Refining margin surge cushions revenue drop amid leadership void

Ecopetrol S.A. (NYSE: EC, BVC: ECOPETROL) reported first-quarter 2026 consolidated revenues of 28.6 trillion COP, a decline of 8.7% from 31.4 trillion COP in the year-earlier period, as lower crude oil prices and reduced hydrocarbon production compressed the top line for Colombia’s state-controlled oil and gas company. Against that backdrop, a marked recovery in refining margins and disciplined cost management lifted EBITDA by 1.5% to 13.5 trillion COP, yielding a 47% EBITDA margin and partially offsetting the revenue headwind. At the Q1 2026 average exchange rate of approximately 3,700 COP per USD, the quarter’s revenues translate to roughly $7.73 billion USD and EBITDA to approximately $3.65 billion USD.

Net income for the quarter reached 2.9 trillion COP (approximately $784 million USD), down 7.7% year-over-year, reflecting the combined drag of lower revenues, a sharply elevated effective tax rate of 37.1%, and a one-time charge of 1.2 trillion COP for the impuesto al patrimonio — Colombia’s government-mandated wealth levy on large corporations established to fund post-disaster reconstruction measures. The company is also subject to a 10% income tax surcharge applicable for fiscal year 2026, which is embedded in the reported effective rate. The aggregate tax burden absorbed a disproportionate share of operating improvement relative to prior periods, limiting the flow-through of refining gains to the net income line.

Total hydrocarbon production averaged 725.2 thousand barrels of oil equivalent per day (kboed) in Q1 2026, below the 745 kboed recorded in the 2025 annual average cited by management during the March 2026 general shareholders’ meeting. Domestic crude output represented the largest component at approximately 520 thousand barrels per day (kbd). Ecopetrol’s Permian Basin operations in the United States contributed 91.8 kbd, underscoring the continued strategic importance of the international segment. Gas production continued a multi-year declining trend that poses a medium-term domestic supply challenge; management has sought to address this partially through regasification capacity additions at Puerto Bahía and on the Pacific coast, expected to come online in the second half of 2026 with a combined contribution of up to 430 billion BTU per day.

The refining segment delivered the quarter’s most pronounced operational outperformance. Ecopetrol’s domestic refineries, led by Refinería de Cartagena, processed 417.5 kbd of crude throughput. The integrated refining margin rose to $17.3 USD per barrel, a 60% improvement over the same quarter of 2025, driven by favorable differential pricing between domestic crude benchmarks and refined product values alongside ongoing operational efficiency improvements. The Comisión de Regulación de Energía y Gas (CREG) and the Ministerio de Minas y Energía remain central to the regulatory framework governing downstream margins over the medium term.

The balance sheet carries significant structural and contingent risk items of direct relevance to institutional credit and equity holders. Gross debt stood at 108.1 trillion COP (approximately $29.2 billion USD), representing a leverage ratio of 2.3 times trailing EBITDA — a level that leaves limited room for further deterioration before debt covenants or rating agency thresholds become binding. Ecopetrol holds a receivable of 4.2 trillion COP (approximately $1.14 billion USD) from the Fondo de Estabilización de Precios de los Combustibles (FEPC), a government fuel price stabilization mechanism that represents a claim on the Colombian treasury with timing and recovery risk. A dispute with the Dirección de Impuestos y Aduanas Nacionales (DIAN) over value-added tax assessments totals 12.26 trillion COP (approximately $3.31 billion USD) in aggregate, of which 10.22 trillion COP relates to Ecopetrol’s consolidated operations and 2.04 trillion COP to Refinería de Cartagena. Both cases are under administrative and judicial review; no provisions have been recognized in the financial statements pending resolution, but the potential liability represents a material contingency relative to the company’s quarterly net income.

On the corporate development front, Ecopetrol disclosed three significant transactions during or following the quarter. The company agreed to acquire producing assets from Gran Tierra Energy (NYSE: GTE, TSX: GTE) for $92.4 million USD, adding Colombian upstream production inventory in basins where both companies have operated. In Brazil, Ecopetrol launched a tender offer for shares of Brava Energia (BVMF: BRAV3) at 23 BRL per share, seeking to expand its footprint in that country’s oil and gas sector. And in a transaction that would reshape the mid-size independent landscape in Colombia, the company reached an agreement to acquire Parex Resources (TSX: PXT) for $250 million USD; Parex is a Colombia-focused producer with a complementary asset base across the Llanos and other producing basins. Collectively, the three transactions signal that Ecopetrol’s capital allocation strategy under the current government continues to favor upstream consolidation despite the elevated leverage profile.

The exploration portfolio generated positive news announcements. The Copoazú-1 exploratory well, drilled in Colombia’s Llanos foothills region, was confirmed as a commercial discovery, adding to the domestic reserve base. The Sirius offshore project advanced through the Consulta Previa process — a legally mandated prior consultation with indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities required before development of projects in or near their territories — reaching a milestone in community engagement that brings the project closer to formal development sanction. The Agencia Nacional de Hidrocarburos (ANH) oversees the licensing framework within which both projects operate.

“Ecopetrol is listed on the New York Stock Exchange; we are governed by the strict regulations of US federal agencies. Agencies like OFAC and the SEC could intervene in the company and could even accelerate the payment of financial obligations, which would be extremely grave for Ecopetrol.” — Martín Ravelo, President, Unión Sindical Obrera (USO)

The ISA transmission segment, managed through Ecopetrol’s majority stake in ISA — Interconexión Eléctrica S.A., contributed stable regulated cash flows during the quarter. ISA completed 46 transmission reinforcement works across its Latin American concession portfolio. The segment also completed the acquisition of 100% of IE Madeira in Brazil, consolidating its position in that country’s power grid interconnection infrastructure. ISA further submitted a competitive bid for the Río Bueno–Puerto Montt high-voltage transmission line concession in Chile, demonstrating the group’s appetite for long-duration, inflation-linked infrastructure assets across the Andes region. For institutional investors evaluating Ecopetrol as a blended hydrocarbons-and-infrastructure holding, ISA’s consistent cash generation provides partial diversification from crude price volatility, though it does not insulate the consolidated entity from headline governance risk.

The most consequential variable for the investment thesis over the near term is Ecopetrol’s prolonged governance crisis. At the company’s general shareholders’ meeting on March 27, 2026, held at the Corferias convention center in Bogotá, minority shareholders loudly heckled president Ricardo Roa — with audible shouts of “¡Fuera, fuera!” reverberating through the hall — as debate over his leadership erupted into open confrontation. The meeting approved a dividend of 121 COP per share for minority holders and a 4 trillion COP distribution to the Colombian government as majority shareholder, payable in two installments by June 30, 2026. Despite the financial business conducted, governance overshadowed the proceedings.

Roa faces two separate judicial proceedings. The Fiscalía General de la Nación formally charged him in connection with alleged influence peddling related to the purchase of an apartment in northern Bogotá — charges he has denied. Separately, the Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE) is examining whether campaign spending limits were violated during President Gustavo Petro’s 2022 presidential campaign, which Roa managed — an investigation that Finance Colombia has covered in detail. Angela Maria Robledo, Chair of the Board of Directors, defended the board’s decision to retain Roa at the March assembly, citing the constitutional presumption of innocence. However, four of the nine board members had already formally recorded their support for his removal at that point, exposing a divided governance structure at a time when strategic and operational decisions require unified leadership.

The Unión Sindical Obrera (USO), which represents approximately one-third of Ecopetrol’s workforce, issued a production strike ultimatum timed to a March 30 board meeting. Martín Ravelo, president of the USO, framed the leadership crisis explicitly in terms of US regulatory risk: “Ecopetrol is listed on the New York Stock Exchange; we are governed by the strict regulations of US federal agencies. Agencies like OFAC and the SEC could intervene in the company and could even accelerate the payment of financial obligations, which would be extremely grave for Ecopetrol.” Ravelo further warned that the company’s outstanding international debt — which he placed at approximately $30 billion USD and which is exacerbated by elevated interest rates — left Ecopetrol exposed to potential covenant triggers or early repayment demands in a scenario where the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or the Office of Foreign Assets Control were to take enforcement action.

Following sustained pressure from the USO, minority shareholders, and opposition political figures, Ecopetrol’s board approved an extended leave of absence for Roa beginning April 7, 2026. Under the arrangement, Roa used accrued vacation through May 27, followed by 30 calendar days of unpaid leave beginning May 28, extending his absence through the end of June — a period encompassing Colombia’s presidential first round on May 31 and a potential runoff on June 21. Juan Carlos Hurtado Parra, the company’s executive vice president of hydrocarbons and designated first alternate to the presidency since November 2025, was appointed acting president. Hurtado Parra holds an MBA in International Oil and Gas and brings more than 28 years of energy sector experience to the acting role, having previously served as vice president of exploration, development, and production.

The political calendar creates a structural transition risk that sits above the operational and financial results as the primary concern for long-duration investors. Colombia’s incoming government, to be inaugurated August 7, 2026, is widely expected to appoint a new Ecopetrol board and select a new company president. That transition may bring material shifts in strategic priorities — including the pace of upstream investment, the approach to the FEPC receivable recovery, the trajectory of energy transition spending, and the capital allocation balance between the hydrocarbons segment and the ISA infrastructure platform. The Ministerio de Hacienda y Crédito Público and the Ministerio de Minas y Energía will both play key roles in establishing the post-election policy framework under which Ecopetrol operates. Institutional investors holding exposure to Ecopetrol via NYSE: EC or BVC: ECOPETROL must weigh Q1’s genuine operational improvement — most visibly in refining margins and EBITDA stability — against a governance and policy transition risk profile that is unlikely to be resolved before the August handover.

