President Gustavo Petro accused Ecuador on Monday of carrying out bombing raids inside Colombian territory, sharply escalating a diplomatic and trade dispute that has been simmering since January.
Petro said “27 charred bodies” have been found near the border and suggested the attacks could not have been carried out by illegal armed groups, though he presented no evidence to support the claim.
“Ecuador is bombing us, and these are not illegal armed groups,” Petro said during a televised cabinet meeting, warning of a serious breach of sovereignty.
Ecuador’s President Daniel Noboa swiftly rejected the accusation.
“President Petro, your statements are false; we are acting within our own territory,” Noboa said, adding that Ecuadorian forces were targeting “narco-terrorist structures” operating near the border.
Petro said a bomb believed to have been dropped from an aircraft had been discovered near the frontier, reinforcing what he described as a pattern of cross-border strikes.
“A bomb has appeared, dropped from a plane… very close to the border with Ecuador,” Petro said. “We must investigate thoroughly, but this supports my suspicion that Ecuador is bombing us.”
He added that “many explosions” had been reported and said his government would soon release an audio recording allegedly originating from Ecuador.
In a post on social media platform X, Petro said the bombings did not appear to come from Colombian armed forces or illegal groups, which he argued lack the capability to carry out aerial attacks. “The explanation (from Ecuador) is not credible,” he wrote, without specifying when or where the deaths occurred.
Ecuador doubles down
Noboa, facing a surge in organized crime violence at home, has adopted an aggressive military strategy that includes aerial bombardments of suspected cartel camps near the Colombian border.
His government says the operations are conducted strictly within Ecuadorian territory and are often aimed at groups with Colombian origins, including FARC dissidents. “Together with international cooperation, we continue this fight, bombing locations used as hideouts by these groups, many of them Colombian,” Noboa said in a statement.
He also accused Colombia of failing to control its side of the border, allowing criminal organizations to spill into Ecuador.
The latest confrontation comes against the backdrop of a worsening trade dispute that began in January when Ecuador imposed a 30% “security tariff” on Colombian imports, citing Bogotá’s alleged inaction against narcotrafficking.
The tariff was later increased to 50%.
Colombia retaliated with tariffs on 73 products, suspended electricity exports to Ecuador, and imposed restrictions on bilateral trade, deepening tensions between the neighboring countries.
Ecuador responded by raising fees on the transport of Colombian crude through one of its main pipelines.
Despite early attempts to contain the fallout, relations have steadily deteriorated, culminating in the current exchange of accusations.
Risk of escalation
Petro’s latest claims mark the most serious rupture yet, raising the specter of a cross-border military incident between the two countries, which share a long and porous frontier plagued by drug trafficking and illegal mining.
The Colombian president said he had appealed to Donald Trump to intervene diplomatically.“I asked him to act and call the president of Ecuador because we do not want to go to war,” he said.
The involvement of the United States adds another layer of complexity. Ecuador recently deepened security cooperation with Washington, including the establishment of a new FBI office and joint operations targeting organized crime. Earlier this month, Ecuadorian and U.S. forces conducted strikes on a camp linked to the Comandos de la Frontera, a dissident faction of the FARC guerrilla.
The Colombia–Ecuador border has long been a strategic corridor for cocaine trafficking, with armed groups exploiting weak state presence on both sides. While the border itself is not disputed, diverging security strategies have increasingly brought Bogotá and Quito into conflict.
Petro’s government has prioritized negotiations with armed groups under its “Total Peace” policy, while Noboa has pursued a hardline military crackdown.
For now, the allegations from Casa de Nariño remain unverified, but the political damage is done – and one further miscalculation could carry deep consequences far beyond the shared border.
Colombia’s presidential race entered a decisive new phase this week after Sunday’s inter-party primaries propelled conservative senator Paloma Valencia into the national spotlight and triggered a scramble among political factions to forge alliances ahead of the May 31 election.
Valencia’s commanding performance in the right-wing “La Gran Consulta” primary – where she secured roughly six million votes – has reshaped the political landscape, opening a contest within the conservative bloc while forcing candidates across the spectrum to recalibrate their strategies.
The vote effectively marks the start of Colombia’s election season, in which presidential hopefuls must broaden their appeal beyond ideological bases while navigating a fragmented political field.
For the right, the central challenge is whether it can attract moderate and centrist voters without alienating the hardline supporters who form the backbone of a political base – and party – associated with former president Álvaro Uribe.
Valencia, a senior figure in Uribe’s Democratic Center, emerged from the primaries as one of the leading conservative contenders after her vote total surpassed the turnout achieved by President Gustavo Petro and Vice President Francia Márquez in their coalition primaries ahead of the 2022 election.
For Uribe’s movement, which appeared weakened after the presidency of Iván Duque and several electoral setbacks, the result represents an unexpected demonstration of political resilience.
Yet the surge of security-focused Senator has also intensified competition from the far right.
Barranquilla-based lawyer Abelardo de la Espriella, who had previously dominated opposition to Petro, now faces a rival capable of consolidating support among traditional party structures while courting voters beyond the hard-right.
De la Espriella announced Tuesday that Ivan Duque’s former finance minister José Manuel Restrepo will join his presidential ticket as vice-presidential candidate, a move widely interpreted as an attempt to add economic credibility to a campaign largely driven by security rhetoric.
