Colombian President Gustavo Petro on Monday decreed a 23.7% increase in the country’s minimum wage for 2026, the largest real rise in at least two decades, bypassing negotiations with unions and business groups and sparking warnings from economists, bankers and employers over inflation, job losses and rising informality.

The decree lifts the monthly minimum wage to 1.75 million pesos (U.S$470), or close to 2 million pesos including transport subsidies, and will apply to roughly 2.5 million workers when it takes effect next year. Petro said the measure aims to reduce inequality and move Colombia toward a “living minimum wage” that allows workers to “live better.”

But business associations, financial analysts and opposition lawmakers said the scale of the increase — far above inflation and productivity trends — risks destabilising the labour market and the broader economy.

According to calculations based on official data, with inflation expected to close 2025 at around 5.3% and labour productivity growth estimated at 0.9%, a technically grounded adjustment would have been close to 6.2%. The gap between that benchmark and the decreed hike exceeds 17 percentage points, the largest deviation on record.

Informality and job losses

Colombia’s minimum wage plays an outsized role in the economy, serving not only as the legal wage floor but also as a reference for pensions, social security contributions and public-sector pay.

Banking association Asobancaria warned that increases far above productivity can generate unintended effects. Citing data from the national statistics agency DANE, the group noted that 49% of employed Colombians — about 11.4 million people — earn less than the minimum wage, mostly in the informal economy, while only 10% earn exactly the minimum wage. Former director of DANE and economist Juan Daniel Oviedo believes that an increase that only benefits one-out-of-ten workers will stump job creation. “A minimum wage of 2 million pesos will make us move like turtles when it comes to creating formal jobs  — something we need to structurally address poverty in Colombia.”

Retail association FENALCO described the decision as “populist” and said the talks had been a “charade.” Its president, Jaime Alberto Cabal, said the process ignored technical, economic and productivity variables and would hit small businesses hardest.

Lawmakers also raised concerns about the impact on independent workers and contractors in the agricultural sectors, especially hired-help on coffee planations. Carlos Fernando Motoa, a senator from the opposition Cambio Radical party, said the decision would push vulnerable workers out of the formal system.

“The unintended effects of this improvised handling of the minimum wage will end up hitting independent workers’ pockets,” Motoa said. “Many will be forced to choose between eating or paying for health and pension contributions.”

Economists warned that micro, small and medium-sized enterprises — which account for the majority of employment — may respond by cutting staff, reducing hours or shifting workers into informal arrangements to cope with higher payroll and social security costs.

Inflation and rates at risk

Analysts also cautioned that the wage hike could reignite inflation, complicating the central bank’s easing cycle. Central bank economists have forecast 2026 inflation at 3.6%, down from 5.1% expected in 2025, but several analysts said those projections may now need revising.

In an interview with Reuters, David Cubides, chief economist at Banco de Occidente, called the increase “absolutely unsustainable,” warning it would affect government payrolls, pension liabilities and the informal labour market.

“Inflation forecasts will have to be revised,” Cubides said, adding that interest rates could rise again in the medium term as a result.

The impact is amplified by Colombia’s ongoing reduction in the legal workweek. From July 2026, the standard workweek will fall to 42 hours, meaning the hourly minimum wage will rise by roughly 28.5%, further increasing labour costs.

The decree comes six months before the presidential election on May 31, 2026, and is viewed by critics of Colombia’s first leftist administration as an electoral gamble aimed at shoring up support for the ruling coalition’s candidate, Senator Iván Cepeda.

Opposition senator Esteban Quintero, from the Democratic Center party, warned that Colombia risked repeating the mistakes of other Latin American countries that pursued aggressive wage policies.

“Careful, Colombia. We cannot repeat the history of our neighbours,” Quintero said. “Populism is celebrated at first — and later the costs become unbearable.”

Former finance minister and presidential hopeful Mauricio Cárdenas said the decision would inevitably lead to layoffs, particularly in small businesses already operating on thin margins, and described the policy as “economic populism” whose costs would materialise after the election cycle.

“The employer ends up saying, ‘I can’t sustain this payroll,’” Cárdenas said. “People are laid off, and many end up working for less than the minimum wage. In the end, nothing is achieved.”

Liberal Party senator Mauricio Gómez Amín said the increase risked becoming a political banner rather than a technical policy tool.

“Without technical backing, a 23% increase translates into inflation, bankruptcies and fewer job opportunities,” Gómez Amín said. “Economic populism always sends the bill later.”

While supporters argue the measure will boost purchasing power at the start of 2026, analysts cautioned that the short-term gains could be offset by higher prices, job losses and a further expansion of Colombia’s informal economy — already one of the largest in Latin America.

Boyacá is a department best understood at walking pace. Here, the Colombian Andes rise into cold, luminous páramos, colonial towns cling to mountainsides, and trails once traced by the Muisca people now lead modern hikers through landscapes where history and geography feel inseparable. For those who hike not only to conquer summits but to understand place, Boyacá offers one of Colombia’s richest outdoor experiences.

Landmarks on the Trail

Many hikes in Boyacá double as cultural journeys. The Iguaque Sanctuary of Flora and Fauna, near Villa de Leyva, is among the most emblematic. Its winding ascent leads to the Laguna de Iguaque, a glacial lake revered by the Muisca as the birthplace of humanity. The trail passes cloud forest and páramo, with frailejones standing like silent sentinels, before opening onto a stark, spiritual landscape at nearly 3,800 meters.

Further east, the Sierra Nevada del Cocuy (Güicán) dominates the horizon with snowcapped peaks that feel almost Patagonian in scale. Hiking here is more demanding and tightly regulated to protect fragile ecosystems, but routes toward Ritacuba Blanco, Pan de Azúcar, and the Laguna Grande de la Sierra reward experienced trekkers with glaciers, alpine lakes and some of the most dramatic scenery in Colombia.

For gentler walks, the trails around Monguí, one of Colombia’s most beautiful heritage towns, weave together cobblestone paths, pine forests and views of the high plains. Nearby, the Puente Real de Calicanto, built in the 18th century, connects hikers directly to the colonial past.

Boyacá is defined by altitude. Much of the department sits above 2,500 meters, and hiking here is an exercise in patience and acclimatization. The páramo ecosystems – vast, windswept highlands unique to the northern Andes – are both austere and alive, capturing mist and feeding rivers that sustain millions downstream.

Beyond El Cocuy, lesser-known summits and ridgelines around Soatá, Tenza Valley, and Pisba Páramo offer solitude and long-distance views across folds of green and gold. Pisba, in particular, combines natural beauty with historical weight: these were the cold, punishing routes crossed by Simón Bolívar’s troops during the independence campaign of 1819.

Walking Through History

Boyacá is Colombia’s historic heartland. Trails often pass near sites central to the nation’s founding story, from the Puente de Boyacá, where independence was sealed, to rural paths that once carried armies, traders and pilgrims. Hiking here feels layered with memory: pre-Hispanic sacred sites, colonial estates, and republican battlefields coexist within a single day’s walk.

In Villa de Leyva, hikes extend naturally from stone plazas, monasteries and fossil fields, where ancient marine remains remind visitors that these mountains were once under the sea.

Gastronomy After the Climb

Hiking in Boyacá builds an appetite, and the region’s cuisine is designed to restore. The undisputed classic is cocido boyacense, a hearty stew of tubers, grains and meats – perfect after a cold day on the trail. Arepas boyacenses, thick and slightly sweet with curd cheese, are trail food in themselves, often eaten warm with coffee or hot chocolate.

Highland dairy culture shines in fresh cheeses and cuajada con melao, while trout from cold rivers and lakes – especially near Laguna de Tota – offers a lighter reward after long walks. The local market in Aquitania brims with potatoes, garlic, onions and corn, underscoring how closely food – and plenty of cold beer – is tied to altitude and soil.

Boyacá is not about speed or spectacle alone. It is about immersion – into thin air, deep history and a landscape that demands respect. Hiking here is as much a cultural act as a physical one, a way to understand how mountains have shaped ancient rituals and modern-day life.

Why such a massive U.S. military deployment off the coast of Venezuela, supposedly to combat the “Cartel of the Suns” and stop drug trafficking from Venezuela to the United States? After more than four months, the results amount to little more than a handful of small vessels destroyed – an extremely modest impact given the scale of the force deployed.

The reality is that the volume of drug trafficking transiting through Venezuela to the United States is relatively small. Venezuela is not a producer of cocaine, much less of fentanyl, most of which enters the United States via Mexico. If the real interest is not to halt drug trafficking, what then is the motivation for placing the Fourth Fleet on a war footing in the Caribbean Sea? Logic might lead one to think the U.S. interest is oil, since Venezuela holds the largest reserves in the world—but that is not it either. Today the United States is the world’s leading oil producer, at 13.4 million barrels per day, and it has proven reserves sufficient for approximately ten years, assuming no new discoveries and no improvements in recovery or technological advances—an impossible assumption.

So what, then, is the underlying issue if it is neither drugs, nor oil, nor other minerals in which Venezuela might have potential and that would be attractive to the United States?

The answer lies in a little-publicized document formally released by the White House on December 4, titled National Security Strategy 2025. While the document introduces substantial changes in relations with Europe and traditional adversaries, the most striking element is the new emphasis placed on Latin America. Of the document’s “roadmap to ensure that America remains the greatest and most successful nation in human history”, five sections are devoted exclusively to our region, positioning Latin America as a fundamental component of U.S. security – a very significant shift from earlier versions, which historically prioritized the Middle East or Asia. There is a new strategy, or if you will, a “New Monroe Doctrine,” a continuation of the 1823 Monroe Doctrine, reaffirming U.S. preeminence in the region.

“After years of neglect, the United States will once again apply and enforce the Monroe Doctrine to reestablish U.S. preeminence in the Western Hemisphere, and to protect our homeland and our access to key geographies throughout the region. We will deny non-Hemispheric competitors the ability to position forces or other threatening capabilities, or to own or control strategically vital assets, in our Hemisphere,” states the 29-page document.

Key elements of this new doctrine include: countering external influence by requiring Latin American governments to dismantle foreign military installations and divest strategic assets in exchange for aid or alliances; stopping illegal migration, including naval patrols in the Caribbean and the eastern Pacific, selective border deployments, and the use of incentives for governments to curb migratory flows; combating narco-terrorists and cartels; and sealing economic and political commitments with aligned governments in a win-win framework that would include procurement preferences and greater cooperation, among other measures, with a view to turning Latin America into a stable market for U.S. exports and a buffer against global rivals.

In recent years, China has achieved significant penetration in Latin America through its diplomacy and long-term strategy (the Belt and Road Initiative, or New Silk Road). For nearly all countries in the region, China has become the leading trading partner, displacing the United States; it is also an investor in major infrastructure projects and a lender of funds (in Venezuela’s case, a very large lender that negotiated debt repayment in oil at very low prices). In addition, China has become a major supplier of weapons and information technology.