Ecopetrol’s Cartagena refinery (photo courtesy Ecopetrol)

As Colombia nears its presidential vote, two candidates have endorsed Iván Cepeda and eight others remain below 3.5% in polls

With less than two weeks remaining before Colombia’s presidential election, whose first round is scheduled for May 31, three candidates are concentrating most voter support and competing for access to the presidential palace, Casa de Nariño: ruling coalition senator Iván Cepeda, candidate of the left-wing Pacto Histórico party; senator Paloma Valencia, representing the right-wing Centro Democrático party; and lawyer and businessman Abelardo de la Espriella, a figure of Colombia’s far right.

Although 13 candidates will appear on the ballot, two contenders: Clara López and Luis Gilberto Murillo, withdrew their campaigns to support Cepeda, while the remaining candidates have failed to surpass 3.5% voter support in pre-elections polls, a figure close to the statistical margin of error.

If polling trends hold, no candidate is expected to secure the 50% plus one vote needed to win outright in the first round, making a runoff election on June 21, 2026, highly likely.

Cepeda has remained relatively stable in polls, with voter support ranging between 35% and 43%, effectively securing his place in a second round if trends continue.

The key question: Who will face Cepeda in a runoff?

The main electoral uncertainty centers on who will finish second and challenge the ruling coalition in a likely runoff.

Under Colombia’s electoral system, only the two candidates receiving the highest vote totals advance to the second round. The fragmentation of the political right has complicated efforts to consolidate support behind either Valencia or De la Espriella.

Polls suggest a competitive scenario. Valencia has registered between 14% and 21% voter support, while De la Espriella fluctuates between 16% and 24%, depending on the poll and methodology used.

The lack of unity between the two camps stems from both ideological differences and their political structures. Valencia is a member of the political party founded by former President Álvaro Uribe, while De la Espriella entered the race through an independent signature campaign, marking the first time Colombia’s far right has emerged as a viable contender for the presidency.

A campaign shaped by the absence of public debates

The presidential campaign has been marked by an unusual lack of debates among the leading candidates.

Cepeda has refused to participate in events organized by media outlets, arguing that proposed formats do not offer guarantees of neutrality or what he describes as “fair rules” established by news organizations.

As a result, part of the political confrontation has shifted to Congress, where both Cepeda and Valencia currently serve in the Senate.

Critics, however, have challenged Cepeda’s decision. Former Bogotá Mayor and presidential candidate Claudia López argued that his absence from debates reflects that “Cepeda does not want to take responsibility for the failures of Total Peace (Paz Total),” the negotiation policy with armed groups promoted by President Gustavo Petro, in which Cepeda played a key role as a lawmaker.

Instead of regular debates, the campaign has been dominated by disputes over media formats, digital presence, social media strategies and public controversies aimed at amplifying candidates’ visibility.

De la Espriella embraces confrontation

One of the candidates who has most effectively capitalized on the digital environment is Abelardo de la Espriella, whose political strategy has been compared to right-wing populist leadership styles such as those of Argentine President Javier Milei and US President Donald Trump.

In recent weeks, De la Espriella has faced several media controversies, including an incident involving journalist Laura Rodríguez of Piso 8 FM, for which he later apologized after accusations of inappropriate sexual conduct. He also clashed live on air with television presenter María Lucía Fernández of Caracol Noticias, whom he called “ignorant.”

Questions also emerged following reports by digital outlet La Silla Vacía regarding donations linked to the US Republican Party.

Despite the controversies, the strategy appears to be strengthening his electoral standing. An Atlas Intel poll for Semana magazine, published May 15, showed De la Espriella surpassing Valencia by a two-to-one margin for the first time, with 32.9% support compared with 16.7%.

However, the polling firm is currently under investigation by Colombia’s National Electoral Council (CNE) amid concerns over whether its methodology complies with national standards. If irregularities are confirmed, the firm could face suspension of its operations in Colombia.

Valencia seeks to broaden support toward the political center

Meanwhile, Valencia has sought to expand her electoral base by shifting strategically toward the political center.

As part of that effort, on May 17 she officially introduced her proposal “Mámá No Está Sola (Mom Is Not Alone),” aimed at female heads of household and focused on access to credit, employment and housing property. The proposal also includes a promise to deliver 1 million homes prioritized for women community leaders.

Valencia’s candidacy also marks a historic first for Colombia’s political right: it is the first time a major conservative party has nominated a woman for president.

Her vice presidential running mate, former Bogotá councilman Juan Daniel Oviedo, has openly identified as a member of the LGBTQ+ community, a move that represents a significant shift for the Centro Democrático traditionally conservative electorate.

Colombia appears headed for a runoff

With a highly fragmented field and no signs of consolidation among right-wing candidates, Colombia appears increasingly likely to hold a presidential runoff on June 21, 2026.

Barring a major shift in polling trends, the contest seems set to come down to Iván Cepeda and whichever opposition candidate manages to emerge from an increasingly competitive battle within Colombia’s political right.

Roa had already been administratively sanctioned by Colombia’s electoral authority over campaign spending violations, with the case now advancing in the Attorney General’s Office

Ricardo Roa Barragán, president of Colombia’s state-owned oil and energy company Ecopetrol, has been formally charged by the Attorney General’s Office (FGN) over his alleged responsibility in a case involving violations of campaign spending limits tied to President Gustavo Petro’s 2022 presidential campaign, which Roa managed.

The charging hearing took place Monday, May 11, during which Roa pleaded not guilty. The case will continue through the investigative stage, and no conviction has been issued against him.

This marks the second criminal case facing the executive. On March 11, 2026, prosecutors also charged Roa with alleged influence peddling involving a public official. Both investigations remain ongoing.

Read: The charge adds to a separate investigation over alleged violations of campaign finance limits during President Gustavo Petro’s 2022 presidential campaign.

The latest charges come weeks after Ecopetrol’s board authorized Roa to take vacation leave followed by unpaid leave through June 28, 2026, after Colombia’s presidential elections conclude.

The decision means Roa would return to the company only to participate in the transition process with the team designated by Colombia’s next president, who will take office on August 7, 2026.

Read: Ecopetrol Announces Temporary Leave for President Ricardo Roa Amid Investigations by Colombia’s Attorney General’s Office” by Finance Colombia.

Under Articles 396A and 396B of Colombia’s Criminal Law, individuals found responsible for receiving, administering or allowing prohibited campaign funds may face prison sentences ranging from four to eight years, in addition to fines and disqualification from holding public office if convicted.

Roa, however, retains the presumption of innocence while the judicial process continues.

Investigation into campaign financing

The case stems from the 2022 “Petro Presidente” campaign, which Roa Barragán managed. The matter had already resulted in administrative sanctions from Colombia’s National Electoral Council (CNE), which concluded that the campaign exceeded legal financing limits.

The Attorney General’s Office also said it identified alleged inconsistencies in the campaign’s financial reporting, claiming that first-round expenses were reported during the second round and vice versa.

As a result of that administrative investigation, the CNE referred the case to the Attorney General’s Office, which is responsible for conducting criminal investigations.

According to a statement from prosecutors, collected evidence suggests that campaign spending limits “were exceeded by $1.388 billion COP (around $370,000 USD) during the first presidential round and by $276 million COP ($73,000 USD) during the runoff.”

Prosecutors said the allegedly unreported or improperly reported expenses were linked to “hotel press conferences, breakfasts, loans, transportation, logistics, food services, financing for campaign-closing events, advertising materials and union contributions.

The investigation formally began in 2025 after the CNE determined there were possible irregularities involving campaign spending caps.

Petro defends Roa

President Gustavo Petro again defended Roa and questioned the basis of the judicial investigation.

“The Attorney General’s Office is repeating the same thing as the compromised CNE: that expenses incurred after the legal campaign period ended, such as the costs parties incur for election monitors to protect votes (…) are campaign expenses. Their so-called overspending is not overspending,” Petro wrote on X.

The president argued that several of the questioned expenditures took place after election day, when, according to his interpretation, the campaign had already formally concluded.

A tariff dispute between Colombia and Ecuador escalated to 100% duties on Colombian imports after Ecuador cited a lack of cooperation on border security

The Andean Community of Nations (CAN) ordered Colombia and Ecuador to dismantle, within 10 business days, the trade restrictions and tariff measures imposed since late 2025, concluding that they violate the legal framework governing the regional bloc composed of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru.

The decision was adopted through three resolutions issued May 8, 2026, by the CAN General Secretariat, led by Gonzalo Gutiérrez Reinel, following an assessment of trade disputes that emerged between the two countries amid tensions related to border security and commerce.

The organization concluded that several measures implemented by Quito and Bogotá violate the Cartagena Agreement, the founding treaty of Andean integration, which prohibits restrictions on intraregional trade among member states.

More information about the “security tariff”: Colombia and Ecuador Escalate Trade Tensions with Tariffs Raised to 100%.

Ecuador ordered to lift border restrictions and “security tariff”

The first resolution, No. 2581, ruled in favor of Colombia in a complaint related to Ecuador’s decision to limit bilateral land trade to a single border crossing. The General Secretariat classified the measure as a “restriction on Andean subregional trade” and granted Ecuador 10 business days to withdraw it.

