International observers certify Colombia’s first-round vote as transparent and credible

Two major international electoral observation missions have rejected claims of fraud in Colombia’s May 31 presidential first round, as outgoing President Gustavo Petro continued to press unsubstantiated allegations of irregularities in the days following the vote. The country heads to a June 21 runoff between right-wing candidate Abelardo de la Espriella and leftist senator Iván Cepeda.

The European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) issued a preliminary statement Tuesday, June 2, describing the vote count as having been carried out in a “transparent, orderly and fluid” manner. Esteban González Pons, Vice President of the European Parliament and chief observer of the EU mission, told reporters in Bogotá that none of the 12 candidates who competed in the first round had brought claims of irregularities to his mission.

“We can discard any manipulation of data in the quick count and in the final count,” González Pons said. The mission selected a random sample of tally sheets from around the country and compared them to physical ballots cast, finding no inconsistencies.

“We can discard any manipulation of data in the quick count and in the final count.” — Esteban González Pons, Chief Observer, EU Election Observation Mission to Colombia

The EU EOM deployed 143 observers from 24 EU member states plus Norway, Switzerland, and Canada, covering 591 voting tables. The mission will also observe the June 21 runoff and issue a final report two months after the process concludes.

The Organization of American States (OAS) mission, headed by former Dominican Republic President Leonel Fernández, similarly described the May 31 election day as “civic, calm and participatory,” with high citizen turnout compared to previous electoral cycles. The OAS mission comprised 96 observers and specialists from 24 countries, covering 412 polling stations and 1,340 voting tables across 26 departments, the Capital District, and five cities abroad.

Official results from the National Civil Registry (Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil) showed de la Espriella receiving 43.74% of the vote, a margin of more than 673,000 votes over Cepeda, who received 40.90%. More than 23 million voters participated. By Monday night, the Registry said it had completed its review of 99.98% of voting tables and found a variation of only 0.06% from the quick count issued on election night.

Presento las bases comprobadas del posible fraude. Que puedo entregar a autoridad competente.

Dije que no reconocí los datos del preconteo del software de los hermanos Bautista es porque tengo datos.

Mi compromiso con mi pueblo y el amor a mi país por el que he luchado toda mi…

— Gustavo Petro (@petrogustavo) June 2, 2026

Petro, who is constitutionally barred from seeking re-election, alleged on Sunday that 800,000 voters had been illegally added to voter rolls. He doubled down Tuesday in a post on X, claiming without evidence that 885,000 voters had been registered after a March 31 deadline, and pointing to alleged irregularities in the software used for vote counting and tabulation. The president said he could present his evidence to the relevant authorities.

Cepeda, who represents Petro’s Pacto Histórico, initially declined to acknowledge the quick count results on Sunday, saying he would wait for the official tally overseen by judges and notaries. By Monday, however, he softened his position, stating that monitors deployed by his party had not found “irregularities of a sufficient dimension to speak of fraud.” Cepeda also challenged de la Espriella to a debate ahead of the runoff.

Under Colombian law, election results are certified by judges, not the executive branch, typically within two weeks of the vote. González Pons noted that Colombia “has very strong democratic institutions, rooted in the people,” adding that the country “will find in democracy its principal ally, because of all the things that fail Colombia, democracy is one that has never failed it.”

Political analysts and observers have cautioned that Petro’s fraud allegations, made without supporting evidence, risk inflaming political tensions and contributing to a polarized climate in the lead-up to the June 21 runoff.

Fitch: June 21 Runoff Will Shape Colombia’s Fiscal Path

Colombia’s June 21 presidential runoff will have a significant bearing on the country’s economic policies and prospects, Fitch Ratings said in a commentary published this week.

In the first round of voting on May 31, right-wing candidate Abelardo de la Espriella — running under the Defensores de la Patria movement — received 43.7% of votes, defeating leftist senator Iván Cepeda of the governing Pacto Histórico, who received 40.9%. Neither candidate reached the absolute majority required to win outright, sending the election to a runoff.

De la Espriella’s stronger-than-expected first-round performance prompted a positive reaction in financial markets, reflecting expectations that he may be better positioned to address Colombia’s macroeconomic challenges that have intensified under outgoing President Gustavo Petro.

The next president will face the challenge of addressing Colombia’s wide fiscal imbalance. The central government deficit reached 6.4% of GDP in 2025, or 7.8% when net of a temporary reduction in interest costs from liability management operations. Fitch estimates that debt stabilization will require a fiscal adjustment equivalent to 4% of GDP. Higher global oil prices are expected to boost revenues via taxes and dividends in 2027, but Fitch cautioned that this support may not last.

“De la Espriella’s stronger-than-expected first-round performance prompted a positive reaction in financial markets, reflecting expectations that he may be better positioned to address Colombia’s macroeconomic challenges.” — Fitch Ratings

De la Espriella has pledged fiscal consolidation through a 40% reduction in the size of the state, while Cepeda has proposed restraining public-sector salaries and benefits. Budget rigidities and spending pressures tied to pensions, healthcare, and subnational transfers will make either adjustment difficult. Both candidates have also proposed higher spending — on defense and social welfare respectively. Capital spending could be trimmed as an adjustment variable, but only to a limited extent, with 2025 outlays of 2.7% of GDP.

The interest bill will be another source of pressure amid a higher local yield curve. Recent liability management operations have replaced lower-coupon bonds with higher-coupon ones, providing an up-front financial benefit while increasing future interest costs.

Given these spending constraints, durable fiscal consolidation is likely to require revenue-side measures. Colombia has a history of tax reforms, but new legislation is far from assured. De la Espriella has pledged to cut taxes, and while Cepeda supports revenue-raising measures, he could face obstacles in advancing reforms through Congress — as Petro’s administration found.

Uncertainties about Colombia’s trend growth persist. The economy expanded at an annual rate of 2.5% in 2019–2025, below the ‘BB’ median and below its own prior average of 3.5%–4%, supported by government transfers, a strong labor market, and minimum wage increases that kept private consumption buoyant at +4.2%. In contrast, investment contracted by an average of 1.6% annually, falling to 16% of GDP from 21%, affected in part by business concerns about the Petro administration’s more interventionist policy stance.

De la Espriella has pledged to boost growth through promotion of hydrocarbon development — including fracking — alongside tax cuts and steps to reduce administrative burdens on businesses. Cepeda has pledged continuity with Petro’s state-led development model, without concrete proposals to revive private investment.

Both agendas face implementation challenges. The next legislature will remain fragmented, requiring negotiation to pass any major legislation. As a political newcomer, de la Espriella could encounter difficulty advancing his program should he win. Social protests are a risk, particularly regarding his plans to cut spending and adopt a tougher security stance.

The election could also influence monetary policy, with implications for financial conditions and thus for public finances and growth. Despite rising inflation, the Banco de la República (Banrep) voted to hold its policy rate at 11.25% after swift prior increases of 200 basis points, amid explicit pressure from the executive branch for looser policy. The elections could influence Banrep’s next steps starting with its June 30 board meeting, and will also determine who fills two vacancies on its seven-member board in 2029.

Fitch’s downgrade of Colombia to ‘BB’/Stable in December 2025 reflected the agency’s view that the starting point for public finances had weakened considerably, and that improvement would take time regardless of the election outcome. Faster-than-expected fiscal adjustment, higher growth, and lower real rates that support debt stabilization could be positive for the rating. A worsening of these variables that steepens the debt trajectory could be negative.

Above image: Fitch Ratings

Colombia’s Runoff Could Reshape Investment, Energy, and Labor Policy

Colombia’s first-round presidential election, held Sunday, May 31, 2026, produced a result that crystallizes the country’s political exhaustion with both the governing left and the traditional right. Criminal defense attorney and political outsider Abelardo de la Espriella placed first with more than 10.3 million votes. Leftist Senator Iván Cepeda, a close ally of outgoing President Gustavo Petro and the lead architect of the administration’s Paz Total peace policy, finished second with just under 9.7 million votes. The two will face each other in a runoff election on June 21.

Senator Paloma Valencia, the candidate backed by former President Álvaro Uribe and the standard-bearer of his Uribismo movement, placed a distant third, receiving less than 7% of the vote — fewer than 1.7 million ballots. Former Medellín mayor and Antioquia governor Sergio Fajardo received just over one million votes, while former Bogotá mayor Claudia López finished below 1%, with approximately 225,000 votes. The remaining minor candidates combined for just over 1% of the total.

Under Colombia’s electoral system, the top two finishers advance to a runoff if no candidate surpasses 50% in the first round. The June 21 vote will determine who assumes the presidency on August 7.

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The Candidates: Background and Context

Abelardo de la Espriella, 47, has never held elected office. He built a national profile over more than two decades as a high-profile defense attorney, founding De La Espriella Lawyers in 2002, with offices in Colombia and the United States. His client roster has included controversial figures: he represented Alex Saab, a Colombian-born businessman who became a close associate of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and was implicated in a scheme to launder proceeds from Venezuela’s food-assistance program, the Comité Local de Abastecimiento y Producción (CLAP). Saab was extradited to the United States, convicted, and later granted clemency before being re-arrested in Venezuela in early 2026. De la Espriella also represented members of the Nule family in connection with the Carrusel de Contratos — a major contracting scandal tied to infrastructure works at Bogotá’s El Dorado airport corridor. He has additionally been reported to have represented individuals linked to organized crime.

