local troops and operate under state command rather than private contracts.

Even so, President Petro has cast the phenomenon as a form of exploitation, warning of the risks faced by citizens drawn into distant war, including the conflict in south Sudan.

Those causes are visible not only in Colombia’s labor market but also in Ukraine’s evolving military structure. As the war has dragged on, Kyiv has reorganized its foreign units, integrating international volunteers into larger brigades to improve coordination and access to heavy weaponry. The shift has further embedded foreign fighters – Colombians among them – into the core of Ukraine’s defensive operations.

The human cost of this integration has been steep. Estimates from the Atlantic Council claim that between 300 and 550 Colombians have been killed in Ukraine since 2022, making them the foreign nationality with the highest number of combat deaths. In Kyiv, Colombian flags now appear among the growing patchwork of memorials to fallen soldiers – a quiet testament to the war’s global reach.

Despite the losses, recruitment has continued. Military analysts say the phenomenon reflects deeper structural failures. Colombia’s decades-long conflict produced a large pool of highly trained personnel, but the transition to civilian life has lagged behind. Skills honed in war have limited application in the formal economy, leaving many veterans in a precarious position.

This dynamic has fed what some researchers describe as a transnational market for military labor, operating in the grey zones of international law. Fighters move between conflicts not necessarily out of allegiance, but out of necessity – carrying their expertise with them.

The implications extend beyond Ukraine. Security analysts warn that the eventual return of battle-hardened veterans, particularly those trained in emerging technologies such as drone warfare, could pose risks if criminal organizations seek to absorb their skills.

For now, however, the flow continues in one direction.

On a recent winter evening in Kyiv, a Colombian veteran reflected on the reality behind the headlines. “Tell Colombians not to come,” he said quietly. “More die than return.”

It is a warning that captures the paradox at the heart of this story: a war that is both distant and deeply connected, drawing in those for whom the frontlines are not just a cause, but a last resort.

In that sense, the presence of Colombians in Ukraine is not an anomaly. It is a signal – of how modern conflicts intersect, and of how the consequences of one war can echo, years later, in another.

The Colombian government temporarily closed last week PNN Tayrona National Natural Park following threats against park staff and escalating violence between rival armed groups fighting for control of drug trafficking corridors along the Caribbean coast.

The shutdown, announced on Feb. 17 by Parques Nacionales Naturales de Colombia, was described as a preventive measure to protect visitors, local communities and officials.

“The National Government announced the temporary closure of PNN Tayrona as a preventive measure to protect the lives and safety of visitors, communities, and officials, and to ensure their security,” the agency said in a statement.

Tayrona, located near the city of Santa Marta in the foothills of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, is one of Colombia’s most visited protected areas, drawing as many as 750,000 visitors annually. Known for its white-sand beaches and dense tropical forest, the park is a pillar of the tourism economy in the Magdalena department.

The closure comes amid an intensifying turf war between the Conquering Self-Defense Forces of the Sierra Nevada (ACSN) and the Gaitanist Army of Colombia (EGC), better known as the Clan del Golfo, a criminal organization designated as a terrorist group by the United States.

Authorities say the immediate trigger for the crisis was a Feb. 11 operation to dismantle unauthorized constructions within the protected area, including houses, bathrooms and hiking trails built without state permission.

According to the parks agency, the demolitions prompted threats on social media directed at park personnel. Tensions escalated on Feb. 16 when local residents blocked employees from entering the park. Officials said individuals then began charging tourists for access and allowing entry without formal registration, effectively taking over certain administrative functions.

“This created a situation that prevents a minimum level of security from being ensured within the protected area,” authorities said.

While the government has not formally attributed responsibility for the threats, the timing of the closure has drawn attention to the deteriorating security environment in northern Colombia. Recent confrontations between the Clan del Golfo and the ACSN in nearby municipalities, including Aracataca, have led to forced displacements and heightened fears about the stability of the region.

Colombia’s Ombudsman’s Office has previously warned of the presence of both groups in and around Tayrona, citing risks ranging from extortion to sexual violence. The violence, analysts say, reflects a broader struggle for control over strategic drug trafficking corridors extending into the departments of Cesar and La Guajira.

Yet the official narrative has been complicated by contrasting statements from government negotiators engaged in talks with the ACSN.