The resolution also urged both countries to strengthen bilateral cooperation on border security matters.

“To urge the Republic of Ecuador and the Republic of Colombia to strengthen bilateral cooperation and coordination mechanisms in border control (…) through joint actions, without affecting the normal development of subregional trade,” the organization stated in Resolution 2581.

Meanwhile, Resolution 2582 ordered Ecuador to eliminate the so-called “security tariff” imposed exclusively on Colombian imports, which initially stood at 30% and later escalated to 100%.

According to CAN, the measure violates the Trade Liberalization Program established under the Cartagena Agreement and constitutes a “disguised tariff.”

The General Secretariat concluded that the so-called Customs Control Service Fee (TSCA) or “security tariff” does not qualify as a legitimate fee because it does not compensate for an individualized service to importers, but instead finances general state functions related to intelligence and strategic security.

Ecuador was given a maximum of 10 business days to dismantle the measure and formally report compliance. So far, the government of President Daniel Noboa has not issued an official response to the resolutions.

CAN also orders Colombia to dismantle countermeasures

“I have no problem removing tariffs on Ecuadorian products in the same manner and timeline in which they were imposed,” Petro wrote on X after the ruling became public.

The third resolution, No. 2583, rejected the trade countermeasures adopted by Colombia in response to Ecuador.

The government of President Gustavo Petro had issued Decree 0170, later tightened through Decree 0455, imposing reciprocal tariffs ranging from 30% to 75% on Ecuadorian products and restricting the entry of rice, potatoes, onions, and fishery products through specific border crossings.

CAN concluded that these measures are also incompatible with Andean community regulations.

Trade dispute rooted in security tensions

The commercial dispute between the two countries intensified beginning in late 2025 and reached its peak in April 2026, when both governments progressively increased tariffs and trade restrictions, citing concerns related to border security and anti-narcotics enforcement.

The tensions particularly affected border regions, where business groups and transport operators warned of disruptions to trade flows and rising logistical costs.

CAN’s resolutions now seek to restore free trade conditions within the Andean bloc and reduce diplomatic tensions between two of its largest economies.

The Venezuelan government on Wednesday published a declaration saying it regretted recent violence in the Catatumbo region of Colombia just days after Bogotá announced bombing in cooperation with Caracas.

The statement muddies the waters about whether or not Venezuela was involved in the military operations against the National Liberation Army (ELN) rebels near the two countries’ joint border, which allegedly killed 7 guerrilla fighters. 

“The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela expresses its profound concern and regrets the escalation of violence in the border region of Catatumbo,” read a statement shared on X by Foreign Minister Yvan Gil.

The declaration came after Colombian President Gustavo Petro said on Monday that he had ordered the bombing in cooperation with Venezuela. 

“I gave the order to bomb the ELN camp in accordance with the agreement reached with the Bolivarian government of Venezuela,” wrote Petro on X.

Petro appeared to allude to an agreement with Caracas to cooperate on tackling cross-border crime following his visit to Venezuela in April. 

But Caracas appeared to wash its hands of the recent bombing operation; while it did not directly acknowledge the bombing or Petro’s statement, its declaration said that it “rejects any armed action that compromises the peace, stability, and security of border communities.” 

It added that the only way to preserve peace and stability in the region is through “mechanisms of understanding and mutual respect, avoiding actions that can aggravate tensions or generate greater risks for border populations, who for decades have faced the consequences of a conflict out of their control.”

Since last year, Catatumbo has been the site of what has been described as “the most serious humanitarian crisis of recent times” in Colombia. In January 2025, a family of three, including a nine-month-old baby, was killed, marking the collapse of fragile peace pacts between the ELN and the Frente 33 – a dissident faction of the demobilized FARC rebels – and triggering a humanitarian crisis on a scale not seen in the country for over a decade.

The Red Cross said that 2025 was one of the most complicated years for humanitarian conditions in Colombia: more than 235,000 people were individually displaced, over 176,000 people have been unable to move freely because of armed conflict, and there has also been a sharp increase in cases of mass displacements.

Venezuela’s statement highlights the cross-border nature of the conflict, noting that the country “has historically suffered the consequences of Colombian internal conflict.” Colombian armed groups like the ELN and dissident FARC factions have traditionally had a significant presence in Venezuela and were known to have ties to the Nicolás Maduro regime.

But both the interim government under Delcy Rodríguez and Petro have been under pressure from the White House to confront guerrilla groups.

The post Venezuela contradicts Colombia cooperation claims about military strikes near border appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

Ecuador’s decision to lower tariffs starting June 1 could mark the beginning of a de-escalation in tensions with Colombia

The government of Ecuador, led by President Daniel Noboa, announced a reduction in the so-called “security tariff” applied to imports from Colombia, lowering it from 100% to 75% effective June 1, 2026.

The decision was announced in an official statement from Ecuador’s presidency, which said the measure “reaffirms the national government’s willingness to move toward bilateral cooperation mechanisms on security matters, promoting greater coordination between both countries and strengthening the development of the border region.”

More information about the “security tariff”: Colombia and Ecuador Escalate Trade Tensions with Tariffs Raised to 100%.

Political tensions and tariff dispute

Differences between the governments of Gustavo Petro and Noboa have escalated since 2025, driven by political, commercial and border security disagreements.

In April 2025, Petro initially said he could not recognize Noboa’s election, arguing that Ecuador’s electoral process had taken place “under a state of emergency” and with military presence during voting. However, he later reversed his position and attended Noboa’s inauguration ceremony on May 24, 2025, in Quito.

Since then, both countries have faced disputes related to border security, trade and energy transportation, leading to a gradual escalation in tariffs. Import duties increased progressively from 30% to 50% and later reached 100% on April 9, 2026.

Read: Colombia to Reinforce Border Security with Ecuador Amid Escalating Trade Tensions.

“Unfortunately, it is not possible to reach agreements with someone who does not share the same commitment to fighting narco-terrorism. Since we adopted this measure, violent deaths along the northern border have decreased by 33%. In the future, it will be possible to talk with a government that is truly committed to fighting crime and drug trafficking,” Noboa wrote on X on April 10, 2026, while defending the tougher trade measures.

Signs of de-escalation

The tariff reduction announced by Ecuador coincides with the Colombian government’s earlier decision not to raise its own tariffs to 100%, a move seen as a sign of moderation that could help ease diplomatic and commercial tensions between the two countries.

The dispute has particularly affected Colombian border regions such as Nariño and Cauca, which are already facing security challenges linked to the presence of illegal armed groups and recent violent attacks.

Read: Rising Violence in Colombia: Highway Explosion Leaves 21 Dead, Dozens Injured.

Colombia’s Minister of Commerce, Industry and Tourism, Diana Marcela Morales Rojas, said that “what we are seeing is that Ecuador’s initial strategy did not produce the expected effects on Colombia and instead generated distortions within its own trade system.”

In that regard, “Colombia has maintained and will continue to maintain a permanent willingness for technical dialogue and cooperation, with the same seriousness with which it adopts its policy decisions. Along that path, we are ready to move forward,” the minister added on X.

Meanwhile, Colombian Foreign Minister Rosa Villavicencio said during an interview broadcast by La FM that the government would seek to “resume dialogue with Ecuador in hopes of restoring relations, reducing those tariffs and returning to the trade flow we previously had.”

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National Health Superintendence oversees patients’ rights and regulates EPS insurers, a key pillar of the system that President Petro has sought to eliminate in his reform efforts

Former Medellín mayor and former presidential pre-candidate Daniel Quintero has been appointed as Colombia’s new National Superintendent of Health, a decision that has sparked controversy across political and social sectors due to ongoing judicial and disciplinary investigations against him.

The National Health Superintendence is responsible for safeguarding the rights of users within the health system, overseeing Health Promoting Entities (also called EPS) and Health Service Providers (IPS), and monitoring the use of public finances allocated to the sector, areas that President Gustavo Petro has sought to reform during his administration.

The appointment comes amid a complex situation in Colombia’s health system. During his administration, President Petro presented two structural reform proposals aimed at reshaping the system, including major changes to the role of EPS. Both initiatives were rejected by Congress.

Following these legislative setbacks, the government has pursued reforms through administrative measures and decrees, including the intervention of several of the country’s largest EPS, which together serve more than 23 million affiliates (More information: Colombian President Gustavo Petro Seeks To Restructure Colombian Health Care Despite Congressional Rejection by Finance Colombia).

During his swearing-in, Quintero said his administration would strengthen oversight of the system. “It is time to put an end to abuses by the EPS,” he said.

Criticism over qualifications and legal cases

The appointment has drawn criticism from organizations and political figures who question both his background as an electronic engineer and his legal situation. Transparency for Colombia said the designation “is inappropriate because it places a political figure widely questioned for using public office to favor private interests in charge of addressing the health crisis, instead of appointing individuals with the training, knowledge, and experience required to resolve it.”

The organization also called on the Attorney General’s Office to expedite ongoing investigations. “We respectfully call on the Attorney General’s Office (FGN) to ensure that cases involving Daniel Quintero move forward swiftly, respecting due process guarantees while delivering results in light of the seriousness of the allegations,” it said.