De la Espriella has drawn comparisons to figures such as US President Donald Trump and El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele. His campaign has centered on hard-line security policy, including proposals for large-scale incarceration, expanded military operations against armed groups, and the rejection of negotiations with guerrilla organizations. He is reported to hold Italian and US citizenship in addition to his Colombian nationality, and is said to own property in Florida.

In a notable departure from his defense work, de la Espriella took the side of a victim in a high-profile acid-attack case, acting as a private prosecutor to secure a stronger sentence for the perpetrator — an episode that raised his public profile beyond the defense bar.

Iván Cepeda, 63, enters the runoff as the consolidated candidate of the Colombian left and Petro’s Pacto Histórico coalition. He is the primary legislative architect of Paz Total, the Petro administration’s policy of negotiating simultaneously with multiple armed actors, including the ELN and FARC dissident factions. Cepeda’s family background includes deep ties to the Colombian left: his father was secretary general of the Communist Party, and was assassinated. Cepeda himself studied in communist Bulgaria during the soviet era. The two finalists have an established legal and political history: Uribe attempted to bring criminal charges against Cepeda while both served in the Senate, but the Supreme Court determined that Uribe had fabricated the accusations and attempted to bribe witnesses — a case that resulted in Uribe’s criminal conviction.

“If nothing changes, Abelardo wins.” — Loren Moss, Finance Colombia

The Electoral Map

The geographic distribution of the vote reflects deep regional divisions. Cepeda carried Bogotá, which has trended left for years, particularly in lower-income districts on the city’s south and west sides. Antioquia — historically the heartland of Uribismo and home to Medellín, the country’s second-largest city — voted more than two to one for de la Espriella, a result that signals the weakening grip of Uribe’s movement even in its traditional stronghold.

The heart of coffee-growing country — the departments of Caldas, Risaralda, and Quindío also went to de la Espriella. Caquetá, a sparsely populated department in southern Colombia that has suffered sustained guerrilla violence from both the ELN and FARC dissident groups, voted for de la Espriella as well, a result we may interpret as a direct rejection of Petro and Cepeda’s Paz Total.

Cepeda carried Colombia’s Pacific coast, including the chronically neglected department of Chocó, as well as the sparsely populated Amazonas and Putumayo departments bordering Peru and Brazil, and the northern Caribbean coast. The Caribbean coast result is notable, as the region has historically suffered from underdevelopment, infrastructure deficits, and significant income inequality. Norte de Santander with its Catatumbo region on the Venezuelan border and experiencing severe armed-group activity — voted for de la Espriella, a result consistent with public exhaustion over security policy.

The Political Context: From Uribe to Petro and Beyond

Colombia’s current political trajectory is rooted in decisions made across the past two decades. President Uribe served two terms in the early 2000s and, together with then-Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos, mounted a sustained military campaign against the FARC that significantly weakened the insurgency. Santos later broke from Uribe after assuming the presidency, governing independently and ultimately negotiating a peace agreement with the FARC — a deal that Uribe actively opposed. A plebiscite on the accord failed, but Santos used legislative maneuvering to implement it anyway.

Uribe’s next handpicked candidate, Iván Duque, won the 2018 election but finished his term with approximately 30% approval. Members of his own party publicly distanced themselves from him — Senator María Fernanda Cabal, a staunch Uribista, called Duque a “mamerto” (leftist idiot) while he was still in office. Under his administration, indicators on crime and guerrilla activity worsened, and armed groups including the ELN rebuilt operational capacity that had been degraded under Uribe and Santos.

Petro’s administration has not met initial fears of a Venezuelan-style democratic breakdown: Congress has largely blocked the most radical components of his agenda, including attempts to nationalize the private pension system and convert the healthcare system to a single-payer model. However, crime has increased, armed groups have expanded their operational footprints, and the security situation in several regions has worsened. Paz Total is widely seen as having produced few tangible results.

Uribe himself was convicted of witness tampering and attempted bribery in the case he had brought against Cepeda. Though released from house arrest after conviction, the judges who authorized his release are now reportedly under investigation for judicial corruption. Valencia’s poor performance in the first round — despite being Uribe’s chosen standard-bearer — suggests that Uribismo as a political force is waning, with its core constituency aging and new generations of voters disengaged from the Uribe legacy.

What to Expect Before June 21

Both campaigns will intensify mobilization efforts over the coming three weeks. Cepeda’s movement — Colombia Humana and the broader Pacto Histórico coalition — has historically relied on organized mobilizations, including indigenous community-led mingas, labor unions, and allied social movements. Cepeda’s running mate Senator Aida Quilcué is an indigenous activist, a choice expected to energize those constituencies. FECODE, the Federación Colombiana de Trabajadores de la Educación (Colombia’s main teachers’ federation), is expected to align officially with Cepeda, though individual teachers may not follow union leadership in their voting choices.

On the right, Paloma Valencia issued a public endorsement of de la Espriella immediately following the first-round results. Business community organizations, including ANDI (the Asociación Nacional de Empresarios de Colombia) and Fenalco (the Federación Nacional de Comerciantes), do not formally endorse candidates, but their members are widely understood to favor a government that supports private enterprise and market-oriented policy. De la Espriella holds no congressional constituency, meaning whichever candidate wins will face the same dynamic Petro encountered: a fragmented Congress that is likely to act as a check on executive authority.

The question of centrist voter alignment remains open. Fajardo and López are not expected to formally endorse either finalist, and the direction of their combined approximately 1.2 million votes is uncertain.

Winners and Losers by Sector

For international investors and executives operating in Colombia, the policy differences between the two candidates are substantive across several key sectors.

Petroleum and Natural Gas: De la Espriella has stated unequivocally that he will restart petroleum exploration and licensing, which the Petro administration blocked. Ecopetrol S.A. (NYSE: EC; BVC: ECOPETROL), Colombia’s state-controlled oil company, which also holds producing assets in the US Permian Basin and Gulf of Mexico, has operated under a government that halted new drilling permits. The consequences have included a decline in future production capacity at a time when global oil prices have risen due to Middle East tensions. Colombia has been forced to import natural gas at elevated prices to meet existing domestic demand — including from transportation fleets that were converted to natural gas under government incentive programs. Cepeda would be expected to continue or deepen current restrictions on fossil fuel expansion.

Healthcare: The Petro-Cepeda platform favors a government single-payer model. The administration has already taken over several Entidades Promotoras de Salud (EPS) — Colombia’s managed-care intermediaries — placing the healthcare system in legal and financial uncertainty. Private clinics, hospitals, and physicians who wish to operate outside a government-controlled framework would benefit from a de la Espriella administration. Cepeda’s healthcare agenda would accelerate the shift toward government-managed care.

BPO, Tech, and Call Centers: The BPO sector — which provides large volumes of formal employment, particularly in Medellín, Bogotá, Cali, and Barranquilla — was significantly affected by Petro-era minimum wage increases of 16% and 23% in successive years. These increases created contract renegotiation pressures with international clients, some of whom have shifted or considered shifting operations to competing jurisdictions including Honduras, Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, and Guatemala. At the CX Summit, the industry’s main annual event held in Cartagena, the son of Álvaro Uribe appeared as an invited keynote speaker — a gesture that could be interpreted within the industry as an implicit signal of political alignment. A de la Espriella government, with its orientation toward labor market deregulation and reduced regulatory burden, would be viewed more favorably by this sector. Current Colombian labor law prohibits part-time employment contracts and places significant restrictions on dual employment, making workforce flexibility difficult for businesses that operate outside traditional 40-hour weekly structures.

Mining: The Petro administration has been less aggressive toward mining than toward petroleum, but sector participants expect a more permissive regulatory environment under de la Espriella, and continued constraints under Cepeda.

Security and Tourism: Both candidates have stated support for tourism promotion, but the sector’s trajectory is more directly linked to security conditions. Under current policies, several regions that were accessible to domestic and international travelers several years ago have experienced increased armed-group activity, effectively closing them to tourism. A de la Espriella administration is expected to pursue a more aggressive military posture toward the ELN and FARC dissident factions; a Cepeda government would likely continue dialogue-first approaches. The outcome will directly affect which parts of Colombia’s territory remain accessible to investment and tourism.

Foreign Relations: A de la Espriella government is expected to restore a broadly cooperative relationship with the United States, which deteriorated under Petro following several high-profile diplomatic incidents. De la Espriella has expressed admiration for US President Donald Trump, and reports indicate he holds US citizenship and owns property in Florida. Relations with Ecuador, which have been strained by mutual tariff escalations between Petro and Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa, would be expected to normalize. Relations with Venezuela under Cepeda would likely continue along the current allied trajectory, while a de la Espriella government would be expected to take a more critical posture toward Caracas. China and Russia would find a more receptive diplomatic environment under Cepeda, and a cooler one under de la Espriella.

The Poor and Informal Workers: Cepeda’s campaign argues that minimum wage increases and expanded state services benefit lower-income Colombians. Critics counter that elevated formal labor costs have pushed more employment into the informal sector — which currently accounts for approximately half the Colombian workforce — depriving those workers of pension contributions, health benefits, and job security. De la Espriella’s platform, which emphasizes business formation, security, and labor market deregulation, would be presented as generating more formal-sector job creation. The actual distributional effects of either approach remain contested.

The Outlook

Assuming current polling trends hold and Uribista voters consolidate behind de la Espriella as expected following Valencia’s endorsement, de la Espriella enters the runoff as the frontrunner. Cepeda’s path to victory depends on driving high turnout among his base, securing support from centrist voters who did not vote for either finalist in the first round, and potentially benefiting from any missteps by de la Espriella in the final three weeks of campaigning.

