Colombians face three sharply different futures in May 31 vote

Colombia votes on May 31 with its presidential race concentrated around three candidates whose platforms diverge on nearly every dimension of economic and security policy relevant to foreign investors. For corporate executives, institutional investors, and multinational operations with Colombian exposure, the choice between senator Iván Cepeda, senator Paloma Valencia, and defense attorney Abelardo de la Espriella carries direct, measurable implications for the regulatory environment, foreign direct investment (FDI) conditions, energy sector licensing, and geopolitical alignment through at least 2030.

No candidate is projected to clear the 50%-plus-one threshold required to win outright on May 31, making a runoff election on June 21 the expected outcome. The question that will determine the direction of that runoff — and by extension the next administration — is which of the two opposition candidates finishes second.

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A Race Reshaped by Late Polling

The final-week polling picture shifted substantially, and the trajectory matters as much as the snapshot. The CONDOR weighted aggregate — which incorporates surveys from six polling firms and applies greater weight to more recent data — placed the race as of May 23 at: Cepeda 36.3%, De la Espriella 29.1%, Valencia 16.7%.

Invamer, one of Colombia’s most established polling firms, surveyed 3,800 respondents across 152 municipalities between May 13 and May 20, registering Cepeda at 44.6%, De la Espriella at 31.6%, and Valencia at 14.0%. The Centro Nacional de Consultoría (CNC) published a survey conducted May 22 and 23 showing Cepeda at 33.4%, De la Espriella at 30.9%, and Valencia at 12.6%.

Comparing those figures to the Fundación Génesis Crea survey from May 4 through May 11 — which placed Cepeda at 35.1%, Valencia at 25.4%, and De la Espriella at 21.6% — indicates a multi-poll trend of De la Espriella gaining approximately nine to ten percentage points in three weeks while Valencia shed a comparable share. AS/COA’s poll tracker confirms the directional consistency across firms.

Atlas Intel, which published figures more favorable to De la Espriella, is currently under investigation by Colombia’s Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE) for potential methodology violations and could face suspension of its operations. Those figures are treated with caution in this analysis.

Runoff modeling diverges between firms. Fundación Génesis Crea showed Valencia defeating Cepeda 49.1% to 44.7% in a second-round matchup — meaning she was the stronger opposition candidate in that scenario. The Guarumo/Ecoanalítica survey found Cepeda losing all hypothetical runoff scenarios, including against De la Espriella. Two minor candidates — former senator Clara López and former Chocó governor Luis Gilberto Murillo — withdrew and endorsed Cepeda before the first round, a consolidation that appears to have had limited effect on his polling numbers.

Finance Colombia reported in May that the campaign has been marked by an unusual absence of traditional televised debates. Cepeda declined to participate in events organized by major media outlets, stating that proposed formats lacked neutrality. Former Bogotá Mayor Claudia López, herself a candidate, said publicly that Cepeda’s refusal was motivated by an unwillingness to defend his record as the architect of President Gustavo Petro‘s Paz Total security negotiation strategy.

Security Policy: The Three Approaches to Armed Groups

Public security is the top voter concern heading into the election. InSight Crime documented that the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) launched a major offensive against FARC dissident factions in Norte de Santander in early 2025, resulting in mass civilian casualties in the Catatumbo region. In Chocó and Antioquia, the ELN and the Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC), commonly known as the Clan del Golfo, are competing for control of illegal gold mining corridors and drug trafficking routes. In Cauca, FARC dissident factions have established territorial control in areas where state presence has collapsed.

Cepeda’s approach to security is defined by his role as the principal legislative architect of Paz Total. As chair of the Senate‘s peace commission, he designed the framework that extended negotiating status to the ELN, FARC dissident groups, and the Clan del Golfo. His stated rationale is that targeting the financial leadership of drug networks rather than foot soldiers produces more durable results — a position that has academic backing in narcotics policy literature. In practice, Paz Total produced ceasefires that were repeatedly violated, and security indicators in conflict-affected departments deteriorated during the Petro administration. A Cepeda presidency is expected to continue the negotiated settlement model, with the military operating under political constraints.

Valencia’s security platform is based on reinstating Seguridad Democrática, the doctrine associated with former president Álvaro Uribe’s administrations from 2002 to 2010. The core elements are expanded military presence in rural conflict zones, dismantling of rural criminal networks, and resumption of extradition agreements with the United States — which Petro suspended, effectively shielding cartel leadership from US federal prosecution. The Uribe-era approach resulted in measurable reductions in homicide rates, forced displacement, and ELN and FARC territorial control, though human rights organizations documented serious abuses by security forces during that period.

De la Espriella has stated explicitly that his government would have no peace process. He advocates for a model similar to El Salvador’s under President Nayib Bukele: mass incarceration, construction of high-security prison facilities, classification of guerrilla and cartel organizations as foreign terrorist organizations, and broad military offensives. He has not detailed how such operations would be financed or how the mass detention model would interact with Colombia’s Constitutional Court, which has repeatedly constrained executive security powers.