Quintero, who served as mayor of Medellín from 2020 to 2023, faces more than 40 criminal and disciplinary complaints related to alleged corruption during his administration. Among them is the “Aguas Vivas” case, involving the sale of a forest reserve land plot exceeding 140,000 square meters. In that case, prosecutors have already filed charges for alleged embezzlement, undue interest in public contracts, and misconduct in office, although no conviction has been issued.

Criticism has also emerged from within the government. Carlos Carrillo, head of Colombia’s National Unit for Disaster Risk Management, said that “Quintero is currently on trial for crimes against public administration. He has the right to defend himself, but the Pacto Histórico has no reason to bear the political cost of his legal troubles; we owe him nothing and he brings us nothing.”

Quintero will be the fifth health superintendent appointed during Petro’s administration. His tenure is expected to be temporary, as a new president will take office on August 7, 2026, and will have the authority to appoint a new head of the agency.

Colombian Minister of Labor, Antonio Sanguino, said the government was “on the verge” of issuing a decree outlining a path to collective reparations for trade unions at a rally in Medellín on May 1.

The government had previously pledged to pay state reparations to the trade unions movement, which it has recognized as a victim of the Colombian armed conflict. 

Colombia remains one of the most dangerous countries in the world for trade unionists, accounting for 63% of all anti-union murders worldwide between 1971 and 2023, according to the Ministry of Labor of Colombia, citing data from the International Labour Organization (ILO).

The ministry had previously announced that President Gustavo Petro would sign a decree on May 1 establishing “180 remedial measures for the labor movement.”

While the measure did not materialize on International Workers’ Day, Sanguino maintained it was imminent and hailed the symbolic importance of the historic plans, telling the crowd, “so that our dead are not forgotten, so that our disappeared are present in every action of the government.” 

The measures are part of the integrated collective reparation plan (PIRC) created under the umbrella of the peace process by the Victims Unit. The PIRC was developed in collaboration with labor unions and victims—a historic milestone for the Colombian trade union movement which suffered 15,481 acts of violence between 1970 and 2021.

On May 1st, thousands of Colombian workers gathered in Parque de las Luces in Medellín for International Workers’ Day.

The march began at the Teatro Pablo Tobón Uribe at 9:00 AM while an event scheduled for 12:30 p.m. saw the president and members of his cabinet give speeches alongside social organizations and labor unions.

Speaking at the rally, Sanguino praised the city and the province’s workers: “Antioquia is a people that resists—a resilient people that has fought for its rights and for workers’ rights since the time of María Cano… Today is not Labor Day—work is an activity. It is Workers’ Day.”

Meanwhile, the crowd chanted “Antioquia is not (ex-President Álvaro) Uribe.” Banners and signs praised Gustavo Petro and his administration. There were also slogans and imagery referencing figures such as Betsabé Espinal – the Antioquian woman who led the first women’s strike in Colombia – and Che Guevara.

“I went out to march for workers’ rights because today, as every year, each and every worker in this country is recognized,” said Gladys Maya, a teacher.

The Colombian government outlined its progress on labor rights and the measures included in the labor reform: increasing the “living” minimum wage, reducing working hours, improving pay for night shifts and Sunday work, and raising benefits for older adults.

“This is not a favor; it is justice,” said Claribed Palacios, president of the Unión de Trabajadoras Afrocolombianas del Servicio Doméstico – an Afro-Colombian domestic workers’ union  – regarding progress in labor rights for workers in the sector under the new government, such as mandatory formal employment contracts.

The rally also addressed the status of the pension reform, with Gustavo Petro urging the Constitutional Court of Colombia to fully approve it.

“Dignity is the foundation of the human person, and it is achieved when a person can feel that their rights are beginning to be realized and respected. Dignity is what we bring today,” said Petro.

The president also spoke about the upcoming elections, saying that his government will guarantee democracy through a “free and dignified vote,” but that he “hopes” the next administration will continue the change and social reforms.

“Let them not return us to horror; let them not return us to La Escombrera,” said Petro, referring to a mass grave uncovered in Medellín’s Comuna 13 district. 

The post Colombia claims union reparations law is imminent at May Day rally in Medellín appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

A landmark ruling by the Superior Tribunal of Bogotá has delivered one of the strongest judicial rebukes yet of the narrative surrounding Colombia’s 2021 National Strike, concluding that some of the most destructive episodes of violence during the protests were not spontaneous acts of social unrest but part of a coordinated criminal strategy involving illegal armed groups.

The decision, issued by the Criminal Chamber of the tribunal under magistrate Jaime Andrés Velasco Velasco Muñoz, found that several of those prosecuted for violent acts in the capital maintained operational ties with cells linked to the Second Manuel Marulanda Vélez, a dissident faction of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia –  FARC.

For years, much of the public debate framed the violence of the so-called Paro Nacional as the uncontrolled overflow of legitimate citizen protests sparked by social inequality, police abuse, unemployment and widespread anger over the government of then-President Iván Duque.

But after reviewing wiretaps, surveillance records, testimonies and digital communications, the court concluded that several of the attacks that paralyzed Bogotá followed a clear operational structure, with leadership roles, territorial coordination and instructions issued in advance.

According to the ruling, some defendants acted in coordination with illegal armed actors to organize attacks on police command posts, TransMilenio stations, commercial establishments and strategic road corridors across the capital.

“For the magistrates, these were not isolated or improvised actions,” the ruling stated. “There existed an organized structure with assigned functions, defined leadership and a chain of command.”

The 2021 protests initially erupted after Duque introduced a controversial tax reform proposal during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. The measure, widely criticized for placing additional burdens on the middle and working classes during an economic crisis, quickly ignited nationwide demonstrations.

Although the government later withdrew the reform, the protests escalated into weeks of nationwide unrest, marked by deadly confrontations between demonstrators and security forces, the burning of police stations, attacks on public transport infrastructure and prolonged road blockades that crippled supply chains across Colombia.

In Bogotá alone, dozens of TransMilenio stations were vandalized or destroyed, CAI neighborhood police posts were torched, and mobility across major avenues such as Las Américas, Carrera Séptima and Autonorte was severely disrupted.

Elsewhere, especially in southwestern Colombia, blockades led to shortages of fuel, medical oxygen and basic food supplies, with business leaders warning of millions of dollars in economic losses and humanitarian consequences for vulnerable communities.

The tribunal’s ruling argues that at least part of that violence was not the natural escalation of protest, but the result of deliberate planning.

Investigators identified several WhatsApp groups allegedly used to coordinate simultaneous actions across the city. Among the names cited in the judicial file were groups linked to strategic corridors such as “Américas,” “Carrera Séptima,” “Autonorte,” “Autosur” and “Caracas.”

According to prosecutors, these digital channels were used to organize blockades, assign responsibilities and plan attacks against public infrastructure.

The court also found that some young defendants had been tasked with recruiting new members and expanding influence within university environments, both public and private, strengthening support networks and facilitating operational logistics.

One of the most significant findings involved intercepted communications that allegedly referenced support from higher-ranking commanders connected to FARC dissidents.

For the magistrates, this reinforced the conclusion that there was external coordination behind the violence, rather than a purely spontaneous citizen uprising.

The ruling now sharply challenges the long-promoted narrative of the unrest as exclusively peaceful social protest and instead reframes part of the National Strike as coordinated urban sabotage carried out under the cover of legitimate public discontent.

It also revives scrutiny of the national strike committee and senior left-wing political leaders, including current President Gustavo Petro, who strongly supported the demonstrations and positioned himself as one of the loudest critics of Duque’s handling of both the protests and the pandemic.

Critics argue that political backing from opposition leaders helped legitimize actions that moved far beyond peaceful protest, allowing criminal actors to operate behind the shield of social mobilization while deepening institutional instability.

The protests also unfolded at one of the most fragile moments of the COVID-19 emergency, when Colombia was still facing high ICU occupancy, strict mobility restrictions and biosecurity measures intended to limit mass contagion.

Large demonstrations and road blockades directly violated those restrictions, and critics maintain that the protests contributed to additional infections and unnecessary strain on an already overwhelmed public health system.

For opponents of Petro and sectors of the business community, the ruling is less a revelation than a delayed institutional acknowledgment of what many citizens experienced firsthand: burned police stations, destroyed public transport, food shortages and entire cities brought to a standstill.

After evaluating the full body of evidence, the court sentenced three of the principal defendants to 19 years in prison for terrorism and criminal conspiracy. A fourth defendant received a 10-year prison sentence.

The tribunal also imposed fines exceeding 1 billion pesos, reflecting the severe damage caused to both public and private infrastructure.

Far from closing the chapter on the National Strike, the ruling reopens one of Colombia’s deepest political wounds: whether the country witnessed a legitimate social uprising, or whether parts of it were, from the beginning, a calculated strategy of destabilization supported by organized criminal networks.

For many Colombians, the answer may shape how the country remembers 2021—and who must ultimately be held responsible.

Petro’s “Total Peace” strategy is under pressure ahead of presidential elections as violence by armed groups escalates

An explosive attack on the Pan-American Highway near the municipality of Cajibío, in Colombia’s Cauca department, left at least 21 people dead and 56 injured, Defense Minister Pedro Sánchez Suárez confirmed.

The attack occurred Saturday, April 25, on one of the main roads in the country’s southwest, an area historically affected by the presence of illegal armed groups.

The minister attributed the attack to alias “Marlon,” described as one of the most wanted leaders in the region, “for whom we are offering a reward of up to $1.4 million USD,” he said.