The first-round results produced no major electoral violence. The ELN announced a temporary halt to armed actions during the voting period. Authorities detained some individuals reportedly attempting to purchase votes in rural areas, but no large-scale incidents were recorded.

The incoming president will face a Congress with no natural majority aligned to the executive, a healthcare system in partial administrative disarray, a petroleum sector whose future production trajectory is in question, and regions where state presence remains contested by armed groups. The June 21 runoff will determine which vision — market-oriented restructuring or continuation of the Petro project — Colombia pursues for the next four years.

A June 21 presidential runoff will decide Colombia’s next president

Far-right candidate Abelardo de la Espriella and leftist Iván Cepeda advanced to the runoff round of Colombia’s presidential election after emerging as the top vote-getters in the May 31, 2026, first-round vote, in a result that reflects the deep political polarization shaping the country.

With 99.99% of polling stations counted, the Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil reported that De la Espriella won more than 10.3 million votes (43.7%), while Cepeda secured 9.6 million votes (40.9%). The two candidates will face each other in a runoff election scheduled for June 21, 2026.

Voter turnout reached 23.7 million people, equivalent to 57.8% of eligible voters. Together, the two candidates captured nearly 85% of valid ballots, leaving the remaining contenders far behind and setting up a contest between two sharply contrasting political visions.

De la Espriella’s unexpected rise

De la Espriella’s first-round victory represents one of the biggest surprises of the election and marks the first time in Colombia’s modern political history that a far-right party has emerged with a realistic chance of winning the presidency.

A lawyer by profession with no previous elected office experience, De la Espriella built his campaign around a populist message focused on political confrontation, public security, a hard-liner approach to crime and opposition to negotiations with illegal armed groups. His political style has drawn comparisons to Argentine President Javier Milei, Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele and US President Donald Trump.

Most pre-election polls placed him in second or third position, with support ranging between 15% and 25%, well below his final result.

His platform emphasizes stronger security policies, tougher penalties for criminal and narcotraffic organizations, and the construction of large-scale prisons similar to those in El Salvador. He has also rejected peace negotiations with armed groups.

His opposition to diversity and inclusion policies, as well as controversies involving remarks toward female journalists for which he later apologized, also became defining features of his campaign.

Cepeda achieves the strongest result ever for Colombia’s left party

Although he finished second, Cepeda achieved the highest vote total ever received by a left-wing presidential candidate in Colombia, surpassing the 8.5 million votes won by President Gustavo Petro in a previous presidential election.

The candidate of the ruling Pacto Histórico party based his campaign on grassroots mobilization, public rallies and the consolidation of a unified left-wing movement. His message focused on expanding social programs, inclusion and reducing inequality.

However, his candidacy has also been weighed down by criticism of the current administration, particularly regarding security concerns, problems within Colombia’s healthcare system and the limited results of the government’s “Total Peace” policy, which Petro promoted and Cepeda supported during his years in Congress.

Cepeda’s political career has been built in Congress, where he became known for defending the rights of victims of paramilitary violence and for his role in legal cases involving former President Álvaro Uribe.

After preliminary results were released, both Cepeda and Petro publicly questioned the preliminary vote count while stating they would recognize the official results certified by electoral commissions, judges and notaries.

“As president, I do not accept the preliminary count results,” Petro wrote on X, arguing that Colombia’s pre-count system has no legal validity and that only the official scrutiny process produces binding results. He later added that “the binding results the president will recognize are those issued by the electoral scrutiny commissions.”

Cepeda has also sought to distance himself from some of Petro’s proposals, including the idea of convening a constituent assembly to revise Colombia’s constitutional framework.

Historic defeat for Uribe’s political movement

Another major statement of the election was the poor performance of Paloma Valencia, candidate of the Centro Democrático party and backed by former President Uribe, who campaigned alongside her throughout the country despite defections by several prominent supporters.

Valencia finished third with 1.6 million votes (6.9%), far below polling projections that had placed her above 20%.

The result is widely attributed to voter fatigue with Uribe’s political movement and the migration of conservative voters toward De la Espriella, who was endorsed during the campaign by several prominent right-wing figures, including senators Paola Holguín and María Fernanda Cabal, as well as leader and businessman José Félix Lafaurie.

Strategic decisions within Valencia’s campaign may also have contributed to the result, including the selection of former Bogotá councilman Juan Daniel Oviedo as her vice-presidential running mate and her reluctance to directly confront De la Espriella during the campaign.

This marks the second consecutive presidential election in which Uribe reaches the runoff without a candidate from his own party. Nevertheless, he quickly endorsed De la Espriella after the results became known.

That endorsement could prove crucial. If elected, De la Espriella would face a Congress in which his movement holds only limited representation, making support from Centro Democrático, the second-largest congressional bloc, essential for advancing legislation and reforms.

Centrist voters may decide the runoff

Former Medellín Mayor Sergio Fajardo, who campaigned as a centrist alternative, finished fourth with more than 1 million votes (4.2%), while none of the remaining candidates surpassed 1% of the vote.

As the runoff approaches, the votes won by both Valencia and Fajardo are expected to be closely watched by the two campaigns, as they could prove decisive in an election that is shaping up to be highly competitive, deeply polarized and politically fragmented.

While Valencia has already endorsed De la Espriella, Fajardo has yet to take a public position. In previous elections, the former Medellín mayor has preferred to leave his supporters free to decide rather than formally endorse either finalist.

In Valencia’s case, despite her endorsement of De la Espriella, it remains unclear whether her support came primarily from voters aligned with former President Álvaro Uribe or whether a significant share was driven by the candidacy of Juan Daniel Oviedo, who won more than 1.2 million votes in the coalition primaries held in March.

The June 21 presidential runoff will therefore pit two sharply different visions for Colombia’s future against one another, in a political environment marked by polarization, social tensions, and persistent challenges related to security and governance that the next administration will have to address.

The ongoing investigations have now been joined by a new complaint filed by presidential candidate Claudia López

Colombia’s House Investigation and Accusation Committee has opened an ex officio investigation into President Gustavo Petro over alleged improper political participation ahead of the country’s presidential election on May 31, 2026, amid growing scrutiny over the president’s neutrality during the campaign.

The decision became public Tuesday, May 26, through an official document in which the committee said the investigation stems from “recent statements and social media posts” by the head of state “related to alleged participation in politics in connection with the upcoming presidential elections.”

“This Legal Investigation and Accusation Committee is legally obligated, under the powers granted by Law 600 of 2000 (Article 27) and Law 5 of 1992, to initiate an ex officio criminal investigation for the crime of Political Intervention (Article 422 of the Criminal Code),” the document states.

The order was signed by Gloria Arizabaleta, chair of the Investigation and Accusation Committee and a House representative from the ruling Pacto Histórico party.

Although Colombia’s president is considered the natural leader of his political movement, in this case, Pacto Histórico, whose presidential candidate is Iván Cepeda, Colombian law imposes restrictions on public officials regarding electoral participation.

In Colombia, public officials are subject to the principle of political neutrality, preventing them from intervening in electoral controversies or using their positions to influence citizens’ votes in favor of a particular party or candidate, although they retain their individual right to vote.

Article 422 of Colombia’s Criminal Code (Law 599 of 2000) establishes penalties for improper political intervention, including prison sentences and disqualification from holding public office. Such conduct may also result in disciplinary sanctions under Colombia’s General Disciplinary Code.

Claudia López files separate complaint

Presidential candidate Claudia López also filed a formal complaint before the same committee, alleging lack of electoral guarantees and abuse of power by the president.

“We filed before the House Investigation Committee a 58-page complaint with evidence of President Gustavo Petro’s improper participation in politics and the lack of electoral guarantees. His attacks against my campaign, abuse of power and blatant political interference cannot be accepted,” López said in a social media post.

Inspector General requests report on complaints

Meanwhile, Colombia’s Inspector General’s Office requested a detailed report from the committee regarding existing complaints against Petro related to alleged improper political participation.

The request was signed by Inspector General Gregorio Eljach, who asked for a “detailed report listing complaints against the President of the Republic” to be delivered within three days.

However, the scope of the Inspector General’s Office remains limited because, under Colombia’s institutional system, it holds disciplinary authority over lawmakers and local officials, while constitutional authority to investigate the president rests with the House of Representatives.

“The Executive Branch is overwhelmingly powerful compared with the others, and the president, as head of the state’s public administration, has extraordinary powers and tremendous influence over society,” Eljach told El Tiempo newspaper, referring to the president’s social media activity and its possible impact on voters.

According to El País newspaper in Cali, the Investigation and Accusation Committee currently has around 12 complaints against Petro related to alleged political intervention.

The investigation opens in the final stretch of a presidential campaign in which Petro has sought to maintain political influence through support for ruling coalition candidate Iván Cepeda, who currently leads voter intention polls ahead of the first round.

Colombians face three sharply different futures in May 31 vote

Colombia votes on May 31 with its presidential race concentrated around three candidates whose platforms diverge on nearly every dimension of economic and security policy relevant to foreign investors. For corporate executives, institutional investors, and multinational operations with Colombian exposure, the choice between senator Iván Cepeda, senator Paloma Valencia, and defense attorney Abelardo de la Espriella carries direct, measurable implications for the regulatory environment, foreign direct investment (FDI) conditions, energy sector licensing, and geopolitical alignment through at least 2030.

No candidate is projected to clear the 50%-plus-one threshold required to win outright on May 31, making a runoff election on June 21 the expected outcome. The question that will determine the direction of that runoff — and by extension the next administration — is which of the two opposition candidates finishes second.