For the armed groups operating in Norte de Santander and Cauca, the historical record indicates that Colombia’s criminal organizations respond more acutely to sustained, institutionally grounded military pressure and functioning extradition pipelines than to political rhetoric. By that measure, Valencia’s platform — which rebuilds the institutional security apparatus incrementally — represents a more structurally credible threat to the ELN and the Estado Mayor Central (EMC) FARC dissidents. For the Clan del Golfo leadership, extradition to the United States has historically been the principal deterrent, and Valencia’s program explicitly restores it.

Business Climate and Employment Conditions

The Petro administration enacted a series of minimum wage increases totaling more than 60% over four years — including a 16% increase for 2023, the largest single-year hike in Colombian history, and a 23.78% increase for 2026 — restructured labor regulations to expand premium pay requirements for night, weekend, and holiday shifts, and raised corporate tax rates to fund social spending programs. The Asociación Nacional de Empresarios de Colombia (ANDI) characterized the regulatory environment as adverse to private investment. Finance Colombia tracked a material decline in FDI in the extractive sector over the same period.

Cepeda supported those labor and fiscal reforms throughout their legislative passage. His platform extends the Petro model: increased state social spending, continued land redistribution programs, and maintenance of the current wage and labor cost structure. For companies with established Colombian operations, the regulatory environment is manageable; for companies evaluating market entry or operational expansion, the cost structure adds friction.

Valencia’s economic program emphasizes corporate stability and private sector investment as the primary mechanisms of job creation. Her vice-presidential running mate, Juan Daniel Oviedo — former director of DANE, Colombia’s national statistics agency — represents a technocratic orientation focused on reducing structural market distortions, streamlining public procurement, and scaling back state administrative overhead. Oviedo’s appointment is a direct signal to the business community that economic management would be data-driven rather than ideologically directed. Oviedo also publicly identifies as a member of the LGBTQ+ community, a departure from the traditional social conservatism of Centro Democrático.

De la Espriella’s economic orientation is pro-business with protectionist elements. His vice-presidential candidate, José Manuel Restrepo — who served as Colombia’s Finance Minister and Commerce Minister — provides institutional credibility on fiscal and trade policy. Restrepo’s presence on the ticket signals commitment to fiscal discipline and regulatory reduction in the extractive and commercial sectors. De la Espriella’s personal style, however, introduces operational uncertainty; his campaign has generated multiple high-profile controversies, including a public altercation with Caracol Noticias journalist María Lucía Fernández during a live broadcast and a formal apology following misconduct allegations by journalist Laura Rodríguez of Piso 8 FM.

Foreign Investment, Oil, and Mining

The extractive sector is the most consequential economic policy dimension for international capital. Ecopetrol (NYSE: EC; BVC: ECOPETROL) — Colombia’s state-controlled energy company and the largest corporation in the country — has operated under exploration restrictions during the Petro administration, which has opposed new fossil fuel contracts on climate grounds.

Cepeda’s position extends the Petro framework: mandatory transition away from fossil fuels, heavy restrictions or outright prohibitions on new oil and gas exploration contracts, and stringent environmental licensing requirements for open-pit mining operations. Foreign investment would be directed by policy toward green hydrogen, ecotourism, and smallholder agriculture. For the multinational oil majors with Colombian operations and for institutional investors in the mining sector, a Cepeda presidency represents a continuation of the current constraints and, in some contract scenarios, an accelerated wind-down of Colombian portfolios.

In a related development, Finance Colombia reported in May that Ecopetrol’s president, Ricardo Roa, has been formally charged in connection with alleged campaign spending violations during Petro’s 2022 presidential campaign. The case will be inherited by whoever takes office in August.

Valencia’s position is that hydrocarbon revenues are essential to Colombia’s macroeconomic stability and that the country cannot exit the sector before alternative revenue structures exist. Her platform actively encourages FDI in petroleum exploration, is open to regulated fracking, and commits to clearing the environmental licensing backlog that has stalled multiple large-scale gold and copper mining projects. For energy and mining companies currently blocked by administrative delays, this represents the most direct path to project advancement.

De la Espriella’s position goes further: essentially deregulating the environmental licensing process for major extraction projects on the grounds that Colombia’s economic sovereignty takes precedence over environmental restrictions he characterizes as externally imposed. The practical constraint is whether a De la Espriella administration would have the institutional coherence and congressional support to deliver regulatory rollback, given that his movement has no established political party structure and entered the race through an independent signature campaign.

Foreign Policy: Washington Alignment vs. Multipolar Strategy

Colombia’s relationship with the United States deteriorated materially under Petro, who aligned Colombia with Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro, pursued closer ties with China and Russia, and suspended extradition agreements. US counternarcotics cooperation was strained throughout the period.

Cepeda is committed to what he describes as a multipolar foreign policy — maintaining functional diplomatic channels with Washington and Brussels while deepening strategic and commercial relationships with China and Russia. His alignment with regional left-of-center governments in Mexico, Brazil, and Bolivia would position Colombia as part of a Latin American bloc that has grown increasingly skeptical of US regional leadership. For US companies operating in Colombia, this trajectory does not mean immediate operational disruption, but it reduces Colombia’s utility as a reliable counterpart on security cooperation, counter-narcotics intelligence sharing, and trade dispute resolution.

