Colombia will head to the polls this year to elect the country’s next president and members of Congress. A report released this week by the Ombudsman’s Office found that the government is failing to implement over half of the watchdog’s recommendations to ensure safe and fair elections. 

On Monday, the office released a follow-up report to its October 2025 Electoral Early Warning (ATE 013-25), saying that around 42% of recommendations for safeguarding elections were being implemented.

Last June, the country made international headlines when pre-presidential candidate Miguel Uribe Turbay was shot in the head while holding a rally in Bogotá’s Modelia neighborhood. He would succumb to his injuries two months later. 

Since then, Ombudsman Iris Marín Ortiz’s office has registered 457 cases of death threats against social leaders, human rights defenders, and political actors in the pre-election period, which officially began in January 2025 when President Gustavo Petro convened his cabinet to decide which members would step down to run for elected office in 2026.

The report noted that candidates face ongoing risks, from constraints on campaigning in armed group–controlled areas to stigmatization, threats, and even homicide.

“The risk is not that the elections will be canceled,” said Marín, but rather that un-safeguarded elections could ignore the “forced silence of communities in the face of the governance of armed groups in some regions of the country.”

The Ombudsman’s report categorized municipalities into five risk levels from lowest to highest intensity of identified violence, in order to guide authorities on security, protection, and the safeguarding of political rights.

Two hundred fifty-seven were classified at Ordinary Action Level, 216 at Permanent Monitoring Level, 425 at Priority Action Level, 162 at Urgent Action Level, and 62 at Immediate Action Level — the most critical stage. In the follow-up Report, although the number of municipalities at Permanent Monitoring Level decreased (195), there was an increase in municipalities that required Priority Action (433), Urgent Action (168), and Immediate Action (69).

Political violence has continued in the period since Uribe Turbay’s death. Earlier in February, Senator Jairo Castellanos’s armored vehicle was attacked at an ELN rebel checkpoint in the northeastern Arauca department, killing two of his bodyguards. A few days later, Indigenous Senator Aida Quilcué was temporarily kidnapped in an area of western Cauca where FARC dissidents are active.

Upon reviewing the Government’s response, the highest rate of implementation for the 11 recommendations is 65% and the lowest is 0%. Strengthening and support for political organizations was the least advanced recommendation, followed by inter-institutional coordination and joint action for rapid response.

According to the Report’s conclusions, insufficient implementation of ATE 013-25 led to weak institutional coordination, allowed illegal armed groups to maintain control, jeopardized victims’ political participation in Special Transitional Peace Electoral Districts (CITREP), and perpetuated impunity through ineffective justice mechanisms.

The Ombudsman issued six new recommendations and reinforced the previous ones, urging the Ministry of the Interior to lead the Intersectoral Commission for Rapid Response to Early Warnings (CIPRAT), align action plans, ensure measurable budgets, and eliminate overlapping measures that cause operational gaps.

On March 8, Colombians will head to the polls for legislative elections where they’ll vote for representatives to the national congress, senate as well as primary elections where political parties will choose presidential candidates to represent them in the first round of presidential voting on May 31.

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Colombia is off to the polls in a little under a month, but what’s at stake and what could happen? And why can’t you have a drink while watching results roll in?

Every Colombian over the age of majority (18) and with a correctly registered cédula ciudandanía can vote. In return, each voter gets a half day off work. Non-citizens are not eligible to vote in national elections, but holders of resident visas will be able to vote in next year’s local elections.

The polls are open from 8am until 4pm and counting is usually very fast with the first results coming in just an hour or so later. Due to the PR system (see below), final results come through in the week. 

Land and fluvial borders will be closed for Colombian nationals on the day of the election, although foreigners can cross. From the Saturday afternoon before voting until the Monday morning, ley seca will apply, meaning no alcohol sales in bars, restaurants or shops. That applies for everyone, so no representation or boozing.

Oversight is carried out by the CNE (Consejo Nacional Electoral). In order to do this over the vast territory and number of stations, over 800,000 citizens are selected to be vote-counters. This is similar to jury duty in other countries and is compensated with a day off as well as a compulsory day of training a couple of weeks beforehand.

As the electorate is growing, there are now some 13,000 voting sites across the country, most with multiple voting tables. Colombians have to vote where their cédula is registered, so don’t be surprised to see some people trekking to other cities if they forgot to update their registration.