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A Race Reshaped by Late Polling

The final-week polling picture shifted substantially, and the trajectory matters as much as the snapshot. The CONDOR weighted aggregate — which incorporates surveys from six polling firms and applies greater weight to more recent data — placed the race as of May 23 at: Cepeda 36.3%, De la Espriella 29.1%, Valencia 16.7%.

Invamer, one of Colombia’s most established polling firms, surveyed 3,800 respondents across 152 municipalities between May 13 and May 20, registering Cepeda at 44.6%, De la Espriella at 31.6%, and Valencia at 14.0%. The Centro Nacional de Consultoría (CNC) published a survey conducted May 22 and 23 showing Cepeda at 33.4%, De la Espriella at 30.9%, and Valencia at 12.6%.

Comparing those figures to the Fundación Génesis Crea survey from May 4 through May 11 — which placed Cepeda at 35.1%, Valencia at 25.4%, and De la Espriella at 21.6% — indicates a multi-poll trend of De la Espriella gaining approximately nine to ten percentage points in three weeks while Valencia shed a comparable share. AS/COA’s poll tracker confirms the directional consistency across firms.

Atlas Intel, which published figures more favorable to De la Espriella, is currently under investigation by Colombia’s Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE) for potential methodology violations and could face suspension of its operations. Those figures are treated with caution in this analysis.

Runoff modeling diverges between firms. Fundación Génesis Crea showed Valencia defeating Cepeda 49.1% to 44.7% in a second-round matchup — meaning she was the stronger opposition candidate in that scenario. The Guarumo/Ecoanalítica survey found Cepeda losing all hypothetical runoff scenarios, including against De la Espriella. Two minor candidates — former senator Clara López and former Chocó governor Luis Gilberto Murillo — withdrew and endorsed Cepeda before the first round, a consolidation that appears to have had limited effect on his polling numbers.

Finance Colombia reported in May that the campaign has been marked by an unusual absence of traditional televised debates. Cepeda declined to participate in events organized by major media outlets, stating that proposed formats lacked neutrality. Former Bogotá Mayor Claudia López, herself a candidate, said publicly that Cepeda’s refusal was motivated by an unwillingness to defend his record as the architect of President Gustavo Petro‘s Paz Total security negotiation strategy.

Security Policy: The Three Approaches to Armed Groups

Public security is the top voter concern heading into the election. InSight Crime documented that the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) launched a major offensive against FARC dissident factions in Norte de Santander in early 2025, resulting in mass civilian casualties in the Catatumbo region. In Chocó and Antioquia, the ELN and the Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC), commonly known as the Clan del Golfo, are competing for control of illegal gold mining corridors and drug trafficking routes. In Cauca, FARC dissident factions have established territorial control in areas where state presence has collapsed.

Cepeda’s approach to security is defined by his role as the principal legislative architect of Paz Total. As chair of the Senate‘s peace commission, he designed the framework that extended negotiating status to the ELN, FARC dissident groups, and the Clan del Golfo. His stated rationale is that targeting the financial leadership of drug networks rather than foot soldiers produces more durable results — a position that has academic backing in narcotics policy literature. In practice, Paz Total produced ceasefires that were repeatedly violated, and security indicators in conflict-affected departments deteriorated during the Petro administration. A Cepeda presidency is expected to continue the negotiated settlement model, with the military operating under political constraints.

Valencia’s security platform is based on reinstating Seguridad Democrática, the doctrine associated with former president Álvaro Uribe’s administrations from 2002 to 2010. The core elements are expanded military presence in rural conflict zones, dismantling of rural criminal networks, and resumption of extradition agreements with the United States — which Petro suspended, effectively shielding cartel leadership from US federal prosecution. The Uribe-era approach resulted in measurable reductions in homicide rates, forced displacement, and ELN and FARC territorial control, though human rights organizations documented serious abuses by security forces during that period.

De la Espriella has stated explicitly that his government would have no peace process. He advocates for a model similar to El Salvador’s under President Nayib Bukele: mass incarceration, construction of high-security prison facilities, classification of guerrilla and cartel organizations as foreign terrorist organizations, and broad military offensives. He has not detailed how such operations would be financed or how the mass detention model would interact with Colombia’s Constitutional Court, which has repeatedly constrained executive security powers.

For the armed groups operating in Norte de Santander and Cauca, the historical record indicates that Colombia’s criminal organizations respond more acutely to sustained, institutionally grounded military pressure and functioning extradition pipelines than to political rhetoric. By that measure, Valencia’s platform — which rebuilds the institutional security apparatus incrementally — represents a more structurally credible threat to the ELN and the Estado Mayor Central (EMC) FARC dissidents. For the Clan del Golfo leadership, extradition to the United States has historically been the principal deterrent, and Valencia’s program explicitly restores it.

Business Climate and Employment Conditions

The Petro administration enacted a series of minimum wage increases totaling more than 60% over four years — including a 16% increase for 2023, the largest single-year hike in Colombian history, and a 23.78% increase for 2026 — restructured labor regulations to expand premium pay requirements for night, weekend, and holiday shifts, and raised corporate tax rates to fund social spending programs. The Asociación Nacional de Empresarios de Colombia (ANDI) characterized the regulatory environment as adverse to private investment. Finance Colombia tracked a material decline in FDI in the extractive sector over the same period.

Cepeda supported those labor and fiscal reforms throughout their legislative passage. His platform extends the Petro model: increased state social spending, continued land redistribution programs, and maintenance of the current wage and labor cost structure. For companies with established Colombian operations, the regulatory environment is manageable; for companies evaluating market entry or operational expansion, the cost structure adds friction.

Valencia’s economic program emphasizes corporate stability and private sector investment as the primary mechanisms of job creation. Her vice-presidential running mate, Juan Daniel Oviedo — former director of DANE, Colombia’s national statistics agency — represents a technocratic orientation focused on reducing structural market distortions, streamlining public procurement, and scaling back state administrative overhead. Oviedo’s appointment is a direct signal to the business community that economic management would be data-driven rather than ideologically directed. Oviedo also publicly identifies as a member of the LGBTQ+ community, a departure from the traditional social conservatism of Centro Democrático.

De la Espriella’s economic orientation is pro-business with protectionist elements. His vice-presidential candidate, José Manuel Restrepo — who served as Colombia’s Finance Minister and Commerce Minister — provides institutional credibility on fiscal and trade policy. Restrepo’s presence on the ticket signals commitment to fiscal discipline and regulatory reduction in the extractive and commercial sectors. De la Espriella’s personal style, however, introduces operational uncertainty; his campaign has generated multiple high-profile controversies, including a public altercation with Caracol Noticias journalist María Lucía Fernández during a live broadcast and a formal apology following misconduct allegations by journalist Laura Rodríguez of Piso 8 FM.

Foreign Investment, Oil, and Mining

The extractive sector is the most consequential economic policy dimension for international capital. Ecopetrol (NYSE: EC; BVC: ECOPETROL) — Colombia’s state-controlled energy company and the largest corporation in the country — has operated under exploration restrictions during the Petro administration, which has opposed new fossil fuel contracts on climate grounds.

Cepeda’s position extends the Petro framework: mandatory transition away from fossil fuels, heavy restrictions or outright prohibitions on new oil and gas exploration contracts, and stringent environmental licensing requirements for open-pit mining operations. Foreign investment would be directed by policy toward green hydrogen, ecotourism, and smallholder agriculture. For the multinational oil majors with Colombian operations and for institutional investors in the mining sector, a Cepeda presidency represents a continuation of the current constraints and, in some contract scenarios, an accelerated wind-down of Colombian portfolios.

In a related development, Finance Colombia reported in May that Ecopetrol’s president, Ricardo Roa, has been formally charged in connection with alleged campaign spending violations during Petro’s 2022 presidential campaign. The case will be inherited by whoever takes office in August.

Valencia’s position is that hydrocarbon revenues are essential to Colombia’s macroeconomic stability and that the country cannot exit the sector before alternative revenue structures exist. Her platform actively encourages FDI in petroleum exploration, is open to regulated fracking, and commits to clearing the environmental licensing backlog that has stalled multiple large-scale gold and copper mining projects. For energy and mining companies currently blocked by administrative delays, this represents the most direct path to project advancement.

De la Espriella’s position goes further: essentially deregulating the environmental licensing process for major extraction projects on the grounds that Colombia’s economic sovereignty takes precedence over environmental restrictions he characterizes as externally imposed. The practical constraint is whether a De la Espriella administration would have the institutional coherence and congressional support to deliver regulatory rollback, given that his movement has no established political party structure and entered the race through an independent signature campaign.

Foreign Policy: Washington Alignment vs. Multipolar Strategy

Colombia’s relationship with the United States deteriorated materially under Petro, who aligned Colombia with Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro, pursued closer ties with China and Russia, and suspended extradition agreements. US counternarcotics cooperation was strained throughout the period.

Cepeda is committed to what he describes as a multipolar foreign policy — maintaining functional diplomatic channels with Washington and Brussels while deepening strategic and commercial relationships with China and Russia. His alignment with regional left-of-center governments in Mexico, Brazil, and Bolivia would position Colombia as part of a Latin American bloc that has grown increasingly skeptical of US regional leadership. For US companies operating in Colombia, this trajectory does not mean immediate operational disruption, but it reduces Colombia’s utility as a reliable counterpart on security cooperation, counter-narcotics intelligence sharing, and trade dispute resolution.

