The ongoing investigations have now been joined by a new complaint filed by presidential candidate Claudia López

Colombia’s House Investigation and Accusation Committee has opened an ex officio investigation into President Gustavo Petro over alleged improper political participation ahead of the country’s presidential election on May 31, 2026, amid growing scrutiny over the president’s neutrality during the campaign.

The decision became public Tuesday, May 26, through an official document in which the committee said the investigation stems from “recent statements and social media posts” by the head of state “related to alleged participation in politics in connection with the upcoming presidential elections.”

“This Legal Investigation and Accusation Committee is legally obligated, under the powers granted by Law 600 of 2000 (Article 27) and Law 5 of 1992, to initiate an ex officio criminal investigation for the crime of Political Intervention (Article 422 of the Criminal Code),” the document states.

The order was signed by Gloria Arizabaleta, chair of the Investigation and Accusation Committee and a House representative from the ruling Pacto Histórico party.

Although Colombia’s president is considered the natural leader of his political movement, in this case, Pacto Histórico, whose presidential candidate is Iván Cepeda, Colombian law imposes restrictions on public officials regarding electoral participation.

In Colombia, public officials are subject to the principle of political neutrality, preventing them from intervening in electoral controversies or using their positions to influence citizens’ votes in favor of a particular party or candidate, although they retain their individual right to vote.

Article 422 of Colombia’s Criminal Code (Law 599 of 2000) establishes penalties for improper political intervention, including prison sentences and disqualification from holding public office. Such conduct may also result in disciplinary sanctions under Colombia’s General Disciplinary Code.

Claudia López files separate complaint

Presidential candidate Claudia López also filed a formal complaint before the same committee, alleging lack of electoral guarantees and abuse of power by the president.

“We filed before the House Investigation Committee a 58-page complaint with evidence of President Gustavo Petro’s improper participation in politics and the lack of electoral guarantees. His attacks against my campaign, abuse of power and blatant political interference cannot be accepted,” López said in a social media post.

Inspector General requests report on complaints

Meanwhile, Colombia’s Inspector General’s Office requested a detailed report from the committee regarding existing complaints against Petro related to alleged improper political participation.

The request was signed by Inspector General Gregorio Eljach, who asked for a “detailed report listing complaints against the President of the Republic” to be delivered within three days.

However, the scope of the Inspector General’s Office remains limited because, under Colombia’s institutional system, it holds disciplinary authority over lawmakers and local officials, while constitutional authority to investigate the president rests with the House of Representatives.

“The Executive Branch is overwhelmingly powerful compared with the others, and the president, as head of the state’s public administration, has extraordinary powers and tremendous influence over society,” Eljach told El Tiempo newspaper, referring to the president’s social media activity and its possible impact on voters.

According to El País newspaper in Cali, the Investigation and Accusation Committee currently has around 12 complaints against Petro related to alleged political intervention.

The investigation opens in the final stretch of a presidential campaign in which Petro has sought to maintain political influence through support for ruling coalition candidate Iván Cepeda, who currently leads voter intention polls ahead of the first round.

Colombians face three sharply different futures in May 31 vote

Colombia votes on May 31 with its presidential race concentrated around three candidates whose platforms diverge on nearly every dimension of economic and security policy relevant to foreign investors. For corporate executives, institutional investors, and multinational operations with Colombian exposure, the choice between senator Iván Cepeda, senator Paloma Valencia, and defense attorney Abelardo de la Espriella carries direct, measurable implications for the regulatory environment, foreign direct investment (FDI) conditions, energy sector licensing, and geopolitical alignment through at least 2030.

No candidate is projected to clear the 50%-plus-one threshold required to win outright on May 31, making a runoff election on June 21 the expected outcome. The question that will determine the direction of that runoff — and by extension the next administration — is which of the two opposition candidates finishes second.

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A Race Reshaped by Late Polling

The final-week polling picture shifted substantially, and the trajectory matters as much as the snapshot. The CONDOR weighted aggregate — which incorporates surveys from six polling firms and applies greater weight to more recent data — placed the race as of May 23 at: Cepeda 36.3%, De la Espriella 29.1%, Valencia 16.7%.

Invamer, one of Colombia’s most established polling firms, surveyed 3,800 respondents across 152 municipalities between May 13 and May 20, registering Cepeda at 44.6%, De la Espriella at 31.6%, and Valencia at 14.0%. The Centro Nacional de Consultoría (CNC) published a survey conducted May 22 and 23 showing Cepeda at 33.4%, De la Espriella at 30.9%, and Valencia at 12.6%.

Comparing those figures to the Fundación Génesis Crea survey from May 4 through May 11 — which placed Cepeda at 35.1%, Valencia at 25.4%, and De la Espriella at 21.6% — indicates a multi-poll trend of De la Espriella gaining approximately nine to ten percentage points in three weeks while Valencia shed a comparable share. AS/COA’s poll tracker confirms the directional consistency across firms.

Atlas Intel, which published figures more favorable to De la Espriella, is currently under investigation by Colombia’s Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE) for potential methodology violations and could face suspension of its operations. Those figures are treated with caution in this analysis.

Runoff modeling diverges between firms. Fundación Génesis Crea showed Valencia defeating Cepeda 49.1% to 44.7% in a second-round matchup — meaning she was the stronger opposition candidate in that scenario. The Guarumo/Ecoanalítica survey found Cepeda losing all hypothetical runoff scenarios, including against De la Espriella. Two minor candidates — former senator Clara López and former Chocó governor Luis Gilberto Murillo — withdrew and endorsed Cepeda before the first round, a consolidation that appears to have had limited effect on his polling numbers.

Finance Colombia reported in May that the campaign has been marked by an unusual absence of traditional televised debates. Cepeda declined to participate in events organized by major media outlets, stating that proposed formats lacked neutrality. Former Bogotá Mayor Claudia López, herself a candidate, said publicly that Cepeda’s refusal was motivated by an unwillingness to defend his record as the architect of President Gustavo Petro‘s Paz Total security negotiation strategy.

Security Policy: The Three Approaches to Armed Groups

Public security is the top voter concern heading into the election. InSight Crime documented that the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) launched a major offensive against FARC dissident factions in Norte de Santander in early 2025, resulting in mass civilian casualties in the Catatumbo region. In Chocó and Antioquia, the ELN and the Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC), commonly known as the Clan del Golfo, are competing for control of illegal gold mining corridors and drug trafficking routes. In Cauca, FARC dissident factions have established territorial control in areas where state presence has collapsed.

Cepeda’s approach to security is defined by his role as the principal legislative architect of Paz Total. As chair of the Senate‘s peace commission, he designed the framework that extended negotiating status to the ELN, FARC dissident groups, and the Clan del Golfo. His stated rationale is that targeting the financial leadership of drug networks rather than foot soldiers produces more durable results — a position that has academic backing in narcotics policy literature. In practice, Paz Total produced ceasefires that were repeatedly violated, and security indicators in conflict-affected departments deteriorated during the Petro administration. A Cepeda presidency is expected to continue the negotiated settlement model, with the military operating under political constraints.

Valencia’s security platform is based on reinstating Seguridad Democrática, the doctrine associated with former president Álvaro Uribe’s administrations from 2002 to 2010. The core elements are expanded military presence in rural conflict zones, dismantling of rural criminal networks, and resumption of extradition agreements with the United States — which Petro suspended, effectively shielding cartel leadership from US federal prosecution. The Uribe-era approach resulted in measurable reductions in homicide rates, forced displacement, and ELN and FARC territorial control, though human rights organizations documented serious abuses by security forces during that period.

De la Espriella has stated explicitly that his government would have no peace process. He advocates for a model similar to El Salvador’s under President Nayib Bukele: mass incarceration, construction of high-security prison facilities, classification of guerrilla and cartel organizations as foreign terrorist organizations, and broad military offensives. He has not detailed how such operations would be financed or how the mass detention model would interact with Colombia’s Constitutional Court, which has repeatedly constrained executive security powers.

