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Migración Colombia, Colombia’s immigration agency, has executed the expulsion of two US citizens from Medellín following separate investigations into activities deemed a risk to public security and peaceful coexistence. The administrative measures targeted Steve Newland, a digital content creator known as “Chill Capo,” and Samuel McVey, a former teacher from New York. Both individuals were transported to the Aeropuerto Internacional José María Córdova in Rionegro and placed on a flight to Miami, Florida.
The actions come amid a broader strategy by the Colombian government to address concerns regarding sex tourism and the presence of foreign nationals with outstanding legal issues in their home countries. According to Paola Salazar, the Regional Director of Migración Colombia, the agency has adopted a stricter posture to ensure that Colombia is not utilized as a refuge for individuals linked to fraudulent or illicit activities.
Steve Newland, a 42-year-old US citizen born in Willingboro, New Jersey, had been residing in Medellín since 2022. Operating under the digital brand “Chill Capo,” Newland promoted luxury lifestyle experiences and nightlife events. However, an investigation by Migración Colombia determined that Newland used his digital platforms to promote encounters with alleged purposes of sexual exploitation.
“Lo están esperando y lo capturan, (they are waiting for them and they will capture them)” stated Federico Gutiérrez, the Mayor of Medellín, referring to the coordination with US authorities regarding the return of the individuals.
The agency reported that Newland’s content included advice on how to evade immigration controls at the airport, such as using false medical certificates or simulating injuries to bypass rigorous inspections. His publications also mentioned accommodations linked to historical criminal figures, specifically the penthouses de Pablo Escobar, and provided instructions on how to avoid being targeted with escopolamina during social outings. Following the investigation, authorities confirmed Newland was in an irregular migration status. He has been banned from reentering Colombia for a minimum of five years.
Newland has publicly denied the allegations via his social media channels. He asserted that his primary objective was to educate visitors on safety and help them avoid dangerous situations. Newland claimed that his events were legal, safe, and conducted in collaboration with established Colombian businesses in the Parque Lleras district. He further contended that his visa had been renewed multiple times since 2022, suggesting that any illegal activity would have prevented such renewals. Newland challenged authorities to present specific evidence or identify victims related to the claims of exploitation.
#Noticia | Influenciador estadounidense que promovía turismo con fines de explotación sexual en Medellín, fue deportado por Migración Colombia.
El extranjero no podrá ingresar al país en los próximos cinco años, luego de este tiempo tendrá que solicitar una visa. pic.twitter.com/9QhZKJ7C8X— Migración Colombia (@MigracionCol) April 11, 2026

On LinkedIn, McVey claims to have a new private school in Llanogrande, Antioquia, that embraces “leaders of drug cartels and paramilitaries” among others.
In a separate incident, 46-year-old Samuel McVey, who was fired as a primary school teacher but styles himself as “Chief Executive Officer @ McVey International Group” on LinkedIn, was expelled following a series of disturbances at educational institutions in the Valle de Aburrá (Metro Medellín) and the city’s eastern Antioquia bedroom community of Rionegro. On April 8, 2026, McVey reportedly entered at least three schools in the wealthy Las Palmas sector of Medellín, where he allegedly initiated confrontations and made threats against staff and students. He subsequently traveled to Rionegro, where he attempted to gain entry to the Colegio Monteluna in Llanogrande by posing as an English language instructor.
When denied access, McVey reportedly directed threats toward students, prompting school officials to contact the Policía Nacional. He was apprehended by units from the Estación Llanogrande near a local strip mall. Manuel Villa Mejía, the Secretary of Security and Coexistence of Medellín, described McVey as a risk to the community and confirmed that the individual was in a state of high agitation upon his detention.
Investigation into McVey’s background revealed that he is a fugitive from New Rochelle, New York. In the United States, McVey faces charges of aggravated harassment in the second degree, a misdemeanor. The charges stem from an investigation by the New Rochelle Police Department involving threats made against Dr. Corey W. Reynolds, the Superintendent of the City School District of New Rochelle. McVey, a former Spanish teacher at Isaac E. Young Middle School, was terminated in early 2026. New Rochelle authorities had issued two bench warrants for his arrest after he failed to appear for court proceedings on March 26 and April 1, 2026.
Despite the outstanding warrants, the New Rochelle Police Department noted that they do not typically extradite individuals for misdemeanor offenses. Consequently, Colombian authorities processed his departure as an immediate expulsion based on his conduct within Colombia. McVey has been prohibited from entering Colombia for ten years.
The expulsions of Newland and McVey come after a larger enforcement effort during the 2026 Semana Santa (Easter Week) season. Migración Colombia reported that enhanced controls at airports and land borders resulted in the detection of numerous foreign nationals with irregular status or criminal backgrounds.
Specific cases identified by the agency during this period include:
In the first quarter of 2026, Migración Colombia has denied entry to over 600 foreign nationals. The primary reasons for inadmissibility include state sovereignty and security risks (153 cases), lack of required visas (133 cases), and insufficient documentation (104 cases). Additionally, 89 individuals were rejected for providing false information during immigration interviews, while 34 had documented criminal records.