According to local media reports cited by El Tiempo, “the attack was initially intended to target army troops. However, a change in military plans reportedly led to the explosive being detonated while civilians were passing through the area.”

The impact of the attack was significant. Spain’s El País reported “that the explosion created a large crater, left the road covered in debris, and forced rescue operations that lasted several hours due to difficult access conditions.”

Cauca Governor Octavio Guzmán described the incident as one of the most serious attacks in the region in decades. “What happened on April 25 constitutes the most brutal and ruthless attack against civilians in decades,” he said.

The attack comes amid a resurgence of violence in southwestern Colombia, where illegal armed groups linked to drug trafficking, illegal mining and other illicit economies operate. Authorities continue operations in the area as investigations proceed to clarify the circumstances of the attack and determine responsibility.

According to reports by BBC Mundo, alias “Marlon” is a dissident FARC leader identified as Iván Jacobo Idrobo Arredondo, “the alleged head of the Jaime Martínez structure, part of the Estado Mayor Central (EMC),” one of the country’s most powerful illegal armed groups.

Operations and arrests

As part of response operations, the National Police reported the capture of José Alex Bitoco, alias “David” or “Mi Pez,” identified as the leader of the Dagoberto Ramos structure, another illegal armed faction, who is believed to have acted under orders from alias “Marlon”.

National Police Director Gen. William Rincón Zambrano said the detainee “will have to answer for the wave of terrorist activity” and linked him directly to the attack, stating that “he is responsible for what happened on April 25 in the El Túnel sector on the Pan-American Highway.”

The Defense Ministry reiterated that alias “Marlon” remains a priority target. “He is a high-value target, and we are searching for him with all the capabilities of the state. We have deployed a dedicated intelligence task force to locate him,” Sánchez said, confirming a reward of up to $1.4 million USD for information leading to his capture.

Context: criticism of “Paz Total” policy (Total Peace)

The attack comes amid growing security deterioration in Colombia, intensifying criticism of President Gustavo Petro’s “Total Peace” policy. The Ideas for Peace Foundation (FIP) has warned of a possible failure of the strategy, noting that “less than four months before the end of the government, the lack of progress in peace negotiations and the deterioration of security have become one of the main points of criticism of the Petro administration.”

According to the think tank, during the current administration “the number of disputed territories between illegal actors has nearly doubled, and the number of members in these structures has increased by 85%: they now total more than 27,000 members, including armed individuals and support networks.”

This figure not only represents a significant increase but also places the country at levels similar to, and even higher than, those seen before the peace process with the FARC began. Between 2011 and 2012, the estimate stood at around 26,800 members, compared with 14,600 at the end of Iván Duque’s administration in 2022.

The recent increase has also been rapid. According to the FIP, armed groups grew by 23.5% over the past year (from December 2024 to December 2025), reflecting a swift reconfiguration of these structures. At the same time, violence has intensified. Analysts such as Professor Karol Solís Menco note that over the weekend of April 25–26 alone, “26 terrorist attacks of varying magnitude” were recorded across the country.

Political analysis outlets point to a structural dynamic. According to La Silla Vacía, “Cauca is not experiencing an isolated event, but rather a phase of intensifying territorialized violence, marked by fragmentation among armed actors and a type of violence capable of producing national-level impacts.”

In this context, FARC dissident groups have once again taken center stage in the conflict. “Once again, attention is turning to FARC dissidents. Every attack, every gas cylinder bomb, every assault in Valle and Cauca ends with the same name on the table: the Jaime Martínez structure, one of the strongest groups of Iván Mordisco’s Estado Mayor Central,” El País reported.

Violence indicators also reflect sustained deterioration. “In the first four months of 2026, Colombia has already recorded 48 massacres, with 229 victims, most of them civilians, according to Indepaz. It is the highest figure in the past decade. With these numbers, which represent only a partial picture of the country’s violence, this election year is shaping up to be the most violent since the 2016 peace agreement with the now-defunct FARC guerrilla group,” the same outlet reported.

Cauca, where the attack took place, is considered one of the most sensitive regions. “Cauca is particularly complex because it combines multiple layers of conflict: the historic presence of Indigenous, peasant and Afro-descendant communities; illicit economies; Pacific corridors; disputes over drug trafficking routes; control of the Pan-American Highway; and the presence of FARC dissidents, particularly structures linked to Iván Mordisco,” El País said.

Experts agree that part of the difficulty lies in the design and implementation of the government’s strategy. “Early implementation was a valuable innovation in intent, but it failed to ensure minimum conditions of verification and institutional coherence,” said analyst Germán Valencia of the Peace and Reconciliation Foundation (Pares).

Taken together, these factors have led various sectors to conclude that the “Total Peace” policy faces serious structural limitations amid a scenario of armed fragmentation and territorial expansion by illegal groups.

Despite the severity of the incident, Colombia and Peru have indicated a willingness to address it through diplomacy

 An incident on April 12, 2026, has reignited diplomatic and security tensions in the Amazon border region between Colombia and Peru, following an exchange of gunfire between a Colombian civilian vessel and the Marina de Guerra del Perú, a Peruvian Navy River unit, on the Putumayo River. The incident left one Colombian citizen dead and one person injured on each side.

The episode occurred near Marandúa (Amazonas, Colombia), across from the Peruvian town of El Estrecho. According to Colombia’s Defense Minister, Pedro Sánchez, the fatal victim was identified “as José Miguel Gutiérrez Baquero, owner of the cargo vessel involved in the incident, and one of his sons was injured,” while two other crew members were detained by Peruvian authorities.

Conflicting accounts of the operation

According to the Peruvian government statement, “the incident occurred during a patrol operation aimed at securing the electoral process,” previously coordinated between the two countries. Authorities said two Navy speedboats requested that the Colombian vessel stop for identification.

Peru’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is leading the process, said that “the Colombian vessel refused to comply with the control order and opened fire on two Peruvian Navy units, which returned fire.” As a result, “a member of the Peruvian Navy was also injured, although he is out of danger.”

Colombian authorities, led by the Foreign Ministry, have requested a full clarification of the events and verification of the circumstances surrounding the exchange of gunfire.

Diplomatic channels activated

Following the incident, the governments of Colombia and Peru activated diplomatic and military channels. Colombia’s defense minister said that “preliminary measures were agreed, including prioritizing medical attention for the injured, facilitating the work of judicial authorities, and establishing a binational commission to investigate what happened.”

Colombia’s Foreign Ministry formally requested clarification of “the circumstances of time, mode and place” of the attack, while the Peruvian government expressed its “willingness to cooperate and maintain border coordination mechanisms.”

The detained individuals “remain in the custody of the Fiscalía Provincial Mixta de Putumayo, with access to consular assistance and due process guarantees.”

So far, no final responsibilities have been determined, and both countries agree on the need for a thorough investigation. Both governments said the issue will be addressed at the next High-Level Mechanism on Security and Judicial Cooperation meeting, scheduled for May 2026 in Bogotá.

Context of prior tensions

The incident comes amid sensitive bilateral relations. In recent months, Colombia and Peru have had disagreements over territorial issues in the Amazon, particularly regarding Santa Rosa de Loreto island.

The dispute dates back to August 5, 2025, when President Gustavo Petro said on X that the “government of Peru has taken over territory that belongs to Colombia” and alleged a “violation of the Rio de Janeiro Protocol, which defines the boundaries between the two countries.”

“The Rio de Janeiro Protocol established that the border is the deepest channel of the Amazon River and that any dispute must be resolved between the parties,” Petro said, referring to the emergence of new river islands “north of the current deepest channel,” which, according to his position, should belong to Colombia.

In response, Peru’s Foreign Ministry expressed its “strongest and most forceful protest,” stating that the island, home to about 3,000 residents, mostly Peruvians, is part of its territory and is key to regional river trade.

Tensions escalated days later when then-presidential pre-candidate Daniel Quintero traveled to the island and raised a Colombian flag during a campaign event broadcast on social media, saying: “I will not allow them to take the Amazon from us. Santa Rosa is Colombia.”

The Peruvian government described the act as an “unnecessary action” that “distracts from the cooperation efforts that Peru and Colombia must prioritize to jointly address urgent challenges.”

Headline photo: President Gustavo Petro, Vice President Francia Márquez and Defense Minister Pedro Sánchez at an event held in Leticia (Amazonas) to address tensions with Peru, Aug. 7, 2025. Photo courtesy of Colombia’s Ministry of Defense.

Colombia’s Defense Ministry detailed a plan to bolster security along the Ecuador border

Colombia’s government has announced a package of measures to strengthen security in municipalities along the border with Ecuador, amid escalating tensions between the two countries over security and trade issues.

According to a statement released by the presidency, the actions include “the deployment of 200 additional National Police officers and 270 soldiers, as well as enhanced maritime and riverine capabilities for territorial control and the fight against drug trafficking.”

The plan also includes technical support for surveillance systems, the deployment of two armored platoons to ensure troop mobility, and meetings aimed at strengthening joint operations by security forces and control at border crossings.

Defense Minister Pedro Sánchez announced the measures, stating that “we will not allow criminal groups seeking to profit from illegal activities such as drug trafficking, illegal mining, extortion and smuggling to affect security indicators.”

He added that security forces have already seized 2.4 tons of drugs and remain deployed in the region “to protect our seas and critically disrupt drug trafficking.”