For the armed groups operating in Norte de Santander and Cauca, the historical record indicates that Colombia’s criminal organizations respond more acutely to sustained, institutionally grounded military pressure and functioning extradition pipelines than to political rhetoric. By that measure, Valencia’s platform — which rebuilds the institutional security apparatus incrementally — represents a more structurally credible threat to the ELN and the Estado Mayor Central (EMC) FARC dissidents. For the Clan del Golfo leadership, extradition to the United States has historically been the principal deterrent, and Valencia’s program explicitly restores it.

Business Climate and Employment Conditions

The Petro administration enacted a series of minimum wage increases totaling more than 60% over four years — including a 16% increase for 2023, the largest single-year hike in Colombian history, and a 23.78% increase for 2026 — restructured labor regulations to expand premium pay requirements for night, weekend, and holiday shifts, and raised corporate tax rates to fund social spending programs. The Asociación Nacional de Empresarios de Colombia (ANDI) characterized the regulatory environment as adverse to private investment. Finance Colombia tracked a material decline in FDI in the extractive sector over the same period.

Cepeda supported those labor and fiscal reforms throughout their legislative passage. His platform extends the Petro model: increased state social spending, continued land redistribution programs, and maintenance of the current wage and labor cost structure. For companies with established Colombian operations, the regulatory environment is manageable; for companies evaluating market entry or operational expansion, the cost structure adds friction.

Valencia’s economic program emphasizes corporate stability and private sector investment as the primary mechanisms of job creation. Her vice-presidential running mate, Juan Daniel Oviedo — former director of DANE, Colombia’s national statistics agency — represents a technocratic orientation focused on reducing structural market distortions, streamlining public procurement, and scaling back state administrative overhead. Oviedo’s appointment is a direct signal to the business community that economic management would be data-driven rather than ideologically directed. Oviedo also publicly identifies as a member of the LGBTQ+ community, a departure from the traditional social conservatism of Centro Democrático.

De la Espriella’s economic orientation is pro-business with protectionist elements. His vice-presidential candidate, José Manuel Restrepo — who served as Colombia’s Finance Minister and Commerce Minister — provides institutional credibility on fiscal and trade policy. Restrepo’s presence on the ticket signals commitment to fiscal discipline and regulatory reduction in the extractive and commercial sectors. De la Espriella’s personal style, however, introduces operational uncertainty; his campaign has generated multiple high-profile controversies, including a public altercation with Caracol Noticias journalist María Lucía Fernández during a live broadcast and a formal apology following misconduct allegations by journalist Laura Rodríguez of Piso 8 FM.

Foreign Investment, Oil, and Mining

The extractive sector is the most consequential economic policy dimension for international capital. Ecopetrol (NYSE: EC; BVC: ECOPETROL) — Colombia’s state-controlled energy company and the largest corporation in the country — has operated under exploration restrictions during the Petro administration, which has opposed new fossil fuel contracts on climate grounds.

Cepeda’s position extends the Petro framework: mandatory transition away from fossil fuels, heavy restrictions or outright prohibitions on new oil and gas exploration contracts, and stringent environmental licensing requirements for open-pit mining operations. Foreign investment would be directed by policy toward green hydrogen, ecotourism, and smallholder agriculture. For the multinational oil majors with Colombian operations and for institutional investors in the mining sector, a Cepeda presidency represents a continuation of the current constraints and, in some contract scenarios, an accelerated wind-down of Colombian portfolios.

In a related development, Finance Colombia reported in May that Ecopetrol’s president, Ricardo Roa, has been formally charged in connection with alleged campaign spending violations during Petro’s 2022 presidential campaign. The case will be inherited by whoever takes office in August.

Valencia’s position is that hydrocarbon revenues are essential to Colombia’s macroeconomic stability and that the country cannot exit the sector before alternative revenue structures exist. Her platform actively encourages FDI in petroleum exploration, is open to regulated fracking, and commits to clearing the environmental licensing backlog that has stalled multiple large-scale gold and copper mining projects. For energy and mining companies currently blocked by administrative delays, this represents the most direct path to project advancement.

De la Espriella’s position goes further: essentially deregulating the environmental licensing process for major extraction projects on the grounds that Colombia’s economic sovereignty takes precedence over environmental restrictions he characterizes as externally imposed. The practical constraint is whether a De la Espriella administration would have the institutional coherence and congressional support to deliver regulatory rollback, given that his movement has no established political party structure and entered the race through an independent signature campaign.

Foreign Policy: Washington Alignment vs. Multipolar Strategy

Colombia’s relationship with the United States deteriorated materially under Petro, who aligned Colombia with Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro, pursued closer ties with China and Russia, and suspended extradition agreements. US counternarcotics cooperation was strained throughout the period.

Cepeda is committed to what he describes as a multipolar foreign policy — maintaining functional diplomatic channels with Washington and Brussels while deepening strategic and commercial relationships with China and Russia. His alignment with regional left-of-center governments in Mexico, Brazil, and Bolivia would position Colombia as part of a Latin American bloc that has grown increasingly skeptical of US regional leadership. For US companies operating in Colombia, this trajectory does not mean immediate operational disruption, but it reduces Colombia’s utility as a reliable counterpart on security cooperation, counter-narcotics intelligence sharing, and trade dispute resolution.

Valencia positions a return to the Western alignment as a core objective. She would prioritize restoring the US-Colombia relationship, reinforcing the bilateral Free Trade Agreement, and reestablishing intelligence-sharing mechanisms that were reduced under Petro. Her framing positions Colombia as a democratic anchor in a region experiencing authoritarian pressures.

De la Espriella takes the most explicit pro-US position in the race. La Silla Vacía reported that De la Espriella or entities linked to his campaign donated more than $90,000 USD to the US Republican Party, a fact that raises questions about the nature and expectations of those relationships. He has publicly aligned himself with the populist right in the United States, takes a hostile posture toward China, Russia, and Venezuela, and has characterized his security approach as consistent with a transactional alliance with Washington focused on counter-narcotics enforcement and cartel designation as foreign terrorist organizations.

“Ese pisco robó a 200 mil colombianos.” — Claudia López, former Mayor of Bogotá, referring to presidential candidate Abelardo de la Espriella’s legal representation of DMG pyramid scheme founder David Murcia Guzmán, during a presidential campaign event.

Corruption and Judicial Independence

All three candidates have stated commitments to fighting corruption, though their approaches and focal points differ in ways that are material to the institutional environment for business operations.

Cepeda’s legislative record includes serious, documented work investigating paramilitary infiltration of Colombia’s political institutions — the period known as parapolítica — and pursuing accountability for those cases. His blind spot, his critics argue, is corruption within the current administration. When Ecopetrol’s Ricardo Roa was formally charged in connection with Petro’s 2022 campaign, the response from the Pacto Histórico coalition was subdued. Cepeda has been Álvaro Uribe’s primary judicial antagonist in the Senate; a Cepeda administration would offer no institutional protection to Uribe and would be expected to support the full progress of judicial proceedings against him. For left-wing politicians facing legal exposure, including former Medellín mayor Daniel Quintero, a Cepeda administration would be expected to be more receptive to amnesty frameworks.

Valencia’s approach to anti-corruption is structural rather than prosecutorial: strengthening the independence of the Contraloría General de la República and the Fiscalía General de la Nación, implementing digital transparency in public procurement, and reducing informal executive influence over judicial processes. She would be expected to apply political and rhetorical pressure on behalf of Uribe — her political mentor and a close ally — though her legislative track record indicates a degree of institutional independence from Centro Democrático party orthodoxy.

De la Espriella’s anti-corruption rhetoric centers on severe criminal penalties for corrupt officials. The credibility of that position is complicated by his professional history, which is examined in detail below.