Valencia positions a return to the Western alignment as a core objective. She would prioritize restoring the US-Colombia relationship, reinforcing the bilateral Free Trade Agreement, and reestablishing intelligence-sharing mechanisms that were reduced under Petro. Her framing positions Colombia as a democratic anchor in a region experiencing authoritarian pressures.

De la Espriella takes the most explicit pro-US position in the race. La Silla Vacía reported that De la Espriella or entities linked to his campaign donated more than $90,000 USD to the US Republican Party, a fact that raises questions about the nature and expectations of those relationships. He has publicly aligned himself with the populist right in the United States, takes a hostile posture toward China, Russia, and Venezuela, and has characterized his security approach as consistent with a transactional alliance with Washington focused on counter-narcotics enforcement and cartel designation as foreign terrorist organizations.

“Ese pisco robó a 200 mil colombianos.” — Claudia López, former Mayor of Bogotá, referring to presidential candidate Abelardo de la Espriella’s legal representation of DMG pyramid scheme founder David Murcia Guzmán, during a presidential campaign event.

Corruption and Judicial Independence

All three candidates have stated commitments to fighting corruption, though their approaches and focal points differ in ways that are material to the institutional environment for business operations.

Cepeda’s legislative record includes serious, documented work investigating paramilitary infiltration of Colombia’s political institutions — the period known as parapolítica — and pursuing accountability for those cases. His blind spot, his critics argue, is corruption within the current administration. When Ecopetrol’s Ricardo Roa was formally charged in connection with Petro’s 2022 campaign, the response from the Pacto Histórico coalition was subdued. Cepeda has been Álvaro Uribe’s primary judicial antagonist in the Senate; a Cepeda administration would offer no institutional protection to Uribe and would be expected to support the full progress of judicial proceedings against him. For left-wing politicians facing legal exposure, including former Medellín mayor Daniel Quintero, a Cepeda administration would be expected to be more receptive to amnesty frameworks.

Valencia’s approach to anti-corruption is structural rather than prosecutorial: strengthening the independence of the Contraloría General de la República and the Fiscalía General de la Nación, implementing digital transparency in public procurement, and reducing informal executive influence over judicial processes. She would be expected to apply political and rhetorical pressure on behalf of Uribe — her political mentor and a close ally — though her legislative track record indicates a degree of institutional independence from Centro Democrático party orthodoxy.

De la Espriella’s anti-corruption rhetoric centers on severe criminal penalties for corrupt officials. The credibility of that position is complicated by his professional history, which is examined in detail below.

De la Espriella’s Legal Career: The Documented Record

De la Espriella’s campaign has faced sustained scrutiny over his client history as one of Colombia’s highest-profile criminal defense attorneys. The record is documented in reporting by El Colombiano, El Espectador, and the investigative outlet Corrupción al Día.

His documented client roster includes Salvatore Mancuso, the former supreme commander of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) paramilitary network; multiple legislators convicted in the parapolítica scandal, which established systematic infiltration of Colombia’s congress by paramilitary organizations; David Murcia Guzmán, the operator of the DMG pyramid scheme that defrauded an estimated 200,000 Colombian investors; the Nule Primos, convicted of large-scale public contract fraud; and Álex Saab, the Colombian businessman extradited to the United States on charges of acting as the primary money launderer for the Maduro government in Venezuela. According to Corrupción al Día, De la Espriella’s legal fees from Saab reportedly reached $12 million USD and included private aircraft travel.

De la Espriella’s response to this line of criticism rests on due process principles: that every accused person is entitled to vigorous legal defense regardless of the charges, and that his ability to navigate Colombia’s criminal code at its most complex levels demonstrates the expertise required to enforce the law from the executive branch. The argument has legal validity as a principle. The specific issue for foreign compliance officers and US government counterparts is the Saab representation: the same Nicolás Maduro whose regime De la Espriella’s campaign now characterizes as an ideological enemy received legal services from De la Espriella’s firm when the representation was commercially available.

The Fiscalía investigated De la Espriella in connection with alleged paramilitary links in 2009 and again in 2012; both investigations were dismissed for insufficient evidence, and he carries no convictions or active investigations on those matters.

Cepeda’s Family History and Ideological Background

Critics of Iván Cepeda, including Enrique Gómez of the Salvación Nacional party, have argued that his family background constitutes evidence of structural alignment with guerrilla movements. The record on this point merits examination.

Cepeda is the son of Manuel Cepeda Vargas, who served as Secretary-General of the Colombian Communist Party and as a senator for the Unión Patriótica (UP), a left-wing political movement that was systematically exterminated by a combination of state actors and paramilitary organizations during the 1980s and 1990s. Manuel Cepeda Vargas was assassinated on August 9, 1994. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights subsequently found the Colombian state responsible for his murder. The FARC-EP named its Frente Urbano Manuel Cepeda Vargas — an urban front operating within the Bloque Occidental — in the elder Cepeda’s honor.

The Fundación Paz y Reconciliación (PARES) has documented that Iván Cepeda’s relationship with his father’s political positions was more complex than the family lineage alone suggests. After studying in Bulgaria in 1981, Cepeda broke from his father’s Soviet-oriented communist framework and aligned with democratic leftists including Bernardo Jaramillo Ossa, who publicly rejected the FARC’s armed strategy. Cepeda has repeatedly stated his repudiation of the FARC’s use of his father’s name. No documented evidence connects him to operational coordination with current armed groups.

What the family history does establish is the ideological framework through which Cepeda processes security policy: a belief, grounded in personal and political experience, that the Colombian state’s institutional violence has been as destructive as guerrilla violence, and that negotiated settlements are structurally preferable to military solutions. That framework generates Paz Total. It also generates a posture toward ELN and FARC dissident negotiators that prioritizes process continuity over verified compliance — a disposition that armed groups have demonstrably exploited to maintain territorial and operational positions while negotiation frameworks provided legal cover.

Valencia and the Uribe Question

The comparison to former president Iván Duque (2018–2022) comes up regularly in discussions of Valencia’s political independence. Duque, who had limited independent political standing before Uribe selected him, was perceived throughout his term as governing within constraints set by his patron — a dynamic that Colombian political cartoonists characterized as ventriloquism.

Valencia’s profile differs materially. She is the granddaughter of former Colombian president Guillermo León Valencia, carries her own political lineage, and has served in the Senate for over a decade, building positions on agrarian reform, judicial modernization, and indigenous land rights that have placed her at variance with standard Centro Democrático positions on those issues. She won the Gran Consulta por Colombia primary on March 8 with more than 45% of the vote — over 3.2 million Colombians — establishing a democratic mandate distinct from any party endorsement.

She would be expected to use institutional and rhetorical channels to support Uribe in the ongoing judicial proceedings against him, and to apply pressure on the trajectory of those cases. Whether that constitutes political interference with judicial independence or normal advocacy within democratic norms is a question on which observers disagree. What the legislative record does not support is the characterization of Valencia as incapable of independent governance.

Press Freedom and the Media Environment

Press freedom carries an indirect but measurable correlation with rule-of-law quality, which in turn affects operational risk for companies that rely on regulatory predictability and transparent legal processes.

Cepeda has maintained a posture toward critical media that mirrors President Petro’s practice of characterizing adversarial outlets as acting in the interests of economic elites. Under Petro, this produced a systematic exclusion of critical media from official information flows and persistent rhetorical delegitimization of independent journalism, though the press remained legally free to operate. A Cepeda administration would be expected to continue this pattern.

Valencia’s background in Colombia’s traditional political and intellectual establishment, combined with a decade in a party that has faced sustained critical coverage from Colombia’s major outlets, points toward a conventional institutional relationship with the press — adversarial at times, but within professional norms.

De la Espriella’s conduct during the campaign provides direct evidence of his approach. He publicly called Caracol Noticias journalist María Lucía Fernández “ignorant” in a live interview. He issued a formal apology after journalist Laura Rodríguez of Piso 8 FM made allegations of inappropriate conduct. His campaign strategy has drawn comparisons to the approach of Argentine president Javier Milei and US president Donald Trump in its use of direct digital channels to circumvent traditional media while publicly attacking outlets that publish critical coverage. The press would remain legally protected under a De la Espriella administration, but the operational environment for investigative journalism would be hostile.

The Ideological Spectrum: Market Liberalism to State Direction

The question of which candidate is most aligned with free-market principles requires a distinction that the international business press frequently elides: the difference between economic deregulation and political authoritarianism. These can, and in this election do, exist independently.

De la Espriella’s platform is often described in international coverage as the most pro-market. His deregulation proposals for the extractive sector and his corporate tax rhetoric support that reading in the economic domain. His security platform, however, involves a substantial expansion of state coercive power: mass detention operations, a mega-prison construction program, and the suspension of standard due process protections to facilitate rapid incarceration of criminal suspects. The Cato Institute‘s framework of economic freedom as inseparable from civil liberties would categorize a state powerful enough to detain people without standard procedural protections as a state that represents an institutional risk to property rights and contract enforcement as well.

Valencia’s platform, anchored by Oviedo’s technocratic program of structural market reform — reduced administrative barriers, streamlined procurement, smaller state overhead, maintained civil liberties — represents the closest approximation to coherent market liberalism available in this field. It does not carry the rhetorical force of De la Espriella’s deregulation proposals, but it has more institutional grounding.

Cepeda’s platform is the furthest from market liberalism by any standard measure: state-directed investment allocation, wealth redistribution through tax and transfer mechanisms, state expansion in healthcare and pension administration, and agrarian land redistribution. His program is continuous with the Petro administration’s economic framework.