Political observers on the night of the consulations emphasized that Uribe will play a decisive role in shaping the outcome of any hard-right and center-right alliance.
The former president remains the most influential figure within Colombia’s right-wing political establishment and will act as “kingmaker” when negotiations begin over a possible understanding between Valencia and De la Espriella aimed at consolidating the anti-Petro vote.
Whether such an agreement materializes remains uncertain, as both candidates seek to position themselves as the principal challenger to the left in the first round scheduled for May 31.
Sunday’s primaries also produced a surprise showing from economist Juan Daniel Oviedo, the former head of Colombia’s national statistics agency (DANE), who secured more than one million votes and finished second in La Gran Consulta.
Oviedo has cultivated support among urban and younger voters, particularly in Bogotá, where his technocratic style and socially liberal positions have resonated with diverse constituencies, including large segments of the LGBTQ community.
Yet his unexpectedly strong performance now places him at a political crossroads.
Oviedo is expected to meet Valencia on Thursday to discuss a possible alliance that could include joining her ticket as a vice-presidential candidate.
Such a partnership could help Valencia reach voters beyond the traditional conservative base. But it also carries risks for Oviedo, whose supporters may question a close association with the Uribe-aligned political establishment that has dominated Colombia’s right for more than two decades.
The two politicians differ sharply on several issues, including the 2016 peace agreement with FARC and role of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP), the transitional justice tribunal created to prosecute war crimes committed during Colombia’s internal conflict.
While Oviedo has defended Juan Manuel Santos’ peace agreement and role of the tribunal, Valencia has long criticized JEP and promoted reforms aimed at limiting its legal authority.
Despite the shifting dynamics on the right, the left retains an important institutional foothold following Sunday’s legislative elections.
Petro’s governing coalition, the Historic Pact, emerged as the largest force in the Senate with 25 of the chamber’s 102 seats, according to official results, though it fell short of an outright majority and will need alliances with other parties in the fragmented legislature.
Within the progressive camp, however, the primaries exposed clear divisions.
Former Senate president and former Ambassador to London Roy Barreras secured just over 200,000 votes in the left-wing primary and publicly blamed Petro for the weak turnout, accusing the president of discouraging supporters from voting on Sunday to cement the official candidacy of hard-left candidate Iván Cepeda.
The primaries also underscored the continued weakness of Colombia’s political center.
Former Bogotá mayor Claudia López won her coalition’s primary but attracted fewer than half a million votes, a disappointing result that leaves her entering the first round of the presidential race with reduced political momentum.
With nearly three months remaining before the first round of voting, the campaign that begins this week bears little resemblance to the one that existed before Sunday’s primaries.
The conservative opposition remains divided but newly energized, the left retains institutional strength despite internal tensions, and the political center faces an uphill battle to remain relevant.
In a race now expected to be decided in two rounds, Colombia’s presidential contest is once again wide open as candidates maneuver to build alliances and capture the pivotal voters who will ultimately decide the country’s political direction.
On March 8, Colombia elected the Congress that will exercise legislative authority during the 2026–2030 term. From more than 3,200 candidates, voters chose the 102 senators (upper house) and 182 members of the House of Representatives (lower house) who will make up the country’s legislative branch.
According to preliminary reports from the Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil (RNEC), with 98.4% of polling stations counted, equivalent to 19,220,365 votes tallied, the new Congress has been defined electorally, however, it should be noted that these seat projections correspond to the official preliminary count, which still must go through several formal procedures before the final results are certified.
The Pacto Histórico, the party of current President Gustavo Petro, obtained around 22% of the vote (4,402,601), which would allow it to increase its representation from 20 senators in the current legislature to approximately 25 seats in the next term.
In second place is the Centro Democrático, the party of former President Álvaro Uribe, with about 15% of the vote (3,020,459), potentially increasing its representation from 13 to 17 seats.
The Partido Liberal would rank third with 13 seats (2,268,658 votes). It would be followed by the Alianza por Colombia, led by the Green Party, with 10 seats (1,899,096 votes), and the Partido Conservador, also with 10 seats (1,859,493 votes).
Other wins in the Senate include Party of La U (9 seats), Cambio Radical (7), the Ahora Colombia coalition (5), which backs presidential candidate Sergio Fajardo, and Salvación Nacional (4), the movement of presidential candidate Abelardo de la Espriella. The two remaining seats correspond to the special indigenous constituency.
In terms of losses in representation, the Partido Conservador would be the most affected, losing five of its current 15 seats. Cambio Radical would lose four, the Greens three, La U two, while Liberals and Ahora Colombia would each lose one seat.
Among the prominent figures who would be left out of the new Senate is former President Álvaro Uribe, who occupied position number 25 on his party’s list and would not obtain a seat if the Centro Democrático secures only 17 seats. Green Party senator Angélica Lozano, known for promoting legislation related to transparency, would also lose her seat.
Likewise, movements such as the coalition that supported Juan Daniel Oviedo and the Partido Oxígeno, led by former presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt, who was kidnapped for years by the now-defunct FARC guerrilla group, would fail to surpass the minimum threshold required to obtain Senate representation (3% of the total vote).
On the other hand, the performance of the Salvación Nacional movement, led by presidential candidate Abelardo de la Espriella, stands out. In its first participation in a congressional election, the party would surpass the electoral threshold and secure four senators.
