The candidate, Abelardo de la Espriella, will face a senator from the left-wing party of the departing president, Gustavo Petro, in a June runoff.

Right-wing presidential candidate Abelardo “El Tigre” de la Espriella emerged as the frontrunner in Colombia’s presidential election on Sunday, setting up a high-stakes runoff against left-wing senator Iván Cepeda in a contest that could reshape the political future of one of Latin America’s largest economies.

With more than 97% of ballots counted, National Registry Bulletin No. 15 showed De la Espriella leading with 43.77% of the vote, or approximately 10.1 million ballots, compared with Cepeda’s 40.88%, or slightly above 9.4 million votes. The margin of roughly 667,000 votes exceeded many pre-election forecasts and positioned the Barranquilla-based criminal defense lawyer as the favorite heading into the decisive June 21 runoff.

Election authorities reported that voting unfolded peacefully across the country, with preliminary results available just 90 minutes after polling stations closed at 4:00 p.m. More than 41 million Colombians had been eligible to participate in the election, including 1.4 million citizens residing abroad.

The result represents a significant rebuke to President Gustavo Petro’s political project and highlights growing voter concerns over security, economic performance and public confidence in state institutions.

Petro, who is constitutionally barred from seeking re-election, has thrown his support behind Cepeda, a leading figure within the governing coalition and one of the principal defenders of the government’s controversial “Total Peace” strategy. The policy sought negotiated settlements with FARC dissidents, criminal organizations and other armed groups operating throughout the country, but critics argue it failed to reduce violence in many regions.

While Cepeda entered election day as the favorite in most opinion polls, De la Espriella successfully capitalized on public frustration over extortion, insecurity, illegal armed groups and what many voters perceive as a deterioration of public order under Petro’s administration.

Known to supporters as “El Tigre,” De la Espriella built his campaign around a tough-on-crime platform inspired in part by the security policies of El Salvador’s President Nayib Bukele. He has promised to strengthen the military, restore state authority in conflict-affected regions and confront criminal organizations with what he describes as an uncompromising approach.

His message appears to have resonated particularly among middle-class voters, business sectors and residents of regions heavily impacted by drug trafficking and armed violence.

The election also exposed the weakness of Colombia’s political center, which for years attempted to position itself as an alternative to the country’s increasingly polarized political landscape.

Conservative candidate Paloma Valencia secured more than 1.5 million votes (or 6.9%) but remained well behind the two frontrunners. Although her campaign attracted traditional conservatives and followers of former president Álvaro Uribe Vélez, she struggled to expand beyond the party’s core support base.

Centrist Sergio Fajardo, the former mayor of Medellín and former governor of Antioquia, won just 4.6% of the vote, just shy of one million ballots. Once regarded as a politician capable of bridging Colombia’s ideological divides, Fajardo failed in his third attempt to reach the presidency as voters increasingly gravitated toward candidates offering sharply contrasting visions for the country’s future.

Former Bogotá mayor Claudia López suffered one of the day’s most dramatic defeats, capturing less than 1% of the national vote. The result marked a stunning collapse for a politician who only a few years ago was considered among Colombia’s most vocal leaders.

Analysts say the runoff campaign is now likely to become a referendum on Petro’s presidency and the future direction of the country.

For Cepeda’s supporters, the June 21 vote offers an opportunity to preserve and deepen many of the social and political reforms promoted by the current administration. For De la Espriella’s backers, it represents a chance to reverse those policies and return to a security-centered model associated with the administrations of former president Álvaro Uribe.

The key question over the coming weeks will be whether De la Espriella can consolidate support among conservative and independent voters while Cepeda seeks to unite the left and attract Colombians wary of a return to hardline security policies.

After a largely peaceful election day, Colombia now faces three weeks of intense campaigning before voters make what many observers consider one of the most consequential political decisions since the country’s historic shift to the left in 2022.

Residents of coastal communities in Colombia and Ecuador said the airstrike campaign was making many reconsider anything involving the ocean as a livelihood.

Much of Colombia woke up to temperate weather and clear skies over the capital, Bogotá. As lines began to form outside polling stations when they opened at 8:00 a.m. on Sunday, voters cast their ballots in one of the country’s most closely watched presidential elections in decades, a contest that could redefine the political direction of the South American nation at a time of mounting security concerns and economic uncertainty.

In Bogotá, outside Corferias, the country’s largest exhibition and convention center and one of Colombia’s busiest voting locations, queues of unregistered voters formed well before polling stations officially opened.

According to the National Registry Office, more than 41 million Colombians are eligible to vote in the election, including approximately 1.4 million citizens residing abroad. Polling stations are under tight security nationwide and will remain open until 4:00 p.m. local time.

The 2026 election has been overshadowed by a resurgence of political violence, recalling memories of some of the country’s darkest electoral periods. Authorities have heightened security measures following a tense campaign season marked by threats against candidates, concerns over public safety, and growing polarization between the political left and right.

President Gustavo Petro, who is constitutionally barred from seeking re-election, has thrown his support behind left-wing senator Iván Cepeda, 63, who is widely regarded as the architect of the government’s failed “Total Peace” strategy aimed at negotiating disarmament agreements with FARC dissidents and other illegal armed groups.

President Petro cast his vote at 9:10 am from the Plazoleta Mosquera inside the National Capitol.

Opinion polls have placed Cepeda in first place with support ranging between 33% and 40%, making him the clear favorite to advance to a second-round runoff scheduled for June 21 should no candidate secure an outright majority of 50% plus one vote on Sunday.

Cepeda, of the ruling Historic Pact coalition, is facing two formidable opponents to his Marxist agenda: right-wing senator Paloma Valencia, 48, of the Centro Democrático party, and criminal defense lawyer Abelardo de la Espriella, 47, considered the “outsider” in the race, whose rapid rise has become one of the defining stories of the campaign.

Valencia and De la Espriella both embrace the “democratic security” doctrine associated with former president Álvaro Uribe Vélez, whose two administrations between 2002 and 2010 were defined by an aggressive military campaign against the FARC and ELN guerrillas.

De la Espriella, known among supporters as “The Tiger,” has portrayed himself as a political outsider capable of restoring economic growth and defeating criminal organizations. His campaign has gained momentum through a pro-Bukele message, fueled by a strong social media presence and rhetoric that resonates with middle-class Colombians on the Caribbean coast who are frustrated by extortion, insecurity, and the traditional political establishment.

The political capital of  Sergio Fajardo and Claudia López appears to be spent, as the race has increasingly evolved into a contest between three candidates. The self-professed centrists and former mayors – one from Medellín (Fajardo) and other from Bogotá (López) — have consistently polled in the single digits, but on Sunday, their political relevance could evaporate a quickly with the final tally.

Sunday’s vote is unlikely to produce an outright winner, making a runoff between Cepeda and one of his conservative challengers the most probable outcome.

The key uncertainty is whether Valencia’s established party machinery and her effort to capture the undecided centre by naming Juan Daniel Oviedo as her running mate will push her beyond the six million votes she received in the March primaries.

Should Valencia outperform polling forecasts, De la Espriella will be forced on Monday to convince his supporters to back Uribe’s official candidate.

For many Colombians, this election represents more than a contest between three frontrunners. It has become a referendum on President Petro’s stalled reform agenda, the country’s deteriorating security situation, and the future direction of a democracy facing some of its most significant challenges at a time when the “pink tide” of left-wing governments across Latin America has largely receded. Or in the words of former FARC hostage and ex-presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt: “May ethics, hope, truth, and commitment to Colombia prevail today over the machismo, fear, violence, and misogyny of the extremes. I trust that we will have the first woman President.”

 

 

Colombia’s leftist candidate for president leads in polls, but his main rival — a far-right outsider who calls himself “The Tiger” — has gained momentum.

Just days away from Colombia’s first-round presidential election, incumbent President Gustavo Petro continues to sound the alarm about voter fraud. 

On Tuesday, he repeated claims that the National Registrar’s Office is allowing the vote to be manipulated against his party’s candidate, Senator Iván Cepeda.

Petro renewed calls for citizens to supervise the vote count, describing it as the only way to avoid fraud: “Only the physical vigilance of millions of people can overcome the algorithm manipulations that the Registrar’s Office refused to prevent.”

But are the president’s claims of vulnerabilities in the voting system valid?

A decade-long dispute

Petro’s claims stem from a long-running grudge with Thomas Greg & Sons, a multinational security and printing company tasked with issuing Colombian passports and overseeing electoral logistics.

According to Petro, the firm cannot be trusted with the sensitive task of printing, delivering, and processing vote counting forms.

While the president’s claims have widely been dismissed by electoral institutions as reckless, there is some foundation for them.

Following the 2014 legislative elections, the evangelical political party, MIRA, filed a legal petition against the Registrar’s Office, claiming a discrepancy between the ballot pre-count (filled out by citizen juries in a form known as E-14) and the digitized tally of the vote (filled out by officials in the E-24 form).

MIRA claimed to have evidence of manipulation of the software used for “voting, information, transmission, or tabulation of election results,” which was managed by a subsidiary of Thomas Greg & Sons. 

After a lengthy four-year legal case, the Council of State (Consejo de Estado), the highest court overseeing the government, issued a ruling in favor of MIRA. It found evidence of destruction of electoral material and inconsistencies between the E-14 and E-24 forms. 

Crucially, the Council of State said that it could not confirm that voting software had been sabotaged because it did not have access to the source code of the software during the elections.

Without the original code, it was impossible to know if the system had been tampered with.

The body issued a clear recommendation to prevent repetitions of the dispute in future elections: “Direct the Electoral Organization to acquire the necessary vote-counting software for use within the state—that is, software owned by the organization itself—which allows for full traceability of the vote-counting process from the polling stations through to the official declaration of the election results.”

In other words, it recommended that electoral authorities roll out their own software, rather than relying on third party providers.

But 12 years later, Thomas Greg & Sons remains in charge of the electoral software; according to the Registrar’s Office, purchasing proprietary software and operating the corresponding data centers is not feasible.

While Petro continues to lobby for a fully state-owned system, he has concentrated his efforts on mitigating the risks of a repeat of the 2014 source code issue.

The president has repeatedly demanded that the Registrar’s Office share the source code with the government and the public, which he says would allow them to prevent a repeat of the situation in 2014.

But the Registrar’s Office maintains that there is no need, suggesting that publicizing the code would leave the software more vulnerable to attacks and defending internal audit processes.

Petro rebutted, calling the claim “an immense lie”.

Other types of fraud

As well as warning about software manipulation, the president has also raised the alarm about differences between the pre-count and the official, scrutinized count. Ahead of the March elections, he warned that the pre-count may not accurately reflect the results.

Petro’s concerns stem from the 2022 legislative elections in which over half a million votes for his Historic Pact coalition were excluded in the pre-count and later revealed in the scrutiny. 

Rather than software, the culprit for the discrepancy, which in total represented a 5.49% difference, was human error; the Electoral Observation Mission (MOE) had warned the ballot sheets were designed in a way that could lead to Historic Pact votes being neglected. 

But the 2022 vote appears to be an outlier, with the MOE reporting just a 0.28% discrepancy between the pre-count and the scrutinized votes in March’s legislative elections.

Petro’s mistrust in the pre-count may be valid in the case of a tight race with razor-thin margins but not so much if there is a clear winner. And, in any case, the scrutiny process should clear up any doubts. 

“In Colombian elections, it is judges who determine electoral disputes and not a logistical operator such as Thomas Greg & Sons,” explained Sergio Guzmán, director at Colombia Risk Analysis, a political risk think tank.