Some parties run a closed list system, meaning you simply vote for them, whereas others have open lists, meaning you vote for the party and can also vote for your preferred candidate within the party. For closed lists, the party will decide who enters congress, with an open list it will be done in order of preference.

A smidgen under 50% turnout is common for house elections, with higher figures expected for the presidential elections later this year. The Colombian parliament is a bicameral system with the Senate acting as the upper and more powerful house and the Cámara the lower house.

Most parties do not really have well-defined manifestos as such, although better-funded candidates will give a range of positions on matters. In general, there will simply be slogans and general aims that give voters an idea of where their candidates stand.

Who’s up for election?

With a PR system in place there are a plethora of parties to peruse. The country was dominated for decades by the Conservadores and Liberales and both remain strong across the country. In recent years they’ve been joined by the Centro Democrático as the third force. Expect all three to do well.

Mid-level parties include the likes of the right-wing Cambio Radical, particularly strong on the Caribbean, centrist (and not ecologically centred) Alianza Verde and ex-president Santos’ centrist partido de la U. The last election saw the leftist Colombia Humana rocket up to join these blocs.

Then there are the smaller parties, often operating essentially as almost one-man-bands. These usually have an enormous amount of support in a particular area or for a certain candidate but fail to translate this to a wider audience. It’s common to see them banding together, as with the governing coalition Pacto Histórico.

Finally, there are guaranteed seats in both the Senate and Cámara for certain groups and people. This year sees the Comunes party no longer receiving an automatic five seats in both houses that they had in the last two votes as part of the peace process. 

If you are a fan of PR, this system allows a diverse number of voices to be heard and limits the power of government, especially when there is opposition to their plans. For those more cynically-minded, it is a way to make sure that little gets done and few significant bills are passed.

There’s also the curious option of voto en blanco. Different from a spoiled vote, which is simply disregarded, this is an active protest. If it ranks highest in any race, then a rerun of the election must take place within a month with entirely new candidates and/or party lists. 

Colombian Senate Elections 2026

The Senate now has 103 seats (known as curules) and is the upper house in the bicameral system. Of those, a straight 100 are chosen by the electorate as a whole, while Indigenous communities select a further two and the runner-up in the presidential election will receive the final seat.

The Senate currently boasts a whopping 17 parties, but only six of those have double figure representation with the Conservadores’ 15 being the biggest single group. 26 parties are running 1,000 candidates between them this time. Voting is done on a national basis and tallied up across the territory, meaning this takes a little while to work out.

While there is a diverse group of parties, they hang together in loose blocs roughly delineated as government, opposition and neutral. With the government only controlling 34 curules and the opposition 24, the neutrals are incredibly important for horse-trading.

This will be a huge litmus test for the ruling leftist bloc. They will lose their guaranteed  Comunes seats, so any further losses will be highly problematic. On the other hand, gaining curules would be a huge shot in the arm in terms of public support, hence why they are campaigning in places like Huila, outside of their traditional strongholds.

The most likely outcome is that there will be little change in the makeup of the Senate, with neither the government nor opposition likely to take outright control or make large gains. Whichever of those two groups increases their representation will quickly turn it into a sign that they are on the right track and use that as support for their presidential campaign.

Cámara de Representantes election Colombia 2026

The lower chamber, too, is also up for election. It is significantly larger, with 188 seats and 23 parties. The government is also in a minority here and relies on support from independents to get things done. There are over 2,000 candidates representing nearly 500 parties, or listas of similar candidates.

The key difference in voting here is that it is largely territorial, with 161 seats divided between the departments and Bogotá, DC. The latter returns the most seats, with 18, closely followed by Antioquia with one fewer. Colombians living abroad and voting in embassies get one between them

However, these are not equal, as departments receive at least two seats, meaning Vaupés gets one representative for every 20,000 or so people, while the national average is more like 300,000. Changes in population have led to odd situations like Caldas returning more representantes (5) than Cauca (four) despite only having ⅔ of its population.

Then there are the special seats. Again, the Comunes party will lose their five extra seats in this term and it is also the last election to feature the 16 seats reserved for conflict victims. Colombians of Afro descent get two seats, while Indigenous Colombians and raizales from San Andres and Providencia have one apiece and the VP runner-up rounds it out.