Valencia positions a return to the Western alignment as a core objective. She would prioritize restoring the US-Colombia relationship, reinforcing the bilateral Free Trade Agreement, and reestablishing intelligence-sharing mechanisms that were reduced under Petro. Her framing positions Colombia as a democratic anchor in a region experiencing authoritarian pressures.

De la Espriella takes the most explicit pro-US position in the race. La Silla Vacía reported that De la Espriella or entities linked to his campaign donated more than $90,000 USD to the US Republican Party, a fact that raises questions about the nature and expectations of those relationships. He has publicly aligned himself with the populist right in the United States, takes a hostile posture toward China, Russia, and Venezuela, and has characterized his security approach as consistent with a transactional alliance with Washington focused on counter-narcotics enforcement and cartel designation as foreign terrorist organizations.

“Ese pisco robó a 200 mil colombianos.” — Claudia López, former Mayor of Bogotá, referring to presidential candidate Abelardo de la Espriella’s legal representation of DMG pyramid scheme founder David Murcia Guzmán, during a presidential campaign event.

Corruption and Judicial Independence

All three candidates have stated commitments to fighting corruption, though their approaches and focal points differ in ways that are material to the institutional environment for business operations.

Cepeda’s legislative record includes serious, documented work investigating paramilitary infiltration of Colombia’s political institutions — the period known as parapolítica — and pursuing accountability for those cases. His blind spot, his critics argue, is corruption within the current administration. When Ecopetrol’s Ricardo Roa was formally charged in connection with Petro’s 2022 campaign, the response from the Pacto Histórico coalition was subdued. Cepeda has been Álvaro Uribe’s primary judicial antagonist in the Senate; a Cepeda administration would offer no institutional protection to Uribe and would be expected to support the full progress of judicial proceedings against him. For left-wing politicians facing legal exposure, including former Medellín mayor Daniel Quintero, a Cepeda administration would be expected to be more receptive to amnesty frameworks.

Valencia’s approach to anti-corruption is structural rather than prosecutorial: strengthening the independence of the Contraloría General de la República and the Fiscalía General de la Nación, implementing digital transparency in public procurement, and reducing informal executive influence over judicial processes. She would be expected to apply political and rhetorical pressure on behalf of Uribe — her political mentor and a close ally — though her legislative track record indicates a degree of institutional independence from Centro Democrático party orthodoxy.

De la Espriella’s anti-corruption rhetoric centers on severe criminal penalties for corrupt officials. The credibility of that position is complicated by his professional history, which is examined in detail below.

De la Espriella’s Legal Career: The Documented Record

De la Espriella’s campaign has faced sustained scrutiny over his client history as one of Colombia’s highest-profile criminal defense attorneys. The record is documented in reporting by El Colombiano, El Espectador, and the investigative outlet Corrupción al Día.

His documented client roster includes Salvatore Mancuso, the former supreme commander of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) paramilitary network; multiple legislators convicted in the parapolítica scandal, which established systematic infiltration of Colombia’s congress by paramilitary organizations; David Murcia Guzmán, the operator of the DMG pyramid scheme that defrauded an estimated 200,000 Colombian investors; the Nule Primos, convicted of large-scale public contract fraud; and Álex Saab, the Colombian businessman extradited to the United States on charges of acting as the primary money launderer for the Maduro government in Venezuela. According to Corrupción al Día, De la Espriella’s legal fees from Saab reportedly reached $12 million USD and included private aircraft travel.

De la Espriella’s response to this line of criticism rests on due process principles: that every accused person is entitled to vigorous legal defense regardless of the charges, and that his ability to navigate Colombia’s criminal code at its most complex levels demonstrates the expertise required to enforce the law from the executive branch. The argument has legal validity as a principle. The specific issue for foreign compliance officers and US government counterparts is the Saab representation: the same Nicolás Maduro whose regime De la Espriella’s campaign now characterizes as an ideological enemy received legal services from De la Espriella’s firm when the representation was commercially available.

The Fiscalía investigated De la Espriella in connection with alleged paramilitary links in 2009 and again in 2012; both investigations were dismissed for insufficient evidence, and he carries no convictions or active investigations on those matters.

Cepeda’s Family History and Ideological Background

Critics of Iván Cepeda, including Enrique Gómez of the Salvación Nacional party, have argued that his family background constitutes evidence of structural alignment with guerrilla movements. The record on this point merits examination.

Cepeda is the son of Manuel Cepeda Vargas, who served as Secretary-General of the Colombian Communist Party and as a senator for the Unión Patriótica (UP), a left-wing political movement that was systematically exterminated by a combination of state actors and paramilitary organizations during the 1980s and 1990s. Manuel Cepeda Vargas was assassinated on August 9, 1994. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights subsequently found the Colombian state responsible for his murder. The FARC-EP named its Frente Urbano Manuel Cepeda Vargas — an urban front operating within the Bloque Occidental — in the elder Cepeda’s honor.

The Fundación Paz y Reconciliación (PARES) has documented that Iván Cepeda’s relationship with his father’s political positions was more complex than the family lineage alone suggests. After studying in Bulgaria in 1981, Cepeda broke from his father’s Soviet-oriented communist framework and aligned with democratic leftists including Bernardo Jaramillo Ossa, who publicly rejected the FARC’s armed strategy. Cepeda has repeatedly stated his repudiation of the FARC’s use of his father’s name. No documented evidence connects him to operational coordination with current armed groups.