The allocation of seats in the House of Representatives follows a different process from that of the Senate, making it difficult to project the final distribution in the early stages of the vote count.
This is because the calculation is conducted department by department, once the RNEC determines the seat allocation formula and electoral quotient in each of the 32 States and the Capital District of Bogotá.
According to report number 45 from the RNEC, with 99.03% of votes counted, the main parties have obtained the following preliminary nationwide results:
Because the House of Representatives elections involve parties, movements, and coalitions with strong local and regional influence, several smaller political organizations are expected to win seats, as they must surpass regional thresholds rather than a national one.
With the preliminary distribution of seats in both the Senate and the House of Representatives, projections suggest that Colombia’s next president will need to govern through legislative coalitions, as has occurred under President Gustavo Petro and his predecessors.
Presidential candidates Iván Cepeda, of the Pacto Histórico, and Paloma Valencia, of the Centro Democrático, would begin the next political phase with the largest congressional blocs, although neither would have enough seats to govern alone.
Traditional parties such as the Liberal, Conservador, Cambio Radical, and La U, which together could account for more than 40% of the new congress, have not yet decided which presidential candidate they will support, a situation similar to what occurred in the previous election. These parties could therefore become kingmakers, capable of facilitating, or blocking, governability depending on the alliances and coalitions they choose to form.
For that reason, the coming weeks are expected to be marked by intense political negotiations, as presidential contenders attempt to build alliances that would allow them to secure legislative support.
For candidates such as Sergio Fajardo, whose Ahora Colombia coalition would obtain only five senators, or Abelardo de la Espriella, whose Salvación Nacional movement would have four, the challenge will be significantly greater.
Above photo: Polling station during Colombia’s congressional elections. Photo courtesy of the Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil.
Colombian President Gustavo Petro is continuing to make changes to Colombia’s health system through administrative measures, after two attempts to pass a legislative reform were rejected by Congress.
The latest decision is Decree 0182 of 2026, which centralizes the provision of health services in approximately 45% of the country under the administration of Nueva EPS, a mixed public-private company currently under government intervention. As part of the measure, the insurer would receive 2,84 million reassigned members.
According to the government, the decree seeks to modify the flow of resources within the system so that funds would be paid from the government directly to healthcare providers, such as hospitals and clinics. This change would limit the traditional role of the Entidades Prestadoras de Salud (EPS), the system’s intermediaries, whose reduction has been one of the Petro administration’s key policy goals.
President Petro has publicly defended this approach. In a message posted on the social media platform X, he said that EPS entities “devour 70 trillion pesos annually and demonstrably benefit the wealth of their owners.” The president has also blamed these institutions for the crisis affecting the health sector over the past decade, arguing that during that time “the theft of health resources multiplied, and 117 EPS were liquidated to avoid paying their debts.”
The decree has sparked debate in the media. Some reports, including those published by the outlet Infobae after reviewing the official document, described the measure as a “mass transfer of patients and territorial reorganization of the health system.” However, the Ministry of Health rejected that interpretation and clarified that the measure “does not involve an arbitrary transfer of users, but rather a technical step aimed at correcting structural failures in the insurance model”.
In a statement, the ministry explained that “when an EPS lacks operational or financial capacity in a given territory, the state is authorized to adopt temporary mechanisms to ensure healthcare access for users.” The ministry also stated that the goal of the decree is to guarantee effective, fair, dignified and continuous access to healthcare services across the country, particularly in regions where geographic dispersion and low population density have historically complicated service delivery.
The debate comes amid a broader process of administrative interventions within the system. According to reports cited by the newspaper El Colombiano, “over the past three years the government, through the Superintendencia Nacional de Salud, has intervened in seven EPS,” removing their management from private owners and placing them under state-appointed administrators.
The government has used this context to justify administrative measures such as those included in the decree, arguing that several insurers have demonstrated structural operational weaknesses. At the same time, the legislative debate over a comprehensive health reform has not been completely closed. According to the same outlet, the government is still exploring the possibility of reviving the reform bill through an appeal filed by Senator Fabián Díaz. In the meantime, the administration has moved forward with changes through decrees, regulatory resolutions and decisions by the health regulator.
Despite the publication of the decree, its implementation still requires additional administrative steps. According to analysis cited by Infobae, “the transfer of members will not occur automatically, as it depends on the Superintendencia Nacional de Salud issuing administrative acts that update the territorial scope of the EPS”. This means the reorganization of the system could unfold gradually once the required regulatory procedures are completed.
A total of 3,231 candidates will compete for seats in Colombia’s congress in the legislative elections scheduled for March 8, according to the Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil (RNEC), the authority responsible for organizing the country’s electoral processes. In total, 102 senators and 182 members of the House of Representatives will be elected.
According to the electoral authority, 1,124 candidates registered for the Senate and 2,107 for the House of Representatives, the two chambers that make up Colombia’s congress.
As the political analysis website Razón Pública explains, Colombia’s electoral system is based on proportional representation, which seeks to reflect the diversity of political opinions within society in the composition of Congress. For the Senate, or upper chamber, voters may cast their ballots for candidates anywhere in the country, as it operates under a national constituency. In contrast, the House of Representatives, or lower chamber, is elected through territorial constituencies by departments, including Bogotá as the Capital District.
According to the RNEC, 41,287,084 citizens are eligible to vote in the upcoming elections, a key figure because it influences how seats are allocated.
In this election, 102 senators will be chosen by popular vote. According to the Senate’s official website, 100 will be elected through a nationwide constituency and the remaining two seats are reserved for indigenous communities, a special constituency established by the 1991 Constitution to guarantee political representation for these groups.
Voters must choose between receiving the national ballot or the Indigenous constituency ballot, but they cannot vote in both.
For the House of Representatives, 182 members will be elected, distributed as follows:
Unlike the Senate, each department receives a specific number of seats based on its population, creating regional electoral dynamics in which local political leadership often plays a key role. In practice, more populous departments hold greater representation than smaller ones.
Both the Senate and the House of Representatives receive one additional seat after the presidential election, allocated to the candidate who obtains the second-highest number of votes.
Colombia’s electoral system is regulated by the Acto Legislativo 001 of 2003 and the Electoral Law, and operates under principles of proportional representation.
First, the valid votes obtained by each party list are counted. Only those lists that surpass a 3% threshold of total valid votes are eligible to participate in the distribution of seats. In the 2022 legislative elections, this threshold exceeded 509,000 votes.
According to projections by the Misión de Observación Electoral (MOE), the threshold for the Senate in the upcoming elections could reach around 600,000 votes.
This threshold is crucial because if, for example, a candidate obtains 450,000 votes but their party fails to pass the threshold, neither the candidate nor the party will secure a seat in Congress.
Among the lists that surpass the threshold, seats are distributed using the D’Hondt method, known in Colombia as the cifra repartidora, which allocates seats proportionally according to the number of votes obtained. In 2022, the seat-allocation quotient was 144,013 votes.
For the House of Representatives, the process is more complex because the threshold and D’Hondt method are applied separately within each department, producing different results across regions.
With closed lists, voters select only the political party or list as a whole, without choosing an individual candidate.
Under the Acto Legislativo 1 of 2003, political parties may register open lists or closed lists. With open lists, voters select a specific candidate within a party’s list. The vote counts both for the political party and for the individual candidate. Seats obtained by the party are then assigned to the candidates who received the highest number of votes, regardless of their initial position on the list.
With closed lists, voters select only the political party or list as a whole, without choosing an individual candidate. Seats are then allocated according to the order predetermined and registered at the start of the campaign by the party.
In the upcoming elections, two of Colombia’s most prominent political forces will present closed lists: the Pacto Histórico, the coalition led by current President Gustavo Petro, and the Centro Democrático, the right-wing party founded by former President Álvaro Uribe Vélez.
Photo courtesy of the National Civil Registry of Colombia,
Colombians head to the polls on March 8 for what is, formally, a legislative election. In practice, it is something more consequential: a stress test of the country’s political coalitions ahead of the May 31 presidential race already defined by fragmentation – and by mounting security concerns for right-wing candidates.
The vote for Congress matters. But the country will be watching the consultas presidenciales—three parallel primaries that function as a de facto first round. In them, Colombians vote less for programs than for trajectories: continuity, rupture, or something in between.
On the right, Paloma Valencia is poised to dominate La Gran Consulta, a coalition spanning moderate conservatives, independent liberals, and slate of well-known political leaders. Polling places her far ahead of her rivals, with margins large enough not merely to win, but to define the bloc itself. In a pre-Petro era, such a coalition might have fractured under its contradictions, but today, it coheres around one single objective: opposition to the government of Gustavo Petro and the restoration of order- political, fiscal, and territorial.
Valencia’s strength is not only electoral; it is structural. She inherits the Centro Democrático machinery and the disciplined base loyal to former two-term president Álvaro Uribe, whose legacy continues to shape Colombia’s right. But her challenge begins the moment she wins. The right is not unified—it is merely aligned. To convert alignment into victory, she will need to reach out to Abelardo de la Espriella, a pro-Bukele, pro-Milei, lawyer whose mass appeal is rooted in a more visceral, anti-left electorate. If Valencia succeeds in clinching La Gran Consulta, the right could reach May 31 not only united, but energized. If she fails, she risks replaying a familiar Colombian pattern: ideological proximity undone by personal rivalries.
With “El Tigre” de la Espriella lurking in the shadows, the right looks ascendant. Uribe Vélez now faces the daunting challenge of fusing his CD base with Espriella’s fervent Defensores de la Patria.
Claudia López is expected to win her consultation comfortably, aided as much by the absence of strong rivals as by the presence of loyal supporters. Her likely vote total- perhaps around one million—will be spun as a comeback. In reality, it reflects the residual strength of her partisan mayoralty and Bogotá-based electorate.
The absence of Sergio Fajardo from the Consulta de las Soluciones underscores the fragmentation of Colombia’s center. A strong showing by López will force a choice: seek alliances quickly or face marginalization after March 8. Even a López–Fajardo ticket would face sharp criticism from within their respective bases, and risk a repeat of the 2022 election season in which Sergio Fajardo’s campaign imploded under the weight of Petrismo or Uribismo.
On the left, the situation is more fluid – and more revealing.
The exclusion of Iván Cepeda has transformed the Frente por la Vida into a contest between two practitioners of political adaptation: Roy Barreras and Daniel Quintero. Neither represents the ideological hardline of Petrismo. Both instead offer variations of what might be called continuity without commitment – a “Petrismo 2.0” calibrated for chaise-lounge socialists.
Barreras relies on organization, his tenure as a loyal Petro “insider”, and the quiet efficiencies of Colombia’s territorial elites. Quintero counters with a direct, anti-Uribe narrative amplified through social media. Each seeks not to replace Petro, but to reinterpret him. Yet the Barreras-versus-Quintero contest feels less like a continuation of an embattled political project than an attempt for both candidates to repackage their political futures.
The most important actor on the left may be Petro himself – precisely because of his absence. By declining to endorse the consultation, he has deprived it of coherence. The result is a referendum on his government without his direct participation, and turnout that may struggle to reach even one million voters. In political terms, that is not a mobilization. It is a warning.
What emerges from these three contests is not a country coalescing, but one sorting itself into sharper, more disciplined minorities. The right is concentrated and motivated. The left is divided and improvisational. The center is present, but peripheral.
Then there is the largest bloc of all: those who will not participate. Polling suggests that a majority of Colombians will abstain from the primaries altogether. This is not apathy in the conventional sense. It reflects something more structural – a growing distance between citizens and political mechanisms that no longer seem to mediate power so much as ratify it.
In that respect, March 8 clarifies less about who will win than about how Colombia now conducts politics. Elections no longer aggregate a national will; they stage competitions between organized intensities. Victory belongs not to the broadest coalition, but to the most cohesive one.
By Sunday night, the candidates will claim momentum. Some will have earned it. Others will have inherited it. But all will confront the same reality: the path to the presidency no longer runs through the mythical Colombian center. It runs through blocs – disciplined, polarized, and increasingly unwilling to transcend partisan loyalties for the greater good.
Colombia and Ecuador are engaged in a tariff dispute that could affect both countries. At the beginning of February, Ecuador imposed 30% tariffs on products imported from its northern neighbor, and then Colombia responded with reciprocal tariffs at the same rate. Ecuador has now escalated the dispute by raising the tariff to 50%. Here is a summary of what is happening.
The most recent move by Ecuador was on February 26. “After confirming the lack of implementation of concrete and effective border security measures by Colombia, Ecuador is obliged to adopt sovereign actions. Starting March 1, the security fee on imports originating from Colombia will be increased from 30% to 50%,” the Servicio Nacional de Aduana said in a press release as retaliation for the announcement of reciprocal tariffs by Colombia.
Before that, the Colombian government had officially imposed a reciprocal 30% tariff on imports of goods originating from Ecuador, as established in Decree 170 of 2026, signed on February 24 by President Gustavo Petro and his ministerial cabinet.
The decree states that the measure responds to the 30% tariff previously imposed by Ecuador on Colombian products has generated “an estimated 97% drop in exports to that country, equivalent to an annual reduction of approximately $1.803 billion USD.”
Colombia has suspended electricity delivery to Ecuador in retaliation.
The Colombian decision came as a direct response to the so-called “security fee” introduced by Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa on February 1, which applied the same rate to goods originating from Colombia.
At the time, the Secretaría General de Comunicaciones de Ecuador, announced the measure through the social media platform X, stating that the objective was to “protect national security and strengthen customs controls and security in the border area.” According to President Noboa, the decision was based on “a lack of reciprocity and the need for stronger security measures,” adding that the tariff would remain in place “until there is a genuine joint commitment to combat drug trafficking and illegal mining along the shared border.”
These actions mark an escalation in trade tensions between the two countries, which have faced growing political and diplomatic challenges in recent months. Colombia had already suspended electricity exports to Ecuador following the initial tariffs, while Quito increased fees for transporting Colombian petroleum through its pipelines.
Products affected by tariffs include beans, rice, fats and oils, unsweetened cocoa powder, fresh bananas, ethyl alcohol and denatured spirits, as well as insecticides, fungicides, and disinfectants, among others. Although the tariff is initially paid by importers at the border, these costs are typically passed on to end consumers through price adjustments.
Despite historically close trade relations, it remains unclear whether both countries will reach a short-term agreement, or move toward formal dispute resolution mechanisms. On February 6, foreign ministers from both nations held a negotiation meeting in Quito, though no formal agreement was reached. Ecuador, at the time, conditioned further decisions on progress in security and energy cooperation.
Additionally, according to Bogotá-based El Tiempo daily newspaper, both governments have filed formal complaints with the Comunidad Andina de Naciones (CAN), which must determine whether the claims will be accepted. Analysts generally agree that a diplomatic solution remains the most viable path to resolving the current trade dispute.
The Central Market in Tulcán, Ecuador, near the Colombian border, one of the most affected areas by the new tariffs. (photo: Jadin Samit Vergara)
Headline photo: Border between Tulcán, Ecuador, and Ipiales, Colombia, at the Rumichaca International Bridge. (Photo Jadin Samit Vergara)
The Colombian Council of State has issued a provisional suspension of the government decree that established a 23% increase in the national minimum wage for 2026. The judicial decision halts the implementation of the adjustment, which had set the monthly salary at $1,750,905 COP plus a transportation assistance allowance, totaling approximately $2,000,000 COP.
The suspension follows several legal challenges arguing that the administration of President Gustavo Petro exceeded its authority by setting an increase significantly higher than the 5.1% inflation rate recorded in 2025. The court found reasonable doubt regarding whether the executive branch adhered to the technical criteria mandated by Law 278 of 1996, which requires adjustments to be based on inflation, productivity, and economic growth.