In this context, what Washington appears to be seeking is indeed a regime change in Venezuela to counter the influence of China and Russia, but without openly announcing it in order to avoid a direct diplomatic confrontation. Trump has segmented the region into friendly regimes (Argentina, El Salvador, Ecuador, Honduras, and Guatemala), enemy regimes (Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua), and regimes in limbo (Colombia and Brazil).

For Venezuela, regime change appears imminent, which would profoundly benefit Colombia, because, as Miguel Uribe Turbay said before he was assassinated, “as long as there is no freedom in Venezuela, there will be no peace in Colombia.” On the other hand, a change of government in Colombia is also approaching, and the country will have to decide which of these groups it wants to belong to—whether it repairs its relations with its traditional partner and ally, or definitively joins the group of pariah states in the region. Let us hope it is the former.

About the author: Luis Guillermo Plata served as Minister of Trade, Industry of Commerce during the government of President Álvaro Uribe Vélez, and in 2021, appointed by President Iván Duque, Ambassador of Colombia to Spain.

For a literary festival, silence can be more revealing than speech. The decision by three writers to withdraw from the 2026 Hay Festival in Cartagena over the presence of María Corina Machado, this year’s Nobel Peace Prize laureate and the most prominent figure in Venezuela’s democratic opposition, has exposed a paradox at the heart of contemporary literary culture: a professed devotion to free expression that falters when confronted with an inconvenient voice.

Hay Festival Cartagena, now in its 21st edition, is scheduled to take place from 29 January to 1 February 2026, with parallel events in Barranquilla, Medellín and a special edition in Jericó, Antioquia. Founded three decades ago in Wales and once described by Bill Clinton as “the Woodstock of the mind,” Hay has built its global reputation on the premise that literature flourishes in the presence of disagreement. Its stages have hosted figures as diverse – and divisive – as Salman Rushdie, Jonathan Safran Foer and David Goodhart, writers whose ideas have unsettled orthodoxies across continents.

Yet in Cartagena, dialogue has been recast as contamination.

The Colombian novelist Laura Restrepo, the Barranquilla-born writer Giuseppe Caputo and the Dominican activist Mikaelah Drullard announced they would not attend in protest at Machado’s invitation. Restrepo, winner of the 2004 Alfaguara Prize, had been scheduled to participate in several events, including a conversation with Indian novelist Pankaj Mishra and a session devoted to her most recent book, I Am the Dagger and I Am the Wound. In a public letter addressed to festival director Cristina de la Fuente, Restrepo described Machado’s presence as “a line” crossed.

“I must cancel my attendance at Hay Festival Cartagena 2026,” Restrepo wrote. “The reason is the participation of María Corina Machado, an active supporter of United States military intervention in Latin America.” Granting her a platform, Restrepo argued, amounted to facilitating positions hostile to regional autonomy.

Caputo echoed his reasoning on social media, announcing that “in the current context of escalating imperial violence, it is better to withdraw from a festival taking place opposite the bombarded waters of the Caribbean Sea.” Drullard, five days earlier, said she could not attend an event that “supports pro-genocide and interventionist positions through the mobilisation of those who promote them,” citing Machado’s proximity to the administration of US President Donald Trump.

What remains striking, however, is not merely the severity of these accusations but their selectivity. None of the boycott statements devotes comparable moral energy to denouncing the documented human rights abuses of Nicolás Maduro’s regime: arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances, torture of political prisoners, or the systematic dismantling of democratic institutions. One is left to ask whether the authors’ moral outrage extends to the lived realities of Venezuelans themselves, or whether it finds expression only when filtered through the optics of geopolitics.

The irony is sharpened by the fact that the same US administration helped secure Machado’s escape from Venezuela on December 8, enabling her to arrive in Oslo hours after her daughter Ana Corina Sosa received the Nobel Peace Prize on her behalf. “When the history of our time is written, it won’t be the names of the authoritarian rulers that stand out – but the names of those who dared resist,” noted the Nobel Foundation. 

The arguments from Machado’s detractors  warrant scrutiny – and above all, debate. What they do not justify is refusal from Latin America’s self-entitled literati. A boycott replaces argument with absence, moral reasoning with pantomime. It is a gesture that confers ethical purity upon the boycotter while foreclosing the very exchange that literature has traditionally claimed to defend. This is the “line” that cannot be crossed.

The Hay Festival’s response has been characteristically diplomatic In a statement following the cancellations, organisers reaffirmed their commitment to pluralism: “We reaffirm our conviction that open, plural and constructive dialogue remains an essential tool for addressing complex realities and for defending the free exchange of ideas and freedom of expression.” They stressed that Hay “does not align itself with or endorse the opinions, positions or statements of those who participate in its activities,” while respecting the decisions of those who chose not to attend.

That insistence on neutrality, however, also reveals a deeper unease. If a literary festival must repeatedly assert its impartiality, it may be because neutrality itself has become suspect. Increasingly, festivals are asked to function as courts of moral arbitration, conferring legitimacy on some voices while quietly disqualifying others. The result is not a more just cultural sphere, but a narrower one—policed less by argument than by consensus.

The controversy has unfolded at a particularly volatile moment for Venezuela’s eight-million diaspora. Machado’s invitation coincides with a renewed escalation in US pressure in the Caribbean Sea. On Tuesday, President Trump ordered a “total and complete blockade” of all sanctioned oil tankers entering or leaving the country, targeting Caracas’s principal source of revenue. His administration also designated Maduro’s government a Foreign Terrorist Organization, accusing it of using “stolen US assets” to finance terrorism, drug trafficking and organised crime.

“Venezuela is completely surrounded by the largest armada ever assembled in the history of South America,” Trump wrote on Truth Social. “It will only get bigger, and the shock to them will be like nothing they have ever seen before – until such time as they return to the United States all of the oil, land and other assets they previously stole from us.”

Against this backdrop, Machado’s high-profile presence at Hay has acquired a symbolic weight that far exceeds literary stages. Yet it is precisely at such moments that intellectual forums are tested. Fiction, after all, teaches empathy, complexity and the capacity to hold contradiction without retreat. To boycott rather than engage is to abandon that lesson – and, with it, democratical ideals.

The reputational cost to Hay Festival Cartagena may prove lasting – not because Machado was invited, but because the limits of reason and tolerance have been publicly exposed. A gathering that once prided itself on hosting difficult conversations now finds itself unsettled by the very principle on which it was founded.

And there is a final inflection. If Hay’s commitment to dialogue is grounded in a leftist agenda – if certain voices render discussion impossible – then Machado herself should reasonably question the value of her remote participation at the festival on January 30, for a scheduled conversation with Venezuelan journalist and former minister Moisés Naím.

In Cartagena, it is not Machado’s words that should concern audiences, but the intellectual impoverishment by those who chose not to speak to her at all.

Christmas in Colombia does not arrive quietly. It announces itself early, with the scent of cinnamon and panela simmering in kitchens, the crackle of fireworks in neighborhood streets, and the steady murmur of voices gathering night after night for the novenas. Long before December 24, the country has already slipped into celebration, moving to a rhythm that blends devotion, family ritual, and an unmistakable sense of joy.

At the heart of the season is the Novena de Aguinaldos, a tradition that dates back to the late 18th century. For nine consecutive nights, families, neighbors, and coworkers gather to recreate the journey of Mary and Joseph in the days before the birth of Christ. Prayers are recited, verses are shared, and villancicos are sung—sometimes reverently, sometimes joyfully out of tune. Children wait impatiently for the final amen, knowing it signals the arrival of food. In Colombia, faith rarely excludes festivity. The novenas are as much about togetherness as they are about devotion, turning living rooms, patios, and office corridors into temporary sanctuaries.

Food anchors the ritual. No Colombian Christmas feels complete without natilla, a custard-like dessert thickened with cornstarch and scented with cinnamon and clove, its sweetness both comforting and familiar. Alongside it appear buñuelos: golden, perfectly round fritters made with fresh cheese, crisp on the outside and soft within. Served warm, they are irresistible—often eaten standing up, mid-conversation, as laughter spills across the room. In some regions, tamales emerge at dawn on Christmas Eve; in others, lechona, empanadas, or slow-cooked meats dominate the table.

Each dish make geography a tradition.

Beyond the home, Colombia’s towns and cities transform through light. Christmas illumination here is not simply decorative—it is theatrical. Medellín’s famed alumbrados turn the Medellín River into a glowing corridor of color and imagination, drawing visitors from across the country and beyond. Smaller towns respond with equal enthusiasm. In places like Villa de Leyva, Tunja, Salento, and countless Andean plazas, lights climb church façades, trace colonial balconies, and spill into public squares where families stroll late into the night.

December also reveals a quieter layer of symbolism written into Colombia’s geography itself. Across the country, towns bear names drawn directly from the Bible—Beléncito in Boyacá, Jerusalén in Cundinamarca, Nazareth in Caldas, El Nilo in Cundinamarca, Jericó in Antioquia. During Christmas, these names seem to awaken. Nativity scenes placed in public squares take on an almost literal resonance, as if the story of the birth of Christ has crossed oceans and centuries to settle, improbably and beautifully, in the Andes.

In these plazas, the pesebre becomes more than decoration. Beneath glowing stars and paper lanterns, surrounded by poinsettias and strings of lights, it turns into a communal gathering point. Children pose for photographs beside the figures of Mary and Joseph. Street vendors sell hot chocolate, obleas layered with arequipe, and freshly fried buñuelos. Grandparents pause to retell the story to a new generation. When a manger sits in the main square of Belén, or a star glows above a church in Jericó, the boundary between scripture and everyday life gently dissolves.

What ultimately defines Christmas in Colombia is its collective warmth. In a country shaped by contrasts – urban and rural, abundance and scarcity – the holidays create a rare moment of shared ritual. Doors open more easily. Invitations multiply. The novena moves fluidly from one home to another, softening social boundaries, if only temporarily. Even those who do not consider themselves religious often take part, drawn by memory, music, and the pull of belonging.

On Christmas Eve, after the final novena, families gather for la Nochebuena. Some attend midnight mass; others remain at home as fireworks light the sky and music carries into the early hours. Christmas Day arrives slowly, with late breakfasts, reheated leftovers, and the quiet satisfaction of having reached the end of something carefully prepared.

In Colombia, Christmas is not a single night or a single meal. It is nine evenings of prayer and laughter, towns shimmering under festive lights, and fireworks that keep the dogs barking all night. It is a season that insists on being shared – bright, noisy, sweet, and unmistakably alive.