Bigger fish to fry

While Petro aims his crusade against Thomas Greg & Sons, a firm which he has clashed with on a range of issues, there are other, more prescient threats to electoral integrity.

“I think that concerns about voters being coerced to vote are legitimate… but I think concerns that somebody will steal the election are overblown,” said Guzmán.

International observers including the United Nations have warned that violence may undermine the elections, particularly in areas under armed group control. 

Vote buying is also a well-documented phenomenon in many regions of the country.

While Petro has some basis for his allegations of voter fraud, there is no evidence of software manipulation determining presidential election results in Colombia.

In a razor-thin race, observers would be wise to wait for the scrutinized vote count to declare a winner. But for now, Petro’s warnings about election-rigging appear to be largely overblown.

The post The truth behind Petro’s claims of Colombia voting fraud appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

Colombia is preparing for one of the largest international election observation missions in its history as the country heads toward Sunday’s presidential election amid heightened security measures, dry laws and nationwide institutional alerts aimed at safeguarding the democratic process.

Polling stations across Colombia will open on Sunday, May 31, from 8:00 a.m. until 4:00 p.m. as voters head to the ballot box to elect a new president for the 2026–2030 term. If no candidate secures an outright majority, a runoff election will be held on June 21.

More than 1,200 international observers from 22 countries are expected to monitor the elections under a mission coordinated by Colombia’s National Electoral Council (CNE), in what officials describe as one of the most extensive observation deployments ever organized in the country.

The official installation of the International Observation Mission took place Friday morning at Bogotá’s Grand Hyatt Hotel, where electoral authorities, diplomats and representatives of multilateral organizations gathered ahead of the vote.

According to the CNE, a total of 1,207 accredited observers will participate in territorial inspections, technical briefings and electoral monitoring operations across various regions of Colombia.

Authorities say the mission seeks to strengthen public confidence, transparency and legitimacy in a country where concerns over disinformation campaigns, fake news and political polarization have increasingly shaped the electoral climate.

Official figures show Colombia will install 118,346 voting tables distributed across 13,489 polling stations nationwide.

Among the international observers already arriving in Colombia is U.S. Republican Senator from Ohio, Bernie Moreno, who landed in Cartagena to participate in election monitoring activities.

Moreno, who was born in Colombia before emigrating to the United States, is part of the delegation accredited by the National Electoral Council to observe the presidential elections and verify the conditions under which the democratic process unfolds.

In Bogotá, authorities have implemented extraordinary measures aimed at maintaining public order during election weekend.

Mayor Carlos Fernando Galán’s administration announced that the capital’s “Ley Seca,” or dry law, will begin at 6:00 p.m. on Friday, May 29, and remain in effect until midday on Monday, June 1.

The restrictions prohibit the sale and consumption of alcoholic beverages in public spaces and establishments open to the public throughout Bogotá.

The measure begins 24 hours earlier than the nationwide presidential decree regulating election weekend restrictions and has sparked criticism from nightlife businesses, bars and restaurant owners who warn the extended dry law could significantly impact weekend revenues.

Business owners have also pointed to the timing of the UEFA Champions League final scheduled for Saturday evening between Paris Saint-Germain and Arsenal F.C. at Budapest’s Puskás Aréna, an event expected to draw large crowds to bars and public viewing venues across the Colombian capital.

“The decree seeks to guarantee coexistence and the proper development of the electoral process,” Bogotá authorities said in the official order announcing the restrictions.

At the same time, Bogotá’s Health Secretariat declared a yellow hospital alert across the entire capital beginning Friday evening and lasting through Monday evening.

The alert places the city’s public and private hospital network under a state of heightened operational readiness in anticipation of any emergencies or disturbances related to the elections.

“We call on all hospital directors and healthcare providers to strictly comply with the directives established under this alert,” José Vicente Guzmán, Bogotá’s deputy director for Emergency and Disaster Risk Management, said in a statement.

“It is essential to streamline patient admissions in emergency rooms, optimize ambulance response times and maintain direct and real-time communication channels with the city’s Emergency and Urgency Coordination Center,” he added.

Under the emergency protocols, hospitals have been ordered to activate disaster risk contingency plans, guarantee staffing availability, ensure sufficient medical supplies and maintain full operational readiness of ambulance services and patient transfer systems.

Authorities warned the alert level could be raised to orange or red depending on events during the weekend.

Residents requiring emergency medical attention have been advised to contact Bogotá’s 137 emergency hotline, which will remain operational around the clock throughout the election period.

Elsewhere in Colombia, local governments are also implementing measures to facilitate voting and public mobility.

In Medellín and the surrounding Aburrá Valley metropolitan region, authorities announced free rides on the city’s metro and cable car systems on election day until 6:00 p.m., while bus services will continue operating normally.

The presidential election arrives at a politically charged moment for Colombia after months of polarized campaigning, growing security concerns in several regions and intense national debate over the future direction of the country following the first leftist administration of President Gustavo Petro.

International observers, electoral authorities and security forces are expected to remain deployed throughout the weekend as Colombia prepares for one of the most consequential elections in recent years.

Medical leave, vacation time and unpaid leave will keep Ricardo Roa away from Ecopetrol through late July

The board of directors of Ecopetrol, Colombia’s largest oil and energy company, announced the postponement of unpaid leave previously granted to its president, Ricardo Roa Barragán, due to a 30-day medical leave taken by the executive. The decision was disclosed by the state-controlled company in an official statement issued May 27, 2026.

According to the company, the unpaid leave, initially scheduled to begin May 26 for a 30-day period, will take effect once both Roa’s medical leave and his remaining vacation period have concluded, meaning it is now expected to begin June 27.

If the schedule remains unchanged, Roa Barragán would return to Ecopetrol in late July, just one week before Colombia’s next president is sworn in on August 7, 2026, and gains the authority to appoint new leadership at the state-owned oil company.

Read Ecopetrol Announces Temporary Leave for President Ricardo Roa Amid Investigations by Colombia’s Attorney General’s Office by Finance Colombia.

The rescheduling extends Roa Barragán’s temporary absence during a sensitive period for Colombia’s largest state-controlled company, amid a government transition and growing scrutiny over its corporate stability.

The vacations and unpaid leave had previously been approved by Ecopetrol’s board as an institutional response to tensions surrounding Roa Barragán’s continued tenure. While labor unions, minority shareholders and various public voices had called for his removal, President Gustavo Petro publicly maintained his support.

Read The petroleum workers called for Ricardo Roa’s head following formal influence-peddling charges filed by Colombia’s Attorney General’s Office.

The board also decided to keep Juan Carlos Hurtado as acting president of Ecopetrol. Hurtado has served as executive vice president of hydrocarbons since November 2025.

So far in 2026, Colombia’s Attorney General’s Office has formally charged Roa Barragán in two separate cases: one involving alleged influence peddling by a public official, linked to purported benefits obtained in the purchase of an apartment in Bogotá, and another involving alleged violations of campaign spending limits in the 2022 “Petro Presidente” presidential campaign, for which he served as campaign manager.

Read Ecopetrol President Ricardo Roa Charged Over Alleged Campaign Spending Violations in Petro’s Presidential Campaign.

So far, no judicial conviction has been issued in either case, and the executive retains the presumption of innocence.

Under the revised schedule, Roa Barragán is expected to remain away from Ecopetrol’s presidency during part of the electoral period and presidential transition, ahead of the eventual handover to the administration elected in Colombia’s May 31 elections.

Twenty-Year Debt Arc Resets Colombia’s Sovereign Risk Outlook

Two decades of fiscal data show that Colombia’s gross general government debt has moved through four distinct macroeconomic phases, ending the current cycle at a level that is materially higher than its pre-pandemic baseline. Persistent annual fiscal deficits, currency volatility, an emergency spending shock and weaker-than-projected tax revenues have combined to push the ratio of public debt to gross domestic product from the mid-30s percent range in the mid-2000s to a band of roughly 60 to 62 percent at the start of 2026, according to figures published by the Ministerio de Hacienda y Crédito Público and the Banco de la República.

The shift carries direct implications for sovereign bondholders, multinationals operating in Colombia and any investor pricing country risk in the Andean region. All three major rating agencies — S&P Global Ratings, Moody’s Ratings and Fitch Ratings — now place Colombia in speculative-grade, or junk, territory, with consecutive downgrades through 2025 and into early 2026.

“The activation of the escape clause confirms that the deterioration observed in 2024 will not be corrected in 2025.” — Renzo Merino, sovereign analyst, Moody’s Ratings

The commodity cushion: 2006 to 2014

During the global commodity supercycle, Colombia benefited from sustained gross domestic product growth and steady government revenue. Hydrocarbon and mining receipts — channeled through Ecopetrol (NYSE: EC; BVC: ECOPETROL) and the broader extractive sector — supplied a substantial share of national tax intake. The debt-to-GDP ratio remained relatively stable during this period, generally hovering between 34 and 38 percent. Even with chronic primary deficits, nominal growth in the denominator absorbed new borrowing, masking the underlying structural imbalance that the Comité Autónomo de la Regla Fiscal (CARF) would later flag as the persistent driver of fiscal stress.

The currency and revenue shock: 2014 to 2019

The mechanics of the ratio changed sharply when Brent crude prices collapsed in late 2014. Reduced hydrocarbon royalties widened the fiscal gap just as the Colombian peso depreciated against the US dollar. Because a significant share of Colombia’s sovereign liabilities is denominated in foreign currency, the peso’s slide automatically inflated the local-currency value of outstanding external debt when measured against domestic GDP. The combined effect — wider deficits funded by new borrowing, plus a valuation effect on existing dollar-denominated obligations — pushed the ratio steadily higher through the late 2010s.

The structural revenue weakness that surfaced during this period has remained a recurring theme in subsequent fiscal assessments from Fedesarrollo and the Pontificia Universidad Javeriana Observatorio Fiscal, both of which have noted that successive tax reforms failed to fully close the gap between commitments and ordinary income.

The pandemic ceiling: 2020

The combination of emergency social spending under the Ingreso Solidario program, expanded health outlays and a sharp contraction in nominal GDP drove the ratio to a historic peak above 65 percent in 2020. The Ministerio de Hacienda reports the all-time high at 65.3 percent of GDP that year. The government activated the escape clause of the regla fiscal — Colombia’s fiscal rule, codified in Law 1473 of 2011 and modified by Law 2155 of 2021 — to accommodate the spending response, suspending the rule for 2020 and 2021.

That episode also triggered the first sovereign downgrade cycle: S&P Global Ratings cut Colombia’s long-term foreign currency rating to BB+ from BBB- in May 2021 after the administration of then-president Iván Duque withdrew a tax reform bill following street protests, costing the country its investment-grade status with that agency.

The new baseline: 2023 to 2026

Strong post-pandemic nominal growth briefly pulled the debt ratio down toward 57 percent in 2023. The decline did not hold. Structural spending pressures, elevated international interest rates and tax collections below budgeted projections pushed the ratio back up, establishing a new operating band around 60 to 62 percent of GDP. The Ministerio de Hacienda reported government debt to GDP at 61.3 percent for 2024.

The administration of President Gustavo Petro and Finance Minister Germán Ávila Plazas activated the regla fiscal escape clause for a second time in June 2025, with the Consejo Superior de Política Fiscal (Confis) approving a three-year suspension covering 2025 through 2027. The decision came despite an unfavorable technical opinion from the Comité Autónomo de la Regla Fiscal, which concluded that legal conditions for activating the clause were not met outside of a national emergency. The clause had previously been invoked only during the COVID-19 pandemic.