The high court has granted the Ministry of Labor an eight-day window to issue a new provisional decree. During this period, employers are instructed to maintain current payment levels until the new administrative act is published.
Legal experts emphasize that the ruling does not have retroactive effects. Juan Pablo López, managing partner at López & Asociados, told daily El Tiempo that payments made between January 1 and the issuance of the new decree remain valid. Companies are legally prohibited from discounting or requesting the return of the additional 23% already paid to employees for January and the first half of February.
Vicente Umaña, partner at Posse Herrera Ruiz, clarified to the same publication that while payments currently due must honor the 23% increase, the forthcoming decree will likely establish a lower rate. This adjustment will subsequently impact other costs indexed to the minimum wage, including administration fees, fines, and transport costs.
The initial 23% hike sparked concerns among economic think tanks regarding formal employment and inflation. Fedesarrollo published an analysis suggesting that such an increase could lead to the loss of up to 600,000 formal jobs and a three-percentage-point rise in labor informality.
Economic researchers at Bancolombia (BVC: BCOLOMBIA, NYSE: CIB) estimated potential job losses could reach 734,000. Their data highlights specific sectors at risk:
According to Medellín-based El Colombiano, Camilo Cuervo, partner at Holland & Knight, noted that the Council of State’s language suggests the original decree may not survive a final merits review. Luis Fernando Mejía, CEO of Lumen Economic Intelligence, indicated that the suspension could serve to stabilize price escalations observed in early 2026.
The National Federation of Merchants (FENALCO) and the National Business Association of Colombia (ANDI) have addressed the ruling. Jaime Alberto Cabal, president of FENALCO, described the suspension as a necessary correction to an adjustment that did not reflect economic realities. Bruce Mac Master, president of ANDI, stated that the ruling establishes important jurisprudence for technical responsibility in wage setting.
Mauricio Montealegre, partner at Pérez-Llorca Gómez-Pinzón, observed that while the government could theoretically attempt to justify the same figure in a new decree, the president has called for a new concertation table to align with the court’s criteria.
Business owners and human resources departments operating in Colombia should consider the following steps:
Photo © Loren Moss
Welcome to the weekend one and all. A week dominated, or at least that was the perception, by politics. Who will be standing in which primary and who will choose / have to go direct to Round 1 in May. Aside from that, the debate over the impact of the 23% minimum wage increase, continues.
1. How was January inflation from Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística – DANE Colombia ?
2. Is the full impact of the Minimum Wage increase now baked in according to Bancolombia ?
3. How were Exports for December from Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística – DANE Colombia ?
4. How many Presidential candidates do we expect to see on the ballot in May ?
5. Why is Petro again discussing Emergency Economic powers ?
6. What are FENALCO & ANDI – Asociación Nacional de Empresarios de Colombia saying about vehicle sales in 2026 ?
7. How have the markets been this week ?
That is our lot for this weekend. Wherever you are, please have a relaxing and peaceful day.
my regards
Rupert
Colombian President Gustavo Petro on Sunday mounted a forceful defence of his government’s 23.7% minimum wage increase for 2026, pledging to issue a temporary decree to keep the so-called “vital wage” in place after the Council of State provisionally suspended the original measure.
Speaking in a televised address on Feb. 15, Petro said that while he disagreed with the high court’s decision, he would respect the judicial process and comply by issuing a transitory administrative decree, pending a final ruling.
“The vital wage will remain in place until the new decree is issued,” Petro said, rejecting claims that the increase had triggered inflation or job losses and insisting that workers’ purchasing power must not be subordinated to shifting economic variables.
The Council of State questioned the technical justification and procedural basis of the December decree that lifted the monthly minimum wage to 1.75 million pesos ($470) – close to 2 million pesos including transport subsidies – forcing the government to revisit the measure barely six weeks after it took effect on Jan. 1.
Rather than retreating, Petro escalated the confrontation, calling for nationwide demonstrations on Feb. 19 to defend what he described as a historic social gain for Colombian workers.
“We’ll see each other in all public squares across Colombia,” the president wrote on social media, framing the dispute as a struggle over dignity and constitutional labour rights rather than a technical wage-setting debate.
Petro anchored his argument in Constitutional Court ruling C-815 of 1999, which he said obliges governments to consider not only inflation and productivity but — “with prevailing character” – the constitutional mandate to guarantee a minimum, vital and mobile wage.
In a move that further unsettled markets and business groups, the government signalled that the revised decree could maintain – or even exceed – the original 23.7% increase.
Labour Minister Antonio Sanguino said on Monday that “nothing is ruled out” as the government reconvenes the Permanent Commission on Wage and Labour Policy, bringing unions and employers back to the negotiating table.
The president himself suggested that a true “vital wage” should be closer to 2.15 million pesos, well above the current level.
Sanguino said the commission would review updated economic indicators from the national statistics agency DANE and the finance ministry, including inflation data for early 2026 and labour market trends from 2025.
Petro dismissed warnings that the wage hike could fuel inflation or unemployment, arguing that recent data contradict those claims. In a post on “X”, he said that even with Central Bank’s inflation forecasts near 6.4%, wage growth would remain strong and support domestic production and productivity. “It would be a national stupidity to lower the vital wage,”added Petro, affirming also that the country’s first leftist administration would still listen to business leaders.
Economists and employers, however, remain sceptical. Financial analysts claim the suspension highlights institutional concerns over policy predictability, and fear the standoff could undermine investor confidence at a time when Colombia is grappling with deep fiscal debt and high labour informality.
The wage dispute has sharpened tensions between Colombia’s Executive, judiciary and private sector, just three months before first-round presidential elections in May 31.
The outcome of the Council of State’s final ruling – and whether the Executive succeeds in forging a late compromise with employers — will shape not only labour costs in 2026 but also a broader debate over economic governance and the autonomy of the Banco de la República.
For now, the minimum wage remains in legal limbo — enforced by decree, contested in court, and to be defended by his political base this week on the street.
Nearly a week after Donald Trump hosted Colombia’s president, Gustavo Petro, at the White House, calm has returned to a bilateral relationship that only recently appeared headed for rupture. The insults have stopped. The social media theatrics have faded. Diplomacy, not spectacle, is back in charge.
This alone tells us that both governments have agreed to “disagree” and agree again.
The meeting itself produced no headline agreements. Instead, it marked something more consequential and less dramatic – a quiet end to illusions. In Washington, Petro’s flagship policy of “Total Peace” is now widely regarded as exhausted, if not outright discredited. What replaces it is a far more traditional, conditional partnership: security cooperation first, democracy under scrutiny, and patience in short supply.
The timing matters. Within days of the White House meeting, the U.S. State Department announced that John McNamara, Washington’s chargé d’affaires in Bogotá, will leave his post on February 13. McNamara arrived a year ago at a moment of open hostility between Trump and Petro, when the relationship was being tested not only by policy disagreements but by personal antagonism. His task was not to advance grand initiatives, but to prevent a collapse. That he succeeded says much about the value of professional diplomacy in an era of impulsive politics.
His departure now marks the end of a holding pattern. What comes next will be harder, more explicit, and less forgiving.
The Trump – Petro encounter was cordial, almost surprisingly so. Trump praised Petro as “terrific.” Petro shared a handwritten note from Trump declaring his affection for Colombia. The optics were deliberate. But the substance lay elsewhere.
According to officials and lawmakers briefed on the talks, Washington’s message was blunt: negotiations without consequences have failed. Petro’s Paz Total—a strategy built on ceasefires, open-ended negotiations, and the assumption that armed groups could be coaxed into disarmament—has not reduced violence. In many regions, it has coincided with territorial expansion by FARC dissidents, rising extortion, and a deepening humanitarian crisis. From Washington’s perspective, it has blurred the line between peace realpolitik and paralysis.
U.S. cooperation with Colombia is now explicitly conditioned on key demands. First, decisive military action against armed groups, especially the ELN along the Venezuelan border, where insurgents have long enjoyed sanctuary. Second, ironclad guarantees that Colombia’s upcoming electoral processes will be free, fair, and transparent ahead of a high-stakes 2026 presidential race.
This is not ideological hostility. It is strategic calculation – from Bogotá to Caracas, and ultimately, the Oval Office.
Colombia remains indispensable to U.S. interests: a capstone of regional security, a key counter-narcotics partner, and a democratic anchor in a hemisphere unsettled by authoritarian drift and Venezuelan instability. But indispensability does not mean indulgence. Washington’s conclusion is that leverage must now be used, not deferred.
The shift was visible almost immediately. Colombian forces bombed ELN encampments in the Catatumbo region near the Venezuelan border, killing several fighters and seizing weapons. The strikes signaled a return to military pressure after months of restraint under Paz Total.
Yet they also exposed the moral and political cost of the new course. According to Colombia’s forensic authorities and reporting by El Colombiano, one of those killed in Catatumbo was a child. Seven bodies were recovered after the operation, including that of a minor. The incident echoed last November’s bombing in Guaviare that killed seven minors, among them an 11-year-old girl.
Petro, in the aftermath of the Trump encounter, has responded with a stark argument: armed groups recruit children precisely to deter military action. Halting airstrikes, he said, would reward a “cowardly and criminal” strategy and accelerate forced recruitment. It is a grim logic, but not an implausible one—and it illustrates the impossible trade-offs now confronting the Colombian state.
Peace negotiations have not been spared. The Clan del Golfo, one of the country’s most powerful criminal organizations, suspended talks with the government after reports that Colombia and the United States discussed targeting “high-value” leaders. From Washington’s perspective, this reaction only reinforces its skepticism: armed groups talk peace when it buys time, not when it requires surrender.
None of this suggests enthusiasm in Washington for a militarized Colombia. It suggests resignation. The United States has seen this cycle before – in Colombia and throughout the hemisphere. Negotiations without enforcement are a contradiction. Ceasefires without verification entrench armed actors. Elections held amid coercion corrode democratic legitimacy from within.
Which brings us to the second pillar of the new relationship: electoral transparency.
U.S. officials have made clear that Colombia’s democratic processes will now be watched closely – not as a moral abstraction, but as a strategic necessity. A Colombia that cannot guarantee free elections is not a reliable ally, no matter how aligned its security policies may be.
This is the bargain now on offer. Not a reset. No rupture. Conditional coexistence.
John McNamara’s departure symbolizes the transition. His tenure was about keeping the peace between governments. The next phase will be about enforcing terms.