De la Espriella’s Legal Career: The Documented Record

De la Espriella’s campaign has faced sustained scrutiny over his client history as one of Colombia’s highest-profile criminal defense attorneys. The record is documented in reporting by El Colombiano, El Espectador, and the investigative outlet Corrupción al Día.

His documented client roster includes Salvatore Mancuso, the former supreme commander of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) paramilitary network; multiple legislators convicted in the parapolítica scandal, which established systematic infiltration of Colombia’s congress by paramilitary organizations; David Murcia Guzmán, the operator of the DMG pyramid scheme that defrauded an estimated 200,000 Colombian investors; the Nule Primos, convicted of large-scale public contract fraud; and Álex Saab, the Colombian businessman extradited to the United States on charges of acting as the primary money launderer for the Maduro government in Venezuela. According to Corrupción al Día, De la Espriella’s legal fees from Saab reportedly reached $12 million USD and included private aircraft travel.

De la Espriella’s response to this line of criticism rests on due process principles: that every accused person is entitled to vigorous legal defense regardless of the charges, and that his ability to navigate Colombia’s criminal code at its most complex levels demonstrates the expertise required to enforce the law from the executive branch. The argument has legal validity as a principle. The specific issue for foreign compliance officers and US government counterparts is the Saab representation: the same Nicolás Maduro whose regime De la Espriella’s campaign now characterizes as an ideological enemy received legal services from De la Espriella’s firm when the representation was commercially available.

The Fiscalía investigated De la Espriella in connection with alleged paramilitary links in 2009 and again in 2012; both investigations were dismissed for insufficient evidence, and he carries no convictions or active investigations on those matters.

Cepeda’s Family History and Ideological Background

Critics of Iván Cepeda, including Enrique Gómez of the Salvación Nacional party, have argued that his family background constitutes evidence of structural alignment with guerrilla movements. The record on this point merits examination.

Cepeda is the son of Manuel Cepeda Vargas, who served as Secretary-General of the Colombian Communist Party and as a senator for the Unión Patriótica (UP), a left-wing political movement that was systematically exterminated by a combination of state actors and paramilitary organizations during the 1980s and 1990s. Manuel Cepeda Vargas was assassinated on August 9, 1994. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights subsequently found the Colombian state responsible for his murder. The FARC-EP named its Frente Urbano Manuel Cepeda Vargas — an urban front operating within the Bloque Occidental — in the elder Cepeda’s honor.

The Fundación Paz y Reconciliación (PARES) has documented that Iván Cepeda’s relationship with his father’s political positions was more complex than the family lineage alone suggests. After studying in Bulgaria in 1981, Cepeda broke from his father’s Soviet-oriented communist framework and aligned with democratic leftists including Bernardo Jaramillo Ossa, who publicly rejected the FARC’s armed strategy. Cepeda has repeatedly stated his repudiation of the FARC’s use of his father’s name. No documented evidence connects him to operational coordination with current armed groups.

What the family history does establish is the ideological framework through which Cepeda processes security policy: a belief, grounded in personal and political experience, that the Colombian state’s institutional violence has been as destructive as guerrilla violence, and that negotiated settlements are structurally preferable to military solutions. That framework generates Paz Total. It also generates a posture toward ELN and FARC dissident negotiators that prioritizes process continuity over verified compliance — a disposition that armed groups have demonstrably exploited to maintain territorial and operational positions while negotiation frameworks provided legal cover.

Valencia and the Uribe Question

The comparison to former president Iván Duque (2018–2022) comes up regularly in discussions of Valencia’s political independence. Duque, who had limited independent political standing before Uribe selected him, was perceived throughout his term as governing within constraints set by his patron — a dynamic that Colombian political cartoonists characterized as ventriloquism.

Valencia’s profile differs materially. She is the granddaughter of former Colombian president Guillermo León Valencia, carries her own political lineage, and has served in the Senate for over a decade, building positions on agrarian reform, judicial modernization, and indigenous land rights that have placed her at variance with standard Centro Democrático positions on those issues. She won the Gran Consulta por Colombia primary on March 8 with more than 45% of the vote — over 3.2 million Colombians — establishing a democratic mandate distinct from any party endorsement.

She would be expected to use institutional and rhetorical channels to support Uribe in the ongoing judicial proceedings against him, and to apply pressure on the trajectory of those cases. Whether that constitutes political interference with judicial independence or normal advocacy within democratic norms is a question on which observers disagree. What the legislative record does not support is the characterization of Valencia as incapable of independent governance.

Press Freedom and the Media Environment

Press freedom carries an indirect but measurable correlation with rule-of-law quality, which in turn affects operational risk for companies that rely on regulatory predictability and transparent legal processes.

Cepeda has maintained a posture toward critical media that mirrors President Petro’s practice of characterizing adversarial outlets as acting in the interests of economic elites. Under Petro, this produced a systematic exclusion of critical media from official information flows and persistent rhetorical delegitimization of independent journalism, though the press remained legally free to operate. A Cepeda administration would be expected to continue this pattern.

Valencia’s background in Colombia’s traditional political and intellectual establishment, combined with a decade in a party that has faced sustained critical coverage from Colombia’s major outlets, points toward a conventional institutional relationship with the press — adversarial at times, but within professional norms.

De la Espriella’s conduct during the campaign provides direct evidence of his approach. He publicly called Caracol Noticias journalist María Lucía Fernández “ignorant” in a live interview. He issued a formal apology after journalist Laura Rodríguez of Piso 8 FM made allegations of inappropriate conduct. His campaign strategy has drawn comparisons to the approach of Argentine president Javier Milei and US president Donald Trump in its use of direct digital channels to circumvent traditional media while publicly attacking outlets that publish critical coverage. The press would remain legally protected under a De la Espriella administration, but the operational environment for investigative journalism would be hostile.

The Ideological Spectrum: Market Liberalism to State Direction

The question of which candidate is most aligned with free-market principles requires a distinction that the international business press frequently elides: the difference between economic deregulation and political authoritarianism. These can, and in this election do, exist independently.

De la Espriella’s platform is often described in international coverage as the most pro-market. His deregulation proposals for the extractive sector and his corporate tax rhetoric support that reading in the economic domain. His security platform, however, involves a substantial expansion of state coercive power: mass detention operations, a mega-prison construction program, and the suspension of standard due process protections to facilitate rapid incarceration of criminal suspects. The Cato Institute‘s framework of economic freedom as inseparable from civil liberties would categorize a state powerful enough to detain people without standard procedural protections as a state that represents an institutional risk to property rights and contract enforcement as well.

Valencia’s platform, anchored by Oviedo’s technocratic program of structural market reform — reduced administrative barriers, streamlined procurement, smaller state overhead, maintained civil liberties — represents the closest approximation to coherent market liberalism available in this field. It does not carry the rhetorical force of De la Espriella’s deregulation proposals, but it has more institutional grounding.

Cepeda’s platform is the furthest from market liberalism by any standard measure: state-directed investment allocation, wealth redistribution through tax and transfer mechanisms, state expansion in healthcare and pension administration, and agrarian land redistribution. His program is continuous with the Petro administration’s economic framework.

Minor Candidates: The Rest of the Ballot

Several other candidates remain on the ballot and are drawing small but potentially consequential vote shares in a first round where the margin between second and third place could be narrow.

Claudia López, former mayor of Bogotá running under the Con Claudia Imparables coalition, positions herself as a progressive centrist with a documented anti-corruption record. Her polling has not broken 3.5% in major surveys, and her high polarization ratings from her mayoral term limit her growth ceiling. Her attacks on De la Espriella during the campaign — she publicly called him a “defender of the mafia” in reference to his client history — have been among the most pointed in the race, and factually grounded on the public record.

Sergio Fajardo, making his third consecutive presidential run under Dignidad y Compromiso, continues to represent a technocratic, education-focused centrism grounded in his work transforming Medellín in the early 2000s. He has not broken 3.5% in any major poll in this cycle.

