President Gustavo Petro recalls Colombia’s ambassador and signals a potential withdrawal from the Andean Community of Nations (CAN)

Ecuador’s government announced an increase in the so-called “security tariff” applied to imports from Colombia, raising it from 50% to 100%, a move that has intensified trade tensions between the two countries.

In response, the Colombian government, through its Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism, said it will match Ecuador’s measure by adjusting its tariffs to the same level, arguing the need to “maintain balance in bilateral trade conditions.”

The Ecuadorian decision was formalized through a resolution issued by the National Customs Service of Ecuador (Servicio Nacional de Aduana del Ecuador), which establishes that the new tariff will take effect on May 1, 2026.

According to Ecuador’s government, led by President Daniel Noboa, the measure is driven by concerns over border security. In an official statement, authorities said that “after confirming the lack of implementation of concrete and effective border security measures by Colombia, Ecuador is obliged to adopt sovereign actions.”

Colombia’s response and diplomatic measures

Amid the escalation, President Gustavo Petro announced immediate diplomatic actions, including recalling Colombia’s ambassador to Ecuador, María Antonia Velasco, whom he said “must return immediately” to Colombia. He also stated that “the next cabinet meeting will be held at a location along the border with Ecuador,” in a message posted on X.

Petro also criticized statements from Ecuador’s government, saying that “the president of Ecuador insults the Colombian government, which has seized more cocaine than at any point in world history.”

For her part, Minister of Commerce, Industry and Tourism, Diana Marcela Morales Rojas said Colombia “had maintained open diplomatic channels prior to Ecuador’s decision.”

“We have exhausted all diplomatic efforts and kept dialogue channels open with the Government of Ecuador, seeking a solution that benefits both countries, businesses, and above all, communities on both sides of the border. However, we have not received a positive response,” she said in a statement.

Economic impact and trade response

Colombia’s government, led by the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism, also announced it will amend Decree 170 to raise tariffs to 100%, in line with Ecuador’s measure. The proposal will be submitted to the Committee on Customs, Tariff and Foreign Trade Affairs (Triple A) for review, meaning that details and the effective date of the increase have yet to be determined.

According to the statement, Ecuador’s tariff hike distorts competitive conditions in the Andean market, negatively affecting Colombian producers competing with Ecuadorian goods.

The government also announced relief measures aimed at mitigating the impact on the productive sector, including favorable credit lines, expanded access to financing, and mechanisms to preserve employment.

Political escalation and questions over the Andean system

Amid the growing trade dispute, President Petro also signaled a potential shift in Colombia’s economic foreign policy, stating that Ecuador’s actions “mark the end of the Andean Pact for Colombia.”

“We have nothing left to do there. The foreign minister must begin the process of joining Mercosur as a full member and redirect our efforts toward the Caribbean and Central America,” he said.

The Andean Pact, also known as the Andean Community of Nations (CAN), established in 1969 by Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia, has historically been a cornerstone of regional economic integration.

Both governments have filed formal complaints with the CAN, which will assess the admissibility of the claims and may mediate the dispute.

More information on the trade dispute between Colombia and Ecuador? Read Trade War Between Colombia And Ecuador Escalates, With 50% Tariffs Threatened by Finance Colombia.

Above photo: President Gustavo Petro of Colombia with President Daniel Noboa of Ecuador (photo courtesy Presidencia of Ecuador)

Former Foreign Minister Álvaro Leyva releases another scathing attack on his former boss as he fights charges.

On April 10, former Colombian Foreign Minister Álvaro Leyva Durán released a formal statement responding to his indictment by the Fiscalía General de la Nación. Leyva faces charges related to his 2023 decision to declare a passport procurement tender void, a process that involved the private security printing firm Thomas Greg & Sons. The former official characterized the legal proceedings as a politically motivated maneuver orchestrated from the Casa de Nariño.

The indictment for prevarication centers on Leyva’s intervention in the bidding process, which the Fiscalía interprets as a deliberate breach of administrative law. In his defense, Leyva maintained that his actions were necessary to address irregularities and ensure the application of the Constitución Política de Colombia. He argued that the prosecuting body’s thesis would criminalize the conduct of any public servant who identifies unconstitutional terms in a government contract.

“If that argument is accepted, then any official who declares a bidding process void because they find the terms and conditions unconstitutional or illegal should go to jail.” — Álvaro Leyva Durán, former Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Leyva also directed accusations toward his successor at the Cancillería, Luis Gilberto Murillo. According to the statement, Murillo suspended a subsequent legal bidding process to justify a state of emergency, which Leyva claims led to an unnecessary markup of approximately $30 billion COP. Furthermore, Leyva alleged that software contracts exceeding $10 billion COP were improperly managed and that the funds remain unaccounted for under the current administration.

The former minister’s statement included severe personal and political criticisms of President Gustavo Petro. Leyva alleged a lack of moral conduct by the head of state during international state visits and questioned the president’s sobriety in public settings. The letter further asserted that US authorities are currently investigating potential links between the executive branch and narcotics trafficking organizations.

Regarding the domestic political landscape, Leyva warned of perceived risks to the Colombian electoral process. He alleged that the administration has engaged in the illegal interception of political candidates and intends to undermine the integrity of future vote counts. Leyva concluded by affirming his intention to defend his record and his legal decisions before the Corte Suprema de Justicia.

COMUNICADO pic.twitter.com/7YYhoHJD4B

— Álvaro Leyva Durán (@AlvaroLeyva) April 10, 2026

Finance Colombia translation of Leyva’s recent open letter dated April 10th

Some time ago, I denounced in a public communiqué that Gustavo Petro had woven against me an atrocious persecution, as retaliation for my denunciations of his closeness to the world of drugs—denunciations that have led to the United States having him cornered today. There I warned that, from within the government, intrigues were being made to throw me in prison and that attempts would be made against my life.

Now, months later, the Attorney General’s Office accuses me of malfeasance (prevaricato) because I declared void a passport tender that, according to that same institution, was based on a “catch-all specifications document” (pliego sastre). For the accusing entity, I should not have fulfilled the obligation of applying the Constitution that I myself helped draft and, by seeking equality, I acted with malicious intent. The world turned upside down.

Understand the gravity: if that thesis is accepted, any official who declares a tender void because they find unconstitutional or illegal specifications must go to prison. So, faced with such a thing, the trial is welcome. I will give the battle in the Supreme Court with all my strength. Because I trust its magistrates, because my life has been a permanent struggle for Colombia, and because justice, reason, and the law are with me.

The acquittal will be the logical consequence of the process in which I will prove, with official documents and among other things, the following: that I left in motion a new, clean, and legal tender, which Minister Luis Gilberto Murillo suspended. That he thus justified another manifest urgency, completely unnecessary, and added an overcharge of nearly 30 billion pesos to it. And that he contracted software for more than 10 billion additional pesos, which was pocketed. All by hand-picking. All murky. All without control. Thus, by brute force, the door was opened to the passport debacle of today. I warned Petro of what was coming down on the country. But he kept silent.

Today I feel the pride of having helped unmask the boss of the mafia that has plunged Colombia into its darkest hours. I took office as his Foreign Minister with the hope of change. But then I came to know his life of vice and decadence. I was slow to understand his vileness and, surely, also slow to denounce it. But from my father Jorge Leyva Urdaneta, exiled for opposing the dictatorship, I inherited courage and respect for institutions; from Álvaro Gómez Hurtado, I learned the necessity of a just order; and from Misael Pastrana Borrero, I learned to think about social peace. So, faithful to myself and to the spirit of my mentors, I denounced in various letters the moral, political, and personal degeneration that I came to know in Gustavo Petro. And time has proven me right.

The President is an infamous being: international human trafficking is a scourge of the poor girls of Colombia, and he, in the middle of a state visit, ends up as a customer of a brothel in Lisbon; he claims to be a champion of peace, but full of hatred he violently divides society with his stale, classist, and racist rhetoric; he claims to fight drug trafficking, but he goes out into the public square drugged, drunk on alcohol and sectarianism, to mistreat and insult those who contradict him, while in the United States his ties to narcos are being investigated. And so, from scandal to scandal, the horrible night does not cease: the homeland trampled by its own President is today the object of all the mockery abroad.

