As the year winds to an end, the Bogotá Post looks back at 2025 in Colombia

2025 might well be looked back upon in years to come as the calm before the storm. An early sign of the potentially troubled waters ahead was the assassination of Senator Miguel Uribe in early June. Other themes included friction with the US, political deadlock and a sense that much is being put off for next year.

Relations with the USA started badly after Trump was sworn in, as he deported Colombian immigrants in chains on military planes. Petro at first refused to receive the flights, before relenting and allowing them to land but greeting the travellers and treating them with dignity.

From there it got worse, with Petro turning up on the New York streets protesting while on a visit to the UN. Trump in turn has no love for Petro, calling him a bad guy and putting him and his family on the Clinton List, alongside highly controversial longtime advisor Armando Benedetti. It also emerged at that point that Petro had separated from Veronica Alcocer some time ago.

After the US started bombing alleged narco ships in international waters in the Caribbean, things took an even darker turn. Petro, like most world leaders, was highly critical of US operations in the Caribbean, leading Trump to warn that “he could be next”.

Bogotá herself kept on with business as usual, although that’s not always a good sign. Mayor Gálan has little to show at the mid point of his time in the Palacio Liévano. Crime and rubbish are the most visible signs of a city that sometimes feels stuck in place, although the Metro seems to be on track.

Away from the febrile world of Colombian politics, there was plenty going on in cultural fields, from an impressive Copa América run by the superpoderosas to possibly the best festival Cordillera yet in Bogotá.

Violence mars the start of 2026 campaigning

Senator Miguel Uribe was assassinated at the start of his electoral bid in a worrrying reminder of what can happen in Colombian politics. The politician was shot a number of times in the head while making a visit to Modelia and put into intensive care for a month before passing.

One shooter, just 15 years of age was shot and captured at the scene by Uribe’s protection. Other suspects and accomplices were relatively quickly captured, although the intellectual author of the crime remains unclear. While social networks have been hothouses of rumours and propaganda, candidates have thankfully so far stayed largely clear of commenting.  

Runners and riders for the presidency have emerged and started the process of thinning the field. The Liberales, Conservadores and Cambio Radical are yet to declare their representatives. However, there are still six candidates for political parties and another 14 who have acquired the requisite 635,000 signatures to run as independents.

Among the latter names there are some big names such as Claudia López, Luis Murillo, Abelardo de Espriella and Vicky Dávila. There’s also a number of seeming no-hopers, but remember that was Rodolfo Hérnandez this time last year and he got to the second round as a semi-protest candidate.

Iván Cepeda is Petro’s successor candidate for Pacto Historico, while the Centro Democrático have plumped for Paloma Valencia. Sergio Fajardo is back in the race again, for Dignidad y Compromiso. That means no place for some high profile heavyweights such as Maria Fernanda Cabal, Susana Muhamed and Gustavo Bolívar.

High-profile roadblocks, change by the back door

One of the constants in Colombian politics in 2025 was that major reforms and were blocked and delayed, yet a few things were snuck in through alternative measures. This was exemplified by Petro declaring economic emergency in a constitutionally dubious manner.

The reforma de salud was sunk again in the springtime, but by mid-year MinSalud had gone ahead with some of the changes anyway. This may well be reversed by an incoming government next year, meaning that EPSs remain somewhat in limbo.

Cómo así que no hay que castigar alcohol cuando más se tiene alcohol en la mercancía, ¿no sabe que es la droga que más produce muerte y daños en los sistemas presupuestales de salud? Menos alcohol en las personas y la sociedad es productivo y beneficioso para la vida. Aquí no se… https://t.co/GFbT4Wx0k5

— Gustavo Petro (@petrogustavo) December 31, 2025

Major budget changes are unlikely to get through under anyone, so failing to get this done can’t really be laid at Petro’s door. However, he’s gone ahead with what he can do: enormous hikes in the minimum salary, IVA abolished on certain items, demanding that pension funds divest from foreign investments and repatriate their savings.

Paz Total is looking more and more like Fracaso Total as time ticks on. At best, talks with various groups are going nowhere, while other talks have essentially collapsed. Trump declaring the Gaitanistas a terrorist group has muddied the waters even further. The ELN, Colombia’s largest remaining guerilla force, in particular have intensified operations.

While some of that has underlined the difference between their rhetoric and reality, with December’s paro nacional affecting little of the country, other attacks have been bloody and worrying, with the increased use of drones a dangerous direction of travel.

Economic uncertainty?

Whether the economy is doing well or not and whether that is because or in spite of the government will depend mainly on your fellings towards Petro. It’s a mixed bag with plenty of caveats on both sides. GDP growth has been good and ahead of expectation, with unemployment continuing to fall and inflation slowing. Those new jobs are largely formal, too.  

However, the GDP growth isn’t as fast as it could be, while it’s outperforming regionally, it’s behind the global average. Unemployment is at a low point for the century, but is still mainly informal and the rate of decrease is slowing. It’s hard to guess how the recently announced minimum wage hike to COP$2,000,000 will affect this.

Much more worrying is that much of this may be built on sand. While Petro has struggled to get big-ticket bills through the legislature, he’s quietly done things behind the scenes that have ramped up public spending. He’s betting on that being an investment which will keep delivering in the long run. If not, it will be an albatross for future governments.

Inflation remains at 5.3% annually, not calamitous, but stubbornly high. The cost of living, too, is ever-increasing, not helped by uncertainty in global trade routes. Despite all that wind and bluster between Trump and Petro, tariffs remain at the standard 10% for the time being.

Petro finally got his reforma laboral over the line, in some ways a major achievement considering the opposition it faced in the Senate. However, the text of the bill is somewhat underwhelming. For the main part, there are minor changes such as a cap on overtime and night shifts starting two hours earlier as well as solidifying full time contracts as the norm.

The most substantial change is a commitment to make online providers such as Rappi pay social security and workplace risk contributions for their workers. This may find the devil is in the details in terms of bringing it into reality.

Colombia also brought the Bre-B system of instant payments online. This is already having a huge impact in a country where digital payments are widespread and popular. Long term, this provides a base for increasing transparancy and reducing corruption. However, questions remain over the infrastructure underpinning these systems.

Transport no longer stuck in a jam

The really big local news has been that the Metro is progressing as planned. This might not seem like big news, but given how long the project spent in planning and the tendency of the president to stick his beak in, it’s just good to see something being done.

The first trains have arrived in the country and are running tests while the towering columns of the track are in place all over the city. Today, that means pain as Transmi stations close and traffic is rerouted, but all is in place for a fully integrated public transport system in the future.

RegioTram is also more or less on schedule, although it will need to be reworked to connect with the Bogotá systems, after it was pointed out that the planned stations are a fair distance away from the trnasmi and Metro. Regardless, connecting satellite towns with the capital is a gamechanging proposal.

Life in the city remains irritating due to continued high crime levels and the seeming refusal of Carlos Fernando Galán to do anything about rubbish on the streets. The best that can be said about Gálan at this point is that he has done little of note, hardly a glowing resumé, given his ambitions coming into office.

Culture vultures

The capital saw a celebration of Latino music as Festival Cordillera 2025 confirmed the event’s stature as a lodestone of music in Colombia. With Festival Estéreo Picnic 2025 providing a balance that focuses on anglophone music, the capital is well set. However, with both those festivals in the Parque Bolívar, Rock al Parque is struggling to stay relevant.

Plenty of other bands were touring throughout the year too, with Bogotá increasingly on the map for big-name world superstars. That means enduring the likes of Guns N’ Roses, but also means that rolos can see contemporary stars like Dua Lipa.

Former busker Ed Sheeran popped up on stage as a surprise guest of J Balvin in December, while another Brit unsurprisingly failed to turn up because that’s what Morrissey does these days. Latinos across Instagram responded by trolling the famous vegetarian with meat recipes.

Elsewhere online, Colombian food performed well on a host of dubious internet polls, sparkign waves of reposted joy throughout the year. In more dispiriting news, Club Colombia Negra was discontinued by Bavaria, meaning you have few chances to neck the country’s last widely available dark lager.

For those more interested in staying home, Colombia’s first ever board games convention took place in November. Ludotopia was an undisputed success, attracting the likes of Wingspan artist Ana Maria Martínez (who teased the upcoming expansion for Wingspan South America, Central America and Caribbean) and proving that Bogotá retains a dynamic and evolving cultural scene.

Colombia fall just short again

The women’s football team came into the Copa América on good form and were within seconds of taking the title. With two minutes of regular time to go, Mayra Ramírez put Colombia ahead for the third and seemingly last time at 3:2. Brazilian superstar supersub Marta, in her last tournament, broke Colombian hearts as she rolled back the years with a last gasp equalizer in the sixth minute of injury time.

The drama wasn’t over, as she then put Brazil in front for the first time in extra time before Leicy Santos equalized and took the game to penalties. There, the game slipped through the fingers of the superpoderosas as perma-champions Brazil showed their experience. They took the shoot out 5:4 for their 9th title in ten Copa Américas.

The men’s team, also runners up in their Copa América, ground their way to qualification for next year’s World Cup in North America. Conmebol was a slogfest this time around, with everyone except Argentina involved in taking points off each other and goals in short supply.

Eventually, Colombia found form, only losing a single game in the year and finishing with a goalfest against Venezuela, beating their fierce rivals 6-3 in the last game. That leaves Colombia 13th in the FIFA rankings – unlucky for some maybe, but not coach Nestor Lorenzo.

On the local stage, Santa Fe reclaimed the liga apertura for Bogotá, triumphing in Medellín over Independiente thanks to an inspired performance from Wigan legend Hugo Rodellega. Knocking out Millos and El Tigre Falcao on the way made it even sweeter. Junior of Barranquilla took the finalizácion, with Nacional winning the Copa Colombia. The latter was a Medellín derby and marred by a pitch invasion and violence at the end.

Cricket Colombia hit a six as MinDeportes officially recognised the gentleman’s game as a sport in the country. This opens up the field for more funding and support for events. They also welcomed a visiting team from Trinidad and Tobago as well as setting a T20 record for a last wicket chase in the Gulf Series against México.

What’s coming next?

Next year promises much more drama in Colombia, with national elections set to be hard-fought. This is an unusual cycle, as the country is preparing to see who will succeed a leftist president. Whether there will be continuity, a sharp tack rightwards or a drive for the centre is still anyone’s guess.

The lineups for the capital’s big music festivals seem strong, with a supporting cast of superstars also set to tour. The men’s football team have a relatively straightforward group in the World Cup and will fancy themselves to do well.

Our predictions for 2026 will be coming in the next few days, but whatever comes to pass, we’ll be here to keep you in the loop with what’s happening in Colombia and why. We got some of the 2025 calls right, after all. right Happy new year from the Bogotá Post – your English voice in Colombia!

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An extraordinary leap of 23.78% in the Colombian minimum salary per month brings it to a symbolic COP$2,000,000

An unprecedented hike in the Colombian minimum salary for 2026 was announced on Monday 29 December, bringing the rate to two million pesos per month. That represents an increase of 23.78% on the 2025 number. That’s the biggest jump ever – only 1997 comes close in recent years with 21.02%.

The minimum salary itself (SMMLV or Salario Mínimo Mensual Legal Vigente) has gone up to COP$1,750,905. There is also a transport subsidy (COP$249,095) which brings the effective minimum salary in Colombia for 2026 to two million on the nose.