What the family history does establish is the ideological framework through which Cepeda processes security policy: a belief, grounded in personal and political experience, that the Colombian state’s institutional violence has been as destructive as guerrilla violence, and that negotiated settlements are structurally preferable to military solutions. That framework generates Paz Total. It also generates a posture toward ELN and FARC dissident negotiators that prioritizes process continuity over verified compliance — a disposition that armed groups have demonstrably exploited to maintain territorial and operational positions while negotiation frameworks provided legal cover.

Valencia and the Uribe Question

The comparison to former president Iván Duque (2018–2022) comes up regularly in discussions of Valencia’s political independence. Duque, who had limited independent political standing before Uribe selected him, was perceived throughout his term as governing within constraints set by his patron — a dynamic that Colombian political cartoonists characterized as ventriloquism.

Valencia’s profile differs materially. She is the granddaughter of former Colombian president Guillermo León Valencia, carries her own political lineage, and has served in the Senate for over a decade, building positions on agrarian reform, judicial modernization, and indigenous land rights that have placed her at variance with standard Centro Democrático positions on those issues. She won the Gran Consulta por Colombia primary on March 8 with more than 45% of the vote — over 3.2 million Colombians — establishing a democratic mandate distinct from any party endorsement.

She would be expected to use institutional and rhetorical channels to support Uribe in the ongoing judicial proceedings against him, and to apply pressure on the trajectory of those cases. Whether that constitutes political interference with judicial independence or normal advocacy within democratic norms is a question on which observers disagree. What the legislative record does not support is the characterization of Valencia as incapable of independent governance.

Press Freedom and the Media Environment

Press freedom carries an indirect but measurable correlation with rule-of-law quality, which in turn affects operational risk for companies that rely on regulatory predictability and transparent legal processes.

Cepeda has maintained a posture toward critical media that mirrors President Petro’s practice of characterizing adversarial outlets as acting in the interests of economic elites. Under Petro, this produced a systematic exclusion of critical media from official information flows and persistent rhetorical delegitimization of independent journalism, though the press remained legally free to operate. A Cepeda administration would be expected to continue this pattern.

Valencia’s background in Colombia’s traditional political and intellectual establishment, combined with a decade in a party that has faced sustained critical coverage from Colombia’s major outlets, points toward a conventional institutional relationship with the press — adversarial at times, but within professional norms.

De la Espriella’s conduct during the campaign provides direct evidence of his approach. He publicly called Caracol Noticias journalist María Lucía Fernández “ignorant” in a live interview. He issued a formal apology after journalist Laura Rodríguez of Piso 8 FM made allegations of inappropriate conduct. His campaign strategy has drawn comparisons to the approach of Argentine president Javier Milei and US president Donald Trump in its use of direct digital channels to circumvent traditional media while publicly attacking outlets that publish critical coverage. The press would remain legally protected under a De la Espriella administration, but the operational environment for investigative journalism would be hostile.

The Ideological Spectrum: Market Liberalism to State Direction

The question of which candidate is most aligned with free-market principles requires a distinction that the international business press frequently elides: the difference between economic deregulation and political authoritarianism. These can, and in this election do, exist independently.

De la Espriella’s platform is often described in international coverage as the most pro-market. His deregulation proposals for the extractive sector and his corporate tax rhetoric support that reading in the economic domain. His security platform, however, involves a substantial expansion of state coercive power: mass detention operations, a mega-prison construction program, and the suspension of standard due process protections to facilitate rapid incarceration of criminal suspects. The Cato Institute‘s framework of economic freedom as inseparable from civil liberties would categorize a state powerful enough to detain people without standard procedural protections as a state that represents an institutional risk to property rights and contract enforcement as well.

Valencia’s platform, anchored by Oviedo’s technocratic program of structural market reform — reduced administrative barriers, streamlined procurement, smaller state overhead, maintained civil liberties — represents the closest approximation to coherent market liberalism available in this field. It does not carry the rhetorical force of De la Espriella’s deregulation proposals, but it has more institutional grounding.

Cepeda’s platform is the furthest from market liberalism by any standard measure: state-directed investment allocation, wealth redistribution through tax and transfer mechanisms, state expansion in healthcare and pension administration, and agrarian land redistribution. His program is continuous with the Petro administration’s economic framework.

Minor Candidates: The Rest of the Ballot

Several other candidates remain on the ballot and are drawing small but potentially consequential vote shares in a first round where the margin between second and third place could be narrow.

Claudia López, former mayor of Bogotá running under the Con Claudia Imparables coalition, positions herself as a progressive centrist with a documented anti-corruption record. Her polling has not broken 3.5% in major surveys, and her high polarization ratings from her mayoral term limit her growth ceiling. Her attacks on De la Espriella during the campaign — she publicly called him a “defender of the mafia” in reference to his client history — have been among the most pointed in the race, and factually grounded on the public record.

Sergio Fajardo, making his third consecutive presidential run under Dignidad y Compromiso, continues to represent a technocratic, education-focused centrism grounded in his work transforming Medellín in the early 2000s. He has not broken 3.5% in any major poll in this cycle.