A Simple Colombian Buñuelo Recipe

Ingredients

• 1 cup grated fresh cheese (queso costeño or queso campesino criollo, well-drained)
• ½ cup cornstarch (maicena)
• ¼ cup tapioca starch (or cassava starch)
• 1 teaspoon baking powder
• 1 egg
• 1–2 tablespoons milk (as needed)
• A pinch of sugar
• Vegetable oil for frying

Method

1. In a bowl, mix the grated cheese, cornstarch, tapioca starch, baking powder, and sugar.
2. Add the egg and mix gently. Gradually add milk until a smooth, pliable dough forms.
3. Shape the dough into small balls, about the size of a walnut.
4. Heat oil over medium-low heat. Fry the buñuelos slowly, turning them so they cook evenly and puff into golden spheres.
5. Remove when crisp and evenly browned. Drain on paper towels and serve warm.

Best enjoyed during a novena, shared with family, and eaten before they cool—because in Colombia, buñuelos rarely last long.

Colombia’s president, Gustavo Petro, triggered yet another diplomatic rupture in South America on Sunday after denouncing Chile’s president-elect, José Antonio Kast, as a “Nazi,” rejecting the legitimacy of Chile’s democratic choice and sharply diverging from the cautious language typically observed between regional leaders.

Petro’s remarks came within hours of Kast’s decisive victory in Chile’s presidential runoff, in which the conservative candidate secured more than 58 per cent of the vote, defeating hard-left contender Jeannette Jara. Jara conceded promptly, saying that “democracy has spoken loud and clear” and wishing Kast success “for the good of Chile.”

Petro, however, used his social media platform X to frame Kast’s victory as evidence of an advancing wave of fascism in Latin America. “Fascism advances. I will never shake hands with a Nazi or a Nazi’s son, nor will I; they are death in human form,” the Colombian president wrote.

In a retort that called for Chileans to “take care of Neruda’s tomb,” Petro went on to equate Kast’s electoral mandate with the legacy of former dictator Augusto Pinochet. “It’s sad that Pinochet had to impose himself by force, but sadder now is that the people choose their Pinochet: elected or not, they are sons of Hitler and Hitler kills the people,” Petro said, adding that Latin Americans “know how to resist.”

The language marked one of the most explicit attacks by a sitting South American president on a democratically elected counterpart in recent years and raised immediate concerns about the state of Colombia – Chile relations, historically among the region’s most stable.

Kast’s victory completes a broader rightward shift in South American politics, following the election of Javier Milei in Argentina, Daniel Noboa in Ecuador and Nayib Bukele in El Salvador, while Bolivia recently ended nearly two decades of socialist rule with the election of centrist Rodrigo Paz. Petro, the region’s most unhinged left-wing leader, with just eight months remaining in his presidential term, appeared to ignore the potential diplomatic fallout of his remarks.

Within hours of Petro’s statement, US Republican Congressman Carlos Gimenez responded sharply, writing: “This guy (Petro) went too far with the drugs and alcohol. This is the real Gustavo Petro: incoherent, hateful, and schizophrenic.”

Former Colombian president Álvaro Uribe Vélez praised Chile’s electoral process and congratulated Kast, saying the vote had taken place peacefully and reflected citizens’ concerns about security and institutional stability. Uribe described Kast as “a guarantee for democratic institutions” in Chile and the wider region.

Another former president, conservative Andrés Pastrana, issued a sharply worded rebuke of Petro, saying the comments were “inappropriate and irresponsible” and did not represent Colombians nor the long-standing spirit of cooperation between Bogotá and Santiago.

Criticism also came from current lawmakers. Federico Hoyos, a congressman from the department of Antioquia, said Petro had “abandoned his role as head of state” and was acting instead as an “ideological agitator “unwilling to engage with leaders who do not share his views. Andrés Forero, a House representative from the opposition Centro Democrático party, accused Petro of disrespecting the sovereign will of Chilean voters, telling Colombians: “Let’s not fool ourselves, Petro is not a democrat.”

While Petro reviles diplomacy, Kast received public congratulations from international figures across the hemisphere. María Corina Machado, Venezuela’ opposition leader and 2025 Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, praised Chile’s election as “an extraordinary electoral day, an example for many nations of Latin America and the world.”

Addressing Kast directly, Machado wrote: “To the president-elect of Chile, José Antonio Kast, I send my affection and congratulations for the trust he has received. In the name of the Venezuelans, I wish him great success in his government.” She added that Venezuelans hoped to count on Kast’s support “to ensure an orderly transition to democracy in Venezuela” and to help build “a safe, prosperous and free hemisphere.”

Machado’s intervention was notable given her continued persecution by the regime of Nicolás Maduro and her public appearance at the Nobel ceremony last week in Oslo, her first in more than a year.

The United States also welcomed Kast’s victory. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said Washington looked forward to working with the incoming administration “to strengthen regional security and revitalise our trade relationship.”

Kast’s transition team said the president-elect would travel to Argentina this week to meet President Javier Milei, signalling an intention to align closely with like-minded governments in the region.

For Petro, the episode reinforces international perceptions that he has become an anachronism of regional politics — reliant on social-media provocation and historical revisionism.

For all the historical accuracy that seems to elude Petro, membership in Adolf Hitler’s National Socialist Party was not voluntary. While many Germans joined out of conviction, others were pressured or effectively compelled to enrol, particularly to obtain employment, documentation or travel permits. During and immediately after the Second World War, Germans seeking to live or work abroad — including in South America — were often required to disclose or document prior party affiliation to secure passports and legal work status, complicating later assessments of individual responsibility.

Michael Kast, born in 1924 in Thalkirschdorf, Bavaria, emigrated in Chile in 1946. His youngest son, José Antonio Kast (born 1966, Santiago) has repeatedly claimed his father was a Third Reich conscript.

Whether the outburst leads to lasting diplomatic consequences remains uncertain. But it has underscored how electoral change in Latin America is now accompanied not only by sharp policy shifts, but by open rhetorical conflict by a Colombian leader increasingly isolated among his regional peers, except for one ally, Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro.

On Monday afternoon, Chile’s Minister of the Interior, Álvaro Elizalde, confirmed that a Letter of Protest will be sent to President Petro, stating in no uncertain terms that: “A decision has been made to uphold the point of view that has to do with Chilean democracy. Ultimately, the people of Chile decide, and we all have to respect that outcome”.

The U.S. seizure of an oil tanker off the Venezuelan coast appears designed to further squeeze the economy of President Nicolás Maduro’s government. The Dec. 10, 2025 operation — in which American forces descended from helicopters onto the vessel — followed months of U.S. military buildup in the Caribbean and was immediately condemned by Venezuela as “barefaced robbery and an act of international piracy.”

The seized tanker, according to reports, is a 20-year-old supertanker called Skipper, capable of carrying around 2 million barrels of oil.

According to the Trump administration, the vessel was heading to Cuba. Given its size, however, it is far more likely that the final destination was China. Tankers of this scale are rarely used for short Caribbean routes; much smaller vessels typically serve Cuba.

The tanker had been sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury in 2022 for carrying prohibited Iranian oil. At the time, it was alleged that the ship — then known as Adisa — was controlled by Russian oil magnate Viktor Artemov and linked to an oil smuggling network.

On the surface, the seizure was unrelated to U.S. sanctions imposed on Venezuela in 2019 and expanded in 2020 to include secondary sanctions on third parties doing business with Caracas.

Venezuelan officials have therefore described the move as unprecedented, and they are largely correct. While Iranian tankers have been seized in the past for sanctions violations, this marks the first time a vessel departing Venezuela with a Venezuelan crew has been taken.

The Trump administration has signaled it intends to seize not only the cargo but the ship itself — a significant loss for the owning company. Because the shipment was sold under a “Free on Board” contract, the buyer assumed responsibility once the vessel left Venezuelan waters.

Nonetheless, the seizure represents a clear escalation in pressure on Venezuela. Reports indicate that around 30 other tankers operating near the country face some form of sanction. These vessels are part of a shadow fleet designed to evade restrictions while transporting oil from Venezuela, Russia, and Iran.

The message from Washington is unambiguous: more seizures may follow as the U.S. seeks to further squeeze Venezuelan oil revenues.

Venezuela’s economy remains overwhelmingly dependent on oil. Although official figures have not been published for seven years, most analysts estimate that oil accounts for more than 80% of exports, with some placing the figure above 90%.

Most Venezuelan oil is sold on the black market, largely to independent refiners in China. Chinese state-owned firms avoid these purchases to limit sanctions exposure, while authorities in Beijing tend to overlook shipments to non-state entities — particularly when tankers conceal their true origin.

An estimated 80% of Venezuelan oil ultimately goes to China through this channel. About 17% is exported to the United States under a Treasury license granted to Chevron, while roughly 3% goes to Cuba, often on subsidized terms.

Oil also accounts for around 20% of Venezuela’s GDP and more than half of government revenue, making the sector indispensable to Maduro’s survival.

Crucially, Venezuela’s oil industry was already in steep decline before U.S. sanctions began. Production peaked at 3.4 million barrels per day in 1998, fell to 2.7 million by the time Maduro took office in 2013, and dropped to 1.3 million barrels per day by 2019.

The 2019 oil sanctions shut Venezuela out of the U.S. market, forcing it to rely more heavily on China and India. When secondary sanctions followed in 2020, Europe and India halted purchases altogether. Combined with the pandemic-driven oil slump, production collapsed to just 400,000 barrels per day.

Output has since recovered to about 1 million barrels per day, aided largely by Chevron’s continued operations.

To sustain exports, Venezuela relies on a shadow fleet that uses false flags, renamed vessels, and manipulated transponders. Cargoes are sometimes transferred at sea — posing major environmental risks — before being relabeled in transit hubs such as Malaysia and shipped on to China.

The tanker seizure had little immediate impact on global oil prices due to ample supply and Venezuela’s limited market share. However, a more aggressive U.S. campaign could change that calculus.

For Venezuelan oil prices, the consequences may be sharper. Already heavily discounted due to sanctions risk, Venezuelan crude is now likely to be sold at even steeper reductions. Buyers will demand higher discounts and fewer prepayments, while export volumes may fall, forcing production cuts that are costly to reverse.

The result will be further pressure on the limited revenues Maduro depends on to keep the Venezuelan state afloat.

About the author:
Francisco J. Monaldi, Ph.D., is the Wallace S. Wilson Fellow in Latin American Energy Policy and director of the Latin America Energy Program at the Center for Energy Studies at Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy.

This article is reproduced from The Conversation under a Creative Commons licence

Two centuries after its founding in the turbulent aftermath of the Wars of Independence, the National Museum of Colombia is marking its bicentenary with one of the most ambitious exhibitions in its history. Inspirar, conmover y convocar: el Museo de la nación (1823–2023) opens this week in Bogotá, inviting visitors to reflect on 200 years of scientific curiosity, cultural formation, and collective memory in a country still redefining its national narrative.