Consultas for the presidential election

Just in case you thought there was enough on the plate, there are further considerations at stake. To avoid spreading the vote, various presidential candidates with similar positions group together for a preliminary vote. The losers in each consulta will drop out on March 9th. This year there are three on the voting card.

The biggest of these with 9 names is the Gran Consulta Por Colombia, which stretches the credibility of political similarity. It’s nominally centrist but features prominent rightists Vicky Dávila and Paloma Valencia alongside traditional centre voices such as Enrique Peñalosa and Juan David Oviedo. The latter is also the Centro Democrático candidate. 

The leftist consulta is under intense scrutiny as candidate Iván Cepeda, currently leading the polls, was blocked from taking part. That led to further withdrawals and angry denunciations from Cépeda and sitting president Gustavo Petro. Roy Barreras is now the favourite to win this five person race.

Then there’s a centrist competition between former Bogotá mayor Claudia López and little-known candidate Leonardo Huerta. López is the clear favourite here after perennial runner Sergio Fajardo chose to go directly to the first round of presidential voting.

At the moment, the presidential campaign is very unclear. Iván Cepeda leads polling and is extremely unlikely not to make the second round. Who joins him is hard to see at this point, so the consultas will trim that field significantly.

While the Senate and Cámara will be decided by mid-March, this is only the first lap of the field for the presidential candidates. Some will fall out, others will consolidate their position and things will start changing throughout the spring until the May 31st first round.

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Nearly a week after Donald Trump hosted Colombia’s president, Gustavo Petro, at the White House, calm has returned to a bilateral relationship that only recently appeared headed for rupture. The insults have stopped. The social media theatrics have faded. Diplomacy, not spectacle, is back in charge.

This alone tells us that both governments have agreed to “disagree” and agree again.

The meeting itself produced no headline agreements. Instead, it marked something more consequential and less dramatic – a quiet end to illusions. In Washington, Petro’s flagship policy of “Total Peace” is now widely regarded as exhausted, if not outright discredited. What replaces it is a far more traditional, conditional partnership: security cooperation first, democracy under scrutiny, and patience in short supply.

The timing matters. Within days of the White House meeting, the U.S. State Department announced that John McNamara, Washington’s chargé d’affaires in Bogotá, will leave his post on February 13. McNamara arrived a year ago at a moment of open hostility between Trump and Petro, when the relationship was being tested not only by policy disagreements but by personal antagonism. His task was not to advance grand initiatives, but to prevent a collapse. That he succeeded says much about the value of professional diplomacy in an era of impulsive politics.

His departure now marks the end of a holding pattern. What comes next will be harder, more explicit, and less forgiving.

The Trump – Petro encounter was cordial, almost surprisingly so. Trump praised Petro as “terrific.” Petro shared a handwritten note from Trump declaring his affection for Colombia. The optics were deliberate. But the substance lay elsewhere.

According to officials and lawmakers briefed on the talks, Washington’s message was blunt: negotiations without consequences have failed. Petro’s Paz Total—a strategy built on ceasefires, open-ended negotiations, and the assumption that armed groups could be coaxed into disarmament—has not reduced violence. In many regions, it has coincided with territorial expansion by FARC dissidents, rising extortion, and a deepening humanitarian crisis. From Washington’s perspective, it has blurred the line between peace realpolitik and paralysis.

U.S. cooperation with Colombia is now explicitly conditioned on key demands. First, decisive military action against armed groups, especially the ELN along the Venezuelan border, where insurgents have long enjoyed sanctuary. Second, ironclad guarantees that Colombia’s upcoming electoral processes will be free, fair, and transparent ahead of a high-stakes 2026 presidential race.

This is not ideological hostility. It is strategic calculation – from Bogotá to Caracas, and ultimately, the Oval Office.

Colombia remains indispensable to U.S. interests: a capstone of regional security, a key counter-narcotics partner, and a democratic anchor in a hemisphere unsettled by authoritarian drift and Venezuelan instability. But indispensability does not mean indulgence. Washington’s conclusion is that leverage must now be used, not deferred.