Roy Barreras, running under La Fuerza de la Paz following his Frente por la Vida primary victory, is one of the most experienced political operatives in Colombia, having been part of multiple coalition governments across ideological lines over two decades. He polls below the threshold for meaningful first-round impact.

Miguel Uribe Londoño, running under Partido Demócrata, represents a younger-generation conservative platform emphasizing fiscal discipline and private sector growth, broadly consistent with Valencia’s program. He also polls below 3.5%.

Carlos Caicedo, running on a regionalist platform emphasizing decentralization away from Bogotá, draws support primarily from the Costa Caribe. His structural argument about Colombia’s administrative over-centralization is substantively grounded, though his national profile is insufficient to affect the first-round outcome.

Investment Implications

For international capital with Colombian exposure, the three-way race produces three materially different operational scenarios.

A Cepeda victory — which remains the single most likely first-round outcome based on available polling — would signal continuity of the Petro-era regulatory framework: sustained capital outflow pressure, high corporate tax rates, no new fossil fuel exploration contracts for Ecopetrol (NYSE: EC; BVC: ECOPETROL) or private operators, continued labor cost escalation, and a foreign policy trajectory away from Washington. Colombian equity valuations would be expected to remain under pressure. The mining licensing backlog would continue to accumulate. A Cepeda administration would not replicate Venezuela’s economic trajectory — Colombia’s independent central bank, Banco de la República, its functioning constitutional court, and its institutional depth provide meaningful buffers — but the investment headwinds would be structural rather than cyclical.

A Valencia victory would represent the sharpest regulatory reversal available in this field. Ecopetrol exploration contracts would be expected to advance. The mining licensing backlog would be addressed. US bilateral relations would be restored, reactivating security intelligence cooperation and trade facilitation mechanisms. The Colombian peso would be expected to strengthen as country risk premium declined. The path to that outcome now requires her to either close the gap significantly on De la Espriella in the first round or rely on runoff polling that showed her as the stronger second-round candidate — data that predates the most recent polling shift.

A De la Espriella victory introduces the widest distribution of possible outcomes. The upside scenario involves Restrepo managing fiscal and trade policy competently, genuine regulatory rollback in the extractive sector, aggressive extradition resumption, and security operations that reduce the physical risk premium in conflict-affected departments including Cauca, Norte de Santander, and Chocó. The downside scenario involves recurring crises generated by De la Espriella’s personal conduct, conflicts of interest arising from his former client relationships, and authoritarian security measures that attract international human rights attention and complicate bilateral relationships. Restrepo’s presence on the ticket reduces the probability of the downside scenario but does not eliminate it.

The current polling trend indicates that right-wing voters are consolidating around De la Espriella at Valencia’s expense. Whether that consolidation produces a runoff between De la Espriella and Cepeda — and whether the runoff produces a left or right-wing government — remains uncertain. What the polling data does not support is the scenario, widely assumed until recently, of a Cepeda-Valencia runoff in which Valencia was positioned as the structurally stronger opposition candidate.

Subscribe to Finance Colombia to remain updated on key developments and impartial analysis.

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Despite 13 campaigns underway, only five candidates’ poll above 2.5% in voter intention

Colombia is heading toward the first round of presidential elections on May 31, 2026, with 13 candidates in the race, in a scenario marked by political fragmentation and a strong concentration of voter support among a few contenders.

The next president will take office on August 7, following the end of President Gustavo Petro’s term, marking the transition from the country’s first left-wing government in recent history.

According to pre-election polls, only five candidates exceed 2% in voter intention, leaving most with limited chances of reaching the presidential palace. Among the leading contenders are Iván Cepeda, the candidate of the ruling Pacto Histórico, who leads polls with between 35% and 43% support; right-wing candidate Abelardo de la Espriella, with between 16% and 24%; and Paloma Valencia of the Centro Democrático party, with between 14% and 21%.

A second group includes centrist candidates Claudia López, polling between 3% and 4%, and Sergio Fajardo, at around 2.5%, reflecting a fragmented vote within that political segment.

Vice presidential picks shape campaign strategies

As the campaign unfolds, candidates have selected their running partners as a key strategy to broaden their electoral appeal.

Iván Cepeda has chosen Aida Quilcué, an Indigenous Nasa leader from southwestern Colombia, reinforcing the campaign’s leftist profile and its emphasis on including historically marginalized communities in political decision-making.

Quilcué has served as a governor and Indigenous authority in her community and, like Cepeda, is a victim of Colombia’s armed conflict: her husband was killed by state agents in 2008. She has been affiliated with the Regional Indigenous Council of Cauca (CRIC) and the National Indigenous Organization of Colombia (ONIC). She presents herself publicly as an Indigenous leader, human rights defender and senator (2022–2026), without reporting formal higher education credentials.

Abelardo de la Espriella has selected former Finance, and Commerce, Industry and Tourism Minister, Juan Manuel Restrepo, as his running mate, forming a ticket focused on security and economic strengthening. “That is a capability I have because I understand productivity, competitiveness and economic development,” Restrepo told La Silla Vacía during his registration.

Restrepo is an economist with a specialization in finance from Rosario University, a master’s degree in economics from the London School of Economics, a specialization in senior management from INALDE Business School, and a doctorate in higher education leadership from the University of Bath. He has also served as rector of three major universities in Colombia.

Juan Daniel Oviedo, a former Bogotá city councilor, is running alongside Paloma Valencia of the Centro Democrático party. As economist from Universidad del Rosario, Oviedo holds a master’s degree in mathematical economics and econometrics and a Ph.D. in economics from the University of Toulouse in France.

He previously served as head of Colombia’s National Statistics Agency (DANE) during the Iván Duque administration and ran for mayor of Bogotá in 2023.

His vice presidential bid gained momentum after securing more than 1.2 million votes in the March 8 inter-party primary, finishing second. His selection aims to attract centrist and center-right voters and strengthen Valencia’s chances of advancing to a potential runoff.

However, his nomination has sparked controversy, as it marks the first time the right-wing party has chosen a candidate with liberal positions on issues such as women’s rights and LGBTQ+ rights.

Claudia López selected Leonardo Huerta, a university professor of law and philosophy, as her running mate. According to Spain’s El País, he comes from “a working middle-class family,” is the youngest of four siblings, and is married with two children.

Huerta is a lawyer from Universidad Libre and holds a degree in philosophy from the Technological University of Pereira. He has a master’s degree in administrative law and is a doctoral candidate in law. His public sector experience includes serving as education secretary in Pereira and as a deputy ombudsman for health issues during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020.

Sergio Fajardo selected Edna Bonilla as his running mate, reinforcing a campaign centered on education and dialogue. Bonilla previously served as Bogotá’s education secretary during Claudia López’s administration (2020–2023).

She is a public accountant from the National University of Colombia, holds a tax specialization from Externado University and a doctorate in political studies. During the campaign launch, Fajardo said: “We will work together to deliver the serious and safe change Colombia needs. To move beyond polarization and build bridges instead of trenches.”

Voter participation

According to Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil, which oversees elections, a total of 41,421,973 citizens are eligible to vote in Colombia and abroad in the first round of the presidential election. Of these, 21,298,492 are women and 20,123,481 are men.

If no candidate secures more than 50% of the vote, a runoff election will be held on June 21, 2026, between the top two candidates.

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National Health Superintendence oversees patients’ rights and regulates EPS insurers, a key pillar of the system that President Petro has sought to eliminate in his reform efforts

Former Medellín mayor and former presidential pre-candidate Daniel Quintero has been appointed as Colombia’s new National Superintendent of Health, a decision that has sparked controversy across political and social sectors due to ongoing judicial and disciplinary investigations against him.

The National Health Superintendence is responsible for safeguarding the rights of users within the health system, overseeing Health Promoting Entities (also called EPS) and Health Service Providers (IPS), and monitoring the use of public finances allocated to the sector, areas that President Gustavo Petro has sought to reform during his administration.