According to the Marco Fiscal de Mediano Plazo (MFMP) presented by the Ministerio de Hacienda, net public debt to GDP is projected to rise from 53 percent in 2023 to 61.3 percent in 2025 and approximately 63 percent in 2026. The fiscal deficit for 2025 was initially projected at 7.1 percent of GDP and later revised to roughly 6.2 percent of GDP, with the administration targeting a deficit below 6 percent of GDP for 2026.

Debt service consumes a larger share of the budget

The cost of servicing this debt has reshaped the structure of the national budget. The 2026 draft budget presented by Minister Ávila totals $557 trillion COP, equivalent to roughly $134.7 billion USD, and represents 28.9 percent of GDP. Of that, debt servicing costs are projected at $102.5 trillion COP, or 5.3 percent of GDP, down from 6.2 percent of GDP in 2025.

The figures published by the Ministerio de Hacienda for domestic debt service in 2026 are higher when measured against tax intake alone: of an estimated $130 trillion COP in domestic debt service, $79 trillion COP corresponds to principal that can be rolled over through new issuances, while $51 trillion COP represents interest payments funded directly from the budget. Against projected tax revenue of approximately $300 trillion COP, that implies roughly one in every three pesos collected by the central government is allocated to interest on existing debt.

Rating agencies reprice the sovereign

The rating cycle has accelerated alongside the fiscal trajectory. Moody’s Ratings downgraded Colombia to Baa3 and subsequently into junk territory in 2025, citing the suspension of the fiscal rule. S&P Global Ratings issued a further downgrade in April 2026, its second cut in less than a year, on the same persistent deficit and debt concerns. Fitch Ratings also moved Colombia deeper into speculative grade in December 2025.

The Banco de la República reported external debt — combining public and private liabilities — at $238.7 billion USD at the close of November 2025, equivalent to 54.8 percent of GDP, an increase of $15.8 billion USD from January of the same year. The Colombian economy is currently valued at approximately $435 billion USD.

What investors are watching next

The Comité Autónomo de la Regla Fiscal has stated in its most recent reports to Congress that the 2025 primary balance target was missed by a wide margin even after the escape clause was activated, and that incoming projections for 2026 raise the bar for any return to the original fiscal rule by 2028. Business groups including Fenalco and the Consejo Gremial Nacional have publicly opposed the suspension and signaled potential legal challenges.

The 2026 financing plan disclosed by the Ministerio de Hacienda includes approximately $4.6 billion USD in global bond issuances, primarily to refinance a one-year Swiss-franc Total Return Swap operation valued at roughly $9.3 billion USD. The ministry has stated that the issuance does not constitute net new external debt. Updated debt and deficit targets are scheduled for release in the next iteration of the Plan Financiero.

For executives operating in Colombia or evaluating new investment, the baseline shift from a mid-30s to a low-60s debt-to-GDP environment alters several variables simultaneously: peso volatility tied to refinancing cycles, the trajectory of corporate tax policy as Congress weighs successive reform proposals, and the path of domestic interest rates set by the Banco de la República as it manages inflation alongside elevated sovereign funding costs. Detailed historical and forward-looking debt data is published by the Investor Relations Colombia office of the Ministerio de Hacienda.

Colombia’s Armed Forces and regional authorities are struggling to verify the full scale of a bloody confrontation between rival FARC dissident factions in the remote southeastern department of Guaviare after clashes reportedly left more than 50 combatants dead.

The fighting, described by officials as one of the deadliest episodes this year involving former Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) splinter groups, erupted in rural areas near the departmental capital San José del Guaviare between forces loyal to two dissident commanders known by their war aliases “Calarcá” and “Iván Mordisco.”

According to a communiqué released by the faction aligned with Calarcá, the confrontation began when approximately 250 fighters allegedly under the command of Néstor Gregorio Vera Fernández, alias Iván Mordisco, launched a surprise assault on a dissident encampment in the hamlet of La Siberia.

The clashes were reported in the rural sectors of Barranco Colorado, Charras and Trocha Ganadera, cattle farming regions with limited state presence.

The Calarcá faction claimed that a combat column belonging to the Isaías Carvajal Front had been resting overnight when it was attacked before dawn.

“In an act of legitimate self-defense, our units broke the siege, inflicting the first enemy casualties,” the group said in the statement, which was circulated through clandestine channels on Thursday.

“After three hours of combat, the enemy withdrew leaving fifty dead on the battlefield and carrying away a large number of wounded,” the communiqué added.

Colombia’s Army confirmed that troops from Brigade 22 remain deployed in the rural outskirts of San José del Guaviare, the epicenter of the fighting, but authorities acknowledged that they have been unable to fully enter the conflict zone due to difficult terrain and the continued presence of heavily armed illegal groups.

Defense Minister Pedro Sánchez confirmed the clashes took place in the Barranco Colorado sector, more than 100 kilometers east of San José del Guaviare, but refrained from confirming casualty figures. Minister Sánchez did, however, claim that the official statement amounted to a “confession and public admission” of an “atrocious crime”. Sánchez also warned that the reported deaths of underage combatants would constitute a grave violation of international humanitarian law and Colombian criminal legislation, further intensifying scrutiny over forced recruitment of children by FARC dissidents.

Officials said access to the region is severely restricted, with many areas reachable only through jungle tracks and river routes. Colombia’s forensic authorities, including Medicina Legal, have yet to recover or identify bodies from the battlefield.

Regional authorities convened an extraordinary security council meeting on Wednesday amid fears that the violence could intensify ahead of Colombia’s presidential election scheduled for May 31.

San José del Guaviare Mayor Willy Rodríguez told Caracol Radio that preliminary reports suggested “dozens” may have died, though he cautioned that authorities had not yet independently verified the numbers.

“We are receiving alarming information from residents in the rural areas, but the Armed Forces still have not been able to fully enter and confirm the situation,” Rodríguez said.

Governor Yeison Rojas joined police and military commanders in emergency deliberations as intelligence agencies attempted to establish the true scale of the confrontation.

The dissident faction loyal to Calarcá accused Iván Mordisco of provoking the conflict and described the elusive guerrilla commander as “a mentally disturbed individual with ideological shortcomings and psychopathic tendencies.”

The statement also claimed the group seized a significant cache of weapons during the battle, including four machine guns, 49 assault rifles, two Dragunov sniper rifles and more than 10,000 rounds of ammunition.

The faction further stated that two of its own fighters were killed and three wounded, while also claiming to have captured “a female prisoner of war.”

“We inform the Colombian people that this tragic event, occurring four days before an electoral contest, was not initiated by us,” the communiqué concluded. “It was an act of legitimate self-defense.”

The confrontation underscores the growing fragmentation and territorial disputes among Colombia’s remaining armed groups following the 2016 peace accord between the Colombian government and the FARC guerrillas.

Iván Mordisco, once considered one of the most powerful dissident commanders operating outside the peace agreement, has become a central figure in the collapse of President Gustavo Petro’s “Total Peace” negotiations with illegal armed groups.

Security analysts warn that Guaviare, a historic stronghold for the former FARC insurgency and a major coca-producing region, has increasingly become the scene of violent turf wars involving rival dissident fronts competing for narcotics routes, extortion rackets and territorial control.

The latest bloodshed also raises concerns over the deteriorating security situation in Colombia’s southeastern departments  just days before Colombians vote in a presidential election, May 31.

San José del Guaviare, long considered a strategic stronghold in Colombia’s anti-narcotics campaign, hosts one of the country’s largest counterinsurgency and anti-drug military bases, including a fleet of Black Hawk helicopter gunships used in jungle operations against armed groups and cocaine trafficking networks. The region has also historically maintained the presence of U.S. military personnel and advisers supporting intelligence, surveillance and counternarcotics missions in southeastern Colombia.

As of Thursday, Colombia’s Attorney General’s Office, National Forensic Institute – Medicina Legal – and Armed Forces had yet to issue a definitive death toll.

Former Colombian Foreign Minister Álvaro Leyva Durán launched a blistering attack against President Gustavo Petro just days before Colombia heads to the polls on May 31, warning of what he described as looming threats to the country’s democratic institutions and accusing the government of preparing to reject an unfavorable electoral outcome.

In a lengthy manifesto published Tuesday on the social media platform X under the title “Propuesta de Álvaro Leyva Durán al País para las Elecciones,” the veteran Conservative politician claimed Petro fears both political defeat and possible legal consequences should right-wing presidential candidate Abelardo De la Espriella emerge victorious.

“Petro knows that his future depends on his successor protecting him from justice,” Leyva wrote, adding that De la Espriella “could win the elections in the first round.”

According to Leyva, the former member of the M-19 guerrilla and senator understands that with De la Espriella in office, “he himself could end up in prison. And that is why he has sought to derail the candidate and will refuse to recognize his victory.”

The explosive accusations mark the latest escalation in the increasingly bitter campaign season ahead of what analysts are calling one of Colombia’s most polarized elections in decades. Leyva, once one of Petro’s closest political allies and his first foreign minister, has in recent months become one of the president’s fiercest critics.

In the manifesto, Leyva intertwined personal memories of Colombia’s turbulent political history with warnings about what he believes is unfolding behind the scenes of the current administration.

“At my age, I know these kinds of stories well,” he wrote, before recalling his close relationship with slain Conservative leader Álvaro Gómez Hurtado.

“My father, Jorge Leyva, gave me at birth the name of his friend Álvaro Gómez Hurtado. When I was 12 years old, Álvaro would speak to me about politics and explain the world to me with a globe.”

Leyva recounted how Gómez and his own father were exiled after the 1953 military coup, and how decades later he worked alongside Gómez politically, even helping negotiate his release after he was kidnapped by the M-19 guerrilla movement in 1988.

“In 1995, after leaving a lecture at Sergio Arboleda University, Álvaro Gómez and I shook hands for the last time,” Leyva wrote. “Because minutes later, I watched in horror as he was assassinated in his car. It was a national tragedy.”

The former minister used Gómez’s legacy as a contrast to his eventual disillusionment with Petro.

“Because of that, I believed I could work with Gustavo Petro,” he said. “When he invited me to become his minister, I accepted because I believed him to be an honorable man. But I was wrong.”

Leyva then delivered some of his harshest remarks yet against the president.

“I came to know the monster from within: his vileness and degradation,” he wrote. “At enormous personal and family cost, I dared to denounce his baseness and his disrespect for the office.”

He added: “Because character demands that one not remain silent in the face of ignominy. And because of everything I witnessed, because of the rotten environment in which he (Petro) moves, I know what the government is plotting.”

Leyva also alleged that Petro’s radicalised supporters to intimidate opponents and manipulate the electoral process. “Today, while Abelardo wages a major democratic battle, Petro incites his followers to commit all kinds of outrages,” he wrote. “There has even been talk of snipers during the campaign.”

Without providing evidence, Leyva claimed that attempts had been made to invalidate De la Espriella’s candidacy, suppress favorable polling data and mobilize state-backed political machinery to influence the vote.

“On election day, rivers of money will flow in an attempt to stop De la Espriella,” he warned.

The former foreign minister also accused Petro of laying the groundwork to dispute the legitimacy of the election itself.

“The president has also spent months constructing a narrative of electoral manipulation,” Leyva wrote. In this way, according to the author, he is “weaving an argument to reject an adverse electoral outcome” that he already senses is inevitable. “That is the false ace up Petro’s sleeve,” he continued. “And like any gambler fueled by hatred, he will use it.”