Roy Barreras, running under La Fuerza de la Paz following his Frente por la Vida primary victory, is one of the most experienced political operatives in Colombia, having been part of multiple coalition governments across ideological lines over two decades. He polls below the threshold for meaningful first-round impact.

Miguel Uribe Londoño, running under Partido Demócrata, represents a younger-generation conservative platform emphasizing fiscal discipline and private sector growth, broadly consistent with Valencia’s program. He also polls below 3.5%.

Carlos Caicedo, running on a regionalist platform emphasizing decentralization away from Bogotá, draws support primarily from the Costa Caribe. His structural argument about Colombia’s administrative over-centralization is substantively grounded, though his national profile is insufficient to affect the first-round outcome.

Investment Implications

For international capital with Colombian exposure, the three-way race produces three materially different operational scenarios.

A Cepeda victory — which remains the single most likely first-round outcome based on available polling — would signal continuity of the Petro-era regulatory framework: sustained capital outflow pressure, high corporate tax rates, no new fossil fuel exploration contracts for Ecopetrol (NYSE: EC; BVC: ECOPETROL) or private operators, continued labor cost escalation, and a foreign policy trajectory away from Washington. Colombian equity valuations would be expected to remain under pressure. The mining licensing backlog would continue to accumulate. A Cepeda administration would not replicate Venezuela’s economic trajectory — Colombia’s independent central bank, Banco de la República, its functioning constitutional court, and its institutional depth provide meaningful buffers — but the investment headwinds would be structural rather than cyclical.

A Valencia victory would represent the sharpest regulatory reversal available in this field. Ecopetrol exploration contracts would be expected to advance. The mining licensing backlog would be addressed. US bilateral relations would be restored, reactivating security intelligence cooperation and trade facilitation mechanisms. The Colombian peso would be expected to strengthen as country risk premium declined. The path to that outcome now requires her to either close the gap significantly on De la Espriella in the first round or rely on runoff polling that showed her as the stronger second-round candidate — data that predates the most recent polling shift.

A De la Espriella victory introduces the widest distribution of possible outcomes. The upside scenario involves Restrepo managing fiscal and trade policy competently, genuine regulatory rollback in the extractive sector, aggressive extradition resumption, and security operations that reduce the physical risk premium in conflict-affected departments including Cauca, Norte de Santander, and Chocó. The downside scenario involves recurring crises generated by De la Espriella’s personal conduct, conflicts of interest arising from his former client relationships, and authoritarian security measures that attract international human rights attention and complicate bilateral relationships. Restrepo’s presence on the ticket reduces the probability of the downside scenario but does not eliminate it.

The current polling trend indicates that right-wing voters are consolidating around De la Espriella at Valencia’s expense. Whether that consolidation produces a runoff between De la Espriella and Cepeda — and whether the runoff produces a left or right-wing government — remains uncertain. What the polling data does not support is the scenario, widely assumed until recently, of a Cepeda-Valencia runoff in which Valencia was positioned as the structurally stronger opposition candidate.

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The extradition of Alex Saab, who is tied to a huge graft scheme, is part of a purge of powerful figures who helped the deposed president, Nicolás Maduro, stay in power.

Dire conditions in Venezuela prompted an exodus. In the wake of the attack that ousted its top leader, the question is whether things have changed enough to make a return appealing.

Colombian President Gustavo Petro will meet Venezuela’s interim leader Delcy Rodríguez in Caracas on Friday to address security challenges along the shared border, marking their first official encounter since Nicolás Maduro was captured by U.S special forces on January 3, 2026.

The meeting, to be held at the Miraflores presidential palace, is expected to center on coordination between the two countries to tackle armed groups, drug trafficking and other cross-border threats that have long destabilized frontier regions.

Colombia’s presidency said the talks aim to “strengthen bilateral cooperation, territorial control and coordination on security matters,” following the cancellation of a previous meeting scheduled for March 13 at the border due to security concerns cited by Caracas.

Friday’s talks come after Rodríguez assumed power earlier this year following the capture of former Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro during Operation Absolute Resolve.

Petro is expected to travel to Caracas after holding meetings earlier in Bogotá. The leaders will first hold a private discussion to outline joint actions addressing border instability, followed by a broader metting between their respective delegations aimed at formalizing institutional commitments.

Officials from both countries are also expected to sign the final act of the III Commission on Neighborhood and Integration, with foreign ministers participating, before delivering statements to the media.

The Colombia–Venezuela border stretches more than 2,200 kilometers (1,367 miles) from the Caribbean coast to the Amazon basin and has long been a hotspot for illegal activity, including the presence of the National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrilla, as well as drug trafficking and smuggling networks.

Petro said earlier this week that the talks would place particular emphasis on the Catatumbo region, one of the most volatile areas along the frontier, where violence linked to armed groups and illicit economies has intensified.

“If we go, Catatumbo is a key issue to discuss with President Delcy,” Petro said during a cabinet meeting on April 21, adding that his delegation would include military and police officials to coordinate security strategies.

He said the goal is to develop a joint security plan, improve coordination between the two countries’ armed forces and police, and deepen intelligence-sharing, warning that a lack of cooperation could lead to operations that harm civilian populations.