Context: security and trade tensions

The measures come days before Ecuador’s tariff increase takes effect, raising the so-called “security tariff” on Colombian goods from 50% to 100% starting May 1, 2026.

Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa told Revista Semana magazine that the decision is not part of a “trade war” with Colombia but rather reflects the costs of reinforcing border security. “We have to spend twice as much, and it costs $400 million USD more per year to keep our armed forces deployed at the border,” he said.

For its part, Colombia’s government has rejected claims of insufficient action on border security. Minister of Commerce, Industry and Tourism Diana Marcela Morales Rojas said Colombia has kept diplomatic channels open.

“We have exhausted all diplomatic efforts and maintained open dialogue channels with the Government of Ecuador, seeking a solution that benefits both countries, businesses and, above all, communities on both sides of the border. However, we have not received a positive response,” she said in a statement.

At the same time, Colombia is evaluating its tariff response. Although President Gustavo Petro previously said he would not impose 100% tariffs on Ecuador, a draft update to Decree 170 of 2026 has recently emerged proposing differentiated tariffs of 35%, 50% and 75% on imports from the neighboring country. So far, the proposal has not been signed or officially published.

More information on the trade dispute between Colombia and Ecuador? Read Trade War Between Colombia And Ecuador Escalates, With 50% Tariffs Threatened by Finance Colombia.

Colombians are expressing outrage and grief after a bombing attributed to dissident factions of the former FARC killed 20 people and left injured 46, marking the country’s deadliest attack in over a decade.

The blast on Saturday afternoon tore through a stretch of the Pan-American Highway near Cajibío, in the southwestern department of Cauca, leaving mangled vehicles, a massive crater, and scenes of devastation that authorities described as among the most brutal assaults on civilians in recent memory.

Departmental governor Octavio Guzmán said the explosion, which injured at least 36 people, including children, was the “most ruthless attack against the civilian population in decades,” adding that several vehicles were overturned by the force of the blast.

Military officials said attackers blocked traffic with a bus and another vehicle before detonating explosives as cars and buses were stranded along the highway, a vital artery linking Colombia’s southwest with the cities of Popayán and Cali.

The attack, attributed to a FARC dissident faction led by Iván Mordisco, came amid a surge of violence across southwestern Colombia, with authorities reporting at least 26 attacks over a two-day period in Cauca and neighbouring Valle del Cauca. Incidents included explosions, arson attacks on vehicles, and assaults on security forces in cities such as Cali, Palmira, and Jamundí.

But as the country mourns, President Gustavo Petro faced mounting criticism after posting images of himself celebrating his birthday, prompting accusations of insensitivity and a lack of leadership during a national crisis.

Late on Saturday evening, Petro shared a photograph on social media showing himself alongside three friends, all wearing Hawaiian-style flower garland necklaces, accompanied by a message marking his birthday on April 19. “Surrounded by love and bonds of affection,” Petro wrote. “We are an army of Quixotes doing the impossible and achieving the impossible.”

The post, which appeared hours after reports of the deadly attack emerged, sparked immediate backlash from political leaders and the public, many of whom questioned the president’s priorities at a moment of national mourning.

Senator Juan Manuel Galán criticized the timing of the message, writing on social media: “19 people murdered in Cajibío, Cauca, the country bleeding, the Pan-American highway turned into tragedy… but the priorities of Gustavo Petro were clear: the country in mourning and he showing us how he celebrated his birthday.”

Presidential hopeful Paloma Valencia travelled to Palmira to meet with victims’ families and express solidarity. “We are with the people who are afraid, who are mourning their loved ones, who need to feel safe again. Petro should be here,” she said.

The criticism underscores deep tensions surrounding Petro’s security strategy, particularly his “Total Peace” policy aimed at negotiating with illegal armed groups. Critics argue the approach has failed to contain violence in regions such as Cauca, where armed groups linked to narcotics trafficking and illegal mining continue to operate with increasing intensity.

Saturday’s bombing, one of the most lethal attacks since the 2016 peace accord with the FARC, has renewed fears about Colombia’s security trajectory and the resilience of dissident factions that refused to demobilise.

Images from the scene showed debris scattered across the highway, shattered vehicles, and a large crater where the explosion occurred. Authorities confirmed that 15 women and five men were among the dead, while several of the injured remained in critical condition.

For residents of the region, the attack has deepened a sense of vulnerability and abandonment.

“Cauca cannot continue to face this barbarity alone,” Governor Guzmán said, calling for greater national support and a stronger security response.

As Colombia approaches a general election on May 31, the attack also reveals the extent to which  the state remains unable to protect civilians, let alone presidential candidates opposed to the failed security policies of the country’s first leftist administration. “Petro: You are simply a disgrace. Show some empathy. Show some respect,” noted Paloma Valencia from Palmira.

 

Colombian President Gustavo Petro will meet Venezuela’s interim leader Delcy Rodríguez in Caracas on Friday to address security challenges along the shared border, marking their first official encounter since Nicolás Maduro was captured by U.S special forces on January 3, 2026.

The meeting, to be held at the Miraflores presidential palace, is expected to center on coordination between the two countries to tackle armed groups, drug trafficking and other cross-border threats that have long destabilized frontier regions.

Colombia’s presidency said the talks aim to “strengthen bilateral cooperation, territorial control and coordination on security matters,” following the cancellation of a previous meeting scheduled for March 13 at the border due to security concerns cited by Caracas.

Friday’s talks come after Rodríguez assumed power earlier this year following the capture of former Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro during Operation Absolute Resolve.

Petro is expected to travel to Caracas after holding meetings earlier in Bogotá. The leaders will first hold a private discussion to outline joint actions addressing border instability, followed by a broader metting between their respective delegations aimed at formalizing institutional commitments.

Officials from both countries are also expected to sign the final act of the III Commission on Neighborhood and Integration, with foreign ministers participating, before delivering statements to the media.

The Colombia–Venezuela border stretches more than 2,200 kilometers (1,367 miles) from the Caribbean coast to the Amazon basin and has long been a hotspot for illegal activity, including the presence of the National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrilla, as well as drug trafficking and smuggling networks.

Petro said earlier this week that the talks would place particular emphasis on the Catatumbo region, one of the most volatile areas along the frontier, where violence linked to armed groups and illicit economies has intensified.

“If we go, Catatumbo is a key issue to discuss with President Delcy,” Petro said during a cabinet meeting on April 21, adding that his delegation would include military and police officials to coordinate security strategies.

He said the goal is to develop a joint security plan, improve coordination between the two countries’ armed forces and police, and deepen intelligence-sharing, warning that a lack of cooperation could lead to operations that harm civilian populations.

The meeting also comes against the backdrop of a rebound in bilateral trade between the two countries following years of strained relations.

Trade flows have increased significantly in recent years, rising from around US$200 million three years ago to more than $1 billion, representing an increase of roughly 600%, according to official figures.

Colombia recorded a trade surplus of US$1 billion with Venezuela in 2025, underscoring the economic incentives for both governments to maintain stable ties despite ongoing political uncertainties.

Petro first announced the trip last week during an interview in Spain, referencing the earlier failed meeting and signaling his willingness to travel to Caracas to advance talks.

The visit marks a key test of Colombia’s role in engaging with Venezuela’s transitional leadership, as both countries seek to stabilize their shared border while cautiously rebuilding diplomatic and economic relations in the post-Maduro era.

President Gustavo Petro recalls Colombia’s ambassador and signals a potential withdrawal from the Andean Community of Nations (CAN)

Ecuador’s government announced an increase in the so-called “security tariff” applied to imports from Colombia, raising it from 50% to 100%, a move that has intensified trade tensions between the two countries.

In response, the Colombian government, through its Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism, said it will match Ecuador’s measure by adjusting its tariffs to the same level, arguing the need to “maintain balance in bilateral trade conditions.”

The Ecuadorian decision was formalized through a resolution issued by the National Customs Service of Ecuador (Servicio Nacional de Aduana del Ecuador), which establishes that the new tariff will take effect on May 1, 2026.

According to Ecuador’s government, led by President Daniel Noboa, the measure is driven by concerns over border security. In an official statement, authorities said that “after confirming the lack of implementation of concrete and effective border security measures by Colombia, Ecuador is obliged to adopt sovereign actions.”

Colombia’s response and diplomatic measures

Amid the escalation, President Gustavo Petro announced immediate diplomatic actions, including recalling Colombia’s ambassador to Ecuador, María Antonia Velasco, whom he said “must return immediately” to Colombia. He also stated that “the next cabinet meeting will be held at a location along the border with Ecuador,” in a message posted on X.

Petro also criticized statements from Ecuador’s government, saying that “the president of Ecuador insults the Colombian government, which has seized more cocaine than at any point in world history.”

For her part, Minister of Commerce, Industry and Tourism, Diana Marcela Morales Rojas said Colombia “had maintained open diplomatic channels prior to Ecuador’s decision.”

“We have exhausted all diplomatic efforts and kept dialogue channels open with the Government of Ecuador, seeking a solution that benefits both countries, businesses, and above all, communities on both sides of the border. However, we have not received a positive response,” she said in a statement.

Economic impact and trade response

Colombia’s government, led by the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism, also announced it will amend Decree 170 to raise tariffs to 100%, in line with Ecuador’s measure. The proposal will be submitted to the Committee on Customs, Tariff and Foreign Trade Affairs (Triple A) for review, meaning that details and the effective date of the increase have yet to be determined.