Petro knows that the upcoming electoral process resembles the one recently lived in Chile. And, to avoid the same result, he illegally intercepts candidates, seeks to destroy them, and is already trying to cast a mantle of doubt over the vote count. But Colombia deserves a new dawn. And the radical left, which—turned into the President’s hooligan squad—forgives him everything, seems condemned to the desert. We shall see whether, in the future, they also forgive him for being responsible for their possible defeat. For my part, I remain ready for all battles: always embracing justice against oppression, and with the law as my spear, shield, and banner.

 

 

Ecopetrol’s board has approved a temporary leave for Ricardo Roa, keeping him out of office until Colombia’s presidential elections wrap up at the end of June 2026

Ecopetrol’s board of directors has approved an unpaid leave of absence for its president, Ricardo Roa Barragán, amid ongoing judicial investigations and growing pressure from unions, minority shareholders and political sectors.

In an official statement, the company said Roa “requested to use his accrued vacation days from April 7 to May 27, 2026,” and that the board also approved an unpaid leave requested by himself, “beginning on May 28 and lasting 30 calendar days.” This means he will be away from his duties for a continuous period extending through the end of June, after Colombia’s presidential elections scheduled for May 31 and June 21, if a runoff is required.

The decision comes in a context marked by two investigations led by the Attorney General’s Office. The first relates to an alleged case of influence peddling involving the purchase of an apartment in northern Bogotá, for which Roa has already been formally charged, although he has pleaded not guilty. The second concerns a possible breach of campaign finance limits during President Gustavo Petro’s 2022 presidential campaign, which Roa managed.

Both cases remain under review by judicial authorities, who will assess the evidence and issue a ruling (Colombia’s Top Prosecutor Charges Ecopetrol President in Alleged Influence-Peddling Case).

Roa’s temporary departure also follows pressure from some of the company’s main labor unions (Strike Threat Looms as Colombia Oil and Gas Union Calls for Ecopetrol President’s Removal), as well as minority shareholders (Ecopetrol Shareholders Loudly Heckle CEO Ricardo Roa at Annual Meeting as Leadership Dispute & Corruption Scandal Roils The Petroleum Company), and opposition political groups.

If this timeline holds, his potential return will coincide with the post-election period, ahead of the transition process with the new government set to take office on August 7, which is expected to appoint a new board and select a new president for the state-controlled oil and gas company.

Acting president appointed

During Roa’s absence, the board appointed Juan Carlos Hurtado Parra as acting president of Ecopetrol. According to the statement, Hurtado currently serves as executive vice president of hydrocarbons and has been the first alternate to the presidency since November 16, 2025.

He has “more than 28 years of experience in the energy sector, including roles as vice president of exploration, development, and production at Ecopetrol and has held executive positions focused on resource management and coordination. He is an electrical engineer, holds a specialization in Project Evaluation and Development, and has a Master of Business Administration (MBA) in International Oil and Gas.”

The Colombian National Police published a report this week summarizing the results of its counter-narcotics operations during the first quarter of 2026.

Authorities highlighted the results of their new anti-drug dubbed ‘Esmeralda Plus‘, which has led to the seizure of 124 tons of cocaine and 99 tons of cannabis.

The report comes as President Gustavo Petro faces pressure from the White House to prove his commitment to countering the illicit drug trade, which has been a source of dispute between the two administrations.

“We are delivering significant strikes against drug trafficking. Today we fulfill our duty to Colombia and the world with dignity,” said Brigadier General William Castaño Ramos, Director of the Anti-Narcotics Division, following the report’s publication.

In addition to the 124 tons of cocaine and 99 tons of cannabis confiscated, the police also seized over 450,000 gallons of liquid chemicals and 396,000 kilograms of solid ingredients used in drug production.

They also announced the destruction of 981 narcotics laboratories and the recovery of 99 ampoules of fentanyl.

The confiscation figures mark a significant increase in seizures compared to the first 100 days of 2025, which saw 104 tons of cocaine and 63 tons of cannabis confiscated. 

These figures serve as a response to the heavy tensions that preceded the White House meeting, when U.S. President Donald Trump personally attacked Petro, signaling him as a “man who likes to make cocaine” and claiming that Colombia was “very sick” under his leadership.

The report comes amid mounting pressure by Washington for the Petro administration to tackle drug production. 

Trump has accused Colombia of failing to cooperate in the fight against the narcotics trade and carried out a series of unilateral aerial strikes against suspected ‘narco-vessels’ off the coast of Colombia since September, actions condemned by the Petro as a violation of national sovereignty.

Furthermore, Colombia’s President is currently facing two preliminary criminal investigations in Brooklyn and Manhattan regarding his 2022 electoral campaign. U.S. prosecutors are examining alleged illicit donations from drug trafficking networks and meetings with traffickers intended to block extraditions.

“The United States has found a mechanism to pressure the government and extract the maximum amount of concessions regarding the fight against drugs,” Sandra Borda, Professor of Political Science at the University of the Andes, told The Bogotá Post. 

While the Colombian government appears to have stepped up its counter-narcotics operations amid U.S. pressure, some say this may not be enough to appease the White House.

“For Washington, these technical results are necessary, but they aren’t enough to fully restore trust,” Nelson Poveda, a political analyst and international affairs expert with experience in Colombia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, told The Bogotá Post. “Still, these reports act as a bridge for ‘technical diplomacy,’ allowing cooperation to continue even when the political relationship is tense.”

In the report, authorities stress that ‘Esmeralda Plus’ attacks narcotics trafficking as a holistic system rather than just seizing drugs.

“We are directly destabilizing the finances, logistics, and operational capacity of these criminal structures,” pointed out General William Rincón, Chief of the National Police Service.

But Colombia has been excluded from key regional counter-narcotics efforts, notably the “Shield of the Americas”, a new anti-drug alliance promoted by Donald Trump.

The White House has historically favored eradication – the destruction of drug crops – as a counter-narcotics strategy. 

But Petro has consistently defended his “Total Peace” policy, arguing that the war on drugs must move away from just persecuting farmers and shift toward dismantling the financial backbone of cartels and taking down criminal leaders.

However, authorities reported 40 arrests for extradition purposes and more than 17,000 arrests related to drug trafficking so far this year. Additionally, the manual eradication of around 2,000 hectares of illicit crops shows that the Colombian administration is maintaining a mixed offensive that combines social policy with high-impact law enforcement.

With the 2026 electoral cycle approaching in Colombia, Petro’s administration is under immense pressure to show that this humanitarian approach is not a sign of weakness before he leaves office.

The post Colombian authorities highlight anti-drug efforts amid US pressure appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

Credit downgrade is an indictment of the Petro administration’s fiscal management, including suspension of the fiscal rule.

On April 8, 2026, S&P Global Ratings (NYSE: SPGI) lowered its long-term foreign currency sovereign credit rating on Colombia to BB- from BB and its long-term local currency rating to BB from BB+. The outlook for both ratings is stable, reflecting expectations that the Government of Colombia will gradually reduce its fiscal deficit while sustaining moderate growth in the national gross domestic product.

The rating action follows persistent fiscal imbalances and a policy environment that has become less predictable since the pandemic-related recession. The government decision to suspend the national fiscal rule in 2025 marked a significant shift in the policy framework. Pro-cyclical fiscal policies have provided marginal support for employment and consumption, but have also contributed to higher inflation expectations and a wider current account deficit. S&P expects the general government fiscal deficit to reach 5.6% of the national gross domestic product in 2026, compared to 5.3% in 2025.

“We expect Colombia to have consistently large fiscal deficits over the next few years.” — S&P Global Ratings

Institutional stability remains a key factor in the rating, though challenges persist. A fragmented legislature followed the March 2026 elections, where Pacto Histórico and Centro Democrático emerged with the largest minorities. The upcoming presidential election, scheduled for May 31, 2026, adds further uncertainty. Candidates such as Iván Cepeda of Pacto Histórico, Paloma Valencia, and Abelardo de la Espriella have proposed varying approaches to fiscal consolidation. The new administration will inherit spending pressures related to domestic security, rising healthcare costs, and pension payments linked to minimum wage increases.

The Banco de la República, the independent central bank of the country, has maintained a tight monetary policy to combat inflationary pressures. Annual inflation reached 5.3% in February 2026, prompting the bank to increase reference rates to 11.25%. S&P anticipates that inflation will not return to the target range of 3% +/- 1% until early 2029. While the independent status of the central bank provides a buffer against external shocks, high interest rates and lower-than-expected revenue collections have contributed to the widening deficit since 2024.