The anniversary is more than a celebration of institutional longevity. It is a moment of self-examination for a museum conceived during the birth of the Republic and shaped by generations of scientists, historians, artists, and citizens. The museum was created by law on July 28, 1823, and inaugurated the following year, rooted in the vision of plenipotentiary Francisco Antonio Zea. During his diplomatic mission in Europe, Zea recruited a cohort of naturalists – including José María Lanz, Mariano de Rivero, Jean-Baptiste Boussingault, and François-Désiré Roulin – to establish a museum of natural history, along with a school of mines, a geography program, and a lithography workshop in the newly constituted Gran Colombia.

These early scientific figures navigated riverways and mountain passes to reach Bogotá, awaiting the young Republic’s final approval of their contracts. Their collections – birds, reptiles, minerals, anatomical studies, botanical illustrations, archaeological finds – formed the foundation of a museum that initially served as a scientific repository for a nation eager to document the vast richness of its territory. Drawings by artists such as Francisco Javier Matís and explorations ordered by Juan María Céspedes gave visual life to the landscapes and ancient cultures the Republic sought to understand and claim as part of its expanding identity.

But as the exhibition demonstrates, the museum’s role has never been static. If the early 19th century emphasized scientific discovery, later decades shifted toward the collection of historical objects, battle flags, ethnographic pieces, and cultural artifacts that broadened the institution’s mandate. Letters exchanged between luminaries De Rivero and Alexander von Humboldt, or between independence-era leaders such as Antonio José de Sucre and Gerónimo Torres, testify to the museum’s early symbolic power. Sucre himself donated the acso– a ceremonial mantle attributed to Atahualpa’s queen – and ordered that defeated Spanish flags be displayed publicly so Colombians could “witness the heroism” of their troops in the war for independence. These gestures turned the museum into a site where political memory and scientific knowledge intertwined.

Two hundred years later, the new exhibition reframes these layered histories through three major sections designed to show how Colombians have constructed, questioned, and reimagined national identity over time.

The first section, Guardar lo que eres (“Preserve What You Are”), looks back at the 19th century through illustrations, botanical specimens, and scientific journalis. These items reveal how the young nation sought to see itself—literally and symbolically—through classification, measurement, and representation. The pieces trace a lineage from early scientific expeditions to the first attempts to map Colombia’s natural and cultural diversity.

The second section, Superar la desventura (“Overcoming Hardship”), addresses conflict and reconstruction. Drawing on flags, legal documents, military archives, and early photographic material, it examines the ways Colombian society has grappled with political rupture, violence, and the challenge of rebuilding. While the exhibition includes objects from independence-era battlefields in Peru, Bolivia, and the Nueva Granada, it also connects more recent struggles with  reconciliation, and justice. The curators highlight that conflict-related objects—whether symbols of patriot triumph or testimonies of displacement and suffering—offer crucial insight into how Colombians understand the past and imagine the possibility of peace.

The third and final section is a celebration of life. Here, archaeological pieces, masks, contemporary artworks, and textiles created by Indigenous communities in Nariño and weavers from Charalá (Santander), emphasize the endurance of living traditions. Rather than presenting heritage as static, the museum foregrounds the constant reinvention of cultural expression—what it calls “a Colombia still weaving its future.”

In total, the exhibition brings together 168 pieces, including nearly 100 that had remained in storage for more than 50 years due to their fragility. Among them are old etchings, rare flags, and objects that once traveled down the Magdalena River to reach the high-altitude capital of Santa Fe de Bogotá. Their exceptional display marks a milestone for the institution and for the country’s historical patrimony.

Visitors encounter not only objects but immersive environments. A multisensory installation projects shifting images onto suspended fabrics, accompanied by a soundscape inspired by Colombian landscapes and local memories. Tactile stations offer replicas with ink and braille textures, making the experience accessible to diverse audiences. Interactive elements invite the public to create postcards, explore regional museum networks, and engage with a digital map linking Bogotá to 45 co-curated displays in 12 departments across the country. Each participating regional museum is exhibiting an object emblematic of its local identity, extending the bicentenary celebration far beyond the capital.

The exhibition reflects the museum’s evolution since its founding as a scientific cabinet of curiosities. Today, grounded in the principles of the 1991 Constitution – cultural diversity,  coexistence, protection of natural and cultural heritage – the National Museum positions itself as a space where collective histories intersect with citizen voices. The bicentenary, the museum highlights, recognizes that history is not a fixed record but an instrument for understanding present challenges and imagining future possibilities.

The exhibition at Museo Nacional runs until March 15, 2026, and includes guided tours and workshops. Admission is Free.

Museo Nacional. Cra 7 No.28-66.

www.museonacional.gov.co

Colombia’s Foreign Minister Rosa Villavicencio declared Thursday that the Government of President Gustavo Petro is “not in agreement” with the Nobel Peace Prize awarded to Venezuelan opposition leader María Corina Machado – a position that signals how Colombia remains a close ideological ally of one of the hemisphere’s most authoritarian states.

In remarks that were evasive at best and obtuse at worst, Villavicencio told Caracol Radio that Colombia did not send a delegation to the ceremony in Oslo because the prize “should not be granted to someone who incites aggression.” She accused Machado of having previously endorsed the possibility of foreign intervention to restore democracy in Venezuela — a talking point aligned with Maduro’s narrative but at odds with the reality of Machado’s persecution and exile.

The foreign minister tried to soften the blow by reminding listeners that the Norwegian Committee is “autonomous,” line repeated several times as if to imply Colombia’s hands were tied. But the message was unmistakable: Colombia has chosen the comfort of accommodating a dictatorship over defending a peaceful transition to democracy in Venezuela.

The Petro administration’s stance also signals how a government that claims to champion human rights now shows deference to regimes that imprison, torture, censor, and force political opponents into hiding. Colombia has deliberately refused to stand with a woman who risked her life to defend the most essential freedoms for all Venezuelans.

The contrast between Colombia’s silence and the global celebration of Machado cannot be more glaring. Leaders across Europe, Latin America, and the United States praised her courage, while King Harald of Norway presided over a ceremony attended by Argentina’s Javier Milei, former Colombian president Iván Duque, Panama’s José Raúl Mulino, Ecuador’s Daniel Noboa, and Paraguay’s Santiago Peña.

Machado’s Escape Exposes Bogotá’s Moral Vacuum

While Colombia questions the legitimacy of the award, Machado herself undertook a dramatic escape that underscored the brutality of the regime she confronts – and the grotesque irony of Bogotá’s position.

According to a Wall Street Journal investigation, Machado disguised herself with a wig, crossed ten military checkpoints, boarded a fishing boat to Curaçao, and flew to Oslo on a private jet. After more than a year in hiding, she emerged publicly in Norway. Her daughter, Ana Corina Sosa, accepted the Nobel Prize on her behalf during a emotional ceremony on Wednesday, December 10.

Machado’s audacity – and the global admiration it generated – stands in stark contrast to Colombia’s  political miscalculations.

Villavicencio justified Colombia’s position by claiming Machado had “accepted any kind of military intervention” in Venezuela. But the remark functioned less as diplomacy and more as justification for a government unwilling to break ranks with a regime that operates as the “criminal hub of the Americas”.

Machado told reporters on Thursday, that Venezuela “has already been invaded” by Russian agents, Iranian agents, and terrorist groups Hezbollah and Hamas.  “What sustains the regime is a very powerful and strongly funded repression system. Where do those funds come from? Well, from drug trafficking, from the black market of oil, from arms trafficking and from human trafficking. We need to cut those flows,” stated the Laureate next to Norway’s Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Stoere.

Machado has pledged to return to Venezuela with her Nobel Prize and insists her country will become democratic and free. She has denounced the criminal structures that sustain the Maduro regime and highlighted the broader regional security threat it poses.

Meanwhile, Colombia – critical of Israel’s human rights abuses in the Gaza Strip – has yet to condemn the October 7 massacre committed by Hamas, and remains notably quiet on Maduro’s sprawling torture centre, El Helicoide, in central Caracas.

Petro’s increasingly toxic foreign policy with the Trump administration has now crossed an indelible moral line.  Latin America’s oldest continuous democracy is now publicly undermining a woman targeted by a dictatorship. In doing so, Colombia has distanced itself from other Western nations defending democratic ideals and aligned itself more closely with those eroding them.

The foreign ministry insists its position is based on principle. But to much of the international community, and to a majority of Colombians, the reality is unavoidable: the Petro government is no longer neutral, no longer cautious, and no longer a credible defender of democratic values. It has willingly taken Maduro’s side – and revealed a profound lack of moral courage on the world stage.

Every December, Bogotá transforms. Streets glow with constellations of LED lights, plazas turn into theatrical stages, and entire neighborhoods feel suspended somewhere between festive nostalgia and big-city spectacle. But this year’s celebration, dubbed Navidad es Cultura, is bigger, brighter, and more imaginative than ever before. Running from December 5 to 23, it invites locals and travelers alike to explore a holiday season built around creativity, community, and a forward-looking vision of the capital.

“This year, Christmas in Bogotá asks us to imagine and build the future we deserve,” says Mayor Carlos Fernando Galán, who unveiled a lineup of 670 activities and more than 4,300 artists. The result is a citywide cultural takeover – part art festival, part family tradition, and always a playground for the young and young-at-heart.

Following the Christmas Trail

For many visitors, the gateway into Bogotá’s holiday spirit begins with La Ruta de la Navidad, a curated trail of illuminated landmarks running through three major sectors: the historic downtown corridor, the sprawling Parque El Tunal in the south, and the bustling districts of the city’s north. This isn’t a gentle dusting of fairy lights. The 2025 installation includes 114 LED Christmas trees, more than 54 kilometers of miniature lights, and 1,655 decorative elements that dazzle both day and night. All of it is powered with a dramatically reduced energy load thanks to the city’s commitment to efficient, sustainable LED technology.

The season’s tallest marvel rises in Parque El Tunal, where Bogotá has erected its highest Christmas tree to date – a shimmering 56-meter-high tower of light with a 20-meter base. Surrounding it, the park becomes a walk-through holiday storybook. More than 1.3 kilometers of illuminated trails lead visitors through a world of giant glowing reindeer, oversized ornaments, a whimsical Santa’s garden, a luminous gift zone, and a charming Postal Navideña designed for festive snapshots.

At night, the park’s central plaza turns into a stage for a 360-degree laser and music show, performed every half hour from December 5 to 28. And this year, two colossal LED matrices – stretching more than 300 meters and totaling 200,000 programmable bulbs – transform the façades of the Palacio Liévano downtown and the Parque El Tunal cultural center, splashing them with color and geometric patterns that ripple like digital brushstrokes.