Mauricio Silva, the government’s chief negotiator in a socio-legal dialogue with the ACSN, said the decision to close the park was driven largely by climatic and preventive considerations. While acknowledging the existence of security risks and territorial control by armed groups in parts of the Sierra Nevada, Silva said it would be inappropriate to assign criminal responsibility without completed judicial investigations.

“One thing is to recognize the delicate security situation in the territory, and another is to point to specific perpetrators without proof,” Silva said, underscoring the government’s cautious position amid ongoing negotiations.

Local tourism operators have also questioned the link between the closure and the armed conflict. Some community leaders argue that the dispute stems in part from longstanding grievances over how ticket revenues are managed. They contend that funds collected by the central government are not sufficiently reinvested in infrastructure and local development within the park and surrounding communities.

The crisis has exposed deeper tensions over who exercises effective authority in one of Colombia’s most emblematic tourist destinations. Indigenous communities, national authorities and armed groups all operate in the broader Sierra Nevada region, where state presence has historically been uneven.

Although tourists in Tayrona have generally been insulated from direct violence — with armed groups preferring to profit indirectly through extortion, drug trafficking and prostitution — the park’s closure has raised concerns that the conflict could increasingly disrupt legitimate economic activity.

For the department of Magdalena, where tourism  depends on Tayrona as key source of revenue, the shutdown represents both a security and economic setback. Hotel operators and tour agencies in Santa Marta have reported cancellations since the announcement, though officials have not provided a timeline for reopening.

The government has said the closure will remain in effect until minimum security conditions can be guaranteed. Meanwhile, the dispute underscores the fragile balance between conservation, tourism and public saefty in a region where armed actors continue to expand their territorial control.

Protest and military action raised the prospect of regime change in Iran and Venezuela, and the voices of both countries’ diasporas were heard loud and clear through the media of their host nations.

Venezuelan exiles in the U.S. were, according to the popular narrative, broadly behind President Donald Trump and his plan to “run Venezuela,” as the nickname “MAGAzuelans” suggests. Meanwhile, the Iranian diaspora rallied behind Prince Reza Pahlavi as he positioned himself as a leader-in-waiting, projecting an image of unified exile support.

Diasporas are often treated by media and policymakers as monolithic blocs — politically unified, ideologically coherent and ready to be mobilized for regime change. But as a scholar of migration and security in Latin America, I know this assumption misunderstands how diaspora communities form, evolve and engage politically.

Iranian and Venezuelan émigrés might broadly oppose their current governments — having left them, this is unsurprising. But they are far from unified on what should replace those governments, who should lead or how change should come about.

Migration waves shape politics

Diasporas are not uniform because their constituent populations did not arrive all at once, from the same places or for the same reasons. Each migration wave carries distinct political orientations shaped by the circumstances of departure.

The tendency of diasporas to become politically frozen at the moment of departure appears across contexts. El Salvador’s diaspora in the United States, which first left during the 1980s civil war, developed a reputation for being “stuck in the ’80s” — mentally still fighting battles that had long since ended at home.

This temporal displacement has consequences. Iranian-American sociologist Asef Bayat, writing about the Iranian diaspora, argues that exile opposition to the ruling government back home “suffers from a political disease, positioning itself against the movement it claims to support.”

In other words, diaspora activists may advocate positions that resonate with Western audiences but find little support among those actually living under authoritarian rule. This lack of accountability to political consequences back home can rankle the constituencies on whose behalf they seek to advocate.

Research on the Venezuelan diaspora reflects similar dynamics. A 2022 study found that Venezuelan exiles hold more extreme anti-government views than those who remained.

Despite this presumed disconnection, homeland politicians often devote disproportionate attention to those who have left. The logic is simple: emigrants send money home — accounting for as much as 25% of gross domestic product in some Central American and Caribbean countries. Politicians assume that this financial power translates into political influence over remittance-receiving relatives.

One party official in El Salvador told me: “If we get one Salvadoran in Washington to support us, that gives us five votes in El Salvador — and it doesn’t even matter if the one in Washington votes.”

My own research tested this assumption using polling and voting data across Latin America and found it to be exaggerated. Remittances and family communication mostly reinforce existing partisan sympathies rather than swing votes.

But the belief in diaspora influence matters politically — and diaspora voters can be weaponized by authoritarian leaders. El Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele, in his successful and plainly unconstitutional 2024 reelection bid, expanded external voting through online balloting, increasing diaspora votes by 87-fold over the previous election.

