The candidate, Abelardo de la Espriella, will face a senator from the left-wing party of the departing president, Gustavo Petro, in a June runoff.

Abelardo De La Espriella, a right-wing outsider, will face Iván Cepeda, a progressive senator, in Colombia’s presidential election runoff.

Right-wing presidential candidate Abelardo “El Tigre” de la Espriella emerged as the frontrunner in Colombia’s presidential election on Sunday, setting up a high-stakes runoff against left-wing senator Iván Cepeda in a contest that could reshape the political future of one of Latin America’s largest economies.

With more than 97% of ballots counted, National Registry Bulletin No. 15 showed De la Espriella leading with 43.77% of the vote, or approximately 10.1 million ballots, compared with Cepeda’s 40.88%, or slightly above 9.4 million votes. The margin of roughly 667,000 votes exceeded many pre-election forecasts and positioned the Barranquilla-based criminal defense lawyer as the favorite heading into the decisive June 21 runoff.

Election authorities reported that voting unfolded peacefully across the country, with preliminary results available just 90 minutes after polling stations closed at 4:00 p.m. More than 41 million Colombians had been eligible to participate in the election, including 1.4 million citizens residing abroad.

The result represents a significant rebuke to President Gustavo Petro’s political project and highlights growing voter concerns over security, economic performance and public confidence in state institutions.

Petro, who is constitutionally barred from seeking re-election, has thrown his support behind Cepeda, a leading figure within the governing coalition and one of the principal defenders of the government’s controversial “Total Peace” strategy. The policy sought negotiated settlements with FARC dissidents, criminal organizations and other armed groups operating throughout the country, but critics argue it failed to reduce violence in many regions.

While Cepeda entered election day as the favorite in most opinion polls, De la Espriella successfully capitalized on public frustration over extortion, insecurity, illegal armed groups and what many voters perceive as a deterioration of public order under Petro’s administration.

Known to supporters as “El Tigre,” De la Espriella built his campaign around a tough-on-crime platform inspired in part by the security policies of El Salvador’s President Nayib Bukele. He has promised to strengthen the military, restore state authority in conflict-affected regions and confront criminal organizations with what he describes as an uncompromising approach.

His message appears to have resonated particularly among middle-class voters, business sectors and residents of regions heavily impacted by drug trafficking and armed violence.

The election also exposed the weakness of Colombia’s political center, which for years attempted to position itself as an alternative to the country’s increasingly polarized political landscape.

Conservative candidate Paloma Valencia secured more than 1.5 million votes (or 6.9%) but remained well behind the two frontrunners. Although her campaign attracted traditional conservatives and followers of former president Álvaro Uribe Vélez, she struggled to expand beyond the party’s core support base.

Centrist Sergio Fajardo, the former mayor of Medellín and former governor of Antioquia, won just 4.6% of the vote, just shy of one million ballots. Once regarded as a politician capable of bridging Colombia’s ideological divides, Fajardo failed in his third attempt to reach the presidency as voters increasingly gravitated toward candidates offering sharply contrasting visions for the country’s future.

Former Bogotá mayor Claudia López suffered one of the day’s most dramatic defeats, capturing less than 1% of the national vote. The result marked a stunning collapse for a politician who only a few years ago was considered among Colombia’s most vocal leaders.

Analysts say the runoff campaign is now likely to become a referendum on Petro’s presidency and the future direction of the country.

For Cepeda’s supporters, the June 21 vote offers an opportunity to preserve and deepen many of the social and political reforms promoted by the current administration. For De la Espriella’s backers, it represents a chance to reverse those policies and return to a security-centered model associated with the administrations of former president Álvaro Uribe.

The key question over the coming weeks will be whether De la Espriella can consolidate support among conservative and independent voters while Cepeda seeks to unite the left and attract Colombians wary of a return to hardline security policies.

After a largely peaceful election day, Colombia now faces three weeks of intense campaigning before voters make what many observers consider one of the most consequential political decisions since the country’s historic shift to the left in 2022.

Former Colombian Foreign Minister Álvaro Leyva Durán launched a blistering attack against President Gustavo Petro just days before Colombia heads to the polls on May 31, warning of what he described as looming threats to the country’s democratic institutions and accusing the government of preparing to reject an unfavorable electoral outcome.

In a lengthy manifesto published Tuesday on the social media platform X under the title “Propuesta de Álvaro Leyva Durán al País para las Elecciones,” the veteran Conservative politician claimed Petro fears both political defeat and possible legal consequences should right-wing presidential candidate Abelardo De la Espriella emerge victorious.

“Petro knows that his future depends on his successor protecting him from justice,” Leyva wrote, adding that De la Espriella “could win the elections in the first round.”

According to Leyva, the former member of the M-19 guerrilla and senator understands that with De la Espriella in office, “he himself could end up in prison. And that is why he has sought to derail the candidate and will refuse to recognize his victory.”

The explosive accusations mark the latest escalation in the increasingly bitter campaign season ahead of what analysts are calling one of Colombia’s most polarized elections in decades. Leyva, once one of Petro’s closest political allies and his first foreign minister, has in recent months become one of the president’s fiercest critics.

In the manifesto, Leyva intertwined personal memories of Colombia’s turbulent political history with warnings about what he believes is unfolding behind the scenes of the current administration.

“At my age, I know these kinds of stories well,” he wrote, before recalling his close relationship with slain Conservative leader Álvaro Gómez Hurtado.

“My father, Jorge Leyva, gave me at birth the name of his friend Álvaro Gómez Hurtado. When I was 12 years old, Álvaro would speak to me about politics and explain the world to me with a globe.”

Leyva recounted how Gómez and his own father were exiled after the 1953 military coup, and how decades later he worked alongside Gómez politically, even helping negotiate his release after he was kidnapped by the M-19 guerrilla movement in 1988.

“In 1995, after leaving a lecture at Sergio Arboleda University, Álvaro Gómez and I shook hands for the last time,” Leyva wrote. “Because minutes later, I watched in horror as he was assassinated in his car. It was a national tragedy.”

The former minister used Gómez’s legacy as a contrast to his eventual disillusionment with Petro.

“Because of that, I believed I could work with Gustavo Petro,” he said. “When he invited me to become his minister, I accepted because I believed him to be an honorable man. But I was wrong.”

Leyva then delivered some of his harshest remarks yet against the president.

“I came to know the monster from within: his vileness and degradation,” he wrote. “At enormous personal and family cost, I dared to denounce his baseness and his disrespect for the office.”

He added: “Because character demands that one not remain silent in the face of ignominy. And because of everything I witnessed, because of the rotten environment in which he (Petro) moves, I know what the government is plotting.”

Leyva also alleged that Petro’s radicalised supporters to intimidate opponents and manipulate the electoral process. “Today, while Abelardo wages a major democratic battle, Petro incites his followers to commit all kinds of outrages,” he wrote. “There has even been talk of snipers during the campaign.”

Without providing evidence, Leyva claimed that attempts had been made to invalidate De la Espriella’s candidacy, suppress favorable polling data and mobilize state-backed political machinery to influence the vote.

“On election day, rivers of money will flow in an attempt to stop De la Espriella,” he warned.

The former foreign minister also accused Petro of laying the groundwork to dispute the legitimacy of the election itself.

“The president has also spent months constructing a narrative of electoral manipulation,” Leyva wrote. In this way, according to the author, he is “weaving an argument to reject an adverse electoral outcome” that he already senses is inevitable. “That is the false ace up Petro’s sleeve,” he continued. “And like any gambler fueled by hatred, he will use it.”

Leyva also referenced U.S. Republican lawmakers from Florida, María Elvira Salazar and Rick Scott, claiming both were aware of the risks facing Colombia’s democratic process. “Scott is an ally of Colombian democracy and correctly sensed what the national government is planning,” he wrote.

In one of the most dramatic sections of the manifesto, Leyva proposed that Petro temporarily step aside if he alleges fraud after either the first or second round of voting.

“I make a proposal: if in the first or second round Petro claims there was fraud, he should step down from office under the terms of Article 193 of the Constitution,” Leyva wrote.

He suggested that the vice president temporarily assume office while an international commission made up of U.S. lawmakers, European parliamentarians, the Vatican and the United Nations review the vote count and oversee the transition of power before August 7.

“Think about it, Gustavo. Think about it carefully,” Leyva concluded. “Because the alternative will not end well for you. Abelardo De la Espriella will be the next president. And you will have to accept that reality, whether you like it or not.”

Colombians face three sharply different futures in May 31 vote

Colombia votes on May 31 with its presidential race concentrated around three candidates whose platforms diverge on nearly every dimension of economic and security policy relevant to foreign investors. For corporate executives, institutional investors, and multinational operations with Colombian exposure, the choice between senator Iván Cepeda, senator Paloma Valencia, and defense attorney Abelardo de la Espriella carries direct, measurable implications for the regulatory environment, foreign direct investment (FDI) conditions, energy sector licensing, and geopolitical alignment through at least 2030.

No candidate is projected to clear the 50%-plus-one threshold required to win outright on May 31, making a runoff election on June 21 the expected outcome. The question that will determine the direction of that runoff — and by extension the next administration — is which of the two opposition candidates finishes second.

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A Race Reshaped by Late Polling

The final-week polling picture shifted substantially, and the trajectory matters as much as the snapshot. The CONDOR weighted aggregate — which incorporates surveys from six polling firms and applies greater weight to more recent data — placed the race as of May 23 at: Cepeda 36.3%, De la Espriella 29.1%, Valencia 16.7%.

Invamer, one of Colombia’s most established polling firms, surveyed 3,800 respondents across 152 municipalities between May 13 and May 20, registering Cepeda at 44.6%, De la Espriella at 31.6%, and Valencia at 14.0%. The Centro Nacional de Consultoría (CNC) published a survey conducted May 22 and 23 showing Cepeda at 33.4%, De la Espriella at 30.9%, and Valencia at 12.6%.

Comparing those figures to the Fundación Génesis Crea survey from May 4 through May 11 — which placed Cepeda at 35.1%, Valencia at 25.4%, and De la Espriella at 21.6% — indicates a multi-poll trend of De la Espriella gaining approximately nine to ten percentage points in three weeks while Valencia shed a comparable share. AS/COA’s poll tracker confirms the directional consistency across firms.

Atlas Intel, which published figures more favorable to De la Espriella, is currently under investigation by Colombia’s Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE) for potential methodology violations and could face suspension of its operations. Those figures are treated with caution in this analysis.

Runoff modeling diverges between firms. Fundación Génesis Crea showed Valencia defeating Cepeda 49.1% to 44.7% in a second-round matchup — meaning she was the stronger opposition candidate in that scenario. The Guarumo/Ecoanalítica survey found Cepeda losing all hypothetical runoff scenarios, including against De la Espriella. Two minor candidates — former senator Clara López and former Chocó governor Luis Gilberto Murillo — withdrew and endorsed Cepeda before the first round, a consolidation that appears to have had limited effect on his polling numbers.

Finance Colombia reported in May that the campaign has been marked by an unusual absence of traditional televised debates. Cepeda declined to participate in events organized by major media outlets, stating that proposed formats lacked neutrality. Former Bogotá Mayor Claudia López, herself a candidate, said publicly that Cepeda’s refusal was motivated by an unwillingness to defend his record as the architect of President Gustavo Petro‘s Paz Total security negotiation strategy.

Security Policy: The Three Approaches to Armed Groups

Public security is the top voter concern heading into the election. InSight Crime documented that the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) launched a major offensive against FARC dissident factions in Norte de Santander in early 2025, resulting in mass civilian casualties in the Catatumbo region. In Chocó and Antioquia, the ELN and the Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC), commonly known as the Clan del Golfo, are competing for control of illegal gold mining corridors and drug trafficking routes. In Cauca, FARC dissident factions have established territorial control in areas where state presence has collapsed.

Cepeda’s approach to security is defined by his role as the principal legislative architect of Paz Total. As chair of the Senate‘s peace commission, he designed the framework that extended negotiating status to the ELN, FARC dissident groups, and the Clan del Golfo. His stated rationale is that targeting the financial leadership of drug networks rather than foot soldiers produces more durable results — a position that has academic backing in narcotics policy literature. In practice, Paz Total produced ceasefires that were repeatedly violated, and security indicators in conflict-affected departments deteriorated during the Petro administration. A Cepeda presidency is expected to continue the negotiated settlement model, with the military operating under political constraints.

Valencia’s security platform is based on reinstating Seguridad Democrática, the doctrine associated with former president Álvaro Uribe’s administrations from 2002 to 2010. The core elements are expanded military presence in rural conflict zones, dismantling of rural criminal networks, and resumption of extradition agreements with the United States — which Petro suspended, effectively shielding cartel leadership from US federal prosecution. The Uribe-era approach resulted in measurable reductions in homicide rates, forced displacement, and ELN and FARC territorial control, though human rights organizations documented serious abuses by security forces during that period.

De la Espriella has stated explicitly that his government would have no peace process. He advocates for a model similar to El Salvador’s under President Nayib Bukele: mass incarceration, construction of high-security prison facilities, classification of guerrilla and cartel organizations as foreign terrorist organizations, and broad military offensives. He has not detailed how such operations would be financed or how the mass detention model would interact with Colombia’s Constitutional Court, which has repeatedly constrained executive security powers.

For the armed groups operating in Norte de Santander and Cauca, the historical record indicates that Colombia’s criminal organizations respond more acutely to sustained, institutionally grounded military pressure and functioning extradition pipelines than to political rhetoric. By that measure, Valencia’s platform — which rebuilds the institutional security apparatus incrementally — represents a more structurally credible threat to the ELN and the Estado Mayor Central (EMC) FARC dissidents. For the Clan del Golfo leadership, extradition to the United States has historically been the principal deterrent, and Valencia’s program explicitly restores it.

Business Climate and Employment Conditions

The Petro administration enacted a series of minimum wage increases totaling more than 60% over four years — including a 16% increase for 2023, the largest single-year hike in Colombian history, and a 23.78% increase for 2026 — restructured labor regulations to expand premium pay requirements for night, weekend, and holiday shifts, and raised corporate tax rates to fund social spending programs. The Asociación Nacional de Empresarios de Colombia (ANDI) characterized the regulatory environment as adverse to private investment. Finance Colombia tracked a material decline in FDI in the extractive sector over the same period.

Cepeda supported those labor and fiscal reforms throughout their legislative passage. His platform extends the Petro model: increased state social spending, continued land redistribution programs, and maintenance of the current wage and labor cost structure. For companies with established Colombian operations, the regulatory environment is manageable; for companies evaluating market entry or operational expansion, the cost structure adds friction.

Valencia’s economic program emphasizes corporate stability and private sector investment as the primary mechanisms of job creation. Her vice-presidential running mate, Juan Daniel Oviedo — former director of DANE, Colombia’s national statistics agency — represents a technocratic orientation focused on reducing structural market distortions, streamlining public procurement, and scaling back state administrative overhead. Oviedo’s appointment is a direct signal to the business community that economic management would be data-driven rather than ideologically directed. Oviedo also publicly identifies as a member of the LGBTQ+ community, a departure from the traditional social conservatism of Centro Democrático.

De la Espriella’s economic orientation is pro-business with protectionist elements. His vice-presidential candidate, José Manuel Restrepo — who served as Colombia’s Finance Minister and Commerce Minister — provides institutional credibility on fiscal and trade policy. Restrepo’s presence on the ticket signals commitment to fiscal discipline and regulatory reduction in the extractive and commercial sectors. De la Espriella’s personal style, however, introduces operational uncertainty; his campaign has generated multiple high-profile controversies, including a public altercation with Caracol Noticias journalist María Lucía Fernández during a live broadcast and a formal apology following misconduct allegations by journalist Laura Rodríguez of Piso 8 FM.

Foreign Investment, Oil, and Mining

The extractive sector is the most consequential economic policy dimension for international capital. Ecopetrol (NYSE: EC; BVC: ECOPETROL) — Colombia’s state-controlled energy company and the largest corporation in the country — has operated under exploration restrictions during the Petro administration, which has opposed new fossil fuel contracts on climate grounds.

Cepeda’s position extends the Petro framework: mandatory transition away from fossil fuels, heavy restrictions or outright prohibitions on new oil and gas exploration contracts, and stringent environmental licensing requirements for open-pit mining operations. Foreign investment would be directed by policy toward green hydrogen, ecotourism, and smallholder agriculture. For the multinational oil majors with Colombian operations and for institutional investors in the mining sector, a Cepeda presidency represents a continuation of the current constraints and, in some contract scenarios, an accelerated wind-down of Colombian portfolios.

In a related development, Finance Colombia reported in May that Ecopetrol’s president, Ricardo Roa, has been formally charged in connection with alleged campaign spending violations during Petro’s 2022 presidential campaign. The case will be inherited by whoever takes office in August.

Valencia’s position is that hydrocarbon revenues are essential to Colombia’s macroeconomic stability and that the country cannot exit the sector before alternative revenue structures exist. Her platform actively encourages FDI in petroleum exploration, is open to regulated fracking, and commits to clearing the environmental licensing backlog that has stalled multiple large-scale gold and copper mining projects. For energy and mining companies currently blocked by administrative delays, this represents the most direct path to project advancement.

De la Espriella’s position goes further: essentially deregulating the environmental licensing process for major extraction projects on the grounds that Colombia’s economic sovereignty takes precedence over environmental restrictions he characterizes as externally imposed. The practical constraint is whether a De la Espriella administration would have the institutional coherence and congressional support to deliver regulatory rollback, given that his movement has no established political party structure and entered the race through an independent signature campaign.

Foreign Policy: Washington Alignment vs. Multipolar Strategy

Colombia’s relationship with the United States deteriorated materially under Petro, who aligned Colombia with Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro, pursued closer ties with China and Russia, and suspended extradition agreements. US counternarcotics cooperation was strained throughout the period.

Cepeda is committed to what he describes as a multipolar foreign policy — maintaining functional diplomatic channels with Washington and Brussels while deepening strategic and commercial relationships with China and Russia. His alignment with regional left-of-center governments in Mexico, Brazil, and Bolivia would position Colombia as part of a Latin American bloc that has grown increasingly skeptical of US regional leadership. For US companies operating in Colombia, this trajectory does not mean immediate operational disruption, but it reduces Colombia’s utility as a reliable counterpart on security cooperation, counter-narcotics intelligence sharing, and trade dispute resolution.

Valencia positions a return to the Western alignment as a core objective. She would prioritize restoring the US-Colombia relationship, reinforcing the bilateral Free Trade Agreement, and reestablishing intelligence-sharing mechanisms that were reduced under Petro. Her framing positions Colombia as a democratic anchor in a region experiencing authoritarian pressures.

De la Espriella takes the most explicit pro-US position in the race. La Silla Vacía reported that De la Espriella or entities linked to his campaign donated more than $90,000 USD to the US Republican Party, a fact that raises questions about the nature and expectations of those relationships. He has publicly aligned himself with the populist right in the United States, takes a hostile posture toward China, Russia, and Venezuela, and has characterized his security approach as consistent with a transactional alliance with Washington focused on counter-narcotics enforcement and cartel designation as foreign terrorist organizations.

“Ese pisco robó a 200 mil colombianos.” — Claudia López, former Mayor of Bogotá, referring to presidential candidate Abelardo de la Espriella’s legal representation of DMG pyramid scheme founder David Murcia Guzmán, during a presidential campaign event.

Corruption and Judicial Independence

All three candidates have stated commitments to fighting corruption, though their approaches and focal points differ in ways that are material to the institutional environment for business operations.

Cepeda’s legislative record includes serious, documented work investigating paramilitary infiltration of Colombia’s political institutions — the period known as parapolítica — and pursuing accountability for those cases. His blind spot, his critics argue, is corruption within the current administration. When Ecopetrol’s Ricardo Roa was formally charged in connection with Petro’s 2022 campaign, the response from the Pacto Histórico coalition was subdued. Cepeda has been Álvaro Uribe’s primary judicial antagonist in the Senate; a Cepeda administration would offer no institutional protection to Uribe and would be expected to support the full progress of judicial proceedings against him. For left-wing politicians facing legal exposure, including former Medellín mayor Daniel Quintero, a Cepeda administration would be expected to be more receptive to amnesty frameworks.

Valencia’s approach to anti-corruption is structural rather than prosecutorial: strengthening the independence of the Contraloría General de la República and the Fiscalía General de la Nación, implementing digital transparency in public procurement, and reducing informal executive influence over judicial processes. She would be expected to apply political and rhetorical pressure on behalf of Uribe — her political mentor and a close ally — though her legislative track record indicates a degree of institutional independence from Centro Democrático party orthodoxy.

De la Espriella’s anti-corruption rhetoric centers on severe criminal penalties for corrupt officials. The credibility of that position is complicated by his professional history, which is examined in detail below.

De la Espriella’s Legal Career: The Documented Record

De la Espriella’s campaign has faced sustained scrutiny over his client history as one of Colombia’s highest-profile criminal defense attorneys. The record is documented in reporting by El Colombiano, El Espectador, and the investigative outlet Corrupción al Día.

His documented client roster includes Salvatore Mancuso, the former supreme commander of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) paramilitary network; multiple legislators convicted in the parapolítica scandal, which established systematic infiltration of Colombia’s congress by paramilitary organizations; David Murcia Guzmán, the operator of the DMG pyramid scheme that defrauded an estimated 200,000 Colombian investors; the Nule Primos, convicted of large-scale public contract fraud; and Álex Saab, the Colombian businessman extradited to the United States on charges of acting as the primary money launderer for the Maduro government in Venezuela. According to Corrupción al Día, De la Espriella’s legal fees from Saab reportedly reached $12 million USD and included private aircraft travel.

De la Espriella’s response to this line of criticism rests on due process principles: that every accused person is entitled to vigorous legal defense regardless of the charges, and that his ability to navigate Colombia’s criminal code at its most complex levels demonstrates the expertise required to enforce the law from the executive branch. The argument has legal validity as a principle. The specific issue for foreign compliance officers and US government counterparts is the Saab representation: the same Nicolás Maduro whose regime De la Espriella’s campaign now characterizes as an ideological enemy received legal services from De la Espriella’s firm when the representation was commercially available.

The Fiscalía investigated De la Espriella in connection with alleged paramilitary links in 2009 and again in 2012; both investigations were dismissed for insufficient evidence, and he carries no convictions or active investigations on those matters.

Cepeda’s Family History and Ideological Background

Critics of Iván Cepeda, including Enrique Gómez of the Salvación Nacional party, have argued that his family background constitutes evidence of structural alignment with guerrilla movements. The record on this point merits examination.

Cepeda is the son of Manuel Cepeda Vargas, who served as Secretary-General of the Colombian Communist Party and as a senator for the Unión Patriótica (UP), a left-wing political movement that was systematically exterminated by a combination of state actors and paramilitary organizations during the 1980s and 1990s. Manuel Cepeda Vargas was assassinated on August 9, 1994. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights subsequently found the Colombian state responsible for his murder. The FARC-EP named its Frente Urbano Manuel Cepeda Vargas — an urban front operating within the Bloque Occidental — in the elder Cepeda’s honor.

The Fundación Paz y Reconciliación (PARES) has documented that Iván Cepeda’s relationship with his father’s political positions was more complex than the family lineage alone suggests. After studying in Bulgaria in 1981, Cepeda broke from his father’s Soviet-oriented communist framework and aligned with democratic leftists including Bernardo Jaramillo Ossa, who publicly rejected the FARC’s armed strategy. Cepeda has repeatedly stated his repudiation of the FARC’s use of his father’s name. No documented evidence connects him to operational coordination with current armed groups.

What the family history does establish is the ideological framework through which Cepeda processes security policy: a belief, grounded in personal and political experience, that the Colombian state’s institutional violence has been as destructive as guerrilla violence, and that negotiated settlements are structurally preferable to military solutions. That framework generates Paz Total. It also generates a posture toward ELN and FARC dissident negotiators that prioritizes process continuity over verified compliance — a disposition that armed groups have demonstrably exploited to maintain territorial and operational positions while negotiation frameworks provided legal cover.

Valencia and the Uribe Question

The comparison to former president Iván Duque (2018–2022) comes up regularly in discussions of Valencia’s political independence. Duque, who had limited independent political standing before Uribe selected him, was perceived throughout his term as governing within constraints set by his patron — a dynamic that Colombian political cartoonists characterized as ventriloquism.

Valencia’s profile differs materially. She is the granddaughter of former Colombian president Guillermo León Valencia, carries her own political lineage, and has served in the Senate for over a decade, building positions on agrarian reform, judicial modernization, and indigenous land rights that have placed her at variance with standard Centro Democrático positions on those issues. She won the Gran Consulta por Colombia primary on March 8 with more than 45% of the vote — over 3.2 million Colombians — establishing a democratic mandate distinct from any party endorsement.

She would be expected to use institutional and rhetorical channels to support Uribe in the ongoing judicial proceedings against him, and to apply pressure on the trajectory of those cases. Whether that constitutes political interference with judicial independence or normal advocacy within democratic norms is a question on which observers disagree. What the legislative record does not support is the characterization of Valencia as incapable of independent governance.

Press Freedom and the Media Environment

Press freedom carries an indirect but measurable correlation with rule-of-law quality, which in turn affects operational risk for companies that rely on regulatory predictability and transparent legal processes.

Cepeda has maintained a posture toward critical media that mirrors President Petro’s practice of characterizing adversarial outlets as acting in the interests of economic elites. Under Petro, this produced a systematic exclusion of critical media from official information flows and persistent rhetorical delegitimization of independent journalism, though the press remained legally free to operate. A Cepeda administration would be expected to continue this pattern.

Valencia’s background in Colombia’s traditional political and intellectual establishment, combined with a decade in a party that has faced sustained critical coverage from Colombia’s major outlets, points toward a conventional institutional relationship with the press — adversarial at times, but within professional norms.

De la Espriella’s conduct during the campaign provides direct evidence of his approach. He publicly called Caracol Noticias journalist María Lucía Fernández “ignorant” in a live interview. He issued a formal apology after journalist Laura Rodríguez of Piso 8 FM made allegations of inappropriate conduct. His campaign strategy has drawn comparisons to the approach of Argentine president Javier Milei and US president Donald Trump in its use of direct digital channels to circumvent traditional media while publicly attacking outlets that publish critical coverage. The press would remain legally protected under a De la Espriella administration, but the operational environment for investigative journalism would be hostile.

The Ideological Spectrum: Market Liberalism to State Direction

The question of which candidate is most aligned with free-market principles requires a distinction that the international business press frequently elides: the difference between economic deregulation and political authoritarianism. These can, and in this election do, exist independently.

De la Espriella’s platform is often described in international coverage as the most pro-market. His deregulation proposals for the extractive sector and his corporate tax rhetoric support that reading in the economic domain. His security platform, however, involves a substantial expansion of state coercive power: mass detention operations, a mega-prison construction program, and the suspension of standard due process protections to facilitate rapid incarceration of criminal suspects. The Cato Institute‘s framework of economic freedom as inseparable from civil liberties would categorize a state powerful enough to detain people without standard procedural protections as a state that represents an institutional risk to property rights and contract enforcement as well.

Valencia’s platform, anchored by Oviedo’s technocratic program of structural market reform — reduced administrative barriers, streamlined procurement, smaller state overhead, maintained civil liberties — represents the closest approximation to coherent market liberalism available in this field. It does not carry the rhetorical force of De la Espriella’s deregulation proposals, but it has more institutional grounding.

Cepeda’s platform is the furthest from market liberalism by any standard measure: state-directed investment allocation, wealth redistribution through tax and transfer mechanisms, state expansion in healthcare and pension administration, and agrarian land redistribution. His program is continuous with the Petro administration’s economic framework.

Minor Candidates: The Rest of the Ballot

Several other candidates remain on the ballot and are drawing small but potentially consequential vote shares in a first round where the margin between second and third place could be narrow.

Claudia López, former mayor of Bogotá running under the Con Claudia Imparables coalition, positions herself as a progressive centrist with a documented anti-corruption record. Her polling has not broken 3.5% in major surveys, and her high polarization ratings from her mayoral term limit her growth ceiling. Her attacks on De la Espriella during the campaign — she publicly called him a “defender of the mafia” in reference to his client history — have been among the most pointed in the race, and factually grounded on the public record.

Sergio Fajardo, making his third consecutive presidential run under Dignidad y Compromiso, continues to represent a technocratic, education-focused centrism grounded in his work transforming Medellín in the early 2000s. He has not broken 3.5% in any major poll in this cycle.

Roy Barreras, running under La Fuerza de la Paz following his Frente por la Vida primary victory, is one of the most experienced political operatives in Colombia, having been part of multiple coalition governments across ideological lines over two decades. He polls below the threshold for meaningful first-round impact.

Miguel Uribe Londoño, running under Partido Demócrata, represents a younger-generation conservative platform emphasizing fiscal discipline and private sector growth, broadly consistent with Valencia’s program. He also polls below 3.5%.

Carlos Caicedo, running on a regionalist platform emphasizing decentralization away from Bogotá, draws support primarily from the Costa Caribe. His structural argument about Colombia’s administrative over-centralization is substantively grounded, though his national profile is insufficient to affect the first-round outcome.

Investment Implications

For international capital with Colombian exposure, the three-way race produces three materially different operational scenarios.

A Cepeda victory — which remains the single most likely first-round outcome based on available polling — would signal continuity of the Petro-era regulatory framework: sustained capital outflow pressure, high corporate tax rates, no new fossil fuel exploration contracts for Ecopetrol (NYSE: EC; BVC: ECOPETROL) or private operators, continued labor cost escalation, and a foreign policy trajectory away from Washington. Colombian equity valuations would be expected to remain under pressure. The mining licensing backlog would continue to accumulate. A Cepeda administration would not replicate Venezuela’s economic trajectory — Colombia’s independent central bank, Banco de la República, its functioning constitutional court, and its institutional depth provide meaningful buffers — but the investment headwinds would be structural rather than cyclical.

A Valencia victory would represent the sharpest regulatory reversal available in this field. Ecopetrol exploration contracts would be expected to advance. The mining licensing backlog would be addressed. US bilateral relations would be restored, reactivating security intelligence cooperation and trade facilitation mechanisms. The Colombian peso would be expected to strengthen as country risk premium declined. The path to that outcome now requires her to either close the gap significantly on De la Espriella in the first round or rely on runoff polling that showed her as the stronger second-round candidate — data that predates the most recent polling shift.

A De la Espriella victory introduces the widest distribution of possible outcomes. The upside scenario involves Restrepo managing fiscal and trade policy competently, genuine regulatory rollback in the extractive sector, aggressive extradition resumption, and security operations that reduce the physical risk premium in conflict-affected departments including Cauca, Norte de Santander, and Chocó. The downside scenario involves recurring crises generated by De la Espriella’s personal conduct, conflicts of interest arising from his former client relationships, and authoritarian security measures that attract international human rights attention and complicate bilateral relationships. Restrepo’s presence on the ticket reduces the probability of the downside scenario but does not eliminate it.

The current polling trend indicates that right-wing voters are consolidating around De la Espriella at Valencia’s expense. Whether that consolidation produces a runoff between De la Espriella and Cepeda — and whether the runoff produces a left or right-wing government — remains uncertain. What the polling data does not support is the scenario, widely assumed until recently, of a Cepeda-Valencia runoff in which Valencia was positioned as the structurally stronger opposition candidate.

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As Colombia nears its presidential vote, two candidates have endorsed Iván Cepeda and eight others remain below 3.5% in polls

With less than two weeks remaining before Colombia’s presidential election, whose first round is scheduled for May 31, three candidates are concentrating most voter support and competing for access to the presidential palace, Casa de Nariño: ruling coalition senator Iván Cepeda, candidate of the left-wing Pacto Histórico party; senator Paloma Valencia, representing the right-wing Centro Democrático party; and lawyer and businessman Abelardo de la Espriella, a figure of Colombia’s far right.

Although 13 candidates will appear on the ballot, two contenders: Clara López and Luis Gilberto Murillo, withdrew their campaigns to support Cepeda, while the remaining candidates have failed to surpass 3.5% voter support in pre-elections polls, a figure close to the statistical margin of error.

If polling trends hold, no candidate is expected to secure the 50% plus one vote needed to win outright in the first round, making a runoff election on June 21, 2026, highly likely.

Cepeda has remained relatively stable in polls, with voter support ranging between 35% and 43%, effectively securing his place in a second round if trends continue.

The key question: Who will face Cepeda in a runoff?

The main electoral uncertainty centers on who will finish second and challenge the ruling coalition in a likely runoff.

Under Colombia’s electoral system, only the two candidates receiving the highest vote totals advance to the second round. The fragmentation of the political right has complicated efforts to consolidate support behind either Valencia or De la Espriella.

Polls suggest a competitive scenario. Valencia has registered between 14% and 21% voter support, while De la Espriella fluctuates between 16% and 24%, depending on the poll and methodology used.

The lack of unity between the two camps stems from both ideological differences and their political structures. Valencia is a member of the political party founded by former President Álvaro Uribe, while De la Espriella entered the race through an independent signature campaign, marking the first time Colombia’s far right has emerged as a viable contender for the presidency.

A campaign shaped by the absence of public debates

The presidential campaign has been marked by an unusual lack of debates among the leading candidates.

Cepeda has refused to participate in events organized by media outlets, arguing that proposed formats do not offer guarantees of neutrality or what he describes as “fair rules” established by news organizations.

As a result, part of the political confrontation has shifted to Congress, where both Cepeda and Valencia currently serve in the Senate.

Critics, however, have challenged Cepeda’s decision. Former Bogotá Mayor and presidential candidate Claudia López argued that his absence from debates reflects that “Cepeda does not want to take responsibility for the failures of Total Peace (Paz Total),” the negotiation policy with armed groups promoted by President Gustavo Petro, in which Cepeda played a key role as a lawmaker.

Instead of regular debates, the campaign has been dominated by disputes over media formats, digital presence, social media strategies and public controversies aimed at amplifying candidates’ visibility.

De la Espriella embraces confrontation

One of the candidates who has most effectively capitalized on the digital environment is Abelardo de la Espriella, whose political strategy has been compared to right-wing populist leadership styles such as those of Argentine President Javier Milei and US President Donald Trump.

In recent weeks, De la Espriella has faced several media controversies, including an incident involving journalist Laura Rodríguez of Piso 8 FM, for which he later apologized after accusations of inappropriate sexual conduct. He also clashed live on air with television presenter María Lucía Fernández of Caracol Noticias, whom he called “ignorant.”

Questions also emerged following reports by digital outlet La Silla Vacía regarding donations linked to the US Republican Party.

Despite the controversies, the strategy appears to be strengthening his electoral standing. An Atlas Intel poll for Semana magazine, published May 15, showed De la Espriella surpassing Valencia by a two-to-one margin for the first time, with 32.9% support compared with 16.7%.

However, the polling firm is currently under investigation by Colombia’s National Electoral Council (CNE) amid concerns over whether its methodology complies with national standards. If irregularities are confirmed, the firm could face suspension of its operations in Colombia.

Valencia seeks to broaden support toward the political center

Meanwhile, Valencia has sought to expand her electoral base by shifting strategically toward the political center.

As part of that effort, on May 17 she officially introduced her proposal “Mámá No Está Sola (Mom Is Not Alone),” aimed at female heads of household and focused on access to credit, employment and housing property. The proposal also includes a promise to deliver 1 million homes prioritized for women community leaders.

Valencia’s candidacy also marks a historic first for Colombia’s political right: it is the first time a major conservative party has nominated a woman for president.

Her vice presidential running mate, former Bogotá councilman Juan Daniel Oviedo, has openly identified as a member of the LGBTQ+ community, a move that represents a significant shift for the Centro Democrático traditionally conservative electorate.

Colombia appears headed for a runoff

With a highly fragmented field and no signs of consolidation among right-wing candidates, Colombia appears increasingly likely to hold a presidential runoff on June 21, 2026.

Barring a major shift in polling trends, the contest seems set to come down to Iván Cepeda and whichever opposition candidate manages to emerge from an increasingly competitive battle within Colombia’s political right.

Hundreds of cars briefly blocked all three lanes of Avenida La Esmeralda in the center of Bogotá on Sunday afternoon as supporters of hard-right Abelardo de la Espriella gathered to show their support for his candidacy two weeks before the presidential elections kick off.

De la Espriella himself was campaigning in Valledupar, but his campaign called for Abelardistas in over 70 municipalities around the country to come out and show their support by convening a noisy caravan.

While many Colombian families relaxed in neighboring Parque Simón Bolívar, a few hundred die-hard supporters of the far-right populist showman answered the call.

The hallmark of de la Espriella’s campaign for the presidency is its promotion of sincere patriotic fervour, and this passion was very much on display.

Colombian flags and football jerseys, vallenato, vuvuzelas, balloons and the words “Firme por la Patria” (Steadfast for the Homeland) abounded.

While the lanes filled up, the self-titled Defensores de la Patria (Defenders of the Homeland) honked their horns, danced, took photos, chatted and saluted one another. Some applied camouflage paint to their faces to get in character.

Vendors were selling Colombia flags and mango biche while children danced to songs hailing El Tigre’s achievements and virtues.

Speaking to The Bogotá Post, some of those present said they were attracted to de la Espriella as an aspirational figure who makes them feel proud to be Colombian. Others are attracted by his personal values. 

For Adriana, waving her flag in the middle of the road, “it is very important that he is a family man, he works hard for his family, he takes his family with him everywhere, and they are very close.”

She believes young people turn to crime because they lack the pride and self-confidence to make something of themselves, describing Abelardo as the kind of role model who could “inspire young people to make a positive contribution to society.”

Others had come along to demonstrate their implacable opposition to a government led by Iván Cepeda, the left-wing candidate currently leading in the polls.

Aron, wearing a baseball cap emblazoned with de la Espriella’s face, is saluting passersby. He explained his view that, “Petro is a socialist, but Cepeda is a communist. Petro is progressive, but Cepeda wants to completely change the country. He doesn’t believe in private property.”

His friend, Doris, added that, “Cepeda will take us down the path of Venezuela.”

Time and again participants reported that they believe Abelardo will bring freedom to Colombia. 

For some, that meant freedom of speech, which they feel has been curtailed under Petro.

For others, freedom meant freedom from crime and corruption, which Abelardo will end by “ruling with an iron fist.”

For yet others, freedom meant an end to economic regulations that they see as inhibiting economic competition.

Everyone who spoke to The Bogotá Post said Colombia needed “saving” from something – which varied from person to person – and that Abelardo was that “savior”.

One man even said, “If we don’t win, they will have stolen it from us.” Accounts affiliated to de la Espriella’s campaign have been disseminating fake polling that shows him winning 86% of the vote. 

Nevertheless, his supporters are pragmatic enough to vote tactically. Every person I spoke to admitted they would vote for right-wing Paloma Valencia in the second round, if Abelardo does not get through, in order to keep Cepeda from power. After an hour of stationary honking, the convoy, led by an enormous dumpster truck, set off on its tour of the city, and the mango biche sellers drifted back into the park.

The post Inside a pro-Abelardo de la Espriella rally in Bogotá appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

Despite 13 campaigns underway, only five candidates’ poll above 2.5% in voter intention

Colombia is heading toward the first round of presidential elections on May 31, 2026, with 13 candidates in the race, in a scenario marked by political fragmentation and a strong concentration of voter support among a few contenders.

The next president will take office on August 7, following the end of President Gustavo Petro’s term, marking the transition from the country’s first left-wing government in recent history.

According to pre-election polls, only five candidates exceed 2% in voter intention, leaving most with limited chances of reaching the presidential palace. Among the leading contenders are Iván Cepeda, the candidate of the ruling Pacto Histórico, who leads polls with between 35% and 43% support; right-wing candidate Abelardo de la Espriella, with between 16% and 24%; and Paloma Valencia of the Centro Democrático party, with between 14% and 21%.

A second group includes centrist candidates Claudia López, polling between 3% and 4%, and Sergio Fajardo, at around 2.5%, reflecting a fragmented vote within that political segment.

Vice presidential picks shape campaign strategies

As the campaign unfolds, candidates have selected their running partners as a key strategy to broaden their electoral appeal.

Iván Cepeda has chosen Aida Quilcué, an Indigenous Nasa leader from southwestern Colombia, reinforcing the campaign’s leftist profile and its emphasis on including historically marginalized communities in political decision-making.

Quilcué has served as a governor and Indigenous authority in her community and, like Cepeda, is a victim of Colombia’s armed conflict: her husband was killed by state agents in 2008. She has been affiliated with the Regional Indigenous Council of Cauca (CRIC) and the National Indigenous Organization of Colombia (ONIC). She presents herself publicly as an Indigenous leader, human rights defender and senator (2022–2026), without reporting formal higher education credentials.

Abelardo de la Espriella has selected former Finance, and Commerce, Industry and Tourism Minister, Juan Manuel Restrepo, as his running mate, forming a ticket focused on security and economic strengthening. “That is a capability I have because I understand productivity, competitiveness and economic development,” Restrepo told La Silla Vacía during his registration.

Restrepo is an economist with a specialization in finance from Rosario University, a master’s degree in economics from the London School of Economics, a specialization in senior management from INALDE Business School, and a doctorate in higher education leadership from the University of Bath. He has also served as rector of three major universities in Colombia.

Juan Daniel Oviedo, a former Bogotá city councilor, is running alongside Paloma Valencia of the Centro Democrático party. As economist from Universidad del Rosario, Oviedo holds a master’s degree in mathematical economics and econometrics and a Ph.D. in economics from the University of Toulouse in France.

He previously served as head of Colombia’s National Statistics Agency (DANE) during the Iván Duque administration and ran for mayor of Bogotá in 2023.

His vice presidential bid gained momentum after securing more than 1.2 million votes in the March 8 inter-party primary, finishing second. His selection aims to attract centrist and center-right voters and strengthen Valencia’s chances of advancing to a potential runoff.

However, his nomination has sparked controversy, as it marks the first time the right-wing party has chosen a candidate with liberal positions on issues such as women’s rights and LGBTQ+ rights.

Claudia López selected Leonardo Huerta, a university professor of law and philosophy, as her running mate. According to Spain’s El País, he comes from “a working middle-class family,” is the youngest of four siblings, and is married with two children.

Huerta is a lawyer from Universidad Libre and holds a degree in philosophy from the Technological University of Pereira. He has a master’s degree in administrative law and is a doctoral candidate in law. His public sector experience includes serving as education secretary in Pereira and as a deputy ombudsman for health issues during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020.

Sergio Fajardo selected Edna Bonilla as his running mate, reinforcing a campaign centered on education and dialogue. Bonilla previously served as Bogotá’s education secretary during Claudia López’s administration (2020–2023).

She is a public accountant from the National University of Colombia, holds a tax specialization from Externado University and a doctorate in political studies. During the campaign launch, Fajardo said: “We will work together to deliver the serious and safe change Colombia needs. To move beyond polarization and build bridges instead of trenches.”

Voter participation

According to Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil, which oversees elections, a total of 41,421,973 citizens are eligible to vote in Colombia and abroad in the first round of the presidential election. Of these, 21,298,492 are women and 20,123,481 are men.

If no candidate secures more than 50% of the vote, a runoff election will be held on June 21, 2026, between the top two candidates.

With just over a month to go before Colombia’s May 31 presidential election, a new Invamer poll suggests the race has narrowed to three viable contenders, as left-wing senator Iván Cepeda strengthens his lead and two right-wing rivals battle for a place in the runoff.

The survey, conducted for Noticias Caracol and Blu Radio, shows Cepeda commanding 44.3% of voting intention, a significant jump from 37.1% in February. The Pacto Histórico candidate has not only consolidated support among core voters but expanded his appeal across all regions, with particularly strong gains among younger voters aged 20 to 30.

Trailing behind, but still within striking distance of a second-round berth, are Abelardo de la Espriella with 21.5% and Paloma Valencia with 19.8%. While De la Espriella has posted modest gains since February, Valencia has emerged as the fastest-rising candidate, nearly doubling her support from 10% in the previous poll.

The data underscores a central dynamic shaping the race: a fragmented right competing for a single runoff slot, even as the left coalesces behind a dominant frontrunner. According to the data, as long as the right remains divided, any division among the pro-Uribe camps will continue to benefit Cepeda. Unless there is a clear consolidation after May 31, the numbers suggest the second round will be a contest over who faces the hard-leftist and not whether he gets to the final run-off.

The collapse of Colombia’s political center has been equally striking. Former Bogotá mayor Claudia López has seen her support plunge from 11.7% to 3.6%, while former Medellín mayor Sergio Fajardo has dropped from 6.6% to just 2.5%. Both candidates have lost more than half of their previous backing and now poll well below the 4% threshold required for state reimbursement of campaign expenses.

López’s decline appears particularly acute in urban constituencies, where she previously drew strong support, including among progressive and LGBTQ voters, pointing to a broader erosion of her core base. Fajardo, meanwhile, continues to struggle to regain traction, reflecting persistent voter dissatisfaction with centrist alternatives.

Analysts are also seeing how centrist voters are shifting toward Valencia, whose ticket includes former DANE statistics chief Juan Daniel Oviedo as the vice-presidential option. Oviedo appears to be decisive in broadening Valencia’s appeal beyond the Centro Democrático base.

Despite Cepeda’s commanding first-round lead, runoff scenarios suggest a more competitive contest – particularly if Valencia secures the second spot. In a hypothetical second round between Cepeda and De la Espriella, the left-wing candidate would win with 54.6% against 42.6%. However, against Valencia, the margin narrows significantly to 51.2% versus 46.6%.

That tightening gap reflects Valencia’s growing ability to attract support beyond her base, including voters from the political center and segments of the undecided electorate. According to the poll, she outperforms De la Espriella in capturing second-choice preferences, positioning her as the more competitive challenger in a potential runoff.

When respondents were asked who they would support if their first-choice candidate failed to advance, Cepeda led with 26.7%, followed closely by Valencia at 25.7%, with De la Espriella trailing at 19.8%. López and Fajardo lagged further behind, reinforcing their diminished relevance in the race.

Cepeda’s dominance, however, is not without warning signs. While he continues to lead comfortably, his projected runoff margins have narrowed compared to earlier surveys, particularly against Valencia. The erosion suggests that while his base remains solid, opposition voters may be coalescing more effectively than before.

For now, the trajectory is clear. Cepeda has gained ground nationally despite a worsening security situation and poll conducted before the terrorist bomb on Saturday, April 25 by FARC dissidents along the Pan-American highway in which 20 persons were killed.

With less than a month until Colombians head to the polls, the race appears increasingly defined not by a crowded field, but by a three-way struggle – one frontrunner and two challengers vying for the chance to stop him.

Bogotá, Colombia – Leftist presidential candidate Iván Cepeda challenged his opponents to a debate on Saturday after turning down previous proposals to face-off with his rivals.

“I challenge the far right, its two candidates – Senator Paloma Valencia and lawyer Abelardo de la Espriella – to a debate,” Cepeda told a crowd at a rally in Fusagasugá, a city near Bogotá. 

His opponents responded by accepting the proposal, while also highlighting that they had been calling for a debate for months.

The possibility of a live face-off between candidates has been a recurring theme ahead of first-round presidential elections on May 31.

Shortly after beginning his candidacy last year, Cepeda dismissed the idea of participating in a debate: “I’m not going to take part in debates—let me make this clear from the outset—to exchange insults with other candidates, or to threaten one another, or to denigrate one another.”

Cepeda’s rivals have repeatedly criticized him for refusing to spar with them on the public stage, something they highlighted following the leftist candidate’s U-turn on Saturday.

“Allow me to correct you: you’re not issuing a challenge; you’re accepting the challenge you were invited to take up months ago,” said criminal defense attorney de la Espriella.

Valencia, the candidate for the Centro Democrático (Democratic Center) party, also seized the opportunity to pounce on Cepeda: “A few weeks ago, it was I who challenged Iván Cepeda several times to a face-to-face debate, yet you chose to hide away in the Senate with a controlled microphone.”

She suggested that Cepeda’s U-turn owes to a worsening performance in recent polls: “Now that the polls are tightening, you’re coming out of Fusagasugá with this challenge.”

Analysts agreed with Valencia’s suggestion, saying that Cepeda’s debate proposal is an attempt to inject life into a stagnating campaign. 

“Cepeda has offered to debate because of his campaign’s inherent lack of momentum and general weakness. He is not captivating any new voters or finding a tangible way of changing the narrative in his favor,” Sergio Guzmán, Director at Colombia Risk Analysis, a political risk consultancy, told Latin America Reports. 

Internal party polls reportedly show sluggish growth in Cepeda’s polling numbers since he became the official candidate for the Pacto Histórico (Historic Pact) in October. 

Meanwhile, Valencia has been soaring in the polls following her victory in presidential primaries in March; Cepeda and de la Espriella did not partake.

But the debate is not without risk for Cepeda, according to Guzmán: “Cepeda runs the risk of having to go on the defensive of Petro and his administration.”

Others believe that Cepeda’s oratory style does not lend itself to the televised debate format.

“He has a much more academic tendency, which is not so typical in politics, let alone in modern politics,” noted Miguel Jaramillo Luján, a Colombian political strategist. In contrast, he noted that de la Espriella and Valencia have a more media-savvy communication style.

Nevertheless, the analyst told Latin America Reports that Cepeda’s debate style could give him the chance to woo crucial centrist voters: “I believe he can inspire confidence and credibility among his target audience and even among the centre, particularly when it comes to dispelling certain myths and lies that have been spread by the centre and the right.”

With the leading candidates agreeing to debate, the battle over the specifics – including moderators, questions, and location – begins. 

The post Colombia elections: candidates set for debate after Cepeda backtracks appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

On Wednesday, the Universidad de la Sabana and the National Federation of Departments (FND) hosted the Governors’ Summit, a rare event that convened almost all of the frontrunners in Colombia’s presidential race.

Paloma Valencia, Abelardo de la Espriella, Sergio Fajardo, Roy Barreras, and Claudia López fielded questions from regional authorities about how they planned to tackle problems in Colombia’s provinces.

While Iván Cepeda, the leftist favorite, was scheduled to attend, his team pulled out at the last minute, fuelling the candidate’s reputation for being media-shy.

Early on Wednesday morning, governors and their aides began filtering into the heavily policed event in Chía, a municipality north of Bogotá.

The FND selected questions from governors which were then posed to candidates by the two moderators: El Tiempo Director Andrés Mompotes and his counterpart at radio station La FM, Juan Lozano.

The main themes of the day were tackling insecurity and armed groups, investing in regional development, and mechanisms to improve provincial representation.

For some governors, the event was an opportunity to redress an acute crisis; Erasmo Zuleta, who heads the local government in Córdoba, used the forum to highlight the ongoing effects of disastrous floods which began earlier this year.

“The emergency didn’t pass, nor did the tragedy. The floodwaters receded, leaving behind widespread damage; they took lives, homes, crops, and material possessions,” Zuleta told The Bogotá Post.

“Now more than ever, we need greater solidarity to recover from the damage,” continued the Governor, in a bid for help from the national government.

Another recurring theme was prison reform, following a recent scandal over a concert that took place in the Itagüí prison in Antioquia.

Abelardo de la Espriella, the firebrand criminal defense attorney and right-wing frontrunner, used the opportunity to push his tough-on-crime proposal.

“In Colombia, there are no prisons—there are universities of crime,” said de la Espriella, who took aim at the National Penitentiary and Prison Institute (INPEC), which he described as “a den of thieves.”

The candidate added that Colombia should look to El Salvador to develop its incarceration model, praising dictator Nayib Bukele’s draconian mass imprisonment efforts that have dramatically reduced crime and drawn condemnation from rights’ groups.

Security, more broadly, was also high on the agenda, as Colombia grapples with a surge in violence related to illegal armed groups.

“Today we are living in the grip of insecurity. They want to drag us back into the abyss we thought we had left behind,” railed Paloma Valencia, the candidate for the right-wing Centro Democrático (Democratic Center) party. 

Fears of insecurity affecting democratic processes have overshadowed the elections, with the United Nations issuing a warning earlier this year that armed groups could disrupt the vote.

The Valle del Cauca department has been one of the most heavily affected by the armed conflict, with its capital, Cali, rocked by a wave of bomb attacks by rebel groups in the past year. 

But its Governor, Dilian Francisca Toro, offered reassurances in conversation with The Bogotá Post: “We ensure that in every municipality and across all regions, law enforcement is present so that we can have free, democratic elections where there is no restriction whatsoever on the ability to vote.”

Toro also cited the elections on March 8 as an example of the success of security planning: “In Valle del Cauca we really had very peaceful elections, and now, God willing, we will have them again.”

Amid the mounting threat by armed groups, candidates De la Espriella and Valencia vow an iron fist, using military force to crush rebel forces. They model themselves after former right-wing President Álvaro Uribe (2002-2010), who teamed up with the U.S. to launch a total war on the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). 

But leftist Iván Cepeda highlights the human rights abuses perpetrated by the government during that period, in which thousands of innocent civilians lost their lives. He proposes to continue the current administration’s Paz Total – or Total Peace – policy of negotiating with armed groups.

But Cepeda missed the opportunity to make his case to the public, fuelling criticism by his opponents.

De la Espriella has repeatedly called on Cepeda to agree to a debate, but the leftist candidate has yet to accept.

With less than two months before the May 31st election, there are increasingly few opportunities for the candidates to make their case before the public.

The post Colombia presidential candidates appear in Governors’ Summit appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

Credit downgrade is an indictment of the Petro administration’s fiscal management, including suspension of the fiscal rule.

On April 8, 2026, S&P Global Ratings (NYSE: SPGI) lowered its long-term foreign currency sovereign credit rating on Colombia to BB- from BB and its long-term local currency rating to BB from BB+. The outlook for both ratings is stable, reflecting expectations that the Government of Colombia will gradually reduce its fiscal deficit while sustaining moderate growth in the national gross domestic product.

The rating action follows persistent fiscal imbalances and a policy environment that has become less predictable since the pandemic-related recession. The government decision to suspend the national fiscal rule in 2025 marked a significant shift in the policy framework. Pro-cyclical fiscal policies have provided marginal support for employment and consumption, but have also contributed to higher inflation expectations and a wider current account deficit. S&P expects the general government fiscal deficit to reach 5.6% of the national gross domestic product in 2026, compared to 5.3% in 2025.

“We expect Colombia to have consistently large fiscal deficits over the next few years.” — S&P Global Ratings

Institutional stability remains a key factor in the rating, though challenges persist. A fragmented legislature followed the March 2026 elections, where Pacto Histórico and Centro Democrático emerged with the largest minorities. The upcoming presidential election, scheduled for May 31, 2026, adds further uncertainty. Candidates such as Iván Cepeda of Pacto Histórico, Paloma Valencia, and Abelardo de la Espriella have proposed varying approaches to fiscal consolidation. The new administration will inherit spending pressures related to domestic security, rising healthcare costs, and pension payments linked to minimum wage increases.

The Banco de la República, the independent central bank of the country, has maintained a tight monetary policy to combat inflationary pressures. Annual inflation reached 5.3% in February 2026, prompting the bank to increase reference rates to 11.25%. S&P anticipates that inflation will not return to the target range of 3% +/- 1% until early 2029. While the independent status of the central bank provides a buffer against external shocks, high interest rates and lower-than-expected revenue collections have contributed to the widening deficit since 2024.

Economic growth is projected at 2.5% for 2026, slightly below the 2.6% recorded in 2025. Per capita growth is estimated at $9,900 USD for 2026, with real growth expected to average just above 2% through 2029. Despite being a net energy exporter, the performance of the US economy and international energy prices continue to influence national outcomes. Hydrocarbon exports declined to 35% of goods exports in 2025, down from 67% in 2013, showing some diversification even as the sector remains a primary source of volatility.

Net general government debt is forecast to approach 66% of the national gross domestic product by 2029, rising from 60.4% in 2025. S&P notes that the government interest burden will average 12.3% of general government revenue over the next three years. The shift toward issuing shorter-term debt instruments has reduced reported interest payments but increased vulnerability to interest rate fluctuations. External indicators remain a concern, with narrow net external debt expected to stabilize at 130% of current account receipts through 2029. Foreign direct investment is expected to be the primary source for funding the current account deficit, which is projected to stabilize around 2.6% of the national gross domestic product.

Vise photo credit © Loren Moss

Though surprises are possible, polling says the front runners are Iván Cepeda, Abelardo de la Espriella, and Paloma Valencia.

The Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil of Colombia (RNEC), the entity responsible for organizing elections in the country, reported that a total of 14 candidates have officially registered to run in the country’s presidential elections, scheduled for May 31, 2026. In this vote, citizens will elect the President and Vice President of the Republic for the 2026–2030 term.

According to the electoral authority, the candidates represent a wide range of political perspectives, from left to right, including independent candidacies running through political movements. Here the list and brief profile of the candidates:

1. Clara Eugenia López Obregón, currently a senator for the Esperanza Democrática She has served as Minister of Labor (2016–2017), acting mayor of Bogotá (2011–2012), and Bogotá’s secretary of government (2008–2010). She has been affiliated with left-wing parties and was Gustavo Petro’s vice presidential running mate in the 2010 election.
2. Óscar Mauricio Lizcano, from the FAMILIA coalition. He served as Minister of Information Technologies (2023–2025), was a senator (2010–2018), and a member of the House of Representatives (2006–2010).
3. Raúl Santiago Botero, candidate of the “Romper el Sistema” movement (Break the Establishment). An agronomist engineer and businessman from Medellín, he presents himself as an independent candidate with no prior political experience.
4. Miguel Uribe Londoño, father of the slain presidential candidate Miguel Uribe Turbay. He is running under the Colombian Democratic Party and previously served as president of the Centro Democrático party founded by Álvaro Uribe Vélez.
5. Sondra Macollins Garvin, from the movement “La Abogada de Hierro” (The Iron Lawyer) A criminal lawyer and psychologist, she presents herself as an independent candidate without political affiliations. She ran for the House of Representatives in 2022 and is known for her work in narcotrafficking and corruption cases.
6. Iván Cepeda Castro, a senator since 2014 and the official candidate of the Pacto Histórico, the same party as President Gustavo Petro. Polls project he will receive the highest vote share in the first election round. He is aligned with left-wing political ideas.
7. Abelardo de la Espriella, a lawyer with far-right positions, running for the first time under the Defensores de la Patria movement. Recent polls place him as a likely second or third contender in voter preference.
8. Claudia López Hernández, former mayor of Bogotá (2020–2023) and former senator (2014–2018), running under the centrist movement “Imparables con Claudia.” She is known for her anti-corruption agenda and secured her candidacy with more than 570,000 votes (about 9%) in recent interparty primaries.
9. Paloma Valencia Laserna, current senator and candidate of the Centro Democrático party led by Álvaro Uribe Vélez. She won the right-wing interparty primary on March 8 with more than 3 million votes. Polls place her among the top three contenders, and if she reaches a runoff, she would become the first woman in Colombia’s history to do so.

• Sergio Fajardo Valderrama, an academic and mathematician running for the Dignidad y Compromiso He served as mayor of Medellín and governor of Antioquia and is running for president for the third time.
• Roy Barreras, from the political party La Fuerza (The Force). He won the left-wing coalition primary on March 8 with the lowest vote total (257,000 votes, about 3.6%). Although currently aligned with left-wing movements and part of the Petro administration, he has previously been affiliated with right- and center-leaning parties.
• Gustavo Matamoros Camacho, of the Colombian Ecologist Party. He served in the Colombian Army for 43 years. With no prior political experience, his campaign focuses on public security.
• Luis Gilberto Murillo, who served as Minister of Foreign Affairs (2024–2025) and Colombia’s ambassador to the United States (2022–2024). A human rights advocate and Afro-Colombian leader from Chocó, he presents himself as an independent, moderate, centrist candidate.
• Carlos Eduardo Caicedo, running under the independent movement “Con Caicedo.” He was mayor of Santa Marta (2012–2015) and governor of Magdalena (2020–2023), where he built a strong base as a left-wing political leader.

The RNEC also reported that “the draw to determine the position of presidential candidates on the ballot will take place on March 25 at the Ágora Bogotá Convention Center.”

This process marks the formal start of the final phase of the presidential campaign, during which candidates will seek to consolidate support ahead of the first round on May 31. If no candidate secures an absolute majority, a runoff between the two leading candidates will be held on June 21.

Headline photo: Polling station in Colombia during last Congress elections in March 8, 2026. Photo courtesy of the Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil.

The new members of Congress will take office on July 20, the official start of the new legislative term.

On March 8, Colombia elected the Congress that will exercise legislative authority during the 2026–2030 term. From more than 3,200 candidates, voters chose the 102 senators (upper house) and 182 members of the House of Representatives (lower house) who will make up the country’s legislative branch.

According to preliminary reports from the Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil (RNEC), with 98.4% of polling stations counted, equivalent to 19,220,365 votes tallied, the new Congress has been defined electorally, however, it should be noted that these seat projections correspond to the official preliminary count, which still must go through several formal procedures before the final results are certified.

How the Senate Race is Shaping Up?

The Pacto Histórico, the party of current President Gustavo Petro, obtained around 22% of the vote (4,402,601), which would allow it to increase its representation from 20 senators in the current legislature to approximately 25 seats in the next term.

In second place is the Centro Democrático, the party of former President Álvaro Uribe, with about 15% of the vote (3,020,459), potentially increasing its representation from 13 to 17 seats.

The Partido Liberal would rank third with 13 seats (2,268,658 votes). It would be followed by the Alianza por Colombia, led by the Green Party, with 10 seats (1,899,096 votes), and the Partido Conservador, also with 10 seats (1,859,493 votes).

Other wins in the Senate include Party of La U (9 seats), Cambio Radical (7), the Ahora Colombia coalition (5), which backs presidential candidate Sergio Fajardo, and Salvación Nacional (4), the movement of presidential candidate Abelardo de la Espriella. The two remaining seats correspond to the special indigenous constituency.

In terms of losses in representation, the Partido Conservador would be the most affected, losing five of its current 15 seats. Cambio Radical would lose four, the Greens three, La U two, while Liberals and Ahora Colombia would each lose one seat.

Among the prominent figures who would be left out of the new Senate is former President Álvaro Uribe, who occupied position number 25 on his party’s list and would not obtain a seat if the Centro Democrático secures only 17 seats. Green Party senator Angélica Lozano, known for promoting legislation related to transparency, would also lose her seat.

Likewise, movements such as the coalition that supported Juan Daniel Oviedo and the Partido Oxígeno, led by former presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt, who was kidnapped for years by the now-defunct FARC guerrilla group, would fail to surpass the minimum threshold required to obtain Senate representation (3% of the total vote).

On the other hand, the performance of the Salvación Nacional movement, led by presidential candidate Abelardo de la Espriella, stands out. In its first participation in a congressional election, the party would surpass the electoral threshold and secure four senators.

What About the House of Representatives?

The allocation of seats in the House of Representatives follows a different process from that of the Senate, making it difficult to project the final distribution in the early stages of the vote count.

This is because the calculation is conducted department by department, once the RNEC determines the seat allocation formula and electoral quotient in each of the 32 States and the Capital District of Bogotá.

According to report number 45 from the RNEC, with 99.03% of votes counted, the main parties have obtained the following preliminary nationwide results:

• Centro Democrático: 2,551,706 votes.
• Partido Liberal: 2,101,877 votes.
• Partido Conservador: 1,967,996 votes.
• La U: 1,044,778 votes.
• Pacto Histórico: 913,990 votes.
• Cambio Radical: 803,721 votes.
• Alianza Verde: 654,071 votes.
• Salvación Nacional: 436,365 votes.

Because the House of Representatives elections involve parties, movements, and coalitions with strong local and regional influence, several smaller political organizations are expected to win seats, as they must surpass regional thresholds rather than a national one.

The Highlight: a Fragmented Congress that Will Require Coalitions

With the preliminary distribution of seats in both the Senate and the House of Representatives, projections suggest that Colombia’s next president will need to govern through legislative coalitions, as has occurred under President Gustavo Petro and his predecessors.

Presidential candidates Iván Cepeda, of the Pacto Histórico, and Paloma Valencia, of the Centro Democrático, would begin the next political phase with the largest congressional blocs, although neither would have enough seats to govern alone.

Traditional parties such as the Liberal, Conservador, Cambio Radical, and La U, which together could account for more than 40% of the new congress, have not yet decided which presidential candidate they will support, a situation similar to what occurred in the previous election. These parties could therefore become kingmakers, capable of facilitating, or blocking, governability depending on the alliances and coalitions they choose to form.

For that reason, the coming weeks are expected to be marked by intense political negotiations, as presidential contenders attempt to build alliances that would allow them to secure legislative support.

For candidates such as Sergio Fajardo, whose Ahora Colombia coalition would obtain only five senators, or Abelardo de la Espriella, whose Salvación Nacional movement would have four, the challenge will be significantly greater.

Above photo: Polling station during Colombia’s congressional elections. Photo courtesy of the Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil.

Colombia’s presidential race has entered a new phase following the interparty primaries held on March 8. Three major coalitions selected their candidates ahead of the first round scheduled for May 31: Paloma Valencia (48 years) will represent the right, Claudia López (56) the center, and Roy Barreras (62) a segment of the left.

They will join three candidates who did not participate in the primaries because they already hold the official endorsement of their parties: Iván Cepeda (63) of the Pacto Histórico (left), Sergio Fajardo (69) of Dignidad y Compromiso (center), and Abelardo de la Espriella (47) of the Salvación Nacional (far right).

Beyond their immediate results, Colombia’s interparty primaries typically serve two main purposes: reducing the number of contenders and selecting the flagbearers of each coalition, while also measuring the electoral strength of political figures ahead of potential negotiations among parties and candidates. With 99% of polling stations counted, and preliminary results rapidly released by the Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil, several political consequences of the vote are already emerging.

Paloma Valencia to Lead the Uribista Right

The right-wing consultation brought together nine candidates from different center-right and conservative currents. One of its main goals was to secure a strong turnout that could consolidate the sector in public opinion and counter the rise of far-right candidate Abelardo de la Espriella, who seeks to capture a portion of Colombia’s traditional conservative electorate.

The winner was Senator Paloma Valencia, who has campaigned nationwide alongside former President Álvaro Uribe Vélez, the leading figure of the Centro Democrático party.

Although polls had already projected her victory, the surprise was the scale of the result. With 99% of polling stations counted, Valencia secured 3,212,528 votes, representing more than 45% of the total votes cast across the three primaries.

She now faces three major challenges. The first will be unifying the right behind her candidacy and preventing conservative voters from drifting toward De la Espriella. In this context, the selection of her vice-presidential running mate will be crucial.

Among the names circulating is Juan Daniel Oviedo (48), a former Bogotá city councilor who unexpectedly finished second in the consultation with more than 1,200,00 votes, despite his well-known ideological differences with the Uribista movement.

The second challenge is symbolic: no woman has ever reached the second round of Colombia’s presidential election, making it difficult to break that historical barrier even with the political backing of Uribe, who still maintains strong favorability ratings.

Finally, Valencia will attempt to channel the anti-Petro vote, capitalizing on public dissatisfaction with the policies of President Gustavo Petro and his close political ally Iván Cepeda, who currently appears as the frontrunner in most polls for both the first and second rounds.

The Center Cools Around Claudia López

With 99% of votes counted, the centrist consultation recorded the lowest turnout among the three coalitions. Former Bogotá mayor Claudia López received more than 572,000 votes, representing just 8.14% of the total, well below polling projections that placed her above 12%.

For López, the result follows a long campaign that began more than a year ago, during which she sought to challenge Sergio Fajardo, the former mayor of Medellín who already holds the endorsement of the Dignidad y Compromiso party.

The key question now is her next political move: whether to remain in the presidential race or eventually join forces with Fajardo, whose polling numbers also remain modest, hovering around 5%.

The weak result may reflect the fragmentation of Colombia’s political center, often criticized for positions perceived as moderate or ambiguous. It may also indicate that Juan Daniel Oviedo attracted part of the centrist electorate within the right-wing consultation.

In any case, the outcome suggests the presidential campaign could once again polarize around two main narratives: “with Petro,” led by Iván Cepeda and the Pacto Histórico, or “against Petro,” a space still contested between Paloma Valencia and Abelardo de la Espriella.

Roy Barreras Wins the Left Consultation, but Momentum Favors Cepeda

In Roy Barreras’s case, two key factors appear to have contributed to his limited result. First was his decision to maintain a primary that many within the left considered unnecessary, given that much of the progressive sector had already rallied behind Iván Cepeda.

Second is his long political trajectory across multiple governments and ideological camps, from the right to the left, which has led some voters to view him as a traditional establishment politician.

With 99% of votes counted, Barreras secured just over 255,000 votes, less than 4% of the total. During the campaign, Barreras had stated he expected to surpass 1,500,000 votes in order to negotiate a stronger position within the left-wing coalition. Following these results, his most likely option may be withdrawing his candidacy and endorsing Cepeda, signaling unity within the progressive camp.

Other Highlights from the Electoral Day

One of the most striking outcomes was the performance of Juan Daniel Oviedo, who finished second among the 18 candidates participating in the primaries with 1,251,428 votes. With this electoral capital, Oviedo has become one of the most sought-after figures for potential alliances.

His political alignment remains uncertain. It is unclear whether he will fully integrate into Paloma Valencia’s campaign and the Centro Democrático, with whom he has ideological differences, or attempt to move closer to the weakened political center.

Unlike many traditional politicians, Oviedo has built a relatively short but distinctive political career based on his technocratic profile, his experience in economic policy, and his attempt to position himself outside the traditional Petro-Uribe political divide.

Meanwhile, journalist Vicky Dávila (52), who has run a campaign with populist elements inspired by figures such as Javier Milei in Argentina and Donald Trump in the United States, received more than 236,000 votes, around 3.3% of the total, leaving her with limited negotiating leverage.

A similar outcome affected Daniel Quintero (45), the former mayor of Medellín, who received just over 226,000 votes (around 3.2%), with his campaign likely hurt by controversies linked to alleged corruption during his administration.

Under Colombia’s electoral law (Law 1475 of 2011), political parties may still modify or withdraw candidates until March 20. After that date, the presidential campaign will move toward the first round scheduled for May 31. If no candidate obtains an absolute majority (50% plus one), the two candidates with the highest vote totals will compete in a runoff election on June 21.

For now, the race appears likely to center on a left-wing coalition led by Iván Cepeda with the backing of President Gustavo Petro, and a divided right contested between Paloma Valencia and the ultraconservative Abelardo de la Espriella.

Above photo: Claudia López, candidate in the centrist primary, casting her vote in Bogotá. Photo courtesy of Claudia López’s campaign team.

 

Colombia’s presidential primaries are interparty, where broad coalitions decide on a candidate that the allied parties then agree to back.

This Sunday, March 8, 2026, Colombia will hold one of the most significant electoral events of the year’s political calendar. In addition to electing a new congress, voters will participate in the so-called Interparty Primaries, a mechanism through which political parties select their candidates for the presidential election scheduled for May 31.

According to the political analysis website Razón Pública, these consultations seek to “build broad coalitions composed of parties, movements, and independent candidacies.” In practice, they allow different political sectors to determine through open voting who will represent each coalition in the presidential race.

Political parties seek to boost their chances in the presidential race or strengthen their leverage in potential coalition negotiations.

In total, three separate primaries will take place, each with its own ballot. Citizens may participate in only one of them by requesting the corresponding ballot when voting for Congress.

The first is the “Solutions Primary: Healthcare, Security and Education,” made up of parties from the political center. In this contest, former Bogotá mayor Claudia López faces independent lawyer Leonardo Huertas. According to the latest Invamer poll, López is the clear frontrunner, with a projected 92.9% voting preference, compared with her only opponent.

The second consultation represents the political right and includes nine pre-candidates in the so-called “Grand Primary for Colombia.”

Among the contenders are former ministers of previous governments Juan Carlos Pinzón (Defense), Mauricio Cárdenas (Finance), and David Luna (Information Technologies); former Antioquia governor Aníbal Gaviria; former Bogotá mayor Enrique Peñalosa; journalist Vicky Dávila; and three senators representing their respective parties: Juan Manuel Galán (Nuevo Liberalismo), Juan Daniel Oviedo (Con Toda con Colombia), and Paloma Valencia (Centro Democrático).

Polls consistently identify Paloma Valencia as the favorite to win the primary. The Invamer poll projects her with 41.6% of the vote, Atlas Intel 44.4%, and Guarumo-EcoAnalítica 40.6%, while the firm Gad3 also places her first but with a lower estimated vote share of 17%. Valencia has been campaigning nationwide accompanied by former president Álvaro Uribe Vélez, the leading figure of the Centro Democrático, and previously won her party’s internal selection process through a member survey held on December 15.

The third primary corresponds to the coalition known as the “Front for Life,” made up of left-wing candidates, although without the official backing of current President Gustavo Petro, who under Colombian law is prohibited from participating in electoral politics or promoting candidates.

Candidates in this race include Héctor Elías Pineda, a former member of the M-19 guerrilla movement (the same group Petro once belonged to); Edison Lucio Torres of the Partido de los Trabajadores (Worker’s Party); and independent candidate Martha Viviana Bernal.

Former senator Roy Barreras; and embattled former mayor of Medellín Daniel Quintero Calle registered through the Movimiento de Autoridades Indígenas de Colombia. Polls by Guarumo-EcoAnalítica (47.6%) and Invamer (68.1%) place Daniel Quintero as the leading candidate of this Primary. However, the firm Atlas Intel did not measure this coalition, arguing that it did not surpass the statistical threshold required.

What comes next in the political landscape after the Primaries?

According to Razón Pública, “once the March 8 voting concludes, the political landscape will enter a phase of critical decisions. The results will determine alliances and realignments ahead of the presidential first round.”

Across the political spectrum, the winners of each consultation will attempt to consolidate support to compete against other candidates who registered directly without participating in the consultations. These include Abelardo de la Espriella, a conservative lawyer and businessman who registered through citizen signatures; Iván Cepeda, the official candidate of the Pacto Histórico coalition led by President Petro and currently leading voting-intention polls; and Sergio Fajardo, who registered with the party Dignidad y Compromiso.

Under Colombia’s electoral Law (1475 of 2011), political parties may still modify or withdraw candidates until March 20. After that date, the presidential campaign will move toward the first round scheduled for May 31. If no candidate secures an absolute majority of the vote (50% plus one), the two candidates receiving the highest number of votes will compete in a runoff election on June 21, where the candidate with a simple majority will be elected president.

Photos courtesy of the Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil

Far-right independent candidate Abelardo De la Espriella, widely known by the nickname “El Tigre” (The Tiger), has taken the lead in Colombia’s presidential race five months ahead of the election, according to a new poll by AtlasIntel published by Semana magazine.

The survey places De la Espriella, founder of the pro-democracy movement Defensores de la Patria, at 28% of voting intentions, narrowly ahead of left-wing senator Iván Cepeda at 26.5%. Former Antioquia governor Sergio Fajardo ranks third with 9.4%, once again failing to surpass the 10% benchmark that has long eluded his centrist candidacies.

A corporate lawyer by training, De la Espriella rose to prominence as a high-profile legal advocate for conservative causes and a vocal critic of President Gustavo Petro’s reform agenda. His political ascent has been driven by hardline law-and-order rhetoric, a confrontational style and an aggressive use of social media, allowing him to position himself as an outsider channeling anti-establishment sentiment and opposition to the left.

In a hypothetical second-round runoff, De la Espriella would defeat hard-leftist Cepeda by 9.3 percentage points, the poll found, consolidating his status as the best-positioned opposition figure at this early stage of the race.

AtlasIntel also projected a runoff between De la Espriella and Fajardo. In that scenario, De la Espriella would secure 37.9% of the vote, compared with 23.2% for Fajardo — a margin of 14.7 points.

Fajardo, a mathematician and former governor of Antioquia from 2012 to 2016, has struggled to expand his electoral base beyond a narrow segment of moderate voters. His current polling echoes his performance in the first round of the 2022 presidential election, when he placed fourth with just over 800,000 votes, equivalent to 4.2% of the total, despite entering that race as a well-known national figure.

Further down the field, Juan Carlos Pinzón and Paloma Valencia each registered 5.1% support, followed by Claudia López (2.6%), Enrique Peñalosa (2.3%), Juan Daniel Oviedo (1.8%) and Aníbal Gaviria (1.3%). Several other candidates polled below 1%.

The survey found that 7.2% of respondents would vote blank, 5.7% remain undecided, and 1.1% said they would not vote.

Valencia, a senator from the right-wing Centro Democrático party, could nonetheless emerge as a pivotal figure in the race. Former president Álvaro Uribe Vélez, Colombia’s most influential conservative leader, has named Valencia as the party’s official presidential candidate, formally placing the weight of his political machine behind her campaign.

Uribe, who governed Colombia from 2002 to 2010, retains significant influence, particularly in his home region of Antioquia and in the country’s second-largest city, Medellín, long considered a stronghold of uribismo. Analysts say Valencia’s numbers could rise sharply as party structures mobilise and undecided conservative voters coalesce around an officially endorsed candidate.

In other simulated second-round matchups, Valencia would narrowly defeat Cepeda by 2.4 points, while Cepeda would beat former defence minister Pinzón by 4.5 points, according to the poll.

AtlasIntel also measured voter intentions ahead of Colombia’s interparty primaries scheduled for March 8, to be held alongside congressional elections. About 18.7% of respondents said they plan to participate in the “Gran Consulta por Colombia,” while 29.8% expressed interest in voting in the leftist “Pacto Amplio”. Former Colombian Ambassador to the United Kingdom and insider of the Petro administration, Roy Barreras, is seen as a leading contender to the clinch the consultation.

Within the Gran Consulta, Valencia leads with 19.1% among likely participants, followed by Pinzón (13.1%), Aníbal Gaviria (11.1%), Juan Daniel Oviedo (10.6%) and former Semana director  Vicky Dávila (7%).

The poll results reinforce a broader pattern of fragmentation across the centre and right, even as opposition voters increasingly focus on preventing a left-wing victory. With five months to go before the May 31 election, an emerging landscape of “all against Cepeda” has appeared on the horizon, in which disparate conservative and centrist forces could eventually rally behind a single contender in a runoff scenario on June 19, 2026.

In this context, De la Espriella — himself a close ideological ally of Uribe — could seek to consolidate all right-wing factions by selecting Valencia as a potential vice-presidential running mate,  move that would unite his strong support on the Colombian coast, with the  strength of Centro Democrático and Uribe’s loyal political base in conservative departments.

According to AtlasIntel’s CEO Andrei Roman, the contest is being shaped by persistent ideological polarisation, internal divisions within the opposition, and the growing dominance of social media.

“The race is structured around the continuity of Petro-style progressivism versus a broad anti-Petro front,” Roman said. “At the same time, digital presence has become decisive, allowing outsider figures to gain traction quickly and redefine political mobilisation.”