The appointment comes amid a complex situation in Colombia’s health system. During his administration, President Petro presented two structural reform proposals aimed at reshaping the system, including major changes to the role of EPS. Both initiatives were rejected by Congress.

Following these legislative setbacks, the government has pursued reforms through administrative measures and decrees, including the intervention of several of the country’s largest EPS, which together serve more than 23 million affiliates (More information: Colombian President Gustavo Petro Seeks To Restructure Colombian Health Care Despite Congressional Rejection by Finance Colombia).

During his swearing-in, Quintero said his administration would strengthen oversight of the system. “It is time to put an end to abuses by the EPS,” he said.

Criticism over qualifications and legal cases

The appointment has drawn criticism from organizations and political figures who question both his background as an electronic engineer and his legal situation. Transparency for Colombia said the designation “is inappropriate because it places a political figure widely questioned for using public office to favor private interests in charge of addressing the health crisis, instead of appointing individuals with the training, knowledge, and experience required to resolve it.”

The organization also called on the Attorney General’s Office to expedite ongoing investigations. “We respectfully call on the Attorney General’s Office (FGN) to ensure that cases involving Daniel Quintero move forward swiftly, respecting due process guarantees while delivering results in light of the seriousness of the allegations,” it said.

Quintero, who served as mayor of Medellín from 2020 to 2023, faces more than 40 criminal and disciplinary complaints related to alleged corruption during his administration. Among them is the “Aguas Vivas” case, involving the sale of a forest reserve land plot exceeding 140,000 square meters. In that case, prosecutors have already filed charges for alleged embezzlement, undue interest in public contracts, and misconduct in office, although no conviction has been issued.

Criticism has also emerged from within the government. Carlos Carrillo, head of Colombia’s National Unit for Disaster Risk Management, said that “Quintero is currently on trial for crimes against public administration. He has the right to defend himself, but the Pacto Histórico has no reason to bear the political cost of his legal troubles; we owe him nothing and he brings us nothing.”

Quintero will be the fifth health superintendent appointed during Petro’s administration. His tenure is expected to be temporary, as a new president will take office on August 7, 2026, and will have the authority to appoint a new head of the agency.

Credit downgrade is an indictment of the Petro administration’s fiscal management, including suspension of the fiscal rule.

On April 8, 2026, S&P Global Ratings (NYSE: SPGI) lowered its long-term foreign currency sovereign credit rating on Colombia to BB- from BB and its long-term local currency rating to BB from BB+. The outlook for both ratings is stable, reflecting expectations that the Government of Colombia will gradually reduce its fiscal deficit while sustaining moderate growth in the national gross domestic product.

The rating action follows persistent fiscal imbalances and a policy environment that has become less predictable since the pandemic-related recession. The government decision to suspend the national fiscal rule in 2025 marked a significant shift in the policy framework. Pro-cyclical fiscal policies have provided marginal support for employment and consumption, but have also contributed to higher inflation expectations and a wider current account deficit. S&P expects the general government fiscal deficit to reach 5.6% of the national gross domestic product in 2026, compared to 5.3% in 2025.

“We expect Colombia to have consistently large fiscal deficits over the next few years.” — S&P Global Ratings

Institutional stability remains a key factor in the rating, though challenges persist. A fragmented legislature followed the March 2026 elections, where Pacto Histórico and Centro Democrático emerged with the largest minorities. The upcoming presidential election, scheduled for May 31, 2026, adds further uncertainty. Candidates such as Iván Cepeda of Pacto Histórico, Paloma Valencia, and Abelardo de la Espriella have proposed varying approaches to fiscal consolidation. The new administration will inherit spending pressures related to domestic security, rising healthcare costs, and pension payments linked to minimum wage increases.

The Banco de la República, the independent central bank of the country, has maintained a tight monetary policy to combat inflationary pressures. Annual inflation reached 5.3% in February 2026, prompting the bank to increase reference rates to 11.25%. S&P anticipates that inflation will not return to the target range of 3% +/- 1% until early 2029. While the independent status of the central bank provides a buffer against external shocks, high interest rates and lower-than-expected revenue collections have contributed to the widening deficit since 2024.

Economic growth is projected at 2.5% for 2026, slightly below the 2.6% recorded in 2025. Per capita growth is estimated at $9,900 USD for 2026, with real growth expected to average just above 2% through 2029. Despite being a net energy exporter, the performance of the US economy and international energy prices continue to influence national outcomes. Hydrocarbon exports declined to 35% of goods exports in 2025, down from 67% in 2013, showing some diversification even as the sector remains a primary source of volatility.

Net general government debt is forecast to approach 66% of the national gross domestic product by 2029, rising from 60.4% in 2025. S&P notes that the government interest burden will average 12.3% of general government revenue over the next three years. The shift toward issuing shorter-term debt instruments has reduced reported interest payments but increased vulnerability to interest rate fluctuations. External indicators remain a concern, with narrow net external debt expected to stabilize at 130% of current account receipts through 2029. Foreign direct investment is expected to be the primary source for funding the current account deficit, which is projected to stabilize around 2.6% of the national gross domestic product.

Vise photo credit © Loren Moss

Though surprises are possible, polling says the front runners are Iván Cepeda, Abelardo de la Espriella, and Paloma Valencia.

The Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil of Colombia (RNEC), the entity responsible for organizing elections in the country, reported that a total of 14 candidates have officially registered to run in the country’s presidential elections, scheduled for May 31, 2026. In this vote, citizens will elect the President and Vice President of the Republic for the 2026–2030 term.

According to the electoral authority, the candidates represent a wide range of political perspectives, from left to right, including independent candidacies running through political movements. Here the list and brief profile of the candidates:

1. Clara Eugenia López Obregón, currently a senator for the Esperanza Democrática She has served as Minister of Labor (2016–2017), acting mayor of Bogotá (2011–2012), and Bogotá’s secretary of government (2008–2010). She has been affiliated with left-wing parties and was Gustavo Petro’s vice presidential running mate in the 2010 election.
2. Óscar Mauricio Lizcano, from the FAMILIA coalition. He served as Minister of Information Technologies (2023–2025), was a senator (2010–2018), and a member of the House of Representatives (2006–2010).
3. Raúl Santiago Botero, candidate of the “Romper el Sistema” movement (Break the Establishment). An agronomist engineer and businessman from Medellín, he presents himself as an independent candidate with no prior political experience.
4. Miguel Uribe Londoño, father of the slain presidential candidate Miguel Uribe Turbay. He is running under the Colombian Democratic Party and previously served as president of the Centro Democrático party founded by Álvaro Uribe Vélez.
5. Sondra Macollins Garvin, from the movement “La Abogada de Hierro” (The Iron Lawyer) A criminal lawyer and psychologist, she presents herself as an independent candidate without political affiliations. She ran for the House of Representatives in 2022 and is known for her work in narcotrafficking and corruption cases.
6. Iván Cepeda Castro, a senator since 2014 and the official candidate of the Pacto Histórico, the same party as President Gustavo Petro. Polls project he will receive the highest vote share in the first election round. He is aligned with left-wing political ideas.
7. Abelardo de la Espriella, a lawyer with far-right positions, running for the first time under the Defensores de la Patria movement. Recent polls place him as a likely second or third contender in voter preference.
8. Claudia López Hernández, former mayor of Bogotá (2020–2023) and former senator (2014–2018), running under the centrist movement “Imparables con Claudia.” She is known for her anti-corruption agenda and secured her candidacy with more than 570,000 votes (about 9%) in recent interparty primaries.
9. Paloma Valencia Laserna, current senator and candidate of the Centro Democrático party led by Álvaro Uribe Vélez. She won the right-wing interparty primary on March 8 with more than 3 million votes. Polls place her among the top three contenders, and if she reaches a runoff, she would become the first woman in Colombia’s history to do so.