Diasporas can influence home-country politics through several channels: direct voting, financial support for opposition movements, lobbying host governments and transmitting democratic values through what sociologist Peggy Levitt calls “social remittances.” Other research has found that remittances can undermine dictatorships by helping fund opposition activities.

Yet authoritarian governments have developed sophisticated countermeasures. Freedom House recorded more than 1,200 incidents of physical transnational repression against dissidents — including assassinations, abductions and unlawful deportation — between 2014 and 2024 involving 48 governments.

The limits of exile politics

For Venezuela and Iran, these lessons counsel caution. Nearly 8 million Venezuelans have fled their homeland — the largest displacement crisis in the Western Hemisphere. Iranian emigration accelerated after the 2022 protests.

Both diasporas contain passionate activists, wealthy donors and would-be leaders positioning themselves for future rule. But passion does not equal unity, and visibility does not equal representation.

The loudest voices on social media — or those amplified by U.S. officials and media — may represent narrow slices of diverse communities. There may be consensus on opposing the government back home, but far less agreement on what should be done or how change should occur.

Nor does diaspora opposition necessarily translate into regime vulnerability. Authoritarian states have learned to insulate themselves from diaspora pressure while simultaneously using emigration as a safety valve, turning potential dissidents into remittance-senders.

Diasporas can contribute to democratic change through funding, advocacy and the transmission of democratic values. But ultimately, the path to democratic change in Venezuela, Iran and elsewhere will be determined by those who remain, not those who left. Diasporas can support that struggle; they cannot substitute for it.

About the author: Michael Paarlberg is Associate Professor of Political Science at Virginia Commonwealth University.

This article is reproduced from The Conversation under a Creative Commons licence.

Singapore has never been shy about scale. But this season, the city’s appetite for monumentality takes on a distinctly Latin American accent. For the first time, the work of Colombian master Fernando Botero makes his Singapore debut with the largest exhibition of his work ever showcased in Asia.

Spanning galleries, inter-active theatres and extensive public gardens, the landmark show presents more than 130 works, positioning the city-state as a hub for global Botero immersion. As the largest presentation of the Medellín-born artist (1932-2023), and timed to coincide with Singapore Art Week, Botero in Singapore unfolds across gallery walls, immersive media spaces and public gardens.

“My father loved Singapore,” remarked the artist’s son Fernando Botero Zea to The Strait Times, highligting that with this retrospective, the country now “has the highest concentration of Botero per capita”.

At the heart of the programme is Heart of Volume, a major gallery exhibition at IMBA Theatre, presenting more than 100 works drawn directly from the Botero family collection. Spanning seven decades, the exhibition traces the evolution of what the artist famously described not as exaggeration, but as “volume”: a formal strategy that lends weight, humour and authority to everyday scenes, portraits, still lifes and reimagined art-historical references.

Seen up close, the discipline behind Botero’s apparent abundance becomes clear. Small watercolours and intimate studies reveal a careful calibration of colour and balance, while larger canvases demonstrate his lifelong dialogue with European painting traditions—from Renaissance composition to modernist distortion—filtered through a distinctly Colombian sensibility. The effect is quietly didactic without ever feeling academic, a curatorial tone well suited to Singapore’s measured cultural landscape.

If Heart of Volume offers intimacy, Garden Grandeur delivers spectacle. Extending across the Silver Garden at Gardens by the Bay, ten monumental bronze sculptures bring Botero’s work into the rhythm of daily life. A towering Horse—more than three meters tall and weighing three tonnes – anchors the display, joined by familiar figures such as Adam and Eve, The Dancers and Woman on Horse. Installed against a backdrop of tropical greenery and glass conservatories, the sculptures feel less like foreign imports and more like temporary citizens of the city.

This democratic impulse was central to Botero’s thinking. As his son, Fernando Botero Zea, noted at the opening, the artist believed that public art should be touched, photographed and shared—an ethos that fits neatly with Singapore’s highly social public spaces. Here, Botero’s bronzes become meeting points and landmarks, their generous forms softening the city’s precision with a dose of playfulness.