Economic growth is projected at 2.5% for 2026, slightly below the 2.6% recorded in 2025. Per capita growth is estimated at $9,900 USD for 2026, with real growth expected to average just above 2% through 2029. Despite being a net energy exporter, the performance of the US economy and international energy prices continue to influence national outcomes. Hydrocarbon exports declined to 35% of goods exports in 2025, down from 67% in 2013, showing some diversification even as the sector remains a primary source of volatility.

Net general government debt is forecast to approach 66% of the national gross domestic product by 2029, rising from 60.4% in 2025. S&P notes that the government interest burden will average 12.3% of general government revenue over the next three years. The shift toward issuing shorter-term debt instruments has reduced reported interest payments but increased vulnerability to interest rate fluctuations. External indicators remain a concern, with narrow net external debt expected to stabilize at 130% of current account receipts through 2029. Foreign direct investment is expected to be the primary source for funding the current account deficit, which is projected to stabilize around 2.6% of the national gross domestic product.

Vise photo credit © Loren Moss

President Gustavo Petro has triggered a rare institutional confrontation with the Central Bank  after he ordered to “break relations” following an modest interest rate increase, raising concerns over economic policy independence just two months before the May 31 presidential election.

The board of Banco de la República voted on March 31 to raise its benchmark rate by 100 basis points to 11.25 per cent, defying government pressure for looser policy. Finance minister Germán Ávila denounced the move as “disproportionate” and withdrew from the board, accusing policymakers of privileging financial sector interests over economic growth.

The decision marks an unprecedented rupture in Colombia’s macroeconomic governance framework. By stepping away from the board, Ávila has effectively deprived it of the quorum required to meet under existing statutes, raising the prospect of a policy deadlock just as inflation remains above target.

At stake is more than a disagreement over rates. The confrontation exposes deeper tensions between a government focused on growth and redistribution and a technocratic central bank committed to price stability. It also risks undermining one of Colombia’s most respected institutions at a time of heightened global uncertainty.

Governor Leonardo Villar defended the rate hike, insisting the bank’s constitutional mandate to control inflation could not be subordinated to political considerations. He said the board remained focused on steering inflation back to its 3 per cent target, noting that price pressures — currently running at 5.29 per cent annually — remain elevated despite signs of moderation.

“The decisions are based on technical criteria,” Villar said, rejecting accusations of bias towards the financial sector. He also warned that the government’s withdrawal runs counter to institutional norms.

Markets are now watching whether the government intends to sustain its boycott. Under Colombian law, the presence of a Finance Minister is required for board meetings, meaning continued absence could paralyse rate-setting decisions in the coming months. Three key meetings — in April, June and July — are scheduled before the end of Petro’s term, with the latter two falling after a decisive first-round of the presidential elections.

Business leaders have reacted with alarm. Camilo Sánchez, head of utilities association Andesco, described the breakdown in coordination as “dire”, warning that permanent dialogue between fiscal and monetary authorities is essential for economic stability.

Analysts say the government may be using institutional leverage to halt further rate increases, given that a majority of board members had signalled a tightening bias to anchor inflation expectations. A prolonged standoff could, however, carry significant costs.

Colombia has long been viewed by investors as a regional outlier for its strong central bank independence. Any perception that political pressure is eroding that autonomy could weigh on the peso, increase borrowing costs and deter foreign investment.

The dispute comes against a complex macroeconomic backdrop. Inflation has been fuelled in part by a sharp increase in the minimum wage and higher public spending, while external risks — including rising energy prices linked to the war in the Middle East and closure of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran.

For Petro, the rate hike reinforces a long-standing critique that tight monetary policy is stifling growth and employment. Writing on social media, the president accused the central bank of pursuing a “suicidal” policy that harms the wider economy.

Yet economists warn that weakening institutional credibility could ultimately prove more damaging than high interest rates. “The risk is not just policy error,” one Bogotá-based analyst said. “It is the erosion of the rules of the game.”

The coming weeks will test whether the standoff is a negotiating tactic or the start of a more fundamental shift in Colombia’s economic governance. Either way, the episode has already injected a new layer of uncertainty into one of Latin America’s most closely watched economies.

Since the start of President Gustavo Petro’s administration, the intelligence agency has had four directors, highlighting instability within one of the institutions responsible for state security.

The resignation of Wilmar Mejía as chief of Colombia’s National Intelligence Agency has highlighted instability within the country’s main intelligence agency under the government of President Gustavo Petro, which has seen four leadership changes over the past three years.

Mejía confirmed his departure on April 1 in an interview with Canal 1. “When the Inspector General’s Office lifted my suspension, I went to sign my reinstatement document and within 15 minutes I submitted my resignation. I am no longer the director of intelligence,” he said.

The official had been suspended since December 23, 2025, by the Inspector General’s Office as part of a disciplinary investigation “for alleged links to and the provision of information to members of dissident factions of the former Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).” The Inspector Office said at the time that the measure aimed to prevent possible interference with the process.

Investigation into alleged links to guerrilla dissidents

The case is related to the seizure of digital files belonging to Alexander Díaz Mendoza, known as “Calarcá Córdoba,” a leader of one of the dissident structures grouped under the Estado Mayor de Bloques y Frente (EMBF). Authorities say the documents point to possible contacts with the former intelligence chief.

Mejía has denied any involvement and has argued that the accusations are part of alleged “setups aimed at silencing reports of internal corruption.”

According to the Inspector Office, the investigation “includes possible acts such as the disclosure of military force communication frequency codes and support in the creation of security companies that could facilitate the legalization of weapons in the event of a breakdown in peace talks with the government.”

So far, neither the Inspector General’s Office nor the Attorney General’s Office has concluded its investigations, and no determination of responsibility has been made.

The case has raised concerns about state security and the institutional stability of the agency, considered a key body for the country’s strategic intelligence.

Local media outlets such as El Colombiano have reported that the situation has affected trust among international intelligence partners, suggesting that agencies such as the CIA (United States), MI6 (United Kingdom), and Mossad (Israel) have restricted the sharing of strategic information with Colombia.

Four directors in just over three years

Since Petro took office, the agency has had four directors, all of them close to the president through their past involvement in the M-19 guerrilla group, which signed a peace agreement in 1990.

The instability dates back to the beginning of Petro’s administration. Since August 2022, when Manuel Alberto Casanova Guzmán was appointed, the agency has undergone repeated leadership changes.

Casanova, who faced criticism over his lack of intelligence experience and background as a philosopher, was removed following allegations of involvement in a false extortion case linked to then-Foreign Minister Álvaro Leyva, as reported by Infobae.

He was succeeded by Carlos Ramón González, who later left the post amid investigations into his alleged role in the corruption scandal involving Unidad Nacional de Gestión de Riesgo y Desastres (UNGRD). He is currently in Nicaragua under political asylum, while Colombia has requested his extradition and Interpol has issued a red notice.

Finally, just before Mejía, the agency was led by Jorge Lemus, who served for nearly a year before resigning. He was subsequently appointed by Petro as director of the Unidad de Información y Análisis Financiero (UIAF), amid growing allegations of possible infiltration within the country’s security institutions.

Finance Minister Germán Ávila walked out of a central bank board meeting, accusing it of going against Colombia’s national interests and deepening institutional tensions.

Colombia’s Finance Minister Germán Ávila abandoned a meeting of the board of the central bank (Banco de la República), on April 1 in protest over two decisions by the institution: the release of an internal document without prior consultation, and a 100-basis-point increase in the benchmark interest rate, which was raised to 11.25%.

According to the finance minister, the disclosure of the document, which involved both institutions and was linked to a draft government decree, constituted an “abuse.”

He also described the rate hike, the second so far this year, as “irresponsible and inconvenient,” arguing that it contradicts the government’s economic growth strategy.

The central bank said the decision was approved by a majority of its board: “four members voted in favor of the increase, two supported a 50-basis-point cut, and one proposed keeping the rate unchanged.”

The bank justified the move by noting that inflation stood at 5.4% in January and 5.3% in February, above the 5.1% recorded at the end of 2025. It also warned of external risks, including the impact of the conflict in Iran on the global economy, which could increase the cost of key imports such as gas and fertilizers and add to inflationary pressures later this year.

It remains unclear whether Ávila’s withdrawal from the board will be temporary or permanent, but the episode marks a new point of institutional tension that could influence the direction of monetary policy in Colombia in the coming months.