• Sergio Fajardo Valderrama, an academic and mathematician running for the Dignidad y Compromiso He served as mayor of Medellín and governor of Antioquia and is running for president for the third time.
• Roy Barreras, from the political party La Fuerza (The Force). He won the left-wing coalition primary on March 8 with the lowest vote total (257,000 votes, about 3.6%). Although currently aligned with left-wing movements and part of the Petro administration, he has previously been affiliated with right- and center-leaning parties.
• Gustavo Matamoros Camacho, of the Colombian Ecologist Party. He served in the Colombian Army for 43 years. With no prior political experience, his campaign focuses on public security.
• Luis Gilberto Murillo, who served as Minister of Foreign Affairs (2024–2025) and Colombia’s ambassador to the United States (2022–2024). A human rights advocate and Afro-Colombian leader from Chocó, he presents himself as an independent, moderate, centrist candidate.
• Carlos Eduardo Caicedo, running under the independent movement “Con Caicedo.” He was mayor of Santa Marta (2012–2015) and governor of Magdalena (2020–2023), where he built a strong base as a left-wing political leader.

The RNEC also reported that “the draw to determine the position of presidential candidates on the ballot will take place on March 25 at the Ágora Bogotá Convention Center.”

This process marks the formal start of the final phase of the presidential campaign, during which candidates will seek to consolidate support ahead of the first round on May 31. If no candidate secures an absolute majority, a runoff between the two leading candidates will be held on June 21.

Headline photo: Polling station in Colombia during last Congress elections in March 8, 2026. Photo courtesy of the Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil.

… but Centro Democratico bounces back, while small parties lose out in March 8 voting.

Last Sunday’s elections brought mixed results to Colombia’s capital with the left-wing Pacto Historico party cementing its position as most popular party in the city even while its main opponent the Centro Democratico showed relatively bigger gains.

With 18 Bogotá seats up for grabs in the Chamber of Representatives, the Pacto Historico, backed by President Gustavo Petro, took a majority of eight, an increase of one seat from the previous period.

And by garnering 900,000 votes the incumbent party upped its count by more than 100,000 compared to 2022, when it was also the most popular party in the city.

But by some comparisons the right-wing Centro Democratico’s result was even more impressive, surging from two to four seats on March 8, totalling 700,000 votes, up from around 300,000 in 2022.

In Bogotá, as at national level, the losers were the smaller independent parties often citizen-led or based on niche issues. Also failing was the Nuevo Liberalismo party, founded by mayor Carlos Galán, which failed to pick up a single seat, a sign perhaps of citizen discontent with the capital’s current administration.

The demise of the small and independents reflected a national trend of voter gravitation towards the two bigger parties, Centro Democratico and Pacto Historico, whose top candidates – Paloma Valencia and Iván Cepeda – are likely contenders for the presidential slug-out in May. 

The remaining Bogotá seats went to smaller traditional parties the Green Alliance (2), and the Liberal Party (1), with one seat awarded to the upstart Salvacion Nacional formed by firebrand right-wing presidential candidate Abelardo De La Espriella.

Political phenomenon

The stand-out result in the Bogotá caucus was Centro Democratico’s first-time congressional candidate Daniel Briceño who captured 262,000 votes for his seat in the chamber.

Not only did Briceño get the highest congressional vote across Colombia, he also out-voted the entire list of senators – which get elected nationally – with one of the historically highest ever recorded in Colombia for a camara or senado representative.

The 34-year-old lawyer was being hailed this week as a political phenomenon. Briceño is currently serving on Bogotá city council where he campaigns against corruption, cronyism and waste through a clever combination of social media and forensic takedowns of his political targets.

The influencer made his name by digging into big data on government databases that has allowed him to uncover contracts and documents embarrassing to the administration of Gustavo Petro.

Since then, he has gained both an online following and voter base by scrutinizing and exposing mismanagement at all government levels.

Defend every vote

Briceño’s jump to congress was mirrored on the political left in Bogotá by the rise of influencers Laura Beltran, aka Lalis, and Daniel Monroy, who both won seats for Pacto Historico.

Despite their success at the urns on March 8, both Monroy and Beltran amplified claims of fraud in the days after the election.

Beltran, posting on X, issued a media alert begging for lawyers in the city to volunteer their time as scrutineers to check the recount after detecting “the winds of fraud”.

“We are defending each vote for the Pacto Historico. In Bogotá we have the chance to recover one more seat,” she said, suggesting the party could up its count to nine.

Monroy, for his part, made a widely echoed claim that  “votes for Pacto Historico are disappearing”.

So far there is no evidence of electoral fraud, though changes in the final vote could come about from errors corrected in the final scrutiny taking place in Bogotá this week.

Meanwhile preliminary declarations by European Union electoral observers  – 145  were deployed to Colombia – stated that the voting process had been “transparent, accurate and well-organized”.

Voter turnout for Bogotá was 48 per cent, similar to the level of participation across the country, with the capital providing 15 per cent of the national vote. A higher turnout is expected for the May presidential elections.

The post Election boost for Pacto Historico in Bogotá … appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

The new members of Congress will take office on July 20, the official start of the new legislative term.

On March 8, Colombia elected the Congress that will exercise legislative authority during the 2026–2030 term. From more than 3,200 candidates, voters chose the 102 senators (upper house) and 182 members of the House of Representatives (lower house) who will make up the country’s legislative branch.

According to preliminary reports from the Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil (RNEC), with 98.4% of polling stations counted, equivalent to 19,220,365 votes tallied, the new Congress has been defined electorally, however, it should be noted that these seat projections correspond to the official preliminary count, which still must go through several formal procedures before the final results are certified.

How the Senate Race is Shaping Up?

The Pacto Histórico, the party of current President Gustavo Petro, obtained around 22% of the vote (4,402,601), which would allow it to increase its representation from 20 senators in the current legislature to approximately 25 seats in the next term.

In second place is the Centro Democrático, the party of former President Álvaro Uribe, with about 15% of the vote (3,020,459), potentially increasing its representation from 13 to 17 seats.

The Partido Liberal would rank third with 13 seats (2,268,658 votes). It would be followed by the Alianza por Colombia, led by the Green Party, with 10 seats (1,899,096 votes), and the Partido Conservador, also with 10 seats (1,859,493 votes).

Other wins in the Senate include Party of La U (9 seats), Cambio Radical (7), the Ahora Colombia coalition (5), which backs presidential candidate Sergio Fajardo, and Salvación Nacional (4), the movement of presidential candidate Abelardo de la Espriella. The two remaining seats correspond to the special indigenous constituency.

In terms of losses in representation, the Partido Conservador would be the most affected, losing five of its current 15 seats. Cambio Radical would lose four, the Greens three, La U two, while Liberals and Ahora Colombia would each lose one seat.

Among the prominent figures who would be left out of the new Senate is former President Álvaro Uribe, who occupied position number 25 on his party’s list and would not obtain a seat if the Centro Democrático secures only 17 seats. Green Party senator Angélica Lozano, known for promoting legislation related to transparency, would also lose her seat.

Likewise, movements such as the coalition that supported Juan Daniel Oviedo and the Partido Oxígeno, led by former presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt, who was kidnapped for years by the now-defunct FARC guerrilla group, would fail to surpass the minimum threshold required to obtain Senate representation (3% of the total vote).

On the other hand, the performance of the Salvación Nacional movement, led by presidential candidate Abelardo de la Espriella, stands out. In its first participation in a congressional election, the party would surpass the electoral threshold and secure four senators.

What About the House of Representatives?

The allocation of seats in the House of Representatives follows a different process from that of the Senate, making it difficult to project the final distribution in the early stages of the vote count.

This is because the calculation is conducted department by department, once the RNEC determines the seat allocation formula and electoral quotient in each of the 32 States and the Capital District of Bogotá.