The Imagined City

The heartbeat of Navidad es Cultura pulses strongest at two iconic venues: Plaza de Bolívar and La Santamaría.

In Plaza de Bolívar, “Una Ciudad Imaginada” steals the show. This high-tech production blends projection mapping, live performance, soundscapes, and more than 50 artists to create a vivid dreamscape. Running December 13–14 and 17–23, the 35-minute performances—three each evening—draw thousands to the capital’s political and cultural heart. Here, Bogotá’s imagined future is cast across historic stone façades, offering a sensory journey through light, architecture, and shared aspiration.

Just a short walk away, Plaza Cultural La Santamaría will host “Más Allá de las Nubes,” a tender 35-minute theatrical piece performed by 80 artists. It tells the poetic story of a young girl and her cat traveling through Bogotá’s neighborhoods – an enchanting family-friendly work that blends dance, acrobatics, immersive staging, and soaring visual elements. With capacity for 10,000 spectators per show, it is one of the season’s most endearing offerings for visitors with children in tow.

Bogotá Belongs to the Night

No Bogotá Christmas is complete without the city’s most beloved holiday tradition: the Ciclovía Nocturna, an annual nighttime cycling celebration when Bogotá hands its streets back to the public.

The edition 48 takes place on Thursday, December 11, from 6 p.m. to midnight, drawing an estimated 2.5 million participants onto 95 kilometers of car-free avenues. Whether you’re pedaling a bike, cruising on a skateboard, or strolling with a cup of hot chocolate, the Ciclovía reveals Bogotá’s electrifying nighttime personality: impromptu music groups, couples on tandem bikes, toddlers being towed in light-strung trailers, and streams of cyclists coasting down Avenida Boyacá or Carrera Séptima under illuminated tunnels of color.

“The Ciclovía is a symbol of Bogotá – of encounter, health, and coexistence,” says IDRD director Daniel García Cañón. This year’s celebration also marks 50 years of Bogotá’s pioneering Ciclovía, now replicated by cities around the world. Fittingly, Bogotá will also host the 15th International Congress of Recreational Ciclovías of the Americas on December 11 and 12, welcoming global leaders for conversations on urban recreation, mobility, and community health.

More than a display of lights, Bogotá’s Christmas season feels like a cultural manifesto—an invitation to imagine a brighter city through shared art, open spaces, and collective celebration. From the sensory wonder of Plaza de Bolívar to the poetic warmth of La Santamaría and the joyful nighttime takeover during Ciclovía Nocturna, Navidad es Cultura positions Bogotá as one of Latin America’s most compelling December destinations.

As Mayor Galán puts it, “I invite everyone to enjoy this year’s Christmas programming and celebrate the end of the year in peace.” This season, Bogotá shines brighter—not only with a constellation of LEDs, but with imagination beyond the clouds.

Colombia has recorded 40,663 homicides during the first three years of President Gustavo Petro’s government, surpassing the totals reported under the administrations of Iván Duque and Juan Manuel Santos, according to a report published Tuesday by the Centro de Paz y Seguridad of Universidad Externado. The report documents killings between August 2022 and August 2025, a period that encompasses Petro’s “Total Peace” agenda with illegal armed groups. According to the data, Colombia registered a 7.59% increase in homicides compared with the same timeframe under Duque, who reported 37,795 cases, while Santos’ second term saw 36,646.

“During the first three years of Gustavo Petro’s administration, violence did not decrease under the banner of ‘Paz Total’. On the contrary, homicides continued to rise,” the study states. Petro’s annual average now stands at 13,554 murders per year, compared with 12,598 under Duque and 12,215 under Santos. Nationally, investigators estimate one person is killed every 39 minutes, a faster rate than during the two previous governments.

The findings, compiled by researchers Andrés González Díaz, Diego Rodríguez Pinzón and Carolina Saldaña, present a wide set of indicators showing the acceleration of lethal violence. Monthly murders during Petro’s term average 1,130 cases — compared with 1,050 under Duque — while daily homicides rose from 34.5 to 37 per day.

The authors also document a territorial reconfiguration of violence. Their analysis identifies rapidly shifting hotspots driven by disputes among armed groups, expanding drug economies and the weakening of state authority in several regions.

The study found the Caribbean region registered the steepest increases, displacing historically violent departments in the southwest. Six departments account for the largest share of the national rise when compared with Duque’s tenure, including Bolívar with 870 homicides, Magdalena: (811), Atlántico: (803) and Santander (530).

Researchers said these spikes coincide with the emergence of new criminal alliances, intensified disputes over drug-trafficking corridors and the collapse of informal ceasefires amid the government’s stalled negotiations with armed groups.

In Catatumbo, one of Colombia’s most unstable border regions, killings rose sharply due to clashes between the National Liberation Army (ELN) and FARC dissidents. “The increase in violence in Norte de Santander — 141 additional homicides — reflects escalating confrontations, particularly in Tibú, Ocaña, El Tarra and Cúcuta,” the report said. Rising attacks on social leaders and former FARC peace signatories further contributed to what analysts describe as an “acute humanitarian risk.”

Bogotá becomes a “critical node”

Despite being the country’s most heavily policed territory, Bogotá recorded one of the most significant increases in homicide volume. Murders rose from 3,198 to 3,427, an increase of 229 cases (7.16%), making the capital the single largest contributor to the regional rise in central Colombia.

The department of Cundinamarca added 139 cases, rising from 1,111 to 1,250 homicides (+12.51%), while Boyacá registered the steepest proportional jump in the region — +17%, from 247 to 289 cases — despite being one of the country’s historically safest departments.

The report concludes that identifying and intervening in these “critical territorial nodes” is essential to reversing the national upward trend. It also adds that the shifting geography of violence reflects a broader proliferation of armed groups and illicit economies fueled by kidnapping, drug trafficking and illegal mining, during Petro’s final months in office.

Before he became Latin America’s most celebrated chef, Álvaro Clavijo spent years doing what few aspiring cooks romantically imagine: scrubbing plates in the basements of Parisian kitchens. He had left Bogotá after a brief, unsatisfying year studying architecture at Los Andes University. In Paris he dabbled in photography, learned impeccable French, and quickly discovered that the underbelly of a culinary capital is more grit than glamour.

But something in the rhythm of kitchens – heat, repetition, precision – anchored him. Despite his mother’s skepticism that he could make a living cooking (“She couldn’t even fry an egg,” he jokes), he enrolled at Barcelona’s prestigious Hofmann School, known for turning students into chefs ready for the academy’s own Michelin-starred restaurant.

Three years in Barcelona, five in France, and still, Colombia tugged at him. Yet just as he considered returning home, another city intervened – New York, home to the temples of modern gastronomy. He landed at Thomas Keller’s Per Se, where the immaculate choreography of haute cuisine shaped him indelibly. “My cooking is French, my ingredients are Colombian, and my organization is American,” he says today, seated in the dining room of El Chato, the Bogotá restaurant that has now been named Latin America’s Best Restaurant 2025 by Latin America’s 50 Best Restaurants.

Clavijo returned to Bogotá in 2013 to open the first incarnation of El Chato in Quinta Camacho. The menu – slow-cooked meats, obsessive technique, and elegant, deeply flavored dishes – won over small but devoted crowds. Still, it was removed from the city’s emerging gastrosphere. When a more neighborhood-friendly house became available in Chapinero Alto, he moved the restaurant, unaware that the next decade would transform it into one of the continent’s most influential kitchens.

Today, El Chato is a study in unpretentious sophistication. The 80-seat dining room blends the familiar with the eccentric: a 1970s rotary telephone, faded high-school portraits, and stacks of old medical encyclopedias donated by friends. Bare brick walls glow under soft lighting. The décor is tongue-in-cheek, but the menu – one page, clean, unfussy –  reveals Clavijo’s philosophy: dining should thrill, not intimidate.

A meal begins with the restaurant’s signature “mule,” part Moscow classic, part tribute to the Colombian countryside’s icon. Infused with herbs and tropical fruits, the drink sets the tone for a night driven by local ingredients elevated through global technique. Upstairs, the kitchen team moves like monks—quiet, deliberate, wholly focused.

Clavijo’s signature dishes have become objects of devotion. A roast lamb, equal parts Boyacá and Provence, is tender, perfumed, and blanketed with a buttery cream sauce. The crab in avocado purée, studded with mango, foraged greens, and blackened-rice chips, is the kind of dish entire essays could be written about. Beef tartare arrives garnished with rose vinaigrette, mini croutons, and kale mayonnaise. Even the lunch menu—Cuban pulled pork sandwiches, bright shrimp buns—shows a level of refinement that belies its casual delivery.

Temperature, he insists, is everything. He pushes heat to its limits, and his meat cuts are never simply slapped onto a grill; they are cured in-house for weeks, allowing “alchemy,” as he calls it, to work. Rarely leaving the kitchen, he has built a culinary identity rooted in mastery of technique and reverence for Colombian produce, from the high Andes wetlands to the Amazon lowlands.

What distinguishes El Chato – and how it ascended from No. 3 in 2024 to No. 1 in 2025 – is its role as an ambassador for Colombian biodiversity. Working closely with small growers and horticulturists in the Sabana de Bogotá, people whose crops rarely reach high-end kitchens, Clavijo’s dishes are not recreations of Colombian cuisine but reinterpretations – rooted in memory, informed by travel, and executed with discipline.

On a typical night, the dining room hums with locals and international travelers alike. Bogotá’s restaurant scene is fiercely competitive; many places don’t survive their first year. El Chato did more than survive. It set a new standard, one that the world has now recognized by awarding it the top spot in Latin America’s 50 Best Restaurants.

For Clavijo, the accolade is gratifying but not defining. The work continues. The flavors deepen. The relationships with farmers strengthen. And every night, in that Chapinero house where mountain meets sea and garden meets homestead, his team quietly reshapes what Colombian cuisine can be.

The 2025 Latin America’s 50 Best list highlighted restaurants from 21 cities, including seven first-time entrants, underscoring the region’s growing culinary diversity. Kjolle in Lima ranked No. 2 and was named Best Restaurant in Peru, while Don Julio in Buenos Aires placed third, securing Best Restaurant in Argentina. Boragó in Santiago took the No. 6 spot, with its chef, Rodolfo Guzmán, receiving the Icon Award for his influence on Chilean cuisine. Quintonil in Mexico City (No. 7) and Tuju in São Paulo (No. 8) were recognized as the best restaurants in Mexico and Brazil respectively.

Cartagena-based Celelé also has an impressive rank among Latin America’s 50 Best, coming in at No.5.

Casa Las Cujas in Santiago, which debuted at No. 14, won the Highest New Entry Award, while Cosme in Lima earned the Highest Climber Award after rising 19 places to No. 9. Nuema in Quito, ranked No. 10 and named Best Restaurant in Ecuador, saw chef Alejandro Chamorro win the peer-voted Estrella Damm Chefs’ Choice Award.