Clash between monetary policy and government strategy

Ávila criticized the decision, saying the central bank is overlooking the country’s economic progress. “The decision taken by the central bank is repetitive and continues to ignore the national government’s efforts to ensure fiscal stability and sustained economic growth,” he said.

He also argued that the increase is disproportionate compared with global trends. “There is not a single economy in the world proposing a 200-basis-point increase in the benchmark rate in the current global context,” he said, referring to the fact that the bank had already raised rates by 100 basis points in February, meaning a total increase of 200 basis points in just four months.

The government maintains that macroeconomic conditions remain stable, pointing to controlled inflation, a relatively stable Colombian peso (COP) against the dollar, declining unemployment and solid productive growth, and argues that tighter monetary policy is unnecessary.

Debate over central bank independence

The Finance Ministry said the minister’s decision to leave the meeting does not seek to challenge the independence of the central bank, but rather to highlight the need for its decisions to align with the country’s economic and social reality.

However, the move has raised legal and institutional concerns. Central bank chairman of the board, Leonardo Villar noted that the finance minister has a constitutional obligation to attend board meetings, as he “not only represents the government but also lead the meetings” said in a public interview broadcasted by media outlet like La República.

He warned that an indefinite absence could amount to a breach of legal duties and urged President Gustavo Petro to appoint an “ad hoc” delegate if the minister decides not to attend future meetings.

Experts say the minister’s absence could affect the board’s ability to make decisions. According to Andrés Pardo, former deputy finance minister and head of Latin America macro strategy at XP Investments, in an interview with Valora Analitik, “current regulations require at least five members, including the finance minister or a delegate, for the board to deliberate and decide”.

This could mean that, without his presence, the central bank may be legally unable to adopt monetary policy decisions.

Economic impact

The rate increase could have significant effects on the real economy. According to the Finance Ministry, a move of this magnitude could slow economic recovery, increase borrowing costs for households and businesses, and raise debt servicing costs.

Small and medium-sized companies, construction, retail and tourism are expected to be among the most affected sectors, along with households holding variable-rate loans.

Lower-income groups could face the greatest impact, as reduced purchasing power and tighter access to credit may deepen economic inequality.

Colombia’s unemployment rate dropped to 9.2% in February from 10.3% a year earlier, marking the lowest level for the month since 2001, according to official data.

In February 2026, Colombia’s unemployment rate stood at 9.2%, a decrease of 1.1 percentage points compared with the same month in 2025 and the lowest figure for a February since 2001, according to the government through the National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE).

According to the report, “at the national level, the employed population increased by 624,000 people compared with the previous year.” The sectors that contributed most to job creation were professional, scientific and technical activities, with 250,000 new positions, and the public sector (administration, education and health), with 244,000. In contrast, agriculture lost 363,000 jobs and the transportation sector 86,000 compared with February 2025.

President Gustavo Petro highlighted the result on his X account, stating that “we return to a single-digit unemployment rate, 9.2%, the lowest since 2018. More reasons not to accept the mistake of the right parties in claiming that raising the minimum wage to a living wage would bring an employment catastrophe. That was not true: we have the lowest unemployment of this century for the month of February.” The president also defended the minimum wage increase, which reached 23.7%, the highest recorded in the country.

Volvemos a un dígito de tasa de desocupación, 9,2%, la más baja desde el 2018.

Más razones para no aceptar la equivocación de la derecha al afirmar que el subir el salario mínimo al nivel del salario vital traería una catástrofe del empleo.

No fue cierto, tenemos el menor… https://t.co/vXz7Muv3f0 pic.twitter.com/Jx7RBeIWLb

— Gustavo Petro (@petrogustavo) March 30, 2026

Downward trend in unemployment

When analyzing the December–February rolling quarter, the unemployment rate stands at its lowest level in the past ten years, according to DANE reports. The figure rose from an average of 10.7% in 2017–2018 to a peak of 15.7% in 2020–2021, a period marked by the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, before declining steadily to 9.2% in February 2026.

For the same period in 2025, the rate stood at 10.4%, representing a reduction of more than one percentage point.

These figures are consistent with estimates by the International Labour Organization (ILO) in Colombia, which had projected a gradual decline in unemployment from around 16% in 2020 to an estimated 8.3% for the previous year.

Gaps and challenges in the labor market

Despite the overall improvement, the DANE report also highlights challenges in terms of labor inclusion. In February 2026, the unemployment rate for men was 7.4%, while for women it reached 11.7%, representing a gender gap of 4.3 percentage points.

However, the government noted that this gap has been narrowing, as it stood at 5.2 percentage points in the previous month.

The data come from “The Great Integrated Household Survey” (La Gran Ecuesta Integrada de Hogares – GEIH), DANE’s statistical instrument that provides information on the labor market, income, monetary poverty and the sociodemographic characteristics of Colombia’s population.

While Colombia & Ecuador are at peace, the neighboring presidents have a sour relationship going back to when Colombian President Gustavo Petro initially refused to recognize Daniel Noboa’s election.

Traders and transport operators have suspended a 19-day blockade at the Rumichaca International Bridge, the primary land crossing between Colombia and Ecuador. The protest, catalyzed by a 50% tax imposed by the Ecuadorian government on Colombian goods, was lifted to accommodate travel and commerce during the Semana Santa holiday period. Despite the suspension of the strike, the regional business community reports that significant economic damage and diplomatic tensions persist.

The closure of the border crossing created a substantial disruption in binational economic activity. Estimates from the Cámara de Comercio de Ipiales in Nariño, Colombia indicate that losses reached approximately $5 million USD per day due to freight remaining stationary in the border zone. The Comité Gremial de Trabajadores de la Frontera de Ipiales stated that while the reopening is a responsible gesture for the high-traffic holiday season, current tariff policies continue to threaten hundreds of direct and indirect jobs linked to foreign trade.

The Governor of Nariño, Luis Alfonso Escobar, criticized the trade barriers implemented by the administration of Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa. Governor Escobar argued that such measures inadvertently encourage illicit activities in the region. He emphasized that instead of facilitating formal commerce, high tariffs drive trade toward illegality, undermining regional security efforts. To mitigate the conflict, the Comunidad Andina de Naciones (CAN) has initiated high-level dialogues. Diplomatic delegations led by Colombian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Juana Castro and her Ecuadorian counterpart, Alejandro Dávalos, held a virtual working group to address pending issues in trade, transport, energy, and hydrocarbons.

“Decisions adopted without considering the reality of our communities have put at risk the livelihood of merchants, transporters, foreign trade workers, and thousands of people who live from binational exchange,” stated the Comité Gremial de Trabajadores de la Frontera de Ipiales.

Diplomatic friction has extended into the energy sector. President Noboa claimed that in 2017, Ecuador assisted Colombia during a potential blackout by charging 1.6 cents USD per kWh, whereas in 2024, Colombia charged an average of 28 cents USD per kWh during Ecuador’s hydroelectric crisis. In response, the Colombian Minister of Mines and Energy, Edwin Palma, clarified that prices during the 2023-2024 El Niño phenomenon reflected the actual costs of production and distribution, particularly when fossil fuel-powered thermoelectric plants using fuel oil and diesel were activated.

The ongoing trade dispute has impacted more than 5,500 companies over the past two months. Diana Marcela Morales, the Colombian Minister of Commerce, Industry, and Tourism, confirmed scheduled meetings with Ecuadorian officials to de-escalate the conflict and establish fair, transparent rules. Concurrently, the Ministerio de Comercio, Industria y Turismo has moved to protect domestic industries by implementing new tariffs on steel and ceramics from countries without existing free trade agreements. These measures aim to counter market distortions and protect a sector that employs more than 50,000 people while promoting circular economy practices and reducing CO2 emissions.

Above photo: Border between Ecuador & Colombia looking towards Ipiales, Colombia (Photo: Cancillería de Colombia)

Governance concerns and profit drops dominate shareholder assembly.

The Ecopetrol (NYSE: EC, BVC: ECOPETROL) General Shareholders’ Meeting concluded at the Corferias convention center in Bogotá, marked by a decline in annual profits and an intensifying debate regarding the continuity of the company’s president, Ricardo Roa. During the assembly, shareholders approved a dividend of $121 COP per share for minority holders and a total payment of $4 trillion COP to the Colombian government, which serves as the majority shareholder. The government’s payout is scheduled for distribution in two installments, to be completed by June 30, 2026.