Minor Candidates: The Rest of the Ballot

Several other candidates remain on the ballot and are drawing small but potentially consequential vote shares in a first round where the margin between second and third place could be narrow.

Claudia López, former mayor of Bogotá running under the Con Claudia Imparables coalition, positions herself as a progressive centrist with a documented anti-corruption record. Her polling has not broken 3.5% in major surveys, and her high polarization ratings from her mayoral term limit her growth ceiling. Her attacks on De la Espriella during the campaign — she publicly called him a “defender of the mafia” in reference to his client history — have been among the most pointed in the race, and factually grounded on the public record.

Sergio Fajardo, making his third consecutive presidential run under Dignidad y Compromiso, continues to represent a technocratic, education-focused centrism grounded in his work transforming Medellín in the early 2000s. He has not broken 3.5% in any major poll in this cycle.

Roy Barreras, running under La Fuerza de la Paz following his Frente por la Vida primary victory, is one of the most experienced political operatives in Colombia, having been part of multiple coalition governments across ideological lines over two decades. He polls below the threshold for meaningful first-round impact.

Miguel Uribe Londoño, running under Partido Demócrata, represents a younger-generation conservative platform emphasizing fiscal discipline and private sector growth, broadly consistent with Valencia’s program. He also polls below 3.5%.

Carlos Caicedo, running on a regionalist platform emphasizing decentralization away from Bogotá, draws support primarily from the Costa Caribe. His structural argument about Colombia’s administrative over-centralization is substantively grounded, though his national profile is insufficient to affect the first-round outcome.

Investment Implications

For international capital with Colombian exposure, the three-way race produces three materially different operational scenarios.

A Cepeda victory — which remains the single most likely first-round outcome based on available polling — would signal continuity of the Petro-era regulatory framework: sustained capital outflow pressure, high corporate tax rates, no new fossil fuel exploration contracts for Ecopetrol (NYSE: EC; BVC: ECOPETROL) or private operators, continued labor cost escalation, and a foreign policy trajectory away from Washington. Colombian equity valuations would be expected to remain under pressure. The mining licensing backlog would continue to accumulate. A Cepeda administration would not replicate Venezuela’s economic trajectory — Colombia’s independent central bank, Banco de la República, its functioning constitutional court, and its institutional depth provide meaningful buffers — but the investment headwinds would be structural rather than cyclical.

A Valencia victory would represent the sharpest regulatory reversal available in this field. Ecopetrol exploration contracts would be expected to advance. The mining licensing backlog would be addressed. US bilateral relations would be restored, reactivating security intelligence cooperation and trade facilitation mechanisms. The Colombian peso would be expected to strengthen as country risk premium declined. The path to that outcome now requires her to either close the gap significantly on De la Espriella in the first round or rely on runoff polling that showed her as the stronger second-round candidate — data that predates the most recent polling shift.

A De la Espriella victory introduces the widest distribution of possible outcomes. The upside scenario involves Restrepo managing fiscal and trade policy competently, genuine regulatory rollback in the extractive sector, aggressive extradition resumption, and security operations that reduce the physical risk premium in conflict-affected departments including Cauca, Norte de Santander, and Chocó. The downside scenario involves recurring crises generated by De la Espriella’s personal conduct, conflicts of interest arising from his former client relationships, and authoritarian security measures that attract international human rights attention and complicate bilateral relationships. Restrepo’s presence on the ticket reduces the probability of the downside scenario but does not eliminate it.

The current polling trend indicates that right-wing voters are consolidating around De la Espriella at Valencia’s expense. Whether that consolidation produces a runoff between De la Espriella and Cepeda — and whether the runoff produces a left or right-wing government — remains uncertain. What the polling data does not support is the scenario, widely assumed until recently, of a Cepeda-Valencia runoff in which Valencia was positioned as the structurally stronger opposition candidate.

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Refining margin surge cushions revenue drop amid leadership void

Ecopetrol S.A. (NYSE: EC, BVC: ECOPETROL) reported first-quarter 2026 consolidated revenues of 28.6 trillion COP, a decline of 8.7% from 31.4 trillion COP in the year-earlier period, as lower crude oil prices and reduced hydrocarbon production compressed the top line for Colombia’s state-controlled oil and gas company. Against that backdrop, a marked recovery in refining margins and disciplined cost management lifted EBITDA by 1.5% to 13.5 trillion COP, yielding a 47% EBITDA margin and partially offsetting the revenue headwind. At the Q1 2026 average exchange rate of approximately 3,700 COP per USD, the quarter’s revenues translate to roughly $7.73 billion USD and EBITDA to approximately $3.65 billion USD.

Net income for the quarter reached 2.9 trillion COP (approximately $784 million USD), down 7.7% year-over-year, reflecting the combined drag of lower revenues, a sharply elevated effective tax rate of 37.1%, and a one-time charge of 1.2 trillion COP for the impuesto al patrimonio — Colombia’s government-mandated wealth levy on large corporations established to fund post-disaster reconstruction measures. The company is also subject to a 10% income tax surcharge applicable for fiscal year 2026, which is embedded in the reported effective rate. The aggregate tax burden absorbed a disproportionate share of operating improvement relative to prior periods, limiting the flow-through of refining gains to the net income line.

Total hydrocarbon production averaged 725.2 thousand barrels of oil equivalent per day (kboed) in Q1 2026, below the 745 kboed recorded in the 2025 annual average cited by management during the March 2026 general shareholders’ meeting. Domestic crude output represented the largest component at approximately 520 thousand barrels per day (kbd). Ecopetrol’s Permian Basin operations in the United States contributed 91.8 kbd, underscoring the continued strategic importance of the international segment. Gas production continued a multi-year declining trend that poses a medium-term domestic supply challenge; management has sought to address this partially through regasification capacity additions at Puerto Bahía and on the Pacific coast, expected to come online in the second half of 2026 with a combined contribution of up to 430 billion BTU per day.

The refining segment delivered the quarter’s most pronounced operational outperformance. Ecopetrol’s domestic refineries, led by Refinería de Cartagena, processed 417.5 kbd of crude throughput. The integrated refining margin rose to $17.3 USD per barrel, a 60% improvement over the same quarter of 2025, driven by favorable differential pricing between domestic crude benchmarks and refined product values alongside ongoing operational efficiency improvements. The Comisión de Regulación de Energía y Gas (CREG) and the Ministerio de Minas y Energía remain central to the regulatory framework governing downstream margins over the medium term.

The balance sheet carries significant structural and contingent risk items of direct relevance to institutional credit and equity holders. Gross debt stood at 108.1 trillion COP (approximately $29.2 billion USD), representing a leverage ratio of 2.3 times trailing EBITDA — a level that leaves limited room for further deterioration before debt covenants or rating agency thresholds become binding. Ecopetrol holds a receivable of 4.2 trillion COP (approximately $1.14 billion USD) from the Fondo de Estabilización de Precios de los Combustibles (FEPC), a government fuel price stabilization mechanism that represents a claim on the Colombian treasury with timing and recovery risk. A dispute with the Dirección de Impuestos y Aduanas Nacionales (DIAN) over value-added tax assessments totals 12.26 trillion COP (approximately $3.31 billion USD) in aggregate, of which 10.22 trillion COP relates to Ecopetrol’s consolidated operations and 2.04 trillion COP to Refinería de Cartagena. Both cases are under administrative and judicial review; no provisions have been recognized in the financial statements pending resolution, but the potential liability represents a material contingency relative to the company’s quarterly net income.

On the corporate development front, Ecopetrol disclosed three significant transactions during or following the quarter. The company agreed to acquire producing assets from Gran Tierra Energy (NYSE: GTE, TSX: GTE) for $92.4 million USD, adding Colombian upstream production inventory in basins where both companies have operated. In Brazil, Ecopetrol launched a tender offer for shares of Brava Energia (BVMF: BRAV3) at 23 BRL per share, seeking to expand its footprint in that country’s oil and gas sector. And in a transaction that would reshape the mid-size independent landscape in Colombia, the company reached an agreement to acquire Parex Resources (TSX: PXT) for $250 million USD; Parex is a Colombia-focused producer with a complementary asset base across the Llanos and other producing basins. Collectively, the three transactions signal that Ecopetrol’s capital allocation strategy under the current government continues to favor upstream consolidation despite the elevated leverage profile.

The exploration portfolio generated positive news announcements. The Copoazú-1 exploratory well, drilled in Colombia’s Llanos foothills region, was confirmed as a commercial discovery, adding to the domestic reserve base. The Sirius offshore project advanced through the Consulta Previa process — a legally mandated prior consultation with indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities required before development of projects in or near their territories — reaching a milestone in community engagement that brings the project closer to formal development sanction. The Agencia Nacional de Hidrocarburos (ANH) oversees the licensing framework within which both projects operate.

“Ecopetrol is listed on the New York Stock Exchange; we are governed by the strict regulations of US federal agencies. Agencies like OFAC and the SEC could intervene in the company and could even accelerate the payment of financial obligations, which would be extremely grave for Ecopetrol.” — Martín Ravelo, President, Unión Sindical Obrera (USO)

The ISA transmission segment, managed through Ecopetrol’s majority stake in ISA — Interconexión Eléctrica S.A., contributed stable regulated cash flows during the quarter. ISA completed 46 transmission reinforcement works across its Latin American concession portfolio. The segment also completed the acquisition of 100% of IE Madeira in Brazil, consolidating its position in that country’s power grid interconnection infrastructure. ISA further submitted a competitive bid for the Río Bueno–Puerto Montt high-voltage transmission line concession in Chile, demonstrating the group’s appetite for long-duration, inflation-linked infrastructure assets across the Andes region. For institutional investors evaluating Ecopetrol as a blended hydrocarbons-and-infrastructure holding, ISA’s consistent cash generation provides partial diversification from crude price volatility, though it does not insulate the consolidated entity from headline governance risk.