The meeting also comes against the backdrop of a rebound in bilateral trade between the two countries following years of strained relations.

Trade flows have increased significantly in recent years, rising from around US$200 million three years ago to more than $1 billion, representing an increase of roughly 600%, according to official figures.

Colombia recorded a trade surplus of US$1 billion with Venezuela in 2025, underscoring the economic incentives for both governments to maintain stable ties despite ongoing political uncertainties.

Petro first announced the trip last week during an interview in Spain, referencing the earlier failed meeting and signaling his willingness to travel to Caracas to advance talks.

The visit marks a key test of Colombia’s role in engaging with Venezuela’s transitional leadership, as both countries seek to stabilize their shared border while cautiously rebuilding diplomatic and economic relations in the post-Maduro era.

The Justice Department is examining whether President Gustavo Petro of Colombia has ties to drug traffickers.

El Departamento de Justicia estadounidense examina si el mandatario tiene vínculos con narcotraficantes.

Latin America’s left saw Cuba as its lodestar. Now leaders across the spectrum are hesitant to aid a nation in the Trump administration’s cross hairs.

La izquierda de América Latina ha visto a la isla como su referente ideológico. Ahora, líderes de todo el espectro dudan en ayudar a una nación que está en la mira del gobierno de Trump.

El mandatario colombiano había pedido a sus seguidores que salieran por todo el país mientras él se reunía el martes con su homólogo estadounidense.

President Gustavo Petro had asked Colombians to gather around the country during his meeting with President Trump on Tuesday.

Colombian President Gustavo Petro said on Tuesday that Nicolás Maduro should be returned to Venezuela to face trial in his home country, calling the U.S. military operation that captured the ousted leader in Caracas earlier this month a “kidnapping” that violated Venezuelan sovereignty.

“They have to return him and have him tried by a Venezuelan court, not a U.S. one,” Petro said during a public event in Bogotá, days before a scheduled meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump at the White House on Feb. 3.

Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, were captured by U.S. forces on Jan. 3 during a military incursion in Caracas and flown to New York, where they face federal charges including drug trafficking, weapons possession and conspiracy. Both pleaded not guilty at an initial court appearance on Jan. 5 and are being held under maximum-security conditions at the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn. A follow-up hearing is scheduled for March 17.

Petro said the operation lacked a legal basis and risked causing long-lasting damage across Latin America. “No one in their right mind would bomb the homeland of Bolívar,” he said, referring to Venezuelan independence hero Simón Bolívar. “No young man or woman in Latin America will forget that missiles fell on the land of Bolívar.”

The Colombian president framed his remarks as part of a broader critique of U.S. foreign policy and international institutions, reviving rhetoric he has used previously against Trump. He argued that the case should be handled within Venezuela’s judicial system, citing what he described as civilizational differences between Latin America and the Anglo-European world.

“The Latin American civilization is different,” Petro said. “That is why he must be judged there, not in the United States.”

Petro’s comments came during an event announcing the reactivation of Bogotá’s historic San Juan de Dios Hospital, where he appeared alongside Mayor Carlos Fernando Galán. Later in the day, Petro again urged Trump to grant Maduro his freedom or return him to Venezuela, while criticising the United Nations for failing to stop the war in Gaza.

“The way to overcome that failure is not with missiles over the poor,” Petro said. “It is not bombing Caracas.”

The remarks come at a sensitive diplomatic moment, as Petro prepares to travel to Washington after the U.S. government granted him a temporary, five-day visa allowing him to attend the Feb. 3 meeting with Trump. The visa will be valid from Feb. 1 to Feb. 5 and is limited exclusively to the official visit, according to Colombia’s presidency.

Petro’s U.S. visa was withdrawn in September following an unscheduled pro-Palestinian speech he gave in New York during the United Nations General Assembly. On Tuesday, he questioned the decision to reinstate it.

“They took away my visa, now they say they put it back,” Petro said. “Why did they take it away from me? I don’t know if it was for a while or permanently. We’ll know on Feb. 3.”

He described the upcoming meeting with Trump as “determinant,” not only for him personally but “for the life of humanity,” language that underscored both the political symbolism and unpredictability surrounding the encounter.

Colombia’s presidential palace confirmed that the bilateral meeting will take place at 11 a.m. on Feb. 3 inside the White House and said the agenda has been set by the U.S. administration. Officials said the talks aim to stabilise bilateral relations, which have been strained in recent months by disagreements over foreign policy and regional security.

Foreign Minister Rosa Villavicencio will also travel to Washington under the same short-term visa arrangement, ensuring her participation in the official programme, the presidency said.

U.S. authorities have accused Maduro and Flores of overseeing armed groups involved in kidnappings and killings and of receiving hundreds of thousands of dollars in bribes linked to narcotics trafficking. The Justice Department has declassified indictments related to weapons possession and conspiracy involving machine guns and destructive devices.

Although U.S. authorities had previously offered rewards of up to $50 million for information leading to Maduro’s capture, Washington said no reward would be paid because the arrest was carried out directly by U.S. forces under Trump’s renewed extraction orders.

Petro did not address the specific charges against Maduro, focusing instead on what he said were the broader legal and moral implications of the operation, as Colombia seeks to balance its relationship with Washington while maintaining its longstanding opposition to foreign military interventions in the region.