Click on above image to view shareholder meeting

The financial results for the 2025 fiscal year revealed a significant contraction in net income, which fell to $9 trillion COP from the $14.9 trillion COP reported in 2024. Roa attributed this decline primarily to the volatility of international crude prices. He noted that the average price of Brent crude dropped from $80 USD per barrel to $68 USD per barrel over the period. According to company data, every $1 USD drop in the price of Brent corresponds to a reduction of approximately $500 billion COP in net profit and $700 billion COP in EBITDA. Despite the lower earnings, the company maintained a production level of 745,000 barrels per day and achieved a reserve replacement rate of 121%, the highest in five years.

Governance issues remained the primary focus of the assembly. Minority shareholders expressed concern over the legal challenges facing Roa, who is currently under investigation by the Fiscalía General de la Nación for alleged influence peddling. Additionally, the Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE) has raised accusations regarding the alleged violation of spending caps during the presidential campaign of Gustavo Petro, which Roa managed. Angela Maria Robledo, Chair of the Board of Directors, defended the decision to retain Roa, stating that the board has activated a evaluation protocol while respecting the constitutional principle of the presumption of innocence.

Shareholders Erupt In Anger At CEO Ricardo Roa:

Abuchean a Ricardo Roa en asamblea de Ecopetrol

“¡Fuera, fuera!”: Este es el momento del tenso abucheo de los accionistas al presidente de la empresa

Videos: Néstor Gómez pic.twitter.com/uyjh4chpl2

— EL TIEMPO (@ELTIEMPO) March 27, 2026

“Ecopetrol is listed on the New York Stock Exchange; we are governed by the strict regulations of US federal agencies. Agencies like OFAC and the SEC could intervene in the company and could even accelerate the payment of financial obligations, which would be extremely grave for Ecopetrol,” stated Martín Ravelo, President of the USO.

The Unión Sindical Obrera (USO), the primary labor union representing nearly one-third of the company’s workforce, has issued an ultimatum for Roa’s removal. Martin Ravelo, president of the USO, warned that the union will initiate a national strike and affect crude production if Roa is not aparted from his position by Monday, March 30. Ravelo expressed concern that Ecopetrol, which is subject to the regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), could face federal intervention. He highlighted that Ecopetrol’s current debt has reached $30 billion USD, exacerbated by rising interest rates, and warned that the company lacks the cash flow to respond to potential demands for early repayment of international obligations.

President Gustavo Petro responded to the union’s concerns via social media, stating that the executive branch will take measures to shield the company’s financial future. Petro emphasized the importance of maintaining investment during periods of high oil prices to prepare for future market downturns. He also criticized past administrations for failing to invest sufficiently in clean energy during previous price cycles. In contrast, Ravelo called for the board to maintain its independence from political influence, noting that four of the nine board members have already left formal records supporting Roa’s departure.

Ecopetrol also addressed the national gas supply, with Roa announcing that new regasification alternatives at Puerto Bahía and on the Pacific coast are expected to begin operations in the second half of 2026. These projects are intended to contribute between 186 and 430 Gbtud to the national grid. A third regasification facility in Coveñas is projected to start operations in 2029 with a capacity of 400 Gbtud. Despite these operational plans, the immediate focus of the international investment community remains fixed on the board’s upcoming meeting on Monday, where the leadership deadlock must be resolved to avoid a potential halt in national production.

Headline photo: Former Senator Jorge Robledo admonishes the Ecopetrol board of directors at the March 2026 shareholders’ meeting.

The petroleum workers called for Ricardo Roa’s head following formal influence-peddling charges filed by Colombia’s Attorney General’s Office.

One of Colombia’s principal petroleum worker’s unions, the Unión Sindical Obrera (USO), has formally requested that Ecopetrol’s board of directors remove Ricardo Roa Barragán as president of the state-controlled oil company, amid ongoing investigations against him by the Attorney General’s Office. The union warned that it will call a nationwide strike if the request is not addressed.

The request was made in a letter dated March 24, sent after a meeting between union representatives and the company’s board. In the document, the USO stated that, “understanding the feelings of the Colombian people as reflected by the thousands of Ecopetrol workers, we immediately request that, within the framework of due diligence, the board of directors adopt the necessary measures to remove Dr. Ricardo Roa Barragán from his position as president of Ecopetrol.”

The union added that, if the request is not met, “this union will call for nationwide mobilization in defense of the most important asset of the Colombian people.”

On the same day, March 24, Ecopetrol’s board issued a public response, reported by outlets such as Caracol Radio, stating that it had reviewed requests from employees, the union and some minority shareholders.

In its statement, the board said it is “aware of its responsibilities within the framework of due diligence” and has been assessing the risks to the company stemming from reports related to Roa. However, it confirmed that Roa will remain in his position while the evaluation process continues.

The union’s request follows charges filed by the Attorney General’s Office on March 11 against Roa for alleged influence peddling. According to prosecutors, Roa is accused of favoring a third party in the allocation of a project in exchange for a reduction in the price of an apartment he purchased in 2023.

More details on the case can be found in the article “Colombia’s Top Prosecutor Charges Ecopetrol President in Alleged Influence-Peddling Case,” published by Finance Colombia.

At this stage, although the information has been publicly reported, judicial decisions remain under the authority of the Attorney General’s Office, which is leading the proceedings.

Roa’s legal situation is also linked to another investigation involving alleged irregularities in the financing of the Pacto Histórico presidential campaign in 2022, which he managed and which resulted in Gustavo Petro’s election as president.

In February, the Attorney General’s Office said investigators found indications that the campaign may have exceeded legal spending limits. A similar case had already been reviewed by Colombia’s elections authority, the National Electoral Council, which fined those responsible more than $5 billion Colombian pesos (over $1.4 million USD).

Photo by Ecopetrol.

So far, three people have been convicted in the killing of former presidential candidate Miguel Uribe Turbay, while arrest warrants target seven members of FARC dissident factions.

Colombia’s Attorney General’s Office is advancing its investigation into the assassination of Senator and presidential pre-candidate Miguel Uribe Turbay. On one hand, it sentenced alias “El Viejo” to more than 22 years in prison for acting as an intermediary between those who ordered the crime and the criminal network that carried out the attack; on the other, it issued arrest warrants for seven individuals belonging to a dissident faction of the FARC accused of ordering the killing.

The assassination of the Centro Democrático party senator and presidential candidate took place on June 7, 2025, in Bogotá while he was participating in campaign-related activities. The attack was carried out by a 14-year-old who fired multiple shots and was immediately captured after an exchange of gunfire with National Police officers and Uribe Turbay’s security team.

General attorney, Luz Adriana Camargo Garzón said the crime was not “an isolated act, but the result of a structured criminal operation that involved both an urban criminal network operating as outsourcing and an organized armed group” known as the “The Segunda Marquetalia.”

Miguel Uribe Londoño, a presidential candidate and the victim’s father, said in a tweet directed at President Gustavo Petro: “President @petrogustavo You harassed Miguel with your verbal abuse, making him a target for assassination. Your government failed to protect him. Your government has been tolerant of drug trafficking, and the criminals who benefited from your total peace used the Second Marquetalia to assassinate Miguel. But the masterminds behind this must continue to be sought within the Colombian government. We cannot continue to accept this violence. This is why Miguel’s legacy needs to be upheld in the Presidency, and I will carry it until the last day of my life.”

Presidente @petrogustavo.

Usted hostigó a Miguel con su violencia verbal poniéndolo como carne de cañón para que lo asesinaran.

Su gobierno no le dio protección.

Su gobierno ha sido tolerante con el narcotráfico y los criminales beneficiados con su paz total utilizaron a la… pic.twitter.com/mPPvVYZgJv

— Miguel Uribe (@migueluribel) March 22, 2026

Judicial developments and convictions

According to the Attorney General’s report, three individuals have already been convicted through plea agreements:

1. Simeón Pérez Marroquín, alias “El Viejo,” identified as the link between those who ordered the crime and the criminal network, was sentenced on March 20 to 22 years and four months in prison.
2. Carlos Mora González, who conducted surveillance at the attack site and transported other suspects, was sentenced to 21 years in prison.
3. Katherine Andrea Martínez, who took part in planning meetings and retrieved the weapon used (a Glock pistol), was sentenced to 21 years and two months in prison.

The 14-year-old who carried out the attack was sentenced under Colombia’s Juvenile Criminal Responsibility System.