The shift was visible almost immediately. Colombian forces bombed ELN encampments in the Catatumbo region near the Venezuelan border, killing several fighters and seizing weapons. The strikes signaled a return to military pressure after months of restraint under Paz Total.

Yet they also exposed the moral and political cost of the new course. According to Colombia’s forensic authorities and reporting by El Colombiano, one of those killed in Catatumbo was a child. Seven bodies were recovered after the operation, including that of a minor. The incident echoed last November’s bombing in Guaviare that killed seven minors, among them an 11-year-old girl.

Shift in tone and strategy

Petro, in the aftermath of the Trump encounter, has responded with a stark argument: armed groups recruit children precisely to deter military action. Halting airstrikes, he said, would reward a “cowardly and criminal” strategy and accelerate forced recruitment. It is a grim logic, but not an implausible one—and it illustrates the impossible trade-offs now confronting the Colombian state.

Peace negotiations have not been spared. The Clan del Golfo, one of the country’s most powerful criminal organizations, suspended talks with the government after reports that Colombia and the United States discussed targeting “high-value” leaders. From Washington’s perspective, this reaction only reinforces its skepticism: armed groups talk peace when it buys time, not when it requires surrender.

None of this suggests enthusiasm in Washington for a militarized Colombia. It suggests resignation. The United States has seen this cycle before – in Colombia and throughout the hemisphere. Negotiations without enforcement are a contradiction. Ceasefires without verification entrench armed actors. Elections held amid coercion corrode democratic legitimacy from within.

Which brings us to the second pillar of the new relationship: electoral transparency.

U.S. officials have made clear that Colombia’s democratic processes will now be watched closely – not as a moral abstraction, but as a strategic necessity. A Colombia that cannot guarantee free elections is not a reliable ally, no matter how aligned its security policies may be.

This is the bargain now on offer. Not a reset. No rupture. Conditional coexistence.

John McNamara’s departure symbolizes the transition. His tenure was about keeping the peace between governments. The next phase will be about enforcing terms.

For Petro, the challenge is severe. He must deliver security results demanded by Washington without losing legitimacy at home, where skepticism of militarization runs deep. He must demonstrate democratic integrity while navigating a polarized political landscape. And he must do so knowing that Total Peace, once his signature promise, no longer commands confidence abroad.

The calm in U.S.–Colombia relations is real- but it is not comfort. It is the quiet before accountability.

Bogotá, Colombia — In the past week, Colombians have taken to the streets on two occasions to defend the government’s minimum wage increase as it faces legal attacks by business sectors. 

On January 28 and February 3, Colombians marched in major cities in support of the landmark 23% wage increase established at the end of last year.

But the future of Decree 1469, which established what the government has called a “living wage”, remains uncertain.

“This is a major step forward by the government of Gustavo Petro. It is not just an increase; it is the dignification of workers’ wages in Colombia. That is why, as union members and as teachers, we support this mission, which directly impacts people’s everyday lives,” Oscar Patiño, an attendee of the January 28 march, told The Bogotá Post. 

For Patiño, a teacher and union leader, the protest represented a demand that the Council of State act as a guarantor of workers’ rights through its role in defining public policy.

He was part of a wave of sit-in protests in cities across the country called by labor unions, with the backing of the government, to defend the minimum wage hike. The 23% raise brings the monthly base salary to COP$1,750,905 (USD$477) and the transportation allowance to COP $249,095 (USD$68). 

In Bogotá, the demonstration was joined by Labor Minister Antonio Sanguino and lawmakers from the pro-government bloc, including Senator Wilson Arias.

“This increase no longer leaves workers’ wages below key economic indicators. It is for the improvement of their quality of life,” said another attendee, who did not want to be named.

As well as raising the base salary, December’s decree incorporated the concept of a “living wage” as an additional criterion for setting the increase. This concept is not new: it is enshrined in Article 53 of Colombia’s Political Constitution and in International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention No. 131 of 1970.

“In that ruling, the Constitutional Court reminds the government that when setting wages, remuneration must be minimum, I quote, ‘living, and adjustable,’” said Mery Laura Perdomo, a lawyer specializing in labor, social security, and constitutional law. 

The “living wage” responds to the real cost of living, unlike the minimum wage, which barely covers basic needs. “This helps generate conditions for a dignified life in a Social State governed by the rule of law … The major shift is from a minimum wage to a living wage,” said Labor Minister Antonio Sanguino.