On Wednesday, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio is due to meet with Venezuelan opposition leader María Corina Machado at the State Department. The meeting follows U.S. intelligence assessments raising doubts over whether Venezuela’s interim Chavista-run government would cooperate with the Trump administration by severing ties with close international allies such as Iran, China and Russia. Reuters has reported that CIA Director John Ratcliffe travelled to Caracas on Jan. 15 for talks related to Venezuela’s political future. “I want to be clear with you what I’ve shared publicly. We made multiple attempts to get Maduro to leave voluntarily and to avoid all of this because we understood that he was an impediment to progress. You couldn’t make a deal with this guy,” remarked U.S Secretary of State Marco Rubio.

El ELN, un grupo guerrillero armado, se atreve a desafiar la autoridad del Estado colombiano y las ambiciones de EE. UU. en Venezuela.

Los expertos afirman que la determinación del presidente de Colombia de desmantelar al ELN es un reflejo tanto de las exigencias de Trump como de la frustración interna por su anterior gestión de los grupos armados.

President Gustavo Petro of Colombia is taking a harder line against the National Liberation Army, or ELN, a leftist group experts call a powerful drug trafficker in Colombia and Venezuela.

An armed guerrilla group stands emboldened to challenge the authority of the Colombian state — and U.S. ambitions in Venezuela.

Las distintas reacciones de los países latinoamericanos a la incursión de EE. UU. en Venezuela muestran cómo el gobierno de Trump está alterando el continente.

The U.S. capture of Nicolás Maduro has divided the region. But every nation wants to avoid being next.

Bogotá, Colombia — Thousands gathered in Plaza de Bolívar after answering Colombian President Gustavo Petro’s call to mobilize against threats to Colombia’s national sovereignty from the United States.

Petro called for people to take to the streets in every public square across the country after Trump said military action in Colombia “sounds good” on Sunday, January 4,, just a day after removing Nicolás Maduro from power in neighboring Venezuela.

While Petro was expected to deliver a rousing speech against U.S. intervention, he told the crowd that he had to make his remarks less “harsh” after a conciliatory call with Trump just minutes before addressing demonstrators.

Plaza de Bolívar, located in central Bogotá near Congress and the Casa de Nariño presidential residence and office, hosted over 20,000 demonstrators and was adorned with flags and protest signs from the afternoon into the night of January 7.

“And no, no, I do not feel like being a North American colony. And yes, yes, I do feel like being a free and sovereign Colombia,” protesters chanted.

Many participants also used the demonstration to voice opposition to related issues, such as the exploitation of natural resources and the presence of foreign military bases.

“If we don’t defend our country, who will do it for us?” said one demonstrator. Other attendees stressed that the mobilization was not only about Colombia, but about Latin America as a whole.

Throughout the day, the rally featured musical performances and included the presence of labor and union representatives, public institutions, and a large portion of the presidential cabinet. The president and several ministers delivered speeches from the main stage.

President Petro presented some official data and concrete results from three years of his administration — including his fight against drug trafficking — many of them in comparison with the previous government. Among the achievements cited was the seizure of 2,800 tons of illegal substances by December 31, 2025. 

“My goal was zero blows against Colombia’s peasantry, voluntary crop substitution; we are now at 30,000 hectares registered,” he explained.

Petro publicly accused the U.S. far right and Colombian politicians of having convinced Trump that he “ran cocaine factories” and was a “front man for Maduro.” “We are not enemies of any people in the world,” he stated during his speech. Petro also said he spoke with Delcy Rodríguez, Interim President of Venezuela.

The phone call was later confirmed by Trump through his Truth Social account: “It was a great Honor to speak with the President of Colombia, Gustavo Petro, who called to explain the situation of drugs and other disagreements that we had. I appreciated his call and tone, and look forward to meeting him in the near future. Arrangements are being made between Secretary of State Marco Rubio and the Foreign Minister of Colombia. This meeting will take place in the White House in Washington, D.C..” 

In closing, the Colombian leader reaffirmed his stance on national sovereignty, as well as his differences with Trump over events in Venezuela — which he described as “illegal” — and other issues.

“To the mothers of Colombia, I say that the country clearly stands up for the defense of national sovereignty, because [Álvaro] Uribe is wrong. If they touch Petro, they touch Colombia. And if they touch Colombia, Colombia responds as its history has taught it—plain and simple.”

Featured image: Demonstrators at Plaza de Bolívar in central Bogotá
Author: Cristina Dorado Suaza

This article originally appeared on Latin America Reports and was re-published with permission.

The post Thousands rally in Colombia’s Plaza de Bolívar following President Petro’s call with Trump appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

Colombian President Gustavo Petro has called on supporters to mobilise nationwide on Wednesday to defend “national sovereignty,” sharply escalating a diplomatic crisis with the United States after President Donald Trump said a U.S. military operation against Colombia “sounds good” to him.

The demonstrations are expected to take place in Bogotá’s Plaza de Bolívar, Parque Lourdes in the Chapinero locality, and outside the U.S. Embassy, with parallel protests planned in Medellín (Plaza Mayor), Cali (Plaza de Cayzedo), Bucaramanga (Plazoleta Cívica Luis Carlos Galán), Cartagena (Plaza de San Pedro Claver), Santa Marta (Parque de Bolívar).