Business leaders had suggested a rise of around 7.21%, keeping it above annual inflation (5.3% as of November), while trade unions and syndicates had called for an optimistic 16%. Both were left in the dust by Petro’s extraordinary decision.

The extraordinary rise is not due directly to inflation, nor to the rising cost of living, but represents a fundamental change in the rationale behind the number. Colombian president Gustavo Petro explained that the minimum salary should be considered a household income, not individual. He calls this salario vital, or salario digno.

Whether the household basis for the minimum salary holds up to scrutiny is hard to say. It certainly was the case, but like most other middle-income countries Colombia is rapidly changing. The idea of a single income supporting a family is less true every year, with Colombian households under 3.5 people on average and with 1.5 workers. That means a true dependency ratio of nearly one to one.

It was calculated by working around the price of a basket of goods for the average family (canasta básica), logged at nearly 3 million pesos for four people. Using that number of 1.5 workers gave the convenient round number of two million.

The minimum salary (not including the transport subsidy) is the baseline number that in turn influences a whole lot of other values in Colombia, such as fines and public salaries which are counted as multiples of the SMMLV. That includes, happily for Congress, politicians’ pay.

What does the increase in the Colombian minimum salary mean for the economy?

Far harder to work out is the long term impact of this rise in the Colombian minimum salary. Petro claims it will further stoke private spending in the country as the increased wages percolate throughout the economy and allow continued growth.

https://twitter.com/MintrabajoCol/status/2005795577548923288

It will increase labour costs for a number of businesses, especially small companies, some of which will struggle to keep their heads above water with such a sudden rise in payroll. For medium and larger size businesses, this includes mandatory SENA apprentices.

Note that payroll costs for employers will increase by more than the 23.78% headline figure, as they have to make social security payments based on an employee’s wage as well as the wage itself.

Massive firms who are liquid enough to be able to absorb costs will likely be absolutely fine, even if there are a couple of high-profile exceptions. Companies that are dodging the system, either through informal working or false self-employment, will also likely thrive.

Of course, the new reforma laboral promises to regularise and/or eliminate such practices. On paper, that is. In reality, these are the potential counterintuitive effects that could be the legacy of this increase in the Colombian minimum salary.

Colombia saw a sharp downtick in the number of employees on minimum salary this year, while informal work and self-employment has risen to around 55% of the workforce. This trend could continue much more rapidly with companies unwilling to pay the high new Colombian minimum salary.

A further issue is how close the minimum salary is now to the average. This will particularly affect smaller businesses and recent graduates. The former will find it hard to offer salaries that are significantly above minimum to attract quality employees, while the latter will find themselves often close to minimum salary and waiting longer for a return on their studies.

It is worth remembering that both minimum salaries themselves and increases to them are often bitterly opposed the world over and predictions of chaos are frequently sown. In most cases there is short term turbulence followed by long term stability. 

Is this a political power play?

Despite Petro’s official line about household incomes, many will see this as a nakedly political move ahead of next year’s elections. It certainly will play well among the Colombia Humana base and potential voters as a reason to keep faith with the left and cast their vote accordingly next year. 

A more charitable view would be to say that it’s one of the last significant acts that Petro can take before leaving office, so he’s gone big to deliver an achievement. Those have been in short supply over his time in the Palacio Nariño.

What’s undoubtable is that this creates a massive headache for next year. Regardless of who takes power, they won’t be expected to deliver quite such a large rise. However, they will have to be careful how far they go below it.

Any successor to Petro will at least be able to say their allies prepared the ground and maybe get away with a modest increase. An incoming fiscal conservative will be under pressure to deliver another big increase against their natural instincts and take heat for not doing so, while actually cutting the rate would be close to political suicide.

While a lot of candidates in the 2026 election might say that this was a fiscally imprudent move, they will have to be careful how far they push it. Many in Colombia will agree with them, but those same people are also likely benefiting from the increase. 

There are also the optics of a rich politician arguing against the very many voters who are on minimum wage or even those who aspire to earn minimum wage. It’s not a good look to argue against giving stuff to the people whose vote you want.

Short term gains, but long term problems?

So in the end this is a huge play from Petro, which has won him a useful political victory for today. It backs up his rhetoric, as he can easily claim he’s acting on behalf of the workers. There’s plenty of truth in that, as many Colombians work on minimum wage.

It may be a bribe to the electorate, but many will claim that no one else has at least offered them anything like this ever before, so good on him. Going into the 2026 election candidates on Petro’s side will be able to point to this achievement, while opposition candidates face pressure to offer at least something similar or be painted as rich folk denying the poor.

It’s hard to see a short term in which we won’t see a lot of businesses go bankrupt. The longer term is harder to read, as most companies will be unhappy but able to keep going. The effect on public salaries is potentially alarming with the state already running a deficit, unable to achieve fiscal reform and still expanding.

Ironically, it’s entirely possible that the increase in the Colombian minimum salary for 2026 might lead to more informality and less dynamism in the economy. However, it’s also completely believable that the economy is resilient enough to handle it with ease. This may be Petro’s biggest gamble yet and even he doesn’t know how it’ll play out. 

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The National Liberation Army (ELN), a Colombian guerrilla group, concluded its 72-hour armed strike this morning, putting an end to days of tension in many parts of the country. 

The action –a common tactic in Colombia which aims at paralyzing movement by threatening violence against those who do not stay home – left at least three people dead, with incidents registered in 13 departments across the country.

The ELN declared the strike to oppose United States “imperialism” and military threats in the region, with analysts warning White House aggression in the region could empower the guerrillas.

What happened during the strike?

Police attributed various violent actions over the weekend to the ELN. Shortly after the strike began on Sunday, cylinder bombs appeared on key roadways across the country, disrupting land travel.

While over a dozen departments registered incidents, transport in Norte de Santander was particularly affected, with the main road from the capital, Cúcuta, to Pamplona closed due to a bomb.

An attack on a police station in Norte de Santander also claimed the life of an ambulance driver, who reportedly got caught in the crossfire. Two more corpses were found in a Cúcuta neighborhood near the Venezuelan border, which are being investigated as linked to the strike.

In addition to police stations, the rebels attacked other government installations, blowing up a toll booth in Barrancabermeja, Santander, and injuring a worker.

In a particularly grim incident, two policemen in Cali, Colombia’s third city, were killed in a bomb attack on Tuesday morning.

The ELN also burned an intercity bus in the Antioquia department.

‘On the offensive’

The ELN’s actions over the weekend marked the group’s first national-level armed strike since early 2022.

While its leaders signalled an openness to resume peace talks with the state just months ago, the rebels’ actions this week suggest a renewed aggression towards the government.

“The ELN is quite literally on the offensive. It is difficult to know what they want at this time,” said Laura Bonilla, deputy director of the Colombian Peace and Reconciliation Foundation (Pares). 

The analyst explained that the actions highlighted a shift in the methods used by the ELN, notably an increase in the use of indiscriminate explosives like cylinder bombs and drones. 

“The implication of this is that these are weapons that produce a greater effect on civilians,” Bonilla told The Bogotá Post.

In 2024, there was an 89% increase in the number of victims of explosive attacks in Colombia, according to the International Committee for the Red Cross.

Bonilla also noted that the ELN is growing more aggressive as the White House ramps up pressure in the region. 

The group declared the strike to “protest the threat of imperialist intervention in our country as a new phase of Trump’s neo-colonial plan.”

According to Bonilla, the ELN has been “paradoxically empowered” by Washington’s growing militancy, as it fuels their claims to be an anti-imperialist bastion. As Trump promises land strikes on Venezuela, where the ELN has a stronghold, the group may grow more active and more aggressive in Colombia.

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The United States today classified the Gaitanist Army of Colombia (EGC), Colombia’s most powerful armed group, a foreign terrorist organization (FTO).

The EGC, or Clan del Golfo, has expanded its criminal enterprise in Colombia in recent years, consolidating control over lucrative illicit economies like cocaine and illegal gold mining, as well as extorting large-scale enterprise.

While its designation as an FTO could assist authorities in unravelling the organization’s financial structure, analysts say it may threaten ongoing peace talks in Qatar between the EGC and the Colombian government.

“Today, the Department of State is designating Clan del Golfo as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT),” wrote Secretary of State Marco Rubio in a statement on Tuesday morning. 

“Based in Colombia, Clan del Golfo is a violent and powerful criminal organization with thousands of members. The group’s primary source of income is cocaine trafficking, which it uses to fund its violent activities,” continued the memo.

Who are the EGC?

The EGC was born from the remnants of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), a paramilitary group responsible for grave human rights abuses in the late 1990s and early 2000s.

Since then, it has re-branded itself several times; for a time it called itself the Urabeños, then the Clan del Golfo, honoring its heartland in the Gulf of Urabá in northern Colombia; it later changed its name to the Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AGC); most recently, the group adopted the EGC moniker. 

In recent years, the group has argued that it is a political actor in Colombia’s decades-long internal conflict, but its origins were strictly focused on making money illicitly. 

In the past decade, the organization has rapidly expanded beyond northern Colombia into as many as 20 departments across the country, exerting control in both rural and urban areas. 

“On the one hand, the group is an organized crime structure that manages various legal and illegal businesses and, on the other hand, it has also formed a uniformed army,” explained Gerson Arias, conflict and security investigator at the Ideas for Peace Foundation (FIP), a Colombian think tank.

Today, the group counts between 3,000 and 3,500 uniformed troops among its ranks while it has a further 6,000 members who form part of its broader crime structure of extorting businesses, according to Arias. 

“The main threat facing Colombia today is represented by the Clan del Golfo and its military and economic structure, both legal and illegal,” the analyst told The Bogotá Post.

What does the FTO designation change?

Following Washington’s sanctions, anyone deemed to be providing material support to the EGC can be brought to trial in a U.S. court. 

“Not only could cases be brought against members of the Clan del Golfo, but against any businessmen, facilitators, logistics operators, or anyone who provides even something as simple as buying them a meal,” explained Elizabeth Dickinson, Deputy Director for Latin America at International Crisis Group.

She told The Bogotá Post that the FTO designation could therefore “open some interesting doors” by exposing links between the EGC and legal enterprise, adding “this is an organization that has deep tentacles in the business world.”

The move could also provide a pretext for military action against the EGC in Colombia, with the Trump administration saying in recent weeks that drug production in any country is a legitimate target.

“An FTO in and of itself is not a justification for military action. However, it has historically been a step along the road to paving a narrative politically that could lead to the U.S. considering military action,” said Dickinson.

Impact on peace negotiations

In September, the first round of negotiations took place between EGC and Colombian state negotiators in Doha, mediated by the Qatari government.

A second round in December led to the signing of a “commitment to peace”, with the first step towards demobilization planned for March 2026. 

But the State Department’s FTO designation threatens to derail talks, according to analysts.

“I think there’s a lot of pending questions right now about the future of negotiations with this group,” said Dickinson. 

She stressed the progress made in talks so far, including a commitment to take a census of children fighting in the ranks of armed groups and return them to the state.

FIP’s Arias warned that the FTO classification will complicate both the subject of talks and the logistics of engaging in negotiations.

He noted that EGC negotiators will struggle to attend talks safely outside of Colombia and that Colombian authorities will be unable to provide credible non-extradition guarantees to the group’s leaders.