Criminal network and FARC dissident involvement

After nine months of investigation, prosecutors established the involvement of the dissident FARC faction known as The Segunda Marquetalia as the group that ordered the crime and issued arrest warrants against several of its alleged leaders and members.

According to the statement, those targeted include Kendry Téllez Álvarez, identified as a possible mastermind; Iván Luciano Marín Arango, alias “Iván Márquez”; Géner García Molina, alias “Jhon 40”; Alberto Cruz Lobo, alias “Enrique Marulanda”; Jhon Jairo Bedoya Arias, alias “Rusbel”; Diógenes Medina Hernández, alias “Gonzalo”, and José Aldinever Sierra Sabogal, alias “Zarco Aldinever”.

They face charges of aggravated homicide, conspiracy to commit a crime, and the manufacture, trafficking, possession or carrying of firearms, accessories, parts or ammunition.

Additionally, according to El Colombiano, authorities are offering a reward of up to $5 billion Colombian pesos (around $1,4 million USD) for information leading to the capture of alias “Iván Márquez”, and $4 billion Colombian pesos ($1,2 million USD) for alias “Jhon 40” and “Zarco Aldinever”, identified as key leaders of the group.

“Wanted dead or alive”

According to El Colombiano, “the inclusion of ‘Zarco Aldinever’ on the most-wanted list has raised questions, as he had reportedly been killed in August 2025 in alleged clashes with the National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrilla group”

“He is alive; that is, we have no evidence that he is dead. For us, “Zarco Aldinever” is alive. There is no corroborated evidence regarding the rumor that he was killed by the ELN. It remains a rumor, which is why the arrest warrant was issued,” the attorney general said.

Meanwhile, the whereabouts of Iván Luciano Marín Arango, alias “Iván Márquez”, one of the former negotiators of the 2016 peace agreement who later returned to armed activity, remain unknown. He has been reported dead on several occasions, most recently in July 2023, when it was speculated he had died from gunshot wounds in Venezuela.

However, the government has not confirmed those reports. “Despite intelligence efforts by the security forces, there is no reliable information to determine his whereabouts or status,” Defense Minister, Major General (ret.) Pedro Arnulfo Sánchez said.

Photo above. Colombia’s Attorney General Luz Adriana Camargo during a presentation on progress in the Miguel Uribe Turbay case. Photo courtesy of the Attorney General’s Office.

Photo in social media. Miguel Uribe Turbay. Photo courtesy of the Senate of the Republic of Colombia.

A C-130 Hercules aircraft crashed in Putumayo, southern Colombia, on March 23, killing 66 people, including soldiers, Air Force personnel and police. A total of 128 people were on board.

A Hercules aircraft operated by the Colombian Air Force (FAC) crashed shortly after takeoff from Puerto Leguízamo, in southern Colombia’s Putumayo department, in a tragedy on Monday, March 23, that left dozens of victims among members of the security forces.

According to Jhon Molina, governor of Putumayo, “58 soldiers, six members of the Air Force and two police officers were among the victims who died in the accident.” A total of 128 people were on board the aircraft. One survived unharmed, and four others remain unaccounted for.

The aircraft, a US-built C-130 Hercules used to transport troops and supplies, went down about one and a half kilometers from the airfield just minutes after takeoff.

Defense Minister, Major General (ret.) Pedro Arnulfo Sánchez, said the crash occurred as the aircraft “was taking off from Puerto Leguízamo (Putumayo, near the border with Peru and Ecuador) while transporting troops from our security forces.”

Investigation underway

The national government authorities said that, based on the information available so far, there is no evidence of an attack by illegal armed groups. According to the defense minister, “the fire triggered the detonation of part of the ammunition being transported, which explains the sounds heard in videos circulating on social media.”

The minister said that “all response protocols for the victims and their families have been activated, along with the corresponding investigation.” In a message posted on X, he added: “I extend my deepest condolences to the families of those affected and, out of respect for their grief, I urge people to avoid speculation until official information is available.”

President Gustavo Petro also addressed structural limitations within the armed forces, noting that bureaucratic processes have delayed modernization efforts. “Renewing the armed forces’ equipment has been a decision of my administration for years. Bureaucratic obstacles in military administration have prevented the approval of the Conpes/Confis (Colombia´s public policy instruments) for over a year since I requested it,” he said.

Statement from the Colombian Air Force

The Colombian Air Force (FAC) expressed its condolences following the crash. We “deeply regrets the tragic accident involving the C-130 Hercules, a loss that brings mourning to our military forces and National Police. The aircraft and its crew were in optimal condition to carry out the mission, with the professionalism that characterizes them.”

The institution added that “the pain and helplessness caused by the unexpected loss of our heroes in this tragic air accident are immense. But that pain is transformed into determination: to honor their memory and legacy with an even greater commitment to the nation, doing what we love: protecting Colombia.”

Gen. Carlos Fernando Silva of the Colombian Air Force said a technical investigation will be conducted with support from the US Air Force to determine the causes of the crash “with transparency and rigor.”

Photos courtesy of the FAC.

Colombia’s President Gustavo Petro ran for president on a campaign promising Paz Total—Total Peace. He promised to give the FARC dissidents, the vicious ELN guerillas, and mafias like the Clan del Golfo a good talking to, and with that, they will just lay down their weapons and become model citizens. Petro promised that through dialogue with bloodthirsty kidnappers and extortionists, they would be willing to stop being bloodthirsty kidnappers and extortionists; as if they are just misunderstood little muffins who only need a hug.

According to figures compiled by the Universidad Externado and reported by The City Paper Bogotá, Colombia has recorded 40,663 homicides during the first three years of the Petro presidency. Over 400 human rights defenders have been slaughtered between 2022 and 2025 according to the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights. Human Rights Watch reports that the ELN and FARC dissidents have expanded their territories by up to 55%. They are taking back over Colombia.

Under Gustavo Petro’s watch, Colombia has returned to the Institute for Economics and Peace’s Global Terrorism Index top ten list of countries impacted by terrorism, along with Total Peace destinations like Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, and Syria. Just this past week, a Clan del Golfo poster was put up within walking distance from the Aeropuerto Internacional José María Córdova just outside of Medellín. This Total Peace nonsense is a failure.

Right now, in the neglected Pacific department of Chocó, the ELN has kidnapped whole communities. Petro ran a campaign promising that he was going to embrace these historically neglected communities—places like Chocó, Nariño, La Guajira, and Norte de Santander—but insecurity is increasing. Chocó’s governor, Nubia Carolina Córdoba, says 6,047 people are trapped inside of their homes because the ELN has announced an illegal armed curfew in the municipality of Bajo Baudó. Most of these people are already poor, and now they have been kidnapped en masse by this guerilla group that operates with impunity because Gustavo Petro coddles them with “dialogue.”

According to Governor Córdoba, they attacked the police station in the village of Santa Rita using grenades attached to drones. It has gotten so bad that Colombia has restricted the entry of drones into the country. These people are calling out for help, but the president insists on talking as the ELN grows and continues to menace the police forces, the Colombian military, and, most importantly, the innocent public.

There is currently public disorder where belligerents have completely blocked the roads in the north of Antioquia, in the region called Bajo Cauca, and also in the neighboring department of Córdoba. The city of Caucasia is under curfew. Antioquia’s Governor, Andrés Rendón, has urgently called on the national government to stop the talk and take action. Groups are attacking ambulances and burning people’s motorcycles as they try to get by the roadblocks, regardless of the emergency.

Governor Rendón stated: “There can be no dialogue amidst blockades and human rights violations. It’s been seven days now with the Bajo Cauca region paralyzed and the country held hostage by chaos.” He called on the Fiscalía General de la Nación to bring those responsible to justice and challenged the Minister of Defense, Pedro Sánchez, to order the immediate reopening of the roads. “We’re not talking about small-scale miners here; behind this are criminal structures, as everyone knows, that finance themselves through illegal mining and move billions of pesos,” Rendón added, demanding full authority against the criminals who use communities as a shield.

El gobernador de Antioquia, @AndresJRendonC, se pronunció sobre la situación de orden público en el Bajo Cauca, en medio de los bloqueos que ya completan varios días y afectan la movilidad y la seguridad en la región. @GobAntioquia pic.twitter.com/4SPQgTa68r

— MiOriente (@MiOriente) March 22, 2026

The current situation with these organized criminal groups—whether regular mafias like the Clan del Golfo or murderous Marxist guerillas like the ELN and the FARC dissidents—is reminiscent of a classroom where a substitute teacher has lost all control. Petro promised Total Peace, but the result has been Total Chaos. Investors do not want to deal with this mess. While the Petro government claims they want tourism to be a major economic driver, road blocks make many areas look like scenes out of Mad Max: Road Warrior. Whole zones of the Pacific coast are unsafe even for residents, met with pure impotence from the regime.