The government passed the decree raising wages unilaterally after failing to reach consensus with government representatives, business associations and labor unions. It determined the base salary raise based on economic criteria such as inflation (CPI), GDP, the contribution of wages to national income, inflation targets, and productivity.

But the decree generated dissatisfaction among business associations and parts of the public, prompting them to pursue legal action. 

Perdomo notes that there are two types of challenges to the wage increase: tutela actions—arguing violations of fundamental rights, specifically due process or harm to certain companies—and a lawsuit seeking the annulment of the decree.

“I believe there are no sufficient legal grounds for a potential declaration of unconstitutionality,” Perdomo said, noting that the decree grounds its constitutionality in ILO conventions, the constitution, and technical and economic studies and criteria. “There are constitutional, legal, jurisprudential, and technical-economic grounds to say that this minimum wage decree could not be declared unconstitutional.”

So far, tutela actions have not succeeded, according to Perdomo. As for the annulment lawsuit—filed by the National Federation of Merchants (Fenalco)—it is currently under review and awaiting evaluation by the assigned judge, according to the Colombian economic magazine Portafolio. The claim argues that constitutional and legal criteria were disregarded.

Portafolio also reports that the risks of the legal debate lie in the possibility that, while a final decision is pending, the Council of State could not only annul the decree but also order a provisional suspension of the wage increase.

But Perdomo warned this would be an unpopular move ahead of next month’s legislative elections: “Politically, this is risky in an electoral context, since a large portion of the population—especially low-income earners—is satisfied with the minimum wage increase. Overturning it could sour the political climate on the eve of elections and have a real impact on voting intentions.”

Meanwhile, Petro’s ruling Pacto Historico coalition, which has formed into a party ahead of the elections, has made a point of championing the minimum wage increase. 

On Tuesday, it called for rallies across the country to support the living wage, justice, and labor dignity. 

“The living wage is not a favor; it is a right. A dignified life begins with fair work, and this mobilization reminds us that labor dignity is the foundation of social justice,” declared Health Minister Guillermo Alfonso Jaramillo from Bogotá’s Plaza de Bolívar.

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En el avión viajaban 15 personas, incluyendo dos políticos locales, Diógenes Quintero y Carlos Salcedo, que estaban postulados como candidatos al Congreso en las próximas elecciones nacionales.

The aircraft was carrying 15 people, and the authorities said there were no survivors.

Colombia’s presidential race has entered poll season with a revealing snapshot from Noticias RCN and Spanish firm GAD3 that points to an election defined less by early frontrunners than by who can consolidate votes after March’s inter-party consultations.

At first glance, Historic Pact senator Iván Cepeda appears comfortably ahead. The RCN poll places him at 30% voting intention — well above far-right independent Abelardo de la Espriella (22%) and miles ahead of the scattered field trailing behind in single digits.

But a deeper reading of the numbers suggests Cepeda’s lead may already be capped.

The 30% figure aligns almost perfectly with President Gustavo Petro’s loyal electoral base, which has consistently hovered between 28% and 32% since his rise to national prominence. In other words, Cepeda appears to have consolidated petrismo rather than expanded beyond it. The poll reinforces this ceiling: 5% of respondents favor a blank vote, 11% say they would vote for none of the candidates, and 14% remain undecided — a combined 30% still outside the Petro orbit and unlikely to gravitate toward Cepeda.

Further down the list, potential left-leaning or independent figures barely register: Sergio Fajardo, Aníbal Gaviria, Juan Daniel Oviedo, Roy Barreras and Camilo Romero each sit around 1%. Even Claudia López and Germán Vargas Lleras score negligible fractions. The fragmentation benefits Cepeda for now, but it also masks the absence of new voters entering his camp.

By contrast, the Right’s apparent weakness hides a powerful consolidation opportunity.

The Gran Consulta por Colombia, on March 8, shows Paloma Valencia leading the consultation vote with 23%. Yet the poll also reveals that the rest of the consultation slate collectively commands nearly 20%: Juan Manuel Galán (8%), Vicky Dávila (8%), Juan Carlos Pinzón (6%), Juan Daniel Oviedo (4%), Aníbal Gaviria (3%), Enrique Peñalosa (2%), David Luna (1%) and Mauricio Cárdenas (1%).