The exhibition also introduces Life in Fullness, the world’s first immersive Botero experience: a 45-minute audiovisual journey narrated by his son, combining archival footage, animation and storytelling. It is a humanizing counterpoint to the grand scale elsewhere, framing Botero as father, provocateur and craftsman—an artist whose work often invites smiles, but is underpinned by a serious engagement with power, politics and art history.

Beyond the artworks themselves, Botero in Singapore signals a broader shift. Latin American artists have long been underrepresented in Southeast Asia’s major exhibition circuits, despite Singapore’s ambition to position itself as a global cultural hub. This collaboration—between IMBA, the Fernando Botero Foundation, and Colombia’s diplomatic mission—suggests a growing appetite for narratives that extend beyond the usual Euro-American axis.

There is also a certain symmetry at play. Botero’s art, with its emphasis on presence rather than speed, arrives in a city known for efficiency and control. His figures occupy space unapologetically; they slow the viewer down. In Singapore’s gardens and galleries, that insistence on taking up room feels less like excess and more like quiet persuasion.

As Singapore Art Week draws international collectors, curators and critics to one of the most affluent cities in Asia, Botero’s debut is both timely and long-overdue. It is not a retrospective weighed down by reverence, but a confident, outward-looking presentation that invites the public in – free of charge in the Gardens, and without intimidation indoors.

Botero’s Singapore moment is less about spectacle than about accessibility. His volumes, for all their heft, carry a lightness of spirit, and a persuasive contribution that art should always coexist alongside everyday life.

Colombian President Gustavo Petro on Sunday mounted a forceful defence of his government’s 23.7% minimum wage increase for 2026, pledging to issue a temporary decree to keep the so-called “vital wage” in place after the Council of State provisionally suspended the original measure.

Speaking in a televised address on Feb. 15, Petro said that while he disagreed with the high court’s decision, he would respect the judicial process and comply by issuing a transitory administrative decree, pending a final ruling.

“The vital wage will remain in place until the new decree is issued,” Petro said, rejecting claims that the increase had triggered inflation or job losses and insisting that workers’ purchasing power must not be subordinated to shifting economic variables.

The Council of State questioned the technical justification and procedural basis of the December decree that lifted the monthly minimum wage to 1.75 million pesos ($470) – close to 2 million pesos including transport subsidies – forcing the government to revisit the measure barely six weeks after it took effect on Jan. 1.

Rather than retreating, Petro escalated the confrontation, calling for nationwide demonstrations on Feb. 19 to defend what he described as a historic social gain for Colombian workers.

“We’ll see each other in all public squares across Colombia,” the president wrote on social media, framing the dispute as a struggle over dignity and constitutional labour rights rather than a technical wage-setting debate.

Petro anchored his argument in Constitutional Court ruling C-815 of 1999, which he said obliges governments to consider not only inflation and productivity but — “with prevailing character” – the constitutional mandate to guarantee a minimum, vital and mobile wage.

Even higher wage not ruled out

In a move that further unsettled markets and business groups, the government signalled that the revised decree could maintain – or even exceed – the original 23.7% increase.

Labour Minister Antonio Sanguino said on Monday that “nothing is ruled out” as the government reconvenes the Permanent Commission on Wage and Labour Policy, bringing unions and employers back to the negotiating table.

The president himself suggested that a true “vital wage” should be closer to 2.15 million pesos, well above the current level.

Sanguino said the commission would review updated economic indicators from the national statistics agency DANE and the finance ministry, including inflation data for early 2026 and labour market trends from 2025.

Inflation and employment debate intensifies

Petro dismissed warnings that the wage hike could fuel inflation or unemployment, arguing that recent data contradict those claims. In a post on “X”, he said that even with Central Bank’s inflation forecasts near 6.4%, wage growth would remain strong and support domestic production and productivity. “It would be a national stupidity to lower the vital wage,”added  Petro, affirming also that the country’s first leftist administration would still listen to business leaders.

Economists and employers, however, remain sceptical. Financial analysts claim the suspension highlights institutional concerns over policy predictability, and fear the standoff could undermine investor confidence at a time when Colombia is grappling with deep fiscal debt and high labour informality.

The wage dispute has sharpened tensions between Colombia’s Executive, judiciary and private sector, just three months before first-round presidential elections in May 31.

The outcome of the Council of State’s final ruling – and whether the Executive succeeds in forging a late compromise with employers — will shape not only labour costs in 2026 but also a broader debate over economic governance and the autonomy of the Banco de la República.