According to report number 45 from the RNEC, with 99.03% of votes counted, the main parties have obtained the following preliminary nationwide results:

• Centro Democrático: 2,551,706 votes.
• Partido Liberal: 2,101,877 votes.
• Partido Conservador: 1,967,996 votes.
• La U: 1,044,778 votes.
• Pacto Histórico: 913,990 votes.
• Cambio Radical: 803,721 votes.
• Alianza Verde: 654,071 votes.
• Salvación Nacional: 436,365 votes.

Because the House of Representatives elections involve parties, movements, and coalitions with strong local and regional influence, several smaller political organizations are expected to win seats, as they must surpass regional thresholds rather than a national one.

The Highlight: a Fragmented Congress that Will Require Coalitions

With the preliminary distribution of seats in both the Senate and the House of Representatives, projections suggest that Colombia’s next president will need to govern through legislative coalitions, as has occurred under President Gustavo Petro and his predecessors.

Presidential candidates Iván Cepeda, of the Pacto Histórico, and Paloma Valencia, of the Centro Democrático, would begin the next political phase with the largest congressional blocs, although neither would have enough seats to govern alone.

Traditional parties such as the Liberal, Conservador, Cambio Radical, and La U, which together could account for more than 40% of the new congress, have not yet decided which presidential candidate they will support, a situation similar to what occurred in the previous election. These parties could therefore become kingmakers, capable of facilitating, or blocking, governability depending on the alliances and coalitions they choose to form.

For that reason, the coming weeks are expected to be marked by intense political negotiations, as presidential contenders attempt to build alliances that would allow them to secure legislative support.

For candidates such as Sergio Fajardo, whose Ahora Colombia coalition would obtain only five senators, or Abelardo de la Espriella, whose Salvación Nacional movement would have four, the challenge will be significantly greater.

Above photo: Polling station during Colombia’s congressional elections. Photo courtesy of the Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil.

Colombia’s presidential race has entered a new phase following the interparty primaries held on March 8. Three major coalitions selected their candidates ahead of the first round scheduled for May 31: Paloma Valencia (48 years) will represent the right, Claudia López (56) the center, and Roy Barreras (62) a segment of the left.

They will join three candidates who did not participate in the primaries because they already hold the official endorsement of their parties: Iván Cepeda (63) of the Pacto Histórico (left), Sergio Fajardo (69) of Dignidad y Compromiso (center), and Abelardo de la Espriella (47) of the Salvación Nacional (far right).

Beyond their immediate results, Colombia’s interparty primaries typically serve two main purposes: reducing the number of contenders and selecting the flagbearers of each coalition, while also measuring the electoral strength of political figures ahead of potential negotiations among parties and candidates. With 99% of polling stations counted, and preliminary results rapidly released by the Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil, several political consequences of the vote are already emerging.

Paloma Valencia to Lead the Uribista Right

The right-wing consultation brought together nine candidates from different center-right and conservative currents. One of its main goals was to secure a strong turnout that could consolidate the sector in public opinion and counter the rise of far-right candidate Abelardo de la Espriella, who seeks to capture a portion of Colombia’s traditional conservative electorate.

The winner was Senator Paloma Valencia, who has campaigned nationwide alongside former President Álvaro Uribe Vélez, the leading figure of the Centro Democrático party.

Although polls had already projected her victory, the surprise was the scale of the result. With 99% of polling stations counted, Valencia secured 3,212,528 votes, representing more than 45% of the total votes cast across the three primaries.

She now faces three major challenges. The first will be unifying the right behind her candidacy and preventing conservative voters from drifting toward De la Espriella. In this context, the selection of her vice-presidential running mate will be crucial.

Among the names circulating is Juan Daniel Oviedo (48), a former Bogotá city councilor who unexpectedly finished second in the consultation with more than 1,200,00 votes, despite his well-known ideological differences with the Uribista movement.

The second challenge is symbolic: no woman has ever reached the second round of Colombia’s presidential election, making it difficult to break that historical barrier even with the political backing of Uribe, who still maintains strong favorability ratings.

Finally, Valencia will attempt to channel the anti-Petro vote, capitalizing on public dissatisfaction with the policies of President Gustavo Petro and his close political ally Iván Cepeda, who currently appears as the frontrunner in most polls for both the first and second rounds.

The Center Cools Around Claudia López

With 99% of votes counted, the centrist consultation recorded the lowest turnout among the three coalitions. Former Bogotá mayor Claudia López received more than 572,000 votes, representing just 8.14% of the total, well below polling projections that placed her above 12%.

For López, the result follows a long campaign that began more than a year ago, during which she sought to challenge Sergio Fajardo, the former mayor of Medellín who already holds the endorsement of the Dignidad y Compromiso party.

The key question now is her next political move: whether to remain in the presidential race or eventually join forces with Fajardo, whose polling numbers also remain modest, hovering around 5%.

The weak result may reflect the fragmentation of Colombia’s political center, often criticized for positions perceived as moderate or ambiguous. It may also indicate that Juan Daniel Oviedo attracted part of the centrist electorate within the right-wing consultation.

In any case, the outcome suggests the presidential campaign could once again polarize around two main narratives: “with Petro,” led by Iván Cepeda and the Pacto Histórico, or “against Petro,” a space still contested between Paloma Valencia and Abelardo de la Espriella.

Roy Barreras Wins the Left Consultation, but Momentum Favors Cepeda

In Roy Barreras’s case, two key factors appear to have contributed to his limited result. First was his decision to maintain a primary that many within the left considered unnecessary, given that much of the progressive sector had already rallied behind Iván Cepeda.

Second is his long political trajectory across multiple governments and ideological camps, from the right to the left, which has led some voters to view him as a traditional establishment politician.

With 99% of votes counted, Barreras secured just over 255,000 votes, less than 4% of the total. During the campaign, Barreras had stated he expected to surpass 1,500,000 votes in order to negotiate a stronger position within the left-wing coalition. Following these results, his most likely option may be withdrawing his candidacy and endorsing Cepeda, signaling unity within the progressive camp.

Other Highlights from the Electoral Day

One of the most striking outcomes was the performance of Juan Daniel Oviedo, who finished second among the 18 candidates participating in the primaries with 1,251,428 votes. With this electoral capital, Oviedo has become one of the most sought-after figures for potential alliances.

His political alignment remains uncertain. It is unclear whether he will fully integrate into Paloma Valencia’s campaign and the Centro Democrático, with whom he has ideological differences, or attempt to move closer to the weakened political center.

Unlike many traditional politicians, Oviedo has built a relatively short but distinctive political career based on his technocratic profile, his experience in economic policy, and his attempt to position himself outside the traditional Petro-Uribe political divide.

Meanwhile, journalist Vicky Dávila (52), who has run a campaign with populist elements inspired by figures such as Javier Milei in Argentina and Donald Trump in the United States, received more than 236,000 votes, around 3.3% of the total, leaving her with limited negotiating leverage.

A similar outcome affected Daniel Quintero (45), the former mayor of Medellín, who received just over 226,000 votes (around 3.2%), with his campaign likely hurt by controversies linked to alleged corruption during his administration.

Under Colombia’s electoral law (Law 1475 of 2011), political parties may still modify or withdraw candidates until March 20. After that date, the presidential campaign will move toward the first round scheduled for May 31. If no candidate obtains an absolute majority (50% plus one), the two candidates with the highest vote totals will compete in a runoff election on June 21.

For now, the race appears likely to center on a left-wing coalition led by Iván Cepeda with the backing of President Gustavo Petro, and a divided right contested between Paloma Valencia and the ultraconservative Abelardo de la Espriella.

Above photo: Claudia López, candidate in the centrist primary, casting her vote in Bogotá. Photo courtesy of Claudia López’s campaign team.

 

Seats are distributed using the D’Hondt method, known in Colombia as the cifra repartidora, which allocates seats proportionally according to the number of votes obtained.