This bloc is electorally decisive because it represents Colombia’s ideological center — liberal technocrats, urban moderates and business-friendly reformists who reject Petro’s economic direction but resist extreme rhetoric. Valencia’s political résumé, Senate visibility and party machinery position her as the most viable leader to absorb that vote once the consultation narrows the field.

If she consolidates those nearly 20 points, her support would leap toward — or beyond — 40%, instantly surpassing Cepeda’s apparent plateau.

De la Espriella’s 22% underscores the volatility on the Right but also its fragility. His voters overlap heavily with Valencia’s base and are expected to migrate toward a unified conservative candidacy. Even Uribe has hinted that such unity is inevitable in a runoff; the RCN poll suggests it could happen much earlier under electoral pressure.

Yet the poll’s most intriguing subplot lies within the Left’s own consultation, where Roy Barreras emerges as a latent threat to Cepeda despite low headline numbers.

In the Frente Amplio consultation, Cepeda commands 34%, but the striking figure is the 44% who say they would vote for none. Barreras registers 4%, and Camilo Romero 3%, revealing a progressive electorate deeply unconvinced by the current slate.

Barreras’ political positioning explains why that matters. Though aligned with Petro’s government, his ideological lineage is closer to former President Juan Manuel Santos — pragmatic, transactional and coalition-oriented. Unlike Cepeda, Barreras is seen as someone capable of negotiating with centrists and conservatives alike. He represents continuity without ideological rigidity.

If Barreras manages to capture even part of that dissatisfied 44%, Cepeda’s narrow base could erode quickly. The RCN poll already shows Cepeda strong only where the Left is unified and stagnant where broader voters are involved.

Second-round simulations deepen the warning. Cepeda defeats De la Espriella 40% to 32%, but those numbers again reflect Petro’s core plus soft undecideds. Against Paloma Valencia he drops to 43% versus her 20% — a gap that would narrow dramatically once Valencia inherits the consultation bloc. More telling still, Cepeda’s numbers barely move across matchups, reinforcing the perception of a fixed ceiling.

Colombia’s presidential arithmetic is therefore shifting beneath the surface.

Cepeda leads because the field is divided. Valencia stands to surge because her side is about to unify. Barreras lurks as the only left-leaning figure capable of fracturing Cepeda’s ideological monopoly and attracting voters beyond Petro’s loyalists.

While headlines focus on Cepeda versus De la Espriella, the RCN poll suggests the real race may ultimately emerge after March 8 — between Paloma Valencia consolidating a broad anti-Petro coalition and Roy Barreras positioning himself as the Left’s only candidate with cross-spectrum appeal.

In Colombia’s elections, momentum follows math. And the math is just beginning to move.

Colombian President Gustavo Petro on Monday decreed a 23.7% increase in the country’s minimum wage for 2026, the largest real rise in at least two decades, bypassing negotiations with unions and business groups and sparking warnings from economists, bankers and employers over inflation, job losses and rising informality.

The decree lifts the monthly minimum wage to 1.75 million pesos (U.S$470), or close to 2 million pesos including transport subsidies, and will apply to roughly 2.5 million workers when it takes effect next year. Petro said the measure aims to reduce inequality and move Colombia toward a “living minimum wage” that allows workers to “live better.”

But business associations, financial analysts and opposition lawmakers said the scale of the increase — far above inflation and productivity trends — risks destabilising the labour market and the broader economy.

According to calculations based on official data, with inflation expected to close 2025 at around 5.3% and labour productivity growth estimated at 0.9%, a technically grounded adjustment would have been close to 6.2%. The gap between that benchmark and the decreed hike exceeds 17 percentage points, the largest deviation on record.

Informality and job losses

Colombia’s minimum wage plays an outsized role in the economy, serving not only as the legal wage floor but also as a reference for pensions, social security contributions and public-sector pay.

Banking association Asobancaria warned that increases far above productivity can generate unintended effects. Citing data from the national statistics agency DANE, the group noted that 49% of employed Colombians — about 11.4 million people — earn less than the minimum wage, mostly in the informal economy, while only 10% earn exactly the minimum wage. Former director of DANE and economist Juan Daniel Oviedo believes that an increase that only benefits one-out-of-ten workers will stump job creation. “A minimum wage of 2 million pesos will make us move like turtles when it comes to creating formal jobs  — something we need to structurally address poverty in Colombia.”