For now, the minimum wage remains in legal limbo — enforced by decree, contested in court, and to be defended by his political base this week on the street.

International airlines are rapidly re-establishing services to Venezuela, signalling a cautious but commercially significant reopening of the country’s aviation market. On Thursday, February 12, Colombia’s Avianca resumed a daily direct flights between Bogotá and Caracas.

The move restores one of the most important air corridors in northern South America and comes amid a flurry of announcements from carriers across Europe, the Americas and the Middle East seeking to regain access to a market that has been largely closed since 2019.

The flagship carrier claims that this key route was restored after a “comprehensive evaluation of operational conditions and aviation safety,” carried out in coordination with Colombian and Venezuelan authorities.

Avianca’s daily round trip flight will operate with an A320 aircraft, departing Bogotá (AV142) at 07:40 a.m. and returning from Caracas (AV143) at 12:10 p.m.

The resumption reflects the strong commercial ties between Colombia and Venezuela, as well as growing confidence among airlines that operational, regulatory and security conditions now allow for a gradual return.

For Avianca, which has operated in Venezuela for more than 60 years, the route carries both symbolic and strategic weight. The carrier said the service would strengthen regional connectivity and support trade, tourism and business travel between the two countries, which share deep economic and social ties disrupted during years of political confrontation and border closures.

Avianca’s return is part of a broader recalibration by the global aviation industry following Venezuela’s political transition and the end of Nicolás Maduro’s rule. Airlines had largely withdrawn from the country after the suspension of international flights, currency controls, safety concerns and U.S. sanctions made operations increasingly unviable.

Now, with demand for travel surging among Venezuela’s large diaspora and regional business community, carriers are moving quickly to reclaim market share — albeit cautiously, with a close eye on regulatory approvals and security assessments.

In January, American Airlines said it was ready to resume daily service to Venezuela, positioning itself as the first U.S. carrier to formally announce plans to return after nearly seven years. The airline said flights would remain subject to U.S. government approval and security evaluations, and has not yet announced a launch date.

“We have a more than 30-year history connecting Venezuelans to the U.S., and we are ready to renew that relationship,” said Nat Pieper, American’s chief commercial officer, underscoring the airline’s focus on family reunification, business travel and trade.

Before suspending operations in 2019, American was the largest U.S. airline serving Venezuela, having entered the market in 1987. The carrier said it remains in close contact with federal authorities and is working with regulators, unions and internal teams to ensure a compliant return.

While direct U.S.–Venezuela flights remain pending, regional alternatives are already expanding. Panama-based Copa Airlines has enabled ticket sales since late January allowing passengers to travel between Caracas and Miami via Panama under a single reservation, restoring a key transit option for Venezuelan travellers.

European and Latin American airlines have moved faster, with firm restart dates announced over the next six weeks. Spain’s Air Europa will resume Madrid–Caracas flights on February 17, followed by Laser Airlines the next day. LATAM Airlines plans to restart flights from Bogotá on February 23, while Colombian low-cost carrier Wingo will relaunch Medellín–Caracas services on March 1.

Further afield, Turkish Airlines will begin flights between Istanbul and Caracas on March 3, marking the return of a long-haul intercontinental connection. Spain’s low-cost Plus Ultra will also start services that same day, while Brazil’s GOL plans to resume flights from São Paulo on March 8.

TAP Portugal is scheduled to restore Lisbon–Caracas flights by the end of March.

The pace of announcements reflects both pent-up demand and a race among carriers to secure early-mover advantage in a market that, while still fragile, offers long-term potential. Venezuela’s population of more than 28 million, combined with millions of citizens living abroad, represents a sizeable base for leisure, family and humanitarian travel.

Yet challenges remain. Airlines face currency risks, infrastructure constraints and the possibility of renewed political or regulatory instability. Industry executives say most carriers are returning with limited capacity and flexible schedules, allowing them to scale operations up or down as conditions evolve.

For now, the reopening of Venezuela’s airspace is being driven less by optimism than by calculated risk-taking. Airlines are betting that gradual political normalization and the easing of restrictions will allow them to rebuild routes profitably — without repeating the costly exits of the past decade.

Avianca’s daily Bogotá–Caracas service may therefore serve as an early test case. If demand proves resilient and operations remain stable, more capacity is likely to follow. If not, airlines may once again find themselves navigating turbulence in one of Latin America’s most complex markets.