According to the statement, Ecuador’s tariff hike distorts competitive conditions in the Andean market, negatively affecting Colombian producers competing with Ecuadorian goods.

The government also announced relief measures aimed at mitigating the impact on the productive sector, including favorable credit lines, expanded access to financing, and mechanisms to preserve employment.

Political escalation and questions over the Andean system

Amid the growing trade dispute, President Petro also signaled a potential shift in Colombia’s economic foreign policy, stating that Ecuador’s actions “mark the end of the Andean Pact for Colombia.”

“We have nothing left to do there. The foreign minister must begin the process of joining Mercosur as a full member and redirect our efforts toward the Caribbean and Central America,” he said.

The Andean Pact, also known as the Andean Community of Nations (CAN), established in 1969 by Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia, has historically been a cornerstone of regional economic integration.

Both governments have filed formal complaints with the CAN, which will assess the admissibility of the claims and may mediate the dispute.

More information on the trade dispute between Colombia and Ecuador? Read Trade War Between Colombia And Ecuador Escalates, With 50% Tariffs Threatened by Finance Colombia.

Above photo: President Gustavo Petro of Colombia with President Daniel Noboa of Ecuador (photo courtesy Presidencia of Ecuador)

Former Foreign Minister Álvaro Leyva releases another scathing attack on his former boss as he fights charges.

On April 10, former Colombian Foreign Minister Álvaro Leyva Durán released a formal statement responding to his indictment by the Fiscalía General de la Nación. Leyva faces charges related to his 2023 decision to declare a passport procurement tender void, a process that involved the private security printing firm Thomas Greg & Sons. The former official characterized the legal proceedings as a politically motivated maneuver orchestrated from the Casa de Nariño.

The indictment for prevarication centers on Leyva’s intervention in the bidding process, which the Fiscalía interprets as a deliberate breach of administrative law. In his defense, Leyva maintained that his actions were necessary to address irregularities and ensure the application of the Constitución Política de Colombia. He argued that the prosecuting body’s thesis would criminalize the conduct of any public servant who identifies unconstitutional terms in a government contract.

“If that argument is accepted, then any official who declares a bidding process void because they find the terms and conditions unconstitutional or illegal should go to jail.” — Álvaro Leyva Durán, former Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Leyva also directed accusations toward his successor at the Cancillería, Luis Gilberto Murillo. According to the statement, Murillo suspended a subsequent legal bidding process to justify a state of emergency, which Leyva claims led to an unnecessary markup of approximately $30 billion COP. Furthermore, Leyva alleged that software contracts exceeding $10 billion COP were improperly managed and that the funds remain unaccounted for under the current administration.

The former minister’s statement included severe personal and political criticisms of President Gustavo Petro. Leyva alleged a lack of moral conduct by the head of state during international state visits and questioned the president’s sobriety in public settings. The letter further asserted that US authorities are currently investigating potential links between the executive branch and narcotics trafficking organizations.

Regarding the domestic political landscape, Leyva warned of perceived risks to the Colombian electoral process. He alleged that the administration has engaged in the illegal interception of political candidates and intends to undermine the integrity of future vote counts. Leyva concluded by affirming his intention to defend his record and his legal decisions before the Corte Suprema de Justicia.

COMUNICADO pic.twitter.com/7YYhoHJD4B

— Álvaro Leyva Durán (@AlvaroLeyva) April 10, 2026

Finance Colombia translation of Leyva’s recent open letter dated April 10th

Some time ago, I denounced in a public communiqué that Gustavo Petro had woven against me an atrocious persecution, as retaliation for my denunciations of his closeness to the world of drugs—denunciations that have led to the United States having him cornered today. There I warned that, from within the government, intrigues were being made to throw me in prison and that attempts would be made against my life.

Now, months later, the Attorney General’s Office accuses me of malfeasance (prevaricato) because I declared void a passport tender that, according to that same institution, was based on a “catch-all specifications document” (pliego sastre). For the accusing entity, I should not have fulfilled the obligation of applying the Constitution that I myself helped draft and, by seeking equality, I acted with malicious intent. The world turned upside down.

Understand the gravity: if that thesis is accepted, any official who declares a tender void because they find unconstitutional or illegal specifications must go to prison. So, faced with such a thing, the trial is welcome. I will give the battle in the Supreme Court with all my strength. Because I trust its magistrates, because my life has been a permanent struggle for Colombia, and because justice, reason, and the law are with me.

The acquittal will be the logical consequence of the process in which I will prove, with official documents and among other things, the following: that I left in motion a new, clean, and legal tender, which Minister Luis Gilberto Murillo suspended. That he thus justified another manifest urgency, completely unnecessary, and added an overcharge of nearly 30 billion pesos to it. And that he contracted software for more than 10 billion additional pesos, which was pocketed. All by hand-picking. All murky. All without control. Thus, by brute force, the door was opened to the passport debacle of today. I warned Petro of what was coming down on the country. But he kept silent.

Today I feel the pride of having helped unmask the boss of the mafia that has plunged Colombia into its darkest hours. I took office as his Foreign Minister with the hope of change. But then I came to know his life of vice and decadence. I was slow to understand his vileness and, surely, also slow to denounce it. But from my father Jorge Leyva Urdaneta, exiled for opposing the dictatorship, I inherited courage and respect for institutions; from Álvaro Gómez Hurtado, I learned the necessity of a just order; and from Misael Pastrana Borrero, I learned to think about social peace. So, faithful to myself and to the spirit of my mentors, I denounced in various letters the moral, political, and personal degeneration that I came to know in Gustavo Petro. And time has proven me right.

The President is an infamous being: international human trafficking is a scourge of the poor girls of Colombia, and he, in the middle of a state visit, ends up as a customer of a brothel in Lisbon; he claims to be a champion of peace, but full of hatred he violently divides society with his stale, classist, and racist rhetoric; he claims to fight drug trafficking, but he goes out into the public square drugged, drunk on alcohol and sectarianism, to mistreat and insult those who contradict him, while in the United States his ties to narcos are being investigated. And so, from scandal to scandal, the horrible night does not cease: the homeland trampled by its own President is today the object of all the mockery abroad.

Petro knows that the upcoming electoral process resembles the one recently lived in Chile. And, to avoid the same result, he illegally intercepts candidates, seeks to destroy them, and is already trying to cast a mantle of doubt over the vote count. But Colombia deserves a new dawn. And the radical left, which—turned into the President’s hooligan squad—forgives him everything, seems condemned to the desert. We shall see whether, in the future, they also forgive him for being responsible for their possible defeat. For my part, I remain ready for all battles: always embracing justice against oppression, and with the law as my spear, shield, and banner.

 

 

Ecopetrol’s board has approved a temporary leave for Ricardo Roa, keeping him out of office until Colombia’s presidential elections wrap up at the end of June 2026

Ecopetrol’s board of directors has approved an unpaid leave of absence for its president, Ricardo Roa Barragán, amid ongoing judicial investigations and growing pressure from unions, minority shareholders and political sectors.

In an official statement, the company said Roa “requested to use his accrued vacation days from April 7 to May 27, 2026,” and that the board also approved an unpaid leave requested by himself, “beginning on May 28 and lasting 30 calendar days.” This means he will be away from his duties for a continuous period extending through the end of June, after Colombia’s presidential elections scheduled for May 31 and June 21, if a runoff is required.

The decision comes in a context marked by two investigations led by the Attorney General’s Office. The first relates to an alleged case of influence peddling involving the purchase of an apartment in northern Bogotá, for which Roa has already been formally charged, although he has pleaded not guilty. The second concerns a possible breach of campaign finance limits during President Gustavo Petro’s 2022 presidential campaign, which Roa managed.

Both cases remain under review by judicial authorities, who will assess the evidence and issue a ruling (Colombia’s Top Prosecutor Charges Ecopetrol President in Alleged Influence-Peddling Case).

Roa’s temporary departure also follows pressure from some of the company’s main labor unions (Strike Threat Looms as Colombia Oil and Gas Union Calls for Ecopetrol President’s Removal), as well as minority shareholders (Ecopetrol Shareholders Loudly Heckle CEO Ricardo Roa at Annual Meeting as Leadership Dispute & Corruption Scandal Roils The Petroleum Company), and opposition political groups.

If this timeline holds, his potential return will coincide with the post-election period, ahead of the transition process with the new government set to take office on August 7, which is expected to appoint a new board and select a new president for the state-controlled oil and gas company.

Acting president appointed

During Roa’s absence, the board appointed Juan Carlos Hurtado Parra as acting president of Ecopetrol. According to the statement, Hurtado currently serves as executive vice president of hydrocarbons and has been the first alternate to the presidency since November 16, 2025.

He has “more than 28 years of experience in the energy sector, including roles as vice president of exploration, development, and production at Ecopetrol and has held executive positions focused on resource management and coordination. He is an electrical engineer, holds a specialization in Project Evaluation and Development, and has a Master of Business Administration (MBA) in International Oil and Gas.”

The Colombian National Police published a report this week summarizing the results of its counter-narcotics operations during the first quarter of 2026.

Authorities highlighted the results of their new anti-drug dubbed ‘Esmeralda Plus‘, which has led to the seizure of 124 tons of cocaine and 99 tons of cannabis.

The report comes as President Gustavo Petro faces pressure from the White House to prove his commitment to countering the illicit drug trade, which has been a source of dispute between the two administrations.