Retail association FENALCO described the decision as “populist” and said the talks had been a “charade.” Its president, Jaime Alberto Cabal, said the process ignored technical, economic and productivity variables and would hit small businesses hardest.

Lawmakers also raised concerns about the impact on independent workers and contractors in the agricultural sectors, especially hired-help on coffee planations. Carlos Fernando Motoa, a senator from the opposition Cambio Radical party, said the decision would push vulnerable workers out of the formal system.

“The unintended effects of this improvised handling of the minimum wage will end up hitting independent workers’ pockets,” Motoa said. “Many will be forced to choose between eating or paying for health and pension contributions.”

Economists warned that micro, small and medium-sized enterprises — which account for the majority of employment — may respond by cutting staff, reducing hours or shifting workers into informal arrangements to cope with higher payroll and social security costs.

Inflation and rates at risk

Analysts also cautioned that the wage hike could reignite inflation, complicating the central bank’s easing cycle. Central bank economists have forecast 2026 inflation at 3.6%, down from 5.1% expected in 2025, but several analysts said those projections may now need revising.

In an interview with Reuters, David Cubides, chief economist at Banco de Occidente, called the increase “absolutely unsustainable,” warning it would affect government payrolls, pension liabilities and the informal labour market.

“Inflation forecasts will have to be revised,” Cubides said, adding that interest rates could rise again in the medium term as a result.

The impact is amplified by Colombia’s ongoing reduction in the legal workweek. From July 2026, the standard workweek will fall to 42 hours, meaning the hourly minimum wage will rise by roughly 28.5%, further increasing labour costs.

The decree comes six months before the presidential election on May 31, 2026, and is viewed by critics of Colombia’s first leftist administration as an electoral gamble aimed at shoring up support for the ruling coalition’s candidate, Senator Iván Cepeda.

Opposition senator Esteban Quintero, from the Democratic Center party, warned that Colombia risked repeating the mistakes of other Latin American countries that pursued aggressive wage policies.

“Careful, Colombia. We cannot repeat the history of our neighbours,” Quintero said. “Populism is celebrated at first — and later the costs become unbearable.”

Former finance minister and presidential hopeful Mauricio Cárdenas said the decision would inevitably lead to layoffs, particularly in small businesses already operating on thin margins, and described the policy as “economic populism” whose costs would materialise after the election cycle.

“The employer ends up saying, ‘I can’t sustain this payroll,’” Cárdenas said. “People are laid off, and many end up working for less than the minimum wage. In the end, nothing is achieved.”

Liberal Party senator Mauricio Gómez Amín said the increase risked becoming a political banner rather than a technical policy tool.

“Without technical backing, a 23% increase translates into inflation, bankruptcies and fewer job opportunities,” Gómez Amín said. “Economic populism always sends the bill later.”

While supporters argue the measure will boost purchasing power at the start of 2026, analysts cautioned that the short-term gains could be offset by higher prices, job losses and a further expansion of Colombia’s informal economy — already one of the largest in Latin America.

Senator Iván Cepeda of the ruling Historic Pact coalition has emerged as the early front-runner in Colombia’s 2026 presidential race, according to a nationwide Invamer poll released Sunday by Caracol TV and Blu Radio. The survey – the first major measurement since the lifting of Colombia’s recent polling restrictions – places the left-wing candidate at 31.9% of voting intention, six months ahead of the first round.

The results position Cepeda well ahead of candidate Abelardo de la Espriella of Defensores de la Patria, who received 18.2%, and independent centrist Sergio Fajardo, who registered 8.5%. Miguel Uribe Londoño, running for the leadership of  President Álvaro Uribe Vélez’s Centro Democrático party, follows with 4.2%. Uribe Londoño is the father of Senator Miguel Uribe Turbay, victim of an assassination attempt on June 7, and who died two months later at the Santa Fe Hospital in Bogotá.