Leyva also referenced U.S. Republican lawmakers from Florida, María Elvira Salazar and Rick Scott, claiming both were aware of the risks facing Colombia’s democratic process. “Scott is an ally of Colombian democracy and correctly sensed what the national government is planning,” he wrote.

In one of the most dramatic sections of the manifesto, Leyva proposed that Petro temporarily step aside if he alleges fraud after either the first or second round of voting.

“I make a proposal: if in the first or second round Petro claims there was fraud, he should step down from office under the terms of Article 193 of the Constitution,” Leyva wrote.

He suggested that the vice president temporarily assume office while an international commission made up of U.S. lawmakers, European parliamentarians, the Vatican and the United Nations review the vote count and oversee the transition of power before August 7.

“Think about it, Gustavo. Think about it carefully,” Leyva concluded. “Because the alternative will not end well for you. Abelardo De la Espriella will be the next president. And you will have to accept that reality, whether you like it or not.”

The ongoing investigations have now been joined by a new complaint filed by presidential candidate Claudia López

Colombia’s House Investigation and Accusation Committee has opened an ex officio investigation into President Gustavo Petro over alleged improper political participation ahead of the country’s presidential election on May 31, 2026, amid growing scrutiny over the president’s neutrality during the campaign.

The decision became public Tuesday, May 26, through an official document in which the committee said the investigation stems from “recent statements and social media posts” by the head of state “related to alleged participation in politics in connection with the upcoming presidential elections.”

“This Legal Investigation and Accusation Committee is legally obligated, under the powers granted by Law 600 of 2000 (Article 27) and Law 5 of 1992, to initiate an ex officio criminal investigation for the crime of Political Intervention (Article 422 of the Criminal Code),” the document states.

The order was signed by Gloria Arizabaleta, chair of the Investigation and Accusation Committee and a House representative from the ruling Pacto Histórico party.

Although Colombia’s president is considered the natural leader of his political movement, in this case, Pacto Histórico, whose presidential candidate is Iván Cepeda, Colombian law imposes restrictions on public officials regarding electoral participation.

In Colombia, public officials are subject to the principle of political neutrality, preventing them from intervening in electoral controversies or using their positions to influence citizens’ votes in favor of a particular party or candidate, although they retain their individual right to vote.

Article 422 of Colombia’s Criminal Code (Law 599 of 2000) establishes penalties for improper political intervention, including prison sentences and disqualification from holding public office. Such conduct may also result in disciplinary sanctions under Colombia’s General Disciplinary Code.

Claudia López files separate complaint

Presidential candidate Claudia López also filed a formal complaint before the same committee, alleging lack of electoral guarantees and abuse of power by the president.

“We filed before the House Investigation Committee a 58-page complaint with evidence of President Gustavo Petro’s improper participation in politics and the lack of electoral guarantees. His attacks against my campaign, abuse of power and blatant political interference cannot be accepted,” López said in a social media post.

Inspector General requests report on complaints

Meanwhile, Colombia’s Inspector General’s Office requested a detailed report from the committee regarding existing complaints against Petro related to alleged improper political participation.

The request was signed by Inspector General Gregorio Eljach, who asked for a “detailed report listing complaints against the President of the Republic” to be delivered within three days.

However, the scope of the Inspector General’s Office remains limited because, under Colombia’s institutional system, it holds disciplinary authority over lawmakers and local officials, while constitutional authority to investigate the president rests with the House of Representatives.

“The Executive Branch is overwhelmingly powerful compared with the others, and the president, as head of the state’s public administration, has extraordinary powers and tremendous influence over society,” Eljach told El Tiempo newspaper, referring to the president’s social media activity and its possible impact on voters.

According to El País newspaper in Cali, the Investigation and Accusation Committee currently has around 12 complaints against Petro related to alleged political intervention.

The investigation opens in the final stretch of a presidential campaign in which Petro has sought to maintain political influence through support for ruling coalition candidate Iván Cepeda, who currently leads voter intention polls ahead of the first round.

Colombians face three sharply different futures in May 31 vote

Colombia votes on May 31 with its presidential race concentrated around three candidates whose platforms diverge on nearly every dimension of economic and security policy relevant to foreign investors. For corporate executives, institutional investors, and multinational operations with Colombian exposure, the choice between senator Iván Cepeda, senator Paloma Valencia, and defense attorney Abelardo de la Espriella carries direct, measurable implications for the regulatory environment, foreign direct investment (FDI) conditions, energy sector licensing, and geopolitical alignment through at least 2030.

No candidate is projected to clear the 50%-plus-one threshold required to win outright on May 31, making a runoff election on June 21 the expected outcome. The question that will determine the direction of that runoff — and by extension the next administration — is which of the two opposition candidates finishes second.

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A Race Reshaped by Late Polling

The final-week polling picture shifted substantially, and the trajectory matters as much as the snapshot. The CONDOR weighted aggregate — which incorporates surveys from six polling firms and applies greater weight to more recent data — placed the race as of May 23 at: Cepeda 36.3%, De la Espriella 29.1%, Valencia 16.7%.

Invamer, one of Colombia’s most established polling firms, surveyed 3,800 respondents across 152 municipalities between May 13 and May 20, registering Cepeda at 44.6%, De la Espriella at 31.6%, and Valencia at 14.0%. The Centro Nacional de Consultoría (CNC) published a survey conducted May 22 and 23 showing Cepeda at 33.4%, De la Espriella at 30.9%, and Valencia at 12.6%.

Comparing those figures to the Fundación Génesis Crea survey from May 4 through May 11 — which placed Cepeda at 35.1%, Valencia at 25.4%, and De la Espriella at 21.6% — indicates a multi-poll trend of De la Espriella gaining approximately nine to ten percentage points in three weeks while Valencia shed a comparable share. AS/COA’s poll tracker confirms the directional consistency across firms.

Atlas Intel, which published figures more favorable to De la Espriella, is currently under investigation by Colombia’s Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE) for potential methodology violations and could face suspension of its operations. Those figures are treated with caution in this analysis.

Runoff modeling diverges between firms. Fundación Génesis Crea showed Valencia defeating Cepeda 49.1% to 44.7% in a second-round matchup — meaning she was the stronger opposition candidate in that scenario. The Guarumo/Ecoanalítica survey found Cepeda losing all hypothetical runoff scenarios, including against De la Espriella. Two minor candidates — former senator Clara López and former Chocó governor Luis Gilberto Murillo — withdrew and endorsed Cepeda before the first round, a consolidation that appears to have had limited effect on his polling numbers.

Finance Colombia reported in May that the campaign has been marked by an unusual absence of traditional televised debates. Cepeda declined to participate in events organized by major media outlets, stating that proposed formats lacked neutrality. Former Bogotá Mayor Claudia López, herself a candidate, said publicly that Cepeda’s refusal was motivated by an unwillingness to defend his record as the architect of President Gustavo Petro‘s Paz Total security negotiation strategy.

Security Policy: The Three Approaches to Armed Groups

Public security is the top voter concern heading into the election. InSight Crime documented that the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) launched a major offensive against FARC dissident factions in Norte de Santander in early 2025, resulting in mass civilian casualties in the Catatumbo region. In Chocó and Antioquia, the ELN and the Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC), commonly known as the Clan del Golfo, are competing for control of illegal gold mining corridors and drug trafficking routes. In Cauca, FARC dissident factions have established territorial control in areas where state presence has collapsed.

Cepeda’s approach to security is defined by his role as the principal legislative architect of Paz Total. As chair of the Senate‘s peace commission, he designed the framework that extended negotiating status to the ELN, FARC dissident groups, and the Clan del Golfo. His stated rationale is that targeting the financial leadership of drug networks rather than foot soldiers produces more durable results — a position that has academic backing in narcotics policy literature. In practice, Paz Total produced ceasefires that were repeatedly violated, and security indicators in conflict-affected departments deteriorated during the Petro administration. A Cepeda presidency is expected to continue the negotiated settlement model, with the military operating under political constraints.

Valencia’s security platform is based on reinstating Seguridad Democrática, the doctrine associated with former president Álvaro Uribe’s administrations from 2002 to 2010. The core elements are expanded military presence in rural conflict zones, dismantling of rural criminal networks, and resumption of extradition agreements with the United States — which Petro suspended, effectively shielding cartel leadership from US federal prosecution. The Uribe-era approach resulted in measurable reductions in homicide rates, forced displacement, and ELN and FARC territorial control, though human rights organizations documented serious abuses by security forces during that period.

De la Espriella has stated explicitly that his government would have no peace process. He advocates for a model similar to El Salvador’s under President Nayib Bukele: mass incarceration, construction of high-security prison facilities, classification of guerrilla and cartel organizations as foreign terrorist organizations, and broad military offensives. He has not detailed how such operations would be financed or how the mass detention model would interact with Colombia’s Constitutional Court, which has repeatedly constrained executive security powers.

For the armed groups operating in Norte de Santander and Cauca, the historical record indicates that Colombia’s criminal organizations respond more acutely to sustained, institutionally grounded military pressure and functioning extradition pipelines than to political rhetoric. By that measure, Valencia’s platform — which rebuilds the institutional security apparatus incrementally — represents a more structurally credible threat to the ELN and the Estado Mayor Central (EMC) FARC dissidents. For the Clan del Golfo leadership, extradition to the United States has historically been the principal deterrent, and Valencia’s program explicitly restores it.

Business Climate and Employment Conditions

The Petro administration enacted a series of minimum wage increases totaling more than 60% over four years — including a 16% increase for 2023, the largest single-year hike in Colombian history, and a 23.78% increase for 2026 — restructured labor regulations to expand premium pay requirements for night, weekend, and holiday shifts, and raised corporate tax rates to fund social spending programs. The Asociación Nacional de Empresarios de Colombia (ANDI) characterized the regulatory environment as adverse to private investment. Finance Colombia tracked a material decline in FDI in the extractive sector over the same period.

Cepeda supported those labor and fiscal reforms throughout their legislative passage. His platform extends the Petro model: increased state social spending, continued land redistribution programs, and maintenance of the current wage and labor cost structure. For companies with established Colombian operations, the regulatory environment is manageable; for companies evaluating market entry or operational expansion, the cost structure adds friction.

Valencia’s economic program emphasizes corporate stability and private sector investment as the primary mechanisms of job creation. Her vice-presidential running mate, Juan Daniel Oviedo — former director of DANE, Colombia’s national statistics agency — represents a technocratic orientation focused on reducing structural market distortions, streamlining public procurement, and scaling back state administrative overhead. Oviedo’s appointment is a direct signal to the business community that economic management would be data-driven rather than ideologically directed. Oviedo also publicly identifies as a member of the LGBTQ+ community, a departure from the traditional social conservatism of Centro Democrático.

De la Espriella’s economic orientation is pro-business with protectionist elements. His vice-presidential candidate, José Manuel Restrepo — who served as Colombia’s Finance Minister and Commerce Minister — provides institutional credibility on fiscal and trade policy. Restrepo’s presence on the ticket signals commitment to fiscal discipline and regulatory reduction in the extractive and commercial sectors. De la Espriella’s personal style, however, introduces operational uncertainty; his campaign has generated multiple high-profile controversies, including a public altercation with Caracol Noticias journalist María Lucía Fernández during a live broadcast and a formal apology following misconduct allegations by journalist Laura Rodríguez of Piso 8 FM.

Foreign Investment, Oil, and Mining

The extractive sector is the most consequential economic policy dimension for international capital. Ecopetrol (NYSE: EC; BVC: ECOPETROL) — Colombia’s state-controlled energy company and the largest corporation in the country — has operated under exploration restrictions during the Petro administration, which has opposed new fossil fuel contracts on climate grounds.

Cepeda’s position extends the Petro framework: mandatory transition away from fossil fuels, heavy restrictions or outright prohibitions on new oil and gas exploration contracts, and stringent environmental licensing requirements for open-pit mining operations. Foreign investment would be directed by policy toward green hydrogen, ecotourism, and smallholder agriculture. For the multinational oil majors with Colombian operations and for institutional investors in the mining sector, a Cepeda presidency represents a continuation of the current constraints and, in some contract scenarios, an accelerated wind-down of Colombian portfolios.

In a related development, Finance Colombia reported in May that Ecopetrol’s president, Ricardo Roa, has been formally charged in connection with alleged campaign spending violations during Petro’s 2022 presidential campaign. The case will be inherited by whoever takes office in August.

Valencia’s position is that hydrocarbon revenues are essential to Colombia’s macroeconomic stability and that the country cannot exit the sector before alternative revenue structures exist. Her platform actively encourages FDI in petroleum exploration, is open to regulated fracking, and commits to clearing the environmental licensing backlog that has stalled multiple large-scale gold and copper mining projects. For energy and mining companies currently blocked by administrative delays, this represents the most direct path to project advancement.

De la Espriella’s position goes further: essentially deregulating the environmental licensing process for major extraction projects on the grounds that Colombia’s economic sovereignty takes precedence over environmental restrictions he characterizes as externally imposed. The practical constraint is whether a De la Espriella administration would have the institutional coherence and congressional support to deliver regulatory rollback, given that his movement has no established political party structure and entered the race through an independent signature campaign.

Foreign Policy: Washington Alignment vs. Multipolar Strategy

Colombia’s relationship with the United States deteriorated materially under Petro, who aligned Colombia with Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro, pursued closer ties with China and Russia, and suspended extradition agreements. US counternarcotics cooperation was strained throughout the period.

Cepeda is committed to what he describes as a multipolar foreign policy — maintaining functional diplomatic channels with Washington and Brussels while deepening strategic and commercial relationships with China and Russia. His alignment with regional left-of-center governments in Mexico, Brazil, and Bolivia would position Colombia as part of a Latin American bloc that has grown increasingly skeptical of US regional leadership. For US companies operating in Colombia, this trajectory does not mean immediate operational disruption, but it reduces Colombia’s utility as a reliable counterpart on security cooperation, counter-narcotics intelligence sharing, and trade dispute resolution.

Valencia positions a return to the Western alignment as a core objective. She would prioritize restoring the US-Colombia relationship, reinforcing the bilateral Free Trade Agreement, and reestablishing intelligence-sharing mechanisms that were reduced under Petro. Her framing positions Colombia as a democratic anchor in a region experiencing authoritarian pressures.

De la Espriella takes the most explicit pro-US position in the race. La Silla Vacía reported that De la Espriella or entities linked to his campaign donated more than $90,000 USD to the US Republican Party, a fact that raises questions about the nature and expectations of those relationships. He has publicly aligned himself with the populist right in the United States, takes a hostile posture toward China, Russia, and Venezuela, and has characterized his security approach as consistent with a transactional alliance with Washington focused on counter-narcotics enforcement and cartel designation as foreign terrorist organizations.

“Ese pisco robó a 200 mil colombianos.” — Claudia López, former Mayor of Bogotá, referring to presidential candidate Abelardo de la Espriella’s legal representation of DMG pyramid scheme founder David Murcia Guzmán, during a presidential campaign event.

Corruption and Judicial Independence

All three candidates have stated commitments to fighting corruption, though their approaches and focal points differ in ways that are material to the institutional environment for business operations.

Cepeda’s legislative record includes serious, documented work investigating paramilitary infiltration of Colombia’s political institutions — the period known as parapolítica — and pursuing accountability for those cases. His blind spot, his critics argue, is corruption within the current administration. When Ecopetrol’s Ricardo Roa was formally charged in connection with Petro’s 2022 campaign, the response from the Pacto Histórico coalition was subdued. Cepeda has been Álvaro Uribe’s primary judicial antagonist in the Senate; a Cepeda administration would offer no institutional protection to Uribe and would be expected to support the full progress of judicial proceedings against him. For left-wing politicians facing legal exposure, including former Medellín mayor Daniel Quintero, a Cepeda administration would be expected to be more receptive to amnesty frameworks.

Valencia’s approach to anti-corruption is structural rather than prosecutorial: strengthening the independence of the Contraloría General de la República and the Fiscalía General de la Nación, implementing digital transparency in public procurement, and reducing informal executive influence over judicial processes. She would be expected to apply political and rhetorical pressure on behalf of Uribe — her political mentor and a close ally — though her legislative track record indicates a degree of institutional independence from Centro Democrático party orthodoxy.

De la Espriella’s anti-corruption rhetoric centers on severe criminal penalties for corrupt officials. The credibility of that position is complicated by his professional history, which is examined in detail below.

De la Espriella’s Legal Career: The Documented Record

De la Espriella’s campaign has faced sustained scrutiny over his client history as one of Colombia’s highest-profile criminal defense attorneys. The record is documented in reporting by El Colombiano, El Espectador, and the investigative outlet Corrupción al Día.

His documented client roster includes Salvatore Mancuso, the former supreme commander of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) paramilitary network; multiple legislators convicted in the parapolítica scandal, which established systematic infiltration of Colombia’s congress by paramilitary organizations; David Murcia Guzmán, the operator of the DMG pyramid scheme that defrauded an estimated 200,000 Colombian investors; the Nule Primos, convicted of large-scale public contract fraud; and Álex Saab, the Colombian businessman extradited to the United States on charges of acting as the primary money launderer for the Maduro government in Venezuela. According to Corrupción al Día, De la Espriella’s legal fees from Saab reportedly reached $12 million USD and included private aircraft travel.

De la Espriella’s response to this line of criticism rests on due process principles: that every accused person is entitled to vigorous legal defense regardless of the charges, and that his ability to navigate Colombia’s criminal code at its most complex levels demonstrates the expertise required to enforce the law from the executive branch. The argument has legal validity as a principle. The specific issue for foreign compliance officers and US government counterparts is the Saab representation: the same Nicolás Maduro whose regime De la Espriella’s campaign now characterizes as an ideological enemy received legal services from De la Espriella’s firm when the representation was commercially available.

The Fiscalía investigated De la Espriella in connection with alleged paramilitary links in 2009 and again in 2012; both investigations were dismissed for insufficient evidence, and he carries no convictions or active investigations on those matters.

Cepeda’s Family History and Ideological Background

Critics of Iván Cepeda, including Enrique Gómez of the Salvación Nacional party, have argued that his family background constitutes evidence of structural alignment with guerrilla movements. The record on this point merits examination.

Cepeda is the son of Manuel Cepeda Vargas, who served as Secretary-General of the Colombian Communist Party and as a senator for the Unión Patriótica (UP), a left-wing political movement that was systematically exterminated by a combination of state actors and paramilitary organizations during the 1980s and 1990s. Manuel Cepeda Vargas was assassinated on August 9, 1994. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights subsequently found the Colombian state responsible for his murder. The FARC-EP named its Frente Urbano Manuel Cepeda Vargas — an urban front operating within the Bloque Occidental — in the elder Cepeda’s honor.

The Fundación Paz y Reconciliación (PARES) has documented that Iván Cepeda’s relationship with his father’s political positions was more complex than the family lineage alone suggests. After studying in Bulgaria in 1981, Cepeda broke from his father’s Soviet-oriented communist framework and aligned with democratic leftists including Bernardo Jaramillo Ossa, who publicly rejected the FARC’s armed strategy. Cepeda has repeatedly stated his repudiation of the FARC’s use of his father’s name. No documented evidence connects him to operational coordination with current armed groups.

What the family history does establish is the ideological framework through which Cepeda processes security policy: a belief, grounded in personal and political experience, that the Colombian state’s institutional violence has been as destructive as guerrilla violence, and that negotiated settlements are structurally preferable to military solutions. That framework generates Paz Total. It also generates a posture toward ELN and FARC dissident negotiators that prioritizes process continuity over verified compliance — a disposition that armed groups have demonstrably exploited to maintain territorial and operational positions while negotiation frameworks provided legal cover.

Valencia and the Uribe Question

The comparison to former president Iván Duque (2018–2022) comes up regularly in discussions of Valencia’s political independence. Duque, who had limited independent political standing before Uribe selected him, was perceived throughout his term as governing within constraints set by his patron — a dynamic that Colombian political cartoonists characterized as ventriloquism.

Valencia’s profile differs materially. She is the granddaughter of former Colombian president Guillermo León Valencia, carries her own political lineage, and has served in the Senate for over a decade, building positions on agrarian reform, judicial modernization, and indigenous land rights that have placed her at variance with standard Centro Democrático positions on those issues. She won the Gran Consulta por Colombia primary on March 8 with more than 45% of the vote — over 3.2 million Colombians — establishing a democratic mandate distinct from any party endorsement.

She would be expected to use institutional and rhetorical channels to support Uribe in the ongoing judicial proceedings against him, and to apply pressure on the trajectory of those cases. Whether that constitutes political interference with judicial independence or normal advocacy within democratic norms is a question on which observers disagree. What the legislative record does not support is the characterization of Valencia as incapable of independent governance.

Press Freedom and the Media Environment

Press freedom carries an indirect but measurable correlation with rule-of-law quality, which in turn affects operational risk for companies that rely on regulatory predictability and transparent legal processes.

Cepeda has maintained a posture toward critical media that mirrors President Petro’s practice of characterizing adversarial outlets as acting in the interests of economic elites. Under Petro, this produced a systematic exclusion of critical media from official information flows and persistent rhetorical delegitimization of independent journalism, though the press remained legally free to operate. A Cepeda administration would be expected to continue this pattern.

Valencia’s background in Colombia’s traditional political and intellectual establishment, combined with a decade in a party that has faced sustained critical coverage from Colombia’s major outlets, points toward a conventional institutional relationship with the press — adversarial at times, but within professional norms.

De la Espriella’s conduct during the campaign provides direct evidence of his approach. He publicly called Caracol Noticias journalist María Lucía Fernández “ignorant” in a live interview. He issued a formal apology after journalist Laura Rodríguez of Piso 8 FM made allegations of inappropriate conduct. His campaign strategy has drawn comparisons to the approach of Argentine president Javier Milei and US president Donald Trump in its use of direct digital channels to circumvent traditional media while publicly attacking outlets that publish critical coverage. The press would remain legally protected under a De la Espriella administration, but the operational environment for investigative journalism would be hostile.

The Ideological Spectrum: Market Liberalism to State Direction

The question of which candidate is most aligned with free-market principles requires a distinction that the international business press frequently elides: the difference between economic deregulation and political authoritarianism. These can, and in this election do, exist independently.

De la Espriella’s platform is often described in international coverage as the most pro-market. His deregulation proposals for the extractive sector and his corporate tax rhetoric support that reading in the economic domain. His security platform, however, involves a substantial expansion of state coercive power: mass detention operations, a mega-prison construction program, and the suspension of standard due process protections to facilitate rapid incarceration of criminal suspects. The Cato Institute‘s framework of economic freedom as inseparable from civil liberties would categorize a state powerful enough to detain people without standard procedural protections as a state that represents an institutional risk to property rights and contract enforcement as well.

Valencia’s platform, anchored by Oviedo’s technocratic program of structural market reform — reduced administrative barriers, streamlined procurement, smaller state overhead, maintained civil liberties — represents the closest approximation to coherent market liberalism available in this field. It does not carry the rhetorical force of De la Espriella’s deregulation proposals, but it has more institutional grounding.

Cepeda’s platform is the furthest from market liberalism by any standard measure: state-directed investment allocation, wealth redistribution through tax and transfer mechanisms, state expansion in healthcare and pension administration, and agrarian land redistribution. His program is continuous with the Petro administration’s economic framework.

Minor Candidates: The Rest of the Ballot

Several other candidates remain on the ballot and are drawing small but potentially consequential vote shares in a first round where the margin between second and third place could be narrow.

Claudia López, former mayor of Bogotá running under the Con Claudia Imparables coalition, positions herself as a progressive centrist with a documented anti-corruption record. Her polling has not broken 3.5% in major surveys, and her high polarization ratings from her mayoral term limit her growth ceiling. Her attacks on De la Espriella during the campaign — she publicly called him a “defender of the mafia” in reference to his client history — have been among the most pointed in the race, and factually grounded on the public record.

Sergio Fajardo, making his third consecutive presidential run under Dignidad y Compromiso, continues to represent a technocratic, education-focused centrism grounded in his work transforming Medellín in the early 2000s. He has not broken 3.5% in any major poll in this cycle.

Roy Barreras, running under La Fuerza de la Paz following his Frente por la Vida primary victory, is one of the most experienced political operatives in Colombia, having been part of multiple coalition governments across ideological lines over two decades. He polls below the threshold for meaningful first-round impact.

Miguel Uribe Londoño, running under Partido Demócrata, represents a younger-generation conservative platform emphasizing fiscal discipline and private sector growth, broadly consistent with Valencia’s program. He also polls below 3.5%.

Carlos Caicedo, running on a regionalist platform emphasizing decentralization away from Bogotá, draws support primarily from the Costa Caribe. His structural argument about Colombia’s administrative over-centralization is substantively grounded, though his national profile is insufficient to affect the first-round outcome.

Investment Implications

For international capital with Colombian exposure, the three-way race produces three materially different operational scenarios.

A Cepeda victory — which remains the single most likely first-round outcome based on available polling — would signal continuity of the Petro-era regulatory framework: sustained capital outflow pressure, high corporate tax rates, no new fossil fuel exploration contracts for Ecopetrol (NYSE: EC; BVC: ECOPETROL) or private operators, continued labor cost escalation, and a foreign policy trajectory away from Washington. Colombian equity valuations would be expected to remain under pressure. The mining licensing backlog would continue to accumulate. A Cepeda administration would not replicate Venezuela’s economic trajectory — Colombia’s independent central bank, Banco de la República, its functioning constitutional court, and its institutional depth provide meaningful buffers — but the investment headwinds would be structural rather than cyclical.

A Valencia victory would represent the sharpest regulatory reversal available in this field. Ecopetrol exploration contracts would be expected to advance. The mining licensing backlog would be addressed. US bilateral relations would be restored, reactivating security intelligence cooperation and trade facilitation mechanisms. The Colombian peso would be expected to strengthen as country risk premium declined. The path to that outcome now requires her to either close the gap significantly on De la Espriella in the first round or rely on runoff polling that showed her as the stronger second-round candidate — data that predates the most recent polling shift.

A De la Espriella victory introduces the widest distribution of possible outcomes. The upside scenario involves Restrepo managing fiscal and trade policy competently, genuine regulatory rollback in the extractive sector, aggressive extradition resumption, and security operations that reduce the physical risk premium in conflict-affected departments including Cauca, Norte de Santander, and Chocó. The downside scenario involves recurring crises generated by De la Espriella’s personal conduct, conflicts of interest arising from his former client relationships, and authoritarian security measures that attract international human rights attention and complicate bilateral relationships. Restrepo’s presence on the ticket reduces the probability of the downside scenario but does not eliminate it.

The current polling trend indicates that right-wing voters are consolidating around De la Espriella at Valencia’s expense. Whether that consolidation produces a runoff between De la Espriella and Cepeda — and whether the runoff produces a left or right-wing government — remains uncertain. What the polling data does not support is the scenario, widely assumed until recently, of a Cepeda-Valencia runoff in which Valencia was positioned as the structurally stronger opposition candidate.

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More than 400 combatants would be concentrated in the new zones as negotiations continue in Doha, Qatar

President Gustavo Petro is moving forward with the creation of temporary concentration zones, known as Zonas de Ubicación Temporal (ZUT), for members of the Estado Mayor Conjunto del Ejército Gaitanista de Colombia (EGC), also known as the Clan del Golfo, the country’s largest drug trafficking armed group, in a renewed effort to advance his Total Peace (Paz Total) policy just days before Colombia’s presidential elections on May 31, 2026.

According to an official statement from Colombia’s presidency, the ZUTs would initially allow the concentration of more than 400 combatants while parallel negotiations continue over a possible peace agreement with the Colombian government, although no preliminary agreements have yet been reached.

The temporary concentration zones would function as designated areas where combatants suspend armed activities while participating in talks with the government and preparing for a potential reintegration into civilian life.

According to the government, the zones would remain in effect until December 31, 2026, meaning their future would ultimately depend on Colombia’s next president, who will take office on August 7, as well as on the broader future of the Total Peace policy.

Colombia’s most powerful criminal organization

The Clan del Golfo is considered by specialized organizations, including the Fundación Ideas para la Paz (FIP), to be Colombia’s most powerful criminal structure.

According to the organization, the group has nearly 10,000 armed members and operates in multiple strategic regions linked to drug trafficking, illegal mining and territorial control.

The US government has designated the group a transnational terrorist organization, while President Donald Trump previously warned of possible US military actions in Colombian territory over security and narcotics concerns, comments that sparked diplomatic tensions with Petro’s administration.

Institutional clash over arrest warrants and extradition requests

The ZUT proposal comes amid tensions between Colombia’s executive branch and the Attorney General’s Office over the legal conditions required to move the process forward.

The Office of the High Commissioner for Peace requested the suspension of arrest warrants against 29 Clan del Golfo members, including 13 individuals subject to extradition requests, among them Jobanis de Jesús Ávila Villadiego, alias “Chiquito Malo,” the group’s top leader.

Attorney General Luz Adriana Camargo rejected the request, citing legal limitations regarding individuals sought by foreign authorities.

Following the refusal, Petro publicly defended the process in a message on X. “I have been clear that, in the early stages of the process, individuals facing extradition do not participate,” the president wrote, denying any intention to suspend extradition orders unless there is “an advanced peace process, as established by law.”

Amid the controversy, the Clan del Golfo itself issued a statement accepting that individuals facing extradition requests would not initially participate in the temporary concentration zones.

“As an unequivocal demonstration of political will and coherence, the Joint High Command of the Gaitanista Army of Colombia accepts, in good faith, that access to the Temporary Concentration Zones will be limited to combatants who are not subject to extradition requests by any foreign government,” the group said.

The group added that the decision seeks to “remove any shadow of doubt” over the process and prevent extradition disputes from obstructing negotiations.

The presidency later highlighted that the EGC accepted the government’s conditions for concentrating fighters in Tierralta, Córdoba, and in the municipalities of Belén de Bajirá and Unguía, Chocó. According to the government, combatants and commanders are expected to begin entering the zones on June 25.

Criticism over timing

The initiative has sparked criticism because of its timing, arriving just days before presidential elections and during a government transition period.

Ombudswoman Iris Marín warned that the process creates uncertainty over how armed groups might interpret the political transition.

“The move toward those zones creates expectations among armed groups in the middle of an electoral context and government transition. It is impossible for disarmament to happen before August 7, 2026, so how do armed groups interpret that in an electoral context?” Marín said in a video shared on social media.

Marín clarified, however, that Colombia’s Constitution grants the president authority to pursue peace negotiations, meaning concerns center not on the legality of the initiative itself but on its political timing.

Negotiations between the Colombian government and the Clan del Golfo have been underway since 2025 in Doha, Qatar, which has quietly hosted talks between both parties. According to official sources, the ZUTs are intended as confidence-building measures and humanitarian relief for communities affected by the group’s violence.

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Photo: Colombian government representative Álvaro Jiménez shakes hands with Clan del Golfo spokesperson Luis Armando Pérez in the presence of Qatar’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mohammed bin Abdulaziz bin Saleh Al-Khulaifi, in Doha on September 18, 2025, at the start of peace talks. Photo shared by Colombia’s Office of the High Commissioner for Peace.

Colombia and Bolivia intensified a diplomatic crisis this week after mutually expelling representatives from their respective embassies, amid growing political tensions between Colombian President Gustavo Petro and Bolivian President Rodrigo Paz Pereira.

The tensions began May 20, 2026, when Bolivia’s Foreign Ministry announced the expulsion of Colombia’s ambassador to La Paz, Elizabeth García Carrillo, after describing remarks made by Petro regarding Bolivia’s political crisis as interference in the country’s internal affairs.

“The decision responds to the need to preserve the principles of sovereignty, noninterference in internal affairs and mutual respect among states, fundamental pillars of international coexistence and diplomatic relations between sovereign nations,” Bolivia’s Foreign Ministry said in an official statement.

One day later, Colombia’s Foreign Ministry, headed by Rosa Yolanda Villavicencio, responded by expelling Bolivia’s chargé d’affaires in Bogotá, Ariel Percy Molina Pimentel, under the principle of diplomatic reciprocity.

“The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Colombia, considering the recent decision adopted by the Government of the Plurinational State of Bolivia regarding the permanence of Colombia’s ambassador (…) was compelled, on the basis of reciprocity, to declare the termination of the functions of Mr. Ariel Percy Molina Pimentel,” Colombia’s Foreign Ministry said, citing Article 9 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

The Colombian government clarified that the measure does not imply a formal break in diplomatic relations between the two countries, adding that “Colombia remains willing to support, always at the request of the Bolivian government, initiatives in favor of peace, political dialogue, institutional channels, citizen participation and the observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms.”

Origin of the dispute

Bolivia’s decision followed a message posted by Petro on X on May 18, in which he said that “Bolivia is experiencing a popular uprising,” referring to the political and social crisis affecting the Andean country.

For the past three weeks, Bolivia has faced protests and road blockades led by supporters of former President Evo Morales, who oppose the current administration and are demanding the resignation of President Rodrigo Paz Pereira.

The protests have also unfolded as Morales faces judicial proceedings over alleged crimes related to human trafficking and child sexual abuse, while also refusing to appear before judicial authorities.

The Bolivian government interpreted Petro’s remarks as a violation of the principle of nonintervention in domestic affairs.

Bogotá, however, rejected that interpretation and said its officials had not sought to interfere in Bolivia’s internal politics.

Colombia “categorically rejects any interpretation attributing to its authorities an interest or intention to interfere in Bolivia’s internal affairs,” the Colombian Foreign Ministry said, while reiterating its commitment to sovereign equality, nonintervention, self-determination of peoples, peaceful settlement of disputes and respect for territorial integrity.

A politically sensitive moment for both governments

The diplomatic tensions come as Rodrigo Paz Pereira, who took office in November, faces social unrest, road blockades and domestic criticism over his administration.

Meanwhile, Petro is approaching the end of his term in Colombia amid a highly polarized electoral climate. The Colombian president is seeking to preserve the continuity of his political project through the election of a successor in presidential elections whose first round will take place May 31, with the next president set to take office on August 7, 2026.

Although neither government has announced additional measures, the exchange of expulsions marks the highest level of diplomatic tension between Colombia and Bolivia in recent years.