The most consequential variable for the investment thesis over the near term is Ecopetrol’s prolonged governance crisis. At the company’s general shareholders’ meeting on March 27, 2026, held at the Corferias convention center in Bogotá, minority shareholders loudly heckled president Ricardo Roa — with audible shouts of “¡Fuera, fuera!” reverberating through the hall — as debate over his leadership erupted into open confrontation. The meeting approved a dividend of 121 COP per share for minority holders and a 4 trillion COP distribution to the Colombian government as majority shareholder, payable in two installments by June 30, 2026. Despite the financial business conducted, governance overshadowed the proceedings.

Roa faces two separate judicial proceedings. The Fiscalía General de la Nación formally charged him in connection with alleged influence peddling related to the purchase of an apartment in northern Bogotá — charges he has denied. Separately, the Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE) is examining whether campaign spending limits were violated during President Gustavo Petro’s 2022 presidential campaign, which Roa managed — an investigation that Finance Colombia has covered in detail. Angela Maria Robledo, Chair of the Board of Directors, defended the board’s decision to retain Roa at the March assembly, citing the constitutional presumption of innocence. However, four of the nine board members had already formally recorded their support for his removal at that point, exposing a divided governance structure at a time when strategic and operational decisions require unified leadership.

The Unión Sindical Obrera (USO), which represents approximately one-third of Ecopetrol’s workforce, issued a production strike ultimatum timed to a March 30 board meeting. Martín Ravelo, president of the USO, framed the leadership crisis explicitly in terms of US regulatory risk: “Ecopetrol is listed on the New York Stock Exchange; we are governed by the strict regulations of US federal agencies. Agencies like OFAC and the SEC could intervene in the company and could even accelerate the payment of financial obligations, which would be extremely grave for Ecopetrol.” Ravelo further warned that the company’s outstanding international debt — which he placed at approximately $30 billion USD and which is exacerbated by elevated interest rates — left Ecopetrol exposed to potential covenant triggers or early repayment demands in a scenario where the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or the Office of Foreign Assets Control were to take enforcement action.

Following sustained pressure from the USO, minority shareholders, and opposition political figures, Ecopetrol’s board approved an extended leave of absence for Roa beginning April 7, 2026. Under the arrangement, Roa used accrued vacation through May 27, followed by 30 calendar days of unpaid leave beginning May 28, extending his absence through the end of June — a period encompassing Colombia’s presidential first round on May 31 and a potential runoff on June 21. Juan Carlos Hurtado Parra, the company’s executive vice president of hydrocarbons and designated first alternate to the presidency since November 2025, was appointed acting president. Hurtado Parra holds an MBA in International Oil and Gas and brings more than 28 years of energy sector experience to the acting role, having previously served as vice president of exploration, development, and production.

The political calendar creates a structural transition risk that sits above the operational and financial results as the primary concern for long-duration investors. Colombia’s incoming government, to be inaugurated August 7, 2026, is widely expected to appoint a new Ecopetrol board and select a new company president. That transition may bring material shifts in strategic priorities — including the pace of upstream investment, the approach to the FEPC receivable recovery, the trajectory of energy transition spending, and the capital allocation balance between the hydrocarbons segment and the ISA infrastructure platform. The Ministerio de Hacienda y Crédito Público and the Ministerio de Minas y Energía will both play key roles in establishing the post-election policy framework under which Ecopetrol operates. Institutional investors holding exposure to Ecopetrol via NYSE: EC or BVC: ECOPETROL must weigh Q1’s genuine operational improvement — most visibly in refining margins and EBITDA stability — against a governance and policy transition risk profile that is unlikely to be resolved before the August handover.

Ecopetrol’s Cartagena refinery (photo courtesy Ecopetrol)

As Colombia nears its presidential vote, two candidates have endorsed Iván Cepeda and eight others remain below 3.5% in polls

With less than two weeks remaining before Colombia’s presidential election, whose first round is scheduled for May 31, three candidates are concentrating most voter support and competing for access to the presidential palace, Casa de Nariño: ruling coalition senator Iván Cepeda, candidate of the left-wing Pacto Histórico party; senator Paloma Valencia, representing the right-wing Centro Democrático party; and lawyer and businessman Abelardo de la Espriella, a figure of Colombia’s far right.

Although 13 candidates will appear on the ballot, two contenders: Clara López and Luis Gilberto Murillo, withdrew their campaigns to support Cepeda, while the remaining candidates have failed to surpass 3.5% voter support in pre-elections polls, a figure close to the statistical margin of error.

If polling trends hold, no candidate is expected to secure the 50% plus one vote needed to win outright in the first round, making a runoff election on June 21, 2026, highly likely.

Cepeda has remained relatively stable in polls, with voter support ranging between 35% and 43%, effectively securing his place in a second round if trends continue.

The key question: Who will face Cepeda in a runoff?

The main electoral uncertainty centers on who will finish second and challenge the ruling coalition in a likely runoff.

Under Colombia’s electoral system, only the two candidates receiving the highest vote totals advance to the second round. The fragmentation of the political right has complicated efforts to consolidate support behind either Valencia or De la Espriella.

Polls suggest a competitive scenario. Valencia has registered between 14% and 21% voter support, while De la Espriella fluctuates between 16% and 24%, depending on the poll and methodology used.

The lack of unity between the two camps stems from both ideological differences and their political structures. Valencia is a member of the political party founded by former President Álvaro Uribe, while De la Espriella entered the race through an independent signature campaign, marking the first time Colombia’s far right has emerged as a viable contender for the presidency.

A campaign shaped by the absence of public debates

The presidential campaign has been marked by an unusual lack of debates among the leading candidates.

Cepeda has refused to participate in events organized by media outlets, arguing that proposed formats do not offer guarantees of neutrality or what he describes as “fair rules” established by news organizations.

As a result, part of the political confrontation has shifted to Congress, where both Cepeda and Valencia currently serve in the Senate.

Critics, however, have challenged Cepeda’s decision. Former Bogotá Mayor and presidential candidate Claudia López argued that his absence from debates reflects that “Cepeda does not want to take responsibility for the failures of Total Peace (Paz Total),” the negotiation policy with armed groups promoted by President Gustavo Petro, in which Cepeda played a key role as a lawmaker.

Instead of regular debates, the campaign has been dominated by disputes over media formats, digital presence, social media strategies and public controversies aimed at amplifying candidates’ visibility.

De la Espriella embraces confrontation

One of the candidates who has most effectively capitalized on the digital environment is Abelardo de la Espriella, whose political strategy has been compared to right-wing populist leadership styles such as those of Argentine President Javier Milei and US President Donald Trump.

In recent weeks, De la Espriella has faced several media controversies, including an incident involving journalist Laura Rodríguez of Piso 8 FM, for which he later apologized after accusations of inappropriate sexual conduct. He also clashed live on air with television presenter María Lucía Fernández of Caracol Noticias, whom he called “ignorant.”

Questions also emerged following reports by digital outlet La Silla Vacía regarding donations linked to the US Republican Party.

Despite the controversies, the strategy appears to be strengthening his electoral standing. An Atlas Intel poll for Semana magazine, published May 15, showed De la Espriella surpassing Valencia by a two-to-one margin for the first time, with 32.9% support compared with 16.7%.

However, the polling firm is currently under investigation by Colombia’s National Electoral Council (CNE) amid concerns over whether its methodology complies with national standards. If irregularities are confirmed, the firm could face suspension of its operations in Colombia.

Valencia seeks to broaden support toward the political center

Meanwhile, Valencia has sought to expand her electoral base by shifting strategically toward the political center.

As part of that effort, on May 17 she officially introduced her proposal “Mámá No Está Sola (Mom Is Not Alone),” aimed at female heads of household and focused on access to credit, employment and housing property. The proposal also includes a promise to deliver 1 million homes prioritized for women community leaders.

Valencia’s candidacy also marks a historic first for Colombia’s political right: it is the first time a major conservative party has nominated a woman for president.

Her vice presidential running mate, former Bogotá councilman Juan Daniel Oviedo, has openly identified as a member of the LGBTQ+ community, a move that represents a significant shift for the Centro Democrático traditionally conservative electorate.

Colombia appears headed for a runoff

With a highly fragmented field and no signs of consolidation among right-wing candidates, Colombia appears increasingly likely to hold a presidential runoff on June 21, 2026.

Barring a major shift in polling trends, the contest seems set to come down to Iván Cepeda and whichever opposition candidate manages to emerge from an increasingly competitive battle within Colombia’s political right.

Though surprises are possible, polling says the front runners are Iván Cepeda, Abelardo de la Espriella, and Paloma Valencia.

The Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil of Colombia (RNEC), the entity responsible for organizing elections in the country, reported that a total of 14 candidates have officially registered to run in the country’s presidential elections, scheduled for May 31, 2026. In this vote, citizens will elect the President and Vice President of the Republic for the 2026–2030 term.