Bianca Mirabili of Evvai in São Paulo (No. 20) was named Latin America’s Best Pastry Chef, and Argentina’s Maximiliano Pérez received the Best Sommelier Award for his wine-driven interpretations of local terroir. Ttássia Magalhães was awarded Latin America’s Best Female Chef for her leadership of an all-women kitchen team in São Paulo.

The awards also recognized national leaders: Maito in Panama City (No. 18), Sublime in Guatemala City (No. 19), Cordero in Caracas (No. 29), and Sikwa in San José (No. 43) were named the best restaurants in their respective countries. Seven new entries joined the 2025 ranking, including Afluente in Bogotá (No. 34), El Mercado in Buenos Aires (No. 27), Arami in La Paz (No. 48), and Demo Magnolia, Yum Cha and Karai by Mitsuharu in Santiago.

Oda in Bogotá received the Sustainable Restaurant Award for its focus on hyper-local sourcing. Additional previously announced prizes included Chef Tita of the Dominican Republic winning the Champions of Change Award, Kjolle receiving the Art of Hospitality Award, and Guatemala’s Ana being named the American Express One To Watch.

In 2017, after El Chato had recently opened its doors to the public, The City Paper profiled the venue and sat down to talk with the young, dynamic chef. The restaurant’s location on Calle 65 No.3B-76 remains the same, and reservations are required.

El Chato: A Bogotá restaurant on par with the very best

Hugo Carvajal Barrios, the former Venezuelan intelligence chief known as “El Pollo,” has issued an explosive letter from a U.S. federal prison alleging that Nicolás Maduro’s government systematically used drug trafficking, criminal gangs, espionage networks, and even electoral technology as tools to undermine the United States. The 10-page statement, addressed to “President Trump and the People of the United States,” asserts that Venezuela’s ruling elite operates as a “narco-terrorist organization” with global reach and explicit anti-American intent.

Carvajal, a three-star general who served as Director of Military Intelligence under both Hugo Chávez and Maduro, writes that he is now “sitting in an American prison because I voluntarily plead guilty to the crimes charged against me: a narco-terrorism conspiracy.” He frames the letter not as a political intervention but as an act of accountability: a decision, he says, to reveal “the full truth so that the United States can protect itself from the dangers witnessed for so many years.”

Having broken publicly with the Maduro government in 2017, Carvajal fled Venezuela and was later extradited to the United States. He insists that even as he knew he faced prosecution, he acted “with the strongest conviction to dismantle Maduro’s criminal regime and bring freedom to my country.” Today, he writes, he believes it is essential to warn Americans about “the reality of what the Venezuelan regime truly is and why President Trump’s policies are not only correct, but absolutely necessary to the United States’ national security.”

Maduro and Cabello of Direct “Narco-Terrorism”

Carvajal accuses Maduro and ruling party strongman Diosdado Cabello of transforming the Venezuelan state into a criminal consortium dedicated to drug trafficking. “I personally witnessed how Hugo Chávez’s government became a criminal organization that is now run by Nicolás Maduro, Diosdado Cabello, and other senior regime officials,” he states. The purpose of this network—known internationally as the Cartel de los Soles—was, he claims, “to weaponize drugs against the United States.”

He maintains that narcotrafficking operations facilitated by Venezuela were not the result of corruption or rogue actors. “The drugs that reached your cities through new routes were not accidents… they were deliberate policies coordinated by the Venezuelan regime against the United States,” he writes. According to Carvajal, the strategy “was suggested by the Cuban regime to Chávez in the mid-2000s” and relied on cooperation from the FARC, ELN, Cuban intelligence agencies, and “Hezbollah.” The regime, he adds, supplied “weapons, passports, and impunity” to these groups.

Carvajal devotes a significant portion of the letter to the evolution of the Venezuelan criminal super-gang Tren de Aragua, now considered one of Latin America’s most rapidly expanding transnational crime networks. He claims he personally witnessed its origins inside Venezuelan prisons.

“I was present when decisions were made to organize and weaponize criminal gangs across Venezuela to protect the regime—among them the group known as Tren de Aragua,” he writes. Chávez, he claims, ordered the recruitment of gang leaders “to defend the revolution in exchange for impunity,” while Maduro later expanded the strategy by “exporting criminality and chaos abroad.”

Carvajal alleges that “thousands of members” of the gang were sent out of Venezuela through coordination among the Ministries of Interior and Prisons, the National Guard, and national police forces. He claims the outflow accelerated when “the Biden-Harris open-border policy became widely known,” asserting that Tren de Aragua “seized the opportunity to send these operatives into the United States.”

“They now have obedient, armed personnel on American soil,” he writes, alleging that the gang was ordered to continue “kidnapping, extorting, and killing” as a means of financing itself abroad.

Russian and Cuban Intelligence Behind Spy Networks

Carvajal goes on to detail alleged espionage operations linked to both Russian and Cuban intelligence services. He claims Russian operatives approached Chávez with a plan to tap submarine internet cables linking South America and the Caribbean to the United States – purportedly to intercept U.S. government communications.

He also recounts warning Maduro in 2015 that allowing Russia to build a listening post on La Orchila Island “would one day invite American bombs,” a warning he says was ignored.

According to Carvajal, Venezuela and Cuba also sent operatives into the United States. “For twenty years, the Venezuelan regime sent spies into your country – many are still there, some disguised as members of the Venezuelan opposition,” he writes. Cuban intelligence, he claims, “bragged about having sent thousands of spies over decades, some now career politicians.” Most sensationally, he asserts: “U.S. diplomats and CIA officers were paid to assist Chávez and Maduro… and some remain active to this day.”

Carvajal also revives allegations about the voting-technology company Smartmatic. “The Smartmatic system can be altered—this is a fact,” he writes, claiming he oversaw the placement of the official responsible for information systems at Venezuela’s electoral authority. While he stops short of alleging that U.S. elections were stolen, he asserts that “elections can be rigged with the software and has been used to do so.”

“The Regime Is at War With You”

Carvajal concludes with a sweeping warning to the United States. “Make no mistake about the threat posed by allowing a narco-terrorist organization to roam freely in the Caribbean,” he writes. “The regime I served is not merely hostile—it is at war with you.” He reiterates his support for Trump’s stance on Venezuela, writing: “I absolutely support President Trump’s policy… because it is in self-defense and he is acting based on the truth.”

Colombia’s Transport Minister María Fernanda Rojas said on Monday that Avianca is close to completing mandatory software updates on its Airbus A320 fleet, with only 19 aircraft still pending intervention after a week of global disruptions triggered by what aviation experts describe as the largest recall in Airbus’s 55-year history.

The grounding forced airlines across several continents to halt operations, rebook thousands of passengers, and reconfigure flight schedules during one of the busiest travel periods of the year.

According to Aerocivil, Colombia’s Civil Aviation Authority, 102 of Avianca’s 124 grounded A320 aircraft are now back in service following an accelerated technical effort led in coordination with Airbus technicians. The remaining aircraft are expected to be updated within three days at Avianca’s main maintenance base at Rionegro, Antioquia. Authorities fast-tracked the import of 10 additional software units from France after Colombian regulators, the Ministry of Transport, and the tax agency DIAN jointly cleared an emergency customs process over the weekend.

Latam Airlines and JetSMART, the two other carriers in Colombia operating affected A320s  have already completed updates on their six combined jets. The minister said the rapid turnaround reflects “an unprecedented level of coordination” between airlines, regulators and Airbus engineers, who were deployed across several countries to help implement the corrective measures.

Globally, airlines said operations were returning to normal on Monday, after the grounding struck at a sensitive time for the global aviation industry. The Airbus A320, which only weeks ago overtook the Boeing 737 as history’s most-delivered jetliner, also faces long-term maintenance bottlenecks that have left hundreds of aircraft parked and waiting for parts under the pressure of post-pandemic demand.

The crisis also hit Airbus at a moment when the European manufacturer was stepping up efforts to meet its year-end delivery targets. Signals of lower-than-expected deliveries for November have already rattled investors, and the grounding added further uncertainty to an already tight production schedule. Shares of major Airbus customers — including Lufthansa and easyJet — fell on Monday amid concerns that delivery timelines could slip further. According to Reuters several deliveries have already been impacted, though the extent and duration remain unclear; one industry insider estimated around 50 aircraft could face delays.

Adding to Airbus’s challenges, the company on Monday confirmed a separate quality issue involving metal fuselage panels on a “limited number” of A320 aircraft. While the defect does not pose an immediate safety risk, Airbus said it is taking a “conservative approach” by inspecting all aircraft that could potentially be affected. The announcement sent Airbus shares tumbling as much as 6% during early trading, heightening market anxiety already fueled by the software crisis and flight disruptions.

The initial software alert was triggered after Airbus analyzed data from a recent in-flight incident and concluded that intense solar radiation under certain conditions could corrupt data linked to the aircraft’s flight-control computers. The disruptions rippled across major hubs in Latin America and the United States, coinciding with the U.S. Thanksgiving travel weekend, one of the busiest periods of the year.

Delta and American Airlines were forced to delay or cancel flights as dozens of A320 jets were pulled from service for urgent inspections. “Airbus apologises for any challenges and delays caused to passengers and airlines by this event,” the manufacturer said in a statement.

For Colombia’s flagship carrier and one of the world’s largest A320 operators, the near-completion of the updates marks a significant recovery after days of cancellations, rebookings and schedule reshuffling. The airline will reopen ticket sales on December 5 as its domestic and international network returns to full capacity and the remaining 19 jets are certified to fly.

Senator Iván Cepeda of the ruling Historic Pact coalition has emerged as the early front-runner in Colombia’s 2026 presidential race, according to a nationwide Invamer poll released Sunday by Caracol TV and Blu Radio. The survey – the first major measurement since the lifting of Colombia’s recent polling restrictions – places the left-wing candidate at 31.9% of voting intention, six months ahead of the first round.

The results position Cepeda well ahead of candidate Abelardo de la Espriella of Defensores de la Patria, who received 18.2%, and independent centrist Sergio Fajardo, who registered 8.5%. Miguel Uribe Londoño, running for the leadership of  President Álvaro Uribe Vélez’s Centro Democrático party, follows with 4.2%. Uribe Londoño is the father of Senator Miguel Uribe Turbay, victim of an assassination attempt on June 7, and who died two months later at the Santa Fe Hospital in Bogotá.

The findings come amid broad public dissatisfaction with the country’s direction and with the administration of President Gustavo Petro, who leaves office on August 7, 2026. According to the poll, 56% of respondents disapprove of Petro’s administration, while 37% approve. Although disapproval has dipped slightly from previous months, nearly six in ten Colombians remain critical of the government. National sentiment is similarly pessimistic: 59.8% believe Colombia is “on the wrong track,” compared with 34.4% who feel otherwise.