The agency also noted a specific focus on preventing the Explotación Sexual Comercial de Niños, Niñas y Adolescentes (ESCNNA). Through cooperation with international intelligence agencies and the Angel Watch platform, 471 individuals have been denied entry since 2016 for reasons associated with sexual offenses. At the Rionegro terminal alone, 31 inadmissibility cases have been recorded so far in 2026 related to potential sex tourism risks.
The Director General of Migración Colombia, Gloria Esperanza Arriero, emphasized that while the country remains open to international travel and investment, visitors are required to comply with the Constitución Política de Colombia and national laws. Under Decreto 2136 de 2021, the immigration authority maintains the power to deny entry or order the immediate return of any foreign citizen who poses a risk to national security or public order.
The main nationalities of those denied entry in early 2026 include citizens from the United States (76), the Dominican Republic (64), Ecuador (55), and Venezuela (52).
Video footage courtesy Migración Colombia
Colombian authorities have captured the alleged crime boss “Mison,” also known as the “invisible narco”, who played a key role in facilitating the arrival of the Venezuelan criminal group Tren de Aragua in the capital Bogotá
The suspect, also known as “El Viejo,” was detained in Ecuador and handed over to Colombian authorities at the Rumichaca international border crossing under an Interpol notice, in a joint operation with Ecuadorian officials.
In Colombia, he is wanted on charges including aggravated conspiracy, homicide, drug trafficking and illegal weapons possession. A judge has ordered his pre-trial detention.
Authorities say Mison was the leader of “Los Maracuchos,” a criminal network with a strong presence in three Bogotá districts – Kennedy, Santa Fe and Los Mártires. For more than a decade, he allegedly operated under the guise of a nightlife entrepreneur, owning bars, nightclubs and informal rental properties known as “pagadiarios.”
Mayor Carlos Fernando Galán described the arrest as one of the most significant blows to organized crime in the city in recent years, calling the suspect “almost a myth” within criminal circles.
“He appeared to be a businessman in Bogotá’s nightlife economy, but in reality he was a central figure in a complex criminal structure,” Galán said.
According to investigators, the establishments he controlled served as hubs for drug distribution and were linked to serious crimes, including killings and torture. Among the venues identified by authorities are sites known as “Los Potrillos” and “Hotel Negro.”
Police also allege that Mison played a decisive role in enabling the expansion of Tren de Aragua into Bogotá around 2018, exploiting vulnerable migrant populations to recruit and train individuals for criminal activities. The group, which originated in Venezuela, has expanded across Latin America and is increasingly associated with organized crime in Colombia’s urban centers.
Bogotá Police Chief General Giovanni Cristancho said the arrest followed a two-year investigation involving cross-border cooperation. “He maintained a double life as a businessman while coordinating criminal operations,” noted Cristancho. “He was a pioneer in using ‘pagadiarios’ as operational centers to consolidate territorial control.”
Authorities said Mison fled to Ecuador in 2024 following intensified police pressure in Bogotá, where he continued operating under the cover of a merchant until his location was confirmed.
Prosecutors estimate that he accumulated assets worth more than 20 billion pesos (approximately $5 million), including rural properties, vehicles and real estate held through third parties. Officials say he generated monthly criminal revenues of up to 2 billion pesos through drug trafficking, extortion and other illicit activities.
Bogotá Security Secretary César Restrepo said the suspect’s influence extended beyond narcotics, linking him to extortion networks and contract killings.
“This is not a distant trafficker. He directly fueled violence in Bogotá and is responsible for significant harm to victims across the city,” Restrepo said.
Authorities believe the arrest will disrupt criminal structures tied to drug trafficking and urban violence, although they caution that such networks often adapt quickly.
If convicted, Mison could face a prison sentence of up to 32 years.
The operation is the latest in a series of high-profile security actions in Bogotá, as authorities seek to regain control over criminal networks and restore public safety in key areas of the capital.
Mayor Galán said the result demonstrates that sustained investigations and coordinated efforts can weaken organized crime groups.
Fresh audio revelations broadcast by Noticias Caracol have triggered a political storm in Colombia, implicating senior government-linked figures in alleged secret contacts with one of the country’s most notorious smugglers, Diego Marín Buitrago.
The recordings, aired late on April 5, appear to document meetings between intermediaries connected to President Gustavo Petro and the legal representative of Marín, widely known by the alias “Papá Pitufo.” The revelations come with just over four months remaining in Petro’s presidential term, intensifying scrutiny over his administration.
According to the report, the audios – lasting more than 90 minutes – capture conversations from early 2025 involving at least four individuals allegedly acting as emissaries of the government. Among them is Jorge Lemus, the former head of the National Intelligence Directorate (DNI), as well as other figures with links to the administration.