The mobilisation follows Trump’s remarks aboard Air Force One on Sunday, when he described Petro as “a sick man” and appeared to endorse the idea of a U.S. military operation in Colombia — dubbed “Operation Colombia” by a journalist — comparable in scope to the operation that led to the arrest of Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro and wife, Cilia Flores.

When pressed on whether he meant direct military action, Trump replied: “Sounds good to me,” before adding that Petro should “watch his ass.” The White House has not clarified whether the comments reflect official U.S. policy.

A Return to Arms?

Petro responded with a torrent of social media posts and public statements that have alarmed political opponents and business leaders . In some of his strongest language since taking office, the leftist president warned that U.S. military action would plunge Colombia back into armed conflict.

“If you bomb peasants, thousands of guerrillas will return to the mountains,” Petro said. “And if you arrest the president whom a good part of my people want and respect, you will unleash the popular jaguar.”

Petro, Colombia’s first leftist leader and a former militant of the M-19 guerrilla, said he had sworn under the 1989 peace pact never to take up arms again, but suggested that commitment could be reversed if Colombia’s sovereignty were threatened.

“Although I have not been a military man, I know war and clandestinity,” Petro wrote. “I swore not to touch a weapon again since the 1989 Peace Pact, but for the homeland I will take up arms again — even though I do not want to.”

He also warned Colombia’s armed forces against showing loyalty to Washington, saying any commander who prioritised U.S. interests over Colombia’s would be dismissed. The constitution, he said, required the military to defend “popular sovereignty.”

Diplomatic protest lodged in Washington

Colombia’s Foreign Ministry formally raised the dispute on January 4, issuing a diplomatic note of protest to the U.S. government through Ambassador Daniel García-Peña in Washington.

In the letter, the ministry said Trump’s remarks violated basic principles governing relations between sovereign states and amounted to “undue interference” in Colombia’s internal affairs.

“The President of the Republic of Colombia has been legitimately elected by the sovereign will of the Colombian people,” the statement said, adding that any attempt to discredit him was incompatible with international law and the United Nations Charter.

The Cancillería also cited principles of sovereign equality, non-intervention and mutual respect, saying threats or the use of force between states were “unacceptable.”

“Colombia is a democratic, sovereign state that conducts its foreign policy autonomously,” it said. “Its sovereignty, institutional legitimacy and political independence are not subject to external conditioning.”

The crisis has further polarised Colombia’s already fractured political landscape. Former president Álvaro Uribe, a vocal critic of Petro, said Colombia was drifting toward a Venezuela-style confrontation with the United States, though he stopped short of endorsing military intervention.

“What Colombia needs is a change of government,” Uribe told El Tiempo, adding that he trusted Washington’s strategy was “well conceived.”

Petro has cast Wednesday’s demonstrations as a defining moment for his presidency, portraying himself as the defender of national dignity against foreign aggression. He also reiterated the Colombian goverment’s position to cooperate fully with Washington on counter-narcotics and security issues. “You (Trump) took it upon yourself, in an act of arrogance, to punish my opinion — my words against the Palestinian genocide. Your punishment has been to falsely label me a drug trafficker and accuse me of running cocaine factories,” stated Petro hours after the Air Force One declations. “I don’t know whether Maduro is good or bad, or even whether he is a drug trafficker (…) so, stop the slander against me,” he said.

Petro’s critics accuse the president of instrumentalising public rallies to divert attention from Colombia’s deep internal security crisis, and to position himself politically alongside Venezuela’s ousted strongman. They argue that his language of “sovereignty” closely mirrors chavista narratives, warning that the protests risk morphing into an implicit show of solidarity with Nicolás Maduro rather than a defence of Colombia’s territorial integrity.

The White House has not walked back Trump’s remarks, and U.S. officials have so far declined to offer reassurances. On Wednesday morning, Secretary of State Marco Rubio and U.S. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth held a classified briefing with senators on Capitol Hill in which, according to Democratic leaders, their Republican counterparts refused to rule out sending U.S. troops to Venezuela or other countries.

Democratic Senate leader Chuck Schumer said he had asked for assurances that Washington was not planning operations elsewhere. “I mentioned some cases — including Colombia and Cuba — and I was very disappointed with their response,” Schumer said, adding that the meeting “left more questions than answers” and that the plan for the United States to govern Venezuela was “vague and based on illusions.”

As governments across Latin America closely watch the incoming chavista regime under interim president Delcy Rodríguez, the confrontation between Trump and Petro marks the most serious rupture in U.S.–Colombia relations in over two centuries. For Bogotá — long one of Washington’s closest allies in the region — the escalation has raised fears that incendiary rhetoric and mass mobilisation could push an already volatile situation into dangerous territory.

Editor’s Note: The U.S Embassy in Bogotá has issued a security alert, warning U.S. citizens to avoid large protests “as they have the potential to turn violent”.

President Gustavo Petro said that he had asked the Colombian people to defend him “against any illegitimate violent act.” His defense minister emphasized that security cooperation with Washington continued.