A total of 3,231 candidates will compete for seats in Colombia’s congress in the legislative elections scheduled for March 8, according to the Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil (RNEC), the authority responsible for organizing the country’s electoral processes. In total, 102 senators and 182 members of the House of Representatives will be elected.

According to the electoral authority, 1,124 candidates registered for the Senate and 2,107 for the House of Representatives, the two chambers that make up Colombia’s congress.

As the political analysis website Razón Pública explains, Colombia’s electoral system is based on proportional representation, which seeks to reflect the diversity of political opinions within society in the composition of Congress. For the Senate, or upper chamber, voters may cast their ballots for candidates anywhere in the country, as it operates under a national constituency. In contrast, the House of Representatives, or lower chamber, is elected through territorial constituencies by departments, including Bogotá as the Capital District.

According to the RNEC, 41,287,084 citizens are eligible to vote in the upcoming elections, a key figure because it influences how seats are allocated.

Senate elections

In this election, 102 senators will be chosen by popular vote. According to the Senate’s official website, 100 will be elected through a nationwide constituency and the remaining two seats are reserved for indigenous communities, a special constituency established by the 1991 Constitution to guarantee political representation for these groups.

Voters must choose between receiving the national ballot or the Indigenous constituency ballot, but they cannot vote in both.

House of Representatives elections

For the House of Representatives, 182 members will be elected, distributed as follows:

• Territorial constituencies: 161 seats allocated to departments and the Capital District of Bogotá.
• Special Transitional Peace Constituencies: 16 seats reserved for victims of the armed conflict, created by the Acto Legislativo 02 of 2021.
• Afro-descendant communities: 2 seats.
• Indigenous communities: 1 seat.
• Community of San Andrés (Raizal): 1 seat.
• Colombians living abroad: 1 seat.

Unlike the Senate, each department receives a specific number of seats based on its population, creating regional electoral dynamics in which local political leadership often plays a key role. In practice, more populous departments hold greater representation than smaller ones.

Both the Senate and the House of Representatives receive one additional seat after the presidential election, allocated to the candidate who obtains the second-highest number of votes.

How seats are allocated

Colombia’s electoral system is regulated by the Acto Legislativo 001 of 2003 and the Electoral Law, and operates under principles of proportional representation.

First, the valid votes obtained by each party list are counted. Only those lists that surpass a 3% threshold of total valid votes are eligible to participate in the distribution of seats. In the 2022 legislative elections, this threshold exceeded 509,000 votes.

According to projections by the Misión de Observación Electoral (MOE), the threshold for the Senate in the upcoming elections could reach around 600,000 votes.

This threshold is crucial because if, for example, a candidate obtains 450,000 votes but their party fails to pass the threshold, neither the candidate nor the party will secure a seat in Congress.

Among the lists that surpass the threshold, seats are distributed using the D’Hondt method, known in Colombia as the cifra repartidora, which allocates seats proportionally according to the number of votes obtained. In 2022, the seat-allocation quotient was 144,013 votes.

For the House of Representatives, the process is more complex because the threshold and D’Hondt method are applied separately within each department, producing different results across regions.

With closed lists, voters select only the political party or list as a whole, without choosing an individual candidate.

Open and closed lists

Under the Acto Legislativo 1 of 2003, political parties may register open lists or closed lists. With open lists, voters select a specific candidate within a party’s list. The vote counts both for the political party and for the individual candidate. Seats obtained by the party are then assigned to the candidates who received the highest number of votes, regardless of their initial position on the list.

With closed lists, voters select only the political party or list as a whole, without choosing an individual candidate. Seats are then allocated according to the order predetermined and registered at the start of the campaign by the party.

In the upcoming elections, two of Colombia’s most prominent political forces will present closed lists: the Pacto Histórico, the coalition led by current President Gustavo Petro, and the Centro Democrático, the right-wing party founded by former President Álvaro Uribe Vélez.

Photo courtesy of the National Civil Registry of Colombia,

Colombia’s presidential primaries are interparty, where broad coalitions decide on a candidate that the allied parties then agree to back.

This Sunday, March 8, 2026, Colombia will hold one of the most significant electoral events of the year’s political calendar. In addition to electing a new congress, voters will participate in the so-called Interparty Primaries, a mechanism through which political parties select their candidates for the presidential election scheduled for May 31.

According to the political analysis website Razón Pública, these consultations seek to “build broad coalitions composed of parties, movements, and independent candidacies.” In practice, they allow different political sectors to determine through open voting who will represent each coalition in the presidential race.

Political parties seek to boost their chances in the presidential race or strengthen their leverage in potential coalition negotiations.

In total, three separate primaries will take place, each with its own ballot. Citizens may participate in only one of them by requesting the corresponding ballot when voting for Congress.

The first is the “Solutions Primary: Healthcare, Security and Education,” made up of parties from the political center. In this contest, former Bogotá mayor Claudia López faces independent lawyer Leonardo Huertas. According to the latest Invamer poll, López is the clear frontrunner, with a projected 92.9% voting preference, compared with her only opponent.

The second consultation represents the political right and includes nine pre-candidates in the so-called “Grand Primary for Colombia.”

Among the contenders are former ministers of previous governments Juan Carlos Pinzón (Defense), Mauricio Cárdenas (Finance), and David Luna (Information Technologies); former Antioquia governor Aníbal Gaviria; former Bogotá mayor Enrique Peñalosa; journalist Vicky Dávila; and three senators representing their respective parties: Juan Manuel Galán (Nuevo Liberalismo), Juan Daniel Oviedo (Con Toda con Colombia), and Paloma Valencia (Centro Democrático).

Polls consistently identify Paloma Valencia as the favorite to win the primary. The Invamer poll projects her with 41.6% of the vote, Atlas Intel 44.4%, and Guarumo-EcoAnalítica 40.6%, while the firm Gad3 also places her first but with a lower estimated vote share of 17%. Valencia has been campaigning nationwide accompanied by former president Álvaro Uribe Vélez, the leading figure of the Centro Democrático, and previously won her party’s internal selection process through a member survey held on December 15.

The third primary corresponds to the coalition known as the “Front for Life,” made up of left-wing candidates, although without the official backing of current President Gustavo Petro, who under Colombian law is prohibited from participating in electoral politics or promoting candidates.

Candidates in this race include Héctor Elías Pineda, a former member of the M-19 guerrilla movement (the same group Petro once belonged to); Edison Lucio Torres of the Partido de los Trabajadores (Worker’s Party); and independent candidate Martha Viviana Bernal.

Former senator Roy Barreras; and embattled former mayor of Medellín Daniel Quintero Calle registered through the Movimiento de Autoridades Indígenas de Colombia. Polls by Guarumo-EcoAnalítica (47.6%) and Invamer (68.1%) place Daniel Quintero as the leading candidate of this Primary. However, the firm Atlas Intel did not measure this coalition, arguing that it did not surpass the statistical threshold required.

What comes next in the political landscape after the Primaries?

According to Razón Pública, “once the March 8 voting concludes, the political landscape will enter a phase of critical decisions. The results will determine alliances and realignments ahead of the presidential first round.”

Across the political spectrum, the winners of each consultation will attempt to consolidate support to compete against other candidates who registered directly without participating in the consultations. These include Abelardo de la Espriella, a conservative lawyer and businessman who registered through citizen signatures; Iván Cepeda, the official candidate of the Pacto Histórico coalition led by President Petro and currently leading voting-intention polls; and Sergio Fajardo, who registered with the party Dignidad y Compromiso.

Under Colombia’s electoral Law (1475 of 2011), political parties may still modify or withdraw candidates until March 20. After that date, the presidential campaign will move toward the first round scheduled for May 31. If no candidate secures an absolute majority of the vote (50% plus one), the two candidates receiving the highest number of votes will compete in a runoff election on June 21, where the candidate with a simple majority will be elected president.

Photos courtesy of the Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil