Twenty-Year Debt Arc Resets Colombia’s Sovereign Risk Outlook

Two decades of fiscal data show that Colombia’s gross general government debt has moved through four distinct macroeconomic phases, ending the current cycle at a level that is materially higher than its pre-pandemic baseline. Persistent annual fiscal deficits, currency volatility, an emergency spending shock and weaker-than-projected tax revenues have combined to push the ratio of public debt to gross domestic product from the mid-30s percent range in the mid-2000s to a band of roughly 60 to 62 percent at the start of 2026, according to figures published by the Ministerio de Hacienda y Crédito Público and the Banco de la República.

The shift carries direct implications for sovereign bondholders, multinationals operating in Colombia and any investor pricing country risk in the Andean region. All three major rating agencies — S&P Global Ratings, Moody’s Ratings and Fitch Ratings — now place Colombia in speculative-grade, or junk, territory, with consecutive downgrades through 2025 and into early 2026.

“The activation of the escape clause confirms that the deterioration observed in 2024 will not be corrected in 2025.” — Renzo Merino, sovereign analyst, Moody’s Ratings

The commodity cushion: 2006 to 2014

During the global commodity supercycle, Colombia benefited from sustained gross domestic product growth and steady government revenue. Hydrocarbon and mining receipts — channeled through Ecopetrol (NYSE: EC; BVC: ECOPETROL) and the broader extractive sector — supplied a substantial share of national tax intake. The debt-to-GDP ratio remained relatively stable during this period, generally hovering between 34 and 38 percent. Even with chronic primary deficits, nominal growth in the denominator absorbed new borrowing, masking the underlying structural imbalance that the Comité Autónomo de la Regla Fiscal (CARF) would later flag as the persistent driver of fiscal stress.

The currency and revenue shock: 2014 to 2019

The mechanics of the ratio changed sharply when Brent crude prices collapsed in late 2014. Reduced hydrocarbon royalties widened the fiscal gap just as the Colombian peso depreciated against the US dollar. Because a significant share of Colombia’s sovereign liabilities is denominated in foreign currency, the peso’s slide automatically inflated the local-currency value of outstanding external debt when measured against domestic GDP. The combined effect — wider deficits funded by new borrowing, plus a valuation effect on existing dollar-denominated obligations — pushed the ratio steadily higher through the late 2010s.

The structural revenue weakness that surfaced during this period has remained a recurring theme in subsequent fiscal assessments from Fedesarrollo and the Pontificia Universidad Javeriana Observatorio Fiscal, both of which have noted that successive tax reforms failed to fully close the gap between commitments and ordinary income.

The pandemic ceiling: 2020

The combination of emergency social spending under the Ingreso Solidario program, expanded health outlays and a sharp contraction in nominal GDP drove the ratio to a historic peak above 65 percent in 2020. The Ministerio de Hacienda reports the all-time high at 65.3 percent of GDP that year. The government activated the escape clause of the regla fiscal — Colombia’s fiscal rule, codified in Law 1473 of 2011 and modified by Law 2155 of 2021 — to accommodate the spending response, suspending the rule for 2020 and 2021.

That episode also triggered the first sovereign downgrade cycle: S&P Global Ratings cut Colombia’s long-term foreign currency rating to BB+ from BBB- in May 2021 after the administration of then-president Iván Duque withdrew a tax reform bill following street protests, costing the country its investment-grade status with that agency.

The new baseline: 2023 to 2026

Strong post-pandemic nominal growth briefly pulled the debt ratio down toward 57 percent in 2023. The decline did not hold. Structural spending pressures, elevated international interest rates and tax collections below budgeted projections pushed the ratio back up, establishing a new operating band around 60 to 62 percent of GDP. The Ministerio de Hacienda reported government debt to GDP at 61.3 percent for 2024.

The administration of President Gustavo Petro and Finance Minister Germán Ávila Plazas activated the regla fiscal escape clause for a second time in June 2025, with the Consejo Superior de Política Fiscal (Confis) approving a three-year suspension covering 2025 through 2027. The decision came despite an unfavorable technical opinion from the Comité Autónomo de la Regla Fiscal, which concluded that legal conditions for activating the clause were not met outside of a national emergency. The clause had previously been invoked only during the COVID-19 pandemic.

According to the Marco Fiscal de Mediano Plazo (MFMP) presented by the Ministerio de Hacienda, net public debt to GDP is projected to rise from 53 percent in 2023 to 61.3 percent in 2025 and approximately 63 percent in 2026. The fiscal deficit for 2025 was initially projected at 7.1 percent of GDP and later revised to roughly 6.2 percent of GDP, with the administration targeting a deficit below 6 percent of GDP for 2026.

Debt service consumes a larger share of the budget

The cost of servicing this debt has reshaped the structure of the national budget. The 2026 draft budget presented by Minister Ávila totals $557 trillion COP, equivalent to roughly $134.7 billion USD, and represents 28.9 percent of GDP. Of that, debt servicing costs are projected at $102.5 trillion COP, or 5.3 percent of GDP, down from 6.2 percent of GDP in 2025.

The figures published by the Ministerio de Hacienda for domestic debt service in 2026 are higher when measured against tax intake alone: of an estimated $130 trillion COP in domestic debt service, $79 trillion COP corresponds to principal that can be rolled over through new issuances, while $51 trillion COP represents interest payments funded directly from the budget. Against projected tax revenue of approximately $300 trillion COP, that implies roughly one in every three pesos collected by the central government is allocated to interest on existing debt.

Rating agencies reprice the sovereign

The rating cycle has accelerated alongside the fiscal trajectory. Moody’s Ratings downgraded Colombia to Baa3 and subsequently into junk territory in 2025, citing the suspension of the fiscal rule. S&P Global Ratings issued a further downgrade in April 2026, its second cut in less than a year, on the same persistent deficit and debt concerns. Fitch Ratings also moved Colombia deeper into speculative grade in December 2025.

The Banco de la República reported external debt — combining public and private liabilities — at $238.7 billion USD at the close of November 2025, equivalent to 54.8 percent of GDP, an increase of $15.8 billion USD from January of the same year. The Colombian economy is currently valued at approximately $435 billion USD.

What investors are watching next

The Comité Autónomo de la Regla Fiscal has stated in its most recent reports to Congress that the 2025 primary balance target was missed by a wide margin even after the escape clause was activated, and that incoming projections for 2026 raise the bar for any return to the original fiscal rule by 2028. Business groups including Fenalco and the Consejo Gremial Nacional have publicly opposed the suspension and signaled potential legal challenges.

The 2026 financing plan disclosed by the Ministerio de Hacienda includes approximately $4.6 billion USD in global bond issuances, primarily to refinance a one-year Swiss-franc Total Return Swap operation valued at roughly $9.3 billion USD. The ministry has stated that the issuance does not constitute net new external debt. Updated debt and deficit targets are scheduled for release in the next iteration of the Plan Financiero.

For executives operating in Colombia or evaluating new investment, the baseline shift from a mid-30s to a low-60s debt-to-GDP environment alters several variables simultaneously: peso volatility tied to refinancing cycles, the trajectory of corporate tax policy as Congress weighs successive reform proposals, and the path of domestic interest rates set by the Banco de la República as it manages inflation alongside elevated sovereign funding costs. Detailed historical and forward-looking debt data is published by the Investor Relations Colombia office of the Ministerio de Hacienda.

Colombians face three sharply different futures in May 31 vote

Colombia votes on May 31 with its presidential race concentrated around three candidates whose platforms diverge on nearly every dimension of economic and security policy relevant to foreign investors. For corporate executives, institutional investors, and multinational operations with Colombian exposure, the choice between senator Iván Cepeda, senator Paloma Valencia, and defense attorney Abelardo de la Espriella carries direct, measurable implications for the regulatory environment, foreign direct investment (FDI) conditions, energy sector licensing, and geopolitical alignment through at least 2030.

No candidate is projected to clear the 50%-plus-one threshold required to win outright on May 31, making a runoff election on June 21 the expected outcome. The question that will determine the direction of that runoff — and by extension the next administration — is which of the two opposition candidates finishes second.

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A Race Reshaped by Late Polling

The final-week polling picture shifted substantially, and the trajectory matters as much as the snapshot. The CONDOR weighted aggregate — which incorporates surveys from six polling firms and applies greater weight to more recent data — placed the race as of May 23 at: Cepeda 36.3%, De la Espriella 29.1%, Valencia 16.7%.

Invamer, one of Colombia’s most established polling firms, surveyed 3,800 respondents across 152 municipalities between May 13 and May 20, registering Cepeda at 44.6%, De la Espriella at 31.6%, and Valencia at 14.0%. The Centro Nacional de Consultoría (CNC) published a survey conducted May 22 and 23 showing Cepeda at 33.4%, De la Espriella at 30.9%, and Valencia at 12.6%.

Comparing those figures to the Fundación Génesis Crea survey from May 4 through May 11 — which placed Cepeda at 35.1%, Valencia at 25.4%, and De la Espriella at 21.6% — indicates a multi-poll trend of De la Espriella gaining approximately nine to ten percentage points in three weeks while Valencia shed a comparable share. AS/COA’s poll tracker confirms the directional consistency across firms.

Atlas Intel, which published figures more favorable to De la Espriella, is currently under investigation by Colombia’s Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE) for potential methodology violations and could face suspension of its operations. Those figures are treated with caution in this analysis.

Runoff modeling diverges between firms. Fundación Génesis Crea showed Valencia defeating Cepeda 49.1% to 44.7% in a second-round matchup — meaning she was the stronger opposition candidate in that scenario. The Guarumo/Ecoanalítica survey found Cepeda losing all hypothetical runoff scenarios, including against De la Espriella. Two minor candidates — former senator Clara López and former Chocó governor Luis Gilberto Murillo — withdrew and endorsed Cepeda before the first round, a consolidation that appears to have had limited effect on his polling numbers.

Finance Colombia reported in May that the campaign has been marked by an unusual absence of traditional televised debates. Cepeda declined to participate in events organized by major media outlets, stating that proposed formats lacked neutrality. Former Bogotá Mayor Claudia López, herself a candidate, said publicly that Cepeda’s refusal was motivated by an unwillingness to defend his record as the architect of President Gustavo Petro‘s Paz Total security negotiation strategy.

Security Policy: The Three Approaches to Armed Groups

Public security is the top voter concern heading into the election. InSight Crime documented that the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) launched a major offensive against FARC dissident factions in Norte de Santander in early 2025, resulting in mass civilian casualties in the Catatumbo region. In Chocó and Antioquia, the ELN and the Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC), commonly known as the Clan del Golfo, are competing for control of illegal gold mining corridors and drug trafficking routes. In Cauca, FARC dissident factions have established territorial control in areas where state presence has collapsed.

Cepeda’s approach to security is defined by his role as the principal legislative architect of Paz Total. As chair of the Senate‘s peace commission, he designed the framework that extended negotiating status to the ELN, FARC dissident groups, and the Clan del Golfo. His stated rationale is that targeting the financial leadership of drug networks rather than foot soldiers produces more durable results — a position that has academic backing in narcotics policy literature. In practice, Paz Total produced ceasefires that were repeatedly violated, and security indicators in conflict-affected departments deteriorated during the Petro administration. A Cepeda presidency is expected to continue the negotiated settlement model, with the military operating under political constraints.

Valencia’s security platform is based on reinstating Seguridad Democrática, the doctrine associated with former president Álvaro Uribe’s administrations from 2002 to 2010. The core elements are expanded military presence in rural conflict zones, dismantling of rural criminal networks, and resumption of extradition agreements with the United States — which Petro suspended, effectively shielding cartel leadership from US federal prosecution. The Uribe-era approach resulted in measurable reductions in homicide rates, forced displacement, and ELN and FARC territorial control, though human rights organizations documented serious abuses by security forces during that period.

De la Espriella has stated explicitly that his government would have no peace process. He advocates for a model similar to El Salvador’s under President Nayib Bukele: mass incarceration, construction of high-security prison facilities, classification of guerrilla and cartel organizations as foreign terrorist organizations, and broad military offensives. He has not detailed how such operations would be financed or how the mass detention model would interact with Colombia’s Constitutional Court, which has repeatedly constrained executive security powers.

For the armed groups operating in Norte de Santander and Cauca, the historical record indicates that Colombia’s criminal organizations respond more acutely to sustained, institutionally grounded military pressure and functioning extradition pipelines than to political rhetoric. By that measure, Valencia’s platform — which rebuilds the institutional security apparatus incrementally — represents a more structurally credible threat to the ELN and the Estado Mayor Central (EMC) FARC dissidents. For the Clan del Golfo leadership, extradition to the United States has historically been the principal deterrent, and Valencia’s program explicitly restores it.

Business Climate and Employment Conditions

The Petro administration enacted a series of minimum wage increases totaling more than 60% over four years — including a 16% increase for 2023, the largest single-year hike in Colombian history, and a 23.78% increase for 2026 — restructured labor regulations to expand premium pay requirements for night, weekend, and holiday shifts, and raised corporate tax rates to fund social spending programs. The Asociación Nacional de Empresarios de Colombia (ANDI) characterized the regulatory environment as adverse to private investment. Finance Colombia tracked a material decline in FDI in the extractive sector over the same period.

Cepeda supported those labor and fiscal reforms throughout their legislative passage. His platform extends the Petro model: increased state social spending, continued land redistribution programs, and maintenance of the current wage and labor cost structure. For companies with established Colombian operations, the regulatory environment is manageable; for companies evaluating market entry or operational expansion, the cost structure adds friction.

Valencia’s economic program emphasizes corporate stability and private sector investment as the primary mechanisms of job creation. Her vice-presidential running mate, Juan Daniel Oviedo — former director of DANE, Colombia’s national statistics agency — represents a technocratic orientation focused on reducing structural market distortions, streamlining public procurement, and scaling back state administrative overhead. Oviedo’s appointment is a direct signal to the business community that economic management would be data-driven rather than ideologically directed. Oviedo also publicly identifies as a member of the LGBTQ+ community, a departure from the traditional social conservatism of Centro Democrático.

De la Espriella’s economic orientation is pro-business with protectionist elements. His vice-presidential candidate, José Manuel Restrepo — who served as Colombia’s Finance Minister and Commerce Minister — provides institutional credibility on fiscal and trade policy. Restrepo’s presence on the ticket signals commitment to fiscal discipline and regulatory reduction in the extractive and commercial sectors. De la Espriella’s personal style, however, introduces operational uncertainty; his campaign has generated multiple high-profile controversies, including a public altercation with Caracol Noticias journalist María Lucía Fernández during a live broadcast and a formal apology following misconduct allegations by journalist Laura Rodríguez of Piso 8 FM.

Foreign Investment, Oil, and Mining

The extractive sector is the most consequential economic policy dimension for international capital. Ecopetrol (NYSE: EC; BVC: ECOPETROL) — Colombia’s state-controlled energy company and the largest corporation in the country — has operated under exploration restrictions during the Petro administration, which has opposed new fossil fuel contracts on climate grounds.

Cepeda’s position extends the Petro framework: mandatory transition away from fossil fuels, heavy restrictions or outright prohibitions on new oil and gas exploration contracts, and stringent environmental licensing requirements for open-pit mining operations. Foreign investment would be directed by policy toward green hydrogen, ecotourism, and smallholder agriculture. For the multinational oil majors with Colombian operations and for institutional investors in the mining sector, a Cepeda presidency represents a continuation of the current constraints and, in some contract scenarios, an accelerated wind-down of Colombian portfolios.

In a related development, Finance Colombia reported in May that Ecopetrol’s president, Ricardo Roa, has been formally charged in connection with alleged campaign spending violations during Petro’s 2022 presidential campaign. The case will be inherited by whoever takes office in August.

Valencia’s position is that hydrocarbon revenues are essential to Colombia’s macroeconomic stability and that the country cannot exit the sector before alternative revenue structures exist. Her platform actively encourages FDI in petroleum exploration, is open to regulated fracking, and commits to clearing the environmental licensing backlog that has stalled multiple large-scale gold and copper mining projects. For energy and mining companies currently blocked by administrative delays, this represents the most direct path to project advancement.

De la Espriella’s position goes further: essentially deregulating the environmental licensing process for major extraction projects on the grounds that Colombia’s economic sovereignty takes precedence over environmental restrictions he characterizes as externally imposed. The practical constraint is whether a De la Espriella administration would have the institutional coherence and congressional support to deliver regulatory rollback, given that his movement has no established political party structure and entered the race through an independent signature campaign.

Foreign Policy: Washington Alignment vs. Multipolar Strategy

Colombia’s relationship with the United States deteriorated materially under Petro, who aligned Colombia with Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro, pursued closer ties with China and Russia, and suspended extradition agreements. US counternarcotics cooperation was strained throughout the period.

Cepeda is committed to what he describes as a multipolar foreign policy — maintaining functional diplomatic channels with Washington and Brussels while deepening strategic and commercial relationships with China and Russia. His alignment with regional left-of-center governments in Mexico, Brazil, and Bolivia would position Colombia as part of a Latin American bloc that has grown increasingly skeptical of US regional leadership. For US companies operating in Colombia, this trajectory does not mean immediate operational disruption, but it reduces Colombia’s utility as a reliable counterpart on security cooperation, counter-narcotics intelligence sharing, and trade dispute resolution.

Valencia positions a return to the Western alignment as a core objective. She would prioritize restoring the US-Colombia relationship, reinforcing the bilateral Free Trade Agreement, and reestablishing intelligence-sharing mechanisms that were reduced under Petro. Her framing positions Colombia as a democratic anchor in a region experiencing authoritarian pressures.

De la Espriella takes the most explicit pro-US position in the race. La Silla Vacía reported that De la Espriella or entities linked to his campaign donated more than $90,000 USD to the US Republican Party, a fact that raises questions about the nature and expectations of those relationships. He has publicly aligned himself with the populist right in the United States, takes a hostile posture toward China, Russia, and Venezuela, and has characterized his security approach as consistent with a transactional alliance with Washington focused on counter-narcotics enforcement and cartel designation as foreign terrorist organizations.

“Ese pisco robó a 200 mil colombianos.” — Claudia López, former Mayor of Bogotá, referring to presidential candidate Abelardo de la Espriella’s legal representation of DMG pyramid scheme founder David Murcia Guzmán, during a presidential campaign event.

Corruption and Judicial Independence

All three candidates have stated commitments to fighting corruption, though their approaches and focal points differ in ways that are material to the institutional environment for business operations.

Cepeda’s legislative record includes serious, documented work investigating paramilitary infiltration of Colombia’s political institutions — the period known as parapolítica — and pursuing accountability for those cases. His blind spot, his critics argue, is corruption within the current administration. When Ecopetrol’s Ricardo Roa was formally charged in connection with Petro’s 2022 campaign, the response from the Pacto Histórico coalition was subdued. Cepeda has been Álvaro Uribe’s primary judicial antagonist in the Senate; a Cepeda administration would offer no institutional protection to Uribe and would be expected to support the full progress of judicial proceedings against him. For left-wing politicians facing legal exposure, including former Medellín mayor Daniel Quintero, a Cepeda administration would be expected to be more receptive to amnesty frameworks.

Valencia’s approach to anti-corruption is structural rather than prosecutorial: strengthening the independence of the Contraloría General de la República and the Fiscalía General de la Nación, implementing digital transparency in public procurement, and reducing informal executive influence over judicial processes. She would be expected to apply political and rhetorical pressure on behalf of Uribe — her political mentor and a close ally — though her legislative track record indicates a degree of institutional independence from Centro Democrático party orthodoxy.

De la Espriella’s anti-corruption rhetoric centers on severe criminal penalties for corrupt officials. The credibility of that position is complicated by his professional history, which is examined in detail below.

De la Espriella’s Legal Career: The Documented Record

De la Espriella’s campaign has faced sustained scrutiny over his client history as one of Colombia’s highest-profile criminal defense attorneys. The record is documented in reporting by El Colombiano, El Espectador, and the investigative outlet Corrupción al Día.

His documented client roster includes Salvatore Mancuso, the former supreme commander of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) paramilitary network; multiple legislators convicted in the parapolítica scandal, which established systematic infiltration of Colombia’s congress by paramilitary organizations; David Murcia Guzmán, the operator of the DMG pyramid scheme that defrauded an estimated 200,000 Colombian investors; the Nule Primos, convicted of large-scale public contract fraud; and Álex Saab, the Colombian businessman extradited to the United States on charges of acting as the primary money launderer for the Maduro government in Venezuela. According to Corrupción al Día, De la Espriella’s legal fees from Saab reportedly reached $12 million USD and included private aircraft travel.

De la Espriella’s response to this line of criticism rests on due process principles: that every accused person is entitled to vigorous legal defense regardless of the charges, and that his ability to navigate Colombia’s criminal code at its most complex levels demonstrates the expertise required to enforce the law from the executive branch. The argument has legal validity as a principle. The specific issue for foreign compliance officers and US government counterparts is the Saab representation: the same Nicolás Maduro whose regime De la Espriella’s campaign now characterizes as an ideological enemy received legal services from De la Espriella’s firm when the representation was commercially available.

The Fiscalía investigated De la Espriella in connection with alleged paramilitary links in 2009 and again in 2012; both investigations were dismissed for insufficient evidence, and he carries no convictions or active investigations on those matters.

Cepeda’s Family History and Ideological Background

Critics of Iván Cepeda, including Enrique Gómez of the Salvación Nacional party, have argued that his family background constitutes evidence of structural alignment with guerrilla movements. The record on this point merits examination.

Cepeda is the son of Manuel Cepeda Vargas, who served as Secretary-General of the Colombian Communist Party and as a senator for the Unión Patriótica (UP), a left-wing political movement that was systematically exterminated by a combination of state actors and paramilitary organizations during the 1980s and 1990s. Manuel Cepeda Vargas was assassinated on August 9, 1994. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights subsequently found the Colombian state responsible for his murder. The FARC-EP named its Frente Urbano Manuel Cepeda Vargas — an urban front operating within the Bloque Occidental — in the elder Cepeda’s honor.

The Fundación Paz y Reconciliación (PARES) has documented that Iván Cepeda’s relationship with his father’s political positions was more complex than the family lineage alone suggests. After studying in Bulgaria in 1981, Cepeda broke from his father’s Soviet-oriented communist framework and aligned with democratic leftists including Bernardo Jaramillo Ossa, who publicly rejected the FARC’s armed strategy. Cepeda has repeatedly stated his repudiation of the FARC’s use of his father’s name. No documented evidence connects him to operational coordination with current armed groups.

What the family history does establish is the ideological framework through which Cepeda processes security policy: a belief, grounded in personal and political experience, that the Colombian state’s institutional violence has been as destructive as guerrilla violence, and that negotiated settlements are structurally preferable to military solutions. That framework generates Paz Total. It also generates a posture toward ELN and FARC dissident negotiators that prioritizes process continuity over verified compliance — a disposition that armed groups have demonstrably exploited to maintain territorial and operational positions while negotiation frameworks provided legal cover.

Valencia and the Uribe Question

The comparison to former president Iván Duque (2018–2022) comes up regularly in discussions of Valencia’s political independence. Duque, who had limited independent political standing before Uribe selected him, was perceived throughout his term as governing within constraints set by his patron — a dynamic that Colombian political cartoonists characterized as ventriloquism.

Valencia’s profile differs materially. She is the granddaughter of former Colombian president Guillermo León Valencia, carries her own political lineage, and has served in the Senate for over a decade, building positions on agrarian reform, judicial modernization, and indigenous land rights that have placed her at variance with standard Centro Democrático positions on those issues. She won the Gran Consulta por Colombia primary on March 8 with more than 45% of the vote — over 3.2 million Colombians — establishing a democratic mandate distinct from any party endorsement.

She would be expected to use institutional and rhetorical channels to support Uribe in the ongoing judicial proceedings against him, and to apply pressure on the trajectory of those cases. Whether that constitutes political interference with judicial independence or normal advocacy within democratic norms is a question on which observers disagree. What the legislative record does not support is the characterization of Valencia as incapable of independent governance.

Press Freedom and the Media Environment

Press freedom carries an indirect but measurable correlation with rule-of-law quality, which in turn affects operational risk for companies that rely on regulatory predictability and transparent legal processes.

Cepeda has maintained a posture toward critical media that mirrors President Petro’s practice of characterizing adversarial outlets as acting in the interests of economic elites. Under Petro, this produced a systematic exclusion of critical media from official information flows and persistent rhetorical delegitimization of independent journalism, though the press remained legally free to operate. A Cepeda administration would be expected to continue this pattern.

Valencia’s background in Colombia’s traditional political and intellectual establishment, combined with a decade in a party that has faced sustained critical coverage from Colombia’s major outlets, points toward a conventional institutional relationship with the press — adversarial at times, but within professional norms.

De la Espriella’s conduct during the campaign provides direct evidence of his approach. He publicly called Caracol Noticias journalist María Lucía Fernández “ignorant” in a live interview. He issued a formal apology after journalist Laura Rodríguez of Piso 8 FM made allegations of inappropriate conduct. His campaign strategy has drawn comparisons to the approach of Argentine president Javier Milei and US president Donald Trump in its use of direct digital channels to circumvent traditional media while publicly attacking outlets that publish critical coverage. The press would remain legally protected under a De la Espriella administration, but the operational environment for investigative journalism would be hostile.

The Ideological Spectrum: Market Liberalism to State Direction

The question of which candidate is most aligned with free-market principles requires a distinction that the international business press frequently elides: the difference between economic deregulation and political authoritarianism. These can, and in this election do, exist independently.

De la Espriella’s platform is often described in international coverage as the most pro-market. His deregulation proposals for the extractive sector and his corporate tax rhetoric support that reading in the economic domain. His security platform, however, involves a substantial expansion of state coercive power: mass detention operations, a mega-prison construction program, and the suspension of standard due process protections to facilitate rapid incarceration of criminal suspects. The Cato Institute‘s framework of economic freedom as inseparable from civil liberties would categorize a state powerful enough to detain people without standard procedural protections as a state that represents an institutional risk to property rights and contract enforcement as well.

Valencia’s platform, anchored by Oviedo’s technocratic program of structural market reform — reduced administrative barriers, streamlined procurement, smaller state overhead, maintained civil liberties — represents the closest approximation to coherent market liberalism available in this field. It does not carry the rhetorical force of De la Espriella’s deregulation proposals, but it has more institutional grounding.

Cepeda’s platform is the furthest from market liberalism by any standard measure: state-directed investment allocation, wealth redistribution through tax and transfer mechanisms, state expansion in healthcare and pension administration, and agrarian land redistribution. His program is continuous with the Petro administration’s economic framework.

Minor Candidates: The Rest of the Ballot

Several other candidates remain on the ballot and are drawing small but potentially consequential vote shares in a first round where the margin between second and third place could be narrow.

Claudia López, former mayor of Bogotá running under the Con Claudia Imparables coalition, positions herself as a progressive centrist with a documented anti-corruption record. Her polling has not broken 3.5% in major surveys, and her high polarization ratings from her mayoral term limit her growth ceiling. Her attacks on De la Espriella during the campaign — she publicly called him a “defender of the mafia” in reference to his client history — have been among the most pointed in the race, and factually grounded on the public record.

Sergio Fajardo, making his third consecutive presidential run under Dignidad y Compromiso, continues to represent a technocratic, education-focused centrism grounded in his work transforming Medellín in the early 2000s. He has not broken 3.5% in any major poll in this cycle.

Roy Barreras, running under La Fuerza de la Paz following his Frente por la Vida primary victory, is one of the most experienced political operatives in Colombia, having been part of multiple coalition governments across ideological lines over two decades. He polls below the threshold for meaningful first-round impact.

Miguel Uribe Londoño, running under Partido Demócrata, represents a younger-generation conservative platform emphasizing fiscal discipline and private sector growth, broadly consistent with Valencia’s program. He also polls below 3.5%.

Carlos Caicedo, running on a regionalist platform emphasizing decentralization away from Bogotá, draws support primarily from the Costa Caribe. His structural argument about Colombia’s administrative over-centralization is substantively grounded, though his national profile is insufficient to affect the first-round outcome.

Investment Implications

For international capital with Colombian exposure, the three-way race produces three materially different operational scenarios.

A Cepeda victory — which remains the single most likely first-round outcome based on available polling — would signal continuity of the Petro-era regulatory framework: sustained capital outflow pressure, high corporate tax rates, no new fossil fuel exploration contracts for Ecopetrol (NYSE: EC; BVC: ECOPETROL) or private operators, continued labor cost escalation, and a foreign policy trajectory away from Washington. Colombian equity valuations would be expected to remain under pressure. The mining licensing backlog would continue to accumulate. A Cepeda administration would not replicate Venezuela’s economic trajectory — Colombia’s independent central bank, Banco de la República, its functioning constitutional court, and its institutional depth provide meaningful buffers — but the investment headwinds would be structural rather than cyclical.

A Valencia victory would represent the sharpest regulatory reversal available in this field. Ecopetrol exploration contracts would be expected to advance. The mining licensing backlog would be addressed. US bilateral relations would be restored, reactivating security intelligence cooperation and trade facilitation mechanisms. The Colombian peso would be expected to strengthen as country risk premium declined. The path to that outcome now requires her to either close the gap significantly on De la Espriella in the first round or rely on runoff polling that showed her as the stronger second-round candidate — data that predates the most recent polling shift.

A De la Espriella victory introduces the widest distribution of possible outcomes. The upside scenario involves Restrepo managing fiscal and trade policy competently, genuine regulatory rollback in the extractive sector, aggressive extradition resumption, and security operations that reduce the physical risk premium in conflict-affected departments including Cauca, Norte de Santander, and Chocó. The downside scenario involves recurring crises generated by De la Espriella’s personal conduct, conflicts of interest arising from his former client relationships, and authoritarian security measures that attract international human rights attention and complicate bilateral relationships. Restrepo’s presence on the ticket reduces the probability of the downside scenario but does not eliminate it.

The current polling trend indicates that right-wing voters are consolidating around De la Espriella at Valencia’s expense. Whether that consolidation produces a runoff between De la Espriella and Cepeda — and whether the runoff produces a left or right-wing government — remains uncertain. What the polling data does not support is the scenario, widely assumed until recently, of a Cepeda-Valencia runoff in which Valencia was positioned as the structurally stronger opposition candidate.

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A potentially historic El Niño climate event is emerging as one of the defining stories for Colombia through the remainder of 2026, with authorities warning that extreme heat, drought, water shortages and energy pressures could push vulnerable regions toward crisis conditions.

Climate agencies, environmental authorities and agricultural groups are increasingly sounding alarms over what some scientists describe as a possible “super” El Niño – an exceptionally intense warming of Pacific Ocean waters capable of disrupting global weather systems and triggering severe consequences across Latin America.

In Colombia, the warnings are becoming stark.

Authorities fear a prolonged period of extreme temperatures, dwindling reservoirs, forest fires, crop failures and surging food prices that could stretch into early 2027 when typically the “summer season” starts. Officials have already begun urging Colombians to conserve water and electricity as forecasts indicate the phenomenon may intensify during the second half of the year.

The environmental authority of Cundinamarca, known as the CAR, warned that the probability of El Niño has reached 82%, threatening domestic water supplies, industrial production and hydroelectric generation across central Colombia.

“The measures of prevention and adaptation must be taken immediately,” CAR director Alfred Ignacio Ballesteros said, warning that the event could coincide with the Andean region’s traditional dry season in January and February, placing additional pressure on already strained water systems.

For Bogotá, however, authorities insist the capital is better prepared than during the water crisis of 2023 and 2024. The city’s Aqueduct and Sewer Company said no water rationing measures are currently expected despite the arrival of El Niño. Diego Montero, manager of the utility’s master water system, said reservoir levels remain stable, with the Chingaza system — including the Chuza and San Rafael reservoirs — holding nearly 20 million cubic meters above the established guidance curve. Officials also said the Tibitoc treatment plant is undergoing capacity upgrades aimed at increasing production and reducing pressure on the Chingaza system, which supplies most of Bogotá’s drinking water.

Fears beyond Inconvenience

Meteorologists predict temperatures in Colombia’s Caribbean region could surpass 40 degrees Celsius, while prolonged drought conditions may devastate agriculture and livestock production. Industry groups have warned that prices for staple foods including milk, rice, vegetables and beef could rise sharply toward the end of the year, adding renewed pressure to inflation at a moment when many households are already struggling with high living costs. A ‘super’ El Niño could push inflation above 7 percent, warns the National Association of Financial Institutions – ANIF.

Officials are also concerned about the vulnerability of Colombia’s energy grid, which depends heavily on hydroelectric power. Reduced rainfall and lower reservoir levels could increase the risk of electricity rationing or blackouts similar to those experienced during past El Niño events.

The country’s fragile páramo ecosystems and wetlands — critical natural water regulators located in the Andes — may also face heightened threats from forest fires and prolonged heatwaves. Environmentalists warn that drought could destroy sensitive habitats and endanger wildlife already under pressure from deforestation and climate change.

The emerging crisis is part of a broader global climate pattern that scientists say is being intensified by human-driven warming.

El Niño occurs every few years when ocean waters in the eastern and central Pacific become abnormally warm, altering rainfall patterns, shifting jet streams and increasing global temperatures. However, so-called “super” El Niño events are far rarer and more dangerous, with sea surface temperatures rising more than 2 degrees Celsius above historical averages.

Some climate researchers now fear the world could be heading toward one of the strongest El Niño events in modern history.

Paul Roundy, a professor of atmospheric sciences at the University of Albany, recently warned there was “real potential” for the strongest El Niño event in 140 years. Forecasts from the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts suggest Pacific Ocean temperatures could rise three degrees Celsius above average.

Such projections have revived comparisons to the catastrophic El Niño of 1877-1878, which contributed to massive crop failures and famine across parts of India, China, Brazil and Africa. Historians estimate more than 50 million people died globally during that climate disaster.

While modern infrastructure and global trade networks make a repeat of 19th-century famine unlikely, experts say today’s interconnected crises — inflation, inequality, geopolitical conflict and fragile food systems — create new vulnerabilities.

“Hunger is fundamentally political and economic,” warns Benjamin Selwyn from the University of Sussex. “Wars disrupt trade routes, inequality restricts access to food and profit-driven agricultural systems prioritize industrial production over resilience. Climate shocks such as El Niño amplify those existing weaknesses,” writes Selwyn in The Conversation.

Studies by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Meteorological Organization have already shown that rising temperatures are reducing crop yields and making agricultural labor increasingly dangerous in tropical regions. Heat stress also lowers livestock productivity and survival rates.

In Colombia, the government of leftist President Gustavo Petro has begun discussing contingency measures, though critics argue the country remains dangerously unprepared.

Carlos Carrillo, director of Colombia’s National Unit for Disaster Risk Management (UNGRD), has called for urgent efforts to conserve water and energy while identifying regions at high risk of forest fires. There is also growing concern that years of underinvestment in water storage, energy diversification and climate adaptation could leave Colombia exposed to prolonged disruptions.

If the global forecasts prove accurate, Colombians could soon face months of punishing heat, food inflation and growing anxiety over the resilience of the country’s infrastructure in an age of accelerating climate extremes.

Colombia’s gross domestic product expanded 2.2% in the first quarter of 2026 compared to the same period of 2025, surpassing prevailing market estimates, according to data released May 16 by the Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE) and presented by the Ministerio de Comercio, Industria y Turismo. The results reflected positive performance across production, industry, and domestic commerce.

The manufacturing sector was among the quarter’s strongest contributors, posting year-over-year growth of 2.9% and adding 0.3 percentage points to the annual variation in GDP. The sector’s performance placed it among the primary drivers of national economic output for the period.

Within manufacturing, two subsectors recorded particularly pronounced gains. Motor vehicle production expanded 27.8% year-over-year, while metallurgy grew 6.6%. Both categories function as inputs to broader industrial supply chains, and their recovery carries implications for upstream and downstream productive linkages, including employment in skilled manufacturing roles.

“What is notable about the first-quarter results is not solely the magnitude of the growth, but its composition. The performance of sectors such as motor vehicles, metallurgy, and machinery is particularly significant because it demonstrates a recovery of industrial capacities with greater effects on productive linkages, skilled employment, and economic sophistication.” — Diana Marcela Morales Rojas, Minister of Commerce, Industry, and Tourism of Colombia

Separate monthly data from statistical agency DANE’s índice de producción industrial (IPI) showed that real industrial output grew 3.9% in March 2026 compared to March 2025. The expansion was distributed across multiple subsectors, including motor vehicles, metallurgy, machinery and equipment, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, rubber, plastics, and non-metallic minerals, indicating that the manufacturing recovery was not concentrated in a single production category.

Wholesale and retail trade expanded 6.0% in the first quarter, reflecting increased domestic market activity and business commerce. The trade sector’s performance complemented the manufacturing gains and contributed to the overall breadth of the quarter’s expansion.

Not all sectors contributed positively. Construction contracted 5.4% compared to the first quarter of 2025, the weakest result among major economic categories for the period. Public administration, defense, social security, education, and health services grew 5.7%, and reporting by Colombian media citing DANE data indicated that public spending accounted for approximately 46% of total first-quarter growth — a concentration that introduces a structural caveat to the headline figure, as private-sector momentum remains uneven across the economy.

Diana Marcela Morales Rojas, minister of the Ministerio de Comercio, Industria y Turismo, addressed the composition of the results in a statement issued alongside the data release. “What is notable about the first-quarter results is not solely the magnitude of the growth, but its composition,” she said. “The recovery of manufacturing, metallurgical, and industrial production activities demonstrates a greater role for sectors associated with transformation, productive capacity, and value-added generation within the national economic dynamic. The performance of sectors such as motor vehicles, metallurgy, and machinery is particularly significant because it demonstrates a recovery of industrial capacities with greater effects on productive linkages, skilled employment, and economic sophistication. These are meaningful indicators of strengthening of the manufacturing structure and national production.”

The first-quarter data were released as Colombia continues to manage elevated monetary policy rates and fiscal pressures that have weighed on investment activity in recent quarters. The Ministerio de Comercio, Industria y Turismo indicated that the quarter’s results reflect progress on an agenda oriented toward strengthening industry, domestic production, and commercial activity, though the degree to which private-sector industrial recovery can sustain these gains independently of public spending remains a key variable for subsequent quarters.

Headline photo credit: Tecnoglass

Under a mirage of glowing escalators inside Bogotá’s Ágora Convention Center, the catwalks of Bogotá Fashion Week opened Tuesday with more than fabrics and silhouettes on display. Behind the runway lights lies a larger ambition: to turn Colombia’s capital into a regional fashion export hub and bring designers from Bogotá’s workshops and popular commercial districts onto the global stage.

Now in its ninth edition, Bogotá Fashion Week (BFW), led by the Cámara de Comercio de Bogotá, has become the city’s main commercial and promotional platform for fashion, bringing together 145 brands, 28 runway shows, more than 80 international buyers and 755 business meetings aimed at strengthening Colombia’s presence in international markets.

For Ovidio Claros Polanco, president of the chamber, the event is no longer simply about showcasing collections, but about transforming fashion into a driver of economic growth and international competitiveness.

“In Bogotá, the fashion sector represents 33% of the city’s economic activity and brings together approximately 35,000 active companies, the majority of them microenterprises,” Claros said. He added that between 220,000 and 250,000 people are directly linked to the industry, with its impact extending into tourism, hotels, gastronomy and transportation.

The strategy, he said, is to move beyond the traditional notion of fashion as an exclusive industry and instead position it as an economic ecosystem capable of generating employment and export opportunities across all levels of the city.

That vision is particularly visible through [PUENTE] Internacional, a program created by the chamber to connect entrepreneurs from Bogotá’s traditional commercial districts such as San Victorino and Restrepo with major global fashion circuits including New York, Madrid, Dubai and Paris.

This year, eight Bogotá-based brands — Alanna, A Modo Mio, C’emadier, Más Cincuenta y Siete by Love Me Jeans, Lorant & Co, Lyenzo, Liza Herrera and Kernel Leather — were selected to present their autumn-winter collections during Fashion Designers of Latin America (FDLA) at New York Fashion Week in February.

The initiative marked one of the strongest international pushes yet for Bogotá’s so-called “popular fashion” sector, traditionally associated with local manufacturing districts rather than luxury runways.

“We are committed to the internationalization of Bogotá’s popular fashion because it is a powerful vehicle for economic growth and job creation,” Claros said. “We want the best of Bogotá’s design talent to arrive in the global capitals of fashion stepping forward with strength.”

The selection process involved curators and industry figures including Albania Rosario, founder of FDLA, José Forteza, former senior editor of Vogue México, Colombian designer Jorge Duque and stylist Estefanía Turbay.

For Albania Rosario, the initiative reflects the growing relevance of Latin American fashion beyond its domestic markets.

“Each of these brands represents not only the excellence of Bogotá’s design, but also the resilient and visionary spirit of our creative community,” Rosario said. “It is a reminder of the transformative power of Latin American fashion on the global stage.”

The international agenda continues well beyond Bogotá Fashion Week. Following the local runway events this week, [PUENTE] designers are scheduled to participate in Pasarela Madrid later in May, followed by Dubai Fashion Week in September, New York Fashion Week’s spring-summer season, and Paris Fashion Week later that month.

Inside Ágora, the business focus is equally visible. Alongside runway presentations from designers such as Kika Vargas, Francesca Miranda and Alejandro Crocker, the event hosts wholesale meetings between Colombian brands and international buyers seeking new suppliers and partnerships.

A multi-brand retail space open to the public and a series of 24 industry talks with more than 60 speakers also seek to bridge the gap between creative design and commercial scalability.

For organizers, integrating districts like San Victorino and Restrepo into this model is essential. Rather than separating emerging luxury labels from mass-market producers, the chamber is pushing for a unified ecosystem where independent designers, small workshops and large buyers operate within the same commercial conversation.

“There is a need to remove the idea that fashion belongs to only a few people,” Claros said. “This belongs to everyone. Countries change through actions like these.”

As Bogotá Fashion Week expands its global ambitions, the challenge will be whether Colombian brands can translate visibility into long-term exports and sustained international demand.

For now, however, the city is betting that fashion — from the ateliers of Chapinero to the workshops of San Victorino — can become one of Bogotá’s strongest international calling cards.

Ecuador’s decision to lower tariffs starting June 1 could mark the beginning of a de-escalation in tensions with Colombia

The government of Ecuador, led by President Daniel Noboa, announced a reduction in the so-called “security tariff” applied to imports from Colombia, lowering it from 100% to 75% effective June 1, 2026.

The decision was announced in an official statement from Ecuador’s presidency, which said the measure “reaffirms the national government’s willingness to move toward bilateral cooperation mechanisms on security matters, promoting greater coordination between both countries and strengthening the development of the border region.”

More information about the “security tariff”: Colombia and Ecuador Escalate Trade Tensions with Tariffs Raised to 100%.

Political tensions and tariff dispute

Differences between the governments of Gustavo Petro and Noboa have escalated since 2025, driven by political, commercial and border security disagreements.

In April 2025, Petro initially said he could not recognize Noboa’s election, arguing that Ecuador’s electoral process had taken place “under a state of emergency” and with military presence during voting. However, he later reversed his position and attended Noboa’s inauguration ceremony on May 24, 2025, in Quito.

Since then, both countries have faced disputes related to border security, trade and energy transportation, leading to a gradual escalation in tariffs. Import duties increased progressively from 30% to 50% and later reached 100% on April 9, 2026.

Read: Colombia to Reinforce Border Security with Ecuador Amid Escalating Trade Tensions.

“Unfortunately, it is not possible to reach agreements with someone who does not share the same commitment to fighting narco-terrorism. Since we adopted this measure, violent deaths along the northern border have decreased by 33%. In the future, it will be possible to talk with a government that is truly committed to fighting crime and drug trafficking,” Noboa wrote on X on April 10, 2026, while defending the tougher trade measures.

Signs of de-escalation

The tariff reduction announced by Ecuador coincides with the Colombian government’s earlier decision not to raise its own tariffs to 100%, a move seen as a sign of moderation that could help ease diplomatic and commercial tensions between the two countries.

The dispute has particularly affected Colombian border regions such as Nariño and Cauca, which are already facing security challenges linked to the presence of illegal armed groups and recent violent attacks.

Read: Rising Violence in Colombia: Highway Explosion Leaves 21 Dead, Dozens Injured.

Colombia’s Minister of Commerce, Industry and Tourism, Diana Marcela Morales Rojas, said that “what we are seeing is that Ecuador’s initial strategy did not produce the expected effects on Colombia and instead generated distortions within its own trade system.”

In that regard, “Colombia has maintained and will continue to maintain a permanent willingness for technical dialogue and cooperation, with the same seriousness with which it adopts its policy decisions. Along that path, we are ready to move forward,” the minister added on X.

Meanwhile, Colombian Foreign Minister Rosa Villavicencio said during an interview broadcast by La FM that the government would seek to “resume dialogue with Ecuador in hopes of restoring relations, reducing those tariffs and returning to the trade flow we previously had.”

Colombia navigates fiscal challenges following S&P rating revision.

In Colombia’s local fixed-income market, the Títulos de Tesorería (TES) fixed-rate curve appreciated across its entire structure over the last month. As of March, the total balance of TES in circulation stood at 747.9 trillion COP. Despite this positive market valuation, macroeconomic headwinds remain a central concern for the Ministerio de Hacienda y Crédito Público. The fiscal balance of the Gobierno Nacional Central (GNC) reported an accumulated deficit of 1.7% of GDP through February.

These persistent fiscal imbalances were cited as the primary driver behind the recent decision by S&P Global (NYSE: SPGI) to downgrade Colombia’s sovereign credit rating. The administration continues to manage these debt instruments against a backdrop of tight monetary conditions, which remain a primary focus for institutional investors holding Colombian sovereign paper.

Colombian fixed-income markets show valuation gains despite a recent S&P credit downgrade linked to ongoing fiscal imbalances.

The international fixed-income landscape experienced notable shifts between March 25 and April 23, 2026. The yield curve for US Treasury bonds displayed mixed performance, defined by a decrease in short-term rates and an increase in long-term yields. Analysts attribute this volatility primarily to conflicting signals regarding the ongoing conflict in the Middle East.

Economic indicators released by the Bureau of Labor Statistics show that annual consumer inflation, measured by the Consumer Price Index (CPI), accelerated by 0.9 percentage points to reach 3.3% in March. This data triggered a rebound in short-term inflation expectations within the Treasury bond market, while medium and long-term outlooks remained stable. Consequently, the Intercontinental Exchange (NYSE: ICE) MOVE index—which tracks public debt market volatility—and the Cboe (NYSE: CBOE) VIX—which monitors S&P 500 equity volatility—both registered significant declines during the period.

Central bank hike aims to stabilize inflation amid global volatility.

The upcoming monetary policy meeting of the Banco de la República, scheduled for April 30, takes place as the balance of financial risks has shifted significantly compared to the first quarter of 2026. Analysts from Bancolombia (NYSE: CIB) expect the Junta Directiva to increase the benchmark interest rate by 75 basis points, bringing the policy rate to 12.00%.

The convergence of elevated inflation, recent reversal episodes, and misaligned market expectations has reinforced the perceived need for a restrictive monetary stance. This strategy aims to contain domestic demand while preserving the institutional credibility of the central bank. Unlike previous sessions, the current decision-making process is influenced by a shifting global environment where markets have moved toward a higher-for-longer interest rate scenario amid increased uncertainty.

Recent discussions regarding the participation of the Ministro de Hacienda in the Junta Directiva sessions have introduced an additional element of analysis. However, current assessments suggest this does not alter the fundamental policy diagnosis, and no disruptions to the decision-making process are anticipated. Monetary policy is expected to maintain consistency, with the strategic focus shifting from reaching a contractive level to determining the necessary duration of that posture.

Analysts project Banco de la República will raise rates to 12.00% to combat inflation despite slowing domestic economic growth.

The international economic context provides a mixed backdrop for the Colombian decision. Private sector activity in the US appeared to accelerate in April, following a 1.7% monthly increase in retail sales during March. In contrast, the Eurozone reported a contraction in economic activity during April. Energy markets have also seen volatility, with US crude inventories rising in the second week of April while gasoline stocks saw a significant decline. Furthermore, crude prices surged following reports of new security incidents in the Strait of Hormuz.

Domestically, the Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística reported that the Índice de Seguimiento a la Economía grew by 1.6% in February. While imports maintained growth during the same month, the urban unemployment rate across the 13 primary metropolitan areas continued a downward trend through March 2026. In the fixed income market, the central government reported debt levels at 64.2% of GDP for the first quarter, with internal debt accounting for 71.2% of that total.

Market movements reflected these broader trends as the US Treasury curve saw valuation increases driven by investor caution. In the region, Colombia, Brazil, and Uruguay emerged as the primary beneficiaries of the J.P. Morgan (NYSE: JPM) GBI index rebalancing in March. Locally, fixed-rate Títulos de Tesorería experienced devaluations across the entire curve last week. According to the April Encuesta de Opinión Financiera, these devaluations are expected to persist in the coming months. In currency markets, the COP appreciated last week against a backdrop of global and local factors, while the Euro lost ground against the USD.

Headline photo: Bogotá headquarters of Banco de la República (Banrepublica). Photo credit Juan Enrique Rodríguez, courtesy Banrepublica

Sector adapts to investment decline through secondary asset markets.

The mining industry in Colombia is undergoing a structural transformation as companies prioritize operational efficiency to navigate a challenging economic environment. Recent industry data shows the mining Producto Interno Bruto (GDP) contracted by approximately 8%, while foreign direct investment has experienced a notable downturn. This trend has prompted firms to seek innovative financial strategies to maintain sustainability and competitiveness.

A primary strategy gaining traction is the rotation of underutilized industrial assets. By leveraging industrial auctions, companies are liquidating idle machinery—such as excavators, drilling rigs, and heavy-duty power equipment—to recover capital without the necessity of maintaining internal commercial structures. Superbid, a multinational industrial auction platform, has emerged as a key facilitator for these transactions within the region.

“Asset rotation is becoming a strategic decision to free up capital and improve operations.” — Maria Paula Villa Velez, Superbid

This operational shift toward asset-light business models will be a central topic at MINEXPO Colombia 2026, which is scheduled to take place on April 15 and 16 at Plaza Mayor Medellín. The event serves as a platform for mining producers, suppliers, and investors to discuss strategies for financial optimization and industrial reindustrialization.

The secondary market for industrial equipment has expanded significantly as mining companies divest assets no longer essential to their core operations. This machinery is being repurposed in the infrastructure, construction, and energy sectors, thereby extending the lifecycle of the assets and contributing to circular economy objectives. Market participants have observed increased competition for this equipment, with buyers consistently acquiring assets at market-determined values.

Looking toward the remainder of 2026, industry analysts expect the integration of these efficient asset management models to accelerate, particularly in regions such as Antioquia, where the nexus of mining and infrastructure projects remains a critical economic driver.

“Today the mining sector is understanding that efficiency is not only in producing, but in better managing its resources,” stated Maria Paula Villa Velez, sub-manager at Superbid Medellin. “Asset rotation is becoming a strategic decision to free up capital and improve operations.”

Escalating drought risk is potential bad news for rural communities, power consumers.

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the Climate Prediction Center (CPC) have confirmed that ENSO-neutral conditions are currently present in the equatorial Pacific Ocean. However, technical indicators suggest a rapid transition, with a 61% probability of El Niño emerging between May and July 2026. For international investors and executives operating in Colombia, this shift indicates a looming period of increased operational costs, specifically within the energy and agricultural sectors.

The El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) is a recurring climate pattern involving changes in the temperature of waters in the central and eastern tropical Pacific Ocean. During El Niño, trade winds weaken, allowing warm water to move toward the west coast of South America. Conversely, La Niña is characterized by stronger trade winds and cooler ocean temperatures. These fluctuations disrupt global atmospheric circulation, altering rainfall and temperature patterns across the planet.

In Colombia, the effects of these phenomena are distinct and significant. El Niño typically results in a sharp decrease in precipitation and a rise in average temperatures. Because Colombia relies on hydroelectricity for more than 60% of its total power generation, extended dry periods lead to lower reservoir levels. This forces the grid to rely on more expensive thermal generation fueled by natural gas and coal, which historically drives up spot market electricity prices for industrial and residential consumers.

“There is a 25% probability that the index reaches or exceeds +2.0°C during the Northern Hemisphere winter,” according to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.

The current technical diagnostic from NOAA shows that while the sea surface temperature index in the Niño-3.4 region was recently -0.2°C, the easternmost indices have already moved into positive territory. Furthermore, the equatorial subsurface temperature index has increased for five consecutive months. This accumulation of ocean heat is a primary driver behind the high probability of El Niño persistence through the end of 2026. Some models, including those from the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts (ECMWF), suggest a 25% chance of a “strong” or “very strong” event, where temperatures exceed the 2.0°C anomaly threshold.

The Ministerio de Minas y Energía and the Comisión de Regulación de Energía y Gas (CREG) are monitoring these developments closely. A strong El Niño would place additional stress on a natural gas system already facing structural supply constraints. Reduced hydroelectric output coupled with a potential deficit in gas supply could lead to significant energy price volatility. In past events, such as the 2015-2016 cycle, these conditions resulted in substantial financial pressure on the national utility system and necessitated emergency conservation measures.

Agricultural productivity is equally at risk. The Instituto de Hidrología, Meteorología y Estudios Ambientales (IDEAM) has identified the Caribbean and Andean regions—including departments such as La Guajira, Magdalena, and Antioquia—as highly vulnerable. During El Niño, these areas face increased risks of forest fires, water scarcity, and crop failure. For agribusinesses and exporters, this translates to disrupted planting cycles and higher production costs for staples like corn, potatoes, and vegetables, which can fuel domestic food inflation.

Conversely, when La Niña is in effect, Colombia faces the opposite extreme. The cooling of the Pacific leads to excessive rainfall, which can cause devastating landslides and flooding in mountainous terrain. While La Niña can replenish reservoirs, it often damages infrastructure and logistics networks, complicating the transport of goods to port. The current transition out of a La Niña phase provides a brief window of ENSO-neutral stability, which the CPC estimates has an 80% chance of lasting through June 2026.

For the international business community, the significance of these weather cycles extends to macro-economic stability. Persistent dry weather can impact GDP growth by raising the cost of basic services and reducing agricultural output. Strategic planning for 2026 and 2027 must account for these climatic variables. Meteorologists at Colorado State University note that El Niño also tends to reduce hurricane activity in the Atlantic, which may provide some relief for coastal logistics, but the primary threat remains the inland hydrological deficit.

As the Ministerio de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible activates preventive mechanisms, companies are encouraged to review their energy procurement strategies and water management protocols. The next comprehensive diagnostic update from NOAA is scheduled for May 14, 2026, which will provide further clarity on the intensity of the projected warming trend. Understanding the mechanics of the ENSO cycle is no longer a matter of environmental interest but a necessity for risk mitigation in the Colombian market.

Headline photo: the Pacific Ocean from Guachalito Beach, Chocó, Colombia (photo © Loren Moss)

Activity cools to 2.1% annual expansion.

Economic activity in Colombia expanded at an estimated annual rate of 2.1% during the first quarter of 2026. According to the latest NowCast report issued by the Grupo Cibest, unit of Bancolombia (NYSE: CIB, BVC: BCOLOMBIA), this outcome reflects a loss of momentum compared to the rolling quarter ended in February. That previous period recorded a growth of 2.2%, which was revised downward by 10 basis points from an initial estimate of 2.3%.

The 2.1% growth rate for the quarter indicates a slowdown relative to both the market consensus average of 2.7% and the internal growth forecast of 3.3% held by the bank. On a month-over-month basis, the seasonally adjusted series of the NowCast index posted a 1.3% contraction in March 2026. When compared to March 2025, economic activity grew by 2% year over year, representing a 50-basis-point decline from the 2.5% reading recorded the previous month.

“Overall, these results suggest that the economy is beginning to lose steam, amid multiple sources of uncertainty.” — NowCast Bancolombia Report

Analysis at the sector level reveals a broadly weaker growth profile, with deceleration appearing across most productive areas. Slower momentum was identified in trade, manufacturing, recreation, real estate, and financial services. Manufacturing expansion cooled to 1.0% in March 2026, while financial services recorded marginal growth of 0.6%. The real estate sector maintained a steady growth rate of 1.9%.

Construction and communications were the only sectors to record negative growth during the period. The construction sector saw a significant downturn, contracting by 2.3% in March 2026 after having posted 1.4% growth in February. The information and communications sector contracted by 0.4%, marking its fourth consecutive month in contractionary territory. Conversely, acceleration was noted in public administration, which grew by 5.1%, agriculture at 3.7%, and mining at 0.8%.

The NowCast family of indicators is prepared by Grupo Cibest through the processing and aggregation of transaction data from the bank’s various payment channels. Using advanced quantitative tools, the index provides high-frequency estimates of Colombian productive activity to complement official data from the Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística. The report was authored by Arturo Yesid González Peña, Head of Quantitative and Analytics, and Sebastián Ospina Cuartas, Data Controller.

The report also incorporates data from the Bloomberg platform and FocusEconomics Consensus Forecasts to provide broader economic context. While the national economy remains in expansionary territory, the analysts suggest that the current results indicate the market is losing steam due to various sources of domestic uncertainty.

Credit downgrade is an indictment of the Petro administration’s fiscal management, including suspension of the fiscal rule.

On April 8, 2026, S&P Global Ratings (NYSE: SPGI) lowered its long-term foreign currency sovereign credit rating on Colombia to BB- from BB and its long-term local currency rating to BB from BB+. The outlook for both ratings is stable, reflecting expectations that the Government of Colombia will gradually reduce its fiscal deficit while sustaining moderate growth in the national gross domestic product.

The rating action follows persistent fiscal imbalances and a policy environment that has become less predictable since the pandemic-related recession. The government decision to suspend the national fiscal rule in 2025 marked a significant shift in the policy framework. Pro-cyclical fiscal policies have provided marginal support for employment and consumption, but have also contributed to higher inflation expectations and a wider current account deficit. S&P expects the general government fiscal deficit to reach 5.6% of the national gross domestic product in 2026, compared to 5.3% in 2025.

“We expect Colombia to have consistently large fiscal deficits over the next few years.” — S&P Global Ratings

Institutional stability remains a key factor in the rating, though challenges persist. A fragmented legislature followed the March 2026 elections, where Pacto Histórico and Centro Democrático emerged with the largest minorities. The upcoming presidential election, scheduled for May 31, 2026, adds further uncertainty. Candidates such as Iván Cepeda of Pacto Histórico, Paloma Valencia, and Abelardo de la Espriella have proposed varying approaches to fiscal consolidation. The new administration will inherit spending pressures related to domestic security, rising healthcare costs, and pension payments linked to minimum wage increases.

The Banco de la República, the independent central bank of the country, has maintained a tight monetary policy to combat inflationary pressures. Annual inflation reached 5.3% in February 2026, prompting the bank to increase reference rates to 11.25%. S&P anticipates that inflation will not return to the target range of 3% +/- 1% until early 2029. While the independent status of the central bank provides a buffer against external shocks, high interest rates and lower-than-expected revenue collections have contributed to the widening deficit since 2024.

Economic growth is projected at 2.5% for 2026, slightly below the 2.6% recorded in 2025. Per capita growth is estimated at $9,900 USD for 2026, with real growth expected to average just above 2% through 2029. Despite being a net energy exporter, the performance of the US economy and international energy prices continue to influence national outcomes. Hydrocarbon exports declined to 35% of goods exports in 2025, down from 67% in 2013, showing some diversification even as the sector remains a primary source of volatility.

Net general government debt is forecast to approach 66% of the national gross domestic product by 2029, rising from 60.4% in 2025. S&P notes that the government interest burden will average 12.3% of general government revenue over the next three years. The shift toward issuing shorter-term debt instruments has reduced reported interest payments but increased vulnerability to interest rate fluctuations. External indicators remain a concern, with narrow net external debt expected to stabilize at 130% of current account receipts through 2029. Foreign direct investment is expected to be the primary source for funding the current account deficit, which is projected to stabilize around 2.6% of the national gross domestic product.

Vise photo credit © Loren Moss

President Gustavo Petro has triggered a rare institutional confrontation with the Central Bank  after he ordered to “break relations” following an modest interest rate increase, raising concerns over economic policy independence just two months before the May 31 presidential election.

The board of Banco de la República voted on March 31 to raise its benchmark rate by 100 basis points to 11.25 per cent, defying government pressure for looser policy. Finance minister Germán Ávila denounced the move as “disproportionate” and withdrew from the board, accusing policymakers of privileging financial sector interests over economic growth.

The decision marks an unprecedented rupture in Colombia’s macroeconomic governance framework. By stepping away from the board, Ávila has effectively deprived it of the quorum required to meet under existing statutes, raising the prospect of a policy deadlock just as inflation remains above target.

At stake is more than a disagreement over rates. The confrontation exposes deeper tensions between a government focused on growth and redistribution and a technocratic central bank committed to price stability. It also risks undermining one of Colombia’s most respected institutions at a time of heightened global uncertainty.

Governor Leonardo Villar defended the rate hike, insisting the bank’s constitutional mandate to control inflation could not be subordinated to political considerations. He said the board remained focused on steering inflation back to its 3 per cent target, noting that price pressures — currently running at 5.29 per cent annually — remain elevated despite signs of moderation.

“The decisions are based on technical criteria,” Villar said, rejecting accusations of bias towards the financial sector. He also warned that the government’s withdrawal runs counter to institutional norms.

Markets are now watching whether the government intends to sustain its boycott. Under Colombian law, the presence of a Finance Minister is required for board meetings, meaning continued absence could paralyse rate-setting decisions in the coming months. Three key meetings — in April, June and July — are scheduled before the end of Petro’s term, with the latter two falling after a decisive first-round of the presidential elections.

Business leaders have reacted with alarm. Camilo Sánchez, head of utilities association Andesco, described the breakdown in coordination as “dire”, warning that permanent dialogue between fiscal and monetary authorities is essential for economic stability.

Analysts say the government may be using institutional leverage to halt further rate increases, given that a majority of board members had signalled a tightening bias to anchor inflation expectations. A prolonged standoff could, however, carry significant costs.

Colombia has long been viewed by investors as a regional outlier for its strong central bank independence. Any perception that political pressure is eroding that autonomy could weigh on the peso, increase borrowing costs and deter foreign investment.

The dispute comes against a complex macroeconomic backdrop. Inflation has been fuelled in part by a sharp increase in the minimum wage and higher public spending, while external risks — including rising energy prices linked to the war in the Middle East and closure of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran.

For Petro, the rate hike reinforces a long-standing critique that tight monetary policy is stifling growth and employment. Writing on social media, the president accused the central bank of pursuing a “suicidal” policy that harms the wider economy.

Yet economists warn that weakening institutional credibility could ultimately prove more damaging than high interest rates. “The risk is not just policy error,” one Bogotá-based analyst said. “It is the erosion of the rules of the game.”

The coming weeks will test whether the standoff is a negotiating tactic or the start of a more fundamental shift in Colombia’s economic governance. Either way, the episode has already injected a new layer of uncertainty into one of Latin America’s most closely watched economies.

Stronger peso and oil prices shift Colombian investment landscape.

The Colombian peso (COP) experienced a 2.1% appreciation during March 2026, driven by a recovery in global oil prices and key domestic developments. According to the latest analysis from Bancolombia (BVC: BCOLOMBIA / NYSE: CIB), the performance of the currency coincided with the results of national legislative elections and recent monetary policy adjustments by the Banco de la República.

Global energy markets recorded a significant increase in crude prices throughout the month. Brent crude rose 63% to end March at $118 USD per barrel, while West Texas Intermediate (WTI) increased 51% to close at $101 USD per barrel. These price movements have been largely attributed to geopolitical tensions in the Middle East, which continue to influence international commodity flows and investor sentiment.

On the domestic front, the Gran Coalición por Colombia primary election recorded a turnout of more than 5 million voters. Market analysts indicated that the high participation rate was viewed as a positive indicator of institutional stability. Simultaneously, the Board of Directors of the Banco de la República increased the national policy interest rate by 100 basis points, bringing the benchmark rate to 11.25%. This decision aligns with regional efforts to manage inflationary pressures through tighter monetary control.

International market conditions also reflect a shift in expectations regarding the Federal Reserve. Due to ongoing conflict in the Middle East and persistent economic indicators, markets currently anticipate that the US central bank will maintain existing interest rates without cuts for the remainder of the year.

Looking forward to April, the research team at Bancolombia—led by Chief Economist Laura Clavijo, Macroeconomic Manager Jose Luis Mojica, and International and FX Analyst Maria Paula Gonzalez—projects that the exchange rate will trade within a range of $3,625 COP to $3,725 COP. This forecast accounts for continued volatility and heightened uncertainty in both global and domestic financial markets.

Bancolombia (photo © Loren Moss)

Finance Minister Germán Ávila walked out of a central bank board meeting, accusing it of going against Colombia’s national interests and deepening institutional tensions.

Colombia’s Finance Minister Germán Ávila abandoned a meeting of the board of the central bank (Banco de la República), on April 1 in protest over two decisions by the institution: the release of an internal document without prior consultation, and a 100-basis-point increase in the benchmark interest rate, which was raised to 11.25%.

According to the finance minister, the disclosure of the document, which involved both institutions and was linked to a draft government decree, constituted an “abuse.”

He also described the rate hike, the second so far this year, as “irresponsible and inconvenient,” arguing that it contradicts the government’s economic growth strategy.

The central bank said the decision was approved by a majority of its board: “four members voted in favor of the increase, two supported a 50-basis-point cut, and one proposed keeping the rate unchanged.”

The bank justified the move by noting that inflation stood at 5.4% in January and 5.3% in February, above the 5.1% recorded at the end of 2025. It also warned of external risks, including the impact of the conflict in Iran on the global economy, which could increase the cost of key imports such as gas and fertilizers and add to inflationary pressures later this year.

It remains unclear whether Ávila’s withdrawal from the board will be temporary or permanent, but the episode marks a new point of institutional tension that could influence the direction of monetary policy in Colombia in the coming months.

Clash between monetary policy and government strategy

Ávila criticized the decision, saying the central bank is overlooking the country’s economic progress. “The decision taken by the central bank is repetitive and continues to ignore the national government’s efforts to ensure fiscal stability and sustained economic growth,” he said.

He also argued that the increase is disproportionate compared with global trends. “There is not a single economy in the world proposing a 200-basis-point increase in the benchmark rate in the current global context,” he said, referring to the fact that the bank had already raised rates by 100 basis points in February, meaning a total increase of 200 basis points in just four months.

The government maintains that macroeconomic conditions remain stable, pointing to controlled inflation, a relatively stable Colombian peso (COP) against the dollar, declining unemployment and solid productive growth, and argues that tighter monetary policy is unnecessary.

Debate over central bank independence

The Finance Ministry said the minister’s decision to leave the meeting does not seek to challenge the independence of the central bank, but rather to highlight the need for its decisions to align with the country’s economic and social reality.

However, the move has raised legal and institutional concerns. Central bank chairman of the board, Leonardo Villar noted that the finance minister has a constitutional obligation to attend board meetings, as he “not only represents the government but also lead the meetings” said in a public interview broadcasted by media outlet like La República.

He warned that an indefinite absence could amount to a breach of legal duties and urged President Gustavo Petro to appoint an “ad hoc” delegate if the minister decides not to attend future meetings.

Experts say the minister’s absence could affect the board’s ability to make decisions. According to Andrés Pardo, former deputy finance minister and head of Latin America macro strategy at XP Investments, in an interview with Valora Analitik, “current regulations require at least five members, including the finance minister or a delegate, for the board to deliberate and decide”.

This could mean that, without his presence, the central bank may be legally unable to adopt monetary policy decisions.

Economic impact

The rate increase could have significant effects on the real economy. According to the Finance Ministry, a move of this magnitude could slow economic recovery, increase borrowing costs for households and businesses, and raise debt servicing costs.

Small and medium-sized companies, construction, retail and tourism are expected to be among the most affected sectors, along with households holding variable-rate loans.

Lower-income groups could face the greatest impact, as reduced purchasing power and tighter access to credit may deepen economic inequality.

Colombia’s unemployment rate dropped to 9.2% in February from 10.3% a year earlier, marking the lowest level for the month since 2001, according to official data.

In February 2026, Colombia’s unemployment rate stood at 9.2%, a decrease of 1.1 percentage points compared with the same month in 2025 and the lowest figure for a February since 2001, according to the government through the National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE).

According to the report, “at the national level, the employed population increased by 624,000 people compared with the previous year.” The sectors that contributed most to job creation were professional, scientific and technical activities, with 250,000 new positions, and the public sector (administration, education and health), with 244,000. In contrast, agriculture lost 363,000 jobs and the transportation sector 86,000 compared with February 2025.

President Gustavo Petro highlighted the result on his X account, stating that “we return to a single-digit unemployment rate, 9.2%, the lowest since 2018. More reasons not to accept the mistake of the right parties in claiming that raising the minimum wage to a living wage would bring an employment catastrophe. That was not true: we have the lowest unemployment of this century for the month of February.” The president also defended the minimum wage increase, which reached 23.7%, the highest recorded in the country.

Volvemos a un dígito de tasa de desocupación, 9,2%, la más baja desde el 2018.

Más razones para no aceptar la equivocación de la derecha al afirmar que el subir el salario mínimo al nivel del salario vital traería una catástrofe del empleo.

No fue cierto, tenemos el menor… https://t.co/vXz7Muv3f0 pic.twitter.com/Jx7RBeIWLb

— Gustavo Petro (@petrogustavo) March 30, 2026

Downward trend in unemployment

When analyzing the December–February rolling quarter, the unemployment rate stands at its lowest level in the past ten years, according to DANE reports. The figure rose from an average of 10.7% in 2017–2018 to a peak of 15.7% in 2020–2021, a period marked by the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, before declining steadily to 9.2% in February 2026.

For the same period in 2025, the rate stood at 10.4%, representing a reduction of more than one percentage point.

These figures are consistent with estimates by the International Labour Organization (ILO) in Colombia, which had projected a gradual decline in unemployment from around 16% in 2020 to an estimated 8.3% for the previous year.

Gaps and challenges in the labor market

Despite the overall improvement, the DANE report also highlights challenges in terms of labor inclusion. In February 2026, the unemployment rate for men was 7.4%, while for women it reached 11.7%, representing a gender gap of 4.3 percentage points.

However, the government noted that this gap has been narrowing, as it stood at 5.2 percentage points in the previous month.

The data come from “The Great Integrated Household Survey” (La Gran Ecuesta Integrada de Hogares – GEIH), DANE’s statistical instrument that provides information on the labor market, income, monetary poverty and the sociodemographic characteristics of Colombia’s population.

Monetary tightening impacts investment outlook in Colombia.

Colombia’s Banco de la República is preparing for a significant shift in monetary policy as inflationary risks deteriorate. According to the latest report from the Dirección de Investigaciones Económicas, Sectoriales y de Mercados at Bancolombia (NYSE: CIB), persistent internal pressures and a less favorable external environment are driving the need for a more restrictive stance.

Bancolombia’s analysts expect the Junta Directiva of the Banco de la República to increase its policy interest rate by 100 basis points, bringing it to 11.25 percent. This forecast suggests that the first half of 2026 will be characterized by a more aggressive tightening cycle than previously anticipated, with the rate potentially reaching 12.75 percent.

The international landscape is playing an increasingly decisive role in these local policy configurations. A recent week of central bank decisions globally revealed a shift in tone among major financial institutions, primarily due to rising uncertainty stemming from the conflict in Iran. This geopolitical tension has directly impacted costs for energy, transportation, and agricultural inputs.

“The increase responds to the need to send a clear signal of commitment to price stability.” — Dirección de Investigaciones Económicas, Sectoriales y de Mercados at Bancolombia.

In the US, economic activity shows signs of moderation, yet producer price inflation in February exceeded expectations. The yield curve for US Treasuries, managed by the US Department of the Treasury, has shown mixed behavior as the conflict escalates, with the spread between 10-year and 3-month bonds reaching levels not seen since 2023. Inflation expectations in the US have rebounded in the short term, though they remain anchored over longer horizons.

Forecast Category	Mar-25	Sep-25	Dec-25	Feb-26	Mar-26
Year-end 2026 Inflation	3.7%	4.0%	4.5%	6.2%	6.2%
Year-end 2027 Inflation	—	—	—	4.8%	4.8%
Year-end 2026 Policy Rate	6.50%	8.00%	9.25%	11.75%	11.75%
Year-end 2027 Policy Rate	—	—	8.00%	9.75%	10.00%

Domestically, the business indices from think-tank Fedesarrollo showed mixed results for February. However, there are positive indicators in the labor market, as the urban unemployment rate across the 13 primary metropolitan areas continued its downward trend. Additionally, goods exports recorded an advance during the same period.

In the local fixed-income market, the TES fixed-rate curve saw a recovery last week. However, the March Financial Institutions Survey suggests that devaluations of TES may persist in the short term. Long-term TES Class B placements in the first quarter reached 1.0 percent of the GDP.

Energy markets remain volatile as crude oil inventories in the US increased beyond expectations in the third week of March. Despite this, the price of Brent crude rose toward the end of the week, driven by skepticism regarding a potential ceasefire in the Middle East. The Colombian peso appreciated over the past week, tracking the intensity of the regional conflict.

The equity market results for the fourth quarter of 2025 remained neutral and aligned with market expectations. Global volatility continues to be shaped by energy shocks, geopolitical strife, and a cautious approach toward investments in artificial intelligence.

The projected rate hike by the Banco de la República is intended to send a definitive signal of commitment to price stability. This adjustment reflects not only recent inflation trends but also a strategic effort to prevent the further deterioration of expectations in a high-risk environment.

Headline image: Bogotá headquarters of Banco de la República (Banrepublica). Photo credit Juan Enrique Rodríguez, courtesy Banrepublica

Governance concerns and profit drops dominate shareholder assembly.

The Ecopetrol (NYSE: EC, BVC: ECOPETROL) General Shareholders’ Meeting concluded at the Corferias convention center in Bogotá, marked by a decline in annual profits and an intensifying debate regarding the continuity of the company’s president, Ricardo Roa. During the assembly, shareholders approved a dividend of $121 COP per share for minority holders and a total payment of $4 trillion COP to the Colombian government, which serves as the majority shareholder. The government’s payout is scheduled for distribution in two installments, to be completed by June 30, 2026.

Click on above image to view shareholder meeting

The financial results for the 2025 fiscal year revealed a significant contraction in net income, which fell to $9 trillion COP from the $14.9 trillion COP reported in 2024. Roa attributed this decline primarily to the volatility of international crude prices. He noted that the average price of Brent crude dropped from $80 USD per barrel to $68 USD per barrel over the period. According to company data, every $1 USD drop in the price of Brent corresponds to a reduction of approximately $500 billion COP in net profit and $700 billion COP in EBITDA. Despite the lower earnings, the company maintained a production level of 745,000 barrels per day and achieved a reserve replacement rate of 121%, the highest in five years.

Governance issues remained the primary focus of the assembly. Minority shareholders expressed concern over the legal challenges facing Roa, who is currently under investigation by the Fiscalía General de la Nación for alleged influence peddling. Additionally, the Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE) has raised accusations regarding the alleged violation of spending caps during the presidential campaign of Gustavo Petro, which Roa managed. Angela Maria Robledo, Chair of the Board of Directors, defended the decision to retain Roa, stating that the board has activated a evaluation protocol while respecting the constitutional principle of the presumption of innocence.

Shareholders Erupt In Anger At CEO Ricardo Roa:

Abuchean a Ricardo Roa en asamblea de Ecopetrol

“¡Fuera, fuera!”: Este es el momento del tenso abucheo de los accionistas al presidente de la empresa

Videos: Néstor Gómez pic.twitter.com/uyjh4chpl2

— EL TIEMPO (@ELTIEMPO) March 27, 2026

“Ecopetrol is listed on the New York Stock Exchange; we are governed by the strict regulations of US federal agencies. Agencies like OFAC and the SEC could intervene in the company and could even accelerate the payment of financial obligations, which would be extremely grave for Ecopetrol,” stated Martín Ravelo, President of the USO.

The Unión Sindical Obrera (USO), the primary labor union representing nearly one-third of the company’s workforce, has issued an ultimatum for Roa’s removal. Martin Ravelo, president of the USO, warned that the union will initiate a national strike and affect crude production if Roa is not aparted from his position by Monday, March 30. Ravelo expressed concern that Ecopetrol, which is subject to the regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), could face federal intervention. He highlighted that Ecopetrol’s current debt has reached $30 billion USD, exacerbated by rising interest rates, and warned that the company lacks the cash flow to respond to potential demands for early repayment of international obligations.

President Gustavo Petro responded to the union’s concerns via social media, stating that the executive branch will take measures to shield the company’s financial future. Petro emphasized the importance of maintaining investment during periods of high oil prices to prepare for future market downturns. He also criticized past administrations for failing to invest sufficiently in clean energy during previous price cycles. In contrast, Ravelo called for the board to maintain its independence from political influence, noting that four of the nine board members have already left formal records supporting Roa’s departure.

Ecopetrol also addressed the national gas supply, with Roa announcing that new regasification alternatives at Puerto Bahía and on the Pacific coast are expected to begin operations in the second half of 2026. These projects are intended to contribute between 186 and 430 Gbtud to the national grid. A third regasification facility in Coveñas is projected to start operations in 2029 with a capacity of 400 Gbtud. Despite these operational plans, the immediate focus of the international investment community remains fixed on the board’s upcoming meeting on Monday, where the leadership deadlock must be resolved to avoid a potential halt in national production.

Headline photo: Former Senator Jorge Robledo admonishes the Ecopetrol board of directors at the March 2026 shareholders’ meeting.

This mobile cinema initiative in Medellín provides training for 4,000 creators to boost local digital advertising and entrepreneurship.

MEDELLÍN — The mobile film festival SMARTFILMS announced the launch of its third edition in the “City of the Eternal Primavera” on March 17, 2026. The initiative aims to democratize cinema and foster local creative talent through technology and audiovisual narratives. The program’s goal is to train 4,000 participants in the technical skills required to produce films using mobile devices.

The launch is supported by the Alcaldía de Medellín (Medellín mayor’s office), which is providing 3,300 training slots, the Área Metropolitana del Valle de Aburrá (Aburrá Valley metropolitan area) with 300 slots, and the Cámara de Comercio de Medellín para Antioquia with 250 slots. Additional strategic partners include EPM and Fenalco Antioquia, organizations that focus on regional innovation and commercial development. The official opening, led by CEO Yesenia Valencia, took place at the Poblado branch of the Chamber of Commerce,

“SMARTFILMS is not just a festival; it is a platform that demonstrates that to tell a great story, one only needs a good idea and the device everyone carries in their pocket.”

The 2026 program utilizes a four-phase methodology designed to transition creators into digital entrepreneurs. The first phase involves mass training for 4,000 individuals in mobile audiovisual production. In the second phase, 400 selected participants will attend a specialized bootcamp at the Cámara de Comercio de Medellín para Antioquia featuring industry experts. The third phase focuses on business skills for 40 finalists, covering marketing, digital advertising, budgeting, and legal contracts.

In the final stage, participants must produce advertising content for three local neighborhood businesses to assist in their digital transition. Financial incentives include prizes of $10 million COP for first place, $5 million COP for second place, and $3 million COP for third place. Additionally, finalists receive seed capital of $1.5 million COP per person for recording equipment. Registration is managed through the cineconcelular.com platform.

The festival reports a significant regional economic impact, generating 115 direct jobs and over 300 indirect jobs. The direct positions include 33 payroll staff and 82 contractors based in Medellín. Since its inception, the model has trained 8,000 people and led to the creation of 120 businesses nationwide. These creative enterprises currently report monthly revenues ranging from $2 million COP to $10 million COP.

The 2026 version of the project seeks to expand its reach across all districts of the metropolitan area to stimulate the development of cultural companies and social transformation. Documentation from the organizers highlights a 0% desertion rate among participants over the last two years.

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The move targets a high-value niche in the European bioeconomy, offering a scalable model for sustainable Amazonian exports.

The Colombian government has formally submitted a technical and scientific dossier to the European Union seeking authorization to market cacay flour as a “Novel Food.” This regulatory category governs the entry of non-traditional food products into the European market.

The submission is the first of its kind for an Amazonian product from Colombia. It follows a 2024 initiative involving the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Tourism and the [suspicious link removed]. The process was supported by the Sustainable Forest Territories (Territorios Forestales Sostenibles or TEFOS 3) project, a program funded by the British Embassy and the German Cooperation GIZ.

Diana Marcela Morales Rojas, the Minister of Commerce, Industry, and Tourism, stated that the application positions cacay as a strategic component of the national portfolio of high-value natural ingredients. The technical dossier was structured according to the guidelines of the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA). To meet these standards, Colombia provided evidence of safe historical consumption for at least 25 years, alongside data on nutritional profiles, safety, traceability, and sustainable production processes.

The administrative validation phase is expected to take one month, followed by a technical and scientific evaluation by EFSA that may last up to nine months. Six Colombian companies participated in the drafting of the expediente, providing technical data and validating industrial processes to demonstrate the feasibility of large-scale production under international standards.

“This step positions the cacay as a strategic ingredient within the Colombian portfolio of high-value-added natural products.” — Diana Marcela Morales Rojas, Minister of Commerce, Industry, and Tourism.

The cacay nut, native to the Amazon and Orinoquia regions, produces a seed containing up to 60% oil rich in omega-6 and omega-9. The flour, a byproduct of the oil extraction process, contains approximately 40% protein and high fiber content. Beyond its nutritional applications, the crop is integrated into agroforestry systems aimed at restoring degraded lands and promoting biodiversity.

Currently, the cacay value chain involves more than 500 peasant and indigenous families. If approved, the flour would join Colombia’s non-traditional export basket to Europe, reinforcing a bioeconomy model based on fair trade and the sustainable use of biodiversity.