Refining margin surge cushions revenue drop amid leadership void

Ecopetrol S.A. (NYSE: EC, BVC: ECOPETROL) reported first-quarter 2026 consolidated revenues of 28.6 trillion COP, a decline of 8.7% from 31.4 trillion COP in the year-earlier period, as lower crude oil prices and reduced hydrocarbon production compressed the top line for Colombia’s state-controlled oil and gas company. Against that backdrop, a marked recovery in refining margins and disciplined cost management lifted EBITDA by 1.5% to 13.5 trillion COP, yielding a 47% EBITDA margin and partially offsetting the revenue headwind. At the Q1 2026 average exchange rate of approximately 3,700 COP per USD, the quarter’s revenues translate to roughly $7.73 billion USD and EBITDA to approximately $3.65 billion USD.

Net income for the quarter reached 2.9 trillion COP (approximately $784 million USD), down 7.7% year-over-year, reflecting the combined drag of lower revenues, a sharply elevated effective tax rate of 37.1%, and a one-time charge of 1.2 trillion COP for the impuesto al patrimonio — Colombia’s government-mandated wealth levy on large corporations established to fund post-disaster reconstruction measures. The company is also subject to a 10% income tax surcharge applicable for fiscal year 2026, which is embedded in the reported effective rate. The aggregate tax burden absorbed a disproportionate share of operating improvement relative to prior periods, limiting the flow-through of refining gains to the net income line.

Total hydrocarbon production averaged 725.2 thousand barrels of oil equivalent per day (kboed) in Q1 2026, below the 745 kboed recorded in the 2025 annual average cited by management during the March 2026 general shareholders’ meeting. Domestic crude output represented the largest component at approximately 520 thousand barrels per day (kbd). Ecopetrol’s Permian Basin operations in the United States contributed 91.8 kbd, underscoring the continued strategic importance of the international segment. Gas production continued a multi-year declining trend that poses a medium-term domestic supply challenge; management has sought to address this partially through regasification capacity additions at Puerto Bahía and on the Pacific coast, expected to come online in the second half of 2026 with a combined contribution of up to 430 billion BTU per day.

The refining segment delivered the quarter’s most pronounced operational outperformance. Ecopetrol’s domestic refineries, led by Refinería de Cartagena, processed 417.5 kbd of crude throughput. The integrated refining margin rose to $17.3 USD per barrel, a 60% improvement over the same quarter of 2025, driven by favorable differential pricing between domestic crude benchmarks and refined product values alongside ongoing operational efficiency improvements. The Comisión de Regulación de Energía y Gas (CREG) and the Ministerio de Minas y Energía remain central to the regulatory framework governing downstream margins over the medium term.

The balance sheet carries significant structural and contingent risk items of direct relevance to institutional credit and equity holders. Gross debt stood at 108.1 trillion COP (approximately $29.2 billion USD), representing a leverage ratio of 2.3 times trailing EBITDA — a level that leaves limited room for further deterioration before debt covenants or rating agency thresholds become binding. Ecopetrol holds a receivable of 4.2 trillion COP (approximately $1.14 billion USD) from the Fondo de Estabilización de Precios de los Combustibles (FEPC), a government fuel price stabilization mechanism that represents a claim on the Colombian treasury with timing and recovery risk. A dispute with the Dirección de Impuestos y Aduanas Nacionales (DIAN) over value-added tax assessments totals 12.26 trillion COP (approximately $3.31 billion USD) in aggregate, of which 10.22 trillion COP relates to Ecopetrol’s consolidated operations and 2.04 trillion COP to Refinería de Cartagena. Both cases are under administrative and judicial review; no provisions have been recognized in the financial statements pending resolution, but the potential liability represents a material contingency relative to the company’s quarterly net income.

On the corporate development front, Ecopetrol disclosed three significant transactions during or following the quarter. The company agreed to acquire producing assets from Gran Tierra Energy (NYSE: GTE, TSX: GTE) for $92.4 million USD, adding Colombian upstream production inventory in basins where both companies have operated. In Brazil, Ecopetrol launched a tender offer for shares of Brava Energia (BVMF: BRAV3) at 23 BRL per share, seeking to expand its footprint in that country’s oil and gas sector. And in a transaction that would reshape the mid-size independent landscape in Colombia, the company reached an agreement to acquire Parex Resources (TSX: PXT) for $250 million USD; Parex is a Colombia-focused producer with a complementary asset base across the Llanos and other producing basins. Collectively, the three transactions signal that Ecopetrol’s capital allocation strategy under the current government continues to favor upstream consolidation despite the elevated leverage profile.

The exploration portfolio generated positive news announcements. The Copoazú-1 exploratory well, drilled in Colombia’s Llanos foothills region, was confirmed as a commercial discovery, adding to the domestic reserve base. The Sirius offshore project advanced through the Consulta Previa process — a legally mandated prior consultation with indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities required before development of projects in or near their territories — reaching a milestone in community engagement that brings the project closer to formal development sanction. The Agencia Nacional de Hidrocarburos (ANH) oversees the licensing framework within which both projects operate.

“Ecopetrol is listed on the New York Stock Exchange; we are governed by the strict regulations of US federal agencies. Agencies like OFAC and the SEC could intervene in the company and could even accelerate the payment of financial obligations, which would be extremely grave for Ecopetrol.” — Martín Ravelo, President, Unión Sindical Obrera (USO)

The ISA transmission segment, managed through Ecopetrol’s majority stake in ISA — Interconexión Eléctrica S.A., contributed stable regulated cash flows during the quarter. ISA completed 46 transmission reinforcement works across its Latin American concession portfolio. The segment also completed the acquisition of 100% of IE Madeira in Brazil, consolidating its position in that country’s power grid interconnection infrastructure. ISA further submitted a competitive bid for the Río Bueno–Puerto Montt high-voltage transmission line concession in Chile, demonstrating the group’s appetite for long-duration, inflation-linked infrastructure assets across the Andes region. For institutional investors evaluating Ecopetrol as a blended hydrocarbons-and-infrastructure holding, ISA’s consistent cash generation provides partial diversification from crude price volatility, though it does not insulate the consolidated entity from headline governance risk.

The most consequential variable for the investment thesis over the near term is Ecopetrol’s prolonged governance crisis. At the company’s general shareholders’ meeting on March 27, 2026, held at the Corferias convention center in Bogotá, minority shareholders loudly heckled president Ricardo Roa — with audible shouts of “¡Fuera, fuera!” reverberating through the hall — as debate over his leadership erupted into open confrontation. The meeting approved a dividend of 121 COP per share for minority holders and a 4 trillion COP distribution to the Colombian government as majority shareholder, payable in two installments by June 30, 2026. Despite the financial business conducted, governance overshadowed the proceedings.

Roa faces two separate judicial proceedings. The Fiscalía General de la Nación formally charged him in connection with alleged influence peddling related to the purchase of an apartment in northern Bogotá — charges he has denied. Separately, the Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE) is examining whether campaign spending limits were violated during President Gustavo Petro’s 2022 presidential campaign, which Roa managed — an investigation that Finance Colombia has covered in detail. Angela Maria Robledo, Chair of the Board of Directors, defended the board’s decision to retain Roa at the March assembly, citing the constitutional presumption of innocence. However, four of the nine board members had already formally recorded their support for his removal at that point, exposing a divided governance structure at a time when strategic and operational decisions require unified leadership.

The Unión Sindical Obrera (USO), which represents approximately one-third of Ecopetrol’s workforce, issued a production strike ultimatum timed to a March 30 board meeting. Martín Ravelo, president of the USO, framed the leadership crisis explicitly in terms of US regulatory risk: “Ecopetrol is listed on the New York Stock Exchange; we are governed by the strict regulations of US federal agencies. Agencies like OFAC and the SEC could intervene in the company and could even accelerate the payment of financial obligations, which would be extremely grave for Ecopetrol.” Ravelo further warned that the company’s outstanding international debt — which he placed at approximately $30 billion USD and which is exacerbated by elevated interest rates — left Ecopetrol exposed to potential covenant triggers or early repayment demands in a scenario where the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or the Office of Foreign Assets Control were to take enforcement action.

Following sustained pressure from the USO, minority shareholders, and opposition political figures, Ecopetrol’s board approved an extended leave of absence for Roa beginning April 7, 2026. Under the arrangement, Roa used accrued vacation through May 27, followed by 30 calendar days of unpaid leave beginning May 28, extending his absence through the end of June — a period encompassing Colombia’s presidential first round on May 31 and a potential runoff on June 21. Juan Carlos Hurtado Parra, the company’s executive vice president of hydrocarbons and designated first alternate to the presidency since November 2025, was appointed acting president. Hurtado Parra holds an MBA in International Oil and Gas and brings more than 28 years of energy sector experience to the acting role, having previously served as vice president of exploration, development, and production.

The political calendar creates a structural transition risk that sits above the operational and financial results as the primary concern for long-duration investors. Colombia’s incoming government, to be inaugurated August 7, 2026, is widely expected to appoint a new Ecopetrol board and select a new company president. That transition may bring material shifts in strategic priorities — including the pace of upstream investment, the approach to the FEPC receivable recovery, the trajectory of energy transition spending, and the capital allocation balance between the hydrocarbons segment and the ISA infrastructure platform. The Ministerio de Hacienda y Crédito Público and the Ministerio de Minas y Energía will both play key roles in establishing the post-election policy framework under which Ecopetrol operates. Institutional investors holding exposure to Ecopetrol via NYSE: EC or BVC: ECOPETROL must weigh Q1’s genuine operational improvement — most visibly in refining margins and EBITDA stability — against a governance and policy transition risk profile that is unlikely to be resolved before the August handover.

Ecopetrol’s Cartagena refinery (photo courtesy Ecopetrol)

As Colombia nears its presidential vote, two candidates have endorsed Iván Cepeda and eight others remain below 3.5% in polls

With less than two weeks remaining before Colombia’s presidential election, whose first round is scheduled for May 31, three candidates are concentrating most voter support and competing for access to the presidential palace, Casa de Nariño: ruling coalition senator Iván Cepeda, candidate of the left-wing Pacto Histórico party; senator Paloma Valencia, representing the right-wing Centro Democrático party; and lawyer and businessman Abelardo de la Espriella, a figure of Colombia’s far right.

Although 13 candidates will appear on the ballot, two contenders: Clara López and Luis Gilberto Murillo, withdrew their campaigns to support Cepeda, while the remaining candidates have failed to surpass 3.5% voter support in pre-elections polls, a figure close to the statistical margin of error.

If polling trends hold, no candidate is expected to secure the 50% plus one vote needed to win outright in the first round, making a runoff election on June 21, 2026, highly likely.

Cepeda has remained relatively stable in polls, with voter support ranging between 35% and 43%, effectively securing his place in a second round if trends continue.

The key question: Who will face Cepeda in a runoff?

The main electoral uncertainty centers on who will finish second and challenge the ruling coalition in a likely runoff.

Under Colombia’s electoral system, only the two candidates receiving the highest vote totals advance to the second round. The fragmentation of the political right has complicated efforts to consolidate support behind either Valencia or De la Espriella.

Polls suggest a competitive scenario. Valencia has registered between 14% and 21% voter support, while De la Espriella fluctuates between 16% and 24%, depending on the poll and methodology used.

The lack of unity between the two camps stems from both ideological differences and their political structures. Valencia is a member of the political party founded by former President Álvaro Uribe, while De la Espriella entered the race through an independent signature campaign, marking the first time Colombia’s far right has emerged as a viable contender for the presidency.