For Petro, the challenge is severe. He must deliver security results demanded by Washington without losing legitimacy at home, where skepticism of militarization runs deep. He must demonstrate democratic integrity while navigating a polarized political landscape. And he must do so knowing that Total Peace, once his signature promise, no longer commands confidence abroad.
The calm in U.S.–Colombia relations is real- but it is not comfort. It is the quiet before accountability.
Colombian President Gustavo Petro appeared on Tuesday to melt into the gilded woodwork of the Oval Office, wearing a gold tie and an uncharacteristically sober dark suit. Seated beside U.S. President Donald Trump, the two-hour meeting appeared—at least on the surface—to be a cordial encounter between political adversaries entrenched on opposite sides of the ideological divide.
After months of public insults, veiled threats and mutual distrust, both leaders emerged from their first face-to-face meeting keen to project warmth. “We got along very well,” Trump told reporters afterward. “I thought he was terrific.” Petro, speaking later at the Colombian embassy in Washington, described the encounter as “optimistic” and “constructive,” particularly on counter-narcotics cooperation.
Yet behind the gold accents, handshakes and flattering soundbites, the meeting revealed less of a breakthrough than a carefully choreographed de-escalation – one that stabilizes a fraught bilateral relationship without resolving its deepest contradictions.
The meeting defied expectations precisely because expectations were so low. Trump and Petro had spent months trading insults from afar. Trump had previously labeled the Colombian leader a “sick man” and an “illegal drug leader,” offering no evidence. Petro, a former left-wing guerrilla turned president, accused Trump’s administration of committing war crimes through strikes on suspected drug-smuggling vessels and denounced the U.S. operation that removed Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro as a “kidnapping.”
Analysts in Bogotá and Washington alike feared the encounter could spiral into confrontation—or worse, an unfiltered monologue. Instead, the Oval Office doors closed to the press, and when they reopened, both leaders spoke in unusually measured tones.
“There was more fear of what could go wrong than hope for what could go right,” wrote El País. “None of it happened.”
Trump hailed the talks as “terrific,” while Petro posted a photograph on X showing the two men smiling, accompanied by a handwritten note from Trump reading: “Gustavo – A great honor – I love Colombia.” For Petro, the optics alone mattered: after months of diplomatic frost, he had secured not only an invitation but public validation from the most unpredictable ally Colombia has.
Gilded optics for now
Despite the upbeat rhetoric, neither side announced concrete agreements. Trump said the two leaders were “working on” counter-narcotics efforts. Petro said he had urged Trump to cooperate in locating and capturing major drug traffickers living outside Colombia, including in the United Arab Emirates, Europe and the United States.
On Venezuela, Petro floated the idea of trilateral cooperation on oil and gas exports involving Caracas, Bogotá and Washington – an ambitious proposal that runs headlong into U.S. sanctions policy. He also claimed Trump agreed to mediate Colombia’s escalating trade dispute with Ecuador, whose president, Daniel Noboa, is a close Trump ally.
What emerged was less a roadmap than a reset: an agreement to keep talking.
That alone represents progress. Colombia’s security situation has deteriorated sharply, with armed groups such as the ELN expanding their reach. U.S. intelligence, technology and funding remain central to Bogotá’s counterinsurgency and counter-narcotics strategies—just as they were during the years that led the FARC to the negotiating table.
Petro’s political calculus
Domestically, the meeting strengthened Petro at a sensitive moment. As El País noted, Colombia is already edging toward a heated electoral cycle, and the prospect of a public clash with Trump had unnerved even some of Petro’s allies.
Instead, the Colombian president managed to appear pragmatic without abandoning his ideological posture. “He did not change his way of thinking on many issues, and neither did I,” Petro said. His quip about a “pact for life” to “make the America(s) great again” signaled both irony and accommodation – a rhetorical olive branch wrapped in Trump’s own slogan.
The presence of senior officials on both sides underscored the meeting’s importance. Petro was joined by Foreign Minister Rosa Yolanda Villavicencio, Defense Minister Pedro Sánchez and Ambassador Daniel García-Peña. Trump was flanked by Vice President J.D. Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Republican Senator Bernie Moreno.
The Clinton List
One issue loomed quietly in the background: Petro’s status on the so-called Clinton List. According to Colombian media reports citing sources close to the White House, Washington may reassess Petro’s inclusion only after Colombia’s 2026 presidential elections, with a decision expected no earlier than June.
If confirmed, the message is clear: Trump’s administration is willing to thaw relations—but not without leverage.
Trump also said he was working on lifting U.S. sanctions imposed on Petro last year over alleged links to the drug trade, accusations the Colombian president has repeatedly dismissed as “slander.” No timeline was offered.
Alliance restored
For the United States, Colombia remains indispensable: a key intelligence partner, a bulwark against narcotics flows, and a strategic player in a volatile region where Venezuela’s political and economic future remains uncertain. For Colombia, the relationship is existential – economically, militarily and diplomatically. Nearly 30% of Colombian exports go to the U.S., while remittances from more than three million Colombians living there exceed $13 billion annually.
What Tuesday’s meeting achieved was not reconciliation, but recalibration.
The gold tie, the flattering notes, the carefully chosen words – all that glittered. But neither Trump nor Petro abandoned their instincts, their ideologies or their mutual suspicion. The real test will come not in photographs or handwritten dedications, but in whether cooperation materializes once the optics fade.
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