Internal security stands out as the leading concern. Asked whether Petro’s “Total Peace” policy had made them feel safer, 66.2% claim it made them feel more insecure. Nearly 65% believe the initiative is moving in the “wrong direction”, and 73% say the government has lost territorial control to illegal armed groups. Only 20% expressed confidence in the government’s peace and security approach.

The Invamer survey, conducted between November 15 and 27 among 3,800 respondents in 148 municipalities, does not include public reaction to the latest scandal involving alleged infiltration of state institutions by FARC dissidents. The poll has a 1.81% margin of error and a 95% confidence level.

Cepeda’s lead reflects firm support among left-leaning voters and measurable gains among independents and left-leaning centrists. Though only 24% of those polled identified themselves as “left-wing”, the senator’s 31.9% support suggests he is drawing backing among younger voters. He also carries a relatively high rejection rate: 23.9% said they would “never” vote for him.

The survey challenges the perception that Cepeda lacks room to grow beyond the left, even as 50% expressed that they would prefer to vote for a candidate opposed to Petro. Analysts believe the Historic Pact’s decision to hold its internal consultation last month helped consolidate support within the coalition and gave Cepeda a strategic advantage.

Despite his lead, Cepeda could face voter rejection should Petro’s disapproval ratings continue to climb. The candidate’s current negative rating is among the highest of any public figure, and his pro-Petro agenda on security, economy, and U.S relations could push the center closer to the moderate right. Still, the poll indicates Cepeda would win a runoff against De la Espriella with a wide margin, but face a “technical tie” with the mathematician and former Governor of Antioquia.

De la Espriella, meanwhile, has quickly consolidated the anti-Petro vote, emerging as a “dark horse” at the extreme right of the spectrum. Once absent from early electoral projections, the lawyer now surpasses established Centro Democrático politicians – including senators María Fernanda Cabal, Paola Holguín, and Paloma Valencia.

Former defense minister under President Juan Manuel Santos and ex-Ambassador to Washinton, Juan Carlos Pinzón, is in seventh place (2,9%), but these early numbers are likely to increase, given that he maintains a close relationship with three ideological camps (Centro Democrático, La U, Cambio Radical) represented in Presidents Uribe and Juan Manuel Santos, and German Vargás Lleras.

 Even though the poll found that 63% of eligible voters know who De la Espriella is, there is room for continued growth for the five candidates who marked above 2% in the poll, among them, Vargas Lleras in fifth place (2.1%).

The centrist bloc, historically influential in Colombian politics, appears fragmented. Fajardo, once considered a reliable alternative to both left and right, no longer polls in double digits. While he maintains a lower rejection rate than most rivals and doubles the numbers of former Bogotá mayor Claudia López (4.1%), analysts say the proliferation of centrist candidates could dilute Fajardo’s base. Combined, these candidates would outpace De la Espriella’s support, but the numbers suggest this does not translate into a cohesive electoral force.

Foreign policy is also shaping voter priorities. A large majority – 78% – said maintaining strong relations with the United States is essential for the next administration. Respondents widely rejected Petro’s decision to use a megaphone in New York to urge U.S. soldiers not to follow orders from former President Donald Trump; 78% disapproved of the act, even though half of respondents hold an unfavorable view of Trump.

President Petro reacted to the poll on social media, framing the electoral landscape as a struggle between entrenched elites and what he described as a “powerful people” seeking to reclaim the state. Referring implicitly to Uribe and Fajardo, the president said Colombia must reject “mafioso elites” and work toward a “free and educated” society.

The Centro Democrático announced it will conduct an internal vote among more than 4,000 active party members to select two candidates for a March 2026 primary. The contenders are senators Cabal, Holguín, and Valencia, and Miguel Uribe Londoño.

With six months until the first round on May 31, 2026, the Invamer poll highlights a polarized electorate, deep concerns over security and corruption, and an early advantage for the ruling coalition’s candidate — with substantial uncertainty and new political alignments spearheaded by former presidents, especially Álvaro Uribe.

Colombia’s flagship carrier, Avianca, announced Friday it has grounded more than 70% of its Airbus A320 fleet after the European manufacturer issued an urgent global bulletin ordering operators to carry out immediate software updates to prevent potential flight-control failures.

The disruption, one of the most severe to hit the airline in years, comes as Airbus launched one of the largest fleet-wide recalls in its history, affecting some 6,000 A320 commercial aircraft worldwide — more than half of the global fleet. The A320 is the world’s most widely used single-aisle airliner and the backbone of Avianca’s operations across Latin America and to U.S and Canadian hubs.

There are around 11,300 A320 jets in operation in total.

In a statement, Avianca said Airbus notified operators on November 28 that a significant portion of A320 require a mandatory software modification. The update, which Airbus described as reverting to an earlier software version, must be applied before affected aircraft can resume flights, except for ferry operations to maintenance bases.

“As soon as the aircraft reach their maintenance bases, they must remain on the ground until the updates are completed,” Avianca said. “This order affects more than 70% of Avianca’s fleet.”

The airline warned that the grounding will trigger significant operational disruptions over the next 10 days as engineers work to install the update across its aircraft. To limit further complications and manage passenger flow, Avianca has temporarily closed ticket sales for travel dates through December 8 — an extraordinary measure taken to “reorganize its capacity and re-accommodate passengers on available flights.”

Customers with upcoming reservations will receive direct notifications from the airline detailing their travel options.

The update requirement has already led to cascading delays and cancellations across several regions. Reuters reported that, at the time Airbus issued its notice to more than 350 operators, roughly 3,000 A320 aircraft were airborne. Airlines in the United States, Europe, South America, India and New Zealand said the repairs could trigger operational disruption during one of the busiest travel weeks of the year.

American Airlines, the world’s largest operator of the A320 family, said about 340 of its 480 aircraft require the fix. The carrier expects the majority of updates to be completed by Saturday, estimating about two hours of work per jet. Delta Airlines said updates to a small portion of its Airbus A320 planes will likely be completed by Saturday morning, a spokesperson said.

Avianca, however, expects the impact to last longer given the scale of its grounded fleet in Latin America and the limited availability of maintenance slots at Bogotá’s El Dorado International Airport.

The airline said its priority is passenger and crew safety and that it is working “as quickly as possible” to complete the mandatory modifications and restore normal operations.

To mitigate the fallout, Avianca is offering several options to affected passengers:

• Rebooking on the nearest available Avianca flight or on partner airlines with which it has commercial agreements.

• Flexible changes, allowing travelers to reschedule without penalty fees or fare differences, subject to availability, for up to 180 days after the original travel date.

• Refunds for unused flight segments through the airline’s website, call center, sales offices or travel agencies.

Avianca urged customers not to go to the airport unless their flight has been confirmed and to closely monitor email notifications associated with their reservation, as well as updates on its official channels.

Despite the scale of the disruption, the airline said the swift grounding demonstrates its commitment to safety while complying with Airbus’ unprecedented directive.

“The priority of Avianca is to ensure the safety of our passengers and crew,” the company said, adding that it aims to complete the required modifications as soon as possible to “minimize service disruptions.”

The Teatro Mayor Julio Mario Santo Domingo has unveiled its 2026 programme, outlining 116 productions and 178 performances across opera, dance, theatre, music, circus and family shows. The announcement reinforces the theatre’s role as one of Bogotá’s leading cultural institutions, bringing national and international artists to audiences across the capital.

A highlight of the year will be the focus on Germany as Guest Country of Honor, with six events in music and dance that reflect that nation’s contemporary artistic landscape. The most anticipated is the arrival of the Berlin Philharmonic, which will perform in Colombia for the first time in its 186-year history. Led by Kirill Petrenko, the orchestra will offer two October concerts – its first appearance in South America in more than 25 years.

The 2026 lyric season builds on collaborations forged with cultural institutions in Colombia, Spain and Latin America, among them Madrid’s Teatro de la Zarzuela, Fundación Juan March, the Orquesta Sinfónica Nacional de Colombia, Coro Nacional de Colombia and the Orquesta Filarmónica de Bogotá.

The season includes new stagings of Wagner’s The Flying Dutchman (El holandés errante), directed musically by Stefan Lano and scenically by Marcelo Lombardero, and Puccini’s La bohème, conducted by Andrés Orozco Estrada with stage direction by Pedro Salazar. The zarzuelas La tabernera del puerto and El Vizconde will also be presented.

Audiences can expect landmark choral works: Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony, Bach’s St. Matthew Passion, Mahler’s Resurrection Symphony, and Furioso, a musical exploration of the mythical figure Orlando performed by countertenor Xavier Sabata and French ensemble Le Concert de l’Hostel Dieu.

The programming in dance, theatre and circus highlights companies working at the forefront of contemporary creation. The Budapest-based dance troupe Recirquel returns with Paradisum, while international dance companies – including Germany’s tanzmainz, Australia’s Sydney Dance Company, the Ballet Español de la Comunidad de Madrid, the Ballet Folclórico de la Universidad de Guadalajara and Chile’s Ballet Municipal de Santiago – offer a unique slate of choreographic perspectives. The latter will perform Swan Lake.

The theatre lineup brings Spanish award-winning works such as El Monstre by Josep María Miró and En mitad de tanto fuego by Alberto Conejero. Colombian companies including La Quinta del Lobo, Grupo Móvil Flotante and La Casa de Atrás will present co-productions with the theatre. 2026 will also see the premiere of Destinitos fatales, Sandro Romero Rey’s tribute to writer Andrés Caicedo ahead of the 50th anniversary of his death in 2027.

Teatro Mayor will again take part in the programming of the Festival Internacional de Artes Vivas – FIAV Bogotá during Holy Week, strengthening its links with the city’s broader cultural calendar.

In its commitment to showcasing Colombia’s artistic diversity, Teatro Mayor will host the launch events of several major national festivals, including the Festival de la Leyenda Vallenata, the Festival de Música del Pacífico Petronio Álvarez and the Festival de Música Andina “Mono Núñez.” International series such as the Festival de Fado, featuring Camané and Sara Correia, and Tango al Mayor, which will include concerts, masterclasses and a grand milonga, will complement the season.

Public-focused programmes – Teatro Digital and Cien Mil Niños al Mayor – will remain active throughout the year, expanding free access for students and encouraging arts accessibility across the nation’s capital.

Teatro Mayor operates as a public-private partnership and with its 2026 programme, reaffirms its role as a key cultural platform for Bogotá – one that connects local audiences with a broad spectrum of artistic expressions from Colombia and around the world.

The Puracé volcano in southwest Colombia has registered a noticeable uptick in seismic and gas-emission activity over the last 24-hours, prompting authorities to maintain heightened monitoring of one of the country’s most active volcanic systems.