A campaign shaped by the absence of public debates

The presidential campaign has been marked by an unusual lack of debates among the leading candidates.

Cepeda has refused to participate in events organized by media outlets, arguing that proposed formats do not offer guarantees of neutrality or what he describes as “fair rules” established by news organizations.

As a result, part of the political confrontation has shifted to Congress, where both Cepeda and Valencia currently serve in the Senate.

Critics, however, have challenged Cepeda’s decision. Former Bogotá Mayor and presidential candidate Claudia López argued that his absence from debates reflects that “Cepeda does not want to take responsibility for the failures of Total Peace (Paz Total),” the negotiation policy with armed groups promoted by President Gustavo Petro, in which Cepeda played a key role as a lawmaker.

Instead of regular debates, the campaign has been dominated by disputes over media formats, digital presence, social media strategies and public controversies aimed at amplifying candidates’ visibility.

De la Espriella embraces confrontation

One of the candidates who has most effectively capitalized on the digital environment is Abelardo de la Espriella, whose political strategy has been compared to right-wing populist leadership styles such as those of Argentine President Javier Milei and US President Donald Trump.

In recent weeks, De la Espriella has faced several media controversies, including an incident involving journalist Laura Rodríguez of Piso 8 FM, for which he later apologized after accusations of inappropriate sexual conduct. He also clashed live on air with television presenter María Lucía Fernández of Caracol Noticias, whom he called “ignorant.”

Questions also emerged following reports by digital outlet La Silla Vacía regarding donations linked to the US Republican Party.

Despite the controversies, the strategy appears to be strengthening his electoral standing. An Atlas Intel poll for Semana magazine, published May 15, showed De la Espriella surpassing Valencia by a two-to-one margin for the first time, with 32.9% support compared with 16.7%.

However, the polling firm is currently under investigation by Colombia’s National Electoral Council (CNE) amid concerns over whether its methodology complies with national standards. If irregularities are confirmed, the firm could face suspension of its operations in Colombia.

Valencia seeks to broaden support toward the political center

Meanwhile, Valencia has sought to expand her electoral base by shifting strategically toward the political center.

As part of that effort, on May 17 she officially introduced her proposal “Mámá No Está Sola (Mom Is Not Alone),” aimed at female heads of household and focused on access to credit, employment and housing property. The proposal also includes a promise to deliver 1 million homes prioritized for women community leaders.

Valencia’s candidacy also marks a historic first for Colombia’s political right: it is the first time a major conservative party has nominated a woman for president.

Her vice presidential running mate, former Bogotá councilman Juan Daniel Oviedo, has openly identified as a member of the LGBTQ+ community, a move that represents a significant shift for the Centro Democrático traditionally conservative electorate.

Colombia appears headed for a runoff

With a highly fragmented field and no signs of consolidation among right-wing candidates, Colombia appears increasingly likely to hold a presidential runoff on June 21, 2026.

Barring a major shift in polling trends, the contest seems set to come down to Iván Cepeda and whichever opposition candidate manages to emerge from an increasingly competitive battle within Colombia’s political right.

Roa had already been administratively sanctioned by Colombia’s electoral authority over campaign spending violations, with the case now advancing in the Attorney General’s Office

Ricardo Roa Barragán, president of Colombia’s state-owned oil and energy company Ecopetrol, has been formally charged by the Attorney General’s Office (FGN) over his alleged responsibility in a case involving violations of campaign spending limits tied to President Gustavo Petro’s 2022 presidential campaign, which Roa managed.

The charging hearing took place Monday, May 11, during which Roa pleaded not guilty. The case will continue through the investigative stage, and no conviction has been issued against him.

This marks the second criminal case facing the executive. On March 11, 2026, prosecutors also charged Roa with alleged influence peddling involving a public official. Both investigations remain ongoing.

Read: The charge adds to a separate investigation over alleged violations of campaign finance limits during President Gustavo Petro’s 2022 presidential campaign.

The latest charges come weeks after Ecopetrol’s board authorized Roa to take vacation leave followed by unpaid leave through June 28, 2026, after Colombia’s presidential elections conclude.

The decision means Roa would return to the company only to participate in the transition process with the team designated by Colombia’s next president, who will take office on August 7, 2026.

Read: Ecopetrol Announces Temporary Leave for President Ricardo Roa Amid Investigations by Colombia’s Attorney General’s Office” by Finance Colombia.

Under Articles 396A and 396B of Colombia’s Criminal Law, individuals found responsible for receiving, administering or allowing prohibited campaign funds may face prison sentences ranging from four to eight years, in addition to fines and disqualification from holding public office if convicted.

Roa, however, retains the presumption of innocence while the judicial process continues.

Investigation into campaign financing

The case stems from the 2022 “Petro Presidente” campaign, which Roa Barragán managed. The matter had already resulted in administrative sanctions from Colombia’s National Electoral Council (CNE), which concluded that the campaign exceeded legal financing limits.

The Attorney General’s Office also said it identified alleged inconsistencies in the campaign’s financial reporting, claiming that first-round expenses were reported during the second round and vice versa.

As a result of that administrative investigation, the CNE referred the case to the Attorney General’s Office, which is responsible for conducting criminal investigations.

According to a statement from prosecutors, collected evidence suggests that campaign spending limits “were exceeded by $1.388 billion COP (around $370,000 USD) during the first presidential round and by $276 million COP ($73,000 USD) during the runoff.”

Prosecutors said the allegedly unreported or improperly reported expenses were linked to “hotel press conferences, breakfasts, loans, transportation, logistics, food services, financing for campaign-closing events, advertising materials and union contributions.

The investigation formally began in 2025 after the CNE determined there were possible irregularities involving campaign spending caps.

Petro defends Roa

President Gustavo Petro again defended Roa and questioned the basis of the judicial investigation.

“The Attorney General’s Office is repeating the same thing as the compromised CNE: that expenses incurred after the legal campaign period ended, such as the costs parties incur for election monitors to protect votes (…) are campaign expenses. Their so-called overspending is not overspending,” Petro wrote on X.

The president argued that several of the questioned expenditures took place after election day, when, according to his interpretation, the campaign had already formally concluded.

A tariff dispute between Colombia and Ecuador escalated to 100% duties on Colombian imports after Ecuador cited a lack of cooperation on border security

The Andean Community of Nations (CAN) ordered Colombia and Ecuador to dismantle, within 10 business days, the trade restrictions and tariff measures imposed since late 2025, concluding that they violate the legal framework governing the regional bloc composed of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru.

The decision was adopted through three resolutions issued May 8, 2026, by the CAN General Secretariat, led by Gonzalo Gutiérrez Reinel, following an assessment of trade disputes that emerged between the two countries amid tensions related to border security and commerce.

The organization concluded that several measures implemented by Quito and Bogotá violate the Cartagena Agreement, the founding treaty of Andean integration, which prohibits restrictions on intraregional trade among member states.

More information about the “security tariff”: Colombia and Ecuador Escalate Trade Tensions with Tariffs Raised to 100%.

Ecuador ordered to lift border restrictions and “security tariff”

The first resolution, No. 2581, ruled in favor of Colombia in a complaint related to Ecuador’s decision to limit bilateral land trade to a single border crossing. The General Secretariat classified the measure as a “restriction on Andean subregional trade” and granted Ecuador 10 business days to withdraw it.

The resolution also urged both countries to strengthen bilateral cooperation on border security matters.

“To urge the Republic of Ecuador and the Republic of Colombia to strengthen bilateral cooperation and coordination mechanisms in border control (…) through joint actions, without affecting the normal development of subregional trade,” the organization stated in Resolution 2581.

Meanwhile, Resolution 2582 ordered Ecuador to eliminate the so-called “security tariff” imposed exclusively on Colombian imports, which initially stood at 30% and later escalated to 100%.

According to CAN, the measure violates the Trade Liberalization Program established under the Cartagena Agreement and constitutes a “disguised tariff.”

The General Secretariat concluded that the so-called Customs Control Service Fee (TSCA) or “security tariff” does not qualify as a legitimate fee because it does not compensate for an individualized service to importers, but instead finances general state functions related to intelligence and strategic security.

Ecuador was given a maximum of 10 business days to dismantle the measure and formally report compliance. So far, the government of President Daniel Noboa has not issued an official response to the resolutions.

CAN also orders Colombia to dismantle countermeasures

“I have no problem removing tariffs on Ecuadorian products in the same manner and timeline in which they were imposed,” Petro wrote on X after the ruling became public.

The third resolution, No. 2583, rejected the trade countermeasures adopted by Colombia in response to Ecuador.

The government of President Gustavo Petro had issued Decree 0170, later tightened through Decree 0455, imposing reciprocal tariffs ranging from 30% to 75% on Ecuadorian products and restricting the entry of rice, potatoes, onions, and fishery products through specific border crossings.

CAN concluded that these measures are also incompatible with Andean community regulations.

Trade dispute rooted in security tensions

The commercial dispute between the two countries intensified beginning in late 2025 and reached its peak in April 2026, when both governments progressively increased tariffs and trade restrictions, citing concerns related to border security and anti-narcotics enforcement.

The tensions particularly affected border regions, where business groups and transport operators warned of disruptions to trade flows and rising logistical costs.

CAN’s resolutions now seek to restore free trade conditions within the Andean bloc and reduce diplomatic tensions between two of its largest economies.

The Venezuelan government on Wednesday published a declaration saying it regretted recent violence in the Catatumbo region of Colombia just days after Bogotá announced bombing in cooperation with Caracas.

The statement muddies the waters about whether or not Venezuela was involved in the military operations against the National Liberation Army (ELN) rebels near the two countries’ joint border, which allegedly killed 7 guerrilla fighters. 

“The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela expresses its profound concern and regrets the escalation of violence in the border region of Catatumbo,” read a statement shared on X by Foreign Minister Yvan Gil.

The declaration came after Colombian President Gustavo Petro said on Monday that he had ordered the bombing in cooperation with Venezuela. 

“I gave the order to bomb the ELN camp in accordance with the agreement reached with the Bolivarian government of Venezuela,” wrote Petro on X.

Petro appeared to allude to an agreement with Caracas to cooperate on tackling cross-border crime following his visit to Venezuela in April. 

But Caracas appeared to wash its hands of the recent bombing operation; while it did not directly acknowledge the bombing or Petro’s statement, its declaration said that it “rejects any armed action that compromises the peace, stability, and security of border communities.” 

It added that the only way to preserve peace and stability in the region is through “mechanisms of understanding and mutual respect, avoiding actions that can aggravate tensions or generate greater risks for border populations, who for decades have faced the consequences of a conflict out of their control.”

Since last year, Catatumbo has been the site of what has been described as “the most serious humanitarian crisis of recent times” in Colombia. In January 2025, a family of three, including a nine-month-old baby, was killed, marking the collapse of fragile peace pacts between the ELN and the Frente 33 – a dissident faction of the demobilized FARC rebels – and triggering a humanitarian crisis on a scale not seen in the country for over a decade.

The Red Cross said that 2025 was one of the most complicated years for humanitarian conditions in Colombia: more than 235,000 people were individually displaced, over 176,000 people have been unable to move freely because of armed conflict, and there has also been a sharp increase in cases of mass displacements.

Venezuela’s statement highlights the cross-border nature of the conflict, noting that the country “has historically suffered the consequences of Colombian internal conflict.” Colombian armed groups like the ELN and dissident FARC factions have traditionally had a significant presence in Venezuela and were known to have ties to the Nicolás Maduro regime.

But both the interim government under Delcy Rodríguez and Petro have been under pressure from the White House to confront guerrilla groups.

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