The findings come amid broad public dissatisfaction with the country’s direction and with the administration of President Gustavo Petro, who leaves office on August 7, 2026. According to the poll, 56% of respondents disapprove of Petro’s administration, while 37% approve. Although disapproval has dipped slightly from previous months, nearly six in ten Colombians remain critical of the government. National sentiment is similarly pessimistic: 59.8% believe Colombia is “on the wrong track,” compared with 34.4% who feel otherwise.

Internal security stands out as the leading concern. Asked whether Petro’s “Total Peace” policy had made them feel safer, 66.2% claim it made them feel more insecure. Nearly 65% believe the initiative is moving in the “wrong direction”, and 73% say the government has lost territorial control to illegal armed groups. Only 20% expressed confidence in the government’s peace and security approach.

The Invamer survey, conducted between November 15 and 27 among 3,800 respondents in 148 municipalities, does not include public reaction to the latest scandal involving alleged infiltration of state institutions by FARC dissidents. The poll has a 1.81% margin of error and a 95% confidence level.

Cepeda’s lead reflects firm support among left-leaning voters and measurable gains among independents and left-leaning centrists. Though only 24% of those polled identified themselves as “left-wing”, the senator’s 31.9% support suggests he is drawing backing among younger voters. He also carries a relatively high rejection rate: 23.9% said they would “never” vote for him.

The survey challenges the perception that Cepeda lacks room to grow beyond the left, even as 50% expressed that they would prefer to vote for a candidate opposed to Petro. Analysts believe the Historic Pact’s decision to hold its internal consultation last month helped consolidate support within the coalition and gave Cepeda a strategic advantage.

Despite his lead, Cepeda could face voter rejection should Petro’s disapproval ratings continue to climb. The candidate’s current negative rating is among the highest of any public figure, and his pro-Petro agenda on security, economy, and U.S relations could push the center closer to the moderate right. Still, the poll indicates Cepeda would win a runoff against De la Espriella with a wide margin, but face a “technical tie” with the mathematician and former Governor of Antioquia.

De la Espriella, meanwhile, has quickly consolidated the anti-Petro vote, emerging as a “dark horse” at the extreme right of the spectrum. Once absent from early electoral projections, the lawyer now surpasses established Centro Democrático politicians – including senators María Fernanda Cabal, Paola Holguín, and Paloma Valencia.

Former defense minister under President Juan Manuel Santos and ex-Ambassador to Washinton, Juan Carlos Pinzón, is in seventh place (2,9%), but these early numbers are likely to increase, given that he maintains a close relationship with three ideological camps (Centro Democrático, La U, Cambio Radical) represented in Presidents Uribe and Juan Manuel Santos, and German Vargás Lleras.

 Even though the poll found that 63% of eligible voters know who De la Espriella is, there is room for continued growth for the five candidates who marked above 2% in the poll, among them, Vargas Lleras in fifth place (2.1%).

The centrist bloc, historically influential in Colombian politics, appears fragmented. Fajardo, once considered a reliable alternative to both left and right, no longer polls in double digits. While he maintains a lower rejection rate than most rivals and doubles the numbers of former Bogotá mayor Claudia López (4.1%), analysts say the proliferation of centrist candidates could dilute Fajardo’s base. Combined, these candidates would outpace De la Espriella’s support, but the numbers suggest this does not translate into a cohesive electoral force.

Foreign policy is also shaping voter priorities. A large majority – 78% – said maintaining strong relations with the United States is essential for the next administration. Respondents widely rejected Petro’s decision to use a megaphone in New York to urge U.S. soldiers not to follow orders from former President Donald Trump; 78% disapproved of the act, even though half of respondents hold an unfavorable view of Trump.

President Petro reacted to the poll on social media, framing the electoral landscape as a struggle between entrenched elites and what he described as a “powerful people” seeking to reclaim the state. Referring implicitly to Uribe and Fajardo, the president said Colombia must reject “mafioso elites” and work toward a “free and educated” society.

The Centro Democrático announced it will conduct an internal vote among more than 4,000 active party members to select two candidates for a March 2026 primary. The contenders are senators Cabal, Holguín, and Valencia, and Miguel Uribe Londoño.

With six months until the first round on May 31, 2026, the Invamer poll highlights a polarized electorate, deep concerns over security and corruption, and an early advantage for the ruling coalition’s candidate — with substantial uncertainty and new political alignments spearheaded by former presidents, especially Álvaro Uribe.