Ten years ago, it was safe to drive from Medellín to the beachside town of Coveñas in Sucre, but that is no longer the case. While it remains safe to visit Colombia for business or tourism in major hubs like Bogotá, Medellín, Santa Marta, or the San Andrés islands, the long-term outlook is concerning. My hope is that Colombians choose a future leader serious about law and order as a prerequisite for human rights. It is not only the government that we need to protect human rights from; those who kill, steal, kidnap, and forcibly recruit children are violating those rights as well.

 

New Africa initiative drives 112% growth in non-mining exports.

The Ministerio de Comercio, Industria y Turismo (Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Tourism) hosted the first Foro de Reencuentro Económico CELAC–África at the Ágora Convention Center in Bogotá on March 20, 2026. The event, held as part of a broader high-level forum, aimed to strengthen commercial and investment ties between Colombia and the African continent. During the proceedings, officials identified various sectors for potential growth, including jewelry, agricultural machinery, construction materials, software, digital marketing, and food and beverages.

Minister of Trade Diana Marcela Morales Rojas stated that the forum represents a strategic shift toward trade equity and shared economic opportunities. Over the past four years, the Colombian government has sought to diversify its market reach through economic diplomacy, trade missions, and the establishment of new logistical routes to Africa. Data from 2025 indicates that these efforts have resulted in a significant increase in non-mining and non-energy exports to the continent.

“We aim for this forum to mark the beginning of a new stage: one of strategic cooperation, trade with equity, and the construction of shared opportunities.” — Diana Marcela Morales Rojas, Minister of Trade, Industry, and Tourism.

According to ministry figures, non-mining exports to Africa reached $296.5 million USD in 2025, representing a 112% increase compared to 2024. In terms of volume, these shipments totaled 209,273 tons, a 226.8% rise over the previous year. These goods accounted for 46.6% of Colombia’s total exports to the continent, signaling a shift toward a more diversified export basket. Key products driving this growth include coffee, bananas, machinery, paper, and apparel.

The number of Colombian firms participating in this trade has also expanded. In 2025, 165 companies exported non-mining goods to Africa with values exceeding $10,000 USD, up from 145 companies in 2024. This 15.2% growth in participating firms underscores a transition toward higher value-added exports. Vice President Francia Márquez Mina noted that the economies of Latin America and Africa are complementary, offering potential for the development of new value chains and the utilization of strategic mineral reserves necessary for the global energy transition.

A central component of the forum was a business matchmaking event held on March 17 and 18. Preliminary results from the session show expected trade operations totaling $16 million USD. Nicolás Mejía, Vice President of Exports at ProColombia, characterized the results as a validation of the current market diversification plan. Since the beginning of the current administration, the government has implemented the Estrategia África 2022–2026 to strengthen socioeconomic relations with the region.

Through commercial intelligence analysis, the Colombian government has prioritized nine specific markets for its diplomatic and economic deployment: South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, Egypt, Tunisia, and Algeria. These nations serve as the primary focus for the continued implementation of the 2022–2026 strategy.

Above photo: MinCIT/Ricardo Báez.

Ricardo Roa was appointed CEO of Ecopetrol after serving as Colombian President Gustavo Petro’s campaign manager. The Presidential campaign is also under investigation for campaign finance violations.

The controversy surrounding the filing of charges against Ricardo Roa Barragán, president of Colombia´s oil and energy company, Ecopetrol, has taken a new turn following the leak of an internal report suggesting that more than $42 million USD may have been transferred to a private company based in the British Virgin Islands.

According to disclosed information, “the media outlet 6AM W obtained documents showing the link between the USD 42 million payment made by Ecopetrol and a company connected to Serafino Iácono,” as stated by the outlet itself.

It is important to recall that on March 11, Colombia’s Attorney General’s Office (Fiscalía General de la Nación – FGN) formally charged Ricardo Roa Barragán with the alleged crime of influence peddling by a public official. According to the accusation, the executive allegedly intervened to favor a third party (Serafino Iácono) in the assignment of a gasification project in exchange for personal benefits. The FGN stated that Roa “ordered that a specific person be assigned to a gasification project in exchange for a reduction in the price of an apartment” located in northern Bogotá. During the hearing, the executive did not accept the charges.

Regarding the leaked documents, 6AM W reports that the published material “is a memorandum produced following a communication between the lawyers of Miller & Chevallier, hired by Ecopetrol, and Charles Cain, head of the Anti-Corruption Unit for Foreign Operators at the US Securities Exchange Commission (SEC).” This suggests that the document is an internal Ecopetrol report produced in 2024.

Additionally, the report includes references to an “audit commissioned by Ecopetrol to Control Risks, which identifies Iácono as a possible beneficiary of the alleged irregular payment of $42 million USD made through a purchase option” of power generation plants linked to the company Genser, associated with the businessman.

The leaked documents can be accessed through the Caracol Radio website via “Las contradicciones de Ecopetrol y Serafino Iácono en el caso del apartamento de Roa y Termomorichal.”

For his part, Serafino Iácono issued a statement, published by La República via the social network X, in which he affirms that since April 7, 2017, he has had no relationship with the company and that the transaction in question took place in 2023, after his departure.

At this stage, although the information has been reported by the media, judicial decisions remain under the authority of Colombia’s Attorney General’s Office, which is leading the proceedings against Ricardo Roa. Iacono said that he would be filing suit against Control Risks, and hired well-known Colombian lawyer Jaime Lombana Villalba to begin the process.

For further context, readers are encouraged to consult the article “Colombia’s Top Prosecutor Charges Ecopetrol President in Alleged Influence-peddling Case,” published by Finance Colombia.

Beyond the communications previously issued and reported by Finance Colombia in the aforementioned article, no new official statements have been released by Ecopetrol’s board of directors since March 12, prior to the information leak. Finance Colombia has reached out to Iacono for comment and will report any additional information.

The investigation into Colombia’s President comes on the heels of Petro’s visit to Washington & meeting with Trump.

The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has designated Colombian President Gustavo Petro as a priority target as federal prosecutors in New York investigate potential connections to narcotics trafficking organizations. Records indicate that the US Department of Justice is reviewing multiple inquiries dating back to 2022, primarily supported by information from confidential informants.

The investigations involve allegations regarding interactions with the Sinaloa cartel and the possible use of the Paz Total policy to benefit specific traffickers who reportedly contributed to the 2022 presidential campaign. Documents also mention the potential use of law enforcement assets to facilitate the transport of cocaine and fentanyl through maritime terminals. The priority target designation is applied to individuals whom the DEA identifies as having a significant influence on international narcotics distribution.

President Petro has denied any involvement with criminal organizations or the acceptance of illicit funds for his political activities. In a statement released on social media, he suggested that legal proceedings in the US would eventually disprove allegations originating from political opponents. The Embassy of Colombia in Washington stated that the reports are based on unverified and anonymous sources.

“The reported insinuations have no legal or factual basis,” stated the Embassy of Colombia in Washington.

The inquiry has expanded in recent months, with prosecutors in the Eastern and Southern Districts of New York questioning detained individuals about allegations that representatives of the administration solicited bribes in exchange for preventing extradition to the US. It has not been confirmed whether formal charges will be filed against the president, and the White House has stated it has played no role in the independent judicial process.

Portions of the DEA records cite a 2024 interview regarding allegations that former aides and officials from Ecopetrol (NYSE: EC) (BVC: ECOPETROL) were used to launder funds. Ricardo Roa, the president of Ecopetrol, has denied these claims. Simultaneously, the US Department of the Treasury previously sanctioned Petro in late 2025, citing concerns over cocaine production levels, though specific evidence was not made public at that time.

While Petro denies connections to criminal groups, it is important to note that he was a member of the homicidal M-19 guerilla group in Colombia from his teenage years until the group laid down its arms in 1987. Petro served prison time for illegal arms possession due to his activities with the M-19.

Domestic investigations in Colombia are also ongoing regarding the president’s relatives. His son, Nicolas Petro, faced charges in 2023 related to the alleged receipt of funds from a convicted trafficker. Furthermore, the president’s brother, Juan Fernando Petro, has been linked to investigations involving unauthorized negotiations with inmates at the La Picota prison regarding the Paz total framework and extradition protections.