But Dickinson warned of the dangers of ending negotiations: “This organization is the largest threat to peace and security in Colombia. I think it will be important for the Colombian authorities and their country partners in mediation to consider what could be the implications of if peace talks were to end.”

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The Colombian National Liberation Army (ELN) has declared a 72-hour nationwide armed strike beginning on Sunday in protest against increased US military activity in Latin America.

In a statement, the group warned Colombians not to travel via the country’s roadways or navigable rivers during the three day window; while the group said it would not harm civilians, armed strikes are enforced through violence, with previous iterations involving vehicle burnings and civilian casualties.

The action will be the first national-level armed strike since 2022 and comes amid an ongoing U.S. boat bombing campaign – which the Pentagon says has targeted ELN members – as well as White House threats of further intervention, including land strikes in Colombia.

“We, the peoples’ forces of Colombia, protest the threat of imperialist intervention in our country as a new phase of Trump’s neo-colonial plan, which aims to sink its claws even deeper into Latin American and Caribbean territories,” read a decree emitted on Friday by the ELN.

On multiple occasions, U.S. President Donald Trump has floated the idea of striking drug production targets within Colombian borders; Colombia is the world’s largest producer of cocaine and the ELN is known to be a key actor in the drug trade.

The communiqué said the strike would begin at 6:00 AM on Sunday, December 14 and last until the same time on Wednesday. 

While it instructed civilians not to travel by road or river during the three day window, it maintained that its “road control units will respect civilians and their property,” but advised regular people not to mix with soldiers in order to “avoid accidents.”

Although the measures are purportedly national, analysts say they are unlikely to affect the whole country.

“In practical terms, this is a national announcement, but it has a limited impact because the ELN does not have a national presence,” Gerson Arias, investigator at the Ideas for Peace Foundation (FIP), a Colombian think-tank, told The Bogotá Post.

Arias said the bulk of the effect will be seen in areas of ELN control, especially in Colombia’s northeast and in the western departments of Cauca, Nariño and Chocó.

The last time the ELN implemented a nationwide armed strike was in 2022, with incidents across 17 departments including vehicle burnings and road blockages intended to protest the Ivan Duque administration (2018-2022).

But the ELN regularly uses smaller scale armed strikes to exert control over specific areas, usually in rural regions. Experts say that the guerrillas often use the actions as a guise to secure drug transit corridors and facilitate the movement of soldiers and contraband.

Rights groups criticize armed strikes for producing a host of deleterious effects on affected populations, with forced confinement impeding access to education, food, and healthcare. 

While the ELN’s decree did not explicitly mention U.S. threats against Venezuela, the group is known to have a presence in the country and has recorded ties with the Nicolás Maduro regime.

Much of the guerrilla group’s territory lies on the border with Venezuela and any U.S. attack on Colombia’s neighbor would also threaten the ELN, according to FIP’s Arias. 

“The ELN is well aware that it may be affected by some of the measures taken by the United States,” said the analyst.

The group has already been directly impacted by Trump’s boat bombing campaign, with U.S. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth saying an October 17 strike on an alleged drug vessel had killed three ELN members. The rebels denied the claim, insisting they do not smuggle drugs. 

The ELN’s armed strike declaration underscores the complex panorama of armed groups in the region and their ties to government, drug trafficking, and border zones. While the impact of the action is yet to be seen, the announcement shows the far-reaching consequences of the White House’s mounting military pressure in the region.

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U.S. President Donald Trump said he would not rule out land attacks in any drug producing country on Tuesday, moments after criticizing cocaine production in Colombia.

“I hear Colombia, the country of Colombia, is making cocaine. They have cocaine manufacturing plants, OK, and then they sell us their cocaine. We appreciate that very much. But yeah, anybody that’s doing that and selling it into our country is subject to attack,” Trump told reporters at the White House on Tuesday afternoon.

In response, Colombian President Gustavo Petro warned that such an attack “would be a declaration of war,” telling Trump not to damage “two centuries of diplomatic relations.”

Trump’s comments come amid mounting tensions in the Caribbean, where the U.S. has amassed forces since September. While Washington has so far only attacked alleged drug boats, killing at least 80 people, Trump said on Tuesday he plans to expand the campaign to land strikes “very soon.”

While Venezuela and the Nicolás Maduro regime have been the primary focus of the pressure campaign, Petro’s criticism of the strikes aggravated already tense relations between Bogotá and Washington. In October, the White House sanctioned Petro after he alleged the U.S. had killed a Colombian fisherman in a September boat strike, accusing the South American leader of being “an illegal drug dealer.”

“I think the U.S. has been very clear that they have a problem with Petro, but that they have a very productive relationship with Colombian institutions and particularly the security forces,” explained Elizabeth Dickinson, Deputy Director for Latin America at International Crisis Group.

“For that reason, I think it would be extremely unlikely that there would be a strike on Colombian soil,” Dickinson told The Bogotá Post.

Today is not the first time Trump has floated strikes on Colombian territory, with the president in November saying he would be “proud” to destroy cocaine factories in Colombia.

Colombia is the world’s largest producer of cocaine and the United Nations recently estimated that potential cocaine production increased by 50% in 2023. Trump has personally blamed Petro for this increase but the Colombian president cites his government’s commitment to dismantling cocaine laboratories, often with U.S. cooperation.

But the White House has also shown its ability to distinguish between Colombia’s government and its security forces. When he decertified Colombia as a drug cooperation partner in September, Trump praised the country’s army and police and said “the failure of Colombia to meet its drug control obligations over the past year rests solely with its political leadership.”

For that reason, any strike in Colombia is likely to be done in cooperation with the country’s security and intelligence agencies, according to Dickinson.

“If there were to be a unilateral strike, I think that there would be a massive diplomatic fallout,” added the analyst, “but in practice, the relationship likely would survive.”

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Electronic jamming and missiles are two of the risks identified by US regulators.

Major airlines cancelled flights from Bogotá to Caracas this week after US regulators warned of “heightened military activity” around Venezuela.

Avianca and LATAM suspended flights through Venezuelan airspace, along with at least five other airlines, as a response to a Federal Aviation Authority NOTAM (Notice to Airmen) that reported “Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) interference” around Maiquetía “Simón Bolívar” International Airport, which serves nearby Caracas.

The warnings were linked to military exercises under way in Venezuela, a response to threats from US forces massing in the Caribbean and aerial attacks on suspect drug boats, some originating from Venezuelan waters.

Colombia’s own airline regulator, Aeronáutica Civil de Colombia, repeated the FAA’s warning but said that air operators in Colombia could take “autonomous decisions” over flights to Venezuela.

On Monday several airlines were continuing direct flights from Bogotá, such as Wingo, Avior (a Venezuelan airline) and Satena (a commercial airline linked to the Colombian Ministry of Defense). Copa offered connections via Panama.

Mobile missiles

The list of airlines suspending flights continued to grow on Monday night with TAP, Turkish Airlines, Iberia and GOL being joined by Air Europa and Plus Ultra.

This came despite pushback from Venezuela’s Instituto Nacional de Aeronáutica Civil (INAC) which threatened to punish airlines for following the FAA’s recommendations.  According to a report in Aviation Online, airlines avoiding Caracas could in the long term lose access to the country’s airspace.

INAC also issued an ultimatum for airlines suspending flights “to resume services within a 48-hour period” or risk losing their landing permits.

Meanwhile the US FAA issued a more detailed FAA backgrounder clarifying that Venezuela had “at no point expressed an intent to target civil aviation”.

It did, however, seem concerned that the current context could trigger an air accident.

Venezuela, it said, had mobilized “thousands of military and reserve forces” with access to shoulder-mounted anti-aircraft missiles, or MANPADs (man-portable air defense systems), capable of downing low-altitude aircraft.

This followed comments by Maduro last month that his military were in possession of Russian-made Igla-S missiles “with no fewer than 5,000 of them in key anti-aircraft defense positions to guarantee peace, stability, and tranquility”.

Jammers and spoofers

The more immediate risk was to electronic systems, said the FAA documents, with several civil aircraft recently reporting interference while transiting Venezuela, in some cases causing “lingering effects throughout the night”.

“GNSS jammers and spoofers can affect aircraft out to 250 nautical miles [450 kilometres] and can impact a wide variety of critical communication, navigation, surveillance, and safety equipment on aircraft.”

The FAA said it would “continue to monitor the risk environment for US civil aviation operating in the region and make adjustments, as appropriate, to safeguard U.S. civil aviation”.

In fact, the US airlines stopped all direct commercial and cargo flights into Venezuela as part of an order issued in 2019, related to sanctions against the Maduro regime, widely seen as illegitimate, with the US State Department offering a bounty of US$50 million “for information leading to the arrest and / or conviction” .

Open to talks

Commentators on US – Venezuelan relations this week said that FAA announcement was not necessarily a sign of imminent US military action. Former Associated Press analyst Dan Perry told News Nation that the FAA warning was “a message that they [the FAA] expected the country to become unstable”, but did not point to a ground invasion.

For most observers, the NOTAM was a continuation of the maximum pressure strategy pursued by Washington against the Maduro regime, including a recent decision to declare the Cártel de los Soles — a disconnected group of corrupt military officers who facilitate drug shipments — as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.

Last week Maduro said he was open to talks with Washington, according to AP News, though US President Trump underscored that military action was “still on the table”.

In recent months the US has sent eight navy ships, a submarine, an aircraft carrier and 10,000 service members to the Caribbean. And since August, US firepower has killed at least 83 people in aerial attacks on speedboats suspected of running drugs; for anyone arriving in Venezuela, air is still safer than sea.

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Colombian President Gustavo Petro on Monday decreed a 23.7% increase in the country’s minimum wage for 2026, the largest real rise in at least two decades, bypassing negotiations with unions and business groups and sparking warnings from economists, bankers and employers over inflation, job losses and rising informality.

The decree lifts the monthly minimum wage to 1.75 million pesos (U.S$470), or close to 2 million pesos including transport subsidies, and will apply to roughly 2.5 million workers when it takes effect next year. Petro said the measure aims to reduce inequality and move Colombia toward a “living minimum wage” that allows workers to “live better.”

But business associations, financial analysts and opposition lawmakers said the scale of the increase — far above inflation and productivity trends — risks destabilising the labour market and the broader economy.

According to calculations based on official data, with inflation expected to close 2025 at around 5.3% and labour productivity growth estimated at 0.9%, a technically grounded adjustment would have been close to 6.2%. The gap between that benchmark and the decreed hike exceeds 17 percentage points, the largest deviation on record.

Informality and job losses

Colombia’s minimum wage plays an outsized role in the economy, serving not only as the legal wage floor but also as a reference for pensions, social security contributions and public-sector pay.

Banking association Asobancaria warned that increases far above productivity can generate unintended effects. Citing data from the national statistics agency DANE, the group noted that 49% of employed Colombians — about 11.4 million people — earn less than the minimum wage, mostly in the informal economy, while only 10% earn exactly the minimum wage. Former director of DANE and economist Juan Daniel Oviedo believes that an increase that only benefits one-out-of-ten workers will stump job creation. “A minimum wage of 2 million pesos will make us move like turtles when it comes to creating formal jobs  — something we need to structurally address poverty in Colombia.”

Retail association FENALCO described the decision as “populist” and said the talks had been a “charade.” Its president, Jaime Alberto Cabal, said the process ignored technical, economic and productivity variables and would hit small businesses hardest.