The Colombian Geological Service, known as the SGC, said the latest measurements indicate an increase in seismic signals associated with the movement of fluids beneath the crater. Those signals — including continuous volcanic tremor and distinct long-period events — are typically generated as gases, hot water or small amounts of magma shift through fractures inside the volcanic edifice.

The changes have been visible at the surface. According to a bulletin released by the agency, the volcano has produced columns of gas reaching up to 1.6 kilometers, drifting mostly toward the southwest, sometimes carrying small quantities of ash. While limited in scope, those ash emissions qualify technically as minor eruptions.

Cristian Santacoloma, a volcanologist at the Popayán Volcanological and Seismological Observatory, said the most significant variations occurred on Tuesday, November 25. “We have seen an increase in the constant flow of gases to the surface,” he said, noting that the greyish plume observed during the morning hours contained particulate material consistent with ash. The tremor signals, he added, point to “sustained mobility of fluids within the volcano.”

The Puracé’s summit reaches 4,650 meters (15,256 feet) and sits at the northern end of the Los Coconucos volcanic chain, a line of 15 eruptive centers aligned across the highland terrain of the department of Cauca. Its structure includes two concentric craters and an active fumarolic field on the northern flank known as the Fumarola Lateral. Much of its surface is stained yellow and white from chemical deposits carried by persistent gas discharges.

The region surrounding Puracé is shaped by a long geological history: the volcano rests on an older formation known as Pre-Puracé, which itself developed along the rim of the ancient Chagartón caldera. Its eruptive products include layers of pyroclastic material and andesitic lava flows — evidence of repeated cycles of explosive and effusive activity.

The volcano remains under a Yellow Alert, a mid-tier warning that indicates changes in activity but no immediate threat to surrounding communities. In this state, specialists say, Puracé may produce sporadic ash emissions, small explosions inside the crater, localized sulfur precipitation and, under certain conditions, minor lahars.

The SGC has maintained continuous monitoring of the volcano since 1986. In recent years, its surveillance network has expanded to 32 stations equipped with 65 sensors measuring seismicity, ground deformation, gas composition, temperature and other variables that help scientists detect early signs of escalation.

Authorities have urged residents of Popayán, the departmental capital of Cauca, as well as nearby Indigenous and rural communities to follow official updates and respect any restrictions put in place by park administrators or the National Disaster-Risk Agency (UNGRD). While the current activity is not unusual for Puracé, experts say that sustained changes in seismic patterns requires careful attention.

President Gustavo Petro is confronting explosive accusations of treason and complicity after a Noticias Caracol investigative report revealed alleged channels of communication and the transfer of highly classified military intelligence from the Armed Forces to FARC dissidents led by alias Calarcá. The report broadcast on Sunday has plunged the leftist administration into political turmoil and prompted immediate demands for congressional and judicial action.

Caracol’s year-long investigation is grounded in over 100 digital files from seized computers, cellphones, and encrypted chats, as well as damning testimony from Calarcá himself. According to the news outlet, the documents contain references to sensitive military information, including operational details and warnings about troop movements, that dissident commanders allegedly received from contacts inside state institutions. Noticias Caracol also included the video testimony from Calarcá who described President Petro as an “ally.”

The broadcast identified two senior figures repeatedly named in the seized material: General Juan Miguel Huertas, head of the Army’s personnel command, and Wilmar Mejía, a senior official of the National Intelligence Directorate (DNI). General Huertas was reinstated by President Petro in July this year, and Mejía, is a former member of the M-19 guerrilla. According to Caracol, the dissident files portray those officials as conduits through which intelligence moved from the state to the armed group. The report further alleges that, on multiple occasions, official vehicles were used to transport members of the dissident organization away from military pressure.

Caracol reported that the Fiscalía General de la Nación has had custody of the seized technical evidence since July 2024, after a convoy carrying seven dissident members, including Calarcá himself, was detained at a military check-point near Medellín, Antioquia. The convoy was being escorted by personnel from the National Protection Unit (UNP) and was carrying a chache of weapons, cash as well as an under-age combatant. Days after the incident, President Petro named Calarcá a “peace envoy” and secured his release. Despite the material that became part of an investigation by the Attorney General’s Office into collusion between the UNP and FARC dissidents,  Caracol claims, the Fiscalía has not initiatated any judicial actions prior to Sunday’s broadcast.

Noticias Caracol also tied Calarcá’s structure to high-impact attacks against the Colombian state. The dissident commander is identified by investigators as the mastermind behind the downing of a U.S-manufactured ‘Black Hawk’ helicopter in Amalfi, Antioquia, on October 21. The attack with an improvised drone resulted in 13 members of the National Police killed, and marked one of the most serious blows against counter-narcotics operations in the department. According to Caracol, the internal files seized from the guerrilla include references to preparations and communications surrounding the assault.

The dissident FARC commander is also considered one of the intellectual authors behind the June 7 assassination of presidential candidate Miguel Uribe Turbay, attack that shook the national political landscape and remains under investigation.

The investigation further highlights that communications between Calarcá and goverment officials referenced plans to create front companies modeled after the Convivir self-defense groups, and document the visit of a Chinese businessman to guerrilla camps in Catatumbo to discuss weapons fabrication and illegal gold-mining ventures. Caracol presented these elements as part of the dissidents’ own internal operational planning.

The revelations have been widely framed as proof of a deep institutional failures and evidence of a political strategy that has benefited the expansion of illegal armed groups. Opposition leaders claim that the files show deep state-level penetration by dissidents and security breaches that have put the lives of Colombia’s soldiers and police at extreme risk.

Within hours of the report, public condemnations were immediate and forceful. Former FARC hostage and presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt issued a statement demanding urgent action: “Congress must prosecute Petro now. Treason against the homeland is the greatest crime of a president. The congressmen are prevaricating by not doing so. The Supreme Court of Justice must act now. Our democracy is in maximum danger. Our army must refrain from obeying the criminals who have taken over the presidency and the Attorney General’s Office. Petro must leave now.”

Senator María Fernanda Cabal of the Centro Democrático party announced she would file a formal complaint with the House Accusations Committee. “Gustavo Petro must be held accountable before the justice system. I will file a formal complaint with the House Accusations Committee so that it investigates the alleged support from the FARC for his presidential campaign, revealed by Noticias Caracol, as well as the infiltration by alias ‘Calarcá’ into the Military Forces and the DNI,” she said.

President Petro — along with other senior government officials implicated in the scandal, including Vice President Francia Márquez — has not issued an official statement responding to Caracol’s core claims: that dissident commanders received classified military intelligence; that state resources and official vehicles were used to assist dissident mobility; and that high-level officials were named in internal dissident files as intermediaries.

As judicial authorities face growing pressure to respond, and Congress confronts calls to open formal proceedings against President Petro, the nation is entering what analysts describe as one of the most serious confrontations between civilian authority and the military-intelligence establishment in decades. The fallout from Caracol’s disclosures is widening rapidly, and for now, Petro’s silence can only cement the government’s complicity with illegal armed groups financed by drug trafficking. And proof that the U.S administration of President Donald Trump claims to have by adding Petro and close family members to the so-called ‘Clinton List’.

Colombian authorities have rescued 17 minors belonging to Lev Tahor, an ultra-Orthodox Jewish sect widely accused across several countries of child abuse, forced marriage, kidnapping and extreme coercive control. The operation — carried out by Migración Colombia in coordination with the Army’s Gaula Militar — was triggered by international alerts and concerns that the group may have been attempting to establish a new enclave inside Colombia.

Officials intervened in a hotel in the northern municipality of Yarumal after receiving intelligence reports about the presence of foreign minors linked to Lev Tahor. The hotel operation allowed officers to verify the identity and migration status of 26 people, including 17 children from the United States, Guatemala, Canada and other countries. Five of the minors had active Interpol “yellow notices,” issued when a child is reported missing or potentially at risk of crimes such as trafficking or kidnapping.

Authorities said that seven families associated with the sect had arrived in Colombia on October 22 and 23 on flights from New York City. Sister agencies abroad had previously warned Colombian counterparts about possible movements of Lev Tahor members due to ongoing investigations in other jurisdictions. Some members of the group’s leadership have prior convictions in the United States for kidnapping and the sexual exploitation of minors. There are also long-standing allegations from Guatemala of enforced pregnancies, mistreatment of minors and rape inside the community.

According to Colombian investigators, one working hypothesis is that the families may have been seeking to establish a new settlement in rural Colombia. The group has a history of sudden, secretive migrations to avoid scrutiny from foreign governments. Lev Tahor communities, estimated at around 50 families worldwide, have lived in the United States, Canada, Guatemala and Mexico, often leaving abruptly when law-enforcement pressure escalates.

Authorities emphasized that the primary goal of the operation was to protect the children and clarify their situation. The minors were transported to Migración Colombia’s Service Center in Medellín, where they spent the night under continuous supervision. Officials from the Colombian Family Welfare Institute (ICBF), child-protection attorneys and multidisciplinary teams of psychologists, social workers and medical professionals were deployed to guarantee a comprehensive assessment of the children’s well-being.

“All of our actions were guided by an absolute commitment to safeguard the rights of these boys, girls and adolescents,” said Gloria Esperanza Arriero, Director General of Migración Colombia. “This was a preventative and coordinated intervention. Our priority is to determine whether these minors were victims of abuse, coercion, or human trafficking under the guise of religious activity.”

Local and international investigators are now examining evidence to determine whether any of the minors were taken from their home countries illegally. Some preliminary findings suggest that at least a few of the children may have been transported across borders without full parental consent or in violation of court orders, raising the possibility of a trafficking scheme.

The Lev Tahor sect – founded in the 1980s – is known for its rigid, isolationist doctrine and its strict dress codes for women, who are required to wear black, head-to-toe garments. Members live in tightly controlled communities overseen by male leaders and bound by strict obedience norms. Over the past decade, authorities in Canada, the United States, Guatemala and Mexico have repeatedly intervened amid accusations of forced underage marriages, psychological abuse and extreme discipline practices.

In December 2024, Guatemalan authorities rescued 160 minors from a Lev Tahor-occupied farm after receiving reports of forced pregnancies and sexual violence. A year earlier, Mexican police dismantled a compound near the Guatemalan border, removing women and children and arresting at least one leader. And in 2021, two senior members of the group were convicted in New York for kidnapping children and attempting to force a 14-year-old girl back into an illegal sexual relationship with an adult man.

Colombian authorities say they are now collaborating with Interpol, foreign embassies, child-protection agencies, the Attorney General’s Office and the Gaula Militar to fully determine the legal status of the rescued minors, ensure they are not returned to dangerous environments and rule out any signs of human trafficking.

“Protection comes first,” Migración Colombia said in a statement. “We will use every institutional mechanism available to guarantee the safety of these children.”