“We are delivering significant strikes against drug trafficking. Today we fulfill our duty to Colombia and the world with dignity,” said Brigadier General William Castaño Ramos, Director of the Anti-Narcotics Division, following the report’s publication.

In addition to the 124 tons of cocaine and 99 tons of cannabis confiscated, the police also seized over 450,000 gallons of liquid chemicals and 396,000 kilograms of solid ingredients used in drug production.

They also announced the destruction of 981 narcotics laboratories and the recovery of 99 ampoules of fentanyl.

The confiscation figures mark a significant increase in seizures compared to the first 100 days of 2025, which saw 104 tons of cocaine and 63 tons of cannabis confiscated. 

These figures serve as a response to the heavy tensions that preceded the White House meeting, when U.S. President Donald Trump personally attacked Petro, signaling him as a “man who likes to make cocaine” and claiming that Colombia was “very sick” under his leadership.

The report comes amid mounting pressure by Washington for the Petro administration to tackle drug production. 

Trump has accused Colombia of failing to cooperate in the fight against the narcotics trade and carried out a series of unilateral aerial strikes against suspected ‘narco-vessels’ off the coast of Colombia since September, actions condemned by the Petro as a violation of national sovereignty.

Furthermore, Colombia’s President is currently facing two preliminary criminal investigations in Brooklyn and Manhattan regarding his 2022 electoral campaign. U.S. prosecutors are examining alleged illicit donations from drug trafficking networks and meetings with traffickers intended to block extraditions.

“The United States has found a mechanism to pressure the government and extract the maximum amount of concessions regarding the fight against drugs,” Sandra Borda, Professor of Political Science at the University of the Andes, told The Bogotá Post. 

While the Colombian government appears to have stepped up its counter-narcotics operations amid U.S. pressure, some say this may not be enough to appease the White House.

“For Washington, these technical results are necessary, but they aren’t enough to fully restore trust,” Nelson Poveda, a political analyst and international affairs expert with experience in Colombia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, told The Bogotá Post. “Still, these reports act as a bridge for ‘technical diplomacy,’ allowing cooperation to continue even when the political relationship is tense.”

In the report, authorities stress that ‘Esmeralda Plus’ attacks narcotics trafficking as a holistic system rather than just seizing drugs.

“We are directly destabilizing the finances, logistics, and operational capacity of these criminal structures,” pointed out General William Rincón, Chief of the National Police Service.

But Colombia has been excluded from key regional counter-narcotics efforts, notably the “Shield of the Americas”, a new anti-drug alliance promoted by Donald Trump.

The White House has historically favored eradication – the destruction of drug crops – as a counter-narcotics strategy. 

But Petro has consistently defended his “Total Peace” policy, arguing that the war on drugs must move away from just persecuting farmers and shift toward dismantling the financial backbone of cartels and taking down criminal leaders.

However, authorities reported 40 arrests for extradition purposes and more than 17,000 arrests related to drug trafficking so far this year. Additionally, the manual eradication of around 2,000 hectares of illicit crops shows that the Colombian administration is maintaining a mixed offensive that combines social policy with high-impact law enforcement.

With the 2026 electoral cycle approaching in Colombia, Petro’s administration is under immense pressure to show that this humanitarian approach is not a sign of weakness before he leaves office.

The post Colombian authorities highlight anti-drug efforts amid US pressure appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

Credit downgrade is an indictment of the Petro administration’s fiscal management, including suspension of the fiscal rule.

On April 8, 2026, S&P Global Ratings (NYSE: SPGI) lowered its long-term foreign currency sovereign credit rating on Colombia to BB- from BB and its long-term local currency rating to BB from BB+. The outlook for both ratings is stable, reflecting expectations that the Government of Colombia will gradually reduce its fiscal deficit while sustaining moderate growth in the national gross domestic product.

The rating action follows persistent fiscal imbalances and a policy environment that has become less predictable since the pandemic-related recession. The government decision to suspend the national fiscal rule in 2025 marked a significant shift in the policy framework. Pro-cyclical fiscal policies have provided marginal support for employment and consumption, but have also contributed to higher inflation expectations and a wider current account deficit. S&P expects the general government fiscal deficit to reach 5.6% of the national gross domestic product in 2026, compared to 5.3% in 2025.

“We expect Colombia to have consistently large fiscal deficits over the next few years.” — S&P Global Ratings

Institutional stability remains a key factor in the rating, though challenges persist. A fragmented legislature followed the March 2026 elections, where Pacto Histórico and Centro Democrático emerged with the largest minorities. The upcoming presidential election, scheduled for May 31, 2026, adds further uncertainty. Candidates such as Iván Cepeda of Pacto Histórico, Paloma Valencia, and Abelardo de la Espriella have proposed varying approaches to fiscal consolidation. The new administration will inherit spending pressures related to domestic security, rising healthcare costs, and pension payments linked to minimum wage increases.

The Banco de la República, the independent central bank of the country, has maintained a tight monetary policy to combat inflationary pressures. Annual inflation reached 5.3% in February 2026, prompting the bank to increase reference rates to 11.25%. S&P anticipates that inflation will not return to the target range of 3% +/- 1% until early 2029. While the independent status of the central bank provides a buffer against external shocks, high interest rates and lower-than-expected revenue collections have contributed to the widening deficit since 2024.

Economic growth is projected at 2.5% for 2026, slightly below the 2.6% recorded in 2025. Per capita growth is estimated at $9,900 USD for 2026, with real growth expected to average just above 2% through 2029. Despite being a net energy exporter, the performance of the US economy and international energy prices continue to influence national outcomes. Hydrocarbon exports declined to 35% of goods exports in 2025, down from 67% in 2013, showing some diversification even as the sector remains a primary source of volatility.

Net general government debt is forecast to approach 66% of the national gross domestic product by 2029, rising from 60.4% in 2025. S&P notes that the government interest burden will average 12.3% of general government revenue over the next three years. The shift toward issuing shorter-term debt instruments has reduced reported interest payments but increased vulnerability to interest rate fluctuations. External indicators remain a concern, with narrow net external debt expected to stabilize at 130% of current account receipts through 2029. Foreign direct investment is expected to be the primary source for funding the current account deficit, which is projected to stabilize around 2.6% of the national gross domestic product.

Vise photo credit © Loren Moss

President Gustavo Petro has triggered a rare institutional confrontation with the Central Bank  after he ordered to “break relations” following an modest interest rate increase, raising concerns over economic policy independence just two months before the May 31 presidential election.

The board of Banco de la República voted on March 31 to raise its benchmark rate by 100 basis points to 11.25 per cent, defying government pressure for looser policy. Finance minister Germán Ávila denounced the move as “disproportionate” and withdrew from the board, accusing policymakers of privileging financial sector interests over economic growth.

The decision marks an unprecedented rupture in Colombia’s macroeconomic governance framework. By stepping away from the board, Ávila has effectively deprived it of the quorum required to meet under existing statutes, raising the prospect of a policy deadlock just as inflation remains above target.

At stake is more than a disagreement over rates. The confrontation exposes deeper tensions between a government focused on growth and redistribution and a technocratic central bank committed to price stability. It also risks undermining one of Colombia’s most respected institutions at a time of heightened global uncertainty.

Governor Leonardo Villar defended the rate hike, insisting the bank’s constitutional mandate to control inflation could not be subordinated to political considerations. He said the board remained focused on steering inflation back to its 3 per cent target, noting that price pressures — currently running at 5.29 per cent annually — remain elevated despite signs of moderation.

“The decisions are based on technical criteria,” Villar said, rejecting accusations of bias towards the financial sector. He also warned that the government’s withdrawal runs counter to institutional norms.

Markets are now watching whether the government intends to sustain its boycott. Under Colombian law, the presence of a Finance Minister is required for board meetings, meaning continued absence could paralyse rate-setting decisions in the coming months. Three key meetings — in April, June and July — are scheduled before the end of Petro’s term, with the latter two falling after a decisive first-round of the presidential elections.

Business leaders have reacted with alarm. Camilo Sánchez, head of utilities association Andesco, described the breakdown in coordination as “dire”, warning that permanent dialogue between fiscal and monetary authorities is essential for economic stability.

Analysts say the government may be using institutional leverage to halt further rate increases, given that a majority of board members had signalled a tightening bias to anchor inflation expectations. A prolonged standoff could, however, carry significant costs.

Colombia has long been viewed by investors as a regional outlier for its strong central bank independence. Any perception that political pressure is eroding that autonomy could weigh on the peso, increase borrowing costs and deter foreign investment.

The dispute comes against a complex macroeconomic backdrop. Inflation has been fuelled in part by a sharp increase in the minimum wage and higher public spending, while external risks — including rising energy prices linked to the war in the Middle East and closure of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran.

For Petro, the rate hike reinforces a long-standing critique that tight monetary policy is stifling growth and employment. Writing on social media, the president accused the central bank of pursuing a “suicidal” policy that harms the wider economy.

Yet economists warn that weakening institutional credibility could ultimately prove more damaging than high interest rates. “The risk is not just policy error,” one Bogotá-based analyst said. “It is the erosion of the rules of the game.”

The coming weeks will test whether the standoff is a negotiating tactic or the start of a more fundamental shift in Colombia’s economic governance. Either way, the episode has already injected a new layer of uncertainty into one of Latin America’s most closely watched economies.