Lawmakers also raised concerns about the impact on independent workers and contractors in the agricultural sectors, especially hired-help on coffee planations. Carlos Fernando Motoa, a senator from the opposition Cambio Radical party, said the decision would push vulnerable workers out of the formal system.

“The unintended effects of this improvised handling of the minimum wage will end up hitting independent workers’ pockets,” Motoa said. “Many will be forced to choose between eating or paying for health and pension contributions.”

Economists warned that micro, small and medium-sized enterprises — which account for the majority of employment — may respond by cutting staff, reducing hours or shifting workers into informal arrangements to cope with higher payroll and social security costs.

Inflation and rates at risk

Analysts also cautioned that the wage hike could reignite inflation, complicating the central bank’s easing cycle. Central bank economists have forecast 2026 inflation at 3.6%, down from 5.1% expected in 2025, but several analysts said those projections may now need revising.

In an interview with Reuters, David Cubides, chief economist at Banco de Occidente, called the increase “absolutely unsustainable,” warning it would affect government payrolls, pension liabilities and the informal labour market.

“Inflation forecasts will have to be revised,” Cubides said, adding that interest rates could rise again in the medium term as a result.

The impact is amplified by Colombia’s ongoing reduction in the legal workweek. From July 2026, the standard workweek will fall to 42 hours, meaning the hourly minimum wage will rise by roughly 28.5%, further increasing labour costs.

The decree comes six months before the presidential election on May 31, 2026, and is viewed by critics of Colombia’s first leftist administration as an electoral gamble aimed at shoring up support for the ruling coalition’s candidate, Senator Iván Cepeda.

Opposition senator Esteban Quintero, from the Democratic Center party, warned that Colombia risked repeating the mistakes of other Latin American countries that pursued aggressive wage policies.

“Careful, Colombia. We cannot repeat the history of our neighbours,” Quintero said. “Populism is celebrated at first — and later the costs become unbearable.”

Former finance minister and presidential hopeful Mauricio Cárdenas said the decision would inevitably lead to layoffs, particularly in small businesses already operating on thin margins, and described the policy as “economic populism” whose costs would materialise after the election cycle.

“The employer ends up saying, ‘I can’t sustain this payroll,’” Cárdenas said. “People are laid off, and many end up working for less than the minimum wage. In the end, nothing is achieved.”

Liberal Party senator Mauricio Gómez Amín said the increase risked becoming a political banner rather than a technical policy tool.

“Without technical backing, a 23% increase translates into inflation, bankruptcies and fewer job opportunities,” Gómez Amín said. “Economic populism always sends the bill later.”

While supporters argue the measure will boost purchasing power at the start of 2026, analysts cautioned that the short-term gains could be offset by higher prices, job losses and a further expansion of Colombia’s informal economy — already one of the largest in Latin America.

Why such a massive U.S. military deployment off the coast of Venezuela, supposedly to combat the “Cartel of the Suns” and stop drug trafficking from Venezuela to the United States? After more than four months, the results amount to little more than a handful of small vessels destroyed – an extremely modest impact given the scale of the force deployed.

The reality is that the volume of drug trafficking transiting through Venezuela to the United States is relatively small. Venezuela is not a producer of cocaine, much less of fentanyl, most of which enters the United States via Mexico. If the real interest is not to halt drug trafficking, what then is the motivation for placing the Fourth Fleet on a war footing in the Caribbean Sea? Logic might lead one to think the U.S. interest is oil, since Venezuela holds the largest reserves in the world—but that is not it either. Today the United States is the world’s leading oil producer, at 13.4 million barrels per day, and it has proven reserves sufficient for approximately ten years, assuming no new discoveries and no improvements in recovery or technological advances—an impossible assumption.

So what, then, is the underlying issue if it is neither drugs, nor oil, nor other minerals in which Venezuela might have potential and that would be attractive to the United States?

The answer lies in a little-publicized document formally released by the White House on December 4, titled National Security Strategy 2025. While the document introduces substantial changes in relations with Europe and traditional adversaries, the most striking element is the new emphasis placed on Latin America. Of the document’s “roadmap to ensure that America remains the greatest and most successful nation in human history”, five sections are devoted exclusively to our region, positioning Latin America as a fundamental component of U.S. security – a very significant shift from earlier versions, which historically prioritized the Middle East or Asia. There is a new strategy, or if you will, a “New Monroe Doctrine,” a continuation of the 1823 Monroe Doctrine, reaffirming U.S. preeminence in the region.

“After years of neglect, the United States will once again apply and enforce the Monroe Doctrine to reestablish U.S. preeminence in the Western Hemisphere, and to protect our homeland and our access to key geographies throughout the region. We will deny non-Hemispheric competitors the ability to position forces or other threatening capabilities, or to own or control strategically vital assets, in our Hemisphere,” states the 29-page document.

Key elements of this new doctrine include: countering external influence by requiring Latin American governments to dismantle foreign military installations and divest strategic assets in exchange for aid or alliances; stopping illegal migration, including naval patrols in the Caribbean and the eastern Pacific, selective border deployments, and the use of incentives for governments to curb migratory flows; combating narco-terrorists and cartels; and sealing economic and political commitments with aligned governments in a win-win framework that would include procurement preferences and greater cooperation, among other measures, with a view to turning Latin America into a stable market for U.S. exports and a buffer against global rivals.

In recent years, China has achieved significant penetration in Latin America through its diplomacy and long-term strategy (the Belt and Road Initiative, or New Silk Road). For nearly all countries in the region, China has become the leading trading partner, displacing the United States; it is also an investor in major infrastructure projects and a lender of funds (in Venezuela’s case, a very large lender that negotiated debt repayment in oil at very low prices). In addition, China has become a major supplier of weapons and information technology.

In this context, what Washington appears to be seeking is indeed a regime change in Venezuela to counter the influence of China and Russia, but without openly announcing it in order to avoid a direct diplomatic confrontation. Trump has segmented the region into friendly regimes (Argentina, El Salvador, Ecuador, Honduras, and Guatemala), enemy regimes (Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua), and regimes in limbo (Colombia and Brazil).

For Venezuela, regime change appears imminent, which would profoundly benefit Colombia, because, as Miguel Uribe Turbay said before he was assassinated, “as long as there is no freedom in Venezuela, there will be no peace in Colombia.” On the other hand, a change of government in Colombia is also approaching, and the country will have to decide which of these groups it wants to belong to—whether it repairs its relations with its traditional partner and ally, or definitively joins the group of pariah states in the region. Let us hope it is the former.

About the author: Luis Guillermo Plata served as Minister of Trade, Industry of Commerce during the government of President Álvaro Uribe Vélez, and in 2021, appointed by President Iván Duque, Ambassador of Colombia to Spain.

For a literary festival, silence can be more revealing than speech. The decision by three writers to withdraw from the 2026 Hay Festival in Cartagena over the presence of María Corina Machado, this year’s Nobel Peace Prize laureate and the most prominent figure in Venezuela’s democratic opposition, has exposed a paradox at the heart of contemporary literary culture: a professed devotion to free expression that falters when confronted with an inconvenient voice.

Hay Festival Cartagena, now in its 21st edition, is scheduled to take place from 29 January to 1 February 2026, with parallel events in Barranquilla, Medellín and a special edition in Jericó, Antioquia. Founded three decades ago in Wales and once described by Bill Clinton as “the Woodstock of the mind,” Hay has built its global reputation on the premise that literature flourishes in the presence of disagreement. Its stages have hosted figures as diverse – and divisive – as Salman Rushdie, Jonathan Safran Foer and David Goodhart, writers whose ideas have unsettled orthodoxies across continents.

Yet in Cartagena, dialogue has been recast as contamination.

The Colombian novelist Laura Restrepo, the Barranquilla-born writer Giuseppe Caputo and the Dominican activist Mikaelah Drullard announced they would not attend in protest at Machado’s invitation. Restrepo, winner of the 2004 Alfaguara Prize, had been scheduled to participate in several events, including a conversation with Indian novelist Pankaj Mishra and a session devoted to her most recent book, I Am the Dagger and I Am the Wound. In a public letter addressed to festival director Cristina de la Fuente, Restrepo described Machado’s presence as “a line” crossed.

“I must cancel my attendance at Hay Festival Cartagena 2026,” Restrepo wrote. “The reason is the participation of María Corina Machado, an active supporter of United States military intervention in Latin America.” Granting her a platform, Restrepo argued, amounted to facilitating positions hostile to regional autonomy.

Caputo echoed his reasoning on social media, announcing that “in the current context of escalating imperial violence, it is better to withdraw from a festival taking place opposite the bombarded waters of the Caribbean Sea.” Drullard, five days earlier, said she could not attend an event that “supports pro-genocide and interventionist positions through the mobilisation of those who promote them,” citing Machado’s proximity to the administration of US President Donald Trump.

What remains striking, however, is not merely the severity of these accusations but their selectivity. None of the boycott statements devotes comparable moral energy to denouncing the documented human rights abuses of Nicolás Maduro’s regime: arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances, torture of political prisoners, or the systematic dismantling of democratic institutions. One is left to ask whether the authors’ moral outrage extends to the lived realities of Venezuelans themselves, or whether it finds expression only when filtered through the optics of geopolitics.

The irony is sharpened by the fact that the same US administration helped secure Machado’s escape from Venezuela on December 8, enabling her to arrive in Oslo hours after her daughter Ana Corina Sosa received the Nobel Peace Prize on her behalf. “When the history of our time is written, it won’t be the names of the authoritarian rulers that stand out – but the names of those who dared resist,” noted the Nobel Foundation. 

The arguments from Machado’s detractors  warrant scrutiny – and above all, debate. What they do not justify is refusal from Latin America’s self-entitled literati. A boycott replaces argument with absence, moral reasoning with pantomime. It is a gesture that confers ethical purity upon the boycotter while foreclosing the very exchange that literature has traditionally claimed to defend. This is the “line” that cannot be crossed.

The Hay Festival’s response has been characteristically diplomatic In a statement following the cancellations, organisers reaffirmed their commitment to pluralism: “We reaffirm our conviction that open, plural and constructive dialogue remains an essential tool for addressing complex realities and for defending the free exchange of ideas and freedom of expression.” They stressed that Hay “does not align itself with or endorse the opinions, positions or statements of those who participate in its activities,” while respecting the decisions of those who chose not to attend.

That insistence on neutrality, however, also reveals a deeper unease. If a literary festival must repeatedly assert its impartiality, it may be because neutrality itself has become suspect. Increasingly, festivals are asked to function as courts of moral arbitration, conferring legitimacy on some voices while quietly disqualifying others. The result is not a more just cultural sphere, but a narrower one—policed less by argument than by consensus.

The controversy has unfolded at a particularly volatile moment for Venezuela’s eight-million diaspora. Machado’s invitation coincides with a renewed escalation in US pressure in the Caribbean Sea. On Tuesday, President Trump ordered a “total and complete blockade” of all sanctioned oil tankers entering or leaving the country, targeting Caracas’s principal source of revenue. His administration also designated Maduro’s government a Foreign Terrorist Organization, accusing it of using “stolen US assets” to finance terrorism, drug trafficking and organised crime.

“Venezuela is completely surrounded by the largest armada ever assembled in the history of South America,” Trump wrote on Truth Social. “It will only get bigger, and the shock to them will be like nothing they have ever seen before – until such time as they return to the United States all of the oil, land and other assets they previously stole from us.”