Witnesses currently in US custody who may be relevant to the ongoing probes include former members of the Venezuelan Cartel de Los Soles and various Colombian nationals recently extradited, such as individuals associated with the La Inmaculada organization and the Clan del Golfo (Gulf Clan). Some reports suggest that sums near $500 million COP were discussed in exchange for gestores de paz (“Peace Manager”) status, though these allegations remain under judicial review.

Headline photo: Colombian President Gustavo Petro (photo César Carrión, Presidencia de Colombia)

Though surprises are possible, polling says the front runners are Iván Cepeda, Abelardo de la Espriella, and Paloma Valencia.

The Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil of Colombia (RNEC), the entity responsible for organizing elections in the country, reported that a total of 14 candidates have officially registered to run in the country’s presidential elections, scheduled for May 31, 2026. In this vote, citizens will elect the President and Vice President of the Republic for the 2026–2030 term.

According to the electoral authority, the candidates represent a wide range of political perspectives, from left to right, including independent candidacies running through political movements. Here the list and brief profile of the candidates:

1. Clara Eugenia López Obregón, currently a senator for the Esperanza Democrática She has served as Minister of Labor (2016–2017), acting mayor of Bogotá (2011–2012), and Bogotá’s secretary of government (2008–2010). She has been affiliated with left-wing parties and was Gustavo Petro’s vice presidential running mate in the 2010 election.
2. Óscar Mauricio Lizcano, from the FAMILIA coalition. He served as Minister of Information Technologies (2023–2025), was a senator (2010–2018), and a member of the House of Representatives (2006–2010).
3. Raúl Santiago Botero, candidate of the “Romper el Sistema” movement (Break the Establishment). An agronomist engineer and businessman from Medellín, he presents himself as an independent candidate with no prior political experience.
4. Miguel Uribe Londoño, father of the slain presidential candidate Miguel Uribe Turbay. He is running under the Colombian Democratic Party and previously served as president of the Centro Democrático party founded by Álvaro Uribe Vélez.
5. Sondra Macollins Garvin, from the movement “La Abogada de Hierro” (The Iron Lawyer) A criminal lawyer and psychologist, she presents herself as an independent candidate without political affiliations. She ran for the House of Representatives in 2022 and is known for her work in narcotrafficking and corruption cases.
6. Iván Cepeda Castro, a senator since 2014 and the official candidate of the Pacto Histórico, the same party as President Gustavo Petro. Polls project he will receive the highest vote share in the first election round. He is aligned with left-wing political ideas.
7. Abelardo de la Espriella, a lawyer with far-right positions, running for the first time under the Defensores de la Patria movement. Recent polls place him as a likely second or third contender in voter preference.
8. Claudia López Hernández, former mayor of Bogotá (2020–2023) and former senator (2014–2018), running under the centrist movement “Imparables con Claudia.” She is known for her anti-corruption agenda and secured her candidacy with more than 570,000 votes (about 9%) in recent interparty primaries.
9. Paloma Valencia Laserna, current senator and candidate of the Centro Democrático party led by Álvaro Uribe Vélez. She won the right-wing interparty primary on March 8 with more than 3 million votes. Polls place her among the top three contenders, and if she reaches a runoff, she would become the first woman in Colombia’s history to do so.

• Sergio Fajardo Valderrama, an academic and mathematician running for the Dignidad y Compromiso He served as mayor of Medellín and governor of Antioquia and is running for president for the third time.
• Roy Barreras, from the political party La Fuerza (The Force). He won the left-wing coalition primary on March 8 with the lowest vote total (257,000 votes, about 3.6%). Although currently aligned with left-wing movements and part of the Petro administration, he has previously been affiliated with right- and center-leaning parties.
• Gustavo Matamoros Camacho, of the Colombian Ecologist Party. He served in the Colombian Army for 43 years. With no prior political experience, his campaign focuses on public security.
• Luis Gilberto Murillo, who served as Minister of Foreign Affairs (2024–2025) and Colombia’s ambassador to the United States (2022–2024). A human rights advocate and Afro-Colombian leader from Chocó, he presents himself as an independent, moderate, centrist candidate.
• Carlos Eduardo Caicedo, running under the independent movement “Con Caicedo.” He was mayor of Santa Marta (2012–2015) and governor of Magdalena (2020–2023), where he built a strong base as a left-wing political leader.

The RNEC also reported that “the draw to determine the position of presidential candidates on the ballot will take place on March 25 at the Ágora Bogotá Convention Center.”

This process marks the formal start of the final phase of the presidential campaign, during which candidates will seek to consolidate support ahead of the first round on May 31. If no candidate secures an absolute majority, a runoff between the two leading candidates will be held on June 21.

Headline photo: Polling station in Colombia during last Congress elections in March 8, 2026. Photo courtesy of the Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil.

U.S. federal prosecutors have opened preliminary criminal investigations into Colombian President Gustavo Petro over alleged links to drug traffickers and possible illicit financing of his 2022 campaign, according to a report by The New York Times.

The previously undisclosed probes are being conducted by federal prosecutors in Manhattan and Brooklyn and involve specialists in international narcotics trafficking, as well as agents from the Drug Enforcement Administration and Homeland Security Investigations, the newspaper said, citing people familiar with the matter.

Investigators are examining, among other issues, whether Petro held meetings with individuals connected to drug trafficking networks and whether his presidential campaign solicited or received donations from such actors. The two investigations are being carried out independently and remain in their early stages, with no certainty that they will lead to formal criminal charges.

There is no indication that the White House played any role in launching the investigations, according to the report. However, the inquiries emerge in a broader context of heightened tensions and fluctuating diplomacy between Bogotá and Washington.

Relations between Petro and U.S. President Donald Trump have been volatile, marked by sharp public exchanges, threats of tariffs that were never implemented, and the temporary revocation of Petro’s U.S. visa. Trump has repeatedly accused Petro of failing to curb narcotics production and has described him in highly critical terms, while Petro has denounced what he characterises as political pressure and interference.

The U.S. Treasury Department last year imposed sanctions on Petro, members of his family and senior officials, including Interior Minister Armando Benedetti, alleging links to narcotics activity. The measures, which included asset freezes and travel restrictions, were justified by Washington on the grounds that cocaine production in Colombia had reached record levels and that the government had offered concessions to armed groups involved in trafficking.

Petro has rejected those claims, insisting that his administration has strengthened seizures of cocaine and slowed the rate of expansion of coca cultivation. He has also denied any knowledge of illicit funds entering his campaign, dismissing the allegations as politically motivated attacks.

Colombia’s Attorney General  is examining charges that Petro’s son – Nicolás Petro – received money from individuals linked to illicit activities during the 2022 campaign. While his son acknowledged receiving funds that were not reported, no criminal charges have been filed against the president himself, and Petro has maintained he was unaware of the campaign “donations”.

According to the NYT, the U.S. investigations are taking place amid a broader strategy in which Washington has increasingly used legal and judicial tools to advance foreign policy objectives. Analysts say such actions could serve as leverage in bilateral relations or influence political dynamics in allied countries.

The timing of the probes is particularly sensitive, as Colombia prepares for presidential elections on May 31, with a potential runoff in June. Petro, the country’s first leftist president, is constitutionally barred from seeking re-election but has actively backed his political successor with hardleftist Iván Cepeda.

The allegations could reverberate through the electoral campaign, where relations with the United States remain a central issue. Candidates on the right have emphasised the importance of maintaining close ties with Washington, while figures on the left have framed U.S. actions as a challenge to Colombia’s sovereignty.

Despite months of tensions, diplomatic relations between the two countries have shown signs of stabilisation in recent weeks. Petro and Trump held a bilateral meeting at the White House earlier this year, which both sides described as constructive, and officials have since sought to rebuild communication channels.

Even so, uncertainty persists over the trajectory of the relationship, particularly as Washington continues to prioritise counternarcotics cooperation with Colombia, historically one of its closest partners in the region.

Petro has consistently denied any links to drug trafficking and has pointed to his government’s security strategy, which includes negotiations with armed groups and efforts to reduce violence, as evidence of a broader approach to the drug trade.

The start of U.S. investigations add a new layer of complexity to an already fraught political and diplomatic landscape, with potential implications not only for Petro’s post-presidential future but for Colombia’s ties with its most important security ally.