In a lengthy post on Truth Social, U.S. President Donald Trump threw his support behind Colombian presidential candidate Abelardo “El Tigre” de la Espriella, describing him as a “Smart, Strong, and Tough Leader” and offering what he called his “Complete and Total Endorsement” ahead of Colombia’s June 21 presidential runoff.
Trump praised De la Espriella’s first-round victory and portrayed him as a future champion of economic growth, law and order, and closer ties with the United States.
“The results of this Election are very important to the future of Colombia and its relationship to the United States,” Trump wrote.
The endorsement was notable not only for its enthusiasm but also for its language. Trump attacked De la Espriella’s opponent, left-wing senator Iván Cepeda, as a “Radical Left Marxist” and suggested the runoff could shape the future direction of one of Washington’s closest allies in Latin America.
Then came the response.
Addressing Trump directly, De la Espriella published a lengthy open letter that read less like a campaign statement and more like a declaration of intent.
“With my head held high and a heart full of patriotic gratitude, I receive your words and your steadfast support,” he wrote.
“Thank you, Mr. President.”
The candidate praised Trump as “a leader of true strength and conviction” who had refused to surrender to ideological trends or enemies of freedom.
More importantly, he suggested that Colombia was now following a path similar to that taken by Trump’s political movement in the United States.
“You have paved the way for the people to defeat the entrenched powers that have long held sway,” De la Espriella wrote. “In Colombia, we have now begun to follow that same path.”
It was one of the clearest attempts yet by the conservative candidate to place his campaign within a broader political realignment taking shape across the Americas.
The letter repeatedly returned to the idea of a common destiny shared by Colombia and the United States.
“The United States and Colombia are sister nations, bound by the blood of heroes and by our shared destiny to defend Western civilization across the Americas,” he wrote.
“Together, we are unbreakable.”
For De la Espriella, the relationship extends beyond diplomacy. It is rooted in what he described as shared values, mutual respect and a common struggle against forces that threaten both nations.
The candidate outlined a vision of closer cooperation on security, trade and economic development while emphasizing that both countries face similar challenges from organized crime and drug trafficking.
“Our security policies are fully aligned,” he wrote.
“Narcoterrorism is the cancer destroying our societies, and we will confront it relentlessly, with iron resolve and without apology.”
The statement echoed themes that have defined much of De la Espriella’s campaign: security, economic growth, private enterprise and a promise to reverse what he views as the failures of the Petro administration.
“We stand together in the sacred defense of private property, free enterprise, productive growth, and the well-being of our citizens as the highest purpose of government,” he wrote.
The candidate also pledged resistance to what he called the advance of communism in the hemisphere and announced support for an “Alliance of the Shield of the Americas,” a regional initiative intended to strengthen cooperation among governments committed to security, democracy and economic freedom.
The exchange unfolded as another senior figure in the Trump administration weighed in on Colombia’s election. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said Washington would closely monitor the electoral process. “We will be very firm in guaranteeing free and fair elections in Colombia and will do everything within our power to achieve that,” he said.
The comments were interpreted by many as a sign of growing U.S. interest in the outcome of the June 21 runoff.
President Gustavo Petro responded without mentioning Trump directly.
“When one country intervenes in the decisions of another country, freedom dies,” he wrote on social media, before posting videos of anti-riot police on the streets of Santiago, Chile, accompanied by the text: “They chose (President) Kazt and once again the violent war against youth in Chile.” Petro’s incoherence is palpable.
Yet it was the final image accompanying De la Espriella’s letter that perhaps captures the moment more effectively than any political statement.
Created using artificial intelligence, the illustration shows a bald eagle next to a fearless tiger. Behind them, the flags of the United States and Colombia under a turbulent sky.
The symbolism requires little explanation.
The eagle represents the United States. The tiger represents the firebrand “outsider”.
And together they illustrate the central message of De la Espriella’s response: that if voters elect him on June 21, relations between Bogotá and Washington will enter a new chapter.
“In this coming Era of the Tiger – which begins on June 21 – we look forward to the full normalization of relations between Colombia and the United States, built on mutual respect, sovereignty, and mutual benefit.”
Whether Colombians embrace that vision remains to be seen.
But for one extraordinary day in the campaign, the conversation was no longer only about Colombia’s future. It was about two flags, an eagle, a tiger and a political alliance that both supporters and critics believe could reshape relations across the hemisphere.
Two major international electoral observation missions have rejected claims of fraud in Colombia’s May 31 presidential first round, as outgoing President Gustavo Petro continued to press unsubstantiated allegations of irregularities in the days following the vote. The country heads to a June 21 runoff between right-wing candidate Abelardo de la Espriella and leftist senator Iván Cepeda.
The European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) issued a preliminary statement Tuesday, June 2, describing the vote count as having been carried out in a “transparent, orderly and fluid” manner. Esteban González Pons, Vice President of the European Parliament and chief observer of the EU mission, told reporters in Bogotá that none of the 12 candidates who competed in the first round had brought claims of irregularities to his mission.
“We can discard any manipulation of data in the quick count and in the final count,” González Pons said. The mission selected a random sample of tally sheets from around the country and compared them to physical ballots cast, finding no inconsistencies.
“We can discard any manipulation of data in the quick count and in the final count.” — Esteban González Pons, Chief Observer, EU Election Observation Mission to Colombia
The EU EOM deployed 143 observers from 24 EU member states plus Norway, Switzerland, and Canada, covering 591 voting tables. The mission will also observe the June 21 runoff and issue a final report two months after the process concludes.
The Organization of American States (OAS) mission, headed by former Dominican Republic President Leonel Fernández, similarly described the May 31 election day as “civic, calm and participatory,” with high citizen turnout compared to previous electoral cycles. The OAS mission comprised 96 observers and specialists from 24 countries, covering 412 polling stations and 1,340 voting tables across 26 departments, the Capital District, and five cities abroad.
Official results from the National Civil Registry (Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil) showed de la Espriella receiving 43.74% of the vote, a margin of more than 673,000 votes over Cepeda, who received 40.90%. More than 23 million voters participated. By Monday night, the Registry said it had completed its review of 99.98% of voting tables and found a variation of only 0.06% from the quick count issued on election night.
Presento las bases comprobadas del posible fraude. Que puedo entregar a autoridad competente.
Dije que no reconocí los datos del preconteo del software de los hermanos Bautista es porque tengo datos.
Mi compromiso con mi pueblo y el amor a mi país por el que he luchado toda mi…
— Gustavo Petro (@petrogustavo) June 2, 2026
Petro, who is constitutionally barred from seeking re-election, alleged on Sunday that 800,000 voters had been illegally added to voter rolls. He doubled down Tuesday in a post on X, claiming without evidence that 885,000 voters had been registered after a March 31 deadline, and pointing to alleged irregularities in the software used for vote counting and tabulation. The president said he could present his evidence to the relevant authorities.
Iván Cepeda (from Twitter)
Cepeda, who represents Petro’s Pacto Histórico, initially declined to acknowledge the quick count results on Sunday, saying he would wait for the official tally overseen by judges and notaries. By Monday, however, he softened his position, stating that monitors deployed by his party had not found “irregularities of a sufficient dimension to speak of fraud.” Cepeda also challenged de la Espriella to a debate ahead of the runoff.
Under Colombian law, election results are certified by judges, not the executive branch, typically within two weeks of the vote. González Pons noted that Colombia “has very strong democratic institutions, rooted in the people,” adding that the country “will find in democracy its principal ally, because of all the things that fail Colombia, democracy is one that has never failed it.”
Political analysts and observers have cautioned that Petro’s fraud allegations, made without supporting evidence, risk inflaming political tensions and contributing to a polarized climate in the lead-up to the June 21 runoff.
Colombia’s June 21 presidential runoff will have a significant bearing on the country’s economic policies and prospects, Fitch Ratings said in a commentary published this week.
In the first round of voting on May 31, right-wing candidate Abelardo de la Espriella — running under the Defensores de la Patria movement — received 43.7% of votes, defeating leftist senator Iván Cepeda of the governing Pacto Histórico, who received 40.9%. Neither candidate reached the absolute majority required to win outright, sending the election to a runoff.
De la Espriella’s stronger-than-expected first-round performance prompted a positive reaction in financial markets, reflecting expectations that he may be better positioned to address Colombia’s macroeconomic challenges that have intensified under outgoing President Gustavo Petro.
The next president will face the challenge of addressing Colombia’s wide fiscal imbalance. The central government deficit reached 6.4% of GDP in 2025, or 7.8% when net of a temporary reduction in interest costs from liability management operations. Fitch estimates that debt stabilization will require a fiscal adjustment equivalent to 4% of GDP. Higher global oil prices are expected to boost revenues via taxes and dividends in 2027, but Fitch cautioned that this support may not last.
“De la Espriella’s stronger-than-expected first-round performance prompted a positive reaction in financial markets, reflecting expectations that he may be better positioned to address Colombia’s macroeconomic challenges.” — Fitch Ratings
De la Espriella has pledged fiscal consolidation through a 40% reduction in the size of the state, while Cepeda has proposed restraining public-sector salaries and benefits. Budget rigidities and spending pressures tied to pensions, healthcare, and subnational transfers will make either adjustment difficult. Both candidates have also proposed higher spending — on defense and social welfare respectively. Capital spending could be trimmed as an adjustment variable, but only to a limited extent, with 2025 outlays of 2.7% of GDP.
The interest bill will be another source of pressure amid a higher local yield curve. Recent liability management operations have replaced lower-coupon bonds with higher-coupon ones, providing an up-front financial benefit while increasing future interest costs.
Given these spending constraints, durable fiscal consolidation is likely to require revenue-side measures. Colombia has a history of tax reforms, but new legislation is far from assured. De la Espriella has pledged to cut taxes, and while Cepeda supports revenue-raising measures, he could face obstacles in advancing reforms through Congress — as Petro’s administration found.
Uncertainties about Colombia’s trend growth persist. The economy expanded at an annual rate of 2.5% in 2019–2025, below the ‘BB’ median and below its own prior average of 3.5%–4%, supported by government transfers, a strong labor market, and minimum wage increases that kept private consumption buoyant at +4.2%. In contrast, investment contracted by an average of 1.6% annually, falling to 16% of GDP from 21%, affected in part by business concerns about the Petro administration’s more interventionist policy stance.
De la Espriella has pledged to boost growth through promotion of hydrocarbon development — including fracking — alongside tax cuts and steps to reduce administrative burdens on businesses. Cepeda has pledged continuity with Petro’s state-led development model, without concrete proposals to revive private investment.
Both agendas face implementation challenges. The next legislature will remain fragmented, requiring negotiation to pass any major legislation. As a political newcomer, de la Espriella could encounter difficulty advancing his program should he win. Social protests are a risk, particularly regarding his plans to cut spending and adopt a tougher security stance.
The election could also influence monetary policy, with implications for financial conditions and thus for public finances and growth. Despite rising inflation, the Banco de la República (Banrep) voted to hold its policy rate at 11.25% after swift prior increases of 200 basis points, amid explicit pressure from the executive branch for looser policy. The elections could influence Banrep’s next steps starting with its June 30 board meeting, and will also determine who fills two vacancies on its seven-member board in 2029.
Fitch’s downgrade of Colombia to ‘BB’/Stable in December 2025 reflected the agency’s view that the starting point for public finances had weakened considerably, and that improvement would take time regardless of the election outcome. Faster-than-expected fiscal adjustment, higher growth, and lower real rates that support debt stabilization could be positive for the rating. A worsening of these variables that steepens the debt trajectory could be negative.
Above image: Fitch Ratings
U.S. President Donald Trump has thrown his unconditional support behind Colombian hard-right presidential candidate Abelardo “El Tigre” de la Espriella, offering what he described as his “complete and total endorsement” ahead of the country’s June 21 runoff election.
The endorsement, published Tuesday evening on Trump’s Truth Social platform, immediately injected an international dimension into Colombia’s presidential race and marked a rare intervention by a sitting U.S. president in support of a candidate during an active electoral campaign.
The U.S. president went on to congratulate the Barranquilla-based lawyer on his first-round victory and expressed confidence that he would become Colombia’s next president. Trump also used the post to attack De la Espriella’s rival, left-wing senator Iván Cepeda, describing him as a “radical left-wing Marxist.”
Drawing parallels between MAGA (Make America Great Again), and “The Tiger’s” Defensores de la Patria (Defenders of the Homeland) movement, the two-term Republican leader stated the following:
“Abelardo de la Espriella, fights tirelessly for, and loves, his Great Country and People, just like I do for the United States of America.”
He then went on to claim: “As President, Abelardo would be tremendously successful in leading Colombia to Grow the Economy, Create Jobs, Promote Trade, Stop Illegal Immigration, Crack Down on Crime and Drugs, and Restore LAW AND ORDER! (…) “EL TIGRE” ABELARDO DE LA ESPRIELLA WILL NOT THE WONDERFUL PEOPLE OF COLOMBIA DOWN!”
The comments came less than three weeks before Colombians return to the polls to choose a successor to President Gustavo Petro, who is constitutionally barred from seeking reelection.
The runoff has emerged as one of the most polarized presidential contests in recent Colombian history, pitting firebrand De la Espriella, a political “outsider” who has campaigned on restoring security and strengthening ties with Washington, against Cepeda, a veteran senator and one of Petro’s closest political allies.
De la Espriella welcomed Trump’s endorsement, describing it as a sign of confidence in his vision for Colombia and its future relationship with the United States.
“President Trump has my deepest gratitude,” De la Espriella said in a statement following the endorsement.
The candidate has spent much of the campaign positioning himself as a staunch defender of free-market policies and a critic of Petro’s administration, which has faced mounting public dissatisfaction over security, corruption and economic management.
Trump’s endorsement follows months in which De la Espriella cultivated ties with conservative political figures in Washington. As his campaign gained momentum, he received backing from prominent Republican lawmakers including Florida Representative Maria Elvira Salazar and Ohio Senator Bernie Moreno, both influential allies of the U.S. president.
The support from Republican circles comes as Colombia remains one of Washington’s closest partners in Latin America. The two countries maintain extensive cooperation on trade, security, counternarcotics operations and migration issues.
Although U.S. administrations have traditionally avoided direct involvement in Colombian electoral politics, Trump’s endorsement places the White House squarely into the political conversation during the final stretch of the campaign.
Political analysts say the endorsement could resonate among some conservative voters while reinforcing De la Espriella’s efforts to present himself as the candidate most capable of rebuilding a close relationship with Washington.
President Gustavo Petro responded on social media without mentioning Trump by name, framing the issue as one of national sovereignty and warning against foreign influence in Colombia’s democratic process.
“When one country intervenes in the decisions of another country, freedom dies,” Petro wrote.
“I invite all Colombians to vote in complete freedom and not become slaves or a colony of anyone.”
The president also invoked Colombia’s independence heroes, writing that “an entire generation of young men and women of New Granada fought alongside Bolívar and Nariño to give us freedom and sovereignty.”
“If the heart of the world loses its freedom and sovereignty, the hope of the world and of Colombia is extinguished,” Petro added.
The exchange between U.S President Donald Trump and his Colombian counterpart adds a new layer of tension to an election campaign already marked by heightened political polarization and security concerns. The assassination of presidential candidate Miguel Uribe Turbay in June last year shocked the nation and has revived memories of Colombia’s violent political past.
More than 41 million Colombians are eligible to vote in the June 21 election, including approximately 1.4 million citizens living abroad. Recent polling suggests a highly competitive race, although De la Espriella has gained momentum since emerging as the leading candidate in the first round.
The Colombian runoff is now attracting attention far beyond the country’s borders. Whether the U.S. president’s words manages to convince undecided voters in the center of the political spectrum, remains to be seem, but it has already ensured that the race between De la Espriella and Cepeda raises a high-stakes political gambit in Washington and Bogotá.
Colombia’s first-round presidential election, held Sunday, May 31, 2026, produced a result that crystallizes the country’s political exhaustion with both the governing left and the traditional right. Criminal defense attorney and political outsider Abelardo de la Espriella placed first with more than 10.3 million votes. Leftist Senator Iván Cepeda, a close ally of outgoing President Gustavo Petro and the lead architect of the administration’s Paz Total peace policy, finished second with just under 9.7 million votes. The two will face each other in a runoff election on June 21.
Senator Paloma Valencia, the candidate backed by former President Álvaro Uribe and the standard-bearer of his Uribismo movement, placed a distant third, receiving less than 7% of the vote — fewer than 1.7 million ballots. Former Medellín mayor and Antioquia governor Sergio Fajardo received just over one million votes, while former Bogotá mayor Claudia López finished below 1%, with approximately 225,000 votes. The remaining minor candidates combined for just over 1% of the total.
Under Colombia’s electoral system, the top two finishers advance to a runoff if no candidate surpasses 50% in the first round. The June 21 vote will determine who assumes the presidency on August 7.
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Abelardo de la Espriella, 47, has never held elected office. He built a national profile over more than two decades as a high-profile defense attorney, founding De La Espriella Lawyers in 2002, with offices in Colombia and the United States. His client roster has included controversial figures: he represented Alex Saab, a Colombian-born businessman who became a close associate of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and was implicated in a scheme to launder proceeds from Venezuela’s food-assistance program, the Comité Local de Abastecimiento y Producción (CLAP). Saab was extradited to the United States, convicted, and later granted clemency before being re-arrested in Venezuela in early 2026. De la Espriella also represented members of the Nule family in connection with the Carrusel de Contratos — a major contracting scandal tied to infrastructure works at Bogotá’s El Dorado airport corridor. He has additionally been reported to have represented individuals linked to organized crime.
De la Espriella has drawn comparisons to figures such as US President Donald Trump and El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele. His campaign has centered on hard-line security policy, including proposals for large-scale incarceration, expanded military operations against armed groups, and the rejection of negotiations with guerrilla organizations. He is reported to hold Italian and US citizenship in addition to his Colombian nationality, and is said to own property in Florida.
In a notable departure from his defense work, de la Espriella took the side of a victim in a high-profile acid-attack case, acting as a private prosecutor to secure a stronger sentence for the perpetrator — an episode that raised his public profile beyond the defense bar.
Iván Cepeda, 63, enters the runoff as the consolidated candidate of the Colombian left and Petro’s Pacto Histórico coalition. He is the primary legislative architect of Paz Total, the Petro administration’s policy of negotiating simultaneously with multiple armed actors, including the ELN and FARC dissident factions. Cepeda’s family background includes deep ties to the Colombian left: his father was secretary general of the Communist Party, and was assassinated. Cepeda himself studied in communist Bulgaria during the soviet era. The two finalists have an established legal and political history: Uribe attempted to bring criminal charges against Cepeda while both served in the Senate, but the Supreme Court determined that Uribe had fabricated the accusations and attempted to bribe witnesses — a case that resulted in Uribe’s criminal conviction.
“If nothing changes, Abelardo wins.” — Loren Moss, Finance Colombia
The geographic distribution of the vote reflects deep regional divisions. Cepeda carried Bogotá, which has trended left for years, particularly in lower-income districts on the city’s south and west sides. Antioquia — historically the heartland of Uribismo and home to Medellín, the country’s second-largest city — voted more than two to one for de la Espriella, a result that signals the weakening grip of Uribe’s movement even in its traditional stronghold.
The heart of coffee-growing country — the departments of Caldas, Risaralda, and Quindío also went to de la Espriella. Caquetá, a sparsely populated department in southern Colombia that has suffered sustained guerrilla violence from both the ELN and FARC dissident groups, voted for de la Espriella as well, a result we may interpret as a direct rejection of Petro and Cepeda’s Paz Total.
Cepeda carried Colombia’s Pacific coast, including the chronically neglected department of Chocó, as well as the sparsely populated Amazonas and Putumayo departments bordering Peru and Brazil, and the northern Caribbean coast. The Caribbean coast result is notable, as the region has historically suffered from underdevelopment, infrastructure deficits, and significant income inequality. Norte de Santander with its Catatumbo region on the Venezuelan border and experiencing severe armed-group activity — voted for de la Espriella, a result consistent with public exhaustion over security policy.
Colombia’s current political trajectory is rooted in decisions made across the past two decades. President Uribe served two terms in the early 2000s and, together with then-Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos, mounted a sustained military campaign against the FARC that significantly weakened the insurgency. Santos later broke from Uribe after assuming the presidency, governing independently and ultimately negotiating a peace agreement with the FARC — a deal that Uribe actively opposed. A plebiscite on the accord failed, but Santos used legislative maneuvering to implement it anyway.
Colombia 2026 1st round top two (Graphic: Sofi Imfeld for Finance Colombia)
Uribe’s next handpicked candidate, Iván Duque, won the 2018 election but finished his term with approximately 30% approval. Members of his own party publicly distanced themselves from him — Senator María Fernanda Cabal, a staunch Uribista, called Duque a “mamerto” (leftist idiot) while he was still in office. Under his administration, indicators on crime and guerrilla activity worsened, and armed groups including the ELN rebuilt operational capacity that had been degraded under Uribe and Santos.
Petro’s administration has not met initial fears of a Venezuelan-style democratic breakdown: Congress has largely blocked the most radical components of his agenda, including attempts to nationalize the private pension system and convert the healthcare system to a single-payer model. However, crime has increased, armed groups have expanded their operational footprints, and the security situation in several regions has worsened. Paz Total is widely seen as having produced few tangible results.
Uribe himself was convicted of witness tampering and attempted bribery in the case he had brought against Cepeda. Though released from house arrest after conviction, the judges who authorized his release are now reportedly under investigation for judicial corruption. Valencia’s poor performance in the first round — despite being Uribe’s chosen standard-bearer — suggests that Uribismo as a political force is waning, with its core constituency aging and new generations of voters disengaged from the Uribe legacy.
Both campaigns will intensify mobilization efforts over the coming three weeks. Cepeda’s movement — Colombia Humana and the broader Pacto Histórico coalition — has historically relied on organized mobilizations, including indigenous community-led mingas, labor unions, and allied social movements. Cepeda’s running mate Senator Aida Quilcué is an indigenous activist, a choice expected to energize those constituencies. FECODE, the Federación Colombiana de Trabajadores de la Educación (Colombia’s main teachers’ federation), is expected to align officially with Cepeda, though individual teachers may not follow union leadership in their voting choices.
On the right, Paloma Valencia issued a public endorsement of de la Espriella immediately following the first-round results. Business community organizations, including ANDI (the Asociación Nacional de Empresarios de Colombia) and Fenalco (the Federación Nacional de Comerciantes), do not formally endorse candidates, but their members are widely understood to favor a government that supports private enterprise and market-oriented policy. De la Espriella holds no congressional constituency, meaning whichever candidate wins will face the same dynamic Petro encountered: a fragmented Congress that is likely to act as a check on executive authority.
The question of centrist voter alignment remains open. Fajardo and López are not expected to formally endorse either finalist, and the direction of their combined approximately 1.2 million votes is uncertain.
For international investors and executives operating in Colombia, the policy differences between the two candidates are substantive across several key sectors.
Petroleum and Natural Gas: De la Espriella has stated unequivocally that he will restart petroleum exploration and licensing, which the Petro administration blocked. Ecopetrol S.A. (NYSE: EC; BVC: ECOPETROL), Colombia’s state-controlled oil company, which also holds producing assets in the US Permian Basin and Gulf of Mexico, has operated under a government that halted new drilling permits. The consequences have included a decline in future production capacity at a time when global oil prices have risen due to Middle East tensions. Colombia has been forced to import natural gas at elevated prices to meet existing domestic demand — including from transportation fleets that were converted to natural gas under government incentive programs. Cepeda would be expected to continue or deepen current restrictions on fossil fuel expansion.
Healthcare: The Petro-Cepeda platform favors a government single-payer model. The administration has already taken over several Entidades Promotoras de Salud (EPS) — Colombia’s managed-care intermediaries — placing the healthcare system in legal and financial uncertainty. Private clinics, hospitals, and physicians who wish to operate outside a government-controlled framework would benefit from a de la Espriella administration. Cepeda’s healthcare agenda would accelerate the shift toward government-managed care.
BPO, Tech, and Call Centers: The BPO sector — which provides large volumes of formal employment, particularly in Medellín, Bogotá, Cali, and Barranquilla — was significantly affected by Petro-era minimum wage increases of 16% and 23% in successive years. These increases created contract renegotiation pressures with international clients, some of whom have shifted or considered shifting operations to competing jurisdictions including Honduras, Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, and Guatemala. At the CX Summit, the industry’s main annual event held in Cartagena, the son of Álvaro Uribe appeared as an invited keynote speaker — a gesture that could be interpreted within the industry as an implicit signal of political alignment. A de la Espriella government, with its orientation toward labor market deregulation and reduced regulatory burden, would be viewed more favorably by this sector. Current Colombian labor law prohibits part-time employment contracts and places significant restrictions on dual employment, making workforce flexibility difficult for businesses that operate outside traditional 40-hour weekly structures.
Mining: The Petro administration has been less aggressive toward mining than toward petroleum, but sector participants expect a more permissive regulatory environment under de la Espriella, and continued constraints under Cepeda.
Security and Tourism: Both candidates have stated support for tourism promotion, but the sector’s trajectory is more directly linked to security conditions. Under current policies, several regions that were accessible to domestic and international travelers several years ago have experienced increased armed-group activity, effectively closing them to tourism. A de la Espriella administration is expected to pursue a more aggressive military posture toward the ELN and FARC dissident factions; a Cepeda government would likely continue dialogue-first approaches. The outcome will directly affect which parts of Colombia’s territory remain accessible to investment and tourism.
Foreign Relations: A de la Espriella government is expected to restore a broadly cooperative relationship with the United States, which deteriorated under Petro following several high-profile diplomatic incidents. De la Espriella has expressed admiration for US President Donald Trump, and reports indicate he holds US citizenship and owns property in Florida. Relations with Ecuador, which have been strained by mutual tariff escalations between Petro and Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa, would be expected to normalize. Relations with Venezuela under Cepeda would likely continue along the current allied trajectory, while a de la Espriella government would be expected to take a more critical posture toward Caracas. China and Russia would find a more receptive diplomatic environment under Cepeda, and a cooler one under de la Espriella.
The Poor and Informal Workers: Cepeda’s campaign argues that minimum wage increases and expanded state services benefit lower-income Colombians. Critics counter that elevated formal labor costs have pushed more employment into the informal sector — which currently accounts for approximately half the Colombian workforce — depriving those workers of pension contributions, health benefits, and job security. De la Espriella’s platform, which emphasizes business formation, security, and labor market deregulation, would be presented as generating more formal-sector job creation. The actual distributional effects of either approach remain contested.
Assuming current polling trends hold and Uribista voters consolidate behind de la Espriella as expected following Valencia’s endorsement, de la Espriella enters the runoff as the frontrunner. Cepeda’s path to victory depends on driving high turnout among his base, securing support from centrist voters who did not vote for either finalist in the first round, and potentially benefiting from any missteps by de la Espriella in the final three weeks of campaigning.
The first-round results produced no major electoral violence. The ELN announced a temporary halt to armed actions during the voting period. Authorities detained some individuals reportedly attempting to purchase votes in rural areas, but no large-scale incidents were recorded.
The incoming president will face a Congress with no natural majority aligned to the executive, a healthcare system in partial administrative disarray, a petroleum sector whose future production trajectory is in question, and regions where state presence remains contested by armed groups. The June 21 runoff will determine which vision — market-oriented restructuring or continuation of the Petro project — Colombia pursues for the next four years.
U.S. President Donald Trump has nominated Kentucky businessman and political ally Nathaniel “Nate” Morris to serve as the next U.S. ambassador to Colombia, placing a prominent supporter of the Republican president at the helm of one of Washington’s most important diplomatic posts in Latin America.
The nomination was formally submitted to lawmakers on Monday, one day after right-wing presidential candidate Abelardo “El Tigre” de la Espriella emerged as the frontrunner in Colombia’s first-round election, setting up a runoff that could reshape relations between Bogotá and Washington.
Morris, 45, is the founder of Rubicon Technologies, an environmental technology and waste-management company, and has become one of Trump’s most visible political allies in Kentucky. His nomination comes as Colombia enters a period of political transition and uncertainty over the future direction of bilateral cooperation on security, counternarcotics efforts, trade and migration.
The White House announced Morris’s nomination as part of a broader package of diplomatic appointments across Latin America. If confirmed by the Senate, he would become Washington’s top representative in Colombia at a pivotal moment for relations between the longtime allies.
Trump had previously urged Morris to abandon a potential bid for the U.S. Senate in Kentucky in order to join his administration.
“Nate is a fantastic businessman and a strong MAGA warrior,” Trump wrote on social media. “I have asked Nate to step aside from the Senate race to take a role in my Administration as Ambassador. Nate is Oxford-educated, tough as steel, loves our great nation, and will represent the United States very well.”
Although Morris has limited public diplomatic experience, his appointment reflects the Trump administration’s preference for politically connected allies and business leaders in several ambassadorial posts.
A native of Kentucky, Morris studied at George Washington University before pursuing further studies at the University of Oxford. He founded Rubicon Technologies, a company focused on waste management and environmental services, and later established Morris Industries, a private investment holding company based in Lexington with interests in sustainability, technology, industrial operations and financial services.
The nomination comes amid expectations that Colombia’s foreign policy could shift following Sunday’s election result. De la Espriella’s strong showing has fueled speculation that a future administration could seek closer alignment with Washington after years of tensions between the governments of President Donald Trump and Colombian President Gustavo Petro.
Before taking up the post in Bogotá, Morris must undergo Senate hearings and secure confirmation by a majority vote, a process that could take several weeks or months.
The hard-right presidential candidate Abelardo “El Tigre” de la Espriella emerged as the frontrunner in Colombia’s presidential election on Sunday, setting up a June 21 runoff against left-wing senator Iván Cepeda after a closely contested first round that was quickly overshadowed by President Gustavo Petro’s allegations of electoral irregularities.
According to the final bulletin (No.67) released by the National Registry Office, De la Espriella secured 43.74% of the vote, finishing ahead of Cepeda, who obtained 40.91%. Conservative senator Paloma Valencia followed with 6.92%, while centrist candidate Sergio Fajardo received 4.26%.
The outcome sets the stage for a high-stakes second round that could determine whether Colombia continues along the political path established by Petro’s administration or pivots sharply toward a more conservative agenda centered on security, economic growth and closer relations with the United States.
Within hours of the results being announced, Petro cast doubt on the preliminary count, stating on social media that he would not recognize the pre-count figures and would only accept the results produced through the official electoral scrutiny process conducted by judicial commissions.
The president argued that the election-day count “has no binding force” and raised concerns about alleged modifications to electoral software and inconsistencies in the voter registry. Petro further suggested that some 800,000 voter identification records may have been improperly added to the electoral census before the vote.
Petro’s allegations quickly became the dominant political controversy of election night. While the president suggested that software modifications and irregularities in the voter registry may have affected the process, he presented no public evidence to substantiate the claims. Electoral authorities, judicial officials and international observers subsequently defended the integrity of the vote, creating a sharp contrast between the president’s warnings and the assessments of institutions directly responsible for overseeing the election.
National Registrar Hernán Penagos responded forcefully to the allegations, rejecting claims that the software used in the electoral process handled voter identification records. Penagos emphasized that the electoral census had been closed since April 30, that all voting records were publicly available for review and that party witnesses had monitored voting and counting procedures throughout the country.
Attorney General Gregorio Eljach also challenged Petro’s assertions, publicly demanding evidence to support accusations that risked undermining confidence in the electoral process.
The controversy intensified briefly when Cepeda questioned apparent discrepancies in electoral databases and echoed concerns regarding the voter registry. However, the left-wing candidate later moderated his position after internal reviews by his campaign.
“We have found no evidence of facts that merit a statement regarding eventual irregularities,” Cepeda said, effectively distancing himself from Petro’s original claims.
The president’s fake narrative appeared to lose momentum after Cepeda’s own campaign acknowledged that it had uncovered no evidence of fraud or irregularities sufficient to challenge the outcome. The concession strengthened the position of election officials, who maintained throughout the day that Colombia’s voting system functioned normally and transparently.
Former Justice Minister Wilson Ruiz Orejuela was among those who condemned Petro’s statements, accusing the president of attempting to cast doubt on a legitimate electoral process. “Petro did not recognize last night’s results,” Ruiz said. “But he has been a complicit driver of the rigged elections that took place in Venezuela.”
International observers, meanwhile, offered a markedly different assessment of the electoral process. Scott Campbell, Colombia representative for the United Nations Human Rights Office, congratulated Colombians for what he described as a peaceful election day and praised the country’s institutions for overseeing the vote. “Today we have not documented significant violations or infringements of human rights,” Campbell said following the election.
Support for the integrity of the process also came from the United States.
Republican Senator Bernie Moreno, who participated as an international observer, described Colombia’s voting system as one of the most effective he had encountered.
“The beauty of democracy was fully displayed as the people of Colombia exercised their power to chart their future in their own hands and with their own voices,” Moreno wrote on social media.
Speaking later to Colombian media, Moreno said he had informed Secretary of State Marco Rubio and President Donald Trump that “the elections in Colombia were completely free and well done.”
Moreno went further, suggesting aspects of Colombia’s voting system compared favorably with those used in the United States. “They do it better here in Colombia than in the United States,” he said. U.S President Donald Trump directly endorsed De La Espriella ahead of Sunday’s vote, stating: “He has all my support.”
The controversy surrounding Petro’s claims also drew attention from Venezuela’s democratic opposition. President-elect Edmundo González praised Colombia’s institutions and warned of the fragility of democratic systems. “I look at Colombia with hope and with memory,” González wrote. “I know the value of what our Colombian brothers possess because we lost it. The right to choose, and the institutions that make it possible, are not easily recovered. Yours are still standing. Protect them.”
While election authorities sought to contain the controversy, De la Espriella’s victory triggered an immediate wave of support from conservative political leaders across Latin America and beyond.
Argentine President Javier Milei was among the first foreign leaders to congratulate the Barranquilla criminal defense lawyer. “This result reflects the desire for freedom and progress of the Colombian people, and an explicit willingness to say enough to the failed socialist model that has caused so much damage to our region and to Colombia in particular over the last four years,” Milei wrote on X.
The Argentine leader added that if the result is repeated in the runoff, “Colombia will once again join the community of free nations” before concluding with his trademark slogan: “Long live liberty, damn it.”
Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa also congratulated De la Espriella and suggested Colombians were demanding political change after four years of left-wing government. “Being a bad loser is contagious,” Noboa wrote in an apparent reference to former president Rafael Correa, and his criticism of the 2025 election results, adding that Colombia needs “real change.”
Venezuelan opposition leader María Corina Machado likewise celebrated the outcome, saying the result would strengthen democratic institutions and regional security. “The Venezuelan people need a strong and united Colombia,” Machado said, arguing that democratic nations must work together against organized crime and authoritarianism.
In Washington, Republican Congresswoman María Elvira Salazar welcomed De la Espriella’s performance and interpreted the result as a repudiation of Petro’s administration. “The results send a powerful message,” Salazar wrote. “Millions of Colombians reject Gustavo Petro’s direction and want to recover security, prosperity and freedom.”
The Conservative Party formally endorsed De la Espriella following the first-round results, describing him as the candidate who best “represents Colombians demanding a firm direction” for the country.
The runoff campaign now enters a critical three-week stretch as De la Espriella and Cepeda compete for support from voters whose preferred candidates were eliminated in the first round.
For firebrand De la Espriella, victory on June 21 would represent a dramatic ideological shift following four years of Petro’s left-wing presidency and could usher in closer ties with Washington and key allied governments, among them, Israel.
For Cepeda, the challenge will be persuading voters to embrace continuity with Petro’s political project despite deep public dissatisfaction over security, economic mismanagement, corruption scandals and an increasingly polarized political climate.
Far-right candidate Abelardo de la Espriella and leftist Iván Cepeda advanced to the runoff round of Colombia’s presidential election after emerging as the top vote-getters in the May 31, 2026, first-round vote, in a result that reflects the deep political polarization shaping the country.
With 99.99% of polling stations counted, the Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil reported that De la Espriella won more than 10.3 million votes (43.7%), while Cepeda secured 9.6 million votes (40.9%). The two candidates will face each other in a runoff election scheduled for June 21, 2026.
Voter turnout reached 23.7 million people, equivalent to 57.8% of eligible voters. Together, the two candidates captured nearly 85% of valid ballots, leaving the remaining contenders far behind and setting up a contest between two sharply contrasting political visions.
De la Espriella’s first-round victory represents one of the biggest surprises of the election and marks the first time in Colombia’s modern political history that a far-right party has emerged with a realistic chance of winning the presidency.
A lawyer by profession with no previous elected office experience, De la Espriella built his campaign around a populist message focused on political confrontation, public security, a hard-liner approach to crime and opposition to negotiations with illegal armed groups. His political style has drawn comparisons to Argentine President Javier Milei, Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele and US President Donald Trump.
Most pre-election polls placed him in second or third position, with support ranging between 15% and 25%, well below his final result.
His platform emphasizes stronger security policies, tougher penalties for criminal and narcotraffic organizations, and the construction of large-scale prisons similar to those in El Salvador. He has also rejected peace negotiations with armed groups.
His opposition to diversity and inclusion policies, as well as controversies involving remarks toward female journalists for which he later apologized, also became defining features of his campaign.
Although he finished second, Cepeda achieved the highest vote total ever received by a left-wing presidential candidate in Colombia, surpassing the 8.5 million votes won by President Gustavo Petro in a previous presidential election.
The candidate of the ruling Pacto Histórico party based his campaign on grassroots mobilization, public rallies and the consolidation of a unified left-wing movement. His message focused on expanding social programs, inclusion and reducing inequality.
However, his candidacy has also been weighed down by criticism of the current administration, particularly regarding security concerns, problems within Colombia’s healthcare system and the limited results of the government’s “Total Peace” policy, which Petro promoted and Cepeda supported during his years in Congress.
Cepeda’s political career has been built in Congress, where he became known for defending the rights of victims of paramilitary violence and for his role in legal cases involving former President Álvaro Uribe.
After preliminary results were released, both Cepeda and Petro publicly questioned the preliminary vote count while stating they would recognize the official results certified by electoral commissions, judges and notaries.
“As president, I do not accept the preliminary count results,” Petro wrote on X, arguing that Colombia’s pre-count system has no legal validity and that only the official scrutiny process produces binding results. He later added that “the binding results the president will recognize are those issued by the electoral scrutiny commissions.”
Cepeda has also sought to distance himself from some of Petro’s proposals, including the idea of convening a constituent assembly to revise Colombia’s constitutional framework.
Another major statement of the election was the poor performance of Paloma Valencia, candidate of the Centro Democrático party and backed by former President Uribe, who campaigned alongside her throughout the country despite defections by several prominent supporters.
Valencia finished third with 1.6 million votes (6.9%), far below polling projections that had placed her above 20%.
The result is widely attributed to voter fatigue with Uribe’s political movement and the migration of conservative voters toward De la Espriella, who was endorsed during the campaign by several prominent right-wing figures, including senators Paola Holguín and María Fernanda Cabal, as well as leader and businessman José Félix Lafaurie.
Strategic decisions within Valencia’s campaign may also have contributed to the result, including the selection of former Bogotá councilman Juan Daniel Oviedo as her vice-presidential running mate and her reluctance to directly confront De la Espriella during the campaign.
This marks the second consecutive presidential election in which Uribe reaches the runoff without a candidate from his own party. Nevertheless, he quickly endorsed De la Espriella after the results became known.
That endorsement could prove crucial. If elected, De la Espriella would face a Congress in which his movement holds only limited representation, making support from Centro Democrático, the second-largest congressional bloc, essential for advancing legislation and reforms.
Former Medellín Mayor Sergio Fajardo, who campaigned as a centrist alternative, finished fourth with more than 1 million votes (4.2%), while none of the remaining candidates surpassed 1% of the vote.
As the runoff approaches, the votes won by both Valencia and Fajardo are expected to be closely watched by the two campaigns, as they could prove decisive in an election that is shaping up to be highly competitive, deeply polarized and politically fragmented.
While Valencia has already endorsed De la Espriella, Fajardo has yet to take a public position. In previous elections, the former Medellín mayor has preferred to leave his supporters free to decide rather than formally endorse either finalist.
In Valencia’s case, despite her endorsement of De la Espriella, it remains unclear whether her support came primarily from voters aligned with former President Álvaro Uribe or whether a significant share was driven by the candidacy of Juan Daniel Oviedo, who won more than 1.2 million votes in the coalition primaries held in March.
The June 21 presidential runoff will therefore pit two sharply different visions for Colombia’s future against one another, in a political environment marked by polarization, social tensions, and persistent challenges related to security and governance that the next administration will have to address.
Right-wing presidential candidate Abelardo “El Tigre” de la Espriella emerged as the frontrunner in Colombia’s presidential election on Sunday, setting up a high-stakes runoff against left-wing senator Iván Cepeda in a contest that could reshape the political future of one of Latin America’s largest economies.
With more than 97% of ballots counted, National Registry Bulletin No. 15 showed De la Espriella leading with 43.77% of the vote, or approximately 10.1 million ballots, compared with Cepeda’s 40.88%, or slightly above 9.4 million votes. The margin of roughly 667,000 votes exceeded many pre-election forecasts and positioned the Barranquilla-based criminal defense lawyer as the favorite heading into the decisive June 21 runoff.
Election authorities reported that voting unfolded peacefully across the country, with preliminary results available just 90 minutes after polling stations closed at 4:00 p.m. More than 41 million Colombians had been eligible to participate in the election, including 1.4 million citizens residing abroad.
The result represents a significant rebuke to President Gustavo Petro’s political project and highlights growing voter concerns over security, economic performance and public confidence in state institutions.
Petro, who is constitutionally barred from seeking re-election, has thrown his support behind Cepeda, a leading figure within the governing coalition and one of the principal defenders of the government’s controversial “Total Peace” strategy. The policy sought negotiated settlements with FARC dissidents, criminal organizations and other armed groups operating throughout the country, but critics argue it failed to reduce violence in many regions.
While Cepeda entered election day as the favorite in most opinion polls, De la Espriella successfully capitalized on public frustration over extortion, insecurity, illegal armed groups and what many voters perceive as a deterioration of public order under Petro’s administration.
Known to supporters as “El Tigre,” De la Espriella built his campaign around a tough-on-crime platform inspired in part by the security policies of El Salvador’s President Nayib Bukele. He has promised to strengthen the military, restore state authority in conflict-affected regions and confront criminal organizations with what he describes as an uncompromising approach.
His message appears to have resonated particularly among middle-class voters, business sectors and residents of regions heavily impacted by drug trafficking and armed violence.
The election also exposed the weakness of Colombia’s political center, which for years attempted to position itself as an alternative to the country’s increasingly polarized political landscape.
Conservative candidate Paloma Valencia secured more than 1.5 million votes (or 6.9%) but remained well behind the two frontrunners. Although her campaign attracted traditional conservatives and followers of former president Álvaro Uribe Vélez, she struggled to expand beyond the party’s core support base.
Centrist Sergio Fajardo, the former mayor of Medellín and former governor of Antioquia, won just 4.6% of the vote, just shy of one million ballots. Once regarded as a politician capable of bridging Colombia’s ideological divides, Fajardo failed in his third attempt to reach the presidency as voters increasingly gravitated toward candidates offering sharply contrasting visions for the country’s future.
Former Bogotá mayor Claudia López suffered one of the day’s most dramatic defeats, capturing less than 1% of the national vote. The result marked a stunning collapse for a politician who only a few years ago was considered among Colombia’s most vocal leaders.
Analysts say the runoff campaign is now likely to become a referendum on Petro’s presidency and the future direction of the country.
For Cepeda’s supporters, the June 21 vote offers an opportunity to preserve and deepen many of the social and political reforms promoted by the current administration. For De la Espriella’s backers, it represents a chance to reverse those policies and return to a security-centered model associated with the administrations of former president Álvaro Uribe.
The key question over the coming weeks will be whether De la Espriella can consolidate support among conservative and independent voters while Cepeda seeks to unite the left and attract Colombians wary of a return to hardline security policies.
After a largely peaceful election day, Colombia now faces three weeks of intense campaigning before voters make what many observers consider one of the most consequential political decisions since the country’s historic shift to the left in 2022.
Former Colombian Foreign Minister Álvaro Leyva Durán launched a blistering attack against President Gustavo Petro just days before Colombia heads to the polls on May 31, warning of what he described as looming threats to the country’s democratic institutions and accusing the government of preparing to reject an unfavorable electoral outcome.
In a lengthy manifesto published Tuesday on the social media platform X under the title “Propuesta de Álvaro Leyva Durán al País para las Elecciones,” the veteran Conservative politician claimed Petro fears both political defeat and possible legal consequences should right-wing presidential candidate Abelardo De la Espriella emerge victorious.
“Petro knows that his future depends on his successor protecting him from justice,” Leyva wrote, adding that De la Espriella “could win the elections in the first round.”
According to Leyva, the former member of the M-19 guerrilla and senator understands that with De la Espriella in office, “he himself could end up in prison. And that is why he has sought to derail the candidate and will refuse to recognize his victory.”
The explosive accusations mark the latest escalation in the increasingly bitter campaign season ahead of what analysts are calling one of Colombia’s most polarized elections in decades. Leyva, once one of Petro’s closest political allies and his first foreign minister, has in recent months become one of the president’s fiercest critics.
In the manifesto, Leyva intertwined personal memories of Colombia’s turbulent political history with warnings about what he believes is unfolding behind the scenes of the current administration.
“At my age, I know these kinds of stories well,” he wrote, before recalling his close relationship with slain Conservative leader Álvaro Gómez Hurtado.
“My father, Jorge Leyva, gave me at birth the name of his friend Álvaro Gómez Hurtado. When I was 12 years old, Álvaro would speak to me about politics and explain the world to me with a globe.”
Leyva recounted how Gómez and his own father were exiled after the 1953 military coup, and how decades later he worked alongside Gómez politically, even helping negotiate his release after he was kidnapped by the M-19 guerrilla movement in 1988.
“In 1995, after leaving a lecture at Sergio Arboleda University, Álvaro Gómez and I shook hands for the last time,” Leyva wrote. “Because minutes later, I watched in horror as he was assassinated in his car. It was a national tragedy.”
The former minister used Gómez’s legacy as a contrast to his eventual disillusionment with Petro.
“Because of that, I believed I could work with Gustavo Petro,” he said. “When he invited me to become his minister, I accepted because I believed him to be an honorable man. But I was wrong.”
Leyva then delivered some of his harshest remarks yet against the president.
“I came to know the monster from within: his vileness and degradation,” he wrote. “At enormous personal and family cost, I dared to denounce his baseness and his disrespect for the office.”
He added: “Because character demands that one not remain silent in the face of ignominy. And because of everything I witnessed, because of the rotten environment in which he (Petro) moves, I know what the government is plotting.”
Leyva also alleged that Petro’s radicalised supporters to intimidate opponents and manipulate the electoral process. “Today, while Abelardo wages a major democratic battle, Petro incites his followers to commit all kinds of outrages,” he wrote. “There has even been talk of snipers during the campaign.”
Without providing evidence, Leyva claimed that attempts had been made to invalidate De la Espriella’s candidacy, suppress favorable polling data and mobilize state-backed political machinery to influence the vote.
“On election day, rivers of money will flow in an attempt to stop De la Espriella,” he warned.
The former foreign minister also accused Petro of laying the groundwork to dispute the legitimacy of the election itself.
“The president has also spent months constructing a narrative of electoral manipulation,” Leyva wrote. In this way, according to the author, he is “weaving an argument to reject an adverse electoral outcome” that he already senses is inevitable. “That is the false ace up Petro’s sleeve,” he continued. “And like any gambler fueled by hatred, he will use it.”
Leyva also referenced U.S. Republican lawmakers from Florida, María Elvira Salazar and Rick Scott, claiming both were aware of the risks facing Colombia’s democratic process. “Scott is an ally of Colombian democracy and correctly sensed what the national government is planning,” he wrote.
In one of the most dramatic sections of the manifesto, Leyva proposed that Petro temporarily step aside if he alleges fraud after either the first or second round of voting.
“I make a proposal: if in the first or second round Petro claims there was fraud, he should step down from office under the terms of Article 193 of the Constitution,” Leyva wrote.
He suggested that the vice president temporarily assume office while an international commission made up of U.S. lawmakers, European parliamentarians, the Vatican and the United Nations review the vote count and oversee the transition of power before August 7.
“Think about it, Gustavo. Think about it carefully,” Leyva concluded. “Because the alternative will not end well for you. Abelardo De la Espriella will be the next president. And you will have to accept that reality, whether you like it or not.”
Colombia votes on May 31 with its presidential race concentrated around three candidates whose platforms diverge on nearly every dimension of economic and security policy relevant to foreign investors. For corporate executives, institutional investors, and multinational operations with Colombian exposure, the choice between senator Iván Cepeda, senator Paloma Valencia, and defense attorney Abelardo de la Espriella carries direct, measurable implications for the regulatory environment, foreign direct investment (FDI) conditions, energy sector licensing, and geopolitical alignment through at least 2030.
No candidate is projected to clear the 50%-plus-one threshold required to win outright on May 31, making a runoff election on June 21 the expected outcome. The question that will determine the direction of that runoff — and by extension the next administration — is which of the two opposition candidates finishes second.
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The final-week polling picture shifted substantially, and the trajectory matters as much as the snapshot. The CONDOR weighted aggregate — which incorporates surveys from six polling firms and applies greater weight to more recent data — placed the race as of May 23 at: Cepeda 36.3%, De la Espriella 29.1%, Valencia 16.7%.
Invamer, one of Colombia’s most established polling firms, surveyed 3,800 respondents across 152 municipalities between May 13 and May 20, registering Cepeda at 44.6%, De la Espriella at 31.6%, and Valencia at 14.0%. The Centro Nacional de Consultoría (CNC) published a survey conducted May 22 and 23 showing Cepeda at 33.4%, De la Espriella at 30.9%, and Valencia at 12.6%.
Comparing those figures to the Fundación Génesis Crea survey from May 4 through May 11 — which placed Cepeda at 35.1%, Valencia at 25.4%, and De la Espriella at 21.6% — indicates a multi-poll trend of De la Espriella gaining approximately nine to ten percentage points in three weeks while Valencia shed a comparable share. AS/COA’s poll tracker confirms the directional consistency across firms.
Atlas Intel, which published figures more favorable to De la Espriella, is currently under investigation by Colombia’s Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE) for potential methodology violations and could face suspension of its operations. Those figures are treated with caution in this analysis.
Runoff modeling diverges between firms. Fundación Génesis Crea showed Valencia defeating Cepeda 49.1% to 44.7% in a second-round matchup — meaning she was the stronger opposition candidate in that scenario. The Guarumo/Ecoanalítica survey found Cepeda losing all hypothetical runoff scenarios, including against De la Espriella. Two minor candidates — former senator Clara López and former Chocó governor Luis Gilberto Murillo — withdrew and endorsed Cepeda before the first round, a consolidation that appears to have had limited effect on his polling numbers.
Finance Colombia reported in May that the campaign has been marked by an unusual absence of traditional televised debates. Cepeda declined to participate in events organized by major media outlets, stating that proposed formats lacked neutrality. Former Bogotá Mayor Claudia López, herself a candidate, said publicly that Cepeda’s refusal was motivated by an unwillingness to defend his record as the architect of President Gustavo Petro‘s Paz Total security negotiation strategy.
Public security is the top voter concern heading into the election. InSight Crime documented that the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) launched a major offensive against FARC dissident factions in Norte de Santander in early 2025, resulting in mass civilian casualties in the Catatumbo region. In Chocó and Antioquia, the ELN and the Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC), commonly known as the Clan del Golfo, are competing for control of illegal gold mining corridors and drug trafficking routes. In Cauca, FARC dissident factions have established territorial control in areas where state presence has collapsed.
Cepeda’s approach to security is defined by his role as the principal legislative architect of Paz Total. As chair of the Senate‘s peace commission, he designed the framework that extended negotiating status to the ELN, FARC dissident groups, and the Clan del Golfo. His stated rationale is that targeting the financial leadership of drug networks rather than foot soldiers produces more durable results — a position that has academic backing in narcotics policy literature. In practice, Paz Total produced ceasefires that were repeatedly violated, and security indicators in conflict-affected departments deteriorated during the Petro administration. A Cepeda presidency is expected to continue the negotiated settlement model, with the military operating under political constraints.
Valencia’s security platform is based on reinstating Seguridad Democrática, the doctrine associated with former president Álvaro Uribe’s administrations from 2002 to 2010. The core elements are expanded military presence in rural conflict zones, dismantling of rural criminal networks, and resumption of extradition agreements with the United States — which Petro suspended, effectively shielding cartel leadership from US federal prosecution. The Uribe-era approach resulted in measurable reductions in homicide rates, forced displacement, and ELN and FARC territorial control, though human rights organizations documented serious abuses by security forces during that period.
De la Espriella has stated explicitly that his government would have no peace process. He advocates for a model similar to El Salvador’s under President Nayib Bukele: mass incarceration, construction of high-security prison facilities, classification of guerrilla and cartel organizations as foreign terrorist organizations, and broad military offensives. He has not detailed how such operations would be financed or how the mass detention model would interact with Colombia’s Constitutional Court, which has repeatedly constrained executive security powers.
For the armed groups operating in Norte de Santander and Cauca, the historical record indicates that Colombia’s criminal organizations respond more acutely to sustained, institutionally grounded military pressure and functioning extradition pipelines than to political rhetoric. By that measure, Valencia’s platform — which rebuilds the institutional security apparatus incrementally — represents a more structurally credible threat to the ELN and the Estado Mayor Central (EMC) FARC dissidents. For the Clan del Golfo leadership, extradition to the United States has historically been the principal deterrent, and Valencia’s program explicitly restores it.
The Petro administration enacted a series of minimum wage increases totaling more than 60% over four years — including a 16% increase for 2023, the largest single-year hike in Colombian history, and a 23.78% increase for 2026 — restructured labor regulations to expand premium pay requirements for night, weekend, and holiday shifts, and raised corporate tax rates to fund social spending programs. The Asociación Nacional de Empresarios de Colombia (ANDI) characterized the regulatory environment as adverse to private investment. Finance Colombia tracked a material decline in FDI in the extractive sector over the same period.
Cepeda supported those labor and fiscal reforms throughout their legislative passage. His platform extends the Petro model: increased state social spending, continued land redistribution programs, and maintenance of the current wage and labor cost structure. For companies with established Colombian operations, the regulatory environment is manageable; for companies evaluating market entry or operational expansion, the cost structure adds friction.
Valencia’s economic program emphasizes corporate stability and private sector investment as the primary mechanisms of job creation. Her vice-presidential running mate, Juan Daniel Oviedo — former director of DANE, Colombia’s national statistics agency — represents a technocratic orientation focused on reducing structural market distortions, streamlining public procurement, and scaling back state administrative overhead. Oviedo’s appointment is a direct signal to the business community that economic management would be data-driven rather than ideologically directed. Oviedo also publicly identifies as a member of the LGBTQ+ community, a departure from the traditional social conservatism of Centro Democrático.
De la Espriella’s economic orientation is pro-business with protectionist elements. His vice-presidential candidate, José Manuel Restrepo — who served as Colombia’s Finance Minister and Commerce Minister — provides institutional credibility on fiscal and trade policy. Restrepo’s presence on the ticket signals commitment to fiscal discipline and regulatory reduction in the extractive and commercial sectors. De la Espriella’s personal style, however, introduces operational uncertainty; his campaign has generated multiple high-profile controversies, including a public altercation with Caracol Noticias journalist María Lucía Fernández during a live broadcast and a formal apology following misconduct allegations by journalist Laura Rodríguez of Piso 8 FM.
Ecopetrol holds a 31.5% stake in the Gunflint oil field in the Gulf of Mexico.
The extractive sector is the most consequential economic policy dimension for international capital. Ecopetrol (NYSE: EC; BVC: ECOPETROL) — Colombia’s state-controlled energy company and the largest corporation in the country — has operated under exploration restrictions during the Petro administration, which has opposed new fossil fuel contracts on climate grounds.
Cepeda’s position extends the Petro framework: mandatory transition away from fossil fuels, heavy restrictions or outright prohibitions on new oil and gas exploration contracts, and stringent environmental licensing requirements for open-pit mining operations. Foreign investment would be directed by policy toward green hydrogen, ecotourism, and smallholder agriculture. For the multinational oil majors with Colombian operations and for institutional investors in the mining sector, a Cepeda presidency represents a continuation of the current constraints and, in some contract scenarios, an accelerated wind-down of Colombian portfolios.
In a related development, Finance Colombia reported in May that Ecopetrol’s president, Ricardo Roa, has been formally charged in connection with alleged campaign spending violations during Petro’s 2022 presidential campaign. The case will be inherited by whoever takes office in August.
Valencia’s position is that hydrocarbon revenues are essential to Colombia’s macroeconomic stability and that the country cannot exit the sector before alternative revenue structures exist. Her platform actively encourages FDI in petroleum exploration, is open to regulated fracking, and commits to clearing the environmental licensing backlog that has stalled multiple large-scale gold and copper mining projects. For energy and mining companies currently blocked by administrative delays, this represents the most direct path to project advancement.
De la Espriella’s position goes further: essentially deregulating the environmental licensing process for major extraction projects on the grounds that Colombia’s economic sovereignty takes precedence over environmental restrictions he characterizes as externally imposed. The practical constraint is whether a De la Espriella administration would have the institutional coherence and congressional support to deliver regulatory rollback, given that his movement has no established political party structure and entered the race through an independent signature campaign.
The US Embassy in Bogotá is said to be the 3rd largest US mission in the world (photo: Loren Moss)
Colombia’s relationship with the United States deteriorated materially under Petro, who aligned Colombia with Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro, pursued closer ties with China and Russia, and suspended extradition agreements. US counternarcotics cooperation was strained throughout the period.
Cepeda is committed to what he describes as a multipolar foreign policy — maintaining functional diplomatic channels with Washington and Brussels while deepening strategic and commercial relationships with China and Russia. His alignment with regional left-of-center governments in Mexico, Brazil, and Bolivia would position Colombia as part of a Latin American bloc that has grown increasingly skeptical of US regional leadership. For US companies operating in Colombia, this trajectory does not mean immediate operational disruption, but it reduces Colombia’s utility as a reliable counterpart on security cooperation, counter-narcotics intelligence sharing, and trade dispute resolution.
Valencia positions a return to the Western alignment as a core objective. She would prioritize restoring the US-Colombia relationship, reinforcing the bilateral Free Trade Agreement, and reestablishing intelligence-sharing mechanisms that were reduced under Petro. Her framing positions Colombia as a democratic anchor in a region experiencing authoritarian pressures.
De la Espriella takes the most explicit pro-US position in the race. La Silla Vacía reported that De la Espriella or entities linked to his campaign donated more than $90,000 USD to the US Republican Party, a fact that raises questions about the nature and expectations of those relationships. He has publicly aligned himself with the populist right in the United States, takes a hostile posture toward China, Russia, and Venezuela, and has characterized his security approach as consistent with a transactional alliance with Washington focused on counter-narcotics enforcement and cartel designation as foreign terrorist organizations.
“Ese pisco robó a 200 mil colombianos.” — Claudia López, former Mayor of Bogotá, referring to presidential candidate Abelardo de la Espriella’s legal representation of DMG pyramid scheme founder David Murcia Guzmán, during a presidential campaign event.
All three candidates have stated commitments to fighting corruption, though their approaches and focal points differ in ways that are material to the institutional environment for business operations.
Cepeda’s legislative record includes serious, documented work investigating paramilitary infiltration of Colombia’s political institutions — the period known as parapolítica — and pursuing accountability for those cases. His blind spot, his critics argue, is corruption within the current administration. When Ecopetrol’s Ricardo Roa was formally charged in connection with Petro’s 2022 campaign, the response from the Pacto Histórico coalition was subdued. Cepeda has been Álvaro Uribe’s primary judicial antagonist in the Senate; a Cepeda administration would offer no institutional protection to Uribe and would be expected to support the full progress of judicial proceedings against him. For left-wing politicians facing legal exposure, including former Medellín mayor Daniel Quintero, a Cepeda administration would be expected to be more receptive to amnesty frameworks.
Valencia’s approach to anti-corruption is structural rather than prosecutorial: strengthening the independence of the Contraloría General de la República and the Fiscalía General de la Nación, implementing digital transparency in public procurement, and reducing informal executive influence over judicial processes. She would be expected to apply political and rhetorical pressure on behalf of Uribe — her political mentor and a close ally — though her legislative track record indicates a degree of institutional independence from Centro Democrático party orthodoxy.
De la Espriella’s anti-corruption rhetoric centers on severe criminal penalties for corrupt officials. The credibility of that position is complicated by his professional history, which is examined in detail below.
De la Espriella’s campaign has faced sustained scrutiny over his client history as one of Colombia’s highest-profile criminal defense attorneys. The record is documented in reporting by El Colombiano, El Espectador, and the investigative outlet Corrupción al Día.
Abelardo de la Espriella (screen capture from Twitter video)
His documented client roster includes Salvatore Mancuso, the former supreme commander of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) paramilitary network; multiple legislators convicted in the parapolítica scandal, which established systematic infiltration of Colombia’s congress by paramilitary organizations; David Murcia Guzmán, the operator of the DMG pyramid scheme that defrauded an estimated 200,000 Colombian investors; the Nule Primos, convicted of large-scale public contract fraud; and Álex Saab, the Colombian businessman extradited to the United States on charges of acting as the primary money launderer for the Maduro government in Venezuela. According to Corrupción al Día, De la Espriella’s legal fees from Saab reportedly reached $12 million USD and included private aircraft travel.
De la Espriella’s response to this line of criticism rests on due process principles: that every accused person is entitled to vigorous legal defense regardless of the charges, and that his ability to navigate Colombia’s criminal code at its most complex levels demonstrates the expertise required to enforce the law from the executive branch. The argument has legal validity as a principle. The specific issue for foreign compliance officers and US government counterparts is the Saab representation: the same Nicolás Maduro whose regime De la Espriella’s campaign now characterizes as an ideological enemy received legal services from De la Espriella’s firm when the representation was commercially available.
The Fiscalía investigated De la Espriella in connection with alleged paramilitary links in 2009 and again in 2012; both investigations were dismissed for insufficient evidence, and he carries no convictions or active investigations on those matters.
Iván Cepeda (from Twitter)
Critics of Iván Cepeda, including Enrique Gómez of the Salvación Nacional party, have argued that his family background constitutes evidence of structural alignment with guerrilla movements. The record on this point merits examination.
Cepeda is the son of Manuel Cepeda Vargas, who served as Secretary-General of the Colombian Communist Party and as a senator for the Unión Patriótica (UP), a left-wing political movement that was systematically exterminated by a combination of state actors and paramilitary organizations during the 1980s and 1990s. Manuel Cepeda Vargas was assassinated on August 9, 1994. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights subsequently found the Colombian state responsible for his murder. The FARC-EP named its Frente Urbano Manuel Cepeda Vargas — an urban front operating within the Bloque Occidental — in the elder Cepeda’s honor.
The Fundación Paz y Reconciliación (PARES) has documented that Iván Cepeda’s relationship with his father’s political positions was more complex than the family lineage alone suggests. After studying in Bulgaria in 1981, Cepeda broke from his father’s Soviet-oriented communist framework and aligned with democratic leftists including Bernardo Jaramillo Ossa, who publicly rejected the FARC’s armed strategy. Cepeda has repeatedly stated his repudiation of the FARC’s use of his father’s name. No documented evidence connects him to operational coordination with current armed groups.
What the family history does establish is the ideological framework through which Cepeda processes security policy: a belief, grounded in personal and political experience, that the Colombian state’s institutional violence has been as destructive as guerrilla violence, and that negotiated settlements are structurally preferable to military solutions. That framework generates Paz Total. It also generates a posture toward ELN and FARC dissident negotiators that prioritizes process continuity over verified compliance — a disposition that armed groups have demonstrably exploited to maintain territorial and operational positions while negotiation frameworks provided legal cover.
Paloma Valencia (image Twitter)
The comparison to former president Iván Duque (2018–2022) comes up regularly in discussions of Valencia’s political independence. Duque, who had limited independent political standing before Uribe selected him, was perceived throughout his term as governing within constraints set by his patron — a dynamic that Colombian political cartoonists characterized as ventriloquism.
Valencia’s profile differs materially. She is the granddaughter of former Colombian president Guillermo León Valencia, carries her own political lineage, and has served in the Senate for over a decade, building positions on agrarian reform, judicial modernization, and indigenous land rights that have placed her at variance with standard Centro Democrático positions on those issues. She won the Gran Consulta por Colombia primary on March 8 with more than 45% of the vote — over 3.2 million Colombians — establishing a democratic mandate distinct from any party endorsement.
She would be expected to use institutional and rhetorical channels to support Uribe in the ongoing judicial proceedings against him, and to apply pressure on the trajectory of those cases. Whether that constitutes political interference with judicial independence or normal advocacy within democratic norms is a question on which observers disagree. What the legislative record does not support is the characterization of Valencia as incapable of independent governance.
Press freedom carries an indirect but measurable correlation with rule-of-law quality, which in turn affects operational risk for companies that rely on regulatory predictability and transparent legal processes.
Cepeda has maintained a posture toward critical media that mirrors President Petro’s practice of characterizing adversarial outlets as acting in the interests of economic elites. Under Petro, this produced a systematic exclusion of critical media from official information flows and persistent rhetorical delegitimization of independent journalism, though the press remained legally free to operate. A Cepeda administration would be expected to continue this pattern.
Valencia’s background in Colombia’s traditional political and intellectual establishment, combined with a decade in a party that has faced sustained critical coverage from Colombia’s major outlets, points toward a conventional institutional relationship with the press — adversarial at times, but within professional norms.
De la Espriella’s conduct during the campaign provides direct evidence of his approach. He publicly called Caracol Noticias journalist María Lucía Fernández “ignorant” in a live interview. He issued a formal apology after journalist Laura Rodríguez of Piso 8 FM made allegations of inappropriate conduct. His campaign strategy has drawn comparisons to the approach of Argentine president Javier Milei and US president Donald Trump in its use of direct digital channels to circumvent traditional media while publicly attacking outlets that publish critical coverage. The press would remain legally protected under a De la Espriella administration, but the operational environment for investigative journalism would be hostile.
The question of which candidate is most aligned with free-market principles requires a distinction that the international business press frequently elides: the difference between economic deregulation and political authoritarianism. These can, and in this election do, exist independently.
De la Espriella’s platform is often described in international coverage as the most pro-market. His deregulation proposals for the extractive sector and his corporate tax rhetoric support that reading in the economic domain. His security platform, however, involves a substantial expansion of state coercive power: mass detention operations, a mega-prison construction program, and the suspension of standard due process protections to facilitate rapid incarceration of criminal suspects. The Cato Institute‘s framework of economic freedom as inseparable from civil liberties would categorize a state powerful enough to detain people without standard procedural protections as a state that represents an institutional risk to property rights and contract enforcement as well.
Valencia’s platform, anchored by Oviedo’s technocratic program of structural market reform — reduced administrative barriers, streamlined procurement, smaller state overhead, maintained civil liberties — represents the closest approximation to coherent market liberalism available in this field. It does not carry the rhetorical force of De la Espriella’s deregulation proposals, but it has more institutional grounding.
Cepeda’s platform is the furthest from market liberalism by any standard measure: state-directed investment allocation, wealth redistribution through tax and transfer mechanisms, state expansion in healthcare and pension administration, and agrarian land redistribution. His program is continuous with the Petro administration’s economic framework.
Claudia López, senator of Colombia. (Credit: Patty Suescún)
Several other candidates remain on the ballot and are drawing small but potentially consequential vote shares in a first round where the margin between second and third place could be narrow.
Claudia López, former mayor of Bogotá running under the Con Claudia Imparables coalition, positions herself as a progressive centrist with a documented anti-corruption record. Her polling has not broken 3.5% in major surveys, and her high polarization ratings from her mayoral term limit her growth ceiling. Her attacks on De la Espriella during the campaign — she publicly called him a “defender of the mafia” in reference to his client history — have been among the most pointed in the race, and factually grounded on the public record.
Sergio Fajardo, making his third consecutive presidential run under Dignidad y Compromiso, continues to represent a technocratic, education-focused centrism grounded in his work transforming Medellín in the early 2000s. He has not broken 3.5% in any major poll in this cycle.
Roy Barreras, running under La Fuerza de la Paz following his Frente por la Vida primary victory, is one of the most experienced political operatives in Colombia, having been part of multiple coalition governments across ideological lines over two decades. He polls below the threshold for meaningful first-round impact.
Miguel Uribe Londoño, running under Partido Demócrata, represents a younger-generation conservative platform emphasizing fiscal discipline and private sector growth, broadly consistent with Valencia’s program. He also polls below 3.5%.
Carlos Caicedo, running on a regionalist platform emphasizing decentralization away from Bogotá, draws support primarily from the Costa Caribe. His structural argument about Colombia’s administrative over-centralization is substantively grounded, though his national profile is insufficient to affect the first-round outcome.
For international capital with Colombian exposure, the three-way race produces three materially different operational scenarios.
A Cepeda victory — which remains the single most likely first-round outcome based on available polling — would signal continuity of the Petro-era regulatory framework: sustained capital outflow pressure, high corporate tax rates, no new fossil fuel exploration contracts for Ecopetrol (NYSE: EC; BVC: ECOPETROL) or private operators, continued labor cost escalation, and a foreign policy trajectory away from Washington. Colombian equity valuations would be expected to remain under pressure. The mining licensing backlog would continue to accumulate. A Cepeda administration would not replicate Venezuela’s economic trajectory — Colombia’s independent central bank, Banco de la República, its functioning constitutional court, and its institutional depth provide meaningful buffers — but the investment headwinds would be structural rather than cyclical.
A Valencia victory would represent the sharpest regulatory reversal available in this field. Ecopetrol exploration contracts would be expected to advance. The mining licensing backlog would be addressed. US bilateral relations would be restored, reactivating security intelligence cooperation and trade facilitation mechanisms. The Colombian peso would be expected to strengthen as country risk premium declined. The path to that outcome now requires her to either close the gap significantly on De la Espriella in the first round or rely on runoff polling that showed her as the stronger second-round candidate — data that predates the most recent polling shift.
A De la Espriella victory introduces the widest distribution of possible outcomes. The upside scenario involves Restrepo managing fiscal and trade policy competently, genuine regulatory rollback in the extractive sector, aggressive extradition resumption, and security operations that reduce the physical risk premium in conflict-affected departments including Cauca, Norte de Santander, and Chocó. The downside scenario involves recurring crises generated by De la Espriella’s personal conduct, conflicts of interest arising from his former client relationships, and authoritarian security measures that attract international human rights attention and complicate bilateral relationships. Restrepo’s presence on the ticket reduces the probability of the downside scenario but does not eliminate it.
The current polling trend indicates that right-wing voters are consolidating around De la Espriella at Valencia’s expense. Whether that consolidation produces a runoff between De la Espriella and Cepeda — and whether the runoff produces a left or right-wing government — remains uncertain. What the polling data does not support is the scenario, widely assumed until recently, of a Cepeda-Valencia runoff in which Valencia was positioned as the structurally stronger opposition candidate.
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With less than two weeks remaining before Colombia’s presidential election, whose first round is scheduled for May 31, three candidates are concentrating most voter support and competing for access to the presidential palace, Casa de Nariño: ruling coalition senator Iván Cepeda, candidate of the left-wing Pacto Histórico party; senator Paloma Valencia, representing the right-wing Centro Democrático party; and lawyer and businessman Abelardo de la Espriella, a figure of Colombia’s far right.
Although 13 candidates will appear on the ballot, two contenders: Clara López and Luis Gilberto Murillo, withdrew their campaigns to support Cepeda, while the remaining candidates have failed to surpass 3.5% voter support in pre-elections polls, a figure close to the statistical margin of error.
If polling trends hold, no candidate is expected to secure the 50% plus one vote needed to win outright in the first round, making a runoff election on June 21, 2026, highly likely.
Cepeda has remained relatively stable in polls, with voter support ranging between 35% and 43%, effectively securing his place in a second round if trends continue.
The main electoral uncertainty centers on who will finish second and challenge the ruling coalition in a likely runoff.
Under Colombia’s electoral system, only the two candidates receiving the highest vote totals advance to the second round. The fragmentation of the political right has complicated efforts to consolidate support behind either Valencia or De la Espriella.
Polls suggest a competitive scenario. Valencia has registered between 14% and 21% voter support, while De la Espriella fluctuates between 16% and 24%, depending on the poll and methodology used.
The lack of unity between the two camps stems from both ideological differences and their political structures. Valencia is a member of the political party founded by former President Álvaro Uribe, while De la Espriella entered the race through an independent signature campaign, marking the first time Colombia’s far right has emerged as a viable contender for the presidency.
The presidential campaign has been marked by an unusual lack of debates among the leading candidates.
Cepeda has refused to participate in events organized by media outlets, arguing that proposed formats do not offer guarantees of neutrality or what he describes as “fair rules” established by news organizations.
As a result, part of the political confrontation has shifted to Congress, where both Cepeda and Valencia currently serve in the Senate.
Critics, however, have challenged Cepeda’s decision. Former Bogotá Mayor and presidential candidate Claudia López argued that his absence from debates reflects that “Cepeda does not want to take responsibility for the failures of Total Peace (Paz Total),” the negotiation policy with armed groups promoted by President Gustavo Petro, in which Cepeda played a key role as a lawmaker.
Instead of regular debates, the campaign has been dominated by disputes over media formats, digital presence, social media strategies and public controversies aimed at amplifying candidates’ visibility.
One of the candidates who has most effectively capitalized on the digital environment is Abelardo de la Espriella, whose political strategy has been compared to right-wing populist leadership styles such as those of Argentine President Javier Milei and US President Donald Trump.
In recent weeks, De la Espriella has faced several media controversies, including an incident involving journalist Laura Rodríguez of Piso 8 FM, for which he later apologized after accusations of inappropriate sexual conduct. He also clashed live on air with television presenter María Lucía Fernández of Caracol Noticias, whom he called “ignorant.”
Questions also emerged following reports by digital outlet La Silla Vacía regarding donations linked to the US Republican Party.
Despite the controversies, the strategy appears to be strengthening his electoral standing. An Atlas Intel poll for Semana magazine, published May 15, showed De la Espriella surpassing Valencia by a two-to-one margin for the first time, with 32.9% support compared with 16.7%.
However, the polling firm is currently under investigation by Colombia’s National Electoral Council (CNE) amid concerns over whether its methodology complies with national standards. If irregularities are confirmed, the firm could face suspension of its operations in Colombia.
Meanwhile, Valencia has sought to expand her electoral base by shifting strategically toward the political center.
As part of that effort, on May 17 she officially introduced her proposal “Mámá No Está Sola (Mom Is Not Alone),” aimed at female heads of household and focused on access to credit, employment and housing property. The proposal also includes a promise to deliver 1 million homes prioritized for women community leaders.
Valencia’s candidacy also marks a historic first for Colombia’s political right: it is the first time a major conservative party has nominated a woman for president.
Her vice presidential running mate, former Bogotá councilman Juan Daniel Oviedo, has openly identified as a member of the LGBTQ+ community, a move that represents a significant shift for the Centro Democrático traditionally conservative electorate.
With a highly fragmented field and no signs of consolidation among right-wing candidates, Colombia appears increasingly likely to hold a presidential runoff on June 21, 2026.
Barring a major shift in polling trends, the contest seems set to come down to Iván Cepeda and whichever opposition candidate manages to emerge from an increasingly competitive battle within Colombia’s political right.
Hundreds of cars briefly blocked all three lanes of Avenida La Esmeralda in the center of Bogotá on Sunday afternoon as supporters of hard-right Abelardo de la Espriella gathered to show their support for his candidacy two weeks before the presidential elections kick off.
De la Espriella himself was campaigning in Valledupar, but his campaign called for Abelardistas in over 70 municipalities around the country to come out and show their support by convening a noisy caravan.
While many Colombian families relaxed in neighboring Parque Simón Bolívar, a few hundred die-hard supporters of the far-right populist showman answered the call.
The hallmark of de la Espriella’s campaign for the presidency is its promotion of sincere patriotic fervour, and this passion was very much on display.
Colombian flags and football jerseys, vallenato, vuvuzelas, balloons and the words “Firme por la Patria” (Steadfast for the Homeland) abounded.
While the lanes filled up, the self-titled Defensores de la Patria (Defenders of the Homeland) honked their horns, danced, took photos, chatted and saluted one another. Some applied camouflage paint to their faces to get in character.
Vendors were selling Colombia flags and mango biche while children danced to songs hailing El Tigre’s achievements and virtues.
Speaking to The Bogotá Post, some of those present said they were attracted to de la Espriella as an aspirational figure who makes them feel proud to be Colombian. Others are attracted by his personal values.
For Adriana, waving her flag in the middle of the road, “it is very important that he is a family man, he works hard for his family, he takes his family with him everywhere, and they are very close.”
She believes young people turn to crime because they lack the pride and self-confidence to make something of themselves, describing Abelardo as the kind of role model who could “inspire young people to make a positive contribution to society.”
Others had come along to demonstrate their implacable opposition to a government led by Iván Cepeda, the left-wing candidate currently leading in the polls.
Aron, wearing a baseball cap emblazoned with de la Espriella’s face, is saluting passersby. He explained his view that, “Petro is a socialist, but Cepeda is a communist. Petro is progressive, but Cepeda wants to completely change the country. He doesn’t believe in private property.”
His friend, Doris, added that, “Cepeda will take us down the path of Venezuela.”
Time and again participants reported that they believe Abelardo will bring freedom to Colombia.
For some, that meant freedom of speech, which they feel has been curtailed under Petro.
For others, freedom meant freedom from crime and corruption, which Abelardo will end by “ruling with an iron fist.”
For yet others, freedom meant an end to economic regulations that they see as inhibiting economic competition.
Everyone who spoke to The Bogotá Post said Colombia needed “saving” from something – which varied from person to person – and that Abelardo was that “savior”.
One man even said, “If we don’t win, they will have stolen it from us.” Accounts affiliated to de la Espriella’s campaign have been disseminating fake polling that shows him winning 86% of the vote.
Nevertheless, his supporters are pragmatic enough to vote tactically. Every person I spoke to admitted they would vote for right-wing Paloma Valencia in the second round, if Abelardo does not get through, in order to keep Cepeda from power. After an hour of stationary honking, the convoy, led by an enormous dumpster truck, set off on its tour of the city, and the mango biche sellers drifted back into the park.
The post Inside a pro-Abelardo de la Espriella rally in Bogotá appeared first on The Bogotá Post.
Colombia is heading toward the first round of presidential elections on May 31, 2026, with 13 candidates in the race, in a scenario marked by political fragmentation and a strong concentration of voter support among a few contenders.
The next president will take office on August 7, following the end of President Gustavo Petro’s term, marking the transition from the country’s first left-wing government in recent history.
According to pre-election polls, only five candidates exceed 2% in voter intention, leaving most with limited chances of reaching the presidential palace. Among the leading contenders are Iván Cepeda, the candidate of the ruling Pacto Histórico, who leads polls with between 35% and 43% support; right-wing candidate Abelardo de la Espriella, with between 16% and 24%; and Paloma Valencia of the Centro Democrático party, with between 14% and 21%.
A second group includes centrist candidates Claudia López, polling between 3% and 4%, and Sergio Fajardo, at around 2.5%, reflecting a fragmented vote within that political segment.
As the campaign unfolds, candidates have selected their running partners as a key strategy to broaden their electoral appeal.
Iván Cepeda has chosen Aida Quilcué, an Indigenous Nasa leader from southwestern Colombia, reinforcing the campaign’s leftist profile and its emphasis on including historically marginalized communities in political decision-making.
Quilcué has served as a governor and Indigenous authority in her community and, like Cepeda, is a victim of Colombia’s armed conflict: her husband was killed by state agents in 2008. She has been affiliated with the Regional Indigenous Council of Cauca (CRIC) and the National Indigenous Organization of Colombia (ONIC). She presents herself publicly as an Indigenous leader, human rights defender and senator (2022–2026), without reporting formal higher education credentials.
Abelardo de la Espriella has selected former Finance, and Commerce, Industry and Tourism Minister, Juan Manuel Restrepo, as his running mate, forming a ticket focused on security and economic strengthening. “That is a capability I have because I understand productivity, competitiveness and economic development,” Restrepo told La Silla Vacía during his registration.
Restrepo is an economist with a specialization in finance from Rosario University, a master’s degree in economics from the London School of Economics, a specialization in senior management from INALDE Business School, and a doctorate in higher education leadership from the University of Bath. He has also served as rector of three major universities in Colombia.
Juan Daniel Oviedo, a former Bogotá city councilor, is running alongside Paloma Valencia of the Centro Democrático party. As economist from Universidad del Rosario, Oviedo holds a master’s degree in mathematical economics and econometrics and a Ph.D. in economics from the University of Toulouse in France.
He previously served as head of Colombia’s National Statistics Agency (DANE) during the Iván Duque administration and ran for mayor of Bogotá in 2023.
His vice presidential bid gained momentum after securing more than 1.2 million votes in the March 8 inter-party primary, finishing second. His selection aims to attract centrist and center-right voters and strengthen Valencia’s chances of advancing to a potential runoff.
However, his nomination has sparked controversy, as it marks the first time the right-wing party has chosen a candidate with liberal positions on issues such as women’s rights and LGBTQ+ rights.
Claudia López selected Leonardo Huerta, a university professor of law and philosophy, as her running mate. According to Spain’s El País, he comes from “a working middle-class family,” is the youngest of four siblings, and is married with two children.
Huerta is a lawyer from Universidad Libre and holds a degree in philosophy from the Technological University of Pereira. He has a master’s degree in administrative law and is a doctoral candidate in law. His public sector experience includes serving as education secretary in Pereira and as a deputy ombudsman for health issues during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020.
Sergio Fajardo selected Edna Bonilla as his running mate, reinforcing a campaign centered on education and dialogue. Bonilla previously served as Bogotá’s education secretary during Claudia López’s administration (2020–2023).
She is a public accountant from the National University of Colombia, holds a tax specialization from Externado University and a doctorate in political studies. During the campaign launch, Fajardo said: “We will work together to deliver the serious and safe change Colombia needs. To move beyond polarization and build bridges instead of trenches.”
Voter participation
According to Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil, which oversees elections, a total of 41,421,973 citizens are eligible to vote in Colombia and abroad in the first round of the presidential election. Of these, 21,298,492 are women and 20,123,481 are men.
If no candidate secures more than 50% of the vote, a runoff election will be held on June 21, 2026, between the top two candidates.
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