Against this backdrop, Machado’s high-profile presence at Hay has acquired a symbolic weight that far exceeds literary stages. Yet it is precisely at such moments that intellectual forums are tested. Fiction, after all, teaches empathy, complexity and the capacity to hold contradiction without retreat. To boycott rather than engage is to abandon that lesson – and, with it, democratical ideals.

The reputational cost to Hay Festival Cartagena may prove lasting – not because Machado was invited, but because the limits of reason and tolerance have been publicly exposed. A gathering that once prided itself on hosting difficult conversations now finds itself unsettled by the very principle on which it was founded.

And there is a final inflection. If Hay’s commitment to dialogue is grounded in a leftist agenda – if certain voices render discussion impossible – then Machado herself should reasonably question the value of her remote participation at the festival on January 30, for a scheduled conversation with Venezuelan journalist and former minister Moisés Naím.

In Cartagena, it is not Machado’s words that should concern audiences, but the intellectual impoverishment by those who chose not to speak to her at all.

Colombia’s president, Gustavo Petro, triggered yet another diplomatic rupture in South America on Sunday after denouncing Chile’s president-elect, José Antonio Kast, as a “Nazi,” rejecting the legitimacy of Chile’s democratic choice and sharply diverging from the cautious language typically observed between regional leaders.

Petro’s remarks came within hours of Kast’s decisive victory in Chile’s presidential runoff, in which the conservative candidate secured more than 58 per cent of the vote, defeating hard-left contender Jeannette Jara. Jara conceded promptly, saying that “democracy has spoken loud and clear” and wishing Kast success “for the good of Chile.”

Petro, however, used his social media platform X to frame Kast’s victory as evidence of an advancing wave of fascism in Latin America. “Fascism advances. I will never shake hands with a Nazi or a Nazi’s son, nor will I; they are death in human form,” the Colombian president wrote.

In a retort that called for Chileans to “take care of Neruda’s tomb,” Petro went on to equate Kast’s electoral mandate with the legacy of former dictator Augusto Pinochet. “It’s sad that Pinochet had to impose himself by force, but sadder now is that the people choose their Pinochet: elected or not, they are sons of Hitler and Hitler kills the people,” Petro said, adding that Latin Americans “know how to resist.”

The language marked one of the most explicit attacks by a sitting South American president on a democratically elected counterpart in recent years and raised immediate concerns about the state of Colombia – Chile relations, historically among the region’s most stable.

Kast’s victory completes a broader rightward shift in South American politics, following the election of Javier Milei in Argentina, Daniel Noboa in Ecuador and Nayib Bukele in El Salvador, while Bolivia recently ended nearly two decades of socialist rule with the election of centrist Rodrigo Paz. Petro, the region’s most unhinged left-wing leader, with just eight months remaining in his presidential term, appeared to ignore the potential diplomatic fallout of his remarks.

Within hours of Petro’s statement, US Republican Congressman Carlos Gimenez responded sharply, writing: “This guy (Petro) went too far with the drugs and alcohol. This is the real Gustavo Petro: incoherent, hateful, and schizophrenic.”

Former Colombian president Álvaro Uribe Vélez praised Chile’s electoral process and congratulated Kast, saying the vote had taken place peacefully and reflected citizens’ concerns about security and institutional stability. Uribe described Kast as “a guarantee for democratic institutions” in Chile and the wider region.

Another former president, conservative Andrés Pastrana, issued a sharply worded rebuke of Petro, saying the comments were “inappropriate and irresponsible” and did not represent Colombians nor the long-standing spirit of cooperation between Bogotá and Santiago.

Criticism also came from current lawmakers. Federico Hoyos, a congressman from the department of Antioquia, said Petro had “abandoned his role as head of state” and was acting instead as an “ideological agitator “unwilling to engage with leaders who do not share his views. Andrés Forero, a House representative from the opposition Centro Democrático party, accused Petro of disrespecting the sovereign will of Chilean voters, telling Colombians: “Let’s not fool ourselves, Petro is not a democrat.”

While Petro reviles diplomacy, Kast received public congratulations from international figures across the hemisphere. María Corina Machado, Venezuela’ opposition leader and 2025 Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, praised Chile’s election as “an extraordinary electoral day, an example for many nations of Latin America and the world.”

Addressing Kast directly, Machado wrote: “To the president-elect of Chile, José Antonio Kast, I send my affection and congratulations for the trust he has received. In the name of the Venezuelans, I wish him great success in his government.” She added that Venezuelans hoped to count on Kast’s support “to ensure an orderly transition to democracy in Venezuela” and to help build “a safe, prosperous and free hemisphere.”

Machado’s intervention was notable given her continued persecution by the regime of Nicolás Maduro and her public appearance at the Nobel ceremony last week in Oslo, her first in more than a year.

The United States also welcomed Kast’s victory. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said Washington looked forward to working with the incoming administration “to strengthen regional security and revitalise our trade relationship.”

Kast’s transition team said the president-elect would travel to Argentina this week to meet President Javier Milei, signalling an intention to align closely with like-minded governments in the region.

For Petro, the episode reinforces international perceptions that he has become an anachronism of regional politics — reliant on social-media provocation and historical revisionism.

For all the historical accuracy that seems to elude Petro, membership in Adolf Hitler’s National Socialist Party was not voluntary. While many Germans joined out of conviction, others were pressured or effectively compelled to enrol, particularly to obtain employment, documentation or travel permits. During and immediately after the Second World War, Germans seeking to live or work abroad — including in South America — were often required to disclose or document prior party affiliation to secure passports and legal work status, complicating later assessments of individual responsibility.

Michael Kast, born in 1924 in Thalkirschdorf, Bavaria, emigrated in Chile in 1946. His youngest son, José Antonio Kast (born 1966, Santiago) has repeatedly claimed his father was a Third Reich conscript.

Whether the outburst leads to lasting diplomatic consequences remains uncertain. But it has underscored how electoral change in Latin America is now accompanied not only by sharp policy shifts, but by open rhetorical conflict by a Colombian leader increasingly isolated among his regional peers, except for one ally, Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro.

On Monday afternoon, Chile’s Minister of the Interior, Álvaro Elizalde, confirmed that a Letter of Protest will be sent to President Petro, stating in no uncertain terms that: “A decision has been made to uphold the point of view that has to do with Chilean democracy. Ultimately, the people of Chile decide, and we all have to respect that outcome”.

The U.S. seizure of an oil tanker off the Venezuelan coast appears designed to further squeeze the economy of President Nicolás Maduro’s government. The Dec. 10, 2025 operation — in which American forces descended from helicopters onto the vessel — followed months of U.S. military buildup in the Caribbean and was immediately condemned by Venezuela as “barefaced robbery and an act of international piracy.”

The seized tanker, according to reports, is a 20-year-old supertanker called Skipper, capable of carrying around 2 million barrels of oil.

According to the Trump administration, the vessel was heading to Cuba. Given its size, however, it is far more likely that the final destination was China. Tankers of this scale are rarely used for short Caribbean routes; much smaller vessels typically serve Cuba.

The tanker had been sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury in 2022 for carrying prohibited Iranian oil. At the time, it was alleged that the ship — then known as Adisa — was controlled by Russian oil magnate Viktor Artemov and linked to an oil smuggling network.

On the surface, the seizure was unrelated to U.S. sanctions imposed on Venezuela in 2019 and expanded in 2020 to include secondary sanctions on third parties doing business with Caracas.

Venezuelan officials have therefore described the move as unprecedented, and they are largely correct. While Iranian tankers have been seized in the past for sanctions violations, this marks the first time a vessel departing Venezuela with a Venezuelan crew has been taken.

The Trump administration has signaled it intends to seize not only the cargo but the ship itself — a significant loss for the owning company. Because the shipment was sold under a “Free on Board” contract, the buyer assumed responsibility once the vessel left Venezuelan waters.

Nonetheless, the seizure represents a clear escalation in pressure on Venezuela. Reports indicate that around 30 other tankers operating near the country face some form of sanction. These vessels are part of a shadow fleet designed to evade restrictions while transporting oil from Venezuela, Russia, and Iran.

The message from Washington is unambiguous: more seizures may follow as the U.S. seeks to further squeeze Venezuelan oil revenues.

Venezuela’s economy remains overwhelmingly dependent on oil. Although official figures have not been published for seven years, most analysts estimate that oil accounts for more than 80% of exports, with some placing the figure above 90%.

Most Venezuelan oil is sold on the black market, largely to independent refiners in China. Chinese state-owned firms avoid these purchases to limit sanctions exposure, while authorities in Beijing tend to overlook shipments to non-state entities — particularly when tankers conceal their true origin.

An estimated 80% of Venezuelan oil ultimately goes to China through this channel. About 17% is exported to the United States under a Treasury license granted to Chevron, while roughly 3% goes to Cuba, often on subsidized terms.

Oil also accounts for around 20% of Venezuela’s GDP and more than half of government revenue, making the sector indispensable to Maduro’s survival.

Crucially, Venezuela’s oil industry was already in steep decline before U.S. sanctions began. Production peaked at 3.4 million barrels per day in 1998, fell to 2.7 million by the time Maduro took office in 2013, and dropped to 1.3 million barrels per day by 2019.

The 2019 oil sanctions shut Venezuela out of the U.S. market, forcing it to rely more heavily on China and India. When secondary sanctions followed in 2020, Europe and India halted purchases altogether. Combined with the pandemic-driven oil slump, production collapsed to just 400,000 barrels per day.

Output has since recovered to about 1 million barrels per day, aided largely by Chevron’s continued operations.

To sustain exports, Venezuela relies on a shadow fleet that uses false flags, renamed vessels, and manipulated transponders. Cargoes are sometimes transferred at sea — posing major environmental risks — before being relabeled in transit hubs such as Malaysia and shipped on to China.

The tanker seizure had little immediate impact on global oil prices due to ample supply and Venezuela’s limited market share. However, a more aggressive U.S. campaign could change that calculus.

For Venezuelan oil prices, the consequences may be sharper. Already heavily discounted due to sanctions risk, Venezuelan crude is now likely to be sold at even steeper reductions. Buyers will demand higher discounts and fewer prepayments, while export volumes may fall, forcing production cuts that are costly to reverse.

The result will be further pressure on the limited revenues Maduro depends on to keep the Venezuelan state afloat.

About the author:
Francisco J. Monaldi, Ph.D., is the Wallace S. Wilson Fellow in Latin American Energy Policy and director of the Latin America Energy Program at the Center for Energy Studies at Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy.

This article is reproduced from The Conversation under a Creative Commons licence

Colombia’s Foreign Minister Rosa Villavicencio declared Thursday that the Government of President Gustavo Petro is “not in agreement” with the Nobel Peace Prize awarded to Venezuelan opposition leader María Corina Machado – a position that signals how Colombia remains a close ideological ally of one of the hemisphere’s most authoritarian states.

In remarks that were evasive at best and obtuse at worst, Villavicencio told Caracol Radio that Colombia did not send a delegation to the ceremony in Oslo because the prize “should not be granted to someone who incites aggression.” She accused Machado of having previously endorsed the possibility of foreign intervention to restore democracy in Venezuela — a talking point aligned with Maduro’s narrative but at odds with the reality of Machado’s persecution and exile.