Still, after years of near-total isolation, Venezuela’s reappearance on international departure boards marks a turning point — one that global airlines are keen not to miss

Colombia’s goldenberry symbolized the country’s push into high-value fruit exports. Now, it faces a turf war at home from a fruit with far greater global recognition: the blueberry. While blueberry cultivation has expanded rapidly across Colombia over the past decade, producers say the industry remains far from becoming a fully fledged export powerhouse.

Colombia currently has close to 1,000 hectares planted with blueberries, concentrated mainly in the Andean departments of Boyacá and Cundinamarca, which together account for almost the entire cultivated area. Smaller projects are emerging in Antioquia and other regions, bringing national production to an estimated 20,000 tonnes a year.

That marks a dramatic rise from just 40 hectares planted a decade ago. In the past two years alone, between 150 and 200 additional hectares have been planted, reflecting growing interest from investors and farmers seeking alternatives to traditional crops.

Yet despite this momentum, industry leaders warn that Colombia’s blueberry sector still lacks the scale, investment and coordination needed to compete seriously in international markets.

“Blueberries are one of the fastest-growing fruit crops in Colombia, but we are still very far from consolidating a true export agroindustry,” said Camilo Lozano, vice-president of Asocolblue, the national blueberry growers’ association, in an interview with La República.

Lozano argues that Colombia’s potential far exceeds its current footprint. “The country could easily reach 5,000, 6,000 or even 10,000 hectares,” he said. “But that won’t happen overnight. We need more investment, greater scale and the entry of larger producers.”

Peru offers a stark comparison. In 2012, Peruvian blueberry exports were worth just US$400,000. Today, they exceed US$3 billion, supported by more than 22,000 hectares of plantations. Colombia, Lozano notes, shares many of the same advantages that fuelled Peru’s rise: favourable soils, competitive labour costs, efficient logistics and the ability to produce year-round.

“These are the same conditions that made Colombia the world’s leading exporter of cut flowers,” he said.

Blueberries are particularly attractive because they are already deeply embedded in global consumer markets. In North America and Europe, they are a staple product, unlike many tropical fruits that require costly marketing campaigns to build demand.

“In the United States and Canada, consumers already know blueberries,” Lozano said. “You don’t have to explain what they are or how to eat them.”

At present, around 90 per cent of Colombia’s Arandano exports are destined for the United States, with Europe a distant second. Asia remains largely out of reach due to phytosanitary barriers and long shipping times, which can exceed 30 days by sea.

Even in established markets, Colombia struggles to meet minimum volume requirements. International buyers often request several containers per week, but domestic supply remains too fragmented to deliver consistently.

“Today, we get clients asking for five containers a week, and we can’t even fill one,” Lozano admitted. “Only two companies export blueberries by sea on a regular basis.”

The domestic market, however, tells a different story. According to industry estimates, formal blueberry sales in Colombia exceed 200 billion pesos (about US$50 million) annually. Imports — mainly from Peru and Chile — add another 50 billion pesos, highlighting the gap between local demand and national production.

That imbalance underscores both the opportunity and the challenge facing Colombian growers. While consumption is rising, domestic supply remains insufficient, and many producers lack the technical expertise and capital required to expand efficiently.

Asocolblue, which brings together 28 producers, has repeatedly warned that blueberries are not a crop for improvisation. Establishing a commercial plantation requires high upfront investment, technical knowledge, strict quality standards and long-term planning.

“This is not traditional agriculture,” Lozano said. “It’s an agro-industrial business.”

The association operates technical, export and marketing committees aimed at professionalising the sector and ensuring that growth does not come at the expense of productivity or sustainability.

For farmers who succeed, the rewards can be significant. Blueberries offer relatively stable international prices and allow producers to integrate into global supply chains, generating employment, foreign exchange and long-term income. “It allows the producer to make a qualitative leap — from farmer to agro-industrialist,” Lozano said. “It’s essentially an agricultural factory.”

For now, Colombia’s farmers across the Altiplanto Boyacense are enjoying their blueberry boom, but the story is more one of promise than parity with terrirorial rivals, such the uchuva and feijoa. Whether it can replicate the success of its flower industry — or Peru’s meteoric rise — will depend on how quickly investment, scale and coordination catch up with ambition.