In the recordings, Lemus is heard holding closed-door meetings with Marín’s lawyer, Luis Felipe Ramírez, in which possible judicial benefits and guarantees are discussed in exchange for cooperation. Such proposals, if confirmed, would fall outside the remit of intelligence officials and raise questions about potential overreach and irregular negotiations.
The audios also suggest that these contacts occurred before any formal intervention by judicial authorities, with intermediaries allegedly presenting themselves as acting on behalf of the executive branch. Additional names mentioned include Catalan political figures Xavier Vendrell and Ramón Devesa, as well as former financial intelligence adviser Isaac Beltrán.
The revelations have revived a long-running controversy over alleged links between Marín and Petro’s 2022 presidential campaign. Previous reports indicated that the smuggler may have contributed 500 million pesos (approximately $130,000) to the campaign—funds Petro has said were returned upon discovery of their origin. However, opposition figures argue that no conclusive proof of that վերադարձ has ever been presented.
Opposition leaders, including senator and presidential hopeful Paloma Valencia, seized on the latest disclosures to demand an independent investigation. “This is an extremely serious institutional matter,” Valencia said in a video response, questioning the absence of evidence regarding the alleged վերադարձ of the funds and warning of a pattern of clandestine contacts.
Critics argue that the recordings point to “under-the-table” dealings with criminal actors, potentially undermining the government’s legitimacy at a critical political juncture.
President Petro responded by acknowledging that intelligence contacts with Marín’s circle had taken place but insisted they were authorized and aimed solely at securing the smuggler’s cooperation with Colombian justice.
“The purpose was to bring Marín to Colombia,” Petro said, framing the outreach as part of a broader strategy to dismantle criminal networks. However, the president went further, alleging that some intelligence agents may have exploited the situation by attempting to solicit money during the interactions.
According to Petro, these alleged irregularities led to dismissals within state agencies, suggesting internal misconduct rather than a coordinated government effort to negotiate with the smuggler.
The president also criticized the Fiscalía General de la Nación, accusing prosecutors of limiting the scope of investigations and pursuing what he described as a politically motivated campaign against his administration.
Marín, long considered one of Colombia’s most significant contraband operators, has been linked for decades to networks involved in smuggling and bribery. His arrest in Europe in 2024 triggered an ongoing extradition process, though legal challenges in countries including Spain and Portugal have complicated proceedings.
Prosecutors in Colombia have charged him with criminal conspiracy and bribery, alleging he led a sophisticated structure that penetrated state institutions.
The latest revelations add to mounting political pressure on Petro, whose administration has already faced a series of scandals and internal fractures. With the presidential term nearing its end, the emergence of recorded evidence – rather than testimony or second-hand accounts—marks a potentially decisive moment in a controversy that has shadowed his government for years.
Whether the audios lead to formal investigations or judicial consequences remains unclear. But politically, the damage appears immediate, reopening questions about the boundaries between state actors and criminal networks—and the extent to which those lines may have been blurred behind closed doors.
Colombia’s President Gustavo Petro ran for president on a campaign promising Paz Total—Total Peace. He promised to give the FARC dissidents, the vicious ELN guerillas, and mafias like the Clan del Golfo a good talking to, and with that, they will just lay down their weapons and become model citizens. Petro promised that through dialogue with bloodthirsty kidnappers and extortionists, they would be willing to stop being bloodthirsty kidnappers and extortionists; as if they are just misunderstood little muffins who only need a hug.
According to figures compiled by the Universidad Externado and reported by The City Paper Bogotá, Colombia has recorded 40,663 homicides during the first three years of the Petro presidency. Over 400 human rights defenders have been slaughtered between 2022 and 2025 according to the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights. Human Rights Watch reports that the ELN and FARC dissidents have expanded their territories by up to 55%. They are taking back over Colombia.
Under Gustavo Petro’s watch, Colombia has returned to the Institute for Economics and Peace’s Global Terrorism Index top ten list of countries impacted by terrorism, along with Total Peace destinations like Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, and Syria. Just this past week, a Clan del Golfo poster was put up within walking distance from the Aeropuerto Internacional José María Córdova just outside of Medellín. This Total Peace nonsense is a failure.
Right now, in the neglected Pacific department of Chocó, the ELN has kidnapped whole communities. Petro ran a campaign promising that he was going to embrace these historically neglected communities—places like Chocó, Nariño, La Guajira, and Norte de Santander—but insecurity is increasing. Chocó’s governor, Nubia Carolina Córdoba, says 6,047 people are trapped inside of their homes because the ELN has announced an illegal armed curfew in the municipality of Bajo Baudó. Most of these people are already poor, and now they have been kidnapped en masse by this guerilla group that operates with impunity because Gustavo Petro coddles them with “dialogue.”
According to Governor Córdoba, they attacked the police station in the village of Santa Rita using grenades attached to drones. It has gotten so bad that Colombia has restricted the entry of drones into the country. These people are calling out for help, but the president insists on talking as the ELN grows and continues to menace the police forces, the Colombian military, and, most importantly, the innocent public.
There is currently public disorder where belligerents have completely blocked the roads in the north of Antioquia, in the region called Bajo Cauca, and also in the neighboring department of Córdoba. The city of Caucasia is under curfew. Antioquia’s Governor, Andrés Rendón, has urgently called on the national government to stop the talk and take action. Groups are attacking ambulances and burning people’s motorcycles as they try to get by the roadblocks, regardless of the emergency.
Governor Rendón stated: “There can be no dialogue amidst blockades and human rights violations. It’s been seven days now with the Bajo Cauca region paralyzed and the country held hostage by chaos.” He called on the Fiscalía General de la Nación to bring those responsible to justice and challenged the Minister of Defense, Pedro Sánchez, to order the immediate reopening of the roads. “We’re not talking about small-scale miners here; behind this are criminal structures, as everyone knows, that finance themselves through illegal mining and move billions of pesos,” Rendón added, demanding full authority against the criminals who use communities as a shield.
El gobernador de Antioquia, @AndresJRendonC, se pronunció sobre la situación de orden público en el Bajo Cauca, en medio de los bloqueos que ya completan varios días y afectan la movilidad y la seguridad en la región. @GobAntioquia pic.twitter.com/4SPQgTa68r
— MiOriente (@MiOriente) March 22, 2026
The current situation with these organized criminal groups—whether regular mafias like the Clan del Golfo or murderous Marxist guerillas like the ELN and the FARC dissidents—is reminiscent of a classroom where a substitute teacher has lost all control. Petro promised Total Peace, but the result has been Total Chaos. Investors do not want to deal with this mess. While the Petro government claims they want tourism to be a major economic driver, road blocks make many areas look like scenes out of Mad Max: Road Warrior. Whole zones of the Pacific coast are unsafe even for residents, met with pure impotence from the regime.
Ten years ago, it was safe to drive from Medellín to the beachside town of Coveñas in Sucre, but that is no longer the case. While it remains safe to visit Colombia for business or tourism in major hubs like Bogotá, Medellín, Santa Marta, or the San Andrés islands, the long-term outlook is concerning. My hope is that Colombians choose a future leader serious about law and order as a prerequisite for human rights. It is not only the government that we need to protect human rights from; those who kill, steal, kidnap, and forcibly recruit children are violating those rights as well.

Colombian anti-explosives experts inspect propaganda by the Clan del Golfo mafia group just minutes away from Medellin’s international airport in March, 2026 (image from Facebook).
The Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil of Colombia (RNEC), the entity responsible for organizing elections in the country, reported that a total of 14 candidates have officially registered to run in the country’s presidential elections, scheduled for May 31, 2026. In this vote, citizens will elect the President and Vice President of the Republic for the 2026–2030 term.
According to the electoral authority, the candidates represent a wide range of political perspectives, from left to right, including independent candidacies running through political movements. Here the list and brief profile of the candidates:
The RNEC also reported that “the draw to determine the position of presidential candidates on the ballot will take place on March 25 at the Ágora Bogotá Convention Center.”
This process marks the formal start of the final phase of the presidential campaign, during which candidates will seek to consolidate support ahead of the first round on May 31. If no candidate secures an absolute majority, a runoff between the two leading candidates will be held on June 21.

List of registered candidates for Colombia’s presidency. Photo courtesy of the Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil.
Headline photo: Polling station in Colombia during last Congress elections in March 8, 2026. Photo courtesy of the Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil.
Colombian authorities on Wednesday arrested Ángel Esteban Aguilar Morales, alias “Lobo Menor”, an alleged senior figure in the Ecuadorian criminal group Los Lobos and suspected intellectual author behind the 2023 assassination of Ecuadorian presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio.
The arrest took place at El Dorado International Airport, where Aguilar Morales arrived on a commercial flight from Mexico, according to Colombia’s migration authority.
Officials said the suspect attempted to evade detection using false identification as a Colombian citizen, but biometric verification and international intelligence-sharing mechanisms exposed his true identity. He was detained under an Interpol red notice and handed over to judicial authorities pending extradition proceedings.
Aguilar Morales is considered a high-ranking member of Los Lobos, an Ecuador-based criminal organization linked to narcotrafficking, contract killings, illegal mining, and broader transnational crime. Authorities allege he played a central role in planning the killing of Villavicencio, whose assassination during the 2023 campaign sent shockwaves across the region.
The arrest comes at a delicate moment in bilateral relations. Colombia and Ecuador are this week attempting to defuse a growing diplomatic and security crisis following the discovery of an unexploded device inside Colombian territory near the border between the departments of Nariño and Putumayo. The incident has triggered sharp exchanges between the governments of President Gustavo Petro and Ecuador’s leadership, amid mutual accusations over cross-border security threats.
Colombia’s migration chief Gloria Esperanza Arriero López said the capture underscores the country’s determination to confront transnational criminal networks, particularly as tensions with Ecuador highlight the porous and contested nature of the shared border.
“This result demonstrates that Colombia has strong institutions and coordinated security forces working to close the space for criminal organizations, regardless of their origin,” Arriero said.
Colombian officials said Aguilar Morales had been under surveillance following intelligence tracking his movements through Medellín and Itagüí before traveling to Mexico. Authorities credited close cooperation with Mexican counterparts for locating and intercepting him as part of a multinational operation referred to by Petro as “Jericó.”
Petro described the suspect as one of the most significant figures linked to the Villavicencio assassination and alleged ties to dissident Colombian armed factions, including networks associated with “Iván Mordisco,” as well as Mexican cartels — evidence, he said, of the expanding integration of regional criminal economies.
According to investigators, Aguilar Morales had previously been sentenced in Ecuador to 20 years in prison for murder in 2013, but was granted conditional release in 2022 after serving half his sentence. Authorities allege he used falsified documents to meet legal reporting requirements while continuing criminal operations across borders.
The arrest marks a major development in the Villavicencio case and comes as Ecuador grapples with escalating violence linked to organized crime and drug trafficking routes. The slain candidate had campaigned on an anti-corruption platform and vowed to dismantle criminal networks, placing him squarely in their crosshairs.
Colombian authorities said the capture also demonstrates the importance of trilateral coordination between Colombia, Ecuador and Mexico in dismantling organized crime structures. Aguilar Morales is expected to face extradition as Ecuador seeks to prosecute those responsible for orchestrating the assassination.
The timing of the arrest — against the backdrop of rising diplomatic tensions and border security concerns — is likely to reinforce calls for deeper regional cooperation to address increasingly interconnected criminal threats operating across the Andes.
Colombia is at risk of sliding back into one of the darkest chapters of its recent history, according to a stark new report by the United Nations, which warns that escalating violence, territorial control by illegal armed groups and political instability are eroding hard-won human rights gains.
The annual assessment by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights paints a troubling picture of 2025: a country where armed actors have deepened their grip over rural regions, civilians are increasingly trapped in conflict zones, and the implementation of the 2016 peace accord is under growing strain.
At the heart of the report lies a central warning — Colombia faces the “possibility of reverting” to pre-peace agreement levels of violence, particularly in territories where the state remains weak or absent.
Across large swathes of the country — from the Catatumbo in Norte de Santander to the Pacific coast — non-state armed groups and criminal organizations have consolidated control over vulnerable populations, imposing what the report describes as “illegal armed governance”.
The criminal groups mentioned- Clan del Golfo, ELN, FARC dissidents – are responsible for a wide range of abuses: forced displacement, confinement, selective killings, sexual violence and the recruitment of children. Entire communities, especially Indigenous and Afro-Colombian populations, are subjected to coercion and forced participation in illicit economies. “Afro-descendant communities, particularly in regions such as Chocó, continue to face severe human rights violations due to the presence and social control exercised by non-state armed groups,” claims the report.
Even in areas where a single armed group dominates and overt violence is less visible, the UN notes that civilians live under strict systems of control, with basic freedoms curtailed and fear pervasive.
The UN documented 53 verified massacres in 2025, leaving 174 victims, the vast majority attributed to armed groups fighting over control of illegal economies such as drug trafficking.
The report also highlights a disturbing increase in indiscriminate attacks, including the use of explosives and drones in populated areas. Cities such as Cali were directly affected, with civilian casualties mounting as conflict spills into urban spaces.
In one incident in the southern department of Huila, a motorcycle bomb targeting a police station killed civilians and injured dozens, underscoring the growing risks faced by ordinary Colombians.
One of the report’s most alarming findings is the worsening situation for children.
The UN verified 150 cases of child recruitment in 2025, though it warns this represents only a fraction of the true scale due to underreporting and fear of retaliation. Armed groups are increasingly using social media platforms to lure minors, glamorising violence and illegal economies.
In some cases, children recruited into armed groups were later killed during military operations, raising further concerns about protection mechanisms.
Schools have also become battlegrounds. Armed groups have occupied educational spaces, disrupted classes and used them as recruitment grounds, particularly among Indigenous communities at risk of cultural and physical extinction.
The report details systematic patterns of sexual violence, exploitation and coercion, particularly against women and girls in conflict zones.
Armed groups have imposed control over reproductive rights, restricted access to healthcare and, in some cases, forced pregnancies. Girls are often recruited through manipulation and emotional coercion, only to face abuse, forced labour and sexual violence once under the control of armed actors.
Indigenous, Afro-descendant and migrant women are disproportionately affected, facing layered vulnerabilities exacerbated by institutional absence.
As Colombia moves through a politically sensitive period, the report identifies a sharp rise in preelectoral violence.
The killing of the right-wing presidential candidate Miguel Uribe Turbay in August 2025 marked a dramatic escalation, while the UN recorded 18 assassinations and 126 attacks or threats against political leaders and candidates.
Nearly 650 municipalities were classified as high-risk zones by Colombia’s Ombudsman, raising concerns about the integrity of democratic participation.
The report also points to a surge in digital harassment. “Violence has also extended into the digital space, with an increase in hate speech and discriminatory discourse on social media platforms.”
Humanitarian conditions have deteriorated significantly. According to UN data, mass forced displacement rose by 85% compared with 2024, driven largely by clashes between armed groups. In Catatumbo alone, nearly 90,000 people were displaced, alongside a wave of killings, kidnappings and child recruitment.
Confinement — where communities are effectively trapped by armed actors — has also increased, restricting access to food, healthcare and livelihoods, particularly in departments such as Chocó and Cauca.
Despite these challenges, the report acknowledges partial progress in implementing the 2016 Final Accord with the ex-Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrilla.
While land reform initiatives have advanced, delays in formal land titling and uneven territorial implementation continue to limit impact of the 2016 agreement. The killing of 45 former FARC combatants in 2025 — a 36% increase from the previous year — highlights ongoing security gaps in reintegration efforts. “The United Nations Verification Mission documented the continued killing of former FARC, underscoring persistent security risks despite a peace agreement.”
A recurring theme throughout the United Nations report is the insufficient presence of the state in conflict-affected regions. It warns that weak institutional reach continues to limit protection for civilians and the effective implementation of security and development policies. The report also notes that “coca cultivation rose by 3% to 262,000 hectares in 2024,” although growth has slowed for a third consecutive year, cautioning that underfunded substitution programmes risk undermining efforts to transition to legal economies.
In many cases, responses by security forces have been too slow or insufficient to prevent abuses or protect communities.
The UN concludes that Colombia stands at a pivotal juncture.
Without stronger coordination, sustained investment and a renewed focus on protecting civilians, the country risks undermining nearly a decade of peacebuilding.
“The persistence of violence and the strengthening of armed groups continue to gravely affect the civilian population,” the United Nations warns — a stark signal that security conditions are deteriorating across Colombia. As the country enters a polarised election season, the report suggests the stakes are no longer confined to preserving the 2016 peace accord, but to preventing a broader erosion of state authority and civilian protections in territories most at risk.
The Colombian government temporarily closed last week PNN Tayrona National Natural Park following threats against park staff and escalating violence between rival armed groups fighting for control of drug trafficking corridors along the Caribbean coast.
The shutdown, announced on Feb. 17 by Parques Nacionales Naturales de Colombia, was described as a preventive measure to protect visitors, local communities and officials.
“The National Government announced the temporary closure of PNN Tayrona as a preventive measure to protect the lives and safety of visitors, communities, and officials, and to ensure their security,” the agency said in a statement.
Tayrona, located near the city of Santa Marta in the foothills of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, is one of Colombia’s most visited protected areas, drawing as many as 750,000 visitors annually. Known for its white-sand beaches and dense tropical forest, the park is a pillar of the tourism economy in the Magdalena department.
The closure comes amid an intensifying turf war between the Conquering Self-Defense Forces of the Sierra Nevada (ACSN) and the Gaitanist Army of Colombia (EGC), better known as the Clan del Golfo, a criminal organization designated as a terrorist group by the United States.
Authorities say the immediate trigger for the crisis was a Feb. 11 operation to dismantle unauthorized constructions within the protected area, including houses, bathrooms and hiking trails built without state permission.
According to the parks agency, the demolitions prompted threats on social media directed at park personnel. Tensions escalated on Feb. 16 when local residents blocked employees from entering the park. Officials said individuals then began charging tourists for access and allowing entry without formal registration, effectively taking over certain administrative functions.
“This created a situation that prevents a minimum level of security from being ensured within the protected area,” authorities said.
While the government has not formally attributed responsibility for the threats, the timing of the closure has drawn attention to the deteriorating security environment in northern Colombia. Recent confrontations between the Clan del Golfo and the ACSN in nearby municipalities, including Aracataca, have led to forced displacements and heightened fears about the stability of the region.
Colombia’s Ombudsman’s Office has previously warned of the presence of both groups in and around Tayrona, citing risks ranging from extortion to sexual violence. The violence, analysts say, reflects a broader struggle for control over strategic drug trafficking corridors extending into the departments of Cesar and La Guajira.
Yet the official narrative has been complicated by contrasting statements from government negotiators engaged in talks with the ACSN.
Mauricio Silva, the government’s chief negotiator in a socio-legal dialogue with the ACSN, said the decision to close the park was driven largely by climatic and preventive considerations. While acknowledging the existence of security risks and territorial control by armed groups in parts of the Sierra Nevada, Silva said it would be inappropriate to assign criminal responsibility without completed judicial investigations.
“One thing is to recognize the delicate security situation in the territory, and another is to point to specific perpetrators without proof,” Silva said, underscoring the government’s cautious position amid ongoing negotiations.
Local tourism operators have also questioned the link between the closure and the armed conflict. Some community leaders argue that the dispute stems in part from longstanding grievances over how ticket revenues are managed. They contend that funds collected by the central government are not sufficiently reinvested in infrastructure and local development within the park and surrounding communities.
The crisis has exposed deeper tensions over who exercises effective authority in one of Colombia’s most emblematic tourist destinations. Indigenous communities, national authorities and armed groups all operate in the broader Sierra Nevada region, where state presence has historically been uneven.
Although tourists in Tayrona have generally been insulated from direct violence — with armed groups preferring to profit indirectly through extortion, drug trafficking and prostitution — the park’s closure has raised concerns that the conflict could increasingly disrupt legitimate economic activity.
For the department of Magdalena, where tourism depends on Tayrona as key source of revenue, the shutdown represents both a security and economic setback. Hotel operators and tour agencies in Santa Marta have reported cancellations since the announcement, though officials have not provided a timeline for reopening.
The government has said the closure will remain in effect until minimum security conditions can be guaranteed. Meanwhile, the dispute underscores the fragile balance between conservation, tourism and public saefty in a region where armed actors continue to expand their territorial control.
Nearly a week after Donald Trump hosted Colombia’s president, Gustavo Petro, at the White House, calm has returned to a bilateral relationship that only recently appeared headed for rupture. The insults have stopped. The social media theatrics have faded. Diplomacy, not spectacle, is back in charge.
This alone tells us that both governments have agreed to “disagree” and agree again.
The meeting itself produced no headline agreements. Instead, it marked something more consequential and less dramatic – a quiet end to illusions. In Washington, Petro’s flagship policy of “Total Peace” is now widely regarded as exhausted, if not outright discredited. What replaces it is a far more traditional, conditional partnership: security cooperation first, democracy under scrutiny, and patience in short supply.
The timing matters. Within days of the White House meeting, the U.S. State Department announced that John McNamara, Washington’s chargé d’affaires in Bogotá, will leave his post on February 13. McNamara arrived a year ago at a moment of open hostility between Trump and Petro, when the relationship was being tested not only by policy disagreements but by personal antagonism. His task was not to advance grand initiatives, but to prevent a collapse. That he succeeded says much about the value of professional diplomacy in an era of impulsive politics.
His departure now marks the end of a holding pattern. What comes next will be harder, more explicit, and less forgiving.
The Trump – Petro encounter was cordial, almost surprisingly so. Trump praised Petro as “terrific.” Petro shared a handwritten note from Trump declaring his affection for Colombia. The optics were deliberate. But the substance lay elsewhere.
According to officials and lawmakers briefed on the talks, Washington’s message was blunt: negotiations without consequences have failed. Petro’s Paz Total—a strategy built on ceasefires, open-ended negotiations, and the assumption that armed groups could be coaxed into disarmament—has not reduced violence. In many regions, it has coincided with territorial expansion by FARC dissidents, rising extortion, and a deepening humanitarian crisis. From Washington’s perspective, it has blurred the line between peace realpolitik and paralysis.
U.S. cooperation with Colombia is now explicitly conditioned on key demands. First, decisive military action against armed groups, especially the ELN along the Venezuelan border, where insurgents have long enjoyed sanctuary. Second, ironclad guarantees that Colombia’s upcoming electoral processes will be free, fair, and transparent ahead of a high-stakes 2026 presidential race.
This is not ideological hostility. It is strategic calculation – from Bogotá to Caracas, and ultimately, the Oval Office.
Colombia remains indispensable to U.S. interests: a capstone of regional security, a key counter-narcotics partner, and a democratic anchor in a hemisphere unsettled by authoritarian drift and Venezuelan instability. But indispensability does not mean indulgence. Washington’s conclusion is that leverage must now be used, not deferred.
The shift was visible almost immediately. Colombian forces bombed ELN encampments in the Catatumbo region near the Venezuelan border, killing several fighters and seizing weapons. The strikes signaled a return to military pressure after months of restraint under Paz Total.
Yet they also exposed the moral and political cost of the new course. According to Colombia’s forensic authorities and reporting by El Colombiano, one of those killed in Catatumbo was a child. Seven bodies were recovered after the operation, including that of a minor. The incident echoed last November’s bombing in Guaviare that killed seven minors, among them an 11-year-old girl.
Petro, in the aftermath of the Trump encounter, has responded with a stark argument: armed groups recruit children precisely to deter military action. Halting airstrikes, he said, would reward a “cowardly and criminal” strategy and accelerate forced recruitment. It is a grim logic, but not an implausible one—and it illustrates the impossible trade-offs now confronting the Colombian state.
Peace negotiations have not been spared. The Clan del Golfo, one of the country’s most powerful criminal organizations, suspended talks with the government after reports that Colombia and the United States discussed targeting “high-value” leaders. From Washington’s perspective, this reaction only reinforces its skepticism: armed groups talk peace when it buys time, not when it requires surrender.
None of this suggests enthusiasm in Washington for a militarized Colombia. It suggests resignation. The United States has seen this cycle before – in Colombia and throughout the hemisphere. Negotiations without enforcement are a contradiction. Ceasefires without verification entrench armed actors. Elections held amid coercion corrode democratic legitimacy from within.
Which brings us to the second pillar of the new relationship: electoral transparency.
U.S. officials have made clear that Colombia’s democratic processes will now be watched closely – not as a moral abstraction, but as a strategic necessity. A Colombia that cannot guarantee free elections is not a reliable ally, no matter how aligned its security policies may be.
This is the bargain now on offer. Not a reset. No rupture. Conditional coexistence.
John McNamara’s departure symbolizes the transition. His tenure was about keeping the peace between governments. The next phase will be about enforcing terms.
For Petro, the challenge is severe. He must deliver security results demanded by Washington without losing legitimacy at home, where skepticism of militarization runs deep. He must demonstrate democratic integrity while navigating a polarized political landscape. And he must do so knowing that Total Peace, once his signature promise, no longer commands confidence abroad.
The calm in U.S.–Colombia relations is real- but it is not comfort. It is the quiet before accountability.
Ecuador has sharply increased tariffs on Colombian crude oil transported through its pipeline system, deepening a trade and energy dispute between the two Andean neighbours that has already disrupted electricity exports and bilateral commerce.
Ecuador said on Tuesday it had raised the tariff paid by Colombia for each barrel of oil transported through the state-owned Trans-Ecuadorian Oil Pipeline System (SOTE) by 900%, lifting the fee from $3 to $30 per barrel. The move came in response to Colombia’s decision to suspend electricity exports to Ecuador from Feb. 1, 2026.
Bogotá has yet to issue an official response to the tariff increase.
The dispute has widened beyond trade into energy cooperation and crude transportation, straining relations between the two countries amid longstanding tensions over border security and cooperation against drug trafficking.
Without explicitly referring to the trade conflict, Colombia’s Ministry of Mines and Energy last week issued a resolution suspending international electricity transactions (TIE) with Ecuador, describing the measure as a preventive step aimed at protecting Colombia’s energy sovereignty and security amid climate-related pressures on domestic supply.
Colombia is a key electricity supplier to Ecuador, particularly during periods of drought. Ecuador has faced prolonged power cuts in recent years, including in 2024 and 2025, in a country where roughly 70% of electricity generation depends on hydropower.
Colombia’s leftist President Gustavo Petro said his country had previously acted in solidarity during Ecuador’s worst drought in decades. “I hope Ecuador appreciated that when it needed us, we responded with energy,” Petro said last week.
Ecuador’s Environment and Energy Minister Inés Manzano said the crude transport tariff increase applied to Colombia’s state oil company Ecopetrol and private firms exporting oil through the SOTE. “We made a change in the tariff value,” Manzano said. “Instead of three dollars, it is now 30 dollars per barrel.”
According to Ecuadorian news outlets, the SOTE transported nearly 10,300 barrels per day of Colombian crude in November, shipped by Ecopetrol and private companies.
Manzano has also said Ecuador will impose new fees on Colombian crude transported through the Oleoducto de Crudos Pesados (OCP) pipeline, citing reciprocity following Colombia’s suspension of electricity exports.
The trade conflict began last week when Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa, a close political ally of U.S. President Donald Trump, announced a 30% tariff on imports from Colombia, effective from February. Speaking from the World Economic Forum in Davos, Noboa said the measure was justified by what he described as insufficient cooperation from Bogotá in combating drug trafficking and organised crime along the shared border.
“We have made real efforts of cooperation with Colombia,” Noboa said in a post on social media, adding that Ecuador faces a trade deficit of more than $1 billion with its neighbour. “But while we insist on dialogue, our military continues confronting criminal groups tied to narcotrafficking on the border without cooperation.”
Colombia’s foreign ministry rejected the move as unilateral and contrary to Andean Community (CAN) trade rules, sending a formal protest note to Quito. Bogotá has proposed a high-level ministerial meeting involving foreign affairs, defence, trade and energy officials to de-escalate the dispute, though no date has been confirmed.
Colombia’s Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism (MinCIT) responded by announcing a 30% tariff on 23 Ecuadorian products, which have not yet been specified, with the option to extend the measure to additional goods. Trade Minister Diana Marcela Morales Rojas said the tariff was proportional, temporary and intended to restore balance to bilateral trade.
“This levy does not constitute a sanction or a confrontational measure,” the ministry said in a statement. “It is a corrective action aimed at protecting the national productive apparatus.”
Business groups say Colombia exports mainly electricity, medicines, vehicles, cosmetics and plastics to Ecuador, while importing vegetable oils and fats, canned tuna, minerals and metals. Ecuador’s exporters federation, Fedexpor, said non-oil exports to Colombia rose 4% between January and November last year, with more than 1,130 products entering the Colombian market.
Colombia and Ecuador share a 600-kilometre border stretching from the Pacific coast to the Amazon rainforest, a region where Colombian guerrilla groups and binational criminal organisations operate, including networks involved in drug trafficking, arms smuggling and illegal mining.
Although Quito and Bogotá have both signalled willingness to engage in dialogue, the rapid escalation of tariffs and energy measures has raised concerns among exporters, energy producers and regional analysts about the risk of prolonged disruption to trade and cooperation between two of the Andean region’s closest economic partners.