According to the electoral authority, the candidates represent a wide range of political perspectives, from left to right, including independent candidacies running through political movements. Here the list and brief profile of the candidates:

1. Clara Eugenia López Obregón, currently a senator for the Esperanza Democrática She has served as Minister of Labor (2016–2017), acting mayor of Bogotá (2011–2012), and Bogotá’s secretary of government (2008–2010). She has been affiliated with left-wing parties and was Gustavo Petro’s vice presidential running mate in the 2010 election.
2. Óscar Mauricio Lizcano, from the FAMILIA coalition. He served as Minister of Information Technologies (2023–2025), was a senator (2010–2018), and a member of the House of Representatives (2006–2010).
3. Raúl Santiago Botero, candidate of the “Romper el Sistema” movement (Break the Establishment). An agronomist engineer and businessman from Medellín, he presents himself as an independent candidate with no prior political experience.
4. Miguel Uribe Londoño, father of the slain presidential candidate Miguel Uribe Turbay. He is running under the Colombian Democratic Party and previously served as president of the Centro Democrático party founded by Álvaro Uribe Vélez.
5. Sondra Macollins Garvin, from the movement “La Abogada de Hierro” (The Iron Lawyer) A criminal lawyer and psychologist, she presents herself as an independent candidate without political affiliations. She ran for the House of Representatives in 2022 and is known for her work in narcotrafficking and corruption cases.
6. Iván Cepeda Castro, a senator since 2014 and the official candidate of the Pacto Histórico, the same party as President Gustavo Petro. Polls project he will receive the highest vote share in the first election round. He is aligned with left-wing political ideas.
7. Abelardo de la Espriella, a lawyer with far-right positions, running for the first time under the Defensores de la Patria movement. Recent polls place him as a likely second or third contender in voter preference.
8. Claudia López Hernández, former mayor of Bogotá (2020–2023) and former senator (2014–2018), running under the centrist movement “Imparables con Claudia.” She is known for her anti-corruption agenda and secured her candidacy with more than 570,000 votes (about 9%) in recent interparty primaries.
9. Paloma Valencia Laserna, current senator and candidate of the Centro Democrático party led by Álvaro Uribe Vélez. She won the right-wing interparty primary on March 8 with more than 3 million votes. Polls place her among the top three contenders, and if she reaches a runoff, she would become the first woman in Colombia’s history to do so.

• Sergio Fajardo Valderrama, an academic and mathematician running for the Dignidad y Compromiso He served as mayor of Medellín and governor of Antioquia and is running for president for the third time.
• Roy Barreras, from the political party La Fuerza (The Force). He won the left-wing coalition primary on March 8 with the lowest vote total (257,000 votes, about 3.6%). Although currently aligned with left-wing movements and part of the Petro administration, he has previously been affiliated with right- and center-leaning parties.
• Gustavo Matamoros Camacho, of the Colombian Ecologist Party. He served in the Colombian Army for 43 years. With no prior political experience, his campaign focuses on public security.
• Luis Gilberto Murillo, who served as Minister of Foreign Affairs (2024–2025) and Colombia’s ambassador to the United States (2022–2024). A human rights advocate and Afro-Colombian leader from Chocó, he presents himself as an independent, moderate, centrist candidate.
• Carlos Eduardo Caicedo, running under the independent movement “Con Caicedo.” He was mayor of Santa Marta (2012–2015) and governor of Magdalena (2020–2023), where he built a strong base as a left-wing political leader.

The RNEC also reported that “the draw to determine the position of presidential candidates on the ballot will take place on March 25 at the Ágora Bogotá Convention Center.”

This process marks the formal start of the final phase of the presidential campaign, during which candidates will seek to consolidate support ahead of the first round on May 31. If no candidate secures an absolute majority, a runoff between the two leading candidates will be held on June 21.

Headline photo: Polling station in Colombia during last Congress elections in March 8, 2026. Photo courtesy of the Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil.

Colombia’s presidential race has entered a new phase following the interparty primaries held on March 8. Three major coalitions selected their candidates ahead of the first round scheduled for May 31: Paloma Valencia (48 years) will represent the right, Claudia López (56) the center, and Roy Barreras (62) a segment of the left.

They will join three candidates who did not participate in the primaries because they already hold the official endorsement of their parties: Iván Cepeda (63) of the Pacto Histórico (left), Sergio Fajardo (69) of Dignidad y Compromiso (center), and Abelardo de la Espriella (47) of the Salvación Nacional (far right).

Beyond their immediate results, Colombia’s interparty primaries typically serve two main purposes: reducing the number of contenders and selecting the flagbearers of each coalition, while also measuring the electoral strength of political figures ahead of potential negotiations among parties and candidates. With 99% of polling stations counted, and preliminary results rapidly released by the Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil, several political consequences of the vote are already emerging.

Paloma Valencia to Lead the Uribista Right

The right-wing consultation brought together nine candidates from different center-right and conservative currents. One of its main goals was to secure a strong turnout that could consolidate the sector in public opinion and counter the rise of far-right candidate Abelardo de la Espriella, who seeks to capture a portion of Colombia’s traditional conservative electorate.

The winner was Senator Paloma Valencia, who has campaigned nationwide alongside former President Álvaro Uribe Vélez, the leading figure of the Centro Democrático party.

Although polls had already projected her victory, the surprise was the scale of the result. With 99% of polling stations counted, Valencia secured 3,212,528 votes, representing more than 45% of the total votes cast across the three primaries.

She now faces three major challenges. The first will be unifying the right behind her candidacy and preventing conservative voters from drifting toward De la Espriella. In this context, the selection of her vice-presidential running mate will be crucial.

Among the names circulating is Juan Daniel Oviedo (48), a former Bogotá city councilor who unexpectedly finished second in the consultation with more than 1,200,00 votes, despite his well-known ideological differences with the Uribista movement.

The second challenge is symbolic: no woman has ever reached the second round of Colombia’s presidential election, making it difficult to break that historical barrier even with the political backing of Uribe, who still maintains strong favorability ratings.

Finally, Valencia will attempt to channel the anti-Petro vote, capitalizing on public dissatisfaction with the policies of President Gustavo Petro and his close political ally Iván Cepeda, who currently appears as the frontrunner in most polls for both the first and second rounds.

The Center Cools Around Claudia López

With 99% of votes counted, the centrist consultation recorded the lowest turnout among the three coalitions. Former Bogotá mayor Claudia López received more than 572,000 votes, representing just 8.14% of the total, well below polling projections that placed her above 12%.

For López, the result follows a long campaign that began more than a year ago, during which she sought to challenge Sergio Fajardo, the former mayor of Medellín who already holds the endorsement of the Dignidad y Compromiso party.

The key question now is her next political move: whether to remain in the presidential race or eventually join forces with Fajardo, whose polling numbers also remain modest, hovering around 5%.

The weak result may reflect the fragmentation of Colombia’s political center, often criticized for positions perceived as moderate or ambiguous. It may also indicate that Juan Daniel Oviedo attracted part of the centrist electorate within the right-wing consultation.

In any case, the outcome suggests the presidential campaign could once again polarize around two main narratives: “with Petro,” led by Iván Cepeda and the Pacto Histórico, or “against Petro,” a space still contested between Paloma Valencia and Abelardo de la Espriella.

Roy Barreras Wins the Left Consultation, but Momentum Favors Cepeda

In Roy Barreras’s case, two key factors appear to have contributed to his limited result. First was his decision to maintain a primary that many within the left considered unnecessary, given that much of the progressive sector had already rallied behind Iván Cepeda.

Second is his long political trajectory across multiple governments and ideological camps, from the right to the left, which has led some voters to view him as a traditional establishment politician.

With 99% of votes counted, Barreras secured just over 255,000 votes, less than 4% of the total. During the campaign, Barreras had stated he expected to surpass 1,500,000 votes in order to negotiate a stronger position within the left-wing coalition. Following these results, his most likely option may be withdrawing his candidacy and endorsing Cepeda, signaling unity within the progressive camp.

Other Highlights from the Electoral Day

One of the most striking outcomes was the performance of Juan Daniel Oviedo, who finished second among the 18 candidates participating in the primaries with 1,251,428 votes. With this electoral capital, Oviedo has become one of the most sought-after figures for potential alliances.

His political alignment remains uncertain. It is unclear whether he will fully integrate into Paloma Valencia’s campaign and the Centro Democrático, with whom he has ideological differences, or attempt to move closer to the weakened political center.

Unlike many traditional politicians, Oviedo has built a relatively short but distinctive political career based on his technocratic profile, his experience in economic policy, and his attempt to position himself outside the traditional Petro-Uribe political divide.

Meanwhile, journalist Vicky Dávila (52), who has run a campaign with populist elements inspired by figures such as Javier Milei in Argentina and Donald Trump in the United States, received more than 236,000 votes, around 3.3% of the total, leaving her with limited negotiating leverage.

A similar outcome affected Daniel Quintero (45), the former mayor of Medellín, who received just over 226,000 votes (around 3.2%), with his campaign likely hurt by controversies linked to alleged corruption during his administration.

Under Colombia’s electoral law (Law 1475 of 2011), political parties may still modify or withdraw candidates until March 20. After that date, the presidential campaign will move toward the first round scheduled for May 31. If no candidate obtains an absolute majority (50% plus one), the two candidates with the highest vote totals will compete in a runoff election on June 21.

For now, the race appears likely to center on a left-wing coalition led by Iván Cepeda with the backing of President Gustavo Petro, and a divided right contested between Paloma Valencia and the ultraconservative Abelardo de la Espriella.

Above photo: Claudia López, candidate in the centrist primary, casting her vote in Bogotá. Photo courtesy of Claudia López’s campaign team.