The foreign minister tried to soften the blow by reminding listeners that the Norwegian Committee is “autonomous,” line repeated several times as if to imply Colombia’s hands were tied. But the message was unmistakable: Colombia has chosen the comfort of accommodating a dictatorship over defending a peaceful transition to democracy in Venezuela.

The Petro administration’s stance also signals how a government that claims to champion human rights now shows deference to regimes that imprison, torture, censor, and force political opponents into hiding. Colombia has deliberately refused to stand with a woman who risked her life to defend the most essential freedoms for all Venezuelans.

The contrast between Colombia’s silence and the global celebration of Machado cannot be more glaring. Leaders across Europe, Latin America, and the United States praised her courage, while King Harald of Norway presided over a ceremony attended by Argentina’s Javier Milei, former Colombian president Iván Duque, Panama’s José Raúl Mulino, Ecuador’s Daniel Noboa, and Paraguay’s Santiago Peña.

Machado’s Escape Exposes Bogotá’s Moral Vacuum

While Colombia questions the legitimacy of the award, Machado herself undertook a dramatic escape that underscored the brutality of the regime she confronts – and the grotesque irony of Bogotá’s position.

According to a Wall Street Journal investigation, Machado disguised herself with a wig, crossed ten military checkpoints, boarded a fishing boat to Curaçao, and flew to Oslo on a private jet. After more than a year in hiding, she emerged publicly in Norway. Her daughter, Ana Corina Sosa, accepted the Nobel Prize on her behalf during a emotional ceremony on Wednesday, December 10.

Machado’s audacity – and the global admiration it generated – stands in stark contrast to Colombia’s  political miscalculations.

Villavicencio justified Colombia’s position by claiming Machado had “accepted any kind of military intervention” in Venezuela. But the remark functioned less as diplomacy and more as justification for a government unwilling to break ranks with a regime that operates as the “criminal hub of the Americas”.

Machado told reporters on Thursday, that Venezuela “has already been invaded” by Russian agents, Iranian agents, and terrorist groups Hezbollah and Hamas.  “What sustains the regime is a very powerful and strongly funded repression system. Where do those funds come from? Well, from drug trafficking, from the black market of oil, from arms trafficking and from human trafficking. We need to cut those flows,” stated the Laureate next to Norway’s Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Stoere.

Machado has pledged to return to Venezuela with her Nobel Prize and insists her country will become democratic and free. She has denounced the criminal structures that sustain the Maduro regime and highlighted the broader regional security threat it poses.

Meanwhile, Colombia – critical of Israel’s human rights abuses in the Gaza Strip – has yet to condemn the October 7 massacre committed by Hamas, and remains notably quiet on Maduro’s sprawling torture centre, El Helicoide, in central Caracas.

Petro’s increasingly toxic foreign policy with the Trump administration has now crossed an indelible moral line.  Latin America’s oldest continuous democracy is now publicly undermining a woman targeted by a dictatorship. In doing so, Colombia has distanced itself from other Western nations defending democratic ideals and aligned itself more closely with those eroding them.

The foreign ministry insists its position is based on principle. But to much of the international community, and to a majority of Colombians, the reality is unavoidable: the Petro government is no longer neutral, no longer cautious, and no longer a credible defender of democratic values. It has willingly taken Maduro’s side – and revealed a profound lack of moral courage on the world stage.

Every December, Bogotá transforms. Streets glow with constellations of LED lights, plazas turn into theatrical stages, and entire neighborhoods feel suspended somewhere between festive nostalgia and big-city spectacle. But this year’s celebration, dubbed Navidad es Cultura, is bigger, brighter, and more imaginative than ever before. Running from December 5 to 23, it invites locals and travelers alike to explore a holiday season built around creativity, community, and a forward-looking vision of the capital.

“This year, Christmas in Bogotá asks us to imagine and build the future we deserve,” says Mayor Carlos Fernando Galán, who unveiled a lineup of 670 activities and more than 4,300 artists. The result is a citywide cultural takeover – part art festival, part family tradition, and always a playground for the young and young-at-heart.

Following the Christmas Trail

For many visitors, the gateway into Bogotá’s holiday spirit begins with La Ruta de la Navidad, a curated trail of illuminated landmarks running through three major sectors: the historic downtown corridor, the sprawling Parque El Tunal in the south, and the bustling districts of the city’s north. This isn’t a gentle dusting of fairy lights. The 2025 installation includes 114 LED Christmas trees, more than 54 kilometers of miniature lights, and 1,655 decorative elements that dazzle both day and night. All of it is powered with a dramatically reduced energy load thanks to the city’s commitment to efficient, sustainable LED technology.

The season’s tallest marvel rises in Parque El Tunal, where Bogotá has erected its highest Christmas tree to date – a shimmering 56-meter-high tower of light with a 20-meter base. Surrounding it, the park becomes a walk-through holiday storybook. More than 1.3 kilometers of illuminated trails lead visitors through a world of giant glowing reindeer, oversized ornaments, a whimsical Santa’s garden, a luminous gift zone, and a charming Postal Navideña designed for festive snapshots.

At night, the park’s central plaza turns into a stage for a 360-degree laser and music show, performed every half hour from December 5 to 28. And this year, two colossal LED matrices – stretching more than 300 meters and totaling 200,000 programmable bulbs – transform the façades of the Palacio Liévano downtown and the Parque El Tunal cultural center, splashing them with color and geometric patterns that ripple like digital brushstrokes.

The Imagined City

The heartbeat of Navidad es Cultura pulses strongest at two iconic venues: Plaza de Bolívar and La Santamaría.

In Plaza de Bolívar, “Una Ciudad Imaginada” steals the show. This high-tech production blends projection mapping, live performance, soundscapes, and more than 50 artists to create a vivid dreamscape. Running December 13–14 and 17–23, the 35-minute performances—three each evening—draw thousands to the capital’s political and cultural heart. Here, Bogotá’s imagined future is cast across historic stone façades, offering a sensory journey through light, architecture, and shared aspiration.

Just a short walk away, Plaza Cultural La Santamaría will host “Más Allá de las Nubes,” a tender 35-minute theatrical piece performed by 80 artists. It tells the poetic story of a young girl and her cat traveling through Bogotá’s neighborhoods – an enchanting family-friendly work that blends dance, acrobatics, immersive staging, and soaring visual elements. With capacity for 10,000 spectators per show, it is one of the season’s most endearing offerings for visitors with children in tow.

Bogotá Belongs to the Night

No Bogotá Christmas is complete without the city’s most beloved holiday tradition: the Ciclovía Nocturna, an annual nighttime cycling celebration when Bogotá hands its streets back to the public.

The edition 48 takes place on Thursday, December 11, from 6 p.m. to midnight, drawing an estimated 2.5 million participants onto 95 kilometers of car-free avenues. Whether you’re pedaling a bike, cruising on a skateboard, or strolling with a cup of hot chocolate, the Ciclovía reveals Bogotá’s electrifying nighttime personality: impromptu music groups, couples on tandem bikes, toddlers being towed in light-strung trailers, and streams of cyclists coasting down Avenida Boyacá or Carrera Séptima under illuminated tunnels of color.

“The Ciclovía is a symbol of Bogotá – of encounter, health, and coexistence,” says IDRD director Daniel García Cañón. This year’s celebration also marks 50 years of Bogotá’s pioneering Ciclovía, now replicated by cities around the world. Fittingly, Bogotá will also host the 15th International Congress of Recreational Ciclovías of the Americas on December 11 and 12, welcoming global leaders for conversations on urban recreation, mobility, and community health.

More than a display of lights, Bogotá’s Christmas season feels like a cultural manifesto—an invitation to imagine a brighter city through shared art, open spaces, and collective celebration. From the sensory wonder of Plaza de Bolívar to the poetic warmth of La Santamaría and the joyful nighttime takeover during Ciclovía Nocturna, Navidad es Cultura positions Bogotá as one of Latin America’s most compelling December destinations.

As Mayor Galán puts it, “I invite everyone to enjoy this year’s Christmas programming and celebrate the end of the year in peace.” This season, Bogotá shines brighter—not only with a constellation of LEDs, but with imagination beyond the clouds.

Colombia has recorded 40,663 homicides during the first three years of President Gustavo Petro’s government, surpassing the totals reported under the administrations of Iván Duque and Juan Manuel Santos, according to a report published Tuesday by the Centro de Paz y Seguridad of Universidad Externado. The report documents killings between August 2022 and August 2025, a period that encompasses Petro’s “Total Peace” agenda with illegal armed groups. According to the data, Colombia registered a 7.59% increase in homicides compared with the same timeframe under Duque, who reported 37,795 cases, while Santos’ second term saw 36,646.

“During the first three years of Gustavo Petro’s administration, violence did not decrease under the banner of ‘Paz Total’. On the contrary, homicides continued to rise,” the study states. Petro’s annual average now stands at 13,554 murders per year, compared with 12,598 under Duque and 12,215 under Santos. Nationally, investigators estimate one person is killed every 39 minutes, a faster rate than during the two previous governments.

The findings, compiled by researchers Andrés González Díaz, Diego Rodríguez Pinzón and Carolina Saldaña, present a wide set of indicators showing the acceleration of lethal violence. Monthly murders during Petro’s term average 1,130 cases — compared with 1,050 under Duque — while daily homicides rose from 34.5 to 37 per day.

The authors also document a territorial reconfiguration of violence. Their analysis identifies rapidly shifting hotspots driven by disputes among armed groups, expanding drug economies and the weakening of state authority in several regions.

The study found the Caribbean region registered the steepest increases, displacing historically violent departments in the southwest. Six departments account for the largest share of the national rise when compared with Duque’s tenure, including Bolívar with 870 homicides, Magdalena: (811), Atlántico: (803) and Santander (530).

Researchers said these spikes coincide with the emergence of new criminal alliances, intensified disputes over drug-trafficking corridors and the collapse of informal ceasefires amid the government’s stalled negotiations with armed groups.

In Catatumbo, one of Colombia’s most unstable border regions, killings rose sharply due to clashes between the National Liberation Army (ELN) and FARC dissidents. “The increase in violence in Norte de Santander — 141 additional homicides — reflects escalating confrontations, particularly in Tibú, Ocaña, El Tarra and Cúcuta,” the report said. Rising attacks on social leaders and former FARC peace signatories further contributed to what analysts describe as an “acute humanitarian risk.”

Bogotá becomes a “critical node”

Despite being the country’s most heavily policed territory, Bogotá recorded one of the most significant increases in homicide volume. Murders rose from 3,198 to 3,427, an increase of 229 cases (7.16%), making the capital the single largest contributor to the regional rise in central Colombia.

The department of Cundinamarca added 139 cases, rising from 1,111 to 1,250 homicides (+12.51%), while Boyacá registered the steepest proportional jump in the region — +17%, from 247 to 289 cases — despite being one of the country’s historically safest departments.

The report concludes that identifying and intervening in these “critical territorial nodes” is essential to reversing the national upward trend. It also adds that the shifting geography of violence reflects a broader proliferation of armed groups and illicit economies fueled by kidnapping, drug trafficking and illegal mining, during Petro’s final months in office.

Before he became Latin America’s most celebrated chef, Álvaro Clavijo spent years doing what few aspiring cooks romantically imagine: scrubbing plates in the basements of Parisian kitchens. He had left Bogotá after a brief, unsatisfying year studying architecture at Los Andes University. In Paris he dabbled in photography, learned impeccable French, and quickly discovered that the underbelly of a culinary capital is more grit than glamour.

But something in the rhythm of kitchens – heat, repetition, precision – anchored him. Despite his mother’s skepticism that he could make a living cooking (“She couldn’t even fry an egg,” he jokes), he enrolled at Barcelona’s prestigious Hofmann School, known for turning students into chefs ready for the academy’s own Michelin-starred restaurant.

Three years in Barcelona, five in France, and still, Colombia tugged at him. Yet just as he considered returning home, another city intervened – New York, home to the temples of modern gastronomy. He landed at Thomas Keller’s Per Se, where the immaculate choreography of haute cuisine shaped him indelibly. “My cooking is French, my ingredients are Colombian, and my organization is American,” he says today, seated in the dining room of El Chato, the Bogotá restaurant that has now been named Latin America’s Best Restaurant 2025 by Latin America’s 50 Best Restaurants.

Clavijo returned to Bogotá in 2013 to open the first incarnation of El Chato in Quinta Camacho. The menu – slow-cooked meats, obsessive technique, and elegant, deeply flavored dishes – won over small but devoted crowds. Still, it was removed from the city’s emerging gastrosphere. When a more neighborhood-friendly house became available in Chapinero Alto, he moved the restaurant, unaware that the next decade would transform it into one of the continent’s most influential kitchens.

Today, El Chato is a study in unpretentious sophistication. The 80-seat dining room blends the familiar with the eccentric: a 1970s rotary telephone, faded high-school portraits, and stacks of old medical encyclopedias donated by friends. Bare brick walls glow under soft lighting. The décor is tongue-in-cheek, but the menu – one page, clean, unfussy –  reveals Clavijo’s philosophy: dining should thrill, not intimidate.

A meal begins with the restaurant’s signature “mule,” part Moscow classic, part tribute to the Colombian countryside’s icon. Infused with herbs and tropical fruits, the drink sets the tone for a night driven by local ingredients elevated through global technique. Upstairs, the kitchen team moves like monks—quiet, deliberate, wholly focused.

Clavijo’s signature dishes have become objects of devotion. A roast lamb, equal parts Boyacá and Provence, is tender, perfumed, and blanketed with a buttery cream sauce. The crab in avocado purée, studded with mango, foraged greens, and blackened-rice chips, is the kind of dish entire essays could be written about. Beef tartare arrives garnished with rose vinaigrette, mini croutons, and kale mayonnaise. Even the lunch menu—Cuban pulled pork sandwiches, bright shrimp buns—shows a level of refinement that belies its casual delivery.

Temperature, he insists, is everything. He pushes heat to its limits, and his meat cuts are never simply slapped onto a grill; they are cured in-house for weeks, allowing “alchemy,” as he calls it, to work. Rarely leaving the kitchen, he has built a culinary identity rooted in mastery of technique and reverence for Colombian produce, from the high Andes wetlands to the Amazon lowlands.

What distinguishes El Chato – and how it ascended from No. 3 in 2024 to No. 1 in 2025 – is its role as an ambassador for Colombian biodiversity. Working closely with small growers and horticulturists in the Sabana de Bogotá, people whose crops rarely reach high-end kitchens, Clavijo’s dishes are not recreations of Colombian cuisine but reinterpretations – rooted in memory, informed by travel, and executed with discipline.

On a typical night, the dining room hums with locals and international travelers alike. Bogotá’s restaurant scene is fiercely competitive; many places don’t survive their first year. El Chato did more than survive. It set a new standard, one that the world has now recognized by awarding it the top spot in Latin America’s 50 Best Restaurants.

For Clavijo, the accolade is gratifying but not defining. The work continues. The flavors deepen. The relationships with farmers strengthen. And every night, in that Chapinero house where mountain meets sea and garden meets homestead, his team quietly reshapes what Colombian cuisine can be.

The 2025 Latin America’s 50 Best list highlighted restaurants from 21 cities, including seven first-time entrants, underscoring the region’s growing culinary diversity. Kjolle in Lima ranked No. 2 and was named Best Restaurant in Peru, while Don Julio in Buenos Aires placed third, securing Best Restaurant in Argentina. Boragó in Santiago took the No. 6 spot, with its chef, Rodolfo Guzmán, receiving the Icon Award for his influence on Chilean cuisine. Quintonil in Mexico City (No. 7) and Tuju in São Paulo (No. 8) were recognized as the best restaurants in Mexico and Brazil respectively.

Cartagena-based Celelé also has an impressive rank among Latin America’s 50 Best, coming in at No.5.

Casa Las Cujas in Santiago, which debuted at No. 14, won the Highest New Entry Award, while Cosme in Lima earned the Highest Climber Award after rising 19 places to No. 9. Nuema in Quito, ranked No. 10 and named Best Restaurant in Ecuador, saw chef Alejandro Chamorro win the peer-voted Estrella Damm Chefs’ Choice Award.

Bianca Mirabili of Evvai in São Paulo (No. 20) was named Latin America’s Best Pastry Chef, and Argentina’s Maximiliano Pérez received the Best Sommelier Award for his wine-driven interpretations of local terroir. Ttássia Magalhães was awarded Latin America’s Best Female Chef for her leadership of an all-women kitchen team in São Paulo.

The awards also recognized national leaders: Maito in Panama City (No. 18), Sublime in Guatemala City (No. 19), Cordero in Caracas (No. 29), and Sikwa in San José (No. 43) were named the best restaurants in their respective countries. Seven new entries joined the 2025 ranking, including Afluente in Bogotá (No. 34), El Mercado in Buenos Aires (No. 27), Arami in La Paz (No. 48), and Demo Magnolia, Yum Cha and Karai by Mitsuharu in Santiago.

Oda in Bogotá received the Sustainable Restaurant Award for its focus on hyper-local sourcing. Additional previously announced prizes included Chef Tita of the Dominican Republic winning the Champions of Change Award, Kjolle receiving the Art of Hospitality Award, and Guatemala’s Ana being named the American Express One To Watch.

In 2017, after El Chato had recently opened its doors to the public, The City Paper profiled the venue and sat down to talk with the young, dynamic chef. The restaurant’s location on Calle 65 No.3B-76 remains the same, and reservations are required.

 

El Chato: A Bogotá restaurant on par with the very best

Hugo Carvajal Barrios, the former Venezuelan intelligence chief known as “El Pollo,” has issued an explosive letter from a U.S. federal prison alleging that Nicolás Maduro’s government systematically used drug trafficking, criminal gangs, espionage networks, and even electoral technology as tools to undermine the United States. The 10-page statement, addressed to “President Trump and the People of the United States,” asserts that Venezuela’s ruling elite operates as a “narco-terrorist organization” with global reach and explicit anti-American intent.

Carvajal, a three-star general who served as Director of Military Intelligence under both Hugo Chávez and Maduro, writes that he is now “sitting in an American prison because I voluntarily plead guilty to the crimes charged against me: a narco-terrorism conspiracy.” He frames the letter not as a political intervention but as an act of accountability: a decision, he says, to reveal “the full truth so that the United States can protect itself from the dangers witnessed for so many years.”

Having broken publicly with the Maduro government in 2017, Carvajal fled Venezuela and was later extradited to the United States. He insists that even as he knew he faced prosecution, he acted “with the strongest conviction to dismantle Maduro’s criminal regime and bring freedom to my country.” Today, he writes, he believes it is essential to warn Americans about “the reality of what the Venezuelan regime truly is and why President Trump’s policies are not only correct, but absolutely necessary to the United States’ national security.”

Maduro and Cabello of Direct “Narco-Terrorism”

Carvajal accuses Maduro and ruling party strongman Diosdado Cabello of transforming the Venezuelan state into a criminal consortium dedicated to drug trafficking. “I personally witnessed how Hugo Chávez’s government became a criminal organization that is now run by Nicolás Maduro, Diosdado Cabello, and other senior regime officials,” he states. The purpose of this network—known internationally as the Cartel de los Soles—was, he claims, “to weaponize drugs against the United States.”

He maintains that narcotrafficking operations facilitated by Venezuela were not the result of corruption or rogue actors. “The drugs that reached your cities through new routes were not accidents… they were deliberate policies coordinated by the Venezuelan regime against the United States,” he writes. According to Carvajal, the strategy “was suggested by the Cuban regime to Chávez in the mid-2000s” and relied on cooperation from the FARC, ELN, Cuban intelligence agencies, and “Hezbollah.” The regime, he adds, supplied “weapons, passports, and impunity” to these groups.

Carvajal devotes a significant portion of the letter to the evolution of the Venezuelan criminal super-gang Tren de Aragua, now considered one of Latin America’s most rapidly expanding transnational crime networks. He claims he personally witnessed its origins inside Venezuelan prisons.

“I was present when decisions were made to organize and weaponize criminal gangs across Venezuela to protect the regime—among them the group known as Tren de Aragua,” he writes. Chávez, he claims, ordered the recruitment of gang leaders “to defend the revolution in exchange for impunity,” while Maduro later expanded the strategy by “exporting criminality and chaos abroad.”

Carvajal alleges that “thousands of members” of the gang were sent out of Venezuela through coordination among the Ministries of Interior and Prisons, the National Guard, and national police forces. He claims the outflow accelerated when “the Biden-Harris open-border policy became widely known,” asserting that Tren de Aragua “seized the opportunity to send these operatives into the United States.”

“They now have obedient, armed personnel on American soil,” he writes, alleging that the gang was ordered to continue “kidnapping, extorting, and killing” as a means of financing itself abroad.

Russian and Cuban Intelligence Behind Spy Networks

Carvajal goes on to detail alleged espionage operations linked to both Russian and Cuban intelligence services. He claims Russian operatives approached Chávez with a plan to tap submarine internet cables linking South America and the Caribbean to the United States – purportedly to intercept U.S. government communications.

He also recounts warning Maduro in 2015 that allowing Russia to build a listening post on La Orchila Island “would one day invite American bombs,” a warning he says was ignored.

According to Carvajal, Venezuela and Cuba also sent operatives into the United States. “For twenty years, the Venezuelan regime sent spies into your country – many are still there, some disguised as members of the Venezuelan opposition,” he writes. Cuban intelligence, he claims, “bragged about having sent thousands of spies over decades, some now career politicians.” Most sensationally, he asserts: “U.S. diplomats and CIA officers were paid to assist Chávez and Maduro… and some remain active to this day.”

Carvajal also revives allegations about the voting-technology company Smartmatic. “The Smartmatic system can be altered—this is a fact,” he writes, claiming he oversaw the placement of the official responsible for information systems at Venezuela’s electoral authority. While he stops short of alleging that U.S. elections were stolen, he asserts that “elections can be rigged with the software and has been used to do so.”

“The Regime Is at War With You”

Carvajal concludes with a sweeping warning to the United States. “Make no mistake about the threat posed by allowing a narco-terrorist organization to roam freely in the Caribbean,” he writes. “The regime I served is not merely hostile—it is at war with you.” He reiterates his support for Trump’s stance on Venezuela, writing: “I absolutely support President Trump’s policy… because it is in self-defense and he is acting based on the truth.”

Colombia’s Transport Minister María Fernanda Rojas said on Monday that Avianca is close to completing mandatory software updates on its Airbus A320 fleet, with only 19 aircraft still pending intervention after a week of global disruptions triggered by what aviation experts describe as the largest recall in Airbus’s 55-year history.

The grounding forced airlines across several continents to halt operations, rebook thousands of passengers, and reconfigure flight schedules during one of the busiest travel periods of the year.

According to Aerocivil, Colombia’s Civil Aviation Authority, 102 of Avianca’s 124 grounded A320 aircraft are now back in service following an accelerated technical effort led in coordination with Airbus technicians. The remaining aircraft are expected to be updated within three days at Avianca’s main maintenance base at Rionegro, Antioquia. Authorities fast-tracked the import of 10 additional software units from France after Colombian regulators, the Ministry of Transport, and the tax agency DIAN jointly cleared an emergency customs process over the weekend.

Latam Airlines and JetSMART, the two other carriers in Colombia operating affected A320s  have already completed updates on their six combined jets. The minister said the rapid turnaround reflects “an unprecedented level of coordination” between airlines, regulators and Airbus engineers, who were deployed across several countries to help implement the corrective measures.

Globally, airlines said operations were returning to normal on Monday, after the grounding struck at a sensitive time for the global aviation industry. The Airbus A320, which only weeks ago overtook the Boeing 737 as history’s most-delivered jetliner, also faces long-term maintenance bottlenecks that have left hundreds of aircraft parked and waiting for parts under the pressure of post-pandemic demand.

The crisis also hit Airbus at a moment when the European manufacturer was stepping up efforts to meet its year-end delivery targets. Signals of lower-than-expected deliveries for November have already rattled investors, and the grounding added further uncertainty to an already tight production schedule. Shares of major Airbus customers — including Lufthansa and easyJet — fell on Monday amid concerns that delivery timelines could slip further. According to Reuters several deliveries have already been impacted, though the extent and duration remain unclear; one industry insider estimated around 50 aircraft could face delays.

Adding to Airbus’s challenges, the company on Monday confirmed a separate quality issue involving metal fuselage panels on a “limited number” of A320 aircraft. While the defect does not pose an immediate safety risk, Airbus said it is taking a “conservative approach” by inspecting all aircraft that could potentially be affected. The announcement sent Airbus shares tumbling as much as 6% during early trading, heightening market anxiety already fueled by the software crisis and flight disruptions.

The initial software alert was triggered after Airbus analyzed data from a recent in-flight incident and concluded that intense solar radiation under certain conditions could corrupt data linked to the aircraft’s flight-control computers. The disruptions rippled across major hubs in Latin America and the United States, coinciding with the U.S. Thanksgiving travel weekend, one of the busiest periods of the year.

Delta and American Airlines were forced to delay or cancel flights as dozens of A320 jets were pulled from service for urgent inspections. “Airbus apologises for any challenges and delays caused to passengers and airlines by this event,” the manufacturer said in a statement.

For Colombia’s flagship carrier and one of the world’s largest A320 operators, the near-completion of the updates marks a significant recovery after days of cancellations, rebookings and schedule reshuffling. The airline will reopen ticket sales on December 5 as its domestic and international network returns to full capacity and the remaining 19 jets are certified to fly.

Senator Iván Cepeda of the ruling Historic Pact coalition has emerged as the early front-runner in Colombia’s 2026 presidential race, according to a nationwide Invamer poll released Sunday by Caracol TV and Blu Radio. The survey – the first major measurement since the lifting of Colombia’s recent polling restrictions – places the left-wing candidate at 31.9% of voting intention, six months ahead of the first round.

The results position Cepeda well ahead of candidate Abelardo de la Espriella of Defensores de la Patria, who received 18.2%, and independent centrist Sergio Fajardo, who registered 8.5%. Miguel Uribe Londoño, running for the leadership of  President Álvaro Uribe Vélez’s Centro Democrático party, follows with 4.2%. Uribe Londoño is the father of Senator Miguel Uribe Turbay, victim of an assassination attempt on June 7, and who died two months later at the Santa Fe Hospital in Bogotá.

The findings come amid broad public dissatisfaction with the country’s direction and with the administration of President Gustavo Petro, who leaves office on August 7, 2026. According to the poll, 56% of respondents disapprove of Petro’s administration, while 37% approve. Although disapproval has dipped slightly from previous months, nearly six in ten Colombians remain critical of the government. National sentiment is similarly pessimistic: 59.8% believe Colombia is “on the wrong track,” compared with 34.4% who feel otherwise.

Internal security stands out as the leading concern. Asked whether Petro’s “Total Peace” policy had made them feel safer, 66.2% claim it made them feel more insecure. Nearly 65% believe the initiative is moving in the “wrong direction”, and 73% say the government has lost territorial control to illegal armed groups. Only 20% expressed confidence in the government’s peace and security approach.

The Invamer survey, conducted between November 15 and 27 among 3,800 respondents in 148 municipalities, does not include public reaction to the latest scandal involving alleged infiltration of state institutions by FARC dissidents. The poll has a 1.81% margin of error and a 95% confidence level.

Cepeda’s lead reflects firm support among left-leaning voters and measurable gains among independents and left-leaning centrists. Though only 24% of those polled identified themselves as “left-wing”, the senator’s 31.9% support suggests he is drawing backing among younger voters. He also carries a relatively high rejection rate: 23.9% said they would “never” vote for him.

The survey challenges the perception that Cepeda lacks room to grow beyond the left, even as 50% expressed that they would prefer to vote for a candidate opposed to Petro. Analysts believe the Historic Pact’s decision to hold its internal consultation last month helped consolidate support within the coalition and gave Cepeda a strategic advantage.

Despite his lead, Cepeda could face voter rejection should Petro’s disapproval ratings continue to climb. The candidate’s current negative rating is among the highest of any public figure, and his pro-Petro agenda on security, economy, and U.S relations could push the center closer to the moderate right. Still, the poll indicates Cepeda would win a runoff against De la Espriella with a wide margin, but face a “technical tie” with the mathematician and former Governor of Antioquia.

De la Espriella, meanwhile, has quickly consolidated the anti-Petro vote, emerging as a “dark horse” at the extreme right of the spectrum. Once absent from early electoral projections, the lawyer now surpasses established Centro Democrático politicians – including senators María Fernanda Cabal, Paola Holguín, and Paloma Valencia.

Former defense minister under President Juan Manuel Santos and ex-Ambassador to Washinton, Juan Carlos Pinzón, is in seventh place (2,9%), but these early numbers are likely to increase, given that he maintains a close relationship with three ideological camps (Centro Democrático, La U, Cambio Radical) represented in Presidents Uribe and Juan Manuel Santos, and German Vargás Lleras.

 Even though the poll found that 63% of eligible voters know who De la Espriella is, there is room for continued growth for the five candidates who marked above 2% in the poll, among them, Vargas Lleras in fifth place (2.1%).

The centrist bloc, historically influential in Colombian politics, appears fragmented. Fajardo, once considered a reliable alternative to both left and right, no longer polls in double digits. While he maintains a lower rejection rate than most rivals and doubles the numbers of former Bogotá mayor Claudia López (4.1%), analysts say the proliferation of centrist candidates could dilute Fajardo’s base. Combined, these candidates would outpace De la Espriella’s support, but the numbers suggest this does not translate into a cohesive electoral force.

Foreign policy is also shaping voter priorities. A large majority – 78% – said maintaining strong relations with the United States is essential for the next administration. Respondents widely rejected Petro’s decision to use a megaphone in New York to urge U.S. soldiers not to follow orders from former President Donald Trump; 78% disapproved of the act, even though half of respondents hold an unfavorable view of Trump.

President Petro reacted to the poll on social media, framing the electoral landscape as a struggle between entrenched elites and what he described as a “powerful people” seeking to reclaim the state. Referring implicitly to Uribe and Fajardo, the president said Colombia must reject “mafioso elites” and work toward a “free and educated” society.

The Centro Democrático announced it will conduct an internal vote among more than 4,000 active party members to select two candidates for a March 2026 primary. The contenders are senators Cabal, Holguín, and Valencia, and Miguel Uribe Londoño.

With six months until the first round on May 31, 2026, the Invamer poll highlights a polarized electorate, deep concerns over security and corruption, and an early advantage for the ruling coalition’s candidate — with substantial uncertainty and new political alignments spearheaded by former presidents, especially Álvaro Uribe.

Colombia’s flagship carrier, Avianca, announced Friday it has grounded more than 70% of its Airbus A320 fleet after the European manufacturer issued an urgent global bulletin ordering operators to carry out immediate software updates to prevent potential flight-control failures.

The disruption, one of the most severe to hit the airline in years, comes as Airbus launched one of the largest fleet-wide recalls in its history, affecting some 6,000 A320 commercial aircraft worldwide — more than half of the global fleet. The A320 is the world’s most widely used single-aisle airliner and the backbone of Avianca’s operations across Latin America and to U.S and Canadian hubs.

There are around 11,300 A320 jets in operation in total.

In a statement, Avianca said Airbus notified operators on November 28 that a significant portion of A320 require a mandatory software modification. The update, which Airbus described as reverting to an earlier software version, must be applied before affected aircraft can resume flights, except for ferry operations to maintenance bases.

“As soon as the aircraft reach their maintenance bases, they must remain on the ground until the updates are completed,” Avianca said. “This order affects more than 70% of Avianca’s fleet.”

The airline warned that the grounding will trigger significant operational disruptions over the next 10 days as engineers work to install the update across its aircraft. To limit further complications and manage passenger flow, Avianca has temporarily closed ticket sales for travel dates through December 8 — an extraordinary measure taken to “reorganize its capacity and re-accommodate passengers on available flights.”

Customers with upcoming reservations will receive direct notifications from the airline detailing their travel options.

The update requirement has already led to cascading delays and cancellations across several regions. Reuters reported that, at the time Airbus issued its notice to more than 350 operators, roughly 3,000 A320 aircraft were airborne. Airlines in the United States, Europe, South America, India and New Zealand said the repairs could trigger operational disruption during one of the busiest travel weeks of the year.

American Airlines, the world’s largest operator of the A320 family, said about 340 of its 480 aircraft require the fix. The carrier expects the majority of updates to be completed by Saturday, estimating about two hours of work per jet. Delta Airlines said updates to a small portion of its Airbus A320 planes will likely be completed by Saturday morning, a spokesperson said.

Avianca, however, expects the impact to last longer given the scale of its grounded fleet in Latin America and the limited availability of maintenance slots at Bogotá’s El Dorado International Airport.

The airline said its priority is passenger and crew safety and that it is working “as quickly as possible” to complete the mandatory modifications and restore normal operations.

To mitigate the fallout, Avianca is offering several options to affected passengers:

• Rebooking on the nearest available Avianca flight or on partner airlines with which it has commercial agreements.

• Flexible changes, allowing travelers to reschedule without penalty fees or fare differences, subject to availability, for up to 180 days after the original travel date.

• Refunds for unused flight segments through the airline’s website, call center, sales offices or travel agencies.

Avianca urged customers not to go to the airport unless their flight has been confirmed and to closely monitor email notifications associated with their reservation, as well as updates on its official channels.

Despite the scale of the disruption, the airline said the swift grounding demonstrates its commitment to safety while complying with Airbus’ unprecedented directive.

“The priority of Avianca is to ensure the safety of our passengers and crew,” the company said, adding that it aims to complete the required modifications as soon as possible